

Educational Implications of E. Fromm's View of "Ends": Reference to J. Dewey's Idea of the Means–Ends Relationship

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1. Introduction: Fromm and Dewey

Erich Fromm (1900–1980) was a German-born exiled psychoanalyst who worked mainly in America and Mexico during the 20th century. As is well known, he was greatly influenced and inspired by Freud and considered himself the “pupil and translator of Freud” (Fromm, 1966, p. 59). He was not only familiar with Freud’s theories but also “studied and became conversant in the works of major American thinkers,” such as Emerson, Thoreau, James, and “the philosopher and education reformer John Dewey” after migrating to the United States (Friedman, 2013, p. 58). Fromm was clearly intrigued by Dewey and indicated that “Freud’s position” was “in essential points similar to that taken by John Dewey” (Fromm, 1950, p. 20n). However, Fromm briefly examined Dewey’s understanding of religion and compared it with “religious” aspects of Freud’s thought (p. 20n). He examined Dewey’s ethics in more detail in *Man for Himself (MFH)* and was interested in Dewey’s idea of the means–ends relationship (Fromm, 1947/1990a). Therefore, this paper highlights the relationship between Fromm and Dewey, as indicated in Fromm’s *MFH*.

Fromm and Dewey are too far apart in terms of common framework of history of thoughts; Fromm is an exile from Germany, who was a member of early Frankfurt School, on the other hand, Dewey is a prominent American pragmatist who worked as an educational philosopher and published *Democracy and Education*. Partly because of this distance, there are few previous studies on how Fromm interpreted Dewey’s works.¹ However, given Fromm’s admission of Dewey as a thinker of “humanistic ethics” (Fromm, 1947/1990a, pp. 25–30), philosophical relationship between the two is worthwhile to be explored. As Friedman (2013) suggested, when Fromm was a member of the Institute for Social Research and “the Institute was located in a corner of Columbia University, only Fromm sought to cultivate connections and rapport with faculty elsewhere on the campus” (p. 58). Frankfurt scholars such as Horkheimer and Adorno, heavily criticized American pragmatism and it was only Fromm who seemed genuinely interested in American intellectual traditions. Okazaki (2004), who underscored Fromm’s sympathetic quotation from Dewey in *Escape from Freedom* (p. 94; Fromm, 1941/1994, pp. 3–4), urges that “*Fromm is not a German*

¹ One exception is Yukiyasu’s (1993) work comparing Dewey’s and Fromm’s theory in order to examine the problem of alienation.

thinker but a thinker of American democracy” (Okazaki, 2004, p. 104). The current paper agrees with Okazaki that Fromm commits himself to the tradition of American democracy, but it shall focus on Fromm’s conflict in being between German and American intellectual traditions. As McLaughlin (2001) suggested, “when Fromm’s critical theory met America and David Riesman, the great tradition of German sociological theory confronted the American pragmatist sensibility and the empirical demands of American social research” (p. 17). For this reason, it is important to make clear the confrontation between the German and the American in Fromm. In subsequent sections, as part of a study to understand educational implications of Fromm’s thought, this paper attempts to present the reality of this confrontation through Fromm’s interpretations of Dewey, showing that Fromm’s original view of “ends” emerges by using its contrast with Dewey’s idea of the means–ends relationship.

2. Fromm’s Interpretation of Dewey’s Idea of the Means–Ends Relationship

This section examines Fromm’s interpretations of Dewey and Dewey’s idea of the means–ends relationship and explores affinities and differences in their theories. Fromm refers to Dewey’s works most frequently in *MFH*, which is “a continuation” (Fromm, 1947/1990a, p. vii) of *Escape from Freedom*. At the beginning of *MFH*, he declares, “I discuss the problem of ethics, of norms and values leading to the realization of man’s self and of his potentialities” (p. vii). Fromm views the modern human situation as follows:

The growing doubt of human autonomy and reason has created a state of moral confusion where man is left without the guidance of either revelation or reason. The result is the acceptance of a relativistic position which proposes that value judgements and ethical norms are exclusively matters of taste or arbitrary preference But since man can not live without values and norms, this relativism makes him an easy prey for irrational value systems. (p. 5)

Thus, for Fromm, the problem of norms and values must be addressed directly. He asks: “if we do not abandon, as ethical relativism does, the search for objectively valid norms of conduct, what criteria for such norms can we find?” (p. 8). He points out the negative side of the modern human situation in this way. It can be said that his analysis partially relates to the postmodern human situation because we are unable to believe “the grand narratives” in which people could unconditionally trust human autonomy and reason. Although Fromm’s theory is not directly relevant to postmodern thought, his question itself relates to today’s issue of how to respond to the postmodern situation.²

The name of “Dewey” appeared when Fromm advanced his research into “criteria” for “valid

² Geshi (2016) argues that we cannot escape the postmodern situation even if we do not learn postmodern thought (p. vii). Although there are some interpretations of how postmodernism affected or affects discussions in the fields of philosophy of education and educational thought studies in Japan (Geshi, 2016; Nishimura, 2013), it seems that awareness of the postmodern situation is shared in these fields.

norms of conduct." In *MFH*, Fromm locates Dewey in the tradition of humanistic ethics, which includes Aristotle and Spinoza (pp. 25–30). He considers Dewey as "the most significant contemporary proponent of a scientific ethics" (p. 28) and focuses on Dewey's idea of the means–ends relationship (pp. 29–30). However, Fromm states that "[Dewey's] opposition to any fixed ends leads him to relinquish the important position reached by Spinoza: that of a 'model of human nature' as a scientific concept" (p. 28). These statements suggest Fromm's longing for stability and security. So his opinion is incompatible with Deweyan pragmatism if we regard the latter as an expression of anti-foundationalism. But what if Fromm does not think of "ends" to be absolute ones? If so, his theory might show us an alternative way of envisaging "ends" that never falls into absolutism and relativism.

Fromm spotlights a line from Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct*: "means and ends are two names for the same reality," arguing that the two concepts "denote not a division in reality but a distinction in judgement" (Fromm, 1947/1990a, p. 29 [in Dewey, 1922/1983, p. 28]). In Dewey's view, "the distinction of means and end arises in surveying the *course* of a proposed *line* of action, a connected series in time" (Dewey, 1922/1983, p. 27). In other words, when we arrange our action in linear time, the distinction arises. On the other hand, if we remove this kind of sense of time and focus on the now, we are aware of the "reality" in which there is no separation between means and end. We are always thinking in linear time, so that we fail to understand this reality. However, Dewey does not overlook people's "judgement" in linear time.

As soon as we have projected it [end], we must begin to work backward in thought. We must change *what* is to be done into a *how*, the means whereby Only as the end is converted into means is it definitely conceived, or intellectually defined, to say nothing of being executable. (pp. 28–29)

Dewey argues that we project an end, but if "it remains a distant end, it becomes a *mere* end, that is a dream" (p. 28). "Obstacles" between an end and us have to be removed (p. 28). Dewey thinks that "to *reach* an end we must take our mind off from it" (p. 27). His idea of the means–ends relationship emphasizes the conversion from a static end to a dynamic means: from the "what" to the "how." Fromm (1947/1990a) captures this point when he concludes his citation from Dewey by telling us that

Dewey's emphasis on the interrelation between means and ends is undoubtedly a significant point in the development of a theory of rational ethics, especially in warning us against theories which by divorcing ends from means become useless. (p. 29)

Fromm agrees with Dewey: he thinks that the important thing is not to remain in linear time but to remain engaged in the now where there is no separation between means and end. For Fromm, "human existence" is "in a state of constant and unavoidable disequilibrium" (p. 40). Therefore, he assumes that human beings need something secure, but even "the new security" has to be "the security acquired *each*

moment by man's spontaneous activity" (Fromm, 1941/1994, p. 262, emphasis added). In the same way as Dewey's theory, Fromm tries to disclose our reality in the now. However, the following passage is slightly different from the above affirmative evaluation.

The overemphasis on ends leads to a distortion of the harmonious balance between means and ends in various ways: one way is that all emphasis is on *ends* without sufficient consideration of the role of means. The outcome of this distortion is that the ends become abstract, unreal, and eventually nothing but pipe dreams. This danger has been discussed at length by Dewey. The isolation of ends can have the opposite effect: while the end is ideologically retained it serves merely as a cover for shifting all the emphasis to those activities which are allegedly means to this end. (Fromm, 1947/1990a, p. 195)

Although Fromm shares a sense of danger with Dewey that "the ends become abstract," his concern is directed toward "the *overemphasis*" (p. 195, emphasis added) on ends. He approves of defining ends themselves; therefore, Fromm criticizes that Dewey's "opposition to any fixed ends." Here Fromm sharply distinguishes his own theory from Dewey:

It does not seem to be true that "we do not *know* what we are really after until a *course* of action is mentally worked out."³ Ends can be ascertained by the empirical analysis of the total phenomenon—of man—even if we do not yet know the means to achieve them. There are ends about which valid propositions can be made, although they lack at the moment, so to speak, hands and feet. The science of man can give us a picture of a "model of human nature" from which ends can be deduced before means are found to achieve them. (pp. 29–30)

Fromm's view of ends differs from Dewey's, for Fromm believes that ends can be deduced without means if we are aware of a human being as a total phenomenon. Let us translate such an assumed situation into a practical example in a high school, where a female student who wants to become a medical student after graduation comes to talk with a teacher. Apparently, she has this clear goal but is worried about her path to it.⁴ The teacher engages in dialogue with her, finding that she has the goal because one of her parents is a doctor and because both parents expect her to become a doctor. The teacher realizes that the purported goal is not real for her and that a better goal takes a direction that no one knows as yet. Even if means are not found to achieve the goal, the teacher can tell her that the real goal is not to become a doctor—if the teacher remains aware of the student's total phenomenon.

However, if we depend on Dewey's theory, the real goal can never be discovered until the student starts to convert the purported goal into practical means. In contrast to Fromm, Dewey argues that an end

³ In Dewey, 1922/1983, p. 29.

⁴ There is a conceptual difference between end and goal. However, the current paper deliberately pays no attention to that difference in order to focus on a sense of an objective included in the concept of end.

is not “intellectually defined” until “the end is converted into means.” Dewey (1938/1988) criticized “deduction of ends” (p. 354), as he believed that deduction implied losing “the *interdependence* of means and end” (p. 352) such that it leads to positing end without the deliberation of actual means. Hence, Fromm’s idea is incompatible with that of Dewey from the perspective of experimentalism in the Deweyan sense given that Fromm considers the actuality of means only in his mind when he designs ends. However, Fromm did not show us the absolute way of seeking ends. How, then, does he draw out ends by way of his theory? Let us further examine the nature of ends in Fromm’s thought.

3. How to Reach Ends by Fromm’s Idea?

Fromm says, in the above section, ends can be “deduced” from “a picture of a model of human nature” generated by “the science of man.” Therefore, we must understand the concepts of “human nature” and “the science of man” in Fromm’s theory to clarify his view of ends.⁵ Regarding Fromm’s concept of “human nature,” Bronner (1994) explained that it was “neither fixed nor infinitely malleable” (p. 213), but he did not elaborate the reason behind this and how its concept was brought from “the science of man.” In the following section, I investigate how Fromm reached his conception of ends by focusing on his understanding of “the science of man” and the concept of “human nature.”

According to Fromm, the science of man is a method that “is to observe the reactions of man to various individual and social conditions and from observation of these reactions to make inferences about man’s nature” (Fromm, 1947/1990a, p. 23). He adds that “this science does not start out with a full and adequate picture of what human nature is” (p. 23). On the contrary, “human nature can never be observed as such” (p. 24). Thus, for Fromm, “human nature” is neither a priori concept nor an absolute substance.

However, Fromm attempts to frame “human nature” in “specific situations” (p. 24). As evidence for this, he opposes “the theory of the infinite malleability of human nature” (p. 21). If so, “norms and institutions unfavorable to human welfare” (p. 21) end up molding human beings’ character. But, in fact, people try to “change these [cultural] conditions” (p. 23). Fromm assumes that people can reject them if they are not suitable for “human welfare.” Therefore, he clearly mentions that “[man] cannot change his nature” (p. 23). For Fromm, “human nature” is presupposed in his theory, so he tries to apply the concept of human nature to the “science of man.”

The thoroughgoing dynamic study of all manifestations of human nature will lead to the inference of a *tentative* picture of human nature and what the laws governing it are. A humanistic science of man must begin with the concept of human nature, while at the same time aiming to discover what this human nature is. Needless to say, a number of studies should be made of different societies (industrial, preindustrial, primitive) in which hypotheses on human nature should be tested. (Fromm, 1957/2010, pp. 104–105, emphasis added)

⁵ Further research is needed to compare the concept of “human nature” indicated by Fromm and Dewey.

The important point in the “science of man” is to infer a “tentative” picture of human nature. For Fromm, scientific study cannot prepare a perfect picture of human nature in advance because he mentions that “scientific knowledge is not absolute but ‘optimal’” (Fromm, 1947/1990a, p. 239). Therefore, he assumes that the “science of man” can draw a “tentative” picture of human nature. As such, it follows that the “model of human nature” that I explained above is also a “tentative” one. We learned ends could be “deduced” from “a picture of a model of human nature.” Considering this point, it must be concluded that ends are “tentative” in Fromm’s theory.

Is this view of ends incompatible with Dewey’s insight into the means–ends relationship? If the insight demands that we do not discuss any ends, it would be flagrantly inconsistent with Fromm’s view of ends.⁶ However, as cited in the former section, Dewey grasps a “projected” end. In another part of *Human Nature and Conduct*, he says that

sometimes desire means not bare impulse but impulse which has sense of an objective. In this case desire and thought cannot be opposed, for desire includes thought within itself. The question is now how far the work of thought has been done, how adequate is its perception of its directing object. For the moving force may be a shadowy presentiment constructed by wishful hope rather than by study of conditions; it may be an emotional indulgence rather than a solid plan built upon the rocks of actuality discovered by accurate inquiries. (Dewey, 1922/1983, pp. 176–177)

Fromm and Dewey clearly shared the “sense of an objective.” However, for Dewey, “[every such idealized object] becomes an aim or end only when it is worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization, that is in terms of ‘means’” (p. 161). He stresses a conversion from a static end to a dynamic means: from the “what” to the “how.”⁷ In contrast, Fromm’s stress is on the scientific study before the conversion. Fromm indicates that “the *consciously* perceived end may be something different from the one which is perceived *unconsciously*” (Fromm, 1947/1990a, p. 193). He is careful and vigilant against losing reality when human beings try to convert fixed ends into means. Thus, his stress is placed on the examination *before* the conversion. Although Fromm agrees with Dewey’s idea of the conversion, he seems to avoid shedding a light on the means itself. Fromm and Dewey are totally different in emphatic point when they discuss ends. Fromm is not a thinker of the how:⁸

⁶ Noddings (2016), a contemporary educational philosopher, also discussed Dewey’s notion of ends and provided a new perspective for it: She mentioned that “I have attempted a defense of Dewey’s use of growth staying entirely within his frame of reference, but we might challenge the frame itself” (p. 27). By the way, “Dewey insisted that growth is its own end” (p. 26), according to her. It seems that her suggestion more or less justifies analyzing Dewey’s notion of ends in the same manner as Fromm.

⁷ Saito (2005), who discussed Dewey’s idea of the means–ends relationship, asserted that Dewey was a “philosopher of the how” (p. 87). Bernstein (2016), who is a contemporary philosopher in the U.S., also considered Dewey’s idea of “end” or “end-in-view” to be the problem of “means” (p. 55). It seems that these sort of interpretations of Dewey are widely shared.

⁸ See Footnote 7.

One of the most outstanding psychological features of modern life is the fact that activities which are means to ends have more and more usurped the position of ends, while the ends themselves have a shadowy and unreal existence We have become enmeshed in a net of means and have lost sight of ends. (pp. 194–195)

Fromm expresses concern that people in the modern world lose ends while focusing on daily busy work that is purportedly the means to some end. We often observe office staff working so hard that they lose the purpose of the work. Thus, for Fromm, examining *before* the conversion from ends to means is the principal problem at issue. Yet, he does not refuse to enter a dynamic world; he intends to transform the way of addressing ends. In the next section of the paper, I turn to take up this issue.

4. Fromm's Alternative Way of Seeking Ends

Fromm did not examine Dewey's theory except for a single footnote in *Psychoanalysis and Religion* in 1950,⁹ but his general interest in the means-ends relationship has started since *Escape from Freedom* in 1941,¹⁰ and continued through his later works in the 1950's¹¹ and the 1960's. In 1968, he takes up the problem of the means-ends again in an article: entitled "The Condition of the American Spirit."

Eventually, we must consider the fact that we are always concerned with means and instrumentalities, not with ends; that we do not ask *where* we are going, as long as we have found the way, *how* to get 'there.' We are like a man who drives a car and dimly senses that he has lost the way We seem to be driving 'nowhere' but with ever-increasing speed. This nowhere may in reality be the self-destruction of the human race. (Fromm, 1968/2011, p. 6)

Fromm criticizes the modern way of life, in which we are driven to advance without asking "where" we are going.¹² Once we get to know the "how," we start to move "nowhere." Fromm suggests that we have to seek ends, continuing to ask "where we are going." Interestingly, he thinks that seeking ends means accepting the question of the "where": his theory requires us to keep thinking of ends as asking the

⁹ Fromm (1950) saw a similarity between Freud and Dewey: "it is interesting to note that Jung's position in *Psychology and Religion* is in many ways anticipated by William James, while Freud's position is in essential points similar to that taken by John Dewey" (p. 20n). Fromm was interested in Dewey's *A Common Faith*.

¹⁰ In *Escape from Freedom*, Fromm (1941/1994) points out that "the subordination of the individual as a means to economic ends is based on the peculiarities of the capitalistic mode of production" (p. 111).

¹¹ In *The Sane Society*, he argues that "the exchange of goods" used to be "a means to an economic end," but "in capitalistic society *exchanging has become an end itself*" (Fromm, 1955/1990b, p. 146).

¹² Fromm (1968) published *The Revolution of Hope* in 1968. The title of Ch. 3 is "Where Are We Now and Where Are We Headed?"

“where.” This view of ends was implied in a footnote in *MFH* when he discussed Dewey’s theory of the means–ends relationship:

Utopias are visions of ends before the realization of means, yet they are not meaningless; on the contrary, some have contributed greatly to the progress of thought, not to speak of what they have meant to uphold faith in the future of man. (Fromm, 1947/1990a, p. 30n)

The concept of “utopia” makes his view of ends clearer. As is often discussed, “utopia” is a compound word that derives from “ou” and “topos” in Greek: “no” and “place” in English.¹³ When Fromm examined Dewey’s theory in *MFH* in 1947, he considered “visions of ends” to be the thinking of “place”: “where.” While Dewey, as a philosopher of the how, emphasizes the conversion from a static end to a dynamic means: from the “what” to the “how,” Fromm lays stress on shifting from the “what” toward the “where”: the idea of place. Fromm not only changes “what is to be done into a how” like Dewey, but also acknowledges the problem of the “what” as the question of “where we are going.” In this way, Fromm’s theory shows us a new way of seeking ends.

Fromm is a thinker of “where,” but he thinks that the visions of ends as “utopias” do not express static and perfect views of ends imposed upon us, for the visions include dynamism: conversion from a static end to a means, whose idea is shared with Dewey. Fromm, like Dewey, recognizes the importance of the conversion itself. Thus, Fromm’s visions of ends break off relations with static views of ends, and, therefore, his idea rejects the concept of utopia as a mere idealized blueprint alienated from real life.¹⁴ When he interprets visions of ends as the thinking of “where,” the view of ends carries no implication of what is static.

However, Fromm claimed that the humanistic “science of man can give us a picture of a ‘model of human nature’ from which ends can be deduced.” The claim retains a stronger “sense of an objective” than Dewey’s idea of the means–ends relationship. However, based on the above discussion, what Fromm wanted to say is that we can posit ends tentatively by using the “science of man” that offers us optimal knowledge and, then, a tentative picture of human nature, which can contribute to creating tentative ends. For Fromm, creating tentative ends is synonymous with envisioning ends: thinking utopias as no-places. Therefore, it could be said that Fromm’s view of ends represents a thinking practice that requires us to ask the “where” tentatively and spatially.¹⁵ By so doing, we can preserve a real sense of an objective

¹³ See Mita (1976). Fromm’s *The Revolution of Hope* was listed in the references of Mita’s article though he discussed a sense of utopia especially of Karl Mannheim, not Fromm.

¹⁴ This paper referred to Bell’s explanation about a general meaning of “utopia” (Bell, 2017). According to Bell, “utopia is commonly understood as a place that claims to have fulfilled a predetermined (and ostensibly ‘Good’) form of political organization” (p. 75). However, he argues that “such claims . . . are held to be necessarily false, with firmly hierarchical (if not totalitarian) forms of governance required to prevent ‘deviance’ from the purported ‘perfection’” in the field of utopian studies (p. 76). Fromm’s view of ends is not such a perfect picture, which should be criticized in contemporary utopian studies.

¹⁵ Bell (2017), who reviewed contemporary utopian studies, argues, “approaches to utopia [in utopian studies] . . . position it as a perfect place, downplay the importance of space in favour of a focus on utopia’s function (sometimes describing that function as utopia) or view utopia as a temporal process” (p.

without idealizing it.

5. Conclusion

From the previous discussions, it follows that there are two ways to confront ends in Fromm's theory. First, he adopts a way to convert an end into means: the conversion from the "what" to the "how." Secondly, he proposes a way to shift the "what" into the question of "where we are going." By doing so, he tries to keep orienting people's consciousness toward ends, relatively emphasizing the latter. However, these two movements are one for two; they are inseparable. To accept ends as the question of "where we are going" presupposes "we" who have been going somewhere: who already have converted the projected end to the "how." At the same time, to convert the end into the means should include a sense of "where we are going,": the former movement of the conversion from the "what" to the "how" should be accompanied by the latter movement of shifting the "what" into the "where." However, the question of "where we are going" is easily forgotten in the former movement. As Fromm said, we are often "enmeshed in a net of means." Therefore, Fromm criticized Dewey's theory and required us to ask "where we are going."

Since Fromm's theory tries to envisage ends in this way, it may recall an absolute way of seeking ends even if it does not fall into relativism. However, for Fromm, the instrument for creating "tentative" ends was "the science of man." This science was not a science that pursues an absolute knowledge. In addition, seeking ends by asking "where we are going" cannot be a movement to pursue a firm foundation: an absolute end. This is because asking "where we are going" cannot avoid involving us in its practical contemplation. So Fromm's theory leads us not to a secure place but to an unstable one. Fromm once said, "the new security" is "not based on protection, but on man's spontaneous activity" realized at "each moment" (Fromm, 1941/1994, p. 262). As such, it can be concluded that Fromm seeks to a new security through the practice of loosening up our solid footholds. The two movements to confront ends—converting into "how" and asking "where"—are inseparable, but they are also in a tension-filled relationship.

Fromm's view of ends describes the impact that emerged when he confronted "the American pragmatist sensibility" of Dewey. Fromm agrees with the effect of Dewey's idea of converting fixed ends into means, as well as points out the risks inherent in its conversion. In other words, Fromm agrees with the positive effect of Dewey's functional idea of the means-ends relationship and further criticizes the idea of negative dimension. Miyadera (2000), who is a philosopher of education, explains that the functional theory of aims of education, which is typical of Dewey, makes educational aims independent from the social, moral, and ethical contexts (p. 176). The theory takes a detour from the substantial

90). On the other hand, he emphasizes the importance of contemplating "the conceptual specificity of utopia as a place" (p. 93). Following his argument, it seems that Fromm's idea of "utopias" offers us a clue to rethinking "utopia as a place." However, further research is needed to locate Fromm's idea of utopia within utopian studies.

discussion of aims of education and simply relates to the formal discussion (p. 176). Applying these suggestions to Fromm's view of ends, it would be appropriate to suggest that Fromm commits himself to seeking the quality of ends while he considers the society where he lives. This is because accepting ends as the question of "where we are going" means that we contemplate our future life and that question is inseparable from the social contexts in which we are embedded and embed ourselves.

Fromm, as a thinker of the where, critically accepts Dewey's idea of the means–ends relationship and develops an alternative vision of ends that is understood as "utopia." This vision is likely to contribute to the daily practices of teachers, who might otherwise lose their sense of direction. Fromm's visions of ends, utopias, stress thinking of the place we are heading while we convert a static end to an actual means. Thus, teachers pushing forward with their work might have the opportunity, from Fromm's theory, to focus on directions their practices indicate. Fromm was not an educational thinker who thematized education, but his thought can be said to be fundamentally educational.

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E. フロムの「目的」観の教育学的含意

—J. デューイの目的-手段論を手がかりにして—

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20世紀のアメリカで活動したドイツ生まれの精神分析家エーリッヒ・フロムは、しばしばアメリカの思想家に言及し、フロイトの思想とデューイの思想に類似性を見た。従来の研究はこの点に着目することは少なかったが、フロムはデューイを人間主義的倫理学の主要人物として評価していた。そこで本研究は、フロムの思索の教育学的含意をより十全に理解するために、フロムとデューイの思想的連関に焦点を当て、フロムの「目的」観をデューイの目的-手段論を手がかりにして探求する。本研究はまず、フロムのデューイ解釈を検討し、両者の理論の類似点と差異を確認し、次にフロムの「人間の科学」が、「目的」を導出する方法を明らかにする。そしてフロムが、目的概念について、私たちが専念しなければならない問いそのものを変容させることを確認し、彼の代替的な目的追求の仕方を明示する。最後に本研究は、フロムの「目的」観が有する教育学的含意を提示する。

Educational Implications of E. Fromm’s View of “Ends”: Reference to J. Dewey’s Idea of the Means–Ends Relationship

MORITA Kazunao

As one of the most prominent psychoanalysts working mainly in Germany, the USA, and Mexico in the 20th century, Erich Fromm often referred to American thinkers, including Emerson, Thoreau, James, and Dewey, and indicated the similarity between Freud’s and Dewey’s thought. Although recent scholarship overlooks this indication, Fromm highly valued Dewey as a one of the leading figures of humanistic ethics and respected his theory as well as criticizing it. The present study, therefore, highlights the philosophical relationship between Fromm and Dewey and explores Fromm’s view of “ends” with reference to Dewey’s idea of the means–ends relationship to better understand the implications of Fromm’s ideas for education. The study first examines Fromm’s interpretations of Dewey and confirms the similarities and differences in their theories. Subsequently, the study elucidates how Fromm’s “science of man” creates “the model of human nature” from which “ends” are deduced. Further, this study confirms that Fromm transforms the very question that we must address on ends and reveals his alternative way of seeking ends. Finally, the study suggests that Fromm’s view of “ends” has educational implications.

キーワード： エーリッヒ・フロム、ジョン・デューイ、目的、場所

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