

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE MARITIME ORDER IN COASTAL AREA OF SOUTH CHINA DURING THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE BRITISH ROYAL NAVY AND THE PIRATES OF FUJIAN AND GUANGDONG

MURAKAMI Ei

Introduction

The Opium War came to a close on July 24, 1842 with the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing. There had arisen, however, during the conflict pirate bands—mainly Fujianese and Cantonese—who became a great menace to the trade originating in the new treaty ports, which had been established after the treaty.

Few scholars, however, had been concerned with the problems brought about by the pirates at these treaty ports. Therefore, fewer studies have been conducted on the pirates of the time as compared with those of the late-Ming to early-Qing period (Wokou and Zheng family) or those of the Jiaqing era. The first study on the pirates of this period was conducted by Grace Fox, who stressed the suppression of the pirates by the British Royal Navy.¹ Later, John K. Fairbank in his famous study of the age following the opening of the treaty ports discussed in detail the pirates around Ningpo as an example of the turmoil in the coastal area during the period.² In addition to these studies, some general histories have dealt in part with the events that occurred during this period.³ However, there exists no monograph devoted to the pirates of the period. Moreover, contemporary circumstances in the coastal area have been discussed instead in the context of the history of Sino-British diplomatic relations up to the period of the Arrow War.

The flaw in these studies lies in the gap between studies of pre-modern (Ming and Qing) and modern history. Because the great majority of these studies were unable to fully comprehend the situation in the coastal area, they were consequently unable to locate the pirates within the history of the region or to prop-

¹ Fox 1940.

² Fairbank 1953.

³ Matsuura pointed out the change from large-scale pirate bands to small-scale bands owing to the suppression by the great powers (Matsuura 1995, p. 105). Yokoi dealt with the role of the Royal Navy and mentioned the problems caused by the pirates (Yokoi 1988, pp. 208-209).

erly evaluate the significance of the changes that occurred during this period.

In addition, with regard to the activities of the Royal Navy during this period, these studies adopted an approach centered on diplomatic history, and therefore tended to stress gunboat diplomacy, which was premised on viewing the issue within the framework of Britain versus China. They did not consider this period from the perspective of entities other than the state.

With regard to their sources, these studies have used either British government documents or those of the Qing state, and thus in either case their viewpoints have been restricted. Moreover, since the descriptions provided in these sources are fragmentary, these studies have generally been unable to grasp the totality of the changes in the activities of the pirates of the time.

Having considered these issues, I have aimed to fill this gap in historical studies and also to place the pirates of the mid-nineteenth century within the context of the long-term history of the coastal area. Section 1 elucidates the process that led to the emergence of the pirates during the mid-nineteenth century, from the period of opium trade through the Opium War. Section 2 considers the responses of the Qing government and the Royal Navy to the pirates and analyzes the consequences of these responses. Section 3 analyzes the differences between the Fujianese and Cantonese pirates⁴ following their suppression by the Royal Navy. Section 4 considers the attempts made by the Qing officials, British Consuls, and the Royal Navy to reconstruct public order in the region.

This study focuses mainly on the Min'nan (southern Fujian) region, which was historically the center of coastal piracy, but which previous studies have overlooked. To this end, I have used the British Foreign Office archives and the Admiralty archives as primary sources in conjunction with the archives of the Qing government.

1: The Opium War and the Rise of the Pirates

(1) Fluctuations in the rule of the Qing government over the coastal area and the Opium War

Before addressing the main issue, I would like to discuss the maritime order

⁴ The term Fujianese (Fujian ren) mentioned in this article refers mainly to South Fujianese (Min'nan ren). The term Cantonese includes the Cantonese in the Pearl River Delta (Guangfu ren) and the Chaozhou people. Although, the people of these latter two prefectures are distinct, distinguishing them in documents is not possible in many cases; therefore, this term is used for convenience.



Source: Tan Qixiang 1987, pp. 5-6

maintained by the Qing government in the coastal area. I argue that the central elements of this order were control of trade and preservation of peace. This order was realized only after the Taiwan-based Zheng family surrendered in 1683.

After the Zheng family surrendered, the Qing government abolished the *hai-jin* (maritime ban) and simultaneously established *haiguan* (maritime customs) in the provinces along the southeast coast of China for the purpose of controlling trade. *Yahang* (brokers), at the maritime customs, contracted for the control of trade and tax collection.⁵ In addition, since the trade with Taiwan and Southeast Asia was concentrated in Amoy and that with European countries, in Guangzhou, the Qing government restricted trade to specific trade ports and regarded it of utmost importance to secure a fixed tariff rate.

With regard to peace and order, anti-Qing armed groups, such as the Zheng family were diminished; however, the piratical activity continued, and was carried

⁵ Okamoto 1999, pp. 60-75.

out mainly by the Fujianese and Cantonese.⁶ This indirectly demonstrates the limited nature of the peace-keeping activities of the Qing naval forces.

It can thus be assumed that in order to control trade and preserve peace in the coastal area, the most important task for the Qing government was to secure a fixed tariff and to guard against the rise of any power that could pose a threat to the Qing rule. However, in the other aspects, Qing rule was less stringent.

The initial cause of the collapse of Qing rule in terms of public peace was marked by the rise of the pirates during the Jiaqing era, from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century, along the coastal areas from Vietnam to Zhejiang. In order to suppress this rise of piratical activities, the Qing government implemented a policy of *zhaofu* (pacification) and succeeded, but only with great difficulty.⁷

In the context of trade, the trade control system in Amoy collapsed at the beginning of the nineteenth century owing to the dispersal of trade to smaller ports in southern Fujian. Furthermore, while the pirates of the Jiaqing era were suppressed, the opium trade carried out by the Fujianese and Cantonese in the coastal area of the South China Sea grew, extending into smaller ports along the south-east coast. In response to this situation, the Qing government attempted to control the opium trade through *yahang*, but this resulted in an increase in the number of trade transactions that were not carried out through *yahang*. As a result, trade at small ports increased and became even further dispersed.⁸ Unable to control the trade conducted by Chinese, the Qing government sent Lin Zexu to Guangzhou where he confiscated the opium owned by the foreign merchants. Thus began the Opium War.

During the Opium War, the Qing army repeatedly suffered one-sided defeats. This caused the high-level Qing officials in the coastal area to shift the responsibility for the defeat on the coastal people of Fujian and Guangdong who were regarded as *hanjian* ("traitors"). As a result, the Qing government took measures to deal with these traitors by organizing *tuanlian* (militias) and *fenggang* (blockading ports). However, all the policies adopted by the government failed. During the same period, there was a revival of piratical activities, and the Qing government

⁶ For pirates during the said period, see Matsuura 1995, pp. 105-120.

⁷ For the pirates of the Jiaqing era along the coast from Vietnam to Guangdong, see Murray 1987. With regard to the Fujian sea area, see Katsuta 1968. For an analysis from the perspective of social history, see Antony 2003.

⁸ Murakami 2003, pp. 205-228.

found it impossible to control trade and preserve the peace.⁹ It was during this time that the maritime order of the Qing government in the coastal area collapsed entirely.

(2) The opening of the treaty ports and the rise of pirates

With the opening of the five treaty ports after the Opium War, the rise of pirates in the coastal area became problematic. This section deals with the cause of the rise of pirates during the period, taking an overview of all the pirates in the seas off of Fujian.

In reference to the people who constituted the pirate bands, Liu Yunke, the Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang, stated the following:

I think that in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou prefectures, located in the coastal region, brutality is a routine practice among the people, and stubbornness commands respect; it is the unemployed among these people that occasionally sail out to sea and become robbers. Moreover, townships such as Chentou and Jiutou, belonging to Maxiang subprefecture in Quanzhou prefecture, have particularly become a gathering point for robbers. At the end of spring, these robbers recruit ruffians on the pretext of fishing and prepare ships and arms. They then sail out separately to the Fujian and Zhejiang seas and plunder everywhere. At the onset of winter, most of them return to their nests. These robbers have been successful in their operations for a long time now, and their piratical activities have almost become a custom.¹⁰

Based on this description, we can assume that the fishermen in the coastal area of southern Fujian often became seasonal pirates.

Dou Chengbiao, Fujian *shuishì tǐdū* (Admiral of the Qing naval forces in Fujian), assumed the coastal people of the Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, and Xinghua prefectures were generally fishermen by profession. He asserted that, if they were able to make profits, they would all remain good people; however, if they suffered losses, they would become robbers.¹¹ He argued that when these fishermen have

⁹ Murakami 2004.

¹⁰ GZDDG, vol. 17, pp. 219–221 (009120), “Memorial of Liu Yunke on April 28th in the 26th year of the Daoguang era.”

¹¹ GZDDG, vol. 19, pp. 65–66 (010160), “Memorial of Dou Chengbiao on March 22nd in the 27th year of the Daoguang era.”

a poor catch, they become pirates. In addition, Zheng Gaoxiang, who was also an Admiral of the Qing naval forces in Fujian, suggested that it was not only fishermen who were unable to make a profit who became pirates, but seamen who lost their jobs also resorted to robbery.¹² Thus, it was the low-status people in the coastal areas, such as fishermen and seamen, who became pirates.¹³ The makeup of the pirate bands is similar to those of the Jiaqing era that had been composed mainly of fishermen and seamen.¹⁴ They also overlap with those who actively participated in the opium trade prior to the Opium War and who were regarded as “traitors” and subjects to be controlled during the war.¹⁵

With regard to the geographic origins of these pirates, the pirates were reported to have come from Tongan, Maxiang (Jiutou), Jinjiang, Nanan, Fuqing, Huian in Fujian Province and from Jiaying prefecture in Guangdong Province based on the arrests that took place along the coast on July 1, 1847.¹⁶ Hence, it can be said that the bands consisted of Fujianese (mainly from southern Fujian) and Cantonese pirates. Moreover, as is mentioned later in this study, Portuguese, British, and Americans also formed a part of these pirate bands. These groups were thus diversified and composed of not only Fujianese and Cantonese pirates but also Europeans. The participation of Europeans in piratical activities is indicative of the relationship that had existed among the Fujianese, Cantonese and Europeans since the opium trade began.

Why then was there a rise in the number of such pirates during the period? The answer to this question might lie in the change of the people who carried on trade. It is especially important to note that although trade was limited to ports south of Shanghai, Western ships began to participate in the coastal trade that was formerly performed by the Fujianese and Cantonese and that their role in the China-Southeast Asia route increased.¹⁷ Moreover, owing to the fact that the volume of trade did not immediately increase after the opening of the treaty ports, the role of the Fujian and Canton ships decreased relatively. It is highly probable

¹² GZDXF, vol. 4, p. 700 (002026), “Memorial of the Zheng Gaoxiang on April 11th in the 2nd year of the Xianfeng era.”

¹³ The British Consul observed that the people from the lowest class joined the pirates. FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No.33, October 26, 1849.

¹⁴ Murray 1987, p. 6, Zhang Zhongxun 1986, Antony1999, p. 446.

¹⁵ Murakami 2004, pp. 7-8.

¹⁶ GZDDG, vol. 19, pp. 556-560 (010507), “Memorial of Xu Jishe, the Acting Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang on June 27th in the 27th year of the Daoguang era.”

¹⁷ Miyata 2006, pp. 87-88.

that as a consequence, the seamen who lost their jobs participated in piratical activities.

However, it is more important to determine the changes that occurred in the form and content of trade. On March 26, 1844, the Governor-General Liu Yunke reported the following to the Emperor with reference to the smuggling around Amoy :

Based on the investigations of the said official [*buzhengshi*, i.e., Provincial Administration Commissioner], places such as the township of Hecuo, Zhuoqi, and Shenti are all located outside the port of Amoy and are open to water and land routes. Formerly, when the inland merchant ships came to Amoy for the purpose of selling their commodities, the people of said places sometimes colluded with the traders and smuggled goods. Among said places, the population and the number of houses in the township of Hecuo are quite high, and its people most vulgar in comparison with places such as Zhuoqi. After the barbarians (*yiren*, i.e., foreigners) began to trade at Amoy, the nefarious people of Hecuo decided to become merchants and soon after, opened *yahang* secretly; they bought and built ships with the intention of conspiring with barbarian ships (*yichuan*, i.e., foreign ships) and smuggling goods on the outskirts of the port of Amoy. However, soon after the opening of the treaty ports, barbarian ships were able to directly enter [Amoy], and there could no longer be conspiracy between the people of Hecuo and the barbarians, and smuggling has come to an end.¹⁸

However, contrary to Liu Yunke's report, smuggling raged at the treaty ports.¹⁹ In fact, it is certain that as trade became concentrated in the treaty ports, smuggling concentrated around them. This caused a decline in the functioning of small ports, whose volume of trade had increased at the expense of the main ports, such as Amoy, and where the opium trade had flourished from the beginning of the nineteenth century until just before the Opium War. The damage caused in particular to small ports that were far removed from the treaty ports

¹⁸ YZDS, vol. 7, p. 410, "Memorial of Liu Yinke on February 8th in the 24th year of the Daoguang era."

¹⁹ After the opening of the treaty ports, smuggling was rampant in Amoy (Fairbank 1953, pp. 347-350).

and thus could not participate in the smuggling of goods through Western ships may have been greatest. Therefore, it may be assumed that the people living in the coastal areas who were unable to enjoy the profits gained via trade became pirates. Consequently, the members of these pirate bands were fishermen and seamen, the same type of people who participated in the opium trade. Further, the pirate fleets often deployed to these small ports not only because they intended to escape from the Royal Navy but because these small ports were their bases.

2: Responses to the Pirates by the Qing Government and the Royal Navy

(1) The response of the Qing government

The Qing central government did not take strong action to combat the problem of pirates throughout the coastal area during the period in question as it had versus the opium trade and during the Opium War. However, on the local level there were those like Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang Ji Zhichang who in addition to measures such as clearance and pacification in each province reported in February 1852 that measures such as organization and inspection of the *baojia* (community self-defense system)²⁰ and organization of militias had been undertaken.²¹ But both these measures were similar to the measures taken in response to the opium trade and the “traitors” during the Opium War. The effect of these measures was, therefore, questionable.

Was it then possible for the Qing naval forces to clear away the pirates at the time? First, let us examine the condition of the Qing naval forces in Fujian, which then possessed the largest fleet among all the Qing naval forces²² and which should have taken charge of suppressing the pirates.

Zhang Jixin, who arrived in Zhangzhou as the *Daotai* (Circuit Intendant) of the Tingzhou, Zhangzhou, and Longyan prefectures after the fall of Amoy (August 26, 1841) during the Opium War, wrote as follows:

²⁰ GZDXF, vol. 4, pp. 163-165 (001713), “Memorial of Ji Zhichang, the Governor-General of Zhejiang and Fujian, on December 18th in the 1st year of the Xianfeng era.”

²¹ GZDXF, vol.4, pp. 166-167 (001714), “Memorial appended to the memorial of Ji Zhichang on 18th December in the 1st year of the Xianfeng era.”

²² The Qing naval forces in Fujian had considerably more than two hundred ships and over thirty thousand registered troops. It was the largest among the Qing naval forces (Wang Jiajian 1999, pp. 201-203).

There is a shipyard (Jungongchang) outside Zhangzhou city. It has been ruled that the Circuit Intendant is to supervise and build a war-junk (*zhan-chuan*) there every month, and use it to patrol the sea, arrest [pirates, and so on]. In reality, after receiving war-junks, the naval forces leased it to merchants to trade commodities and transport rice or to the officials who often visited Taiwan. If a ship were to sail the high seas, it would drop anchor at a beach and never arrest any pirates (*yangdao*). There was scarcely any difference between the pirates and the Qing naval forces, to the extent that if the father was a pirate, more often than not, the son was in the naval forces. Further, if a soldier in the naval forces failed at his job and was dismissed, he would become a pirate soon after, and if the brigade of the Naval Forces (Shuishiyong) were to recruit soldiers, pirates would enroll immediately. In essence, it is impossible to fill a vacant post with people who are unfamiliar with the coastline and the condition of the tide.²³

We can infer based on this description that the Qing naval forces in Fujian considered commerce as their primary mission, and that they were not very different from the pirates. In addition, the admiral of the Qing naval forces in Fujian, who was originally a pirate himself, had fallen into his dotage and fled to Tongan without the least concern for public opinion when Amoy fell.²⁴

Moreover, after the British Army occupied Dinghai and Zhenhai, Yan Botao, Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang, was ordered to relieve Ningpo in October 1841. He reported as follows:

In Fujian Province, the number of seaports with a first or second priority level is over sixty or seventy and these need to be protected by troops. However, the number of troops in this province is small and land forces are insufficient to send separately. Therefore, mostly township braves (*xiang-yong*) were used to aid in protection. And for the naval forces, patrol ships (*shaochuan*) were the only ships capable of attacking bandits; however, they could not oppose the gunfire of the barbarian ships (i.e., British warships). More than forty ships built under my supervision were burned after the rebellious barbarians (*niyi*, i.e., British forces) intruded into Amoy and thrown large and small canons into the sea. Now, there are no ships and

²³ *DXHJL*, p. 63.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

canons, and therefore, it has become difficult for the Qing naval forces to be deployed [to Ningpo].²⁵

This report indicates that the Qing naval forces in Fujian, which were from the start insufficient to garrison each seaport and ensure peace and which were unsuited for external war, were heavily damaged after the British Army occupied Amoy. Subsequently, no progress was made in replenishing the complement of ships, and by 1850 the number of working naval vessels was only eleven.²⁶

As can be expected, there was a reversal in the relative power of the naval forces and pirates. A report by the British Consul in Amoy in July 1847 stated that within the last three years, Lin Kan, a Fujianese pirate, had sent several challenges to the admiral of the Qing naval forces in Fujian [Dou Chenbiao] and had personally attacked the admiral's flag ship.²⁷ Thus, it can be said that the naval forces had entirely lost their authority.

Furthermore, the Cantonese pirate Zhang Shiwu had demanded two hundred thousands taels from the *Qinchai dachen* (Imperial Envoy) Xu Guangjin as compensation for not plundering and destroying the coastal areas of Fujian and Zhejiang.²⁸ Fearing Zhang Shiwu and his pirates, the military officers and residents of Amoy would escape into the city of Amoy every time the pirates arrived, in the same manner they had escaped during the Opium War.²⁹ The threat was not limited to Zhang Shiwu. Pirates were active not only in the villages around Amoy but also close to the city walls just outside Amoy. The risk of the pirates was thus near at hand.³⁰ To make matters worse, the naval forces were unable to curb them.

Moreover, were the naval forces and the pirates to fight, there was a high possibility that the navy would be defeated. According to the British Consul's report in 1849, the Qing naval forces were defeated by the pirates near Yushan in Zhejiang province.³¹ In September 1852, a patrol ship belonging to the Brigade of

²⁵ YZDS, vol. 4, p.236, "Memorial of Yan Botao on September 8th in the 21st year of the Daoguang era."

²⁶ GZDXF, vol. 3, pp.473-477 (001377), "Memorial of Yu Rui, the Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang, on October 10th in the 1st year of the Xianfeng era."

²⁷ FO228/71 Layton to Davis, No. 62, July 19, 1847.

²⁸ FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No.30, October 13, 1849.

²⁹ FO228/98 Incl. in Layton to Bonham, No. 30, October 13, 1849.

³⁰ FO228/71 Layton to Davis, No. 98, December 21, 1847.

³¹ FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No.13, June 9, 1849.

Min'an (Min'an ying) was defeated by *guangting* (the west-coast boats)³² near Gantang, and was plundered for its cannons and guns.³³ Consequently, the suppression of piratical activities by Qing naval forces became increasingly difficult.

The policy of pacification then became even more important, and attempts were made to recruit the pirates into the naval forces. For example, Governor-General Liu Yunke requested that Fujianese pirates who had surrendered be admitted into the naval forces of Fujian and Zhejiang. However, an imperial edict on January 7, 1847, rejected this request because admitting the former pirates into the navy would have had adverse consequences, and instead ordered the Governor-General to enroll them into camps in provinces distant from Fujian and Zhejiang on the basis of the precedent from the 18th year of the Jiaqing era (1813). Despite the order, on May 1, 1847, Liu Yunke argued the merit of admitting them into the naval forces and again requested their admission into the naval forces of Fujian and Zhejiang.³⁴ His request was at last granted.³⁵ This indicates that the pirates surrendered on the condition that they be admitted into the local naval forces, and that the position of the Qing government was now weaker than that of the government in the Jiaqing era. Furthermore, as is demonstrated by the case of the west-coast boats, which will be addressed below, there was only a slight possibility that the policy of pacification would be able to control the pirates and their activities since the naval forces were nearly powerless. Therefore, the naval forces could not be expected to play a major role in the restoration of public peace in the coastal areas over the long run.

(2) The Appearance of the Royal Navy

It was at this point that the Royal Navy decided to intervene. Although it had played an active role in subduing the pirates during the Opium War,³⁶ it did not actively participate in the elimination of piratical activities after the opening of the treaty ports. Moreover, on March 8, 1845, it was prohibited from interfering with

³² The term "*guangting*" has generally been translated as "west-coast boat" in British diplomatic documents, but it is sometimes translated as a "Cantonese lorcha." There is no fixed translation, and in the broad sense it simply means Cantonese ship.

³³ GZDXF, vol. 6, pp.193-194 (002796), "Attachments to the memorial of Ji Zhichang, on November 7th in the 2nd of the Xianfeng era."

³⁴ GZDDG, vol. 19, pp. 30-34 (010135), "Memorial of Liu Yunke on March 17th in the 27th year of the Daoguang era."

³⁵ JDLSD, vol. 52, p. 203, "Edict on June 4th in the 27th year of the Daoguang era."

³⁶ Murakami 2004, p. 23.

Table: The suppression of pirates by the Royal Navy in the seas of Fujian

Year/month	Name of HMS	Number of captives	Number of men released	Number of pirates ships	Number of ships destroyed	Number of ships captured
1847/3	<i>Scout</i>	86				3
1847/7	<i>Scout</i>	82	15			
1847/8	<i>Scout</i>	22	7	7		
1847/12	<i>Scout</i>	85	13	6		
1848/6	<i>Scout</i>	62	4	2		2
1849/5	<i>Pilot</i>	8		1		
1849/5	<i>Pilot</i>	76	45			
1849/6	<i>Pilot</i>	83		4		3
1849/6	<i>Pilot</i>	47		2		
1849/10	<i>Medea</i>					
1849/10	<i>Fury, Columbine</i>					
1852/2	<i>Lily</i>					
1853/11	<i>Hermes</i>	7			22	3
1853/12	<i>Hermes</i>				40	
1853/12	<i>Hermes</i>	23				16
1854/6	<i>Bittern</i>				1	
1855/1	<i>Bittern</i>			9	2	
1855/6	<i>Racehorse</i>	58		15	2	2
1856/8-9	<i>Comus</i>				7	1
1857/1	<i>Sampson</i>	14				
1857/4	<i>Camilla</i>			4	1	
1857/4	<i>Camilla</i>	28	3		1	1
1857/4	<i>Sampson, Camilla</i>	24			15	5
1858/4	<i>Elk</i>					
1858/9	<i>Magicienne, Algerine</i>					
1858/9	<i>Banterer</i>			8	9	
1858/9-10	<i>Magicienne, Algerine</i>		53	22	18	2
1858/10	<i>Banterer</i>		1		1	3
1859/5	<i>Kestrel, James</i>					
1859/12	<i>Bustard</i>	2	3		6	
1860/3	<i>Scorn</i>	1				
1860/7	<i>Gunboat</i>					

Areas of activity/Pirate identity	source
Near the Island of Nanri &c.	FO228/70, FO663/52
Quanzhou prefecture	FO228/70, FO663/52
	FO228/70, FO663/52
	FO228/70, FO663/52
	FO228/84
	FO228/98
Off the coast of Meizhou, the coast of Taiwan	FO228/98
The coast of Taiwan	FO228/98
	FO228/98
Near Nan'ao; Cantonese pirates	FO228/98
The fleet of Zhang Shiwu	FO228/98
	FO228/141
Near Meizhou; Fujianese and Cantonese pirates	FO228/155
The Small Sword Society	<i>China Mail</i>
Hutoushan; Cantonese pirates	FO228/155
Fujianese pirates, The survivors of the Small Sword Society	FO228/171
Mainly Cantonese pirates	FO228/188
West-coast boats	FO228/188
Near Meizhou	FO228/211, ADM125/1
Off the coast of Chongwu in Huian district; Hong Kong junk	FO228/233, FO663/64
Weitouao	FO228/233
Shushang; West-coast boats	FO228/233, FO663/64
Meizhou & c.; West-Coast boats & c.	ADM125/1
	FO228/251
Retaliatory attack on Weitou for the killing and wounding of British sailors.	FO228/251
The bay of Xinghua	ADM125/3
Meizhou	ADM125/3
Near the Island of Nan'guan	ADM125/3
Search near the Island of Xiaojinmen	FO228/265
The bay of Dinghai and the bay of Huangqi	ADM125/4
Near Meizhou; attacked the piratical village	ADM125/5
Near Meizhou	FO228/285

any Chinese ships without proof certain. This prohibition was issued because it had become difficult to differentiate between pirate ships and merchant ships or fishing boats.³⁷ Most pirate ships would camouflage themselves as merchant ships, making it difficult for the naval forces to identify them.³⁸ Hence, it had become even more difficult for the Royal Navy to distinguish them from other ships.

However, the nonintervention policy was eventually revoked because of pirate attacks on foreign ships, and particularly because of attacks on the opium trade ships. After the opening of the treaty ports, the opium trade was implicitly permitted by the Chinese government, and it came to be conducted in areas outside the treaty ports. For example, the opium trade was carried out around Amoy in Quanzhou Bay, Shenhu Bay, and Nan'ao.³⁹ However, opium trade ships were often attacked by pirates in the coastal area.⁴⁰ It can therefore be assumed that these attacks were in fact attempts made by the coastal people, who could not participate in the opium trade after the opening of the treaty ports, to reap the profits of this trade by attacking foreign ships carrying opium.

Among these attacks on the opium trade ships, the worst incident took place on February 7, 1847. The *Caroline* and the *Omega*, two schooners that belonged to a British firm, were attacked by Cantonese pirates (disguised as fishermen from Macao). All the opium onboard was plundered and over thirty crew members were murdered. It was due to this incident that the opium trade was moved to the vicinity of Amoy.⁴¹

The fishing boat of Macao believed to have been involved in this incident was under the command of the officials who had been ordered by the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi to arrest pirates. As a result, the British Consul in Amoy considered the local military officials to be incapable of preventing piratical activities.⁴² Consequently, the British government decided to use its own warships to suppress the pirates near Amoy.

On March 11, 15, and 17 in 1847, HMS *Scout*, a sloop, in an attempt to sup-

³⁷ Fox 1940, pp. 97-101.

³⁸ GZDDG, vol. 19, pp. 30-34 (010135), "Memorial of Liu Yinke on March 17th in the 27th year of the Daoguang era."

³⁹ Fairbank 1953, pp. 227-232.

⁴⁰ An incident took place off the coast of Fujian in November 1853; a British ship was plundered for its opium in Zhangzhou Bay. FO228/155 Incl. 1 in Robertson to Bonham, No.103, December 1, 1853.

⁴¹ Fairbank 1953, pp.243-246, FO228/70 Layton to Davis, No. 15, February 9, 1847.

⁴² FO228/70 Layton to Davis, No. 16, February 9, 1847.

press the pirates of Amoy, seized three pirate ships and captured eighty-nine men. Following the trial conducted in the presence of the British Consul and the local Qing officials at the British consulate, eighty-six captives were handed over to the Qing government, of whom eighty were sentenced to be beheaded. The liberated ship and the value of its cargo were awarded to the captain of HMS *Scout* as a reward. This suppression of the pirates was welcomed by the merchants and citizens of Amoy. Referring to the reaction of the people, T. H. Layton, a British Consul in Amoy, remarked in the following manner:

The merchants and citizens of Amoy rejoice in this commencement of our warfare against Piracy and hope that the High Way of the Seas will soon be clear to their Commercial enterprise, and their Lawful Pursuit.⁴³

Thereafter HMS *Scout* succeeded in arresting the powerful Fujianese pirate Lin Kan in June of the same year.⁴⁴ This indicates that the Royal Navy had begun to actively suppress the pirates.

In 1848, the British Admiralty became aware of the outrages of the pirates along the Chinese coast. It decided to change policy and recommended the suppression of these pirates in collaboration with the British Consuls and Qing officials.⁴⁵ The suppression of any piratical activity was to be rewarded by the British Exchequer.⁴⁶ The British Consul in Amoy fully supported this recommendation by the British Admiralty for the purpose of securing trade and demonstrating the military strength of Britain.⁴⁷ Thereafter, the suppression of piracy along the Fujian coast continued to be prosecuted (See **Table**).

Faced with the threat of the Royal Navy, the pirates sent a spy disguised as a coolie to the British Consulate in order to obtain information regarding the movement of the British warships.⁴⁸ For the pirates, the threat of the Royal Navy was increasing steadily.

During this period, the Royal Navy forced the fleet of Cantonese pirates

⁴³ FO228/70 Layton to Davis, No. 38, March 29, 1847. For the type of British warship, see Colledge 2003.

⁴⁴ FO228/71 Layton to Davis, No. 62, July 19, 1847.

⁴⁵ Fox 1940, pp. 101-105.

⁴⁶ In addition to the reward given by the British government, there were presents and rewards offered by the Qing officials and foreign governments and foreign merchants (Fox 1940, pp. 137).

⁴⁷ FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No. 33, October 26, 1849.

⁴⁸ FO228/111B Layton to Bonham, No. 4, January 15, 1850.

under Zhang Shiwu, which was active along the coast from Guangdong to Fujian, away from the seas off Fujian⁴⁹ and defeated them in collaboration with the local Qing officials on the open seas between Hong Kong and the Tonkin Gulf. This defeat made the local Qing officials recognize the usefulness of the Royal Navy,⁵⁰ and had a powerful result.

In Amoy, as well, the alliance between local Qing officials and the Royal Navy continued to strengthen. In June 1849, in gratitude for the activity of HMS *Pilot*, a brig-sloop, Qing officials indicated their readiness to further cooperate by offering information regarding the names of the pirates and the areas frequently visited by them and by establishing a code word for use with the Qing warships.⁵¹ British ships and the Qing naval forces tried to identify each other by flying the name of the British Consul (Layton) as a password on banners at their gangways.⁵²

The alliance forged between the Royal Navy and the Chinese merchants in Amoy also continued to flourish. In June 1849, HMS *Pilot*, which was at the time suppressing piratical activities on the west coast of Taiwan, continued its suppression by obtaining information from a merchant junk.⁵³ Then, in 1851, the British Consul obtained information from a Chinese merchant about a junk that had been captured by the pirates around Jinmen Island and consequently ordered HMS *Lily* to set sail. The owner of the captured junk was on HMS *Lily* when she suppressed the pirates.⁵⁴

The Royal Navy's progress in the suppression of the pirates influenced the trade at treaty ports such as Amoy. In 1849, when HMS *Pilot* expelled the Fujianese pirates from the ports of Taiwan, the price of rice fell in Amoy, although rice continued to be exported to Ningpo and Shanghai.⁵⁵ This shows that the security of the rice trade between Amoy and Taiwan was improving. Moreover, with the expulsion of the pirates who were obstructing the trade at Amoy, merchants in Amoy profited and often expressed their gratitude to the British

⁴⁹ FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No. 30, October 13, 1849.

⁵⁰ Graham 1978, pp. 273-275.

⁵¹ FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No. 13, June 9, 1849.

⁵² FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No. 30, October 13, 1849.

⁵³ FO228/98 Encl. 11 in Layton to Bonham, No. 13, June 9, 1849.

⁵⁴ FO228/141 Sullivan to Bonham, No. 10, February 11, 1851.

⁵⁵ FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, Separate, August 9, 1849. After the Opium War, owing to the decrease in the number of merchant ships and the flow of foreign rice into Fujian, it is said that the volume of Taiwan rice exported to Fujian decreased for some time (Gao Mingling 2003, pp. 107-108). In addition, the influence of the pirates should also be taken into consideration.

government.⁵⁶

Given the above, we can see that a pattern had been formed, with the Qing officials (such as the local civil officials and the officers of the naval forces) and the merchants of Amoy forging an alliance with the Royal Navy in opposition to the Fujianese and Cantonese pirates. This pattern of confrontation between the pirates and officials and merchants had existed since the end of the seventeenth century, but now the Royal Navy had been added to the side of the officials and merchants. The reason for this regional cooperation may have been the impact of the Opium War, which had forced the officials and merchants in Amoy to recognize the power of the Royal Navy.

The progress made by the Royal Navy in Amoy in the suppression of the pirates based on this pattern of cooperation caused severe damage to the pirates along the Fujian coast and strongly influenced the formation of pirate bands. Although an accurate number of pirates at the time is unclear, in December 1847, the British Consul in Amoy reported that there were two thousand pirates between Amoy and Fuzhou. Furthermore, in June 1849, he reported that there were three thousand pirates in Amoy, the western coast of Taiwan, and the mouth of the Min River.⁵⁷ This indicates that the number of pirates in the coast of Fujian could be numbered in the thousands.

As shown in the Table, the number of the pirates that became the target of suppression was relatively small. If we consider examples of large-scale pirate activity, the pirate band that was spotted near Meizhou Island in November 1853 was composed of fifteen Canton junks and twenty-five or thirty Fujian junks.⁵⁸ Moreover, fifty Fujian piratical junks attacked the area near Fuzhou in June 1854.⁵⁹ Therefore, each pirate fleet can be assumed to have had a minimum of fifty ships. As mentioned previously, the scale of the pirate bands during the period was smaller than that of those in the Jiaqing era, when one fleet of Cantonese pirates had over one thousand ships and over ten thousand crew members.⁶⁰ Initially, the

⁵⁶ In regard to the activity of the HMS *Pilot*, not only the officials in Amoy but also its inhabitants expressed gratitude for its support of trade and the release of their fellows (FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No. 13, June 9, 1849). Of course, we must also consider the fact that the British Consul was stressing the role of the Royal Navy as well as his own.

⁵⁷ FO228/71 Layton to Davis, No. 98, December 21, 1847; FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No.13, June 9, 1849.

⁵⁸ FO228/155 Incl. 1 in Robertson to Bonham, No.103, December 1, 1853.

⁵⁹ FO228/171 Incl. in Sinclair to Bowring, No.41, July 1, 1854.

⁶⁰ The scale of one pirate fleet amounted to 1,800 ships and 80,000 men in 1809 (Murray 1987, p. 76).

pirates had formed great alliances by uniting smaller groups.⁶¹ However, the activities of the Royal Navy made it difficult for the pirates to form even small groups and made it impossible for them to develop into a large fleet. In addition, since the pirates had been expelled from the treaty ports, which were becoming the center of trade, it became impossible for them to form bands that could reap the profits of the trade and oppose the Qing government. On the other hand, the activities of the Royal Navy made it possible for the weakened Qing naval forces to eliminate the pirates. For instance, among the cases of pirate expulsion executed by the Qing naval forces during the first half of the 1850s, many of the targets were small piratical fleets.

In conclusion, the Royal Navy based in Amoy succeeded in eliminating the large scale pirate fleets along the Fujian coast by the end of the 1840s and in suppressing the pirate bands. How then did the Fujianese and Cantonese pirates react when faced with the threat of the Royal Navy?

3: The Decline of the Fujianese Pirates and the Subsequent Rise of the Cantonese Pirates

(1) The revolts by the coastal people of Fujian and Guangdong and the decline of the Fujianese pirates

During the first half of the 1850s, after an uprising of Xiaodaohui (Small Sword Society) of Amoy in May 1853, revolts by the coastal people of Fujian and Guangdong occurred in Shanghai and Guangdong. Since pirates participated in these rebellions, and all the revolts occurred around the treaty ports, it can be assumed that the forces that had been excluded from trade were now attempting to capture these treaty ports where trade had become more concentrated. From among these revolts, I have chosen to consider the uprising of the Small Sword Society in Amoy and inquire into the movement of the Fujianese and Cantonese pirates.

The Small Sword Society was a rebel group led by Chinese individuals who had returned from Southeast Asia. Amoy was occupied by the society and became the core of the revolt.⁶² The revolt was supplied with men and goods from Singa-

⁶¹ In the case of the pirates in the Jiaqing era, the alliance between the Cantonese pirates, which had been established in 1805, consisted of fleets commanded by seven (later, six) chiefs, and the scale of each fleet was 70 to 300 vessels. The fleets were composed of smaller fleets composed of 10 to 40 ships (Murray 1987, pp. 60-61).

⁶² For the details of the Small Sword Uprising in Amoy, see Sasaki 1963, Huang Jiamo 1978. For the relationships between the returned overseas Chinese and the Small Sword Society, see Murakami 2000.

pore, and pirates were also said to have aided it.⁶³ Therefore, this revolt mainly depended on sea power that essentially consisted of Fujianese pirates.

The Qing government needed to impose a blockade on the Small Sword Society, since it obtained its supplies from Southeast Asia. However, because the rebels maintained good relations with foreigners and because the Royal Navy observed neutrality based on the policy of noninterference in internal affairs, the Qing government was unable to gain the support of the Royal Navy. As a result, the Qing naval forces decided to employ the Cantonese pirates for assistance in suppressing the revolt. J. Backhouse, a British Consul, commented as follows:

Of the Imperial Squadron, the most effective portion consists of Canton or “West-Coast boats” (as they are called) which are supposed to be neither more nor less than pirates, hired for this service. These are well armed and manned, but the majority of them, it is widely reported and very generally believed, are in league with the Insurgents, nor does the effect of their operations tend to discountenance this belief.⁶⁴

This indicates that the west-coast boats, namely, the Cantonese pirates, were employed by the government and that they were the most powerful arm of the naval forces. There is also a possibility that they colluded with the Small Sword Society.

These west-coast boats were originally employed for use in the war against the Taiping Rebellion, but they were later enlisted to suppress the Small Sword Society in Amoy. Wang Yide, Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang, described the Hongdan ships of Guangdong (west-coast boats) as follows:

Said ships [Hongdan ships] passed Fujian in June and July and attacked the rebel group (the Small Sword Society) in cooperation with the naval forces. The hull and canons of these ships are strong and their soldiers, brave. They have cooperated with the troops, which were once commanded by the former Provincial Military Commander (*Tidu*) of Zhejiang, Li Tingyu, and attacked from land and sea.⁶⁵ Both these ships and troops were feared

⁶³ *China Mail*, August 11, 1853, p. 130.

⁶⁴ FO228/155 Backhouse to Bonham, No. 60, August 31, 1853.

⁶⁵ Li Tingyu is said to have joined in the suppression of the Small Sword Society, commanding his relatives and militia, and to have rendered distinguished service. *FSXDSH*, p. 169, “Edict on September 6th in the 3rd year of the Xianfeng era.” He was an adopted son of Li Zhanggeng, who played an active part in the suppression of the pirates in the Jiaqing era.

by the rebel group. However, since the progress of the battle in Jiangnan is urgent and important, the employed ships, which were originally for the purpose of subduing the Guangdong Rebel (*Yue fei*, i.e., “the Taiping Rebellion”), have now been sent for immediate support. The subjugation in Amoy is now satisfactory. [We] have defeated the core of the rebels and occupied the fortress, and [the enemy] is already closely besieged. If we attack the enemy from both sides [sea and land], we should be able to arrest the leader of the rebel forces; however, if we withdraw these ships suddenly, the rebel forces will be encouraged and our soldiers will gradually lose their sense of the importance of their mission. This could influence the entire progress of the battle.

Wang requested an extension of the period during which the Hongdan ships would be stationed at Amoy.⁶⁶ As a result, he employed them until the Qing forces recovered Amoy.⁶⁷ In the end, the Qing government could not have imposed a blockade on the Small Sword Society if it had not depended on the Hongdan ships (the west-coast boats), even though it had originally been unclear whether they would be friend or foe.

The siege of Amoy subsequently progressed from sea and land. On November 11, 1853, the fleet of the Small Sword Society escaped from Amoy, which was then occupied by the Qing army.⁶⁸ The defeat of the Small Sword Society can be regarded as the victory of Cantonese pirates over Fujianese pirates. Following this defeat, the Small Sword Society left Amoy and spread outward to Shanghai, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia.

Following their departure and the loss of their base at Amoy, the Small Sword Society had no choice but to plunder along the coast. As a result, they became a target for the Royal Navy, which had originally observed neutrality. In November 1853, in an attempt to eliminate pirates, HMS *Hermes* captured three junks; two of them belonged to the fleet of the Small Sword Society that had escaped from Amoy.⁶⁹ This demonstrates that immediately after escaping from Amoy, the Small Sword Society became a target for suppression by the Royal

⁶⁶ *FSXDSH*, pp. 171–173, “Edict on October 9th in the 3rd year of the Xianfeng era.”

⁶⁷ The Imperial ordinance ordered Wang to move the Hongdan ships to Jiangnan immediately, but as described below, they were used for recovering Amoy.

⁶⁸ FO228/155 Robertson to Bonham, No. 93, November 14, 1853.

⁶⁹ FO228/155 Robertson to Bonham, No. 103, December 1, 1853.

Navy. In the following month, HMS *Hermes* either destroyed or captured forty piratical junks that were considered to be part of the fleet of the Small Sword Society from Amoy.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the ships that had attacked a lorchas belonging to the British and that were later suppressed by HMS *Bittern* were also regarded as being connected with the fleet of the Small Sword Society.⁷¹

As a result of the Royal Navy's activities along the Fujian coast, Huang Wei, who commanded the survivors of the Small Sword Society, was unable to operate along the Fujian coast, and the Qing government was able to attain an advantage over this group. Subsequently, Huang Wei and his group became active in the seas around Taiwan. They attacked Jilong and captured ships.⁷² Following this incident, Huang Wei was determined to occupy Amoy again. However, as H. S. Parks, a British Consul in Amoy, pointed out, the security of Amoy relied on the existence of British warships,⁷³ and it was the existence of these warships that became an obstacle to Huang Wei's attempted recovery of his base. Finally, in November 1854, Huang Wei retreated to Penghu. He is said to have later moved to Hainan and Cochin China.⁷⁴

Fujianese pirates were finally weakened and removed from the treaty ports and neighboring areas due, not only to the advancements made in the suppression of pirates by the Royal Navy, but also to their defeat by an alliance of the Qing government and the Cantonese pirates, as well as the expansion of the Cantonese pirates (described later in this study). Subsequently, large-scale Fujianese pirate band, such as that of Huang Wei, never made their presence felt again. At this point in time, the influence of the Fujianese pirates, who had played such a major role along the coast of China from the Song period onward, began to decrease dramatically.

While the Fujianese in the coastal area, thereafter, advanced toward Southeast Asia, the Fujianese merchants ensured the security of their commercial activities by using foreign ships rather than relying on Fujianese pirates.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ *China Mail*, December 15, 1853, p. 202.

⁷¹ FO228/171 Parks to Bowring, No. 51, July 31, 1854.

⁷² The troops of Huang Wei were repulsed immediately after they captured Jilong. FO228/171 Parks to Bowring, No. 78, November 22, 1854; *FSXDSH*, pp. 294-295, "Memorial of Shao Lianke, the Acting Provincial Command of Taiwan, on December 1st in the 5th year of the Xianfeng era."

⁷³ FO228/171 Parks to Bowring, No. 78, November 22, 1854.

⁷⁴ FO228/171 Parks to Bowring, No. 86, December 12, 1854.

⁷⁵ Murakami 2000, pp. 120-122.

(2) The rise of the Cantonese pirates

In contrast with the decline of the Fujianese pirates, there was a gradual increase in the power of Cantonese pirates. This section examines how the Cantonese pirates expanded their power.

Behind the expansion of the power of the Cantonese pirates after the opening of the treaty ports were their relations with the Westerners. The Cantonese pirates, who had maintained relations with the Westerners even before the opening of the treaty ports, introduced superior Western technology and were supplied with Western munitions. For example, the ship on which the Cantonese pirate Zhang Shiwu sailed was coppered in a manner similar to an English vessel.⁷⁶ Moreover, the 12-pound and 18-pound cannons, with which the ships (including west-coast boats captured at Meizhou Island in September 1858) were equipped, were made in Britain.⁷⁷ There is no doubt that the Cantonese pirates gained superiority over other groups as a result of advanced Western equipment.

The Westerners would not only supply the Cantonese pirates with their technology and goods but would also sometimes sail on the Cantonese piratical ships. For instance, British and Germans had crewed on the pirate ships that were suppressed around Meizhou Island.⁷⁸ There were many such cases in which Westerners sailed on piratical ships.

Moreover, there were some cases of Portuguese ships practicing piracy along with west-coast boats.⁷⁹ In 1857, HMS *Sampson*, a frigate, captured a lorcha near Meizhou Island. This ship practiced piracy with west-coast boats, flew the Portuguese flag, and was registered as a Portuguese ship.⁸⁰

Furthermore, the Cantonese pirates occasionally disguised their ships as Western ships. It has often been pointed out that they would utilize the Union Jack for this purpose.⁸¹ It has also been said that in 1854, one of the six west-coast boats that attacked the British lorcha at Sanduao in Funing prefecture had flown the American flag at Fuzhou.⁸² Owing to the fact that they would employ

⁷⁶ FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No. 18, July 12, 1849.

⁷⁷ ADM125/3 Vansittart to Seymour, October 5, 1858.

⁷⁸ FO228/285 Incl. 1 in Gingell to Bruce No. 68, September 6, 1860.

⁷⁹ There were frequent incidents suggesting acts of piracy by the Portuguese ships in Ningpo. Fairbank 1953, pp. 341-342.

⁸⁰ ADM125/1 Hand to Seymour, April 24, 1857; ADM125/1 Hand to Seymour, June 2, 1857.

⁸¹ Graham 1978, p. 284.

⁸² FO228/188 Parks to Bowring, No. 6, January 5, 1855.

such methods to disguise the nationality of the ship, they were able to avoid to some extent becoming targets of the Royal Navy.

Forging a relationship with the foreigners enabled the Cantonese pirates to secure the safety of their bases. On December 2, 1851, Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang Yu Rui described the bases of these pirates as follows:

Based on the information I have received, the places at which the said robbers gather to trade stolen goods are Macao and Hong Kong in Guangdong and Shipu and Wenzhou in Zhejiang. Many of the robbers store smuggled goods in their ships, and it is impossible to prevent them from pretending to be merchant ships sailing from port to port to sell their goods.⁸³

Among these places, Macao and Hong Kong were well known as the bases of the Cantonese pirates, and exchanges between the Westerners and the Cantonese pirates took place in these places. Moreover, Shipu and Wenzhou were notable because they were situated between the treaty ports of Ningpo and Fuzhou. They can, therefore, be regarded as places where it was difficult for the Royal Navy, which was based in the treaty ports, to extend their activities toward suppression of pirates.⁸⁴ In addition to these places, Meizhou Island, located between Fuzhou and Amoy, was another important base of the pirates, which Yu Rui chose not to mention in order to evade responsibility (Refer to the **Table**). The prevalence of piratical activities in these places indicates the decline of the position of Min'nan as a pirate base.

In addition to these factors, a central factor in the expansion of the Cantonese pirates was their utilization of their relationship with the Qing officials. As mentioned earlier, when the Shenhu Bay incident took place, the British Consul Layton suspected that there was a relationship between the pirates in Shenhu and the commander of the Qing naval forces in Guangdong. Furthermore, in October 1849, Layton pointed out the collusion between the Cantonese pirates and the officials. He reported that there was a great possibility that Huang Fuxing, who had received orders from the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi and who had been commissioned by the admiral of the Qing naval forces in Fujian to sup-

⁸³ GZDXF, vol. 3, pp. 473-477 (001377), "Memorials of Yu Rui on October 10th in the 1st year of the Xianfeng era."

⁸⁴ It should be noted that Ningpo, a treaty port, became a pirate base after the opening of the treaty ports (Fairbank 1953, pp. 329-346).

press the pirates, in fact, supported them in the Shenhu Bay incident, and although the British government arrested him, there was a great possibility that the authorities in Amoy would be unable to punish him.⁸⁵

The reason behind the alliance between the Cantonese pirates and the officials may be that many of the officers in the Qing naval forces in Fujian, such as its admirals, were Cantonese at the time. It was reported that Dou Chenbiao, who was originally a pirate and who served as the admiral of the naval forces in Fujian for nine years from 1841 onward, was Cantonese.⁸⁶ Zheng Gaoxiang, who succeeded Dou, was from Chaozhou.⁸⁷ There is a great possibility that both of them were associated with Cantonese pirates. In August 1858, the British Consul pointed out that the admiral of the Qing naval forces in Fujian was Cantonese and that he was related to the commander of the fleet of west-coast boats.⁸⁸ Conversely, there is also a great possibility that the increase in the population of Cantonese in the naval forces in Fujian was connected with the expansion of the Cantonese pirates along the coast of Fujian.

These Cantonese pirates participated actively in the squelching of revolts such as the Small Sword Society in Amoy and the Taiping Rebellion. Furthermore, by the beginning of the 1850s, west-coast boats had begun to be employed at various places as a countermeasure against piracy.⁸⁹ In Fujian, as a result of the de-

⁸⁵ A Canton sampan, which had formerly been employed by Huang Fuxing, engaged in piracy off shore Shipu in Zhejiang, but there is no evidence that Huang was punished. FO228/98 Layton to Bonham, No. 33, October 26, 1849; *DQWXS*, vol. 42, on leap August 27th in the 1st year of the Xianfeng era.

⁸⁶ *QGLDQ*, vol. 2, p. 666.

⁸⁷ Taiwan *shuishi xiebiao youying shoubei* (The assistant brigade commander of the right brigade of Command of a Regional Vice Commander in the Taiwan Naval Force), who was the elder cousin of Zheng Gaoxiang's father, was a member of the Chaozhou people. *GZDXF*, vol.4, pp. 501-502 (001916), "Memorial of Ji Zhichang, on February 21st in the 2nd year of the Xianfeng era."

⁸⁸ FO228/251 Morrison to Bowring, No.76, August 18, 1858. However, the admiral of the naval forces in Fujian, Yang Zaifu (Yue Bin), was in fact from Shanghua district in Hunan and had participated in the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion as a member of the staff of Xiangjun (the Hunan Army). Therefore, in all probability the man who was referred to here was Chen Guotai, who was Cantonese and Jinmen *zhen shuishi zongbingguan* (Provincial Command of the Naval Force in the Brigade of Jinmen).

⁸⁹ For example, in 1851, Yi Xing, General of Shengjing, ordered Huang Fuxing, who was an official in the brigade of Dengzhou in Shandong, to employ four west-coast boats for three months. Thereafter, he built west-coast boats, recruited *shuiyong* (sea braves) in Guangdong, and made the soldiers and seamen of the naval forces in Jinzhou study military techniques. But because of the prevalence of piracy in the seas off Zhejiang, the merchants of Ningpo started to buy steamships at Guangdong. Eventually, there were some cases of the merchants from various places in the coastal area buying steamships for protection.

terioration of the capability of the Qing naval forces there, west-coast boats were employed to suppress pirates (the survivors of the Small Sword Society).⁹⁰ This can be regarded as one type of “pacification.”

These activities of the west-coast boats were related to the Cantonese merchants. Initially, British Consul Parks believed that the west-coast boats utilized in Amoy had been employed at Guangzhou and dispatched through the interpreter or comprador of the British firm in Amoy.⁹¹ C.A. Winchester, an interpreter in the British consulate, described the situation as follows:

It being well known that the West Coast Boats, which were hired by the Taoutae (Xingquanyong dao, i.e, Circuit Intendant of Amoy), had been chartered to the Local Government by Awoon, who, in addition to carrying on a considerable business of his own, is the recognised shroff of Messrs F. D. Syme & Co.⁹²

This suggests that the west-coast boats were employed through Awoon, a comprador, and that after the opening of the treaty ports, the expansion of Cantonese merchants to the coastal area as compradores brought about the expansion of the Cantonese pirates. Moreover, it is assumed that the purpose in employing the west-coast boats in this manner was to expand their trade routes by obtaining official assignments.⁹³ Therefore, it can be further assumed that the Cantonese pirates discovered a mutual interest with the Cantonese merchants, and through these Cantonese merchants, they were able to further expand into the treaty ports. This strategy adopted by the Cantonese pirates made them strikingly different from the Fujianese pirates who were continuously in a state of confrontation with the Fujianese merchants. This difference is believed to be a reason why the Cantonese pirates gained superiority over the Fujianese pirates in the treaty ports in the period immediately after their opening.

The Cantonese pirates took full advantage of their relationship with the Westerners and the local Qing officials. As a result, they were able to establish secure bases at the treaty ports and perpetrate piratical activities throughout a wide ranging area along the coast.⁹⁴ In particular, the advance of the Cantonese pirates

⁹⁰ FO228/251 Morrison to Bowring, No. 76, August 18, 1858.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² FO228/188 Winchester to Bowring, No. 26, February 2, 1855.

⁹³ FO228/171 Parks to Bowring, No, 71, October 23, 1854.

⁹⁴ For example, in August 1855, owing to the confession made by Liang Agou, a pirate who was

throughout the Fujian area was a situation that could not have been anticipated prior to the Opium War. The Cantonese pirates achieved their advance by forming an alliance with the native Fujianese pirates.⁹⁵ They further expanded their power by contracting to guard merchant ships.⁹⁶

The question that now arises is what situation was brought about as a result of the Cantonese pirates' expansion.

(3) The problem of the Cantonese pirates

Although the authorities of Amoy had employed Cantonese pirates, they were, at the time, unable to accommodate them financially. In November 1853, after the Qing government succeeded in suppressing the Small Sword Society, the commander of the fleet of the west-coast boats claimed that he would no longer assist the government in the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion and would return to Guangzhou if he were not paid. Subsequently, the local officials in Amoy, unable to ameliorate the situation, requested financial support from the British Consul.⁹⁷

The hired west-coast boats caused further trouble, and in December 1854, British Consul Parks reported the following:

Hwangwei, however, is not the only marauder of whom the Native merchants of Amoy have to complain. Three of their valuable Shantung (Shandong) Junks lately fell into the hands of six Canton boats, that are committing piracies in these waters, and though subsequently rescued by a mixed force of Mandarins and West coast boats in the pay of the Government, the salvage claimed by the latter almost equals the heavy ransom, previously demanded by the former. Two War-junks at present represent the stationary Naval equipment of this Port, one of which is unseaworthy and

defeated and arrested by the Qing naval forces at the mouth of Niangnianggong, Fuzhou in Sheng-jing, it was established that the members of the ship that he sailed with were men who had come from the Panyu district in Guangdong Province and engaged in piracy in the waters of Dianbai district in Guangdong Province, Shacheng district in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces, Meigouying in Fengtian, and at the mouth of Dashitou in Shandong Province. GZDXF, vol. 15, pp. 771-772 (007618), "Memorial of Cheng Zhi on February 4th in the 6th year of the Xianfeng era."

⁹⁵ FO228/188 Incl. in Backhouse to Bowring, No. 65, June 27, 1855.

⁹⁶ At Fuzhou, west-coast boats were employed for the purpose of guarding cargo ships. GZDXF, vol. 26, pp. 107-109 (012597), "Memorial of Qing Duan, on June 25th in the 10th year of the Xianfeng era."

⁹⁷ The British Consul refused this request. FO228/155 Backhouse to Bonham, No. 102, November 29, 1853.

the other would perhaps be joined to be scarcely less useless.⁹⁸

This indicates that both the piratical west-coast boats and those employed by the government demanded almost the same amount of money from the merchants. In addition, it also shows that the naval forces acted like pirates and that they lacked the capacity to wage war.

An event occurred in January 1855, in which a west-coast boat that had been captured by HMS *Hermes* and sold was recaptured by the west-coast boats employed by the Circuit Intendant of Amoy and sent to Jinmen Island. The interpreter Winchester demanded the restoration of the west-coast boat, however, the Circuit Intendant replied that since the west-coast boats had been dismissed, it was impossible for him to influence them and that he would need the support of the British government to recover the ship because there was no superior junks under the command of the admiral of the naval forces in Fujian. Eventually, the British Consul was able to recover the ship after pressuring Awoon through the Portuguese Consul.⁹⁹ Based on this report, we can assume that as a result of the west-coast boats' dismissal, the Qing government lost its influence over them and found it impossible to deal with them.

Further, on February 13, 1855, Winchester was told that the west-coast boats formerly employed by the Circuit Intendant had set sail eight days previously and that they had captured two Taiwan and Quanzhou junks.¹⁰⁰ In other words, the west-coast boats had returned to being pirates immediately after having been dismissed from service.

These activities of the west-coast boats created obstacles for trade at the treaty ports. On June 27, 1855, British Consul Backhouse wrote the following:

Sir,

It is an honor to inform your Excellency that there is presently an unusual number of piratical vessels, of which many are West Coast boats, infesting the coast of this province. Native vessels trading between this place and Formosa are at a great risk of being captured, whilst communication between this place and Foochow as well as even places to the north of it has stopped completely as far as the native craft is concerned.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ FO228/171 Parks to Bowring, No. 86, December 12, 1854.

⁹⁹ FO228/188 Winchester to Bowring, No. 26, February 2, 1855.

¹⁰⁰ FO228/188 Winchester to Bowring, No. 30, February 13, 1855.

¹⁰¹ FO228/188 Backhouse to Bowring, No. 65, June 27, 1855.

At this point in time, in the mid-1850s, the piratical activities of the west-coast boats had reached their zenith. The Qing government, unable to tackle them by itself, needed to take other measures.

4: The Royal Navy and the Restoration of Regional Order

(1) Cooperation between the local Qing officials and Britain

After the enthronement of Xianfeng as Emperor in March 1850, the relationship between the Qing central government and Britain deteriorated. The cooperation that had once existed between the Royal Navy and the Qing government no longer reached to the level of Governor-General or Governor. In Fujian Province, British Consul Parks made a formal representation to the Circuit Intendant of Amoy to inform the Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang of the willingness of Sir J. Bowring, British Minister in China who concurrently served as Governor-General of Hong Kong, and the Naval Commander-in-chief to assist and cooperate with the Chinese authorities in the suppression of piracy. Parks believed that the Circuit Intendant wanted the Royal Navy's support, but had been hesitant to transmit this message to the Governor-General.¹⁰² This is an indication of the negative attitude of the provincial authorities.

The memoir of the Governor-General Wang Yide on August 7, 1856, stated the following:

I received a note from Bowring stating that “pirates are roaming freely while the five ports are open to trade and they are plundering at will; although [I] dispatched warships (*shichuan*) and suppressed them thoroughly, the effect has not been sufficient. At present, during winter and spring, [I would like to] dispatch a warship from Wusong to sail south along the coast via Ningpo, Fuzhou, Amoy, Hong Kong, and Huangpu; during summer and autumn, [I would like to] dispatch it from Huangpu to sail north via Hong Kong, Amoy, Fuzhou, Ningpo, and Wusong. Moreover, [I will] order said ship to eliminate any threats posed by lurking pirate ships, which damage merchant ships, and in doing so, [I] expect silence.”

I, Wang Yide, control the sea through the Naval Forces of Fujian and Guangdong. The sea [of Fujian and Guangdong] is broad and long, and

¹⁰² FO228/188 Parks to Bowring, No. 7, January 6, 1855.

though pirates have taken advantage of this opportunity and plundered at will, I have already ordered the Regional Commanders (*zhenjiang*), whose jurisdictions are of said places, to command the naval forces, patrol at all times, and suppress the pirates in cooperation with one another. According to the military and civil officers of the naval forces and land forces of Fujian and Zhejiang, they have attacked and captured many pirates; therefore, there is no need to suppress and arrest pirates in cooperation with these barbarians.¹⁰³

Wang does not report that the naval force was powerless, and claims that it could suppress the pirates independently. Moreover, he could not officially approve cooperating with the Royal Navy.

However, in Amoy, the alliance of the local Qing officials and merchants with the British Consul and the Royal Navy against the pirates had already been formed and was strengthened during the 1850s. In particular, the local Qing officials, who were unable to cope with the west-coast boats, responded positively to the request of the British Consul and the Royal Navy.

In June 1855, the British Consul and the admiral of the Qing naval forces in Fujian, Li Tingyu, agreed to dispatch an allied fleet consisting of British warships and junks of the Qing naval forces to suppress pirates. Although it was not carried out because the British ships were suddenly dispatched elsewhere, owing to the appearance of pirates there,¹⁰⁴ it was an epoch-making event.

Moreover, the difficulty in discriminating between pirate ships and fishing boats/merchant ships had become more problematic.¹⁰⁵ Thus, in February 1856, in response to the request of the Commander of HMS *Bittern*, the Qing naval forces in Fujian agreed to dispatch officials for the purpose of identifying pirate ships.¹⁰⁶

On March 30, 1857, the Circuit Intendant of Amoy was informed that the fleet of junks carrying rice from Taiwan had been captured by west-coast boats near Amoy and he requested the dispatch of British warships. The British Consul

¹⁰³ SGXD, vol.1, p. 265. Matsuura quotes this account from *Choubian yiwu shimo*, but there are some mistakes in that he regards *shichuan* as a ship of the Qing naval forces (Matsuura 1995, pp. 156-158).

¹⁰⁴ FO228/188 Backhouse to Bowring, No. 65, June 27, 1855.

¹⁰⁵ For example, it became such a problem that the Magistrate (*zhifu*) of Fuzhou regarded the Canton junk captured by HMS *Bittern* around Shipu in May 1856 as a merchant ship and demanded its release. FO228/215 Medhurst to Bowring, No. 32, May 9, 1856.

¹⁰⁶ FO228/211 Backhouse to Bowring, No. 20, February 8, 1856.

complied with this request, and HMS *Camilla*, a sloop, set sail and took charge of search and suppression of the pirates.¹⁰⁷ This indicates that a circuit of cooperation had been formed, linking the Chinese merchants and British warships through the local Qing officials and the British Consul.

The west-coast boats were dealt a serious blow as a result of this systematic cooperation between the Royal Navy and the local Qing officials. The system, combined with the suppression of pirates in the seas off Guangdong as a result of the alliance between the Royal Navy and the Qing government,¹⁰⁸ and the suppression of the west-coast boats by steamships bought by Jiangsu and Zhejiang merchants,¹⁰⁹ became a serious impediment to the expansion of the Cantonese pirates. This is evidenced by the decline of the activity of the Cantonese pirates during the second half of the 1850s.

In 1859, the west-coast boats were once again employed by the government.¹¹⁰ However, the next year they were expelled from the vicinity of Fuzhou because they had clashed with the Fujianese in Fuzhou.¹¹¹ Given the activity of the expelled west-coast boats near Ningpo in July 1859, we can assume that they had been removed from the seas around Fujian.¹¹² Further, on November 19, 1860, a fleet of eighteen west-coast boats with crews of two to three thousand tried to invade Fuzhou but were defeated and suffered great losses.¹¹³ This point in history marked the end of the golden age of the Cantonese pirates in the coastal area of Fujian.

¹⁰⁷ FO228/233 Morrison to Bowring, No. 20, April 3, 1857.

¹⁰⁸ Graham 1978, pp. 285-286.

¹⁰⁹ The steamships that were bought by the merchants of Ningpo and Shanghai for the purpose of guarding *caoyun* (Grain Transport) from 1855 to 1856 inflicted great damage on the pirates, which were mainly composed of west-coast boats from the coast of Fengtian to Zhejiang. GZDXF, vol. 16, pp. 735-737 (008110), "Memorial of He Guiqing on May 3rd in the 6th year of the Xianfeng era."

¹¹⁰ On February 29th in the 9th year of the Xianfeng era, west-coast boats were employed for the purpose of sweeping pirates from the sea of Meizhou in Putian district. GZDXF, vol. 23, pp. 768-769 (011569), "Memorial of Qing Duan on December 15th in the 9th year of the Xianfeng era."

¹¹¹ The west-coast boats that clashed with Fujianese (Quanzhou and Zhangzhou people) and bombarded Nantai left Fuzhou. GZDXF, vol. 26, pp. 107-109 (012597), "Memorial of Qing Duan on June 25th in the 10th year of the Xianfeng era."

¹¹² On July, the west-coast boats attacked Ruian and Wenzhou, but they were repelled. GZDXF, vol. 26, pp. 111-114, "Memorial of Qing Duan on June 25th in the 10th year of the Xianfeng era."

¹¹³ GZDXF, vol. 27, pp. 660-663 (013345), "Memorial of Qing Duan on October 24th in the 11th year of the Xianfeng era;" FO228/289 Incl. 1 in Medhurst to Bruce, No. 95, November 23, 1860.

(2) The establishment of regional maritime order

The activities of the Royal Navy greatly influenced regional maritime order. It was, for example, of critical importance that British warships anchored at Amoy. The British Consul insisted on sending British warships on patrol between Fuzhou and Amoy when the pirates approached Amoy in 1851.¹¹⁴ It was then that the necessity of anchoring a British warship in Amoy was recognized.¹¹⁵ There was also a realization that the number of warships stationed at the treaty ports was insufficient. In 1853, British Consul D. B. Robertson advocated that a British warship be present at Amoy everyday.¹¹⁶

With regard to the local Qing officials, the Circuit Intendant of Amoy expected support from British warships when there was an uprising in the territory under his jurisdiction after the Small Sword Society was suppressed in 1854.¹¹⁷ Moreover, in 1860, the Circuit Intendant of Amoy told the British Consul that although there might have been cause for panic due to the threat of an attack on Amoy by a fleet of pirates, in his opinion the brigs of the Royal Navy and the many other foreign ships in the harbor had ensured security sufficiently.¹¹⁸

This indicates that both the British Consul and the local Qing officials recognized the need to station British warships in Amoy to defend it against pirates and the like. In fact, it was impossible for the pirates to capture Amoy while a warship was stationed there, and they did not even attempt it.

As a result, the security of the treaty port of Amoy was ensured and the pirates were unable to influence the trade by foreign ships in the treaty ports. As mentioned above, the ships of the opium trade had moved to the treaty ports and neighboring areas. Therefore, the concentration of trade by foreign ships at the treaty ports was established. This point in history signaled the end of the decentralization of trade in southern Fujian, which had started at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The pirates that attacked Chinese junks near Amoy were not eliminated since the Royal Navy could only suppress piratical activities on the high seas, not in the

¹¹⁴ FO228/125 Sullivan to Bonham, No. 53, August 7, 1851.

¹¹⁵ The number of British warships stationed at China Station and East Indies Station was only 18 to 23, Fox 1940, p. 195.

¹¹⁶ FO228/155 Incl. 2 in Robertson to Bonham, No. 111, December 22, 1853.

¹¹⁷ But the British side acted with caution. FO228/171 Parks to Bowring, No. 80, November 27, 1854.

¹¹⁸ FO228/285 Gingell to Bruce No. 71, September 9, 1860.

territorial waters of China.¹¹⁹ Therefore, the Qing government was responsible for maintaining public peace in its own territorial waters.

However, in the first half of the 1850s, the military power of the Qing government in the area surrounding Amoy was insufficient to suppress the pirates in the region. In 1854, villagers in the coastal area of Tongan district engaged in piracy against ships that facilitated trade between Amoy and its environs and blocked the traffic between Amoy and Quanzhou. As a result, British Consul Parks requested the admiral of the Qing naval forces in Fujian, Li Tingyu, to suppress these villages.¹²⁰ This shows that Parks considered it important to ensure the security of traffic between Amoy and the hinterlands.

In response to this request, Li Tingyu informed Parks that he had initially failed to suppress the villages, but had again ordered land and naval forces to suppress them.¹²¹ Parks observed that although the admiral had suppressed the villages that supported the revolt in Tongan, the suppression of the piratical villages was ineffective due to the lack of military strength (the number of men serving on the ships was a mere several hundred).¹²² This indicates the lack of local military strength¹²³ and the toleration of local officials for all, including pirates, as long as they were not in rebellion against the state.

The report of the British Consul in February 1859 stated that there were piratical activities near the port of Amoy and that kidnappings for ransom were being carried out in the villages around Amoy and within the city itself.¹²⁴ In the same year, a memorial of Qing Duan, the Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang, stated that the inhabitants of the township of Jiutou in Maxiang subprefecture were repeatedly engaged in piracy, and when the naval forces were moved to Jiutou to arrest them, they had seized the opportunity to plunder the inner harbor of Amoy. The naval forces assembled against them in Amoy planned to suppress

¹¹⁹ Actually, when British warships were in pursuit of pirates, they ignored the territorial boundaries and sometimes landed and attacked the villages involved in piracy as on the instance on September 1858 (see Table).

¹²⁰ FO228/171 Incl. 1 in Parks to Bowring, No. 51, July 31, 1854.

¹²¹ FO228/171 Incl. 2 in Parks to Bowring, No. 51, July 31, 1854.

¹²² FO228/171 Parks to Bowring, No. 51, July 31, 1854.

¹²³ It was difficult for the local Qing officials to intervene in the armed villages in southern Fujian. For instance, on November 1852, an incident occurred in which the local officials and military officers who went to township of Taichong in Jinjiang district, where robberies had frequently occurred, were attacked, and four soldiers and attendants were killed. GZDXF, vol. 6, pp. 192-193 (002796), "Memorial of Ji Zhichang on November 7th in the 2nd year of the Xianfeng era."

¹²⁴ FO228/265 Morrison to Bowring, No. 12, February 11, 1859.

the township, and requested that Xue Shiyi, *Shuishì tìbiao zhongjun canjiang* (Assistant Regional Commander of the Adjutant to the Provincial Command of the Naval Force), be punished because he had not been positively involved in the suppression.¹²⁵ This indicates that the military officials were unenthusiastic about the suppression of these pirates. However, in October 1859, Xue Shiyi participated in the suppression of Jiutou.¹²⁶ Therefore, it can be assumed that the local expansion of pirates was thwarted.

The question that now arises is why local Qing officials did not seriously wish to eradicate the pirates around Amoy? The answer is that after the trade of the treaty ports had been stabilized and concentrated therein, rebellion suppressed, and the west-coast boats restrained, these small-scale pirates did not pose a great threat to the local Qing officials in Amoy. Finally, by the end of the 1850s in southern Fujian, the Qing government was able to restore public order, which was in a sense analogous to the order established at the end of the seventeenth century, by concentrating on trade at Amoy and eradicating large-scale piracy. It was not necessary for the local officials to intervene any further in local matters.¹²⁷ Although there was a time lag, similar restorations of public order were achieved in other treaty ports after the 1860s.

In conclusion

This article can be summarized in the following manner. The concentration of trade at the treaty ports after their opening dealt a blow to the people who were engaged in the opium trade in the coastal area, and this resulted in the expansion of piracy. The activities of the pirates prompted the British to withdraw their nonintervention policy, and the Royal Navy began to actively suppress the pirates, using the treaty ports as their bases. As a result, it became impossible for the pirates to organize large scale fleets, and the pirate bands were suppressed by the end of the 1840s.

The suppression by the Royal Navy caused the Fujianese pirates to lose the influence that they had maintained since the Song Period. The expansion of the

¹²⁵ GZDXF, vol. 23, pp. 394-396 (011345), "Memorial of Qing Duan on November 3rd in the 9th year of the Xianfeng era."

¹²⁶ GZDXF, vol. 24, pp. 852-853 (012097-1), "Memorial of Qing Duan on March 28th in the 10th year of the Xianfeng era."

¹²⁷ This is similar to the fact that local officials were halfhearted about intervening in clan disputes.

Cantonese pirates and the uprising of the Small Sword Society were also factors that led to the decline of the Fujianese pirates. On the other hand, the Cantonese pirates expanded their power throughout the coastal area as a result of their relationship with foreigners, the utilization of secure bases, the alliance with Qing naval forces, and the utilization of Cantonese merchants. Their power reached its zenith in the mid 1850s.

In contrast, the Royal Navy in cooperation with the local officials used treaty ports, such as Amoy, as their bases in an effort to suppress the Cantonese pirates and thus ensured the security of trade by foreign ships between the treaty ports. This led to the centralization of the previously decentralized trade in the treaty ports. This situation spread to the other treaty ports, and as a result, the Qing government was able to suppress the Fujianese pirates and thereafter restrain the Cantonese pirates by utilizing the power of the Royal Navy. Furthermore, the Qing government accomplished the reorganization of public order in the coastal area by, in a sense, “pacifying” the Royal Navy. The Qing government was able to restore order in the coastal area, bearing a lesser financial burden than that needed to pacify the Chinese pirates.

Although the Qing government came to form an official alliance with Britain as a result of the Treaty of Tianjin and Beijing concluding the Arrow War,¹²⁸ it can be seen as both the ratification of the cooperation that had been going on between local Qing officials and the British and the expansion of this cooperation into all the treaty ports.

During the 1860s, the age of pirates, which had begun at the end of the eighteenth century in the coastal area of South China, came to an end as a result of the progress made in their suppression.¹²⁹ The centralization of trade and the development of the system of Foreign Inspectorate of Customs at the treaty ports brought the coastal area into a new age, in which the treaty ports played a central role. Furthermore, 1868 saw not only the continued restraint on British military intervention,¹³⁰ but also the building of China’s first steam gunboat at the Jiangnan

¹²⁸ Article 19 in the Treaty of Tianjin required the Qing authorities to suppress pirates when British ships were damaged. Article 52 required supply of British warships engaged in the pursuit of pirates, and Article 53 included regulations concerning the joint suppression of piracy by China and Britain.

¹²⁹ The suppression of pirates was carried out in Southeast Asia primarily by the Royal Navy during almost the same period. I hope to investigate the relationship between these two contemporary phenomena in the future.

¹³⁰ Fox 1940, p. 67.

arsenal and dockyard, i.e., the modern Chinese navy had begun to take shape.¹³¹ The Qing government as a result accomplished the reorganization of public order in the coastal area under its own direction. The new public order that was forged in this process was in a sense firmer than that of the early Qing period—due mainly to the technological superiority of the modern naval forces and the introduction of the system of maritime customs.

This gives rise to a final question. How did the people of the coastal areas who had been marginalized by this process react? I intend to continue my investigation of these problems, including that of shipwrecks, which is inherently related to that of piracy, in the near future.

Glossary

<i>baojia</i>	保甲	Fujianren	福建人
<i>buzhengshi</i>	布政使	Funing	福寧
<i>canjiang</i>	參將	Fuqing	福清
<i>canjun</i>	參軍	Fuzhou	福州
<i>caoyun</i>	漕運	Gantang	竿塘
Chaozhou	潮州	Guangfu ren	廣府人
Chen Guotai	陳國泰	<i>guangting</i>	廣艇
Chentou	陳頭	<i>haiguan</i>	海關
Cheng Zhi	承志	<i>haijin</i>	海禁
Chongwu	崇武	<i>hanjian</i>	漢奸
<i>Chouban yiwu shimo</i>		Hecuo	何厝
	籌辦夷務始末	He Guiqing	何桂清
Dashitou	大石頭	<i>hongdan</i>	紅單
<i>daotai</i>	道臺	Hutoushan	虎頭山
Dengzhou	登州	Huang Fuxing	黃富興
Dianbai	電白	Huangpu	黃埔
Dinghai	定海	Huangqi	黃岐
Dou Chenbiao	竇辰彪	Huang Wei	黃位
<i>fenggang</i>	封港	Huian	惠安
Fengtian	奉天	Jilong	鷄籠（基隆）

¹³¹ For the Chinese Steam Navy, see Wright 2000.

* I would like to thank Mr. Michael Jamentz of Ritsumeikan University for his helpful advice.

Ji Zhichang	季芝昌	Shanghua	善化
Jiaying	嘉應	<i>shaochuan</i>	哨船
Jiangnan	江南	Shao Lianke	邵連科
Jinjiang	晉江	Shenhu	深滬
Jinmen	金門	Shenti	深鵜
Jinmen zhen	金門鎮	Shengjing	盛京
Jinzhou	金州	<i>shichuan</i>	師船
Jiutou	柏頭	Shipu	石浦
Jungongchang	軍功廠	<i>shoubei</i>	守備
Li Tingyu	李廷鈺	Shushang	書尚
Li Zhanggeng	李長庚	<i>shuishi</i>	水師
Liang Agou	梁阿狗	Shuishiyi	水師營
Lin Kan	林坎	<i>shuiyong</i>	水勇
Lin Zexu	林則徐	Taichong	太沖
Liu Yunke	劉韻珂	Taiping	太平
Longyan	龍岩	<i>tibiao</i>	提標
Maxiang	馬巷	<i>tidu</i>	提督
Meigouying	沒溝營	Tingzhou	汀州
Meizhou	湄州	Tongan	同安
Min'an ying	閩安營	<i>tuanlian</i>	團練
Min'nan	閩南	Wang Yide	王懿德
Nan'an	南安	Weitouao	圍頭澳
Nan'ao	南澳	Wenzhou	溫州
Nan'guan	南關	Wokou	倭寇
Nanri	南日	Wusong	吳淞
Nantai	南臺	Xiangjun	湘軍
<i>niyi</i>	逆夷	<i>xiangyong</i>	鄉勇
Niangnianggong	娘娘宮	Xiaodaohui	小刀會
Panyu	番禺	Xiaojinmen	小金門
Penghu	澎湖	<i>xiebiao</i>	協標
Putian	莆田	Xinghua	興化
Quanzhou	泉州	Xingquanyong dao	興泉永道
<i>Qinchai dazhen</i>	欽差大臣	Xu Guangjin	徐廣縉
Qing Duan	慶端	Xu Jishe	徐繼畬
Ruian	瑞安	Xue Shi	薛師儀
Sanduo	三都澳	<i>yahang</i>	牙行
Shacheng	沙城	Yan Botao	顏伯燾

<i>yangdao</i>	洋盜	Zhang Shiwu	張十五
Yang Zaifu	楊載福	Zhangzhou	漳州
<i>yichuan</i>	夷船	<i>zhaofu</i>	招撫
<i>yiren</i>	夷人	Zhenhai	鎮海
Yi Xing	奕興	<i>zhenjiang</i>	鎮將
<i>youying</i>	右營	Zheng	鄭
Yu Rui	裕瑞	Zheng Gaoxiang	鄭高祥
Yushan	漁山	<i>zhifu</i>	知府
Yue Bin	岳斌	<i>zhongjun</i>	中軍
Yue fei	粵匪	Zhuoqi	卓崎
<i>zhanchuan</i>	戰船	<i>zongbingguan</i>	總兵官
Zhang Jixin	張集馨		

Bibliography

ADM125: Great Britain Admiralty, China Station.

FO228: Great Britain Foreign Office, Embassy and Consular Archives, China, Correspondence Series I.

FO663: Great Britain Foreign Office, Embassy and Consular Archives, China, Amoy.

FSXDSH: Fujian Shanghai Xiaodaohui dangan shiliao huibian 福建·上海小刀會檔案史料匯編 (*The collection of the archives on the Small Sword Society in Fujian and Shanghai*) Shanghai shifan daxue lishixi Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiushi 上海師範大學歷史系中國近代史研究室, Zhongguo diyi lishi dangangan bianjibu 中國第一歷史檔案館編輯部 eds., Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993.

JDLSD: Jiaqing Daoguang liangchao shangyu dang 嘉慶道光兩朝上諭檔 (*Imperial edicts of the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns*) 55 vols., Zhongguo diyi lishi dangangan 中國第一歷史檔案館 ed., Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2000.

DQWXS: Da Qing Wenzong Xianhuangdi Shilu 大清文宗顯皇帝實錄 (*Veritable records of the Qing Dynasty during the Xianfeng reign*), Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964.

DXHJL: Dao Xian huanhai jianwen lu 道咸宦海見聞錄 (*The record of the official world during the Daoguang and Xianfeng reigns*), Zhang Jixin 張集馨, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981.

- GZDDG: Gongzhongdang Daoguang chao zouzhe 宮中檔道光朝奏摺 (Palace memorials of the Daoguang reign) National Palace Museum, Taipei.
- GZDXF: Gongzhongdang Xianfeng chao zouzhe 宮中檔咸豐朝奏摺 (Palace memorials of the Xianfeng reign) National Palace Museum, Taipei.
- QGLDQ: *Qingdai guanyuan Lüli dang'an quanbian* 清代官員履歷檔案全編 (*Entire archives about personal history of officials during the Qing period*) 30vols, Qin Guojing 秦國經 ed., Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1997.
- QZTDS: *Qing-zhengfu zhengya Taipingtianguo dang'an shiliao* 清政府鎮壓太平天國檔案史料 (*The collection of the archives on the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion by Qing government*) Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 ed., Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1993.
- SGXD: *Si guo xin dang* 四國新檔 (*The new archives of four countries*), The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica ed., Taipei: the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1966.
- YZDS: *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao* 鴉片戰爭檔案史料 (*The collection of the archives on the Opium War*) 7 vols, Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 ed., Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1992.
- Antony, Robert J. (An Lebo 安樂博) 1999. "Zuifan huo shouhaizhe: shixi 1795 nian zhi 1810 nian Guangdong sheng haidao jituan zhi chengyin ji qi chengyin zhi shehui beijing" 罪犯或受害者：試析一七九五年至一八一〇年廣東省海盜集團之成因及其成因之社會背景 ("Criminals and victims: An attempt to analyze the causes of the formation of pirates groups in Guangdong province and their social background from 1795 to 1810") in Tang Xiyong 湯熙勇, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhan shi lunwen ji* 中國海洋發展史論文集, vol. 7, Taipei: Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Science and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, pp. 439-451.
- 2003. *Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in Late Imperial South China*, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley: University of California.
- Colledge, J.J. 2003. *Ships of the Royal Navy: The Complete Record of All Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy*, London: Greenhill Books.
- Fairbank, John K. 1953. *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Fox, Grace 1940. *British Admirals and Chinese Pirates 1832-1869*, London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD.

- Gao Mingling 高銘鈴 2003, “Jūkyū sēki zen/chūki ni okeru Taiwanmai no Ryūtsū ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu” 一九世紀前・中期における臺灣米の流通に関する一考察 (“The circulation of Taiwanese rice during the Early and Middle 19th century”) *Tōyō gakuho* 東洋學報85-2, pp. 87-117.
- Graham, Gerald S. 1978. *The China Station: War and Diplomacy 1830-1860*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Huang Jiamo 黃嘉謨 1978. “Yingren yu Xiamen Xiaodaohui shijian” 英人與廈門小刀會事件 (“British and the incident of the Small Sword Society in Amoy”), *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊 7, pp. 309-354.
- Katsuta Hiroko 勝田弘子 1968. “Shindai kaikō no ran” 清代海寇の亂 (“The piratical uprising in the Qing period”), *Shiron* 史論19, pp. 27-50.
- Matsuura Akira 松浦章 1995. *Chūgoku no kaizoku* 中國の海賊 (*Pirates in China*) Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten.
- Miyata Michiaki 宮田道昭 2006. *Chūgoku no kaikō to enkai shijō: Chūgoku kindai kēzaishi ni kansuru ichi shiten* 中國の開港と沿海市場—中國近代經濟史に関する一視點 (*The opening of China and the market in the coastal area: A perspective on the economic history of modern China*) Tokyo: Tōhō shoten.
- Murakami Ei 村上衛 2000. “Gokō kaikōki Amoi ni okeru kikoku kakyō” 五港開港期廈門における歸國華僑 (The problems created by the returned overseas Chinese in Amoy after the Opium War) *Higashi Ajia kindaiishi* 東アジア近代史 3, pp. 112-130.
- 2003. “Binetsu enkaimin no katsudō to Shinchō: Jūkyū sēki zenhan no ahen bōeki katsudō wo chūshin ni” 閩粵沿海民の活動と清朝——一九世紀前半のアヘン貿易活動を中心に (The activities of the local populace in the southern Fujian—Guangdong coastal areas and the Qing dynasty, concentrating on their opium traffic during the former half of the 19th Century)” *Tōhō Gakuho* 東方學報, 75, pp. 201-271.
- 2004. “Shinchō to kankan: Ahen Sensō ji no Fukken Kanton enkaimin taisaku wo chūshinni” 清朝と漢奸—鴉片戰爭時の福建・廣東沿海民對策を中心に (“Traitors and the Qing dynasty, concentrating on the countermeasures against the local populace in the southern Fujian—Guangdong coastal area during the Opium War”) in Mori Tokihiko 森時彦, ed., *Chūgoku kindai no dōtai kōzō* 中國近代化の動態構造 (*Dynamic structure of modernization in China*), Kyoto: Institute for Research in Humanities, pp. 3-34.
- Murray, Dian H. 1987. *Pirates of the South China Coast 1790-1810*, Stanford

:Stanford University Press.

- Okamoto Takashi 1999. *Kindai Chûgoku to Kaikan* 近代中國と海關 (*China and the maritime customs system in modern times*) Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai.
- Sasaki Masaya 佐々木正哉 1963. “Kanpô san nen Amoi shôtôkai no hanran” 咸豐三年廈門小刀會の叛亂 (“The revolt of the Small Sword Society in Amoy in the 3rd year of Xianfeng”) *Tôyô gakuhô* 東洋學報 45-4, pp. 87-112.
- Tan Qixiang 譚其驤, ed. 1987. *Zhongguo lishi dituji* 中國歷史地圖集 (*The historical atlas of China*), vol. 8, Beijing: Ditu chubanshe.
- Wang Jiajian 1999. “Qing dai de lüying shuishi (1681-1864)” 清代的綠營水師 (1681-1864) (The naval force of the Green Standard during the Qing period) in Li Jinqiang 李金強, Liu Yizhang 劉義章 and Mai Jingsheng 麥勁生, ed., *Jindai Zhongguo haifang: Junshi yu jingji* 近代中國海防—軍事與經濟 (*Coastal defense in modern China: military affairs and economy*) Hongkong: Xianggang Zhongguo jindaishi xuehui, pp. 199-215.
- Wright, Richard N. J. 2000, *The Chinese Steam Navy 1862-1945*, London: Chatam Publishing.
- Yokoi Katsuhiko 横井勝彦 1988. *Ajia no umi no Daiê tēkoku: Jūkyū-sēki kaiyō shi-hai no kōzō* アジアの海の大英帝國—19世紀海洋支配の構造 (*The British Empire in Asian seas: The Structure of maritime control during the 19th century*) Tokyo: Dōbunkan Shuppan.
- Zhang Zhongxun 張中訓 1986. “Qing Jiaqing nianjian Minzhe haidao zuzhi yanjiu” 清嘉慶年間閩浙海盜組織研究 (“A study on the organization of the pirates in Zhejiang and Fujian during the Jiaqing period”) in *Zhongguo haiyang fazhan shi lunwen ji bianji weiyuanhui* 中國海洋發展史論文集編輯委員會, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhan shi lunwen ji* 中國海洋發展史論文集, vol. 2, Taipei: The Institute of the Three Principles of the People, Academia Sinica, pp. 161-198.