Reflexive Modernization Theory and Intimate/Public Sphere Theory

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1．Introduction

This paper provides a tentative theoretical perspective on the intersection of the theoretical and empirical problem areas in reflexive modernization theory and intimate/public sphere theory. By temporarily mapping these problem areas, a rough theoretical bird's-eye view of the layout is given. Precise discussions on the research associated with these individual problem areas are planned for the future.

On the basis of specific keywords such as globalization, personalization, risk, monitoring, and informatization, Beck, Giddens, & Lash (1994) each discussed their ideas on reflexive modernization theory as a general theory modern society, to build a theoretical framework for the analysis of the diachronic and historical changes that position modern society as a "second modernity."

The basic theory emphasized two stages: a "first modernity" focused on industrial society and early modernity and a "second modernity" focused on the risk society and reflexive modernity or "high modernity." "Reflexive modernization" is defined as a transformation in the personalization and globalization macrosocial structures and a decline in the importance of intermediate groups, such as the family, the nation, and class. The theoretical ideologies discussed in Beck et al. advocate a break from the modern/post-modern conflict and a shift in critical theory to "chronological sociology" (Beck et al. 1994: 112).

Intimate/public sphere theory, as simply expressed by "sphere,"[1) refers to the "private" and "public" structures in modern civil society, and it was developed in response to the loss of an obvious binary opposition or dividing line. This theory sought to establish a normative basis for redefining or reinterpretating the changes in the "private" and "public" spatial structures in modern society from a cotemporal/spatial perspective.

Habermas'（1962, 1990）"Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere" triggered many criticisms (especially because of its modernist bias). The following two foci particularly influenced its development: the re-evaluation of Arendt's public sphere theory (including its modern critical implications) centered on "The Human Condition" (Arendt 1958) and Giddens' intimate sphere theory in "The Transformation of Intimate" (Giddens 1992), which was compounded into a problem sphere

that had two mutually prescriptive focal points that changed public sphere theory to intimate/public sphere theory. Therefore, as both focused on the reorganization of the social space structure in modern society, reflexive modernization theory and intimate/public sphere theory could be seen to intersect across many theoretical/empirical problem areas.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 theoretically examines reflexive modernization theory based on the individual discussions in Beck et al. (1994), Section 3 reviews the developments in intimate sphere theory, Section 4 examines the developments in public sphere theory and attempts to reposition the two theories within the reflexive modernization theory framework, and Section 5 provides a broad perspective on the intersections between reflexive modernization theory and intimate/public sphere theory.

2.　Reflexive modernization theory

2.1 Reflexivity as "self-destruction"—Beck

In Beck et al. (1994), Beck defined the basic "reflexive modernization" concept as follows: "Developments can be transformed into self-destruction, and in that self-destruction, a new stage [can be identified] in which one modernization undermines and changes another."

As a premise for this definition, Beck then emphasized the need for a strict distinction between "reflexion" and "reflexivity."

In light of these two stages, the concept of "reflexive modernization" can be differentiated against a fundamental misunderstanding. This concept does not imply (as the adjective "reflexive" might suggest) reflection, but (first) self-confrontation — .

This confrontation between the bases of modernization and the consequences of modernization should be clearly distinguished from the increase in knowledge and scientization when self reflecting on modernization. Let us call the autonomous, undesired and unseen, transition from the industrial to the risk society reflexivity (to differentiate it from and contrast it with reflection) (Beck et al. 1994: 6).

This clarification of the distinction between "reflection" and "reflexivity" was an implied criticism of the "optimism" inherent in "modernity's reflection theory" (which is thought to imply the thoughts of Giddens). According to Beck, Giddens starts from the premise that the "reflexivity of modernity theory" is related to "the more societies are modernized, the more agents (subjects) acquire the ability to reflect on the social conditions of their existence and to change them," and Beck criticizes the notion that "reflexive modernization as related to cognitive theory [reflexivity of modernity theory] ignores the possibility that the transition to another epoch of modernity could be unintended,

unseen, and could bypass the dominant categories and theories of the industrial society" (Beck et al. 1994: 176–177, [ ] is from the quote).

In this way, it appears that Beck differs from Giddens (1990) (described later) as he saw the essence of "reflexive modernity" to be the risk society, that is, as an unintended self-destruction of modern times.

However, for "sub-politics" activation, which is another part of Beck's theory of reflexive modernization, he has an approach that overlaps with Giddens' "life politics" theory. "Sub-politics," situation in which "decision-making areas that had been protected by the political in industrial capitalism the private sector, business, science, towns, everyday life, and so on," replace political conflicts as "a (re) invention of the political" (Beck et al. 1994: 18).

2.2 Reflexivity as "self-monitoring"—Giddens

For Giddens (1990), "reflexivity" was related to "the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices"(Giddens 1990: 38), that is, self-reconstruction based on self-monitoring is performed at both microaction and macrostructure levels and can be divided into a "reflexive project" of identity ("self-reflexive") and expert systems or complementary reconstructions ("institutional reflexivity") of abstract trust and local personal trust.

Giddens (1990) contrasted "reflexive modernity" and early modernity in two main areas. First, "reflexive modernity" can be characterized as a "post-traditional society" or, in that sense, the "global society." With "the development of instantaneous global electronic communication," "a world where… pre-existing traditions cannot avoid contact not only with others but also with many alternative ways of life" is appearing, and the possibility of a "mutual interrogation" of traditions is expanding (Beck et al. 1994: 96–7). Therefore, for traditions to continue to exist, the "two frameworks" (1) advocate and justify tradition through dialog and discussion and (2) lead to a "fundamentalization" of traditions (Beck et al. 1994: 100–1).

Giddens (1990) cited gender "de-traditionalization" as a typical example (1) by seeing gender issues as follows: a "pure relationship" in a "discussion space" (a relationship based only on mutual voluntary self-disclosure) through the building of an "emotional democracy" in an intimate sphere and (2) by suggesting that violence could occur when "dialogue has reached its limit" (Beck et al. 1994: 105–6), that is, "dialogic democracy" becomes "the only alternative to violence" (Beck et al. 1994: 106–7).

Giddens (1991) believed that the politics associated with building an "emotional democracy" was "life politics," which, as the name implies, is oriented toward "the creation of morally justifiable forms of life" and the development of "ethics concerning the issue of 'how we should live' in a post-tradi-

tional order" (Giddens 1991: 214). Therefore, it is clear that this concept overlaps with Beck's "sub-politics" concept.

The second emphasis in Giddens' (Beck et al. 1994) theory of reflexive modernization discussion was that "active trust" is involved when dealing with a risky society, which could be aligned with the "reflexive modernization" referred to by Beck. "Active trust" is seen as "the origin of new forms of social solidarity" in reflexive modernization and is defined as "a process of mutual narrative and emotional disclosure," that is, a trust that "has to be won and actively sustained" (Beck et al. 1994: 186–7).

This active trust is also linked to the expansion of "institutional reflexivity" in the expert system and Beck's "sub-politics" activation. Lash comments in the same book (Section 3) that "Giddens's notion of institutional reflexivity involves (as does Beck's) a transformation of expert systems into democratically dialogical and political public spheres" (Beck et al. 1994: 203).

2.3　Aesthetic and hermeneutic reflexivity—Lash

Different from Beck and Giddens, Lash's reflexive reflexivity theory presents specific concepts for "aesthetic reflexivity" and "hermeneutic reflexivity."

"Aesthetic reflexivity," which is a concept derived from the modernist aesthetics of Adorno, Benjamin, and Nietzsche, has the following implications.

> …these flows and accumulations of conceptual symbols constitute conditions of reflexivity. The same is true of the 'mimetic' symbols, of the images, sounds, and narratives making up the other side of our sign economics. On the one hand as the commoditized, intellectual property of the culture industries they belong to the characteristically post-industrial assemblage of power. On the other they open up virtual and real spaces for the popularization of aesthetic critiques of that same power/knowledge complex (Beck et al. 1994: 135).

Lash observed that aesthetic reflexivity was evident in the expansion of the "aesthetic/expressive individualism" mediated by subcultures that distribute "mimetic symbols."

"Iinterpretive reflexivity" was inspired by Bourdieu's "reflexive anthropology," and it is "operating in a fully different terrain than cognitive (Beck, Giddens) and aesthetic (Adorno, Nietzsche) reflexivity" (Beck et al. 1994: 156).

Lash explained the implications of "hermeneutic reflexivity" as follows.

> It means learning through habitus, of similar roots to "habiter," in which truth is neither conceptual nor mimetic, but becomes evident through shared practice.…For reflexive anthro-

pology, it involves bracketing subject object knowledge and situating knowers in their life-world (Beck et al. 1994: 156).

"Hermeneutic reflexivity" in this sense is directed toward the construction of a "reflexive community" based on the sharing of "semantic horizons" in the life-world.

Lash explained that the "reflexive community" was derived from Bourdieu's concept of the "champ" and was an antithesis to Beck's theory of personalization. Lash exemplified "communities of taste," such as soccer team and rock band fans, and "communities with a high awareness of environmental protection." Therefore, "reflexivity" in a "reflexive community" could have the following four characteristics: (1) members throw themselves into these communities, (2) it is widely stretched over abstract space/time, (3) there is a need for constant re-invention, and (4) it is based on "abstract and cultural tools" and products (Beck et al. 1994: 161).

However, Lash explained that the reflexive modern "new community involves at the same time,… its opposite in a substantial intensification of contingency." As an example, Lash cited "the 'neo-tribalism' of say, the anomic eastern German new Nazis of the terraces" (Beck et al. 1994: 168).

Another characteristic of Lash's reflexive modernization theory was the attention given to the "information and communication structure" as a "structural condition of reflexivity." The "information and communication structure" was the "nonsocial" information production and distribution structure that mediates de-institutionalized interactions or "out-of-institutional" social relationships, that is, it is "aesthetic reflexivity" in the sense that it is the basis for the distribution of "mimetic symbols," and it is also "hermeneutic reflexivity" in the sense that it is the basis for the "reflexive community" to expand beyond space and time, each of which has its own structural conditions. At the same time, however, the digital divide in the "information and communication structure" also results in inequalities in life chances and creates a division between "reflexive winners" and "losers" (this is the so-called issue behind the "digital divide" theory). In this sense, therefore, the "information and communication structure" is also a structural condition for the ambivalence of reflexive modernization.

2.4 The "reflexivity" concept

As mentioned, taking "reflexive modernization" as the common key concept, Beck, Giddens, and Lash each emphasized different points, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Placement of the "reflexivity" concept

	Classification of reflexivity		Form
Reflexivity	Cognitive reflexivity	Unintentional self-destruction (Beck)	Globalization/personalization of risk
		Institutional reflexivity (Giddens, Beck)	Discussion in expert systems
		Self-reflexivity (Giddens)	"Emotional democracy" in the intimate sphere
	Aesthetic reflexivity (Lash)		Aesthetic/expressive individualism
	Hermeneutic reflexivity (Lash)		Reflexive community
Structural condition of reflexivity	Information and communication structure (Lash)		

3.　Intimate sphere theory

3.1　Placement of intimate sphere theory

Intimate sphere theory evolved from Giddens's argument that "pure relationships" were basically positive modern relationships. However, the discussions criticizing the "despotism of the intimate" that appeared in the late modern period were also of great significance. After confirming the basic issues associated with both of these streams, the theory was reoriented within the reflexive modernization theory framework.

3.2 Despotism of the intimate―Sennett and Bellah

The discussions criticizing "the despotism of the intimate" in the late modern period began in Sennett's *The Fall of Public Man* (Sennett 1977), which was published before Giddens' intimate sphere theory was propounded. Sennett claimed that "the ideology of intimacy" comprises three beliefs: (1) intimacy is a moral good, (2) intimacy focuses on the flowering of individuality, and (3) all evil in society is "impersonal and cold." Sennett criticized the domination of "the ideology of intimacy" as being typical of modern Western urban societies' "loss of public life" due to its closedness, exclusive aggression, and inhibition of joint actions.

Similar to Sennett's theory was Bellah's "lifestyle excursion" theory, which was introduced in the *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Bellah et al. 1985). Bellah argued that the fragmentary and closed "lifestyle excursion" in modern American society had meant

that people had become only interested in their private lives and shared their own lifestyles, which had resulted in a general departure from public life and social participation.

Unlike Giddens (1991,1992), however, Sennett and Bellah did not examine the ambivalence inherent in intimacy and only criticized the intimacy vector orientations as a departure from public life. Therefore, their arguments positioned the relationship between the intimate sphere and the public sphere as a trade-off, a point that is revisited in Section 4 when discussing public sphere theory.

3.3 Pure relationships─Giddens

Giddens (1991, 1992) defined "pure relationships" as modern relationships with the following seven characteristics: (1) they do not depend on external social and economic life conditions, (2) they are maintained only for the interest of the parties, (3) they have a reflective (reflexive) and open organization, (4) [Voluntary] commitment rather than external ties is important, (5) the focus is on intimacy [especially in relationships in general], (6) they are formed through the active acquisition of mutual trust, and (7) identity is sculpted in the development of the intimate (Giddens 1991, 1992, supplemented by the quoter in [ ]).

These "pure relationships" pursue spontaneity, autonomy, and authenticity (internal integrity) and have an overload of sincerity, authenticity, and easy resolutions. However, there is a peculiar ambivalence toward instability, which becomes "a huge burden on one's sense of unity," and "due to the lack of external moral standards, the peace of mind gained may be vulnerable to fate and other critical aspects of life." Moreover, "it's not surprising that when resentment, anger, or pent-up emotions swirl in a pure relationship, or in a specific situation, intimate relationships are not psychologically rewarding and can run into difficulties" (Giddens 1991: 107–8).

As pointed out by Giddens, the ambivalence of such "pure relationships" is also found in Japanese family sociological research on the transformation of modern families. The modern family has transformed into a pure intimate space and has externalized its reproduction function (education and welfare), which has resulted in an extension of the moratorium on the socialization period and an increase in the "parasite single" (Yamada 1999). However, with the family becoming the only closed space for emotional processing, on the negative side, it has also resulted in an internal closure of violence (domestic violence, child abuse, elder abuse, etc.). As mentioned, the alternatives that Giddens highlights in the gender theory context, building "pure relationships" through dialog and causing violence as the limit of dialog, and in the more general family context, it can be said that this has emerged as an ambivalence toward reflexive modernization.

Doi (2004, 2008) found that the characteristic pressures of "gentle relationships" in young people in modern Japan could also be interpreted as an ambivalence toward "pure relationships," claiming that because of their excessive expectations and dependence on intimate relationships (especially

friendships), adolescents require an approval of their "pure self" by others (as friends) close to them. As the "reading between the lines" is constantly required to maintain these relationships, conflict elements become eliminated from the communication. Therefore, "cyber-bullying" could be seen to be the reverse of "gentle relationships" and could be interpreted as a sanction against those who deviate from such relationships.

3.4 The re-location of intimate sphere theory from a reflexive modernization theoretical perspective

As a leading reflexive modernization theorist, the significance of Giddens' intimate sphere theory and especially the concept of the "pure relationship" need to be viewed within a reflexive modernization theoretical framework. Therefore, the following re-localizes intimate sphere theory from a reflexive modernization viewpoint.

Giddens claimed that the introduction of "emotional democracy" into the intimate sphere was the "only alternative" to the violence that occurred on the reverse side of "pure relationships." However, Lash criticized Giddens' theory of "emotional democracy," saying that Giddens was trying to apply a (Habermasian) "model of politics in the public sphere" to the intimate sphere and that "such abstract systems might be destructive to the meaning associated with the intimate, intense semantic interchanges and emotional sharing and understanding that are central to late modern emotional relationships" (Beck et al. 1994: 204). Lash explained

> Surely democratically contested (expert) propositional truths on sexuality, love, childrearing, and gender roles can and do play a positive role in structuring intimate relationships. But another sort of truth that is neither "formulaic" nor "propositional" plays, I think, an equally or more important role. This third type of truth might be called hermeneutic truth….Such hermeneutic truth is involved in the mutual disclosure of intimate relationships. It is involved in the construction of an intense semantic interchange that such relationships comprise. These affectively charged communications are based on the construction of a web of shared assumptions and pre-understandings, on the construction of a "semantic horizon." Hermeneutic or narrative truth is also a property of the symbols involved in the (time-space distanciated) intervention of films, poems, novels, and popular music in the pure relationship (Beck et al. 1994: 204, emphasis is based on the original text, and [ ] is from the quoter).

Lash's "hermeneutic truth" presupposes his "hermeneutic reflexivity" (as seen in Section 2), which in essence could be seen as a complement to Giddens intimacy, which, in turn, cannot be resolved through "cognitive reflexivity" (or the related "propositional truth"). "They are based on what Schutz

in his description of the life-world calls 'care' (Sorge)." Lash's statement that "It is the co-creation of a collective habitus" (Beck et al. 1994: 206) supports this idea.

Lash's discussion has important theoretical implications for the re-localizing of intimate sphere theory within the reflexive modernization theoretical framework, which is returned to later in this paper.

4.   Public sphere theory and its relationship with the intimate sphere

4.1 Placement of public sphere theory

In a broad sense, public sphere theory applies to the civil society activities of nongovernment organizations (NGOs), nonprofit organizations (NPOs), and voluntary associations. Mikami (2001b: 98-9) argued that the NGO, NPO, and voluntary associations activity space was a "nongovernment" area as it was outside the nation, a "nonprofit" area as it was outside the market, and a "formal" area as it was outside the community (intimate sphere in a broad sense).

The public sphere comprises a political system, an economic system and an intimate sphere, with the specific boundaries being between the government and the nongovernment, the commercial and the nonprofit, and the informal and the formal, and with the area of extension being "nongovernment, nonprofit, openness," as illustrated in Figure 1.

Mikami claimed that the prototypes for these three aspects of the public sphere could be found in the theories of Habermas, Arendt, and Sennett. In "The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere" (Habermas [1962] 1990, 1994), Habermas asserted that the "public sphere" was established in early modern Western civil society as a space for speeches that influenced public opinion and/or criticized national power. In *The Human Condition* (Arendt 1958, 1994), Arendt claimed that the "public/private" prototype was derived from the ancient Greek city-state, with *polis* being the public territory and *oikos* being "the private territory that provided life support and economic activity." Sennett said that the "public (Sphere) is opposite to privateness and intimacy." Therefore, Habermas, Arendt, and Sennett, respectively, positioned public life (public sphere) using the conflicting terms of politics, economy, and intimacy (Mikami 2001a: 78-9).

Although Mikami asserted that these public life (public sphere) definitions were not necessarily positive, to further examine the various discourses and movements in modern society, they are useful in examining the content of the public sphere.

In the following, therefore, the basic elements of Habermas's and Arendt's public life (public sphere) theories are examined with particular attention paid to the relationships with the intimate sphere.

Figure 1. Placement of public sphere theory
(Mikami 2001b: 99 modified)

4.2 Habermas

Habermas positioned the intimate sphere as the resource or "source" of public sphere discourse.

In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas claimed that the historical source of citizens who participate in public debate was in the small family intimate civil knowledge sphere, with the three momentums of the civil family being the "free will, community of love, and culture," brought by the individual family members, when then resulted in the "human formation (Humanität)" concept whereby human beings enter into "purely human" with each other. The main means for self-development were literary works and especially novels, as well as literary discussion in cafes and salons. Because the reader "imitates the private relationships depicted in the literature," the intimacy and independence within the family become both the literary source and the subject of public debate. Therefore, through the literary work discussions in the literary public sphere (which was the precursor to the political public sphere), people gained self-development and formed their identities, that is, the literary public sphere was established "as an extension of the small family intimacy sphere and was also a complement to it" (Habermas [1962] 1990: 110–116).

This complementary intimate sphere/public sphere relationship is also mentioned in *Factuality and Validity* (Habermas 1992), which generalized and redefined the public sphere concept in a modern civil society context as "a network for communication about opinions," in which "the flow of communication is filtered, integrated, and aggregated as public will or public opinion, and bundled through the theme of each occasion" (Habermas 1992: 435–6).

Therefore, the intimate sphere was positioned as the source of the "flow of communication" in the public sphere, with the boundary between them being family, friends, and neighbors, but these boundaries "do not block the intimate sphere from the public sphere, but only direct the flow of the

themes from the former to the latter" (Habermas 1992: 442). Therefore, Habermas claimed that the themes being discussed in the public sphere were first raised in the intimate sphere, extracted, and then redrawn in the public sphere. However, when examining relationships between the political system and the economic system, the public sphere could be seen to be contained and positioned in the "civil society" as a "nonnational, noneconomic union/coalition based on free will." "Civil society comprises voluntarily established groups, organizations, and movements, which have the commonality of locating problems in the intimate sphere, then agglomerating, amplifying and developing them in the political public sphere" (Habermas 1992: 443). Therefore, "the public sphere is an intermediate structure that mediates between the political system on the one hand and the intimate sphere of the live-world on the other hand" (Habermas 1992: 451–2), which can be schematized as shown in Figure 2.


Figure 2. Relationships between Habermas' intimate and public spheres

The characteristics of Habermas' public sphere theory are that first, the communication originates in intimate sphere consensus building and then flows into the public sphere to be integrated into public opinion, and second, it describes the public sphere as exclusively being a "political public sphere," that is, a public sphere that is designed to convey public opinion to the political system. However, these two characteristics could be seen to have some biases or limitations when taken as a general public sphere theory, as pointed out by Saito.

The problem is that Habermas sees it as a requirement to overcome the multiple opinions in such political decisions. Discussion is a process of consensus formation and at the same time a process that can raise new disagreements. There is no contradiction between agreement and disagreement as the significance of open debate is that any disagreements shed new public light

(Saito 2000: 36).

In Habermas' public sphere, the "flow of communication," in which there are many opinions (including disagreements), converges to a single opinion (agreement), that is, the public opinion obscures any consideration that "disagreements shed public light."

As pointed out by Mikami, there are also several limitations. For example, a counter-axis to the public is not seen as necessary by Habermas (who developed the public sphere prototype based on early civil society), such as when NPO activities offer an alternative to market principles and a feminist movement questions traditional family/gender frameworks, that is, there is less consideration of the deployment along the "government/nongovernment," "profit/nonprofit," and "openness/ intimacy" lines. In particular, the "profit/nonprofit" line relationship with the economic system is barely present in Habermas's public sphere theory. Although Habermas claimed that the intimate sphere is the source for the communication in the public sphere, it is limited to a convergence to agreement. In fact, Lash's criticism of Giddens' theory of "emotional democracy" could also be applied to Habermas.

Because of these biases and limitations, when conceptualizing public sphere theory as a general theory a broader perspective is necessary. "If the debate for a new public realm emphasizes freedom from the 'state' (power) and 'market' (money), then a freedom from the 'community' (cooperativity) must be emphasized as well, which lacks logical consistency" (Mikami 2001b: 102). Therefore, to ensure such logical consistency, it is necessary to construct a theory that presents the positive significance of the public sphere. Arendt's theory of public nature provides some important theoretical implications for accomplishing this task.

4.3 Arendt

In *The Human Condition* (Arendt 1958), Arendt claimed that the origin of the binary opposition between the public and private spheres was in the relationship between *polis* (public) and family (*oikos*) in ancient Greece. The family is the realm of economic life and is dominated by "desires and needs" for the "maintenance of individuals and the survival of the species," and the accompanying "strict inequalities" (patriarch and other families/slaves). Polis, However, was seen as the "realm of freedom" and, in that sense, a "political realm," in which the citizens (patriarchs), who are freed from "desire and need," are "equal people," (Arendt 1958: 28–37).

Therefore, Arendt described two meanings for *polis*, which were closely interrelated but not identical.

It means, first, that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and

has the widest possible public spread. For us appearance — something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves — constitutes reality (Arendt 1958: 50).

Public in this sense, means "the space of appearance," that is, "a space created where people relate to each other through actions and speech….A space where I appear to others and where others appear to me" (Saito 2000: 39). Therefore, it is neither "a space for judging whether or not others are useful" nor "a space for judging what kind of needs others have" but is "a space that regards others as one 'beginning,' [and] a space that treats others as free beings, regardless of any other conditions" (Saito 2000: 43). Arendt stated

Second, the term "public" signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it (Arendt 1958: 52).

Saito claimed that there were two conditions for something to be public or to be regarded as being of "the common world": "first, a wide variety of perspectives on the world must be present, and second, people must remain interested in these perspectives" (Saito 2000: 46). In other words, meaning of public as the "common world" refers to a space in which all perspectives and opinions are ensured, and an interest in the people's common problems is continually fostered.

Arendt's public theory portrays modern society as a society that has lost its public face, as suggested by the fact that the prototype for "public" was derived from the ancient Greek *polis*, Arendt surmised that the loss of the public face in modern times was brought about by "a rise in the social," that is, economic life became dominated by "desires and needs." In other words, in ancient Greece, the territory of the economy (desire and necessity) that belonged only to the "family" has now covered the whole society, with the modern "political" organizational form being the "nation state" (Arendt 1958: 28–30). "The social" also refers to "areas in which 'behavior' instead of 'action' becomes a 'normal' activity mode for people," with "behavior" referring to "an activity style that reproduces 'rules,' [and] an activity style that further strengthens the effectiveness of a norm by behaving according to the normal norm" (Saito 2000: 52), "all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous actions or outstanding achievements." With the advent of mass society, the realm of "the social" is maximized for homogenization and standardization (Arendt 1958: 40), with the tyranny of "the social" being the "difference between the private and public realms, the submersion of both in the spheres of the social" in modern society (Arendt 1958: 69).

In this way, the modern intimate sphere emerges as a "compensatory space for lost public space" and the only remaining "transparent space in which the self can be the self and existence and appearance do not divide," In the modern age when the public realm is lost, there is "a space to resist the

power of 'the social' and the power of its conformism" (Saito 2000: 90). Therefore, it could be interpreted as the price of the "space of appearance," that is, the space in which individuals can appear to each other as free beings.

Arendt's public theory opposes the domination of the "the social" brought about by the economic system and the political system as the political organizational form of the economy with and the public nature of the "common world" (perspective pluralities, interest in common problems) being presented as an anti-antigen theory. Further, because of the standardization brought by "the social" in the public sphere, Arendt suggests that a free "appearance" is only available in the intimate sphere in modern society.

The comparison of Arendt's public theory with Habermas's public sphere theory clearly reveals its uniqueness. Arendt sees the public sphere as a space in which people can freely "appear" with each other rather than as a space for consensus building, with the many viewpoints and opinions not needing to converge to a single public opinion as the public sphere is imagined as the "common world." The public sphere is therefore positioned as a counter to "the social" (economic principles and pressure for standardization) represented by the economic system.

From the above considerations, Arendt's positional relationships between the intimate sphere, the public sphere, and the economic system can be as shown in Figure 3.


Figure 3. Arendt's intimate and public spheres

As detailed, Arendt's public theory could be seen to complement the limitations in Habermas's public sphere theory (invisibility of disagreement and a disregard for the relations with the economic system). However, Arendt's public theory also has biases and limitations as the public territory is equated with politics as the territory of "freedom" (idealized from the ancient Greek model) and the private territory is equated with the economy as a territory of "desire and need." Therefore "the

public and private territories are cut by a rigid dichotomy, and the political possibility of rewriting the boundary between the two is abandoned by Arendt himself" (Saito 2000: 53).

Habermas's public sphere theory could also be seen as a complement to the limitations in Arendt. The functions of the political public sphere are positioned as something that should be realized based on the "flow of communication" from the intimate sphere, the convergence of this communication into "public opinion," and the raising of this opinion to a political system, which is an idea "abandoned by Arendt herself."

On the basis of the above considerations, Habermas and Arendt's public sphere theories should not be read as being mutually exclusive, rather, it is clear that they are complementary and could be used to construct a more universal public sphere theory.

4.4 Re-localization of public sphere theory from a reflexive modernization theoretical perspective

After a critical examination of Habermas' and Arendt's public sphere theories, Saito reformed the intimate and public sphere concepts, identifying the public sphere as being "established by people's interest in common problems" and the intimate sphere as being formed and maintained by a specific interest in the life/lives of others.

The "intimate sphere" in this sense was seen as "the sides of the public sphere that raise awareness and raise issues outward through the exchange of information and opinions, as is typically the case with self-help groups." "Rather, it would be more accurate to say that most of the newly created public sphere is born form a transformation of the intimate sphere" (Saito 2000: 92–5). The reason a "conversion" from the intimate sphere to the public sphere is possible is that the boundary between the "public" and "intimate" can always be reflexively (reflectively) redefined, that is, "the boundaries that separate public and private are fluid, depending on discourse," because "'the public' is reflexively defined depending on what is defined as 'personal' and 'private'" (Saito 2000: 12).

Saito's intimate sphere and the public sphere reformulations included the intimate and public sphere concepts related to Habermas's "flow of communication from the intimate sphere to the public sphere" as well as Arendt's "space of appearance" and "common world." This reformulation was also an antithesis to Sennett and Bellah's theories of the "despotism of the intimate" as it positioned the relationship between the intimate sphere and the public sphere as a simple trade-off relationship. However, Saito's reformulations merely restated the normative expectations that the intimate and public spheres are spaces that can be reflexively (reflectively) redefined, with the implication that the rationale for such reflexivity could be found in the reflexive modernization theory examined in the first half of this paper.

In the public sphere, which is a public visualization space for consensus building that encompasses

multiple opinions and disagreements, Giddens' "institutional reflexivity" ― operates, which is a complementary reconstruction of abstract trust in the expert system and local personal trust, and in the intimate sphere, which is a space for finding and raising problems in other people's lives, both Giddens' "self-reflexivity," which is a reflexive reconstruction of identity, and Lash's "hermeneutic reflexivity," which is the building of a "reflexive community" based on the sharing of semantic horizons in the life-world, operate. The above conceptual relationships can be organized as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Relationship between intimate/public spheres and reflexivity

		Social function	Classification of reflexivity
Public sphere		· Consensus building · Public visualization of multiple opinions and disagreements	Institutional reflexivity
Theme flow / Mutual "appearance"			
Intimate sphere		· Problem discovery/problem raising · Interest in the sex/life of specific others	Self-reflexivity Hermeneutic reflexivity

5.　Prospects of the theoretical field of view

As mentioned, reflexive modernization theory aims to build a theoretical framework to describe and analyze the "second modernity," of modern society, and intimate/public sphere theory aims to build a normative basis for describing and interpreting the spatial restructuring of modern society, but overlaps occur in many areas. Therefore, as reflexive modernization theory provides a theoretical analysis framework for intimate/public sphere theory, using the relationship between the two as a stepping stone, intimate/public sphere theory can be seen as having a complementary but normative relationship with reflexive modernization theory.

Finally, to provide an overall map that summarizes the above discussions, this paper concludes by presenting the extremely rough and tentative arrangement in Table 3.

Table 3. Overall mapping between intimate/public sphere theory and reflexive modernization theory

Normative basis	Reflexive modernization theory problem area	
	Classification of reflexivity	Social phenomenon form
	Unintentional self-destruction (Beck)	Globalization and personalization of risk
Public sphere theory (Habermas, Arendt)	Institutional reflexivity (Giddens, Beck)	Discussion in the expert system Sub-politics
	Self-reflexivity (Giddens)	Life politics "Emotional democracy"
Adorno ~ Modernist aesthetics	Aesthetic reflexivity (Lash)	Aesthetic/expressive individualism
Intimate sphere theory (Habermas, Arendt)	Hermeneutic reflexivity (Lash)	Reflexive community
	↑ [Structural condition of reflexivity] Information and communication structure (Lash)	

note

1) Both "intimate sphere" and "public sphere" concepts are often used interchangeably with "intimate" and "public" as more general concepts that do not emphasize their spatial meaning. The former and the latter should be strictly distinguished, but in this paper, to avoid a complex discussion, they are used interchangeably.

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［付記］