The Evolution of "Logical" Rhetorical Figures: with a

Critical Edition of Selected Sections of the $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}kara$

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Acknowledgement

Reading alaṃkāraśāstra is a process of enjoying literary beauty and critical thinking, as well as getting more and more familiar with viewpoints of various authors. I started the investigation of alaṃkāraśāstra under the suggestion of my supervisor, Prof. Somdev Vasudeva, when I felt a little adrift after finishing my master's course. Although to make a new start in another different and seemingly unrelated field is difficult, I have tried my best to combine my knowledge of Indian philosophy with Sanskrit rhetorics when carrying out my research.

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How do you feel the study of Sanskrit and other related fields? Well, my answer is that we may never have the chance to reach the end of Sanskrit because of the limit of life.

Shihong Zhao 2022.1.12, in Shanghai

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Alaṃkāra, Sanskrit Rhetorics and Rhetorical Figures

Nobody knows when or how poetry began¹. In the works belonging to the earliest period of recorded history, we find aesthetic elements. The condition in India is no different, as both connoisseurs and ordinary people will enjoy the fascinating verses of the Rgveda, either by reading the original texts or by reading translations. As for epic literature, it provides us with stories containing heart-touching and inspirational plots as well as verses full of wisdom and humour. Perhaps in the period when epic literature emerged and was redacted, some notions of Sanskrit poetics was already present in the consciousness of ancient pandits.

Even if we set aside our presumptions or speculations, we can point to an early effort of deeper reflection on Sanskrit composition: Bharata's $N\bar{a}tyas\bar{a}stra$. As S.K. De argues, the sixteenth chapter of this work "gives us for the first time an outline of Poetics which is probably earlier in substance, if not in date, than

¹An early attempt of creating a beginning for poetry in the Sanskrit tradition can be found in the famous epic Rāmāyaṇa, 1.2.9–17, where Vālmīki was compassionate after seeing a $nis\bar{a}da$ killing a male $krau\tilde{n}ca$ bird when it was mating with its female. He then said the following words: $m\bar{a}$ $nis\bar{a}da$ $pratisth\bar{a}m$ tvam agamah śāśvatīh $sam\bar{a}h$ | yat $krau\tilde{n}camithun\bar{a}d$ ekam $avadh\bar{n}h$ $k\bar{a}mamohitam$ ||

Never, O Niṣāda, will you obtain a state of rest for everlasting years to come, for you killed one bird of the couple, when it was infatuated by passion.

Vālmīki realized later that his speech is actually a perfect example of poetic composition, and named this "verse" $\acute{s}loka$ because it was created due to his sorrow ($\acute{s}oka$). This is an legendary origin of $\acute{s}loka$ verses in the Sanskrit tradition. Later Sanskrit author, such as Ānandavardhana, regarded Vālmīki as the First Poet ($\bar{a}dikavi$) based on the $krau\~nca$ -killing plot in the Rāmāyaṇa. Dhvanyāloka 1.5: $k\bar{a}vyasyātmā$ sa $ev\bar{a}rthas$ $tath\bar{a}$ $c\bar{a}dikave\rlap/p$ $pur\bar{a}$ |

krauñcadvandvaviyogotthāh śokah ślokatvam āgatah

the earliest existing Kāvya"². Even though this work is archaic, one may still marvel at its elaborateness and find many precursors of themes that became common in describing and prescribing Sanskrit composition, such as rhetorical figures ($alamk\bar{a}ra$), poetic defects (dosa) and poetic virtues (guna). Therefore, the period of the $N\bar{a}tyas\bar{a}stra$ can be taken "as the first known period in the history of Sanskrit Poetics"³.

Among all the topics in the $N\bar{a}tyas\bar{a}stra$, the focus on rhetorical figures is a significant branch. In Sanskrit, the word $alamk\bar{a}ra$ means ornament⁴. This focus in the $N\bar{a}tyas\bar{a}stra$ is not only on rhetorical figures themselves, but also on how they convey aesthetic beauty to readers and listeners of Sanskrit poems. After the $N\bar{a}tyas\bar{a}stra$ the study of poetic ornament expanded from its original scope, while not deviating from it, and the entire discipline of Sanskrit poetics came to be called " $alamk\bar{a}ras\bar{a}stra$ ". Scholars who deal with this discipline are called "rhetoricians" ($\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}rika$).

Early works of Sanskrit rhetorics or poetics usually bear the word $k\bar{a}vya$ in their titles⁵, and the topics in these works include the definition and the purpose of $k\bar{a}vya$, poetic defects, poetic virtues, rhetorical figures and so on. Apart from these topics, these works differ from each other due to the distinct focus of their authors. Some are interested in sentiments (rasa) and rhetorical figures, others are well-versed in discussing styles $(r\bar{\imath}ti)$ and propriety (aucitya), still others show enthusiasm in proposing new theories. The rich academic discussions throughout the history of Sanskrit rhetorics give rise to an abundance of original thoughts, which in turn nurtured the further development and evolution of the discipline.

Throughout South Asia, scholars from Kashmir have taken the pole position in the study and the transmission of medieval Sanskrit rhetorics. Due to its advantageous geographical location, Kashmir was one of the centers of academic and cultural communication in South Asia. We hear of not only the advocate of the *dhvani* theory, Ānandavardhana, and his famous commentator Abhinavagupta, but also of influential scholars from diverse philosophical backgrounds, such as the famous Buddhist thinker Dharmottara and the Naiyāyika philosopher Bhaṭṭa Jayanta.

Besides these famous thinkers together with their works, there are also various minor authors who have aroused the interest of modern researchers. The central person of this study, Śobhākara, active in the late twelfth century A.D., author of the *Alamkāraratnākara* (AlRat), is exactly a rhetorician like that.

²De 1960, vol. ii, p. 1.

 $^{^3}ibid$

 $^{^4}$ Böhtlingk & Roth 1855–1875, vol. 1, p. 457.

⁵For example, Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa, Bhāmaha's and Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṃkāra, Vāmana's Kāvyālamkārasūtravrtti and Udbhaṭa's Kāvyālamkārasārasamgraha.

1.2 Problems in the Study of Śobhākara and the $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}kara$

The following problems remain unsolved in the study of Śobhākara and the AlRat: Firstly, there is no critical edition of the AlRat. The printed edition by Devadhar published in 1942 is not a critical one, but as a prerequisite for further studies, a new critical edition based on Devadhar's edition and other available manuscripts of the AlRat is a must.

Secondly, the AlRat is not a well-known treatise on Sanskrit rhetorics, and it is not thoroughly studied yet due to the low quality of the printed edition. Dwivedi (1963), Rao (1977), Rao (1992) and Vasudeva (2016) are the most recent studies on this treatise. In addition to these four, there are a few dissertations on the AlRat which have not been published⁶.

Thirdly, one needs to be aware of the philosophical and religious background of authors of Sanskrit rhetorical treatises. As for Śobhākara, he appears to have been influenced by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's $Ny\bar{a}yama\tilde{n}jar\bar{\iota}$, and quotes or paraphrases Jayanta's ideas therefrom. This is a part of the uniqueness of his doctrinal positions. Therefore, the study of the $Ny\bar{a}yama\tilde{n}jar\bar{\iota}$ or some knowledge on this work is a prerequisite to understand Śobhākara and the AlRat.

The present study of the AlRat attempts to solve some aspects of these three problems by providing a starting point for a complete critical edition of the AlRat in the future and a detailed investigation of selected sections of the AlRat.

⁶Vasudeva 2016 lists three unpublished Ph.D. dissertations: Dubey 1982, Sharma 1972 and Upadhyaya 1978.

Chapter 2

The Development of "Logical" Rhetorical Figures up to Mammața

2.1 Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha: Debate and Discourse over the "Logical" Rhetorical Figures

Although the formulation of definitions of rhetorical figures begins with the $N\bar{a}\underline{t}yas\bar{a}stra$, "logical" figures are not admitted at first. Based on currently available textual materials, the first deliberations on the "logical" figures are found in the intertextual works of two early Sanskrit rhetoricians: Daṇḍin (ca. 7–8th century) and Bhāmaha (7th century)⁷. The core of this dispute is whether poetical reason (hetu) should be accepted in the field of Sanskrit rhetorics. Daṇḍin, in his work $K\bar{a}vy\bar{a}darśa$ (KĀd), regards poetical reason together with $s\bar{u}k sma$ and leśa as the best ornaments of speech. He distinguishes two main types, namely productive cause ($k\bar{a}raka$) and informative cause ($j\tilde{n}apaka$)⁸, and further gives examples of subtypes of poetical reason with simple expositions⁹ lacking elaborate explanation. According to Jenner's investigation, there are 15 subtypes in Daṇḍin's section on hetu¹⁰, yet the method to distinguish them is not given explicitly.

On the other hand, Bhāmaha, in his $K\bar{a}vy\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}ra$ (KABh), does not accept hetu as a kind of rhetorical figure because it lacks vakrokti, i.e. circumlocution,

⁷For a discussion of Bhāmaha's chronological priority to Daṇḍin, cf. Bronner 2011.

 $^{^8}K\bar{A}d$ 2.235: hetuś ca sūkṣmaleśau ca vācām uttamabhūṣaṇam | kārakajñāpakau hetū tau cānekavidhau yathā ||

 $^{^{9}}$ KĀd 2.236–260ab.

¹⁰Jenner 1969, pp. 255–257.

crookedness or indirectness of speech¹¹, which he believed to be the essence of poetry, necessarily latent in all rhetorical figures.

2.2 Udbhaṭa: Breaking with Daṇḍin's Categories

Udbhaṭa (ca. 750–850 A.D.)¹², the author of the $K\bar{a}vy\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}ras\bar{a}rasamgraha$ (KASS), rejects Daṇḍin's definition of hetu. He is the first rhetorician to introduce a new related figure called $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ in place of hetu. Its definition runs as follows:

When one thing that has been heard becomes the cause of the remembrance or the experience of another [thing], that [figure] is called [the figure of] poetical mark¹³.

Considering this verse, we can ask the following questions: What is the purpose of meaning the word "poetical" in this definition? Why should this figure not be denoted merely as "reason"? Simply from the above stanza it is impossible to understand Udbhaṭa's purpose. The commentator Pratīhārendurāja (ca. 900–950 A.D.)¹⁴ in his commentary, the *Laghuvṛtti*, expresses his understanding of the significance of the word "poetical" as follows:

Although those logical reasons, well established among logicians—containing, as a rule, [the $trair\bar{u}pya^{15}$, i.e.] the presence of inferential mark in the subject-locus, its presence in a similar instance and its non-presence in any counterexample—being formulated with reference to the domain of consensus reality, lead to insipidity, a poetical reason is quite different; because it (i.e. $k\bar{a}vyahetu$) is composed exclusively in dependence on whatever entity ($pad\bar{a}rtha$) that, being full of rasa, enables a concurrence of hearts¹⁶ for all people extraordinarily (atisayena), since it (i.e. $k\bar{a}vyahetu$) is composed exclusively in

 $^{^{11}{\}rm KABh}$ 2.86: hetuś ca sūkṣmo leśo 'tha nālaṃkāratayā mataḥ | samudāyābhidheyasya vakroktyanabhidhānataḥ ||

 $^{^{12}}$ On the date of Udbhaṭa, see De 1960, pp. 72–73; Gerow 1977, p. 233; Kane 1971, pp. 137–138; Pollock 2016, pp. 66–68.

 $^{^{13}}$ KASS 6.7: śrutam ekaṃ yad anyatra smṛter anubhavasya vā | hetutāṃ pratipadyeta kāvyaliṅqam tad ucyate ||

¹⁴De 1960, p. 138, dates Pratīhārendurāja as flourishing around 950 A.D., while Kane 1971, p. 74, dates him in the first half of the 10th century. Pollock 2016, pp. 66–68, puts him at around 900 A.D.

 $^{^{15}}$ On the formulation of $trair\bar{u}pya$, cf. Katsura 1986b.

 $^{^{16}}$ For the translation of $h\dot{r}dayasa\dot{m}v\bar{a}da$ see Pollock 2016, Index: "Other technical terms", s.v. "heart's concurrence".

dependence on that (*i.e.* superiority). Hence the application of the word "poetical" is appropriate in the expression "poetical mark". It is indeed not a philosophical (*i.e.* logical) mark, but rather a poetical mark; this is expressed by the use of the word "poetical"¹⁷.

Here it is clear that Pratīhārendurāja demarcates poetical reason from logical reason. The two kinds are distinguished by whether a cause is grounded on $rasa^{18}$ or on conventional reality, the latter of which he identifies as comparatively insipid¹⁹. At the end of his discussion, Pratīhārendurāja introduces two different views on how hetu functions. He does this to defend Udbhaṭa's definition: the first group of logicians argues that at the time of learning a universal pervasion $(vy\bar{a}ptigrahaṇ a)$, when a thing, such as fire, which has been experienced as a pervader of smoke, which is the thing to be pervaded, $hetuvy\bar{a}p\bar{a}ra$ arises for a person whose mental impressions $(saṃ sk\bar{a}ra)$ are evoked by perceiving some inferential mark, such as smoke, merely by remembering its pervader $(vy\bar{a}paka, i.e.$ fire). The other group of logicians proclaims that in the case of fire on the mountain, a previously not understood connection with a specific property such as the mountain is now understood through the capacity of the functioning of a reason such as a smoke. Pratīhārendurāja's intention with this somewhat odd insertion is to justify the expression $smrter\ anubhavasya\ v\bar{a}$ in Udbhaṭa's definition²⁰.

 $^{^{17}}Laghuvṛtti\ ad\ KASS$ 6.7: pakṣadharmatvānvayavyatirekānusaraṇagarbhatayā yathā tārkikaprasiddhā hetavo lokaprasiddhavastuviṣayatvenopanibadhyamānā vairasyam āvahanti, na tathā kāvyahetuḥ, atiśayena sarveṣāṃ janānāṃ yo 'sau hṛdayasaṃvādī, sarasaḥ padārthas, tanniṣṭhatayā upanibadhyamānatvāt | ataḥ kāvyalingam iti kāvyagrahaṇam upāttam | na khalu tac chāstralingam, kiṃ tarhi kāvyalingam iti kāvyagrahaṇena pratipādyate |

 $^{^{18}}$ In this context, Pratīhārendurāja defines rasa as sounds and senses perfected by poetical excellences. *Ibid: tad evaṃ guṇasaṃskṛtaśabdārthaśarīratvāt kāvyasya sarasatvam iti* |

¹⁹ibid: tadviśiṣṭaṃ kāvyalingaṃ sarasapadārthaniṣṭham eva bhavati, na tu nīrasavastumā-traniṣṭhaṃ śāstralingavad ity upapannam |

²⁰ ibid: tārkikānām ca hetuvyāpāre dvaividhyam | kecit khalu tārkikā vyāptigrahanakāle yad anubhūtam vyāpakam vahnyādivastu dhūmāder vyāpyasya tatsmaranamātre dhūmādihetudarśanaprabuddhasamskārānām puruṣānām hetuvyāpāram manyante | apare tu vahnyādīnām parvatādidharmaviśeṣasambandhasya pūrvam agrhītasya dhūmādihetuvyāpārasāmarthyena idānīm eva avaseyatvāl lingasāmarthyāl lingyanubhavasyaiva utpattim āhuh | tad idam uktam smṛter anubhavasya veti |

The use of the term $hetuvy\bar{a}p\bar{a}ra$ is frequent (see Kamimura 1999, p. 284). How a logical reason functions is a contentious topic in Indian philosophy. Already the two earliest commentaries on the $Ny\bar{a}yas\bar{u}tra$ that survive have different views on sūtra 1.1.5. cf. NBh ad $Ny\bar{a}yas\bar{u}tra$ 1.1.5: $tatp\bar{u}rvakam$ ity anena lingalinginoh sambandhadarśanam lingadarśanam cābhisambadhyate | lingalinginoh sambaddhayor darśanena lingasmṛtir abhisambadhyate | $smṛty\bar{a}$ lingadarśanena cāpratyakṣo 'rtho 'numīyate |

NV ad Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5: lingalingisambandhadarśanam ādyam pratyakṣam, lingadarśanam dvitīyam | bubhutsāvato dvitīyāl lingadarśanāt saṃskārābhivyaktyuttarakālaṃ smṛtiḥ, smṛtyanantaraṃ ca punar lingadarśanam ayaṃ dhūma iti | tad idam antimaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pūrvābhyāṃ pratyakṣābhyāṃ smṛtyā cānugṛhyamāṇaṃ parāmarśarūpam anumānaṃ bhavati |

Let us now turn to Udbhaṭa's example of poetical mark. Udbhaṭa's Kumārasambhava consists of 94 verses. It is used by Pratīhārendurāja as an example to understand Udbhaṭa's idea. The substance of this poem is mainly the story of Śiva and Pārvatī²¹. The following stanza is within the section in which Śiva addresses Pārvatī and praised her beauty:

chāyeyam tava śeṣāṅgakānteḥ kiñcid anujjvalā | vibhūsāghatanādeśān darśayantī dunoti mām ||

This beauty of the radiance of the other parts of your body is a little bit diminished. Revealing the places [previously] bearing ornaments, it inflames me.

By applying Udbhaṭa's definition of poetical mark, we can analyze this stanza as follows: Śiva is reminiscing about Pārvatī's appearance while she was practicing penance to win his love. She had taken off all her ornaments and her radiant golden skin (She is also known as Gaurī) shows a contrast: the places that previously bore ornaments are slightly brighter than the rest of her body. Therefore, Śiva inferred the previous existence of ornaments in those places where Pārvatī's radiance was more brilliant. This inference by Śiva constitutes the poetical mark which the reader can appreciate as beautiful²².

Following the analysis above, it is clear that Udbhaṭa's idea on $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ or hetu is very different from that of Daṇḍin. By firstly introducing the term $k\bar{a}vyalinga$, he breaks with Daṇḍin's vague categorization and puts his own stamp on the development of this $alaṃk\bar{a}ra$.

2.3 Rudrața: A New Formalization

Rudraṭa, the author of the $K\bar{a}vy\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}ra$ (KAR, different from that of Bhāmaha), may be the first rhetorician to explicitly state that $anum\bar{a}na$ should be identified as a distinct rhetorical figure. Scholars have on the basis of careful philological researches discussed the date of Rudraṭa. He can be approximately placed in the 9^{th} century. To be more specific, between the first quarter of this century and its end. He was a Kashmirian and preceded the famous commentator Vallabhadeva who referred to Rudraṭa by name and composed a lost commentary on the $K\bar{a}vy\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}ra^{23}$.

²¹Cf. Banhatti 1982, p. xv.

 $^{^{22}}Laghuvṛtti ad KASS 6.7: atra vibhūṣaṇavinyāsāspadabhūtā ye kaṇṭhādayas tad atra śiṣṭānām aṅgānām yāsau kāntiḥ dīptiḥ tasyā anujjvalā malinā yāsau chāyā śobhā sā liṅgaṃ, tatsāmarthyāc ca bhūṣāvinyāsapradeśānāṃ bhūṣaṇasambandho 'tīto 'numīyate | tena tat kāvyaliṅgam |$

²³De 1960, pp. 91–92; Kane 1971, p. 155; Pollock 2016, pp. 84–85.

One of Rudraṭa's contributions is that he is the first to attempt a both scientific and systematic classification of figures. He proposes "an explicit system of classification which provided for more variables" while "maintaining structural variety of Daṇḍin"²⁴. He groups the embellishments of meaning $(arth\bar{a}laṃk\bar{a}ra)$ into four general types: similitude (aupamya), hyperbole or exaggeration (atiśaya), pun (śleṣa) and natural description $(v\bar{a}stava)$. What has motivated such categorization may be interpreted as that there appeared the need to build Sanskrit rhetoric into an independent discipline and make it $ś\bar{a}stric$.

Rudrața's contribution to the development of logical rhetorical figures is in the fact that he introduces a new figure called "poetical inference" $(anum\bar{a}na)$ and distinguishes it from poetical reason (hetu). This new formalization is not seen in the works of earlier rhetoricians, so it can be ascribed to Rudrata's own invention.

Now, let us check Rudrața's definition and examples of poetical inference. He gives two definitions for it. The first one runs as follows:

vastu parokṣaṃ yasmin sādhyam upanyasya sādhakaṃ tasya | punar anyad upanyasyed viparītaṃ caitad anumānam²⁵ ||

Poetical inference is that [kind of rhetorical figure] in which [the poet] sets forth [at first] a thing to be established $(s\bar{a}dhya)$ that is an imperceivable object, then he should set down an opposed (*i.e.* perceivable) object that is the proving property $(s\bar{a}dhaka)$. Similarly, the reversed [process is also a kind of poetical inference].

To have a better understanding of Rudraṭa's idea, we need to refer to the only surviving commentary, by Namisādhu (ca. 11^{th} century), on this verse because he gives some interesting interpretations:

vāstavalakṣaṇenaivāpuṣṭārthasya parihṛtatvād agnir atra dhūmād ity alaṃkāratvaṃ na bhavati | sādhakam iti jātāv ekavacanam | tena dvayor bahuṣu ca sādhakeṣu bhavati ... sādhakagrahaṇād eva vastunaḥ sādhyatve labdhe sādhyagrahaṇam avastutvena siddhasyābhavasyāpi vastutvapratipattyartham | yat sādhyaṃ tad bhāvarūpam abhāvarūpaṃ vā bhavatv iti | ktvāpratyayenaiva punaḥśabdārthe labdhe, sādhyasādhakayoś ca vilakṣaṇatvād anyatve siddhe, punaranyapadagrahaṇaṃ bahūnāṃ sādhakānām upanyāse saty anumānojjvalatvakhyāpanārtham | sādhakam upanyasyet punaś cānyad upanyasyed iti śabdaśaktyaiva vā bhūyastāpratītih ||

 $^{^{24}}$ Gerow 1971: 35.

 $^{^{25}}$ KAR 7.56.

"Here is fire because there is smoke." Such is not a rhetorical figure due to the exclusion of something irrelevant, thus becoming only a statement of fact. The word " $s\bar{a}dhaka$ " is a collective singular form. Therefore it refers to two or more $s\bar{a}dhaka$ -s ... When the state of being a $s\bar{a}dhya$ of a subject is understood only from the usage of the word $s\bar{a}dhaka$, the usage of the word $s\bar{a}dhya$ is for the purpose of understanding a non-existent thing as being the subject by something that has been established as not being the subject. A $s\bar{a}dhya$ may be either existent or non-existent. Since the meaning of the word punah has been supplied simply by the suffix $Ktv\bar{a}$ (the LyaP), and since difference is already established on the basis of the categorical distinction between $s\bar{a}dhya$ and $s\bar{a}dhaka$, the explicit mention of the words punar and anya serves the purpose of revealing the brilliance of poetical inference when many $s\bar{a}dhaka$ -s have been set down. Or [optionally] through the semantic determinative capacity of words, there is a cognition of a plurality (of $s\bar{a}dhaka$ -s); that is to say, one should put down a $s\bar{a}dhaka$ and one should put down another one.

Namisādhu's interpretation is that to manifest the splendor of poetical inference, we should highlight the presence of multiple $s\bar{a}dhaka$ -s. He also suggests the possibility of double explanation, that is to say that these $s\bar{a}dhaka$ -s can be mentioned by sequence or without sequence. Here Namisādhu obviously relates punar anya in the second half of Rudraṭa's definition to multiple $s\bar{a}dhaka$ -s, but Rudraṭa probably relates the two words to an imperceivable $s\bar{a}dhya$ and its perceivable $s\bar{a}dhaka$.

Let us now take the two examples provided by Rudrața to see how we should understand poetical inference.

```
sāvajñam āgamiṣyan nūnaṃ patito 'si pādayos tasyāḥ | katham anyathā lalāte yāvakarasatilakapaṅktir iyam²6 || (ex. 1)
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You, coming here in contempt, must have fallen at her feet; otherwise why are there lines of red lac spot on your forehead?

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vacanam upacāragarbham dūrād udgamanam āsanam sakalam \mid idam adya mayi tathā te yathāsi nūnam priye kupitā<sup>27</sup> \mid\mid (ex. 2)
```

Words full of courtesy, rising up from [your seat when I was still] far away, [offering] a whole [separate] seat [for me]: such is all your

 $^{^{26}}$ KAR 7.57.

 $^{^{27}}ibid: 7.58.$

[behavior] towards me today; then truly you must be very angry, O lovely one.

In example 1, what is to be established is the falling on the feet of another woman, the proof for that is the lines of red lac spot on the hero's forehead. In example 2, three $s\bar{a}dhaka$ -s are stated at first, and then comes the $s\bar{a}dhya$, i.e. the anger in the heart of the heroine. According to Rudraṭa's definition, the difference of the two examples is the sequence of the imperceivable $s\bar{a}dhya$ and the corresponding perceivable $s\bar{a}dhaka$. If Namisādhu's interpretation is also convincing, then in example 1 we should understand that the word pankti indicates the multitude of red lac spots, while in example 2 the three actions of the heroine are expressed in sequence²⁸.

Next, Rudrata gives the second definition of poetical inference:

```
yatra balīyaḥ kāraṇam ālokyābhūtam eva bhūtam iti | bhāvīti vā tathānyat kathyeta tad anyad anumānam<sup>29</sup> ||
```

Where, after observing an overpowering cause³⁰, another [result that] has not been produced yet should be described as already produced or to be produced [in the future] in such way (*i.e.* either $s\bar{a}dhya$ or $s\bar{a}dhaka$ should be stated first, then the other), that is another kind of poetical inference.

The second subtype of poetical inference focuses on temporal reversion. The poet converts an object or an event from the state of being not yet produced to the state of being already produced or he presents in the process of being produced. Let us examine the following four examples one by one.

```
aviralavilolajaladaḥ kuṭajārjunanīpasurabhivanavātaḥ | ayam āyātaḥ kālo hanta mṛtāḥ pathikagehinyah^{31} || (ex. 3)
```

The dense rain clouds are unsteady, the forest wind blows with the fragrance of kutaja, arjuna and ntpa flowers, and the time [of rainy season] (or $k\bar{a}la$ = "Death") has come: alas, the wives of the travelers are [as good as] dead.

In this verse, the travelers have not returned in time for the amorous season of spring. The death of their wives does not actually happen, but the wafting of

 $^{^{28}}$ Namisādhu ad KAR 7.58: atra vacanādīni pūrvam sādhakāny upanyastāni paścāt kupitatvam sādhyam iti vaiparītyam ||

 $^{^{29}}KAR$ 7.59.

³⁰Namisādhu glosses *balīyah* as the comparative form *balavattarah*.

 $^{^{31}}$ KAR 7.60.

rain clouds and the fragrant wind from the foot of the mountains which serve to inflame their longing for their absent husbands cause the death happen in readers' imagination. But then how is this example different from example 1? The key point here is the expression of an overpowering cause, that is to say the time of spring. Without this ultimate motivation, clouds and fragrant wind would not have appeared in time, not to mention the imaginary death of travelers' wives.

```
diṣṭyā na mṛto 'smi sakhe nūnam idānīṃ priyā prasannā me | nanu bhagavān ayam uditas tribhuvanam ānandayann induh<sup>32</sup> || (ex. 4)
```

Thank heaven! I'm not dead, O friend! Now my beloved must have calmed down; Or rather, this blessed moon has risen up to gladden the three worlds?

In example 4, the hero infers that due to the rising up of the moon, his beloved one, now immersed in anger and sadness, will finally calm down. Her anger and sadness have originated from the separation with the hero. This is a case in which a result that has not been produced yet is described to be produced in the future. But how can the mere rising of the moon be the direct cause for calming down? Thus some attributes are needed here to describe the moonrise. Here the poet uses "gladdening the three worlds" as the attribute, so that it may be suggested that the property of gladdening within the moonlight is the direct cause for the tranquility of the heroine. However, this direct cause cannot exist without mentioning the overpowering cause: the rising up of the moon.

```
yāsyanti yathā<sup>33</sup> tūrṇaṃ vikasitakamalojjvalād amī sarasaḥ | haṃsā yathaivam etāṃ malinayati ghanāvalī kakubham<sup>34</sup> || (ex. 5)
```

The swans will fly quickly from the pond bright with budding lotuses, as those rows of clouds is making grey the quarter of sky.

In example 5, the poet infers that the swans will fly away from the pond because the rain clouds are approaching. The rows of clouds which make grey the sky, indicate the more powerful cause, namely the coming of the rainy season.

vahati yathā malayamarud yathā ca haritībhavanti vipināni | priyasakhi tatheha na cirād eṣyati tava vallabho nūnam³⁵ || (ex. 6)

 $^{^{32}}ibid: 7.61.$

 $^{^{33}\}text{It}$ seems better to correct this $yath\bar{a}$ to $tath\bar{a},$ since a pair of $yath\bar{a}$ - $tath\bar{a}$ can mean "as... therefore...".

 $^{^{34}}ibid: 7.62.$

 $^{^{35}}ibid: 7.63.$

Since the wind from Malaya Mountain blows, since as the forests have become green, O dear friend, your dear one will surely soon return.

In example 6, the wind from Malaya Mountain and the greening of forests are the more powerful causes for the return of the hero in the future. But the direct cause for that is not stated here. We may suppose that this direct cause is the longing for love in her heart, which is strengthened by the omens of the coming of spring.

To summarize the materials above, anumāna for Rudrata has six subtypes:

- 1. A imperceivable $s\bar{a}dhya$ is expressed first, then its perceivable $s\bar{a}dhaka$ -s are expressed as different from it;
- 2. Perceivable $s\bar{a}dhaka$ -s are expressed first, then their imperceivable $s\bar{a}dhya$ is expressed as different from them;
- 3. An overpowering cause is expressed first, with or without weaker causes, and then the result that does not really happen is supposed to have already taken place.
- 4. A result that does not really happen but appears as if it has already taken place comes first, and then its overpowering cause is expressed, with or without weaker causes.
- 5. A result that does not really happen but appears as if it will happen in the future comes first, and then its overpowering cause is expressed, with or without weaker causes.
- 6. An overpowering cause is expressed first, with or without weaker causes, and then its result that does not really happen is supposed to take place in the future.

As has been discussed in the previous subsection, before Rudrața, Daṇḍin had already recognized the prominence of *hetu* as being a kind of rhetorical figure. But he does not feel the need to give space for poetical inference. Then we may ask: what is the principle for inventing new rhetorical figures? I would like to propose two points (or "ideas"). Firstly, for Sanskrit rhetoric, there is a point of view that every discipline can be its attendant³⁶. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that terms from other disciplines have been borrowed to refer to some specific aspects of rhetoric by rhetoricians. Secondly, Rudrața lived in a period when Kashmir became one of the preeminent scholastic centers in northwestern India. Within the great debates held amongst Buddhists and Brahmins against each other, the discussion of logical inference had a remarkable place. Rudrața would not feel

 $^{^{36}}$ First stated by Rājaśekhara in the $K\bar{a}vyam\bar{i}m\bar{a}ms\bar{a}$, the eighth $adhy\bar{a}ya$: $sarvap\bar{a}rṣadatv\bar{a}t$ $k\bar{a}vyavidy\bar{a}y\bar{a}h$ $t\bar{a}n$ $im\bar{a}n$ $any\bar{a}m\acute{s}$ $c\bar{a}rth\bar{a}n$ vyutpattaye pratyavekṣeta. I translate this sentence as follows: "Since the science of poem needs every [other discipline] to be its attendant, one should examine those and other objects [carefully] for the sake of perfection of knowledge."

embarrassed to borrow a term to construct his paradigm of rhetorical figures with emendations from Dandin.

Concerning poetical reason (*hetu*), Rudrața also advocates a different definition in comparison to previous authors:

```
hetumatā saha hetor abhidhānam abhedakṛd bhaved yatra | so 'laṃkāro hetuh syād anyebhyah pṛthagbhūtah<sup>37</sup> ||
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That is the rhetorical figure [called] poetical reason in which a reason should be stated together with its result as not being different. It is distinct from other [figures].

Rudrața only gives this definition and leaves us no further interpretation. The key point here is that according to Rudrața, in the figure of poetical reason, reason and its result should be depicted as identical. The example given by him runs as follows:

```
aviralakamalavikāsaḥ sakalālimadaś ca kokilānandaḥ | ramyo 'yam eti samprati lokotkanthākarah kālah<sup>38</sup> ||
```

Now comes this lovely season [of spring], which is [filled with] the blossoming of many lotuses, the excitement of [flying] bees and the joy of cuckoos, making people long for [love].

In this verse, lotuses, bees and cuckoos are common signs of spring. Their appearance indicates the coming of spring, thus people start to long for love. In other words, spring causes them to appear. However, since they are all in the nominative case, we need to take them together in apposition to spring. Namisādhu himself suggests another example for this figure:

```
āyur ghṛtaṃ nadī puṇyaṃ bhayaṃ cauraḥ sukhaṃ priyā | vairam dyūtam qurur jñānam śreyo brāhmanapūjanam<sup>39</sup> ||
```

Ghee is longevity, a river is sanctity, a thief is fear, a wife is happiness, gambling is hostility, a teacher is knowledge, and showing respect to Brahmins is bliss.

We can analyse this verse in the following way: ghee, water, a wife, gambling, a teacher and honoring Brahmins are the cause for longevity, sanctity, fear, happiness, hostility, knowledge and bliss respectively. Although depicted as if

 $[\]overline{^{37}}$ KAR 7.82.

³⁸KAR 7.83.

 $^{^{39} \}mathrm{Namis\bar{a}dhu}~ad~\mathrm{KAR}$ 7.83.

not being different, they are no doubt in the relation of cause and effect or in the relation of reason and result. Namisādhu also excludes the possibility of double interpretation here, saying that we cannot take $aviralakamalavik\bar{a}sa$ as a $bahuvr\bar{\imath}hi$ compound⁴⁰.

From the discussion above, Rudrața's new formalization of poetical inference and poetical reason can be summarized as follows:

- 1. The invention of poetical inference.
- 2. The introduction of the word $s\bar{a}dhya$ and $s\bar{a}dhana$ and the changing of their narrative sequence into the definition of poetical inference.
- 3. The effect which has not happened can be depicted as something already happened or happening in the future.
- 4. Admission of *hetu* instead of $k\bar{a}vyalinga$, and the first explicit definition of it.

2.4 Mammața: Consolidation

So far, the aforementioned rhetoricians were inclined to advocate new ideas in a number of rhetorical figures and criticize the theories of earlier authors. But Mammaṭa is a different case. His work, the $K\bar{a}vyaprak\bar{a}\acute{s}a$ (KP), covers almost all the aspects of this discipline and thus became a new starting point of later textbooks for rhetorical studies for centuries in India. One can rather say that the KP is more like a "synthetic" work than a "systematic" one⁴¹. Therefore, it can be regarded as a consolidated encyclopedia of various rhetorical figures.

As for Mammaṭa's date, scholars believe that he flourished in the middle of the 11^{th} century and can be dated to the latter half of the same century⁴². By this period, the theories of inference of the early philosophical schools have been developing for centuries, and internal evolutions and new inventions of the previous theories had already appeared. From Mammaṭa's definition of $anum\bar{a}na^{43}$, one can notice the usage of technical terms of Indian logic. To explain, he defined $anum\bar{a}na$ as an expression concerning both the thing to be proven $(s\bar{a}dhya)$ and its proof $(s\bar{a}dhana)$ and tried to establish a consensus between Sanskrit rhetorics

 $^{^{40}}$ ibid: aviralānām kamalānām vikāsahetutvād vasantakāla eva tathocyate | evam sakalālimadaś cetyādāv api draṣṭavyam | na tv aviralānām kamalānām vikāso yatretyādi bahuvrīhiḥ kartavyaḥ | tadā tv abhedo na syāt |

⁴¹Gerow 1977, p. 271–272: "In a way the KP seems less systematic than the uncompromising but erratic monolith of Bhoja, for it precisely attempts to comprehend and integrate the various extant doctrines of Indian poetics ... So a better term than 'systematic' might be 'synthetic'."

 $^{^{42}}$ See De 1960, pp. 145–147; Gajendragadkar 2010, pp. 10–12; Gerow 1977, p. 272; Kane 1971, pp. 273–274.

⁴³KP 117cd: anumānam tad uktam yat sādhyasādhanayor vacaḥ //

and logical science. The borrowing of technical terms of Indian logic demonstrates his familiarity with this discipline⁴⁴. Mammaṭa's effort may be regarded as an attempt to build a universal ($sarvap\bar{a}r\bar{s}ada$) system of knowledge at that time. Yet, from his explanation of $anum\bar{a}na$, it is difficult to determine the exact doctrine of inference which Mammaṭa was following. The three characteristics in a proper reason or cause, expressed as $pak\bar{s}adharm\bar{a}nvayavyatirekitvam$, may only represent the logical concept $trair\bar{u}pya$ in the general way⁴⁵. He also criticized Rudraṭa's definition without mentioning the name of the latter for the reason that changing the order of stating the thing to be proven and its proof does not bring any poetical beauty⁴⁶.

Mammaṭa's example of anumāna runs as follows:

yatraitā laharīcalācaladṛśo vyāparayanti bhruvaṃ yat tatraiva patanti saṃtatam amī marmaspṛśo mārgaṇāḥ | tac cakrīkṛtacāpam añcitaśarapreṅkhatkaraḥ krodhano dhāvaty agrata eva śāsanadharaḥ satyaṃ sadāsāṃ smaraḥ ||

Since these arrows, piercing the vulnerable points, fall continually only there, to where those young ladies with unsteady glances gesture with their eyebrows, the wrathful Love-god, who is their envoy, truly always runs in front [of them] like a full bow, pulling back with his hand the curved arrow⁴⁷.

This verse is a vivid and fascinating portrait of young ladies' beauty capturing the hearts of heroes, but Mammaṭa did not give any further interpretation of this example. His definition and interpretation of anumāna focused on the process of poetical inference and its validity. In the above verse, the thing to be proven is the running ahead of the Love-god, its proof is the falling down of his arrows, which is denoted by the movement of young ladies' eyebrows.

Mammața also cast his gaze toward the figure of $k\bar{a}vyalinga$. In comparison to the definition by Udbhața, he clearly defined it as follows:

 $^{^{44}\,}Vrtti$ ad KP 117cd: pakṣadharmānvayavyatirekitvena trirūpo hetuḥ sādhanam | dharmiṇi ayogavyavacchedo vyāpakasya sādhyatvam |

 $^{^{45}}$ Indian philosophers in the early period used different technical terms to express the three characteristics of a valid logical mark ($li\dot{n}ga$). On different formulations of $trair\bar{u}pya$, see Katsura 1985. Mammața's appellation of the second and the third characteristics, i.e, anvaya and vyatireka, are also used by Uddyotakara in the NV (also expressed as anvayavyatirekin by Mokṣākaragupta in the $Tarkabh\bar{a}s\bar{a}$)

 $^{^{46}\}mathrm{KP}$ ad 117cd: sādhyasādhanayoḥ paurvāparyavikalpena kiñcid vaicitryam iti na tathā darśitam ||

⁴⁷In my critical edition of the anumāna section of the AlRat, the third line reads tac cakrīkṛtacāpasañcitaśarapreṅkhatkaraḥ krodhano. Here cakrīkṛtacāpam is treated adverbially.

 $k\bar{a}vyali\dot{n}gam\ hetor\ v\bar{a}kyapad\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}^{48}\ ||$

Poetical mark is [that kind of figure in which] a reason is the meaning of a sentence or the meaning of words.

Mammaṭa divided $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ into three subtypes: a reason in the form of the meaning of a sentence $(v\bar{a}ky\bar{a}rthat\bar{a})$, a reason in the form of the meaning of multiple words $(anekapad\bar{a}rthat\bar{a})$ and a reason in the form of a single word $(ekapad\bar{a}rthat\bar{a})$. Examples of each subtype are demonstrated respectively in the following:

vapuḥprādurbhāvād anumitam idaṃ janmani purā
purāre na prāyaḥ kvacid api bhavantaṃ praṇatavān |
naman muktaḥ saṃpraty aham atanur agre 'py anatibhān
maheśa kṣantavyaṃ tad idam aparādhadvayam api ||

From the manifestation of the body it is inferred [by me] that I probably have never bowed to you in my former life, O enemy of cities (i.e. Śiva). Now bowing to you and being released, I, with no body, would not grant a bow [to you] even in the future. O great lord, therefore, these two faults should also be pardoned [by you].

The verse describes a pious devotee to Śiva confessing his two faults. Here the non-bowing to Śiva in the former and future lives, expressed in the first three $p\bar{a}da$ -s, is the reason for the two faults in the last $p\bar{a}da$. Therefore, the verse is exactly an example of the $v\bar{a}ky\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}$ subtype.

praṇayisakhīsalīlaparihāsarasādhigatair⁴⁹ lalitaśirīṣapuṣpahananair api tāmyati yat | vapuṣi vadhāya tatra tava śastram upakṣipataḥ patatu śirasy akāṇḍayamadaṇḍa ivaiṣa bhujaḥ||

You who hurl your weapon to kill that [beautiful] body, which is pained even by the strokes of soft *śirīṣa*-flowers from [her] beloved friends in sportive joke—let this arm [of mine] fall on [your] head like the unexpected Yama's rod.

This verse is the speech of the hero, Mādhava, towards the sorceress Aghoraghaṇṭa, who attempted to sacrifice the heroine, Mālatī, to the Goddess Cāmuṇḍā. The action of hurling the weapon to kill Mālatī is the reason for the falling of

⁴⁸KP 114cd.

 $^{^{49}} M\bar{a}lat\bar{\imath}m\bar{a}dhava~5.31.$

Mādhava's arm. Since the phrase śastram upakṣipataḥ as the reason is expressed in multiple words, this verse is an example of the $anekapad\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}$ subtype⁵⁰.

bhasmoddhūlana bhadram astu bhavate rudrākṣamāle śubhaṃ hā sopānaparaṃparāṃ girisutākāntālayālaṅkṛtiṃ | adyārādhanatoṣitena vibhunā yuṣmatsaparyāsukhā-lokocchedini mokṣanāmani mahāmohe nidhīyāmahe ||

Farewell, O dusting with ash! O rosary of Rudrākṣa beads, may all go well for you! Alas for the rows of stairs which adorn the dwelling of the lover of the Mountain's daughter (*i.e.* Śiva). Today, the lord who is satisfied with my propitiation has cast me into the great numbness called emancipation, which cuts off the light that is the pleasure to serve you.

This verse seems to be a eulogy from a Śaiva devotee towards Śiva. The source is yet not traced. From the content, the image of a pious devotee who wants to serve Śiva forever emerges vividly in our mind. The cutting off of the light in the form of the pleasure to serve Śiva is the reason for the great numbness. Even though the expression sukhālokocchedini consists of several independent words, we need to understand it as a compound, thus it is one word. Therefore, as the reason is expressed by the meaning of a single word, the verse is exactly an example of the $ekapad\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}$ subtype.

Mammața is also aware of the definition of hetu given by Rudrața, yet he regards this designation as problematic. In the section of $k\bar{a}ranam\bar{a}l\bar{a}$, Mammața challenges Rudrața's and Namisādhu's ideas on hetu. He comments that there is no embellishment in Namisādhu's verse because the mere expression treating a reason and its result as being not different lacks aesthetic beauty, and that KAR 7.83 deserves to be considered a good verse only because it contains the alliteration of soft sounds, not because of the assumption of the figure hetu. Since Rudrața's example fails to demonstrate this figure, Mammața has good reason to include it in his $k\bar{a}vyalinqa^{51}$.

 $^{^{50}{\}rm M\bar{a}}$ nikyacandra ad KP 114cd: iha śastropakṣeparūpo hetuḥ śastram ity upakṣipata iti cānekapadārthayoktaḥ |

⁵¹ Vṛtti ad KP 120abc: hetumatā saha hetor abhidhānam abhedato hetur iti hetvalamkāro 'tra na lakṣitaḥ | āyur ghṛtaṃ ityādirūpo hy eṣa na bhūṣaṇatāṃ kadācid arhati | vaicitryābhāvāt | aviralakamalavikāsaḥ sakalālimadaś ca kokilānandaḥ | ramyo 'yam eti saṃprati lokotkaṇṭhākaraḥ kālaḥ || ity atra tu kāvyarūpatāṃ komalānuprāsamahimnaiva samāmnāsiṣur na punar hetvalaṃkārakalpanayeti pūrvoktaṃ kāvyalingam eva hetuḥ ||

2.5 Other Related Authors

Among other rhetoricians who more or less admitted elements borrowed from the discipline of logic, the following need to be mentioned: Ruyyaka, Jayaratha, and Bhoja. Here I only discuss the ideas of Bhoja.

Bhoja's date is probably between 1010 A.D. and 1055 A.D., according to previous studies⁵². In his $\acute{S}rig\bar{a}raprak\bar{a}\acute{s}a$, Chapter 10, Bhoja lists 72 different rhetorical figures which can be divided into three main subtypes: $b\bar{a}hya$, $\bar{a}bhyantara$ and $b\bar{a}hy\bar{a}bhyantara$. They correspond to $\acute{s}abd\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}ra$, $arth\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}ra$ and $ubhay\bar{a}lamk\bar{a}ra$ respectively⁵³, and their distinctions are expressed in "the simile of three kinds of ornaments used by women"⁵⁴. $Anum\bar{a}na$ and hetu belong to the $\bar{a}bhyantara$ group.

A noteworthy point about the $\acute{S}rig\bar{a}raprak\bar{a}\acute{s}a$ is that Bhoja accepts all six $pram\bar{a}na$ -s of the Mīmāmsā school as rhetorical figures⁵⁵.

In the $\dot{S}rig\bar{a}raprak\bar{a}\acute{s}a$, Bhoja defines hetu as a cause of both promoting an action and preventing an action⁵⁶. He admits six subtypes: promoting (pravartaka), preventing (nivartaka), instigating (pravojaka), informing $(j\tilde{n}\bar{a}paka)$, negative $(abh\bar{a}vahetu)$ and variated (citrahetu). Among these, the pravojaka and the $abh\bar{a}vahetu$ are comparable with those subtypes as defined by Daṇḍin because the quoted verses are the same⁵⁷. As for the informing subtype, Bhoja uses a verse from the $Sarasvat\bar{\imath}kanth\bar{a}bharana^{58}$ which has a similar idea to Daṇḍin's examples:

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gajjante khe mehā phullā nīvā paṇaddiā morā | naṭṭho candujjoo vāsīranto halā patto || [garjanti khe meghāḥ phullā nīpāḥ pranartitā mayūrāḥ |] [naṣṭaś candroddyoto varṣartuḥ sakhi prāptaḥ ||] (Sarasvatīkanṭhābharaṇa 3.48, v. 153)
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Clouds are thundering in the sky, the foothills are full of flowers, peacocks are encouraged to dance, moonlight has disappeared: O friend! The rainy season has come.

This verse describes the coming of the rainy season by showing four signs: rain clouds, blooming flowers, dancing peacocks and the disappearing moonlight.

⁵²De 1971, pp. 133–136; Gerow 1977, p. 270; Raghavan 1978, p. 5.

⁵³See Raghavan 1963, pp. 24–25.

 $^{^{54}}ibid,\;\mathrm{p.}\;\;24.$

 $^{^{55}}$ See Raghavan 1978, p. 25. The six $pram\bar{a}na$ -s mentioned are $upam\bar{a}na$, $anum\bar{a}na$, $arth\bar{a}patti$, $abh\bar{a}va$, $\bar{a}gama$ and pratyakṣa.

 $^{^{56}}$ Śṛṅgāraprakāśa Chapter 10: pravṛttinivṛttyor nibandhanaṃ hetuḥ |

⁵⁷Bhoja quotes KA 2.243 and 2.247 as examples of prayojaka and abhāvahetu respectively.

⁵⁸This verse is listed as an example of anumāna in the Sarasvatīkanthābharaṇa.

Although readers are aware of the cause-effect relation between these signs and the rainy season, there is no explicit expression of the rainy season itself in this part of the stanza. The idea of indicating the time by using seasonal or temporal signs had already been admitted by Daṇḍin in his examples of $hetu^{59}$.

As for $anum\bar{a}na$, Bhoja has some unique viewpoints. His definition of this figure in the $\acute{S}rig\bar{a}raprak\bar{a}\acute{s}a$ is similar to that of Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka and Śobhākara⁶⁰, but he quotes KAR 7.60 and 7.83 as examples. He also distinguishes between $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}pakahetu$ and $anum\bar{a}na$:

If one asks: How is it $(anum\bar{a}na)$ different from the informing [reason] $(j\tilde{n}\bar{a}paka)$ subtype? We answer: $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}paka$ is so called because it is employed towards someone who is about to know [something]. Poetical inference $(anum\bar{a}na)$ means that something is inferred later by means of it. Objection: this [poetical inference] also causes [another person] to know [something]. [Reply:]That is correct, but this causes one who is not desirous to know know [something], yet that [informing reason] only [makes] one who is desirous to know [know something]⁶¹.

Bhoja lists several examples to demonstrate the difference between the two figures, but he does not give any explanation of these verses. For him, $anum\bar{a}na$ can refer to both the method of obtaining valid knowledge and the resulting valid knowledge, but $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}pakahetu$ only refers to the method of obtaining valid knowledge⁶². Another aspect of $anum\bar{a}na$ is that it needs to contain a process which is already accepted or understood, but $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}pakahetu$ should contain a process not yet accepted or understood. Understood as such, $j\tilde{n}\bar{a}pakahetu$ has three subtypes based on whether it includes a past, a present or a future object.

Interestingly, Bhoja's ideas are somehow changed in the $Sarasvat\bar{\imath}kanth\bar{a}b-harana$. His idea of $anum\bar{a}na$ presented in this work demonstrates his familiarity with Praśastapāda's $Pad\bar{a}rthadharmasamgraha^{63}$ and the Naiyāyika terminology

 $^{^{59}{\}rm KA}$ 2.244: gato 'stam arko bhātīndur yānti vāsāya pakṣiṇaḥ | itīdam api sādhv eva kālāvasthānivedane ||

 $^{^{60}}$ Śṛṅgāraprakāśa: liṅgadarśanād liṅgij $\~{n}$ ānam anum $\={a}$ nam |

 $^{^{61}}$ Śṛṅgāraprakāśa: ko 'sya jñāpakād bheda iti ced ucyate | jānantaṃ prayuṅkta iti jñāpakaḥ | anu paścān mīyate anenety anumānam | nanv idam api jñāpayati | satyam | kiṃ tv idam ajijñāsum api jñāpayati | sa tu jijñāsum eva |

⁶²Śṛṅgāraprakāśa: athavā pramitirūpam phalam anumānam ... pramāṇarūpo hetur jñāpakaḥ ... yadi vā upāttavyāpāro 'numānahetuḥ ... anupāttavyāpāro jñāpakaḥ |

⁶³Sarasvatīkaņṭhābharaṇa 3.47-48: liṅgād yal liṅgino jñānam anumānaṃ tad ucyate | pūrvavac cheṣavac caiva dṛṣṭaṃ sāmānyataś ca yat || phalasāmagryabhedena dvidhaitad bhidyate pṛthak | udāharanam evaisām rūpavyaktyai bhavisyati ||

cf. Padārthadharmasaṃgraha (Dvivedin 1895), p. 200: liṅgadarśanāt saṃjāyamānaṃ laiṅgikam || liṅgaṃ punaḥ — yad anumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite | tadabhāve ca nāsty eva tal liṅgam anumāpakam || ibid, p. 201: yad anumeyenārthena deśaviśeṣe

of inference⁶⁴. He follows the threefold Naiyāyika subdivision of inference into $p\bar{u}rvavat$, $\acute{s}e \dot{s}avat$ and $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato$ $dr\dot{s}tam$, and attempts, at the same time, the introduction of two alternative understandings of the term $anum\bar{a}na$, either as the result of inference (inferential knowledge) or a means of valid knowledge (inferential mark)⁶⁵. In this way, Bhoja accepts six subtypes of $anum\bar{a}na$ in total. We can take the two verses of the $\acute{s}esavat$ subtype as examples.

When taking anumāna as the result of inference, Bhoja quotes KAR 7.57. The result of inference in this verse is demonstrated in the first line: the hero must have lain down at the feet of another lady, and he must have come to the heroine with a remorseful face that the heroine interprets as being disdainful. Here the result is composed with poetic turn of phrase. On the other hand, in Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa 3.48, v. 156⁶⁶, anumāna is understood as the inferential mark, i.e. the yearning for love in the heroine's heart. Even though the signs of spring, such as mango-buds and the soft wind from Malaya Mountain, do not appear in reality, the mere desire for love is strong enough to convince the heroine of the coming of spring. In this way, the inferential mark is composed with poetical fascination.

Bhoja exerts much effort on the figure of hetu. It consists of four subtypes: productive, informative, non-existent and variated. Each subtype includes several species⁶⁷. The abundant varieties of hetu in comparison to the passages in the

 $k\bar{a}$ laviśese vā sahacaritam anumeyadharmānvite cānyatra sarvasminn ekadeśe vā prasiddham anumeyaviparīte ca sarvasmin pramāṇato 'sad eva tad aprasiddhārthasyānumāpakam liṅgaṃ bhavatīti || The verse in bold type is directly quoted by Bhoja after Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa 3.48, v. 153.

 64 Bhoja's understanding of $p\bar{u}rvavat$, $\acute{s}e\dot{s}avat$ and $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato$ $dr\dot{s}tam$ follows the first interpretation of the NV; that is to say, both understand $p\bar{u}rvavat$ as an inference of an effect from a cause, $\acute{s}e\dot{s}avat$ as an inference of a cause from an effect, and $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato$ $dr\dot{s}tam$ as an inference based on the non-causal invariable concomitance between two things. See NV ad NS 1.1.5 ($Ny\bar{a}yadar\acute{s}ana$, pp. 146-149.)

 65 Vṛtti ad Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa 3.48: tāny etāni bhāvasādhane 'numānaśabde phalapakṣe udāharaṇāni bhavanti | yadā punaḥ karaṇasādhano 'numānaśabdas tadānumīyate 'nenety anumānaśabdena yathoktaṃ liṅgam ucyate | yad āha — anumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite | tadabhāve ca nāsty eva tal liṅgam anumāpakam ||

66 dīsai ņa cūamaülam attā ņa a vāi malaagandhavaho | ettam vasantamāso sahi jam utkaṇṭhiam ceam || [dṛśyate na cūtamukulam adya na ca vāti malayagandhavahaḥ | eti vasantamāsaḥ sakhi yad utkaṇṭhitam cetaḥ ||] cit. Weber 543, Bhuvanapāla 501: dīsai ņa cūamaülam attā ņa a vāi malaagaṃdhavaho | pattam vasaṃtamāsam sāhai ukkaṃṭhiam cea ||

The mange-buds are not visible, oh friend; the Malaya breeze too has not yet begun to blow. But the deep longing in my heart itself announces the advent of the spring-month. (Patwardhan 1988, p. 63.)

⁶⁷Sarasvatīkanthābharana 3.12–17: kriyāyāh kāraṇaṃ hetuḥ kārako jñāpakaś ca saḥ | abhāvaś citrahetuś ca caturvidha iheṣyate || yaḥ pravṛttiṃ nivṛttiṃ ca prayuktiṃ cāntarā viśan | udāsīno 'pi kuryāt kārakaṃ tat pracakṣate || dvitīyā ca tṛtīyā ca caturthī saptamī ca yam | kriyānāviṣṭam ācaṣṭe laksanam jñāpakaś ca sah || abhāvah prāqabhāvādibhedeneha caturvidhah | qhatābhāvādibhedāt tu

 $\acute{S}rig\bar{a}raprak\bar{a}\acute{s}a$, are the first point of astonishment for readers. As for the analysis of Bhoja's viewpoints, I have to leave it to future articles.

tasya saṃkhyā na vidyate || vidūrakāryaḥ sahajaḥ kāryānantarajas tathā | yukto na yukta ity evam asaṃkhyāś citrahetavaḥ || te 'mī prayogamārgeṣu gauṇavṛttivyapāśrayāḥ | kāryāḥ kāvyeṣu vaicitryaṃ tathā te kartum īśate ||

Jenner's recognition of subtypes of hetu in the KĀd seems to follow Bhoja's subdivisions. See Jenner 1968, pp. 255–257.

Chapter 3

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Conception of Inference $(anum\bar{a}na)$

3.1 The Incorporation of the Technical Term "Means of Valid Knowledge" (pramāṇa) into Sanskrit Rhetorical Literature

How is it possible that the pearl of Indian logic and the stream of Sanskrit rhetorics converge in the ocean of the mind of Sanskrit rhetoricians? In fact, we need to understand that the development of any research discipline is a dynamic process in both internal and external aspects: knowledge accumulation and its development occur not only within a specific field, but they are also influenced by viewpoints and theories from outside. As has been pointed out in Kane (1971), Prajapati (1998), Rajendran (2001), Shastri (1986) and Thakur (1958), Indian philosophy and grammatical studies have exerted a strong influence on Sanskrit rhetorics. If one reads Sanskrit rhetorical literature carefully, he or she will notice the enormous borrowing of concepts and technical terms from other sources. For later authors of alamkāraśāstra, paraphrasing paragraphs from philosophical or grammatical works in their own treatises is not blameable; on the contrary, this is how Sanskrit rhetorics continued its development. We can find many traces which demonstrate deep familiarity with Indian philosophy, such as mentioning, quoting or paraphrasing verses from Dharmakīrti's Pramānavārttika and $Nyāyabindu^{68}$ and the introduction of new designations for rhetorical figures based on the terminology used for philosophical categories. Particularly revealing are the different strategies used to incorporate the foundations of medieval Indian philosophy: the $pram\bar{a}na$ -s themselves. It is the irrigation by the intellectual streams from various disciplines

⁶⁸See Thakur 1958, pp. 258–260.

that leads aestheticians to consider the aesthetic aspects of epistemology.

3.2 Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's View on Inference in the $Ny\bar{a}yama\~njar\~i$

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta is a Kashmirian Naiyāyika philosopher active at around 850-910 A.D. 69 . He composed the $Ny\bar{a}yama\~njar\~i$ (NM), a unique work not only functioning as a commentary on the $Ny\bar{a}yas\=utra$, but also legitimizing his own viewpoints on the $Ny\bar{a}ya$ school. Generally, commentaries on the $Ny\bar{a}yas\=utra$ closely follow the original s $\=utra$; the NM, however, is not a mere commentary, but a detailed introduction to both Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's own philosophical thought and the theories of other philosophical schools. To be specific, he firstly quotes the original s $\=utra$, then proposes his own interpretation and theories with reference to previous commentators, while at the same time he presents the theories of other schools and refutes them by revealing the defects in those theories. Meanwhile, the style of Jayanta's composition is such that it does not make readers feel like they are listening to some insipid dogmatic preachings, but rather it provides them a fascinating experience of reading a well-constructed combination of both a philosophical argument and a literary work. It is on this basis that the NM is acclaimed as a unique work.

The Nyāya school admits four methods of valid cognition (pramāṇa): direct perception (pratyakṣa), logical inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and authoritative speech $(śabda)^{70}$. Inference is a significant tool to recognize the reality of the world. The stock example of inference is that after seeing smoke on the mountain, one can infer the existence of fire thereon. This inference is grasped because the one who infers has previously learned the invariable concomitance $(vy\bar{a}pti)$ between fire and smoke: wherever there is smoke, there is fire. For the Nyāya school, there are three kinds of logical inference: $p\bar{u}rvavat$, $\acute{s}e_{\dot{s}}avat$ and $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato$ $drṣṭaṃ^{71}$. As is noticed by Vātsyāyana, the author of the NBh, there are two different interpretations of these three terms:

1. $p\bar{u}rvavat$ is an inference in which an effect is inferred from its cause, śeṣavat is an inference in which a cause is inferred from its effect, $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato$ drstam is an inference of the kind where we understand the existence of an object's motion because we saw it in one place previously and now we see it in another place, like

⁶⁹Hacker 1951, p. 162; Raghavan 1964, pp. i–xxix. See also Graheli 2015, pp. 3–11, where previous studies on Jayanta's date and personality are summarized.

⁷⁰Nyāyasūtra 1.1.3: pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni.

 $^{^{71}}Ny\bar{a}yas\bar{u}tra$ 1.1.5: atha tatp $\bar{u}rvakam$ trividham anum $\bar{a}nam$ p $\bar{u}rvavac$ cheṣavat s $\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyatodrṣtam$ ca.

the movement of the sun^{72} .

2. $p\bar{u}rvavat$ is an inference in which, by seeing one of the two things that were perceived as invariably connected, one deduces the other, not being perceived at this moment, to be present according to the former situation; $\dot{s}e\dot{s}avat$ is an inference which, after negating all other properties, consists in the consent to what remains because of the lack of another possibility; $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato\ dr\dot{s}tam$ is an inference in which, when the invariable concomitance between an inferential mark and its possessor is not perceived, we understand this possessor of inferential mark through the similarity of the mark to some other objects⁷³.

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta is also aware of these two interpretations. He accepts the first interpretations of $p\bar{u}rvavat$ and $\acute{s}e \dot{s}avat$ and rejects the opponent's ideas⁷⁴, and further exerts himself to provide more detailed explanations and additional examples for the second interpretation of these two kinds of inference. $p\bar{u}rvavat$ here means an inference where one learns the invariable concomitance between a cause and its effect based on a previous perception of both a homogeneous cause and a homogeneous effect, and thus he or she can infer on the basis that the present situation is the same⁷⁵. For $\acute{s}e \dot{s}avat$, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta follows the interpretation in the NBh and provides a new example of inferring the fuel of fire: after an inference of unqualified fire based on smoke in some place, if we try to identify what the fuel is, there are several alternatives. After rejecting all other possibilities such as grass, dried leaves, wood and others, we can finally conclude that the fire is caused by cow-dung⁷⁶.

 $^{^{72}{\}rm NBh}$ ad NS 1.1.5: pūrvavad iti — yatra kāraņena kāryam anumīyate yathā meghonnatyā bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭir iti | śeṣavat tad — yatra kāryeṇa kāraṇam anumīyate pūrvodakaviparītam udakaṃ nadyāḥ pūrṇatvaṃ śīghratvaṃ ca dṛṣṭvā srotaso 'numīyate bhūtā vṛṣṭir iti | sāmānyatodṛṣṭam — vrajyāpūrvakam anyatra dṛṣṭasya 'nyatra darśanam iti tathā cādityasya tasmād asty apratyakṣāpy ādityasya vrajyeti |

⁷³ ibid: atha vā pūrvavad iti — yatra yathāpūrvam pratyakṣabhūtayor anyataradarśanenānyatarasyānumānam, 'pratyakṣasyānumānam, yathā dhūmenāgnir iti | śeṣavan nāma pariśeṣaḥ, sa ca prasaktapratiṣedhe 'nyatrāprasaṅgāc chiṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ, yathā sad anityam evamādinā dravyaguṇakarmaṇām aviśeṣeṇa sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyebhyo vibhaktasya śabdasya, tasmin dravyakarmaguṇasaṃśaye, na dravyam, ekadravyatvāt, na karma, śabdāntarahetutvāt, yas tu śiṣyate so 'yam iti śabdasya guṇatvapratipattih | sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ nāma — yatrāpratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhe kenacid arthena liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgā gamyate, yathecchādibhir ātmā, icchādayo guṇāḥ, guṇāś ca dravyasaṃsthānāḥ, tad tad eṣāṃ sthānam sa ātmeti |

See Oberhammer, Prets and Prandstetter 1991, p. 48–49, under the item anumāna; Oberhammer, Prets and Prandstetter 1996, p. 169–170, under the item pūrvavad [anumānam]; Oberhammer, Prets and Prandstetter 2006, p. 193–195, under the item śeṣavad [anumānam].

⁷⁴NM I, pp. 335–343.

 $^{^{75}}$ ibid, p. 347: atra sambandhagrahaṇakāle lingalinginoḥ pratyakṣataḥ svarūpam avadhārya punas tādṛśaiva lingena tādṛg eva lingī gamyate tat pūrveṇa tulyaṃ vartata iti pūrvavad anumānam \mid yathā mahānase dhūmāgnī sahacaritau dṛṣṭvā punaḥ dhūmāgnyanumānam \mid

⁷⁶ibid, p. 348: śesavan nāma pariśesah | sa ca prasaktapratisedhe 'nyatrāprasaṅgāc chisyamāne

As for $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato\ drstam$, Bhatta Jayanta gives two interpretations. In the first case, a lingin is inferred from its linga, and both should not be in the relation of cause and effect. One can infer the taste of an elephant apple (kapittha) by its color. Both the taste and the color inhere within this elephant apple and there is no causeeffect relation between them⁷⁷. Bhatta Jayanta questions Vātsyāyana's example of the first kind of $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato\ drstam$, saying that the different positions of the sun are actually the effect of its movement. Since we need to infer the cause from its effect, this example should be categorized under $\acute{s}esavat^{78}$. On this point and on the viewpoint that non-causal inference between two things belongs to $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato$ drstam, Bhatta Jayanta holds the same idea with Uddyotakara, the author of the NV⁷⁹. The second case can be demonstrated as follows: when a thing A is similar to A' in some way and A' is invariably accompanied by B', then one can infer that A is accompanied by B which is similar to B', even though B' is imperceptible. For example, we can obtain the knowledge of invariable concomitance between an instrument and an action it performs from the perception of cutting something with an axe, then by accepting this invariable concomitance as a general or universal case, in a similar way we can infer from the action of hearing some sounds that there must be a sensual organ in the body functioning as the instrument of hearing, even though it is itself categorically imperceptible⁸⁰.

A shorter and more concise version of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's viewpoints on the three subtypes of inference can be found in his $Ny\bar{a}yakalik\bar{a}$. This work can be regarded as a manual explaining basic Naiyāyika concepts for beginners because it is "one of the earliest extant example of works in the Nyāya tradition that intend to be a

saṃpratyayaḥ | yathā kvacit pradeśe dhūmenāgnimātre 'numite kimindhano 'yam agniḥ iti vimarśe prasaktānāṃ tṛṇaparṇākāṣṭhādīnām aprasaṅgāc ca gomayendhano 'gniḥ parikalpyate | yathā vā śabde dravyakarmatvapratiṣedhāt sāmānyādāv aprasaṅgāc ca guṇatvānumānaṃ vakṣyate

⁷⁷ibid, p. 344: sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ tu yad akāryakāraṇabhūtāl liṅgāt tādṛśasyaiva liṅgino 'numānam — yathā kapitthādau rūpeṇa rasānumānam | rūparasayoḥ samavāyikāraṇam ekaṃ kapitthādidravyam, na tu tayor anyonyam kāryakāranabhāvah ||

⁷⁸ibid: yat punar bhāṣyakāreṇa bhāskarasya deśāntaraprāptyā gatyanumānam udāhṛtaṃ —— tad ayuktam —— deśāntaraprāpter gatikāryatvāt kāryeṇa kāraṇānumānaṃ śeṣavad evedaṃ syāt

⁷⁹NV ad NS 1.1.5: sāmānyato dṛṣṭam nāma akāryakāraṇabhūtena yatrāvinābhāvinā viśeṣaṇena viśeṣyamāṇo dharmī gamyate tat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam, yathā balākayā salilānumānam | katham punar balākayā salilānumānam yāvad asya deśaḥ balākayājahadvṛttitvena prasiddho bhavati tāvantam antarbhāvya vṛkṣādikam artham pakṣīkṛtya balākāvattvena sādhayati |

 $^{^{80}{\}rm NM~I,p.~348:}~s\bar{a}manyato~drṣṭam̄~tu~---~yatra~sambandhakāle~'pi liṅgisvarūpam apratyakṣam̄~--- nityaparokṣam eva sāmānyato vyāptigrahanād anumīyate ---- yathā śabdādyupalabdhyā śrotrādikaraṇam | indriyāṇām atīndriyatvāt na kadācit pratyakṣagamyatvam | atha ca chedanādikriyāṇām̄ paraśvadhādikaraṇapūrvakatvena vyāptigrahaṇāt śabdādyupalabdhikriyāṇām̄ karaṇapūrvakatvam anumīyate |$

concise textbook for students"⁸¹. There Bhaṭṭa Jayanta clearly defines the three subtypes of inference as $pratyakṣap\bar{u}rvakam$, pariśeṣa and $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyato$ dṛṣṭam, and their definitions are the same as the second interpretation mentioned above⁸².

In another passage, Bhatta Jayanta also mentions the distinction between the inference for the sake of oneself $(sv\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na)$ and the inference for the sake of another (parārthānumāna). There Bhatta Jayanta definitely states that when talking about inference, we need to recognize two different cognizers: one who has understood the invariable concomitance by himself or herself according to fixed rules and one who has not understood it. The inference made by the former can be called the inference for the sake of oneself because the cognition of the concomitance has already arisen. As for the latter, one needs to explain the concomitance to make him or her understand. The instructive speech to such a person can be called the inference for the sake of another person⁸³. The term $sv\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ and $par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$, together with other similar expressions, are, however, not Bhatta Jayanta's invention. Their traces can be found not only in Buddhist dialectics, but also in Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasamgraha. Praśastapāda is a follower of the Vaiśesika School. He admits two kinds of inference: svaniścitārtham and parārtham. svaniścitārtham, as the name suggests, is the inference in which one apprehends the thing to be inferred by remembering the previous knowledge of invariable concomitance, while parartham is the explicit verbal statement of svaniścitartham to another person who has not learned the invariable concomitance before by means of a fivefold syllogism⁸⁴. Bhatta Javanta

⁸¹Kataoka 2013, p. 236(1).

⁸²Kataoka 2013, pp. 218(19)–217(20): tasya grahanam pratyakṣānupalambhasahāyān mānasapratyakṣāt | dhūmam agnisahacaritam indriyenopalabhyānagneś ca jalāder vyāvartamānam anupalambhena jñātvā manasā niścinoti "dhūmo 'gnim na vyabhicarati" iti | tathā niścitya punaḥ parvatādau dhūmam paśyann agnim anumimīte | tac caitat pratyakṣapūrvakam anumānam ucyate | pariśeṣānumānam tu prasaktapratiṣedhe 'nyatrāprasangāc chiṣyamānārthaparikalpanam | yathā prasaktayor dravyakarmanoḥ pratiṣedhāt sāmānyādāv aprasangāc ca pāriśeṣyāt "gunaḥ śabdaḥ" iti niścīyate | sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ tu nityaparokṣe dharmini sāmānyena vyāptigrahaṇād anumānam | yathecchādinā kāryeṇātmānumānam vakṣyate |

 $^{^{83} \}mathrm{NM}$ II, 551: satyam — na paramārthatah parārthānumānam upapadyate | kin tu dvividhah pratipattā | svayam avagatayathāprakrtalingavyāptikah tadviparītaś ca | tatra svayam avadhrtapratibandham prati nopadiśyata evam anumānam svata eva tasya pratītyupapatteḥ | anavadhrtavyāptikasya tu vyāptir eva vyutpādyata iti tam prati parārthānumānam tadupadeśakam vākyam evākhyāyate |

⁸⁴ Padārthadharmasamgraha (Dvivedin 1895), pp. 205–206: evamādi tat sarvam asyedam iti sambandhamātravacanāt siddham | tat tu dvividham | dṛṣṭaṃ sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ca | tatra dṛṣṭam prasiddhasādhyayor atyantajātyabhede 'numānam | yathā gavy eva sāsnāmātram upalabhya deśāntare 'pi sāsnāmātradarśanād gavi pratipattiḥ | prasiddhasādhyayor atyantajātibhede lingānumeyadharmasāmānyānuvṛttito 'numānaṃ sāmānyato dṛṣṭam | yathā karṣakavaṇigrājapuruṣāṇāṃ ca pravṛtteḥ phalavattvam upalabhya varṇāśraminām api dṛṣṭam prayojanam anuddiśya pravartamānāmām phalānumānam iti | tatra lingadarśanam pramānam pramitir agnijñānam | athavāqnijñānam eva pramānam pramitir agnau qunadosamādhyasthyadarśanam ity etat

seems to adopt Praśastapāda's idea and holds the viewpoint that the core of $par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ is not a mere speech or a mere explanatory repetition, but the conveyance of the invariable concomitance which establishes correct knowledge in another person⁸⁵. As for the Buddhist side, Dignāga advocates the distinction between $sv\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ and $par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na^{86}$. Dharmakīrti (ca. 550–600 A.D.) and his commentator Dharmottara (ca. 740–800 A.D.) follows this dichotomy of inference⁸⁷.

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svaniścitārtham anumānam |
ibid, pp. 231–233: pañcāvayavena vākyena svaniścitārthapratipādanam parārthānumānam
pañcāvayavenaiva vākyena samśayitaviparyastāvyutpannānām paresām svaniścitārthapratipā-
danam parārthānumānam vijneyam | avayavāh punah pratijnāpadeśanidarśanānusandhā-
napraty\bar{a}mn\bar{a}y\bar{a}h
  <sup>85</sup>NM II, p. 551, 12–p. 552, 2:
      vaktrā svapratyayenedam na hi vākyam prayujyate
      paro madvacanād eva tam artham budhyatām iti ||
      kim tv enam anumānena bodhayāmīti manyate
      so 'pi tadvacanān naiva tam artham avabudhyate ||
      kin tu vyāptimato lingāt svayam tat tu na paśyati |
      tatpratar{\imath}tyabhyupar{a}yatvar{a}t parar{a}rtham idam ucyate ||
      ataś ca śrotuh svārthānumānam evedam | vaktā tu tathā param pratipādayan
parārthānumānam prayunkta ity ucyate ||
      na cānuvādamātram tat vaktur ity upapadyate |
      yato vyāpriyate samyak parasya pratipattaye ||
  ^{86}See Kitagawa 1965, pp. 12–13. Dignāga's definitions of the two subtypes of inference in his
Pramānasamuccaya can be reconstructed from Tibetan translations:
anumānam dvidhā svārtham trirūpāl lingato 'rthadrk | (Pramānasamuccaya 2.1ab)
parārtham anumānam tu svadrstārthaprakāśanam | (Pramānasamuccaya 3.1ab) (Watanabe 2011,
svadrst\bar{a}rthaprak\bar{a}sánam seems to be a similar expression to Prasastapāda's svaniscit\bar{a}rthapratip\bar{a}-
dan\bar{a}m.
  ^{87}Pram\bar{a}nav\bar{a}rttika (PV) 4.1: parasya pratip\bar{a}dyatv\bar{a}d adrsto 'pi svayam paraih | drstah
s\bar{a}dhanam\ ity\ eke\ tat\ ksep\bar{a}y\bar{a}tmadrgvacah\ ||
NB 2.1-3: anumānam dvidhā || svārtham parārtham ca || tatra svārtham trirūpāl lingād yad
anumeye jñānam tad anumānam ||
Tīkā ad NB 2.2-3: svasmāy idam svārtham / yena svayam pratipadyate tat svārtham
/ parasmāy idam parārtham / yena param pratipādayati tat parārtham / tatra tayoh
svārthaparārthānumānayor madhye svārtham jñānam kim višistam ity āha—trirūpād iti /
trīņi rūpāni yasya vaksyamāṇalakṣaṇāni tat trirūpam | lingyate gamyate 'nenārtham iti lingam
/ tasmāt trirūpāl lingād yad jātam jñānam iti / etad dhetudvārena višesanam / tat trirūpāc ca
lingāt trirūpalingālambanam apy utpadyata iti viśinasti—anumeya iti / etac ca viṣayadvāreṇa
višesaņam | trirūpāl lingād yad utpannam anumeyālambanam jñānam tat svārtham anumānam
iti \mid \mid
NB 3.1: trirūpalingākhyānam parārtham anumānam ||
Tīkā
         ad
                NB
                        3.1:
                                     trir\bar{u}pali\dot{n}q\bar{a}khy\bar{a}nam
                                                               iti
                                                                            tr\bar{\imath}ni
                                                                                      r\bar{u}p\bar{a}ni—
anvayavyatirekapakṣadharmatvasamjñakāni yasya tat trirūpam / trirūpam ca tal lingam ca
tasyākhyānam / ākhyāyate prakāśyate 'neneti—trirūpam lingam iti ākhyānam / kim punas tat,
vacanam | vacanena hi trirūpam lingam ākhyāyate | parasmāy idam parārtham ||
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3.3 Śobhākara's Familiarity with the $Ny\bar{a}ya-ma\tilde{n}jar\bar{\imath}$

Vasudeva (2016) mentions that there are a few traces indicating the textual and intellectual influence of the NM on the AlRat. The most obvious one is the opening verse of the AlRat, which is the third *mangala* verse of the NM:

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surāsuraśiroratnamarīcikhacitānghraye | viqhnāndhakārasūryāya qanādhipataye namah ||
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Homage to Ganeśa, the sun to the darkness that is hindrance, his feet stippled with the brilliance of the crest gems of gods and demons.

It is not a trend for Sanskrit rhetoricians to directly quote a *mangala* verse from a philosophical work. Śobhākara could have produced his own praising to Gaṇeśa or Śiva, but he did not. Therefore, there must be a deeper motivation for him to quote Bhatta Jayanta's verse.

Speaking of the sections of $anum\bar{a}na$ and hetu, Śobhākara's introduction of the distinction between $sv\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ and $par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ reminds us of the passages in the NM, but there is no close verbal parallel.

Vrtti ad AlRat 79:

tena svayam lingāt pratipattir anumānam | lingena parapratyāyanam parārthānumānarūpam kāvyalingaparyāyo hetvalamkārah |

Therefore, poetical inference is one's own comprehension from an inferential mark, [while] the figure of poetical reason, which has "poetical mark" $(k\bar{a}vyalinga)$ as its synonym, causes another person to understand by means of an inferential mark, and it takes the form of an inference [made to inform] for another person.

NM II, pp. 551:

tatra svayam avadhṛtapratibandhaṃ prati nopadiśyata evam anumānam svata eva tasya pratītyupapatteḥ | anavadhṛtavyāptikasya tu vyāptir eva vyutpādyata iti taṃ prati parārthānumānaṃ tadupadeśakaṃ vākyam evākhyāyate |

Among [the two kinds of comprehensions, if] there is no informing of someone who has themselves already grasped the connection (*i.e.* invariable concomitance) that has been understood by oneself, such inference is strictly 'for oneself' because the cognition is possible for

that [person]. However, in the case of someone who has not [yet] understood the invariable concomitance, the invariable concomitance itself is communicated; the speech which instructs this [idea] is called an inference for the sake of another person.

It can be said that Śobhākara's viewpoint is conformable to Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's interpretation of the Naiyāyika position. As we saw in the previous and as we see in the present section, the idea of distinguishing between $sv\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ and $par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ is shared by several Indian philosophers, including at least Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, Praśāstapāda, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta is one of the influences of Śobhakara on the understanding of inference. The study of the figure anumana, hetu and arthantaranyasa in Chapter 4 does not show any direct textual dependence on the $Ny\bar{a}yamañjar\bar{\imath}$, but Śobhakara's understanding of the process of inference is compatible to Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's understanding of $sv\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ and $par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$. While the agreement is not dramatic, it is close enough for us to see Śobhākara to be indebted to Bhatta Jayanta.

Chapter 4

Śobhākara as a Challenger of the Re-systematization of Sanskrit Rhetorics by Ruyyaka

4.1 Śobhākara's Date, His Works and Status in Sanskrit Rhetorics

Just like many Sanskrit rhetoricians after Daṇḍin were from Kashmir, Śobhākaramitra (Śobhākara for short) was also born in this mountainous region. We know that his father was Trayīśvaramitra, a minister in the court⁸⁸. The date of Śobhākara is not difficult to determine. Since he wrote later than Ruyyaka who was active in the middle of the 12^{th} century, and prior to Ruyyaka's defender Jayaratha who was active in the 13^{th} century, his relative date falls between the middle of the 12^{th} century and the early period of the 13^{th} century.

The only work of Śobhākara transmitted to us is the rhetorical work Alaṃkāraratnākara (AlRat). The treatise consists of individual sūtras defining each rhetorical figure. The sūtra section is then followed by an auto-commentary discussing theoretical issues concerning the definitions of rhetorical figures, and examining both positive example verses and negative counter-examples. The whole section of the auto-commentary ends with verses summarizing the key ideas underlying these figures, which are called saṃgraha or saṃkṣepa. I will designate the auto-commentary and saṃgraha/saṃkṣepa together as vṛtti. The vṛtti also contains critical evaluations of the doctrines of other Sanskrit rhetoricians, especially that of Ruyyaka, the function of which is to legitimize Śobhākara's

 $^{^{88}\}mathrm{On}$ the proper name of Śobhākara and on the name of his father, see Vasudeva 2016, p. 495, fn. 1.

own viewpoints.

In this treatise, Śobhākara questions Ruyyaka's re-systematization of Sanskrit rhetorics and attempts to introduce new elements into the system. Connoisseurs of Sanskrit literature will surely be impressed by his adventurous analysis and invention of various rhetorical figures. From a diachronic aspect, Śobhākara and the AlRat stands at the final phase of the development of Sanskrit rhetorics in Kashmir, together with Ruyyaka and Jayaratha, which is demonstrated in the way of academic dialectics between the three authors. This academic tradition of Sanskrit rhetorics, however, is lost in its homeland and luckily transmitted to other regions in South Asia through scholars who knows Jayaratha's works.

4.2 The Different Viewpoints of Ruyyaka, Śobhākara and Jayaratha on Some Logic-related Figures

To comprehend academic relationship between Ruyyaka, Śobhākara and Jayaratha, we need to examine their viewpoints on various rhetorical figures in the way of intertextuality. This intertextuality has been previously noticed in Rao (1992). In her study, Rao examines each rhetorical figure discussed in the AlRat by comparing the different viewpoints of the three authors towards them. Though a forward-looking attempt, the details in the original texts are more or less omitted by her. Vasudeva (2016) is also aware of the interconnection between the AlSar, the AlRat and Jayaratha's Alaṃkāravimarśinī (AlVim). This study focuses more on Śobhākara's criticism on Ruyyaka. Based on identification of parallel texts, the study explores Śobhākara's intellectual background and theoretical innovations in comparison to Ruyyaka as well as Jayaratha's response to Śobhākara. It also proposes producing a critical edition of the AlVim and the AlRat by utilizing birch bark manuscripts preserved in the Bodleian Library at Oxford University.

In the following paragraphs, I select their viewpoints on some "logical" rhetorical figures for comparison to show what kind of intertextuality between Ruyyaka, Śobhākara and Jayaratha is.

The two core rhetorical figures in the following discussions are $anum\bar{a}na$ and $hetu/k\bar{a}vyalinga$. Ruyyaka uses the expressions $tarkany\bar{a}yam\bar{u}la$ and $tarkany\bar{a}y\bar{a}\acute{s}raya$ as group names for $anum\bar{a}na$ and $k\bar{a}vyalinga$. Like Ruyyaka, Śobhākara also groups these two figures together; but he does not articulate a clear categorization of the various types of rhetorical figures. The grouping of rhetorical figures, in fact, differs in various $alamk\bar{a}ra\acute{s}\bar{a}stra$ -s. The figure $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, for example, is not clearly

classified by Ruyyaka⁸⁹. The categorization of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ is controversial for later authors of Sanskrit rhetorical works. Vidyānātha and Jagannātha, for instance, include $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ in the $tarkany\bar{a}ya$ group⁹⁰, highlighting the presence of the cause-effect relation in the figure. One would expect that Śobhākara raises objections against Ruyyaka's vague attitude towards $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$. Some other figures, such as $vy\bar{a}pti$ and $\bar{a}patti$, which are possibly closely related to $anum\bar{a}na$ and $hetu/k\bar{a}vyalinga$, also need further investigations. Therefore, future work should be carried out on the rhetorical figures of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, $vy\bar{a}pti$ and $\bar{a}patti$ more carefully.

4.2.1 $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$

arthāntaranyāsa can be translated as "poetical substantiation" or "poetical corroboration". It is a rhetorical figure in which "a proposition or remark is justified or substantiated by the adjunction of a relevant moral or rationale" Gerow even uses the term "apodixis" to name it 92. Although this figure has been discussed since the period of Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha, I will start from Ruyyaka's viewpoints.

Ruyyaka defines $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ as the substantiation of already indicated propositions by the relationship of a universal and a particular and by the relationship of cause and effect⁹³. He recognizes eight subtypes of this figure according to the different relationships between the thing to be substantiated and its substantiator and according to their similarity or dissimilarity. For Ruyyaka, $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ is different from $anum\bar{a}na$ which will be discussed in the next subsection because the latter requires an object or a thesis which is not yet understood⁹⁴. However, Ruyyaka's inclusion of the cause-effect relationship here may become a problem for his system because $anum\bar{a}na$ also requires this relationship, and as we will see in the subsection of $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ and hetu, $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ and $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ shares the same substantiated-substantiator

⁸⁹See Chakrabarti 1989, pp. 81–82

⁹⁰*ibid.*, p. 84.

⁹¹Gerow 1971, p. 118.

⁹²This term is difficult to translate. Gerow's two translations, "apodixis" and "introduction of another matter", do not thoroughly cover the extent of this figure. For Śobhākara, the core of this figure is a substantiation (samarthana) of a general case by means of a specific one, so the appellation "substantiation" is not enough to fully describe it. Here I translate it as "poetical substantiation", but it may be better to keep it untranslated.

 $^{^{93}} AlSar~35$: sāmanyavišeṣakāryakāraṇabhāvābhyāṃ nirdiṣṭaprakṛtasamarthanam arthāntaranyāsaḥ ||

 $^{^{94}}$ Vṛtti ad AlSar 35: nirdiṣṭasyābhihitasya samarthanārhasya prakṛtasya samarthakāt pūrvaṃ paścād vā nirdiṣṭasya yat samarthanam upapādanaṃ, na tv apūrvatvena pratītir anumānarūpā so 'rthāntaranyāsaḥ | tatra sāmānyaṃ viśeṣasya viśeṣo vā sāmānyasya samarthaka iti dvau bhedau | tathā kāryaṃ kāraṇasya kāraṇaṃ vā kāryasya samarthakam ity api dvau bhedau | tatra bhedacatuṣṭaye pratyekaṃ sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ bhedadvaye 'ṣṭau bhedāḥ |

relationship ($samarthyasamarthakabh\bar{a}va$). He also does not admit the subtypes based on the employment or the non-employment of the word hi or the subtypes based on the different orders of the thing to be substantiated and the substantiator because they do not bring forth aesthetic beauty⁹⁵.

Now we can analyze Ruyyaka's first example, Kumārasambhava 1.3.

anantaratnaprabhavasya yasya himam na saubhagyavilopi jātam | eko hi doṣo guṇasannipāte nimajjatīndoḥ kiraṇeṣv ivāṅkaḥ ||

Snow does not diminish his beauty, he who is the source of endless jewels, for one blemish drowns in a flood of virtues, like the moon's spot in its rays.

In this verse, the fact that one blemish drowns in a flood of virtues functions as the universal or the general case, and it substantiates the specific case of snow that does not diminish the beauty of the Himalaya Mountain. Therefore, the process of substantiation is established here.

Sobhākara has noticed the problem that Ruyyaka includes the cause-effect relationship in his definition of this figure, so he excludes it from his definition of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$. Now this figure only denotes the condition in which an individual is substantiated by a universal by means of invariable concomitance⁹⁶. The reverse condition is defined as a new figure $ud\bar{a}harana^{97}$. Śobhākara admits four subtypes of this figure based on the similarity or the dissimilarity between the thing to be substantiated and the substantiator, and on the explicit or implicit expression of the substantiation based on the employment or the non-employment of the word hi^{98} .

Jayaratha also notices the problem of including the cause-effect relation in $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$. He points out that since Ruyyaka himself will state $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ later, which requires the cause-effect relation, only the universal-individual relation is needed here⁹⁹. Jayaratha agrees with Śobhākara on accepting the new figure

 $^{^{95}}ibid$: $hi\acute{s}abd\bar{a}bhidh\bar{a}n\bar{a}nabhidh\bar{a}n\bar{a}bhy\bar{a}m$ $samarthakap\bar{u}rvopany\bar{a}sottaropany\bar{a}s\bar{a}bhy\bar{a}m$ $cabhed\bar{a}ntarasambhave$ 'pi na $tadgunan\bar{a}$ $sahrdayahrdayah\bar{a}rino$ $vaicitryasy\bar{a}bh\bar{a}v\bar{a}t$ |

 $^{^{96}}$ Vṛtti ad AlRat 76: yatra viśeṣo 'bhihitaḥ sāmānyena vyāptipradarśanarūpatayā samarthyate sthirīkriyate so 'rthāntaranyāsaḥ |

 $^{^{97}}$ According to Śobhākara, $ud\bar{a}haraṇa$ is a figure in which an individual is presented as an illustration of a universal. Here the illustration serves for the purpose of clarifying or explaining a cognition ($prat\bar{\imath}tivi\acute{s}ad\bar{\imath}karaṇ\bar{a}rtham$). AlRat 12: $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nyoddist\bar{\imath}an\bar{a}m$ ekasya $nidar\acute{s}anam$ $ud\bar{a}haraṇam$ ||

 $^{^{98}}$ See appendices for details.

⁹⁹AlVim ad AlSar 35: kāryakāraņabhāvāśrayasya bhedadvayasya kāvyalingatvaṃ granthakṛd eva vakṣyatīti sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvāśrayam eva bhedadvayam āśrayaṇīyam |

 $ud\bar{a}harana$. He criticizes Ruyyaka's first example of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa^{100}$, saying that that one defect sinks into the aggregation of virtues is a well-known fact, so it does not need any support. The dark spot on the moon bathed in the moonlight, functioning here as an individual, is only to illustrate the previous idea, so this verse should be categorized under $ud\bar{a}harana^{101}$. However, Jayaratha has a different idea on verse 409 in the AlRat¹⁰². According to Śobhākara, it is a case of $ud\bar{a}harana$, so the individual stated in the second line is only to illustrate the universal stated in the first line, but not to substantiate it. Jayaratha, on the other hand, adopts the substantiation in this case and still puts this verse under $ud\bar{a}harana^{103}$. In both Ruyyaka's first example of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ and verse 409 in the AlRat, the universal is illustrated by an individual, yet Jayaratha has contradictory viewpoints on them. His strange attitude can only be explained after investigating the manuscripts of the AlVim.

4.2.2 $anumar{a}na$

As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, the development of the figure of $anum\bar{a}na$ shows apparent influence from Indian philosophy since Mammaṭa. It can be called "poetical inference" for the purpose of distinguishing it from logical inference because the latter does not contain any poetical beauty. Now, let us examine the viewpoints of the three authors on this figure.

Ruyyaka's definition of $anum\bar{a}na$ is developed from Mammaṭa's definition: the figure denotes a statement concerning both the thing to be proven and its proof¹⁰⁵. He interprets this definition sūtra as follows:

[If in a rhetorical figure] where a proof possessing [the state of] being a property of the topic of the thesis, positive concomitance and negative concomitance is stated through the power of words (śabdavṛttena) in order to understand the thing to be proven, that is the figure of poetical

 $^{^{100}}$ anantaratnaprabhavasya yasya himam na saubhāgyavilopi jātam \mid eko hi doṣo guṇasannipāte nimajjatīndoh kiranesv ivānkah $\mid\mid$

¹⁰¹ ibid: yatra punah svatahsiddhasyaiva pratītiviśadīkaraṇārtham tadekadeśabhūto viśeṣa upādīyate tatrodāharaṇālamkāraḥ | guṇasaṃnipāte doṣanimajjanātmanah sāmānyasya nairākānkṣyeṇa siddhasyendoḥ kiraṇeṣv ivānka iti tadekadeśabhūto viśeṣas tatra pratītiviśadīkaraṇārtham upāttaḥ | ataś ca viśeṣasyānyena samarthanam arthāntaranyāsa ity atra viśeṣeṇāpi sāmānyasya samarthanam iti sūtraṇīyam | anyathā hy avyāptiḥ syāt |

 $^{^{102}} AlRat$ v. 409: guṇānām eva daurātmyād dhuri dhuryo niyujyate | asaṃjātakiṇaskandhaḥ sukhaṃ svapiti gaur gaḍā ||

 $^{^{103}}ibid:$ sāmānyam tu višeṣeṇa samarthyate yathā — guṇānām eva daurātmyād dhuri dhuryo niyujyate | asaṃjātakiṇaskandhaḥ sukham svapiti gaur gaḍī || atrāpi samarthyasamarthakabhāvasamarthanād udāharaṇatvam vācyam |

¹⁰⁴Gerow, p. 108, translates this figure as "inference".

 $^{^{105}}$ AlSar 58: $s\bar{a}dhyas\bar{a}dhananirde\'{so}$ 'num $\bar{a}nam$ ||

inference. Some special strikingness (vicchittiviśeṣa) is to be presented here by the context ($arth\bar{a}t$). Otherwise what is the difference from logical inference¹⁰⁶?

In a poetical inference, poets need to convey the existence of the cause verbally. As we will see next, this characteristic makes poetical inference distinct from poetical mark, where the inferential mark is not expressed directly. Now let us examine Ruyyaka's two examples. The first one runs as follows:

yathā randhraṃ vyomnaś calajaladadhūmaḥ sthagayati sphulingānāṃ rūpaṃ dadhati ca yathā kīṭamaṇayaḥ | yathā vidyujjvālollasanaparipingāś ca kakubhas tathā manye lagnaḥ pathikataruṣaṇḍe smaradavaḥ ||

Since the smoke of drifting rain clouds hides the vault of the heavens, since fireflies appear as sparks, and since the quarters are reddened with flashing lightning bolts, therefore, I think, a firestorm of love has taken hold of the travelers' grove.

In this example, the $s\bar{a}dhana$ -s are the smoke in the form of rain clouds, the sparks and the tawny color of the sky quarters. These three are the marks inferring the existence of fire which is stated by the word "forest fire". Rain clouds, fireflies and the tawny color of the sky's quarters only appear in the rainy season, and during this season, travelers and their wives are meant to be reunited (the rainy season is a time of love-in-union). Separation in this season intensifies the longing for lovers. But outside of the rainy season, there will be neither unsteady rain clouds, nor fireflies, nor the reddening of the quarters, and it is not as easy to arouse the longing for lovers in travelers. Therefore, the groves in the form of travelers are burnt by the forest fire in the form of love exactly in the rainy season. In this way, both positive concomitance and negative concomitance are confirmed. The rainy season is usually the time of love-in-union, when travelers are expected to already have returned home. They cannot travel during the rainy season so it is the best time to be at home. Besides, since it is based on another rhetorical figure $r\bar{u}paka$ (the two phrases "the forest fire of love" and "the groves/groups

 $^{^{106}}$ Vṛtti ad AlSar 58: yatra śabdavṛttena paksadharmānvayavyatirekavat sādhanaṃ sādhyapratītaye nirdiśyate so 'numānālankāraḥ | vicchittiviśeṣaś cātrārthād āśrayaṇīyaḥ | anyathā tarkānumānāt kiṃ vailakṣaṇyam |

The word $arth\bar{a}t$ is interpreted by commentators as "because of the wonderfulness fabricated by the poet" ($kavikalpitavaicitry\bar{a}t$, according to Vidyācakravartin's commentary, the $Sa\tilde{n}j\bar{t}van\bar{t}$) or "because of the production of an ornament of speech by creating poetical beauty" ($k\bar{a}vya\acute{s}obh\bar{a}karatven\bar{a}la\acute{n}k\bar{a}ratvasambhav\bar{a}t$, according to Samudrabandha).

of travelers"), it contains strikingness¹⁰⁷. A further point to discuss here is that smoke, sparks, reddened sky, fire and grove are common subjects mentioned in a typical logical inference: there must be fire on that mountain; because there is smoke produced from fresh groves, reddening the quarters; as is known to us, where there is smoke, there must be fire; and now we have observed the smoke on that mountain; therefore there must be fire thereon. Ruyyaka connects these subjects with the specific things in this stanza by applying the figure of $r\bar{u}paka$ and $utprek_{\bar{s}}\bar{a}^{108}$. To explain, the relationship between fire and smoke in this stanza is constructed by pure imagination. The standard example of fire and smoke mentioned above is imaginably reworked as a poetical inference.

The second example is exactly the same one in the KP, so I will enter the discussion directly. Ruyyaka observes that the proof, *i.e.* the falling of arrows is not ornamented, but described as a mere fact. Ruyyaka calls this verse a case of "pure poetical inference" based on the unornamented state of the proof. However, even though being "pure", readers can still experience poetical beauty there because the verse again depends on a special strikingness of speech which lies in a meaning produced by the poet's fascinating expression¹⁰⁹.

Šobhākara, however, is not in the line of Ruyyaka. He defines $anum\bar{a}na$ as that kind of rhetorical figure in which one understands by oneself, from its proof, an object which is not yet understood by means of explicit verbal expression or by means of implicit expression¹¹⁰. As we will see in the appendices, Śobhākara distinguishes the figures of $anum\bar{a}na$ and hetu on the basis of the form of inference: $anum\bar{a}na$ is in the form of an inference for the sake of one's self $(sv\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na)$, while hetu is in the form of an inference for the sake of another person $(par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na)^{111}$. According to the ways in which the proof is expressed, $anum\bar{a}na$ can be divided into an explicit subtype and an implicit subtype. Śobhākara's examples for these two subtypes all contain shades of other rhetorical figures except for one Prakrit verse. He also does not hesitate to criticize

 $^{^{107}}$ Vṛtti ad AlSar 58: atra dhūmasphulingakapiladiktvāni vahnilingāni trirūpatvād davaśabdapratipāditaṃ vahniṃ gamayantīty anumānam | rūpakamūlatvenālankārāntaragarbhīkāreṇa vicchittyāśrayanāt tarkānumānavailaksanyam |

 $^{^{108}}$ Ruyyaka's understanding of $utpreks\bar{a}$ includes a subtype containing the word manye which expresses imagination (vitarka). See his explanation on AlSar 22

 $^{^{109}}ibid:$ atra yoşitām bhrūvyāpāreṇa mārgaṇapatanam smarapurogāmitve sādhye 'nalaṅkṛtam eva sādhanam iti śuddham anumānam | prauḍhoktimātraniṣpannārthaniṣṭhatvena ca vicchittiviśeṣāśrayaṇāc cārutvam |

¹¹⁰AlRat 78: $s\bar{a}dhan\bar{a}t$ $s\bar{a}dhyaprat\bar{\imath}tir$ $anum\bar{a}nam$

 $Vrtti\ ad\ AlRat\ 78:\ yatr\bar{a}prat\bar{\imath}to\ 'rthaḥ\ s\bar{a}dhyar\bar{u}paḥ\ s\bar{a}dhan\bar{a}c\ ch\bar{a}bden\bar{a}rthena\ v\bar{a}\ vrttena\ svayam\ avaqamyate\ tad\ anum\bar{a}nam\ |$

¹¹¹ Vrtti ad AlRat 79: pareṇānavagatasya vastunah pratipādakam gamakarūpam lingam hetuh | paragrahaṇam anumānavailakṣaṇyārtham | tena svayam lingāt pratipattir anumānam | lingena parapratyāyanam parārthānumānarūpam kāvyalingaparyāyo hetvalamkārah |

Ruyyaka's viewpoints at any possible occasion. At the end of the $anum\bar{a}na$ section, Śobhākara also quotes Ruyyaka's second example, the verse starting with $yatrait\bar{a}$ $lahar\bar{\iota}cal\bar{a}caladr\acute{s}o$, and opposes Ruyyaka's interpretation of it as a case of "pure" poetical inference in that even though one should admit the power of the clever expression by the poet (praudhokti) to make readers understand the aesthetic beauty here, the more important point is that all the things and actions depicted in this verse, as they are in reality not related, become related to each other due to this clever expression. This condition fits the figure $ati\acute{s}ayokti$, or hyperbole, which is an identifying ascertainment¹¹². Therefore, although this verse is an example of $anum\bar{a}na$, it is in fact combined with another figure $ati\acute{s}ayokti$, thus Ruyyaka's viewpoint is untenable.

Jayaratha's viewpoints are somehow confusing. He admits Śobhākara's division and definition of $sv\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ and $par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$, but advocates that since both are a kind of inference, and since there is the relation between $prak\bar{a}ra$ and prakārin because both follow a general definition, anumāna and hetu should be categorized as one figure¹¹³. As for Ruyyaka's example of anumāna beginning with yatraitā laharīcalācaladrśo, Jayaratha defends Ruyyaka's idea from Šobhākara's criticism, saying that though containing the clever expression of poet, the characteristics of the envoy are intended to be factual, and one does not find the figure atisayokti involved in this verse. It is the poetical function (kavikarman) that makes the figure $anum\bar{a}na$ distinct from a logical inference¹¹⁴. Jayaratha further quotes verse 420 and verse 422 of the AlRat, and comments that verse 420, beginning with yo yatkathāprasange, should not be considered as a case of rhetorical figure because even though the reason in this verse is an implicit one, it is ultimately a factual statement and does not bring forth poetical imagination, so it is out of place. As for verse 422, beginning with prajanam vinayadhanad, educating, protecting and supporting the kingdom's subjects are expressed as factual, so this verse is also not a case of rhetorical figure 115. Sobhākara's viewpoint

¹¹²AlRat 37: adhyavasānam atiśayoktih ||

 $^{^{113}}$ AlVim ad AlSar 58: tac cānumānam dvidhā | svārtham parārtham ca | tatra svārtham yatra mayāyam avagato 'rtha iti svaparāmarśasya niścayah syāt | parārtham tu yatra parenānavagatasya vastunah pratipādanāt parapratyāyakatvam syāt | evam ca | svārthaparārthabhedena dvividham anumānam evaiko 'laṃkāro vācyo na punar anumānahetutayā pṛthag alaṃkāratvam | ubhayatrāpi sāmānyalakṣanānugamāt prakāraprakāribhāvasyaivopapatteh |

 $^{^{114}}ibid:$ analaṃkṛtam iti | śāsanadharādeḥ (originally śāsanadharmādeḥ) prauḍhoktyā vāstavatvenaiva vivakṣitatvād atiśayoktyādyalaṃkārāntaragarbhīkārābhāvāt | ataś cāsya kavikarmaiva vailakṣanyanimittam iti bhāvaḥ | tad āha **prauḍhoktī**tyādi | evaṃ ca kavikarmābhāvād yatra vicchittiviśeṣāśrayaṇaṃ na syāt tatra nāyam alaṃkāraḥ |

 $^{^{115}}ibid: \ yath\bar{a} \ yo \ yatkath\bar{a}prasange \ chinnacchinn\bar{a}yatosnanihsv\bar{a}sah \ | \ sa \ bhavati$

on verse 420 is similar to Jayaratha's, arguing that the inference in this verse is like a logical one and should not be counted as a rhetorical figure because such inference lacks a special strikingness¹¹⁶. His idea on verse 422 is, however, rejected by Jayaratha. Śobhākara thinks that although the three reasons to prove the state of being a father are expressed explicitly, it is still an example of $\bar{a}rthahetu^{117}$. Jayaratha, as we have seen above, insists that the factual expression of the three reasons in this verse makes it a counter-example of hetu. In other words, Śobhākara focuses on the contradiction between an explicit reason and an implicit reason, but Jayaratha focuses on whether the reason in an example contains poetical imagination or is just a factual statement. According to Jayaratha, we cannot judge one verse to be a proper example of $anum\bar{a}na$ on the basis of whether the reasons in it is expressed implicitly or explicitly because only poetical function can convey a rhetorical figure, but not the state of being implicit. If an implicit reason were to be admitted as a rhetorical figure without any poetical function, then there would not be any problem to accept an explicit reason as a rhetorical figure as long as it might provide readers with some poetical imagination¹¹⁸.

4.2.3 $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ or hetu

As has been discussed in Chapter 2, the name of this figure differs from author to author. One can call it "poetical mark" for $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ and call it "poetical reason" for hetu respectively. Ruyyaka follows Mammaṭa and designates it $k\bar{a}vyalinga$. There are, however, two different readings of his definition of this figure. Each seems to be reasonable and it is difficult to decide which is a better reading¹¹⁹:

When a reason is [depicted as taking the form of] the meaning of sentence, or the meaning of words, that figure is [called] poetical mark.

Or:

taṃ prati raktas tvaṃ ca tathā dṛśyase sutanu || atra raktatvaṃ prati viśiṣṭasya niḥsvasitasyārthe 'pi hetutve vāstavatvāt kavipratibhānirvartitatvābhāvān nāyam alaṃkāraḥ | yathā prajānāṃ vinayādhānād rakṣaṇād bharaṇād api | sa pitā pitaras tāsāṃ kevalaṃ janmahetavah || atra vinayādhānādihetūnām vāstavatvād analamkāratvam |

¹¹⁶ Vṛtti ad AlRat 78, v. 420: vicchittiviśeṣābhāve tu tarkānumānavan nālaṃkāratvam

 $^{^{117}}$ Vrtti ad AlRat 78, v. 422: ityādau pitrtvasya kāraņasya vinayādhānādih kāryarūpah śābdo hetur na vaicitryāvaha iti padārthasyārtham eva hetutvam \mid

¹¹⁸AlVim ad AlSar 58: na punar atra hetor ārthatvābhāvād analaṃkāratvam iti vācyam | kavikarmaṇa evālaṃkāranibandhanatvenoktatvād ārthatvasyāprayojakatvāt (originally arthatvasya tadaprayojakatvāt) | na hi hetor ārthatve 'pi kavikarmavyatirekeṇālaṃkāratvaṃ syāt | tac chābde 'pi hetau kvacit kavipratibhānirvartitatvenālaṃkāratvābhyupagame na kaścid doṣaḥ | ¹¹⁹AlSar 57: hetor vākyapadārthatve (vākyapadārthatā) kāvyalingam ||

After checking some manuscripts of the AlSar, I found that north Indian manuscripts generally read $v\bar{a}kyapad\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}$, while south Indian manuscripts generally read $v\bar{a}kyapad\bar{a}rthatve$. This may suggest the existence of two different transmissions of the treatise.

Poetical mark is a reason which takes the form of being the meaning of sentence, or the meaning of words.

The key point in both the definitions is that a reason must be the meaning of sentence, or the meaning of a single word, or the meaning of multiple words. As we will see later, Ruyyaka also divides the reason in the form of the meaning of the sentence into two subtypes: one concerns a reason in the form of the meaning of multiple sentences, the other concerns a reason in the form of the meaning of a single sentence. In contrast to Mammaṭa who only points out the reasons and results in his examples and does not interpret the figure in detail, Ruyyaka does give a precise description after stating his sūtra:

[The rhetorical figure] in which a reason in the form of a cause is depicted as an inferential mark, either ending up as the meaning of sentences $(v\bar{a}ky\bar{a}rthagaty\bar{a})$ or ending up as the meaning of words by way of attributes $(vi\acute{s}e;anadv\bar{a}rena\ pad\bar{a}rthagaty\bar{a})$, is poetical mark. The use of the word "poetical" is for the purpose of distinguishing [it] from logical [mark]; for here the universal pervasion $(vy\bar{a}pti)$, the logical reason's being a property of the topic of thesis $(pak;adharmat\bar{a})$, conclusion $(upasamh\bar{a}ra)$ and so on are not employed. The thing being depicted as ending up as the meaning of sentence should be secondarily construed (upanibaddhavya) only as a reason, [but] the thing secondarily construed is not a reason. Otherwise there would be no difference of this [figure] from "justification/corroboration" $(arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa)^{120}$.

For Ruyyaka, $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ conforms to the following rules: firstly, the reason lies in the meaning of words or in the meaning of a sentence, as Mammaṭa has stated; secondly, it is different from formal reason; thirdly, there should be no direct expression of cause and effect in this figure, and it is different from $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ which requires, though optionally, the particle hi to express justification.

To explain the four subtypes of $k\bar{a}vyalinga$, Ruyyaka quotes one verse from the $R\bar{a}m\bar{a}bhyudaya$ of Yaśovarman, Raghuvamśa 13.24, $Kum\bar{a}rasambhava$ 5.4 and $M\bar{a}lat\bar{i}m\bar{a}dhava$ 1.19, which correspond to $anekav\bar{a}ky\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}$, $anekapad\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}$, $ekav\bar{a}ky\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}$, and $ekapad\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}$ subtypes respectively¹²¹.

Ruyyaka also teaches readers how to distinguish $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, $anum\bar{a}na$ and $k\bar{a}vyalinga$. At the end of the section on $anum\bar{a}na$, he argues that in the realm

¹²⁰ Vṛtti ad AlSar 57: yatra hetuḥ kāraṇarūpo vākyārthagatyā viśeṣaṇadvāreṇa vā padārthagatyā lingatvena nibadhyate tat kāvyalingam | tarkavailakṣaṇyārtham kāvyagrahaṇam | na hy atra vyāptipakṣadharmatopasamhārādayaḥ kriyante | vākyārthagatyā ca nibadhyamāno hetutvenaivopanibaddhavyaḥ, nopanibaddhasya hetutvam | anyathārthāntaranyāsān nāsya bhedaḥ syāt |

¹²¹See appendices for details.

of rhetorical figures based on the principle of reasoning $(tarkany\bar{a}yam\bar{u}la)$, there are two kinds of relationships: 1) the relationship between the thing to be understood and the thing which causes its understanding (pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāva), and 2) the relationship between the thing to be substantiated and its substantiator $(samarthyasamarthakabh\bar{a}va)$. The former relationship subsists when something that is not yet understood is being demonstrated, while the latter subsists when something already understood is demonstrated. For Ruyyaka, anumāna requires an unknown or new thing to be understood to appear in the context¹²², and the other two $(arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa \text{ and } k\bar{a}vyalinga)$ require the samarthyasamarthak-To distinguish $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ and $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, Ruyyaka lists three conditions: firstly, when an object in the form of the meaning of words, already expressed, functions as a reason, this is a case of $k\bar{a}vyalinqa$; secondly, when a reason takes the form of the meaning of a sentence, and it is introduced as being a reason but not presented as a reason, then this is also a case of poetical reason; thirdly, if a reason is introduced as something unrelated, then it is a case of arthāntaranyāsa. All three conditions require the reason to be expressed in an implicit way. If, however, a reason is stated as a reason explicitly 123, then there is no rhetorical figure in this case 124 .

Śobhākara, on the other hand, does not agree with Ruyyaka's distinction of $anum\bar{a}na$ and $k\bar{a}vyalinga$. He even refuses to call this figure $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ and returns to the designation hetu, arguing that they are actually synonyms. As has been mentioned in the subsection above, Śobhākara distinguishes $anum\bar{a}na$ and hetu on the basis of the distinction between $sv\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$ and $par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na$. One may raise the question of whether, since both $anum\bar{a}na$ and hetu are based on inference, there is a need for two different rhetorical figures. Śobhākara answers that he follows a distinction invented by elder rhetoricians and makes his viewpoints sound reasonable.

Next, Śobhākara criticizes Ruyyaka's viewpoints on the distinction between anumāna and hetu: if hetu conveys an inference of an object already understood, to whom should this inference be conveyed? The speaker or the one addressed? The answer is neither. By proving Ruyyaka's viewpoints to be false, Śobhākara argues that his own distinction of the two figures is correct.

 $^{^{122}}$ Vṛtti ad AlSar 58: ihāsti pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāvaḥ | asti ca samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ | tatrāpratītapratyāyane pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāvaḥ | pratītapratyāyane samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ | tatra pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāve 'numānam |

¹²³That is to say, the reason takes instrumental or ablative endings

 $^{^{124}}ibid:$ samarthyasamarthakabhāve tu yatra padārtho hetus tatra hetutvenōpādāne nāgendrahastās tvaci karkaśatvād ekāntaśaityāt kadalīviśeṣā ityādāv iva na kaścid alankārah yatra tūpāttasya hetutvam yathodāhrte viṣaye mṛgyaś ca darbhānkurinirvyapekṣā ityādau tatraiva kāvyalingam | yatra tu vākyārthasya hetutvam tatra hetutvapratipādakam antarena hetutvenopanyāse kāvyalingam eva | taṭasthatvenopanyastasya tu hetutve 'rthāntaranyāsah |

Śobhākara distinguishes three types of hetu: (1) the meaning of words as the reason in an implicit way and (2) the meaning of sentences as the reason in an implicit way or in (3) an explicit way. The examples for these three subtypes also contain shades of other rhetorical figures. After examining several examples, he draws the conclusion of how to distinguish $anum\bar{a}na$ and hetu. Generally speaking, in cases of hetu, the inferential mark needs to be in the form of the meaning of a sentence or in the form of the meaning of words, and it needs to make another person understand something; but whether this other person is addressed or not is optional. In cases of $anum\bar{a}na$, readers will find typical words like "surely now" $(n\bar{u}nam)$ and "I know" $(j\bar{a}ne)$; yet, even though in some cases these words do not appear, as long as readers can ascertain their own reflections according to the context, we still call these the cases of $anum\bar{a}na$. Let us analyze the following two verses:

na jātā rāgasarvasvasamāptir iha ced vidheḥ | kim pāndurāni padmāni tena sṛṣṭāni kānicit |

If the creator had not used up all of the colors [in the world in creating you], then why did he create any white lotuses at all?

This verse is an example of $anum\bar{a}na$, but there are no typical words. However, according to the context, we understand that the speaker is making an ascertainment of his/her own reflection: at first, I thought the creator had not used up all the beautiful colors in this world when he created you, O beautiful lady; now, since there are some white water-lilies before me, I am pretty sure that beautiful colors have already been used up to create you. This ascertainment of reflection proves this verse to be a case of $anum\bar{a}na$, not a case of hetu.

parimlānam pīnastanajaghanasangād ubhayatas tanor madhyasyāntah parimilanam aprāpya haritam idam vyastanyāsam ślathabhujalatākṣepavalanaiḥ kṛśāngyāḥ saṃtāpam vadati bisinīpattraśayanam ||

This bed of lotus-leaves, crushed on both sides owing to the contact of her ample breasts and hips, green (in the middle), not having come in close touch with her slender waist, and with its arrangement disordered by the tossings and turnings of her drooping creeper-like arms, tells of the torment of the slim-bodied one.

This verse from the $Ratn\bar{a}val\bar{\imath}$ is also an ascertainment of the speaker's own reflection without any typical denoting words. The heroine's action makes the hero infer that she is affected by love-sickness. To ascertain his inference, the

hero observes the situation of her bed, and notices the fading green color and the disarrangement of lotus leaves. These two phenomena demonstrate implicitly that the heroine is experiencing love-sickness. Therefore, it is also a case of $anum\bar{a}na$.

Jayaratha also has something to say on hetu. He raises an objection against this figure through the voice of an anonymous opponent, saying that hetu or $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ does not deserve to be a rhetorical figure because a reason either being the meaning of words or being the meaning of sentences lacks a special strikingness. To go into more detail, a reason already expressed in order to prove something that needs to be proven cannot be depicted as beyond the two subtypes of hetu, and one should not say that a reason obtains the status of being a rhetorical figure merely because the depiction of a reason is possible. As is known to scholars of Sanskrit rhetorics, the special strikingness which is poetical imagination is exactly the core of a rhetorical figure. Therefore, a mere depiction of a reason does not contain any aesthetic beauty, so hetu should not be counted as a rhetorical figure ¹²⁵. Jayaratha follows this opinion and argues that the depiction of a reason, either in the form of the meaning of words or in the form of the meaning of a sentence, is possible, but it lacks aesthetic beauty as long as it is a factual statement. Ruyyaka's acceptance of $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ only follows the ideas of previous Sanskrit rhetoricians¹²⁶. Moreover, Sobhākara's viewpoint that a designated meaning embracing a suggested meaning becomes the reason of another designated meaning is not tenable because in that case the aesthetic beauty would arise by means of this suggested meaning, and a mere reason would never have any aesthetic beauty in itself. Therefore, we need to admit that in those cases of the so-called hetu or $k\bar{a}vyalinga$, it is the suggested meaning that brings forth aesthetic beauty and not the rhetorical figure 127. If the opponent says that a reason accompanied by a suggested meaning is enough to be a rhetorical figure, then a reason explicitly expressed would also become a figure. Again, if this explicit reason contains some suggested meaning, it loses the state of being a rhetorical figure due to its explicit expression; if it does not contain any

 $^{^{125}}$ AlVim ad AlSar 57: nanu hetor vākyārthapadārthatayopanibandhe (originally vākyapadārthobhayopanibandhe) na kaścid vicchittiviśeṣaḥ pratīyata iti katham asyālaṃkāratvam uktam \mid na hi sādhyasādhanāyopāttasya hetor evaṃprakāradvayātirekeṇopanibandhaḥ syāt \mid na ca yathāsambhavinopanibandhamātreṇālaṃkāratvaṃ vaktuṃ yuktam \mid kavipratibhātmakasya vicchittiviśeṣasyālaṃkāratvenoktatvāt \mid na caivamupanibandhāt kaścid atiśaya iti katham asyālaṃkāratvam \mid

 $^{^{126}}ibid:$ satyam | yady apy evam upanibandhasya vastuvṛttena sambhavān (originally vastuvṛttera sambhavān) na kaścid atiśayaḥ pratīyate | tathāpi granthakṛtā prācyair lakṣitatvād etad iha lakṣitam |

 $^{^{127}}ibid:$ atha yatra vyangyāśliṣṭo vācyārtho vācyam evārtham prati hetutām bhajate tatrāyam alaṃkāro yujyate eveti cet | tarhi vyangyāśleṣavaśena tadutthānād vākyārthapadārthatayopanibaddhyamānasya hetoḥ svātmani na kaścid atiśaya iti vyangyakṛta evātiśayo 'bhyupagamyate | na tatkṛtaḥ | tasyaivam upanibaddhasya vāstavatvāt (originally vāstavyatvāt) |

suggested meaning, then there is no need to mention it. Therefore, Śobhākara's viewpoint should be rejected¹²⁸.

Jayaratha further examines three examples quoted in the AlRat under hetu and finds no suggested meaning inside. He advocates that in the reason-result relation, there is no trace of aesthetic beauty. If the opponent insists that a depiction of reason is for the purpose of cognizing a thing to be established, then $anum\bar{a}na$ is not different from this figure and one can just include it in $anum\bar{a}na^{129}$.

From the analyses of $anum\bar{a}na$ and $k\bar{a}vyalinga/hetu$, we can notice the common points in Ruyyaka's, Śobhākara's and Jayaratha's ideas: all three authors agree with the presupposition that for both figures, a factual statement as the reason or any reason explicitly expressed should not be admitted as demonstrating the figure because such a reason fails to convey poetical imagination or lacks the special strikingness.

4.2.4 $\bar{a}patti$

 $\bar{a}patti$ is a new rhetorical figure invented by Śobhākara. It can be translated as "unwanted consequence" and refers to an undesirable result or effect of some action or condition. In $\delta \bar{a}stric$ contexts, human beings are intended to avoid it in daily life. However, our author decided to adopt, for the first time, this "unwanted consequence" as an element in his system of rhetorics.

Śobhākara considers aesthetically productive "consequences" to fall into two types: $\bar{a}patti$ and prasanga, and he introduces them into the family of rhetorical figures¹³⁰. His definition of $\bar{a}patti$ refers to "the effecting ($\bar{a}p\bar{a}dana$) of undesirable things" as the distinguishing property¹³¹. To explain, when someone is doing

¹²⁸ ibid: yadi ca vyangyasāhacaryeṇaiva hetur alaṃkāratām iyāt tac chābdasyāpi (originally chabdasyāpi) hetor alaṃkāratvaṃ prasajyate | yadi tatrāpi vyangyāśleṣaḥ syāt | atha tasya śābdatvād eva vaicitryābhāvād alaṃkāratvaṃ na yuktam iti cet | na yata ārthasyāpi hetoḥ svayaṃ vaicitryābhāvād ayam analaṃkāratve nimittatvaṃ kathaṃ na yāyāt (originally alaṃkāratvaṃ prayuktam → hetoḥ svayaṃ omitted) | atha tatra vyangyāśleṣo na bhavatīti cet kiṃ nāmāparāddham | ... pratyuta yatra bhavatā vyangyāśleṣa uktas tatra sa nāstīti vaktuṃ śakyate | ¹29 ibid: evaṃ ca yatrāpi vyangyāśleṣaḥ syāt tatrāpi hetor vākyārthapadārthatayopanibandhe na kaścid atiśayaḥ | atha sādhyapratītaye hetor upanibandhād asty eva vaicitryātiśaya iti cet | tarhy anumānam evedaṃ syān nālaṃkārāntaram | sādhyasādhanasya tallakṣaṇatvena vakṣyamāṇatvāt | evaṃ hetor vākyapadārthatayopanibaddhasya vāstavatvād asya pṛthag alaṃkāratvaṃ na yuktam | uktavaksyamānanītyānumāna evāntarbhāvopapatteh |

 $^{^{130}}$ Śobhākara advocates a separate rhetorical figure of *prasanga*. This figure exists in a case where "an effort mainly intended to achieve an effect, incidentally (prasangat) achieves another effect" (Rao 1992, p. 254). This second effect is in some cases desired to obtained.

Vṛtti ad AlRat 87: yatra prādhānyāt kenacit phalena kasyacit prayuktasya prayatnasyārthān-tarakāryakāritā prasangād bhavati sa prasangaḥ ... evaṃ cānuniṣpannatayā yatra phalāntaram utpadyate tatra viśeṣaḥ | yatra tu cikīrṣitam api prasangāt saṃpadyate tatra prasangaḥ |

 $^{^{131} {}m NM~I~29,~5-8}:~trividh\bar{a}~c\bar{a}sya~\acute{s}\bar{a}strasya~pravrttih~udde\acute{s}ah~lakṣanam~parīkṣā~ceti~|~n\bar{a}madheyena$

something, and another unwanted event or thing occurs, such condition can be called unwanted consequence. In this figure, the occurrence of undesirable things would be a prasaiga, *i.e.* an unwanted condition or incident¹³². Here prasaiga needs to be divided into two aspects: the philosophical one and the rhetorical one¹³³. We shall first examine the former in the figure of $\bar{a}patti$.

When discussing the term prasanga in a philosophical context, one of the first thing that comes to one's mind is the famous reductio ad absurdum (prasanga) as defined by Nāgārjuna in his Vigrahavyavartan (ViVy). He prominently uses infinite regress to undermine the very idea that a valid instrument of knowing and validity itself can be established because any attempt to do so will end in an infinite regress¹³⁴.

Śobhākara does not seem to be indebted to Nāgārjuna's work. A close parallel to the formulation of his definition that "an unwanted condition is the effecting of undesirable things for others under their agreement" can be found in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's $Ny\bar{a}yama\tilde{n}jar\bar{\imath}^{135}$: prasangas ca $n\bar{a}ma$ parasiddhena parasyanisṭāpādanam $ucyate^{136}$. The reason Śobhākara omitted the expression "parabhyupagatena parasya" from the definition $s\bar{u}tra$ is that the word " $\bar{a}p\bar{a}dana$ " has already expressed a causative meaning 137 ; that is to say, it aims at communication to another person. For Śobhākara, $\bar{a}patti$ is different from poetical inference ($anum\bar{a}na$) and poetical reason (hetu) because it is an unwanted condition that ends in invalidation, while the other two take the form of corroboration and can be understood to be different by the presence of words like " $n\bar{u}nam$ " and so on 138 .

 $pad\bar{a}rth\bar{a}bhidh\bar{a}nam\ udde\'sah\ |\ uddiṣṭasya\ tattvavyavasth\bar{a}pako\ dharmo\ lakṣaṇam\ |\ lakṣitasya\ tallakṣaṇam\ upapadyate\ na\ veti\ vic\bar{a}rah\ parīkṣ\bar{a}\ ||$

To form a proper definition, one should give the property that can appropriately establish the essence of the thing to be defined.

Translation: Unwanted consequence is the production of something undesired [by accepting something else desired].

Vrtti~ad AlRat 80: kasyacit kiñcit kurvato yad aniṣṭam āpadyate sā prasaṅgātmikāniṣṭasyāpādanād āpattiḥ /

 133 Śobhākara has a separate figure of prasanga. It deals with the condition where an effort intended to achieve one effect incidentally achieves another effect. This second effect is mainly desired to be achieved. The figure of prasanga advocated by Śobhākara is obviously different from the logical prasanga. See AlRat 87 and the commentaries on this sūtra for details.

 $^{134}\,Vrtti$ ad ViVy 32ab: yadi punar manyase pramāṇaiḥ prameyāṇāṃ prasiddhis teṣāṃ pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir anavasthāprasaṅgah |

¹³⁵ Vṛtti ad AlRat 80: yathoktaṃ parābhyupagatena parasyāniṣṭāpādanaṃ prasaṅga iti | Besides the NM, other sources, such as the Tattavasaṃgraha and the Hetubinduṭīkā, has either parābhyupagatena or parāsyāniṣṭāpādana, but the two phrases do not appear in one sentence.

¹³²AlRat 80: aniṣṭāpādanam āpattih |

¹³⁶NM I, p. 266, 3–4

¹³⁷ibid: anistāpādanam iti nijarthaparyālocanayārthād evāvagateh |

¹³⁸ ibid: tathā cānumānahetvalankārābhyām nūnam ityādibhāvena vilakṣaṇaiva pratītiḥ | anumānāder asyāh sādhanarūpaś ca dūṣaṇatvajuṣah |

 $\overline{apatte}\underline{h}\ suvyakto\ bhedo\ j\~neya\underline{h}\ prasangar\bar{u}p\bar{a}khya\underline{h}\ ||$

Chapter 5

Conclusion

This study is a basic attempt to present and analyze Sobhākara's "creation" or "use" of "logical" rhetorical figures with special reference to their historical development. Now I would like to draw to the conclusion of this study.

The effort of examining "logical" rhetorical figures starts in the period of Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha. Although early authors of $alaṃk\bar{a}raś\bar{a}stra$ does not have a consensus view on whether logical elements should be included into Sanskrit rhetorics, Daṇḍin's emphasis on the figure of hetu establishes a strong foundation for later development of logical rhetorical figures. Udbhaṭa breaks with Daṇḍin's vague categorization of hetu and introduces a new figure called $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ in place of the former, putting his own stamp on the development of logical figures. Rudraṭa further distinguishes $anum\bar{a}na$ from hetu, but the details of his idea need more studies with the help of Namisādhu's commentary. The South Indian rhetorician Bhoja understands hetu in a similar way as Daṇḍin does; his view on $anum\bar{a}na$ indicates his familiarity with various Indian philosophical schools, such as Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya. Mammaṭa finally establishes a strong foundation for the existence of logical elements in the definitions of logical figures, especially in the case of $anum\bar{a}na$.

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, as has been mentioned in Chapter 3, is probably one of the philosophical influences of Śobhākara. The study of arthāntaranyāsa, anumāna and hetu does not show any direct textual dependence on the Nyāyamañjarī, but Śobhakara's understanding of the process of inference is compatible to Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's understanding of svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna. Although there is no definite proof for this influence, but this study shows that there is growing accumulation of philosophical elements and discussions in Sanskrit rhetorics.

Śobhākara's development of "logical" rhetorical figures is never an effort without purpose. The AlRat is actually a concealed bridge to understanding the development of Sanskrit rhetorics after Ruyyaka's AlSar and Jayaratha's anonymous criticism. Śobhākara's criticism of Ruyyaka needs to be understood as a

competitive effort and an advocation of a new systematization of Sanskrit rhetorics. The distinct viewpoints on $anum\bar{a}na$ and hetu show different aspects of analyzing the process of inference. Although both authors are indebted to their predecessors for providing plentiful ideas, they do not merely utter clichés according to the framework advocated by previous rhetoricians, but they try to modify or expand those ideas in their own systems. In this thesis, I have investigated the viewpoints of the three authors on the figure of arthantaranyāsa, anumāna, hetu/kāvyalinga and apatti. For arthantaranyasa, Ruyyaka's inclusion of cause-effect relationship is questioned by both Sobhākara and Jayaratha. Sobhākara not only excludes this relationship from arthantaranyāsa, but also distinguishes a new figure called udāharana from it. Jayaratha basically agrees with Sobhākara's categorization of arthāntaranyāsa, but he holds different understandings of Ruyyaka's example verses with regard to Sobhākara. For anumāna and hetu/kāvyalinga, Ruyyaka distinguishes the two figures according to the difference of whether the content of a communication of inference is a subject already known to the addressed person or a subject not known to that person. Śobhākara criticizes Ruyyaka's categorization of anumāna and hetu, and emphasizes that the difference between the two figures depends on the distinction between svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna. Jayaratha insists that in examples of the so-called $hetu/k\bar{a}vyali\dot{n}qa$ there is no trace of the function of any rhetorical figure, but only the suggested meaning therein brings forth poetical beauty. Therefore, $hetu/k\bar{a}vyalinga$ does not deserve to be an independent figure, so Śobhākara's new definition of it is not tenable.

The study also examines the possibility of producing a critical edition of the AlRat. Based on the currently available manuscripts, a critical edition of the sections of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, $anum\bar{a}na$ and hetu is presented in this thesis. As has been stated in the Appendix C, the grouping of all available manuscripts needs further investigation, but it is obvious that O_x and V_a usually provide better readings and alternatives for editors when they read identically or similarly. Therefore, a much more reliable edition can be made based on O_x and V_a .

Appendices

Appendix A

A Critical Edition of the $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ and $anum\bar{a}na$ Sections of the $Alamk\bar{a}rasarvasva$

A.1 Abbreviations and Sigla of Manuscripts and Editions

- E_{b1} The Alankârasarvasva of Râjânaka Ruyyaka with the Commentary of Jayaratha. Edited by Mahâmahopâdhyâya Paṇḍit Durgâprasâd and Kâśînâth Pâṇdurang Parab. 1893. Kâvyamâlâ 35. Bombay: Javati Dadaji's Nirnaya-Sagara Press.
- E_{b2} The Alañkārasarvasva of Rājānaka Ruyyaka with the Commentary of Jayaratha. Edited and revised with a historical introduction by Paṇḍit Girijāprasād Dvivedi. Second Edition. 1969. Kāvyamālā 35. Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press.
- E_m Alamkāra-sarvasva of Ruyyaka with Sañjīvanī Commentary of Vidyā-cakravartin: Text and Study. By Kumari S. S. Janaki. Edited by V. Raghavan. 1965. Thesis admitted to the P.G. Degree of M. Litt. in the University of Madras. Delhi: Mehar Chand Lachhman Das.
- E_t The Alankârasûtra of Râjânaka Srî Ruyyaka with The Vritti, Alankârasarvasva of Srî Mankhuka and Commentary by Samudrabandha on the Latter. Edited by T. Gaṇapati Sâstrî. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. XL. Trivandrum: The Travancore Government.
- J_1 Devanagari manuscript from Shri Raghunatha Temple MSS Library, Jammu. Reference number 476 Gha.

- ${\bf J_2}~$ Devanagari manuscript from Shri Raghunatha Temple MSS Library, Jammu. Reference number 534 Gha.
- ${\bf J_3}$ Devanagari manuscript from Shree Raghunath Sanskrit Research Institute Library, Jammu. Reference number 801 Gha.
- \mathbf{L}_{\pm} Śāradā manuscript from Lucknow, photographed by eGangotri. No. 76.
- $\mathbf{L_{\acute{s}sp}}$ $S\bar{u}trap\bar{a}tha$ of $\mathbf{L_{\acute{s}}}$, immediately after the main text of the AlSar.
- $\mathbf{P_{\pm}}$ Śāradā manuscript from the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune. Catalogue number. Folio 1 to 110b.
- $\mathbf{P_{\acute{s}sp}}$ $S\bar{u}trap\bar{a}tha$ of $\mathbf{P_{\acute{s}}}$, immediately after the main text of the AlSar. Folio 110b to 113b.

ante correcturam, i.e. the reading before the correction by the scribe post correcturam, i.e. the reading after the correction by the scribe

conj. conjecture
corr. correction
em. emendation
padma deleted by scribe

om. omitted

 Σ The reading in all of the manuscripts except for one

ca+++ti Unreadable or vague «ya» inserted by scribe

A.2 Kāvyalingam

 $31^v J_1, 48^r J_2, 40^v J_3,$

 37^r L_Ś, 74^v

 $P_{\acute{S}}$

A.2.1 Kāvyalingasya lakṣaṇam

adhunā tarkanyāyāśrayeṇālankāradvayam ucyate | tatra—

hetor vākyapadārthatve kāvyalingam ||57||

yatra hetuḥ kāraṇarūpo vākyārthagatyā viśeṣaṇadvāreṇa vā padārthagatyā 3 liṅgatvena nibadhyate tat kāvyaliṅgam |

A.2.2 Kāvyagrahaņasya hetuḥ

tarkavailakṣaṇyārthaṃ kāvyagrahaṇam |na hy atra vyāptipakṣadharmatopasaṃhārādayah krivante |

A.2.3 Arthantaranyasad bhedah

vākyārthagatyā ca nibadhyamāno hetutvenaivopanibaddhavyaḥ, nopanibaddhasya hetutvam | anyathārthāntaranyāsān nāsya bhedah syāt |

A.2.4 Anekavākyārthapadārthagatasya kāvyalingasya udāharanam

krameņa yathā—

yat tvannetrasamānakānti salile magnam tadindīvaram meghair antaritah priye tava mukhacchāyānukārah śaśī | ye 'pi tvadgamanānusārigatayas te rājāhaṃsā gatās tvatsādṛśyavinodamātram api me daivena na kṣamyate ||

3 L_{SSP} and P_{SSP}: hetor $v\bar{a}kyapad\bar{a}rthat\bar{a}\ k\bar{a}vyalingam$. **10** yat \rightarrow kṣamyate] $R\bar{a}m\bar{a}bhyudaya$ of Yaśovarman, Act II ? cit. Saduktikarṇāmṛta 976, Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa 4.22–23, verse 21.

1 tarkanyāyāśrayenā° $\mathbb{E}_{B_1} \mathbb{E}_{B_2} \mathbb{E}_M \mathbb{E}_T \mathbb{J}_2 \mathbb{P}_{\hat{S}}$, tatkanyāyāśrayam \mathbb{J}_1 , tarkanyāyāśrayam \mathbb{J}_3 , tarkanyā «yā» śrayenā° $L_{\acute{s}}$ 1°āla
ṅkāra°] $E_{M}E_{T}L_{\acute{s}}P_{\acute{s}},$ °ālaṃkāra°
 $E_{B1}E_{B2}J_{2},$ alaṃkāra° $J_{1}J_{3}$ 2 ° \bar{a} rthatve | $E_M E_T$, °ārthatā $E_{B1}E_{B2}J_1J_2J_3L_5P_5$ **3** yatra] Σ , atra L_5 ^{ac} **3** hetuḥ] Σ , hetu J_2 **3** °dvāreṇa] Σ , °dvareṇa L_5 **3** vā] Σ , om. P_5 ^{ac} **4** nibadhyate] $E_ME_TJ_1J_2J_3L_5P_5$, nibaddhyate $E_{B1}E_{B2}$ $\mathbf{5} \text{ ``vailakṣaṇyā''} \text{] } \Sigma, \text{ ``vailakṣyaṇyā''} \text{ L}_{\acute{S}} \quad \mathbf{5} \text{ ``dharmato''} \text{] } \text{ E}_{\text{B1}} \text{E}_{\text{B2}} \text{E}_{\text{M}} \text{E}_{\text{T}}, \text{ ``dharmo''} \text{ J}_{1} \text{J}_{2} \text{J}_{3} \text{L}_{\acute{S}} \text{P}_{\acute{S}}$ 7 ca] Σ , śa J₃ 8 nibadhyamāno \rightarrow hetutvam | $E_{B2}E_{M}J_{3}P_{5}$, nibaddhopanibaddhasya hetutvam E_{B1} , nibadhyamāno hetutvenaivopanibanddhavyah, nopanibaddhasya hetutvam E_{T} , nibandhavyopanibaddhasya ho<*tri>tutvam J₁, nibadhyamāno hetutvenopanipabamdhasya hetutvam J_2 , nibadhyamāno hetutvenopanibaddhavyo nopanibandhasya hetutvam L_{\S} bhedaḥ syāt] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}J_{3}$, bhedo bhavet $L_{5}P_{5}$, bheda syāt J_{2} 9 krameṇa yathā] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}J_{1}J_{2}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$, krameņodāharaņam $E_{T}J_{3}$ 12 °ānusāri° | E_{B1}E_{B2}E_ME_T, °ānukāri° $J_1J_2L_{\acute{s}}P_{\acute{s}}$, °ānvakāri° J_3 **12** rājāhaṃsā] Σ , rājāhaṃsa J_3 13 tvat°] Σ , tvāt° $L_{\acute{s}}$ ac 13 daivena | Σ , daivane J_1 13 kṣamyate | Σ , kramyate $L_{\acute{S}}$

⁸ cf. AlVim ad AlSar 57: anyatheti | hetutvenopanibandho yadi na syāt |

mṛgyaś ca darbhānkuranirvyapekṣās tavāgatijñam samabodhayan mām | vyāpārayantyo diśi dakṣiṇasyām utpakṣmarājīni vilocanāni ||

pūrvatra pādatrayārtho 'nekavākyārtharūpaś caturthapādārthe hetutvenopanyastaḥ | uttaratra tu saṃbodhane vyāpārayantya iti mṛgīviśeṣaṇatvenānekapadārtho hetur uktaḥ | $75^v P_{S}$ $48^v J_2$

A.2.5 Ekavākyārthapadārthagatasya kāvyalingasya udāharanam

evam ekavākyārthapadārthagatatvena kāvyalingam udāhriyate | yathā—

manīṣitāḥ santi gṛheṣu devatās
tapaḥ kva vatse kva ca tāvakaṃ vapuḥ |
padaṃ saheta bhramarasya pelavaṃ
śirīṣapuṣpaṃ na punaḥ patatriṇaḥ ||

yad vismayastimitam astamitānyabhāvam
ānandamandam amṛtaplavanād ivābhūt |
tatsannidhau tad adhunā hṛdayaṃ madīyam
aṅgāracumbitam iva vyathamānam āste ||

pūrvatra varaprāptihetubhūtataponiṣedhasya manīṣitā iti vākyārtharūpo hetur nirdiṣṭaḥ | uttaratra punar astamitānyabhāvam ity atra vismayastimitam iti 76^{7} Pś viśeṣaṇadvāreṇa padārthaḥ ||

14 mṛgyaś \rightarrow vilocanāni] Raghuvaṃśa 13.24 20 manīṣitaḥ \rightarrow patatriṇaḥ] $Kum\bar{a}rasambhava$ 5.4 24 yad \rightarrow āste] $M\bar{a}lat\bar{i}m\bar{a}dhava$ 1.19

¹⁵ dakṣiṇasyām] Σ , dakṣiṇasyāṃm J₂ 16 °rūpaś] Σ , °rūpaḥ | E_{B1} 16 caturthapādārthe] $E_{B2}E_ME_TJ_1L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$, caturthapādārtho E_{B1} , caturthapādārtha° J_2 , caturtha° J_3 Σ , uturatra J₃ **17** tu] $E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}J_{2}J_{3}$, om. $E_{B1}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$ 18 ° \bar{a} nekapad \bar{a} rtho | $E_M E_T$, °ānekaḥ padārtho $E_{\rm B1}E_{\rm B2}J_{1}J_{3}L_{\rm \acute{s}}P_{\rm \acute{s}}$, °ānekaḥ padārtha° J_{2} 18 hetur uktah | E_ME_TL_ŚP_Ś, 23 śirīṣapuṣpaṃ $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{2}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$, śarīṣapuṣpaṃ $J_{1}J_{3}$ **23** patatriṇaḥ] $E_{M}J_{1}J_{2}J_{3}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$, patattriṇaḥ $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{T}$ **25** ānandamandam] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}L_{S}$, ānaṃdamagnam $J_{1}J_{2}J_{3}$, ānandamandram P_{S} amṛtaplavanād] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{2}L_{\acute{S}}$, amṛtaplāvād(unmetrical) J_{1} , amṛtāplavanād $J_{3}P_{\acute{S}}$ ivābhūt] Σ , ivābhūti $P_{\acute{S}}$ ac **26** tatsannidhau] Σ , tatsanni J_3 **26** hṛdayaṃ] hyadayam J $_3$ **26** madīyam] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_ME_TJ_1J_3L_5$ $^{pc}P_5$, sadīyas J $_2$, madīyam L $_5$ ac **27** aṅgāra° $] \quad E_{\rm B1}E_{\rm B2}E_{\rm M}E_{\rm T}L_{\rm S}P_{\rm S}, \ {\rm eg\bar{a}ra}^{\circ}\ J_{1}, \ {\rm amg\bar{a}ra}^{\circ}\ J_{2}, \ {\rm amg\bar{a}}^{\circ}\ J_{3} \qquad {\bf 27} \quad {\rm ``cumbitam} \quad] \quad E_{\rm B1}E_{\rm B2}E_{\rm M}E_{\rm T}J_{3}L_{\rm S},$ °cumbitum J_1 , °cumbhitam J_2 , °sumbitam P_5 28 °bhūta°] Σ , °bhūto J_1 28 °niṣedhasya] $E_{\rm B1}E_{\rm B2}E_{\rm M}J_1,\ {}^{\circ}{\rm ni}\\ {\rm i}\\ {\rm e}\\ {\rm t}\\ {\rm E}_{\rm T}J_2J_3L_{\rm S}P_{\rm S},\ {\rm man}\\ {\rm i}\\ {\rm i}\\ {\rm t}\\ {\rm i}\\ {\rm E}_{\rm B1}E_{\rm B2}E_{\rm M},\ {\rm san}\\ {\rm i}\\ {\rm i}\\ {\rm t}\\ {\rm i}\\ {\rm i}\\ {\rm e}\\ {$ J_1 28 °rūpo] Σ , °rūpe $L_{\acute{s}}$ 28 hetur] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}J_{2}L_{\acute{s}}$, hetu J_3 , hetun $P_{\acute{s}}$ ac, hetuḥ $P_{\acute{s}}^{pc}$ **29** uttaratra | Σ , utturatra J_3 **29** punar astamit \bar{a}° | $E_T J_1 J_3 L_{\acute{s}} P_{\acute{s}}$, punah astamit \bar{a}° $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}$, punarah samitā° J_{2} 30 višeṣaṇa° | Σ , višeṣe° $L_{\acute{s}}$ ac, višeṣa° $L_{\acute{s}}$ pc

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A.3 Anumānam

A.3.1 Anumānasya lakṣaṇaṃ

sādhyasādhananirdeśo 'numānam ||58||

yatra śabdavṛttena pakṣadharmānvayavyatirekavatsādhanaṃ sādhyapratītaye nirdiśyate so 'numānālaṅkāraḥ | vicchittiviśeṣaś cātrārthād āśrayaṇīyaḥ | anyathā tarkānumānāt kim vailaksanyam |

A.3.2 Alankārāntaramūlānumānasya udāharanam

udāharanam—

 $49^{r} J_{2}$

yathā randhram vyomnaś calajaladadhūmaḥ sthagayati sphuliṅgānām rūpam dadhati ca yathā kīṭamaṇayaḥ | yathā vidyujjvālollasanaparipiṅgāś ca kakubhas tathā manye lagnaḥ pathikataruṣaṇḍe smaradavaḥ ||

atra dhūmasphuliṅgakapiladiktvāni vahniliṅgāni trirūpatvād davaśabdapratipā- $_{76^v}$ P $_{\pm}$ ditaṃ vahniṃ gamayantīty anumānam | rūpakamūlatvenālaṅkārāntaragarb- $_{41^v}$ J $_2$ hīkāreṇa vicchittyāśrayaṇāt tarkānumānavailakṣaṇyam |

A.3.3 Śuddhānumānasya udāharaṇam

kvacit tu śuddham api bhavati | yathā—

36 yathā randhram \rightarrow smaradavaḥ] cit. Sūktimuktāvalī 61.39, Verse ad Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa 2.1, Verse ad Suvṛṭtatilaka 2.31, Kāvyaśikṣā 3.63. Ascribed to Muktākaṇa.

31 sādhya°] Σ , sādhye P_ś ac 32 °vṛttena] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{3}L_{\acute{S}}$, °vṛttatvena J_{1} , °vṛtena **32** pakṣadharmā°] Σ , pakṣadharmatā° E_T J₂, °vṛtte«na» P_ś **32** sādhyapratītaye] Σ , sādhyapratītaṃye L_ś ac33 'numānālankārah] $E_{\rm M}E_{\rm T}$, 'numānam alamkārah $E_{\rm B1}$, 'numānālaṃkāraḥ $E_{\rm B2},$ numānam alaṃkāraḥ $J_1,$ numānālaṃkāraḥ $J_2J_3,$ numānālaṅkāraḥ $L_{\pm}P_{\pm}$ **33** °ārthād āśrayaṇīyaḥ] $E_{B2}E_ME_TJ_2J_3L_śP_ś$, °ārthāśrayaṇīyaḥ $E_{B1}J_1$ **34** vailaksanyam] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}J_{3},$ vailaksyanyam $J_{1},$ vailaksyanyam syāt $L_{\pm}P_{\pm}E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}L_{\pm}P_{\pm},$ tadā $J_{2}J_{3}$ $\bf 36$ °dhūmah] $\Sigma,$ °dhūma J_{3} **35** udāharaṇam **37** sphulingānām $E_{\rm B1}E_{\rm B2}E_{\rm M}E_{\rm T}P_{\rm \acute{S}},\ {\rm sphulimg\bar{a}n\bar{a}m}\ J_{1}J_{2}J_{3},\ {\rm sphulimg\bar{a}n\bar{a}m}\ L_{\rm \acute{S}}$ 37 rūpam Σ , bhaṃgim J₃ **38** vidyujjvālollasana°] $E_M E_T J_2 P_S$, **37** dadhati] Σ , dadati J₃ **37** yath $\bar{a} \mid \Sigma, om.J_2$ vidyuj
jvālo jvalana° E_{B1} , vidyujjvālojjvalana° $E_{B2}J_1$, vidyujālollas
ana° J_3 , vidyujjvalollasana° L_{\pm} 39 pathikataruṣaṇḍe] Σ , pathitarukaṣaṃḍe J_2 39 smaradavaḥ] $E_{\rm B1}E_{\rm B2}E_{\rm M}E_{\rm T}J_3L_{\pm}P_{\pm}$ smaradaya
h $J_1,$ saradava
h J_2 **40** atra] $\Sigma,$ yatra
 $L_{\acute{S}}$ **40** vahnilingāni] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}},$ vahnilimgāni J_1J_2 , vahnilimgā J_3 40 trirūpatvād] Σ , trirūpakatvād J_3 40 davaśabda°] Σ , dava P_{\pm}^{ac} 41 pratipāditam] Σ , pritipāditam P_{\pm}^{ac} 41 anumānam] Σ , anusānam J_1 42 °garbhīkāreņa $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}$, °garbhīkāre $J_{2}J_{3}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$ ac, °garbhīkārer $P_{\acute{S}}$ pc 42 °āśrayaṇāt] Σ , °āśrayaṇā J₂ **42** tarkānumāna°] Σ , tarkānumāne J₃ **43** kvacit tu] Σ , kvacitu J_3 43 api] Σ , eva J_1 43 bhavati] Σ , bharāvati L_{\pm}^{ac} , bharavati L_{\pm}^{c} $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}J_{2}J_{3}$, om. $L_{S}P_{S}$

yatraitā laharīcalācaladṛśo vyāpārayanti bhruvaṃ yat tatraiva patanti saṃtatam amī marmaspṛśo mārgaṇāḥ | taccakrīkṛtacāpasañcitaśarapreṅkhatkaraḥ krodhano dhāvaty agrata eva śāsanadharaḥ satyaṃ sadāsāṃ smaraḥ ||

atra yoşitām bhrūvyāpāreņa mārgaņapatanam smarapurogāmitve sādhye 32^v J₁ 'nalaṅkṛtam eva sādhanam iti śuddham anumānam | prauḍhoktimātraniṣpannārthaniṣthatvena ca vicchittiviśeṣāśrayaṇāc cārutvam |

A.3.4 Bhāvadvayayor astitvam

ayam atra piṇḍārthaḥ | ihāsti pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāvaḥ | asti ca samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ | tatrāpratītapratyāyane pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāvaḥ | pratītapratyāyane tu samarthyasamarthakabhāvah | 77^{r} Ps

A.3.5 Anumānasya vişayaḥ

tatra pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāve 'numānam |

44 yatraitā \rightarrow smarah \parallel cit. Kāvyaprakāśa 117, Alaikāraratnākara 78.

44 yatraitā] Σ , yatretā $L_{\acute{s}}$ 44 laharīcalācala $^{\circ}$] $E_{B2}E_{M}J_{3}$, laharī calācala $^{\circ}$ E_{B1} , laharīcalām cala
° E_T , laharīcalāṃcala
° J_1J_2 , laharīcalāñcala
° L_{\pm} , laharī cañcala
° P_{\pm} ac, laharī ca calañcala
° P_{\pm} P_{s}^{pc} 45 °spṛśo] Σ , °spṛṣo E_{B1} 46 tac°] Σ , taś° L_{s} 46 °cakrī°] Σ , °caṃkrī° J_{1} 46 "saṃjita" J $_1$, "saṃhita" J $_2$, "saṃcita" J $_3$ — 47 dhāvaty] $\; \Sigma, \; {\rm dhāvaṃty} \; {\rm J}_3$ — 47 śāsanadharaḥ] Σ , śāsānadhara
ḥ J_1 , śāsanadharas P_{\pm} 47 sadāsām] Σ , sadāmām J_2 48 atra] Σ , yatra L_{s}^{ac} 48 purogāmitve | Σ , purogāmitatve J_{2} 48 sādhye | $E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{2}J_{3}L_{s}P_{s}$, 'sādhye E_{B1} , sakhye J_1 50 °nişthatvena | $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_ME_TJ_1L_S$, °niştatvena J_2J_3 , °niştatve P_S ac, °niştatvena **50** vicchitti°] Σ , $om.J_1$ **50** °āśrayaṇāc] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_ME_TJ_1J_2P_{\pm}$, °āśrayaṇās J_3L_{\pm} **51** ayam] Σ , ayam apy L_Ś **51** pratyāyya°] Σ , pratyāya° J₂ **51** asti ca] Σ , om.J₃ **51** samarthya° $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{2}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$ pc , samarthyā° J_{1} , $om.J_{3}P_{\acute{S}}$ ac **52** °samarthakabhāvaḥ] **52** asti ca samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{2}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$ pc , $^{\circ}$ asti ca samarthyasamathabhāvaḥ J_1 , $om.J_3$ 52 $tatrā^{\circ}$] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_1J_2J_3$, $om.L_{\pm}P_{\pm}$ ac, $atrā^{\circ}$ P_{\pm} $\mathbf{52}\ ^{\circ}\mathbf{praty}\\ \mathbf{\bar{a}yane}\]\ E_{\mathrm{B1}}E_{\mathrm{B2}}E_{\mathrm{M}}E_{\mathrm{T}}J_{2}J_{3}P_{\acute{\mathrm{S}}}\ ^{pc},\ ^{\circ}\mathbf{praty}\\ \mathbf{\bar{a}yane}\ J_{1},\ om.\\ L_{\acute{\mathrm{S}}}P_{\acute{\mathrm{S}}}\ ^{ac}\qquad \mathbf{52}\ \mathbf{praty}\\ \mathbf{\bar{a}yya}^{\circ}\]$ $^{pc},~^{\circ}$ pratyāyakahāva
h $\rm J_1,~om.J_3L_{\acute{\rm S}}P_{\acute{\rm S}}^{-ac}$ **52** pratītapratyāyane $| E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{2}P_{S} |^{pc},$ pratītapratyayena J_1 , $om.J_3L_{\pm}P_{\pm}$ ac 53 tu $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_1J_2P_{\pm}$ pc, $om.J_3L_{\pm}P_{\pm}$ ac samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}J_{2}P_{5}$, om. $J_{3}L_{5}$ 54 tatra] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{T}E_{M}J_{1}J_{2}P_{5}$, $om.J_3$, atra L_Ś 54 pratyāyya° | $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_ME_TJ_1L_ŚP_ś$, pratyāya° J_2J_3 54 °pratyāyaka° | Σ , °pratyāka° P_{\pm}^{ac} **54** 'numānam | $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}$, numānam $J_{1}J_{3}P_{\pm}L_{\pm}$, namānam J_{2}

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A.3.6 Samarthyasamarthakabhāve kāvyaliṅgārthāntaranyāsayor bhedaḥ

samarthyasamarthakabhāve tu yatra padārtho hetus tatra hetutvenopādāne nāgendrahastās tvaci karkaśatvād ityadāv iva na kaścid alaṅkāraḥ | yatra tūpāttasya hetutvaṃ yathodāhṛte viṣaye mṛgyaś ca darbhāṅkuranirvyapekṣā ityādau tatraiva kāvyaliṅgam | yatra tu vākyārtho hetus tatra hetutvapratipādakam antareṇa hetutvāyopanyāse kāvyaliṅgam eva | taṭasthatvenopanyastasya tu hetutve 'rthāntaranyāsaḥ |

A.3.7 Alańkāradvayayor viṣayabhedaḥ

evam cāsyām prakriyāyām kāryakāraṇavākyārthayor hetutve kāvyaliṅgam eva paryavasyati | samarthyavākyasya sāpekṣatvāt tāṭasthyābhāvāt | tataś ca sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva evārthāntaranyāsasya viṣayaḥ |

A.3.8 Kāryakāraņayoḥ samarthyasamarthakatvam arthāntaranyāse

 $77^v\,P_{\pm}\,$ yat punar arthāntaranyāsasya kāryakāraṇagatatvena samarthakatvam uktam tad $42^r\,J_3\,$ uktalakṣaṇaṃ kāvyaliṅgam anāśritya, tadviṣayatvena lakṣaṇāntarasyaudbhaṭair

56 nāgendrahastās \rightarrow karkaśatvād] $Kum\bar{a}rasambhava$ 1.36a

55 samarthya°] Σ , sāmarthya° J₂ **55** °samarthaka°] Σ , °samartha° J₃ **55** hetutveno° **56** nāgendra°] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}^{\phantom{\acute{E}}\phantom{\acute{E}}\phantom{\acute{E}}\phantom{\acute{E}}$, nāgemdra° $J_{1}J_{2}J_{3}$, nāgenra° $P_{\acute{S}}$ Σ , hetureno° J_2 56 nāgendrahastās \rightarrow karkaśatvād] Σ , nāgendrahastās \rightarrow karkaśatvād ekāntaśaityāt kadalīvišeṣāḥ $E_M E_T$ **56** °adāv] $E_M E_T J_3 L_{\acute{S}} P_{\acute{S}}$, °atra $E_{B1} E_{B2} J_1 J_2$ **56** iva $\mathbb{I} E_{M}E_{T}J_{3}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$, **56** na] Σ , om.J₂ **57** hetutvam] Σ , hetuhetutvam J₁ $om.E_{B1}E_{B2}J_1J_2$ yathodāhṛte | Σ , yathodāhyate J_3 57 mṛgyaś | $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_ME_TJ_2L_śP_ś$, mṛgīś J_1 , sṛgyaś J_3 $\bf 58$ darbhānkuranirvyapekṣā ityādau] $\rm E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}L_{S}P_{S},$ darbhāṃkuranirvyapekṣā ityādau $\rm J_{1},$ darbhāṃkuretyādau J_2J_3 58 °aiva] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_ME_TJ_1$, °aikaṃ J_2P_{\pm} , °ekaṃ J_3 , °aika° L_{\pm} 58 $v\bar{a}ky\bar{a}rtho\]\ E_{B1}E_{B2}J_1J_2J_3L_\acute{s}P_\acute{s},\ v\bar{a}ky\bar{a}rthasya\ E_ME_T\ \ \mathbf{58}\ hetus\]\ E_{B1}E_{B2}J_1J_2J_3L_\acute{s}P_\acute{s},\ hetutvam$ 58 hetutva°] $E_M E_T J_2 J_3 P_{\acute{S}}$, hetu° $E_{B1} E_{B2} J_1 L_{\acute{S}}$ 59 hetutvāyo°] $E_{B1} E_{B2} J_1 J_2 J_3 L_{\acute{S}} P_{\acute{S}}$, no° $E_M E_T$ 59 tatasthatvenopanyastasya] Σ , tatasthenopanyasta $L_{\acute{S}}$ 69 tu hetutveno $^{\circ}$ $E_{M}E_{T}$ $] \quad E_{\mathrm{B2}}E_{\mathrm{M}}E_{\mathrm{T}}J_{1}J_{2}J_{3}, \quad om.E_{\mathrm{B1}}L_{\acute{\mathrm{S}}}P_{\acute{\mathrm{S}}}$ **60** hetutve] $E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{3}$, hetutvenā° $E_{B1}J_{1}L_{\acute{S}}P_{\acute{S}}$, tvenā° J_2 61 cāsyāṃ] Σ , cāsyāṃḥ $L_{\acute{S}}$ ac 61 kāryakāraṇavākyārthayor] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}P_{\acute{S}}$, kāryakāraņavākyārthayo
ḥ J_2 , kāraņavākyārthayo ḥ J_3 , kāryakāraņayor vākyārthayo ḥ L_{\pm} samarthya°] $E_{B2}E_ME_TJ_3P_{\pm}$ ac, samarthaka° $E_{B1}J_1P_{\pm}$ pc, sāmarthya° J_2 , samartha° L_{\pm} sāpekṣatvāt] $E_{B1}E_{B2}E_{M}E_{T}J_{1}J_{3}P_{S}$, sāpekṣatvā J_{2} , sapekṣatvāt L_{S} 63 °bhāva] $E_{M}E_{T}J_{2}J_{3}P_{S}$ pc , °bhāvo $E_{B1}E_{B2}J_1L_{\pm}$, °bhāve P_{\pm}^{ac} 63 evārthā°] $E_{T}J_2J_3P_{\pm}$, 'rthā° $E_{B1}E_{B2}J_1L_{\pm}$, eva arthā° E_{M} 63 vişaya
h] Σ , viśeṣaḥ J₂ 64 samarthakatvam] Σ , samarthyatvam L
ś ac 65 °lakṣaṇaṃ Σ , °lakṣaṇa° E_{B1} 65 °āntara° Σ , °āntara° P_{\S} ac 65 °audbhaṭair Σ , °odbhaṭair P_{\S}

āśritatvāt | uktalakṣaṇāśrayaṇe tu **yat tvannetre**tyādir vivikto viṣayaḥ kāvyaliṅgasyārthāntaranyāsād darśita iti kāryakāraṇayoḥ samarthyasamarthakatvam arthāntaranyāse pūrvaṃ darśitam itīyatī gamanikāśrayitavyā |

A.3.9 Samāptiķ

69 evam tarkanyāyamūlam alankāradvayam iha pratipāditam |

⁶⁶ KASS 2.4 (arthāntaranyāsa): samarthakasya pūrvam yad vaco 'nyasya ca pṛṣṭhataḥ | viparyayeṇa vā yat syād dhi śabdoktyānyathāpi vā || ibid: 6.7 (kāvyalinga): śrutam ekam yad anyatra smṛṭer anubhavasya vā | hetutām pratipadye kāvyalingam tad ucyate || 66 yat tvannetra || cit. Verse ad Suvṛṭtatilaka 2.39, Saduktikarṇāmṛṭa 976,

Appendix B

An Annotated Translation of the $k\bar{a}vyalinga$ and $anum\bar{a}na$ Sections of the $Alamk\bar{a}rasarvasva$

B.1 Poetical mark

B.1.1 The definition of poetical mark

Now, two rhetorical figures are stated as being dependent on the principle of logics. Among them,

When the reason is [depicted as taking the form of] the meaning of sentence, or the meaning of words, that figure is poetical mark.

That [rhetorical figure] in which a reason in the form of cause is depicted as the inferential mark, either providing the meaning of sentence, or providing the meaning of words by ways of attributes, is "poetical mark".

B.1.2 The reason for using the word "poetical"

The word "poetical" is used to distinguish it from logical cause. In fact, in this figure, neither universal pervasion, nor the state of the logical reason's being a property of the subject, nor the conclusion and so on should be applied.

B.1.3 The difference with regard to $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$

Additionally, that which is being depicted as providing the meaning of the sentence should be depicted as the reason itself, what has already been depicted is not the reason; otherwise, there would be no difference from the figure of arthantaranyāsa.

B.1.4 Examples of a poetical mark existing in the meaning of multiple sentences or in the meaning of multiple words

Examples are as follows:

Since that blue water lily which has the same beauty of your eyes has sunk in the water, and since the moon that imitates the luster of your face is [now] surrounded by clouds, O beautiful lady, and since even those royal swans which imitate your gait have gone away, [therefore,] fate never permits me even the small respite of [seeing something that shares] a similarity with you.

The does, indifferent to the fresh *darbha* grass, informed me, who did not know of your movements; [for] they directed their eyes to the southern direction with eyelashes upturned.

In the first example, the meaning of the initial three $p\bar{a}da$ -s, which take the form of the meaning of multiple sentences, is set down as the reason for the fourth $p\bar{a}da$; but in the second example, [the action of] informing $vy\bar{a}p\bar{a}ranyatya\dot{p}$ as an attribute of does is accepted as a reason which conveys the meaning of multiple words.

B.1.5 Examples of a poetical mark existing in the meaning of a single sentence or in the meaning of a single word

Similarly, we can exemplify poetical mark which exists in the meaning of one sentence or in the meaning of one word. For example,

The longed for divinities are found in the home. How can your [slender] body, O child, [resist the fierce] austerity! The delicate \dot{sirisa} -flower may bear the step of a bee, but never [the step] of a bird.

This heart of mine, stunned through astonishment, with all other feelings ceased, as if exhilarated by the pleasure of bathing in nectar, is now disconcerted when she is near, as if it were kissed by burning coals.

In the first example, with regard to the prohibition of austerity which is the reason for the obtainment of a boon, "longed for" which takes the form of the meaning of a sentence is indicated to be the reason. In the second example, however, [the reason is] "all other feelings have ceased" which takes the meaning of word by means of its attribute "stunned through astonishment".

B.2 Poetical inference

B.2.1 The definition of poetical inference

The explicit statement of a thing to be proven and its proof is poetical inference.

That [rhetorical figure] in which, by means of explicit verbal denotion, a proof possessing [1] the state of the logical reason's being a property of the subject, [2] positive concomitance and negative concomitance is indicated for the comprehension of a thing to be proven, is the rhetorical figure called poetical inference. A special strikingness should be applied here accordingly; otherwise there would be no distinction from logical inference.

B.2.2 The example of poetical inference taking another rhetorical figure as its base

For example,

Since the vapour of wafting clouds conceals the chasm of the sky, since fireflies take on the form of sparks of fire, and since the quarters of the sky are reddened by the flickering flame of lightning, therefore, I suppose, the fire of love is smouldering in the woods where the travellers [stay]..

In this example, the poetical inference is [as follows]: the signs of fire, *i.e.* vapour, sparks of fire and the dark-red quarter of sky, cause the understanding of [the existence of] fire which is stated by the word "dava". It is different from logical inference because since [the poetical inference in this example] is pregnant with another rhetorical figure, *i.e.* having $r\bar{u}paka$ as its base, it (*i.e.* the poetical inference in this example) relies on strikingness.

B.2.3 The example of pure poetical inference

However, in some cases there is also pure [poetical inference.] For example,

Since those very stinging arrows fall continually only there to where those young ladies with unsteady glances gesture with their eyebrows, therefore, the vigorous Love-god, who is the herald, truly always runs in front [of them], with his hand drawing back the arrow set to the bow that [is drawn back so far that it] turns into a circle.

In this example, with regard to the thing to be proven, *i.e.* the fact that Cupid walks ahead, the falling of arrows as the proof is surely not ornamented [with any rhetorical figure]. Therefore, this is a pure poetical inference. The aesthetic beauty [here is based on] a special strikingness because it depends on the meaning brought about merely by the fascinating expression [by the poet].

B.2.4 The existence of two kinds of relations

Here [the following] is the core idea. Here there is the relation of the thing to be cognized and the causer of cognition; a relation of the thing to be substantiated and the substantiator also exists. Among those two, when there is a case of causing a cognition of a [hitherto] uncognized object, the relation of the thing to be cognized and the causer of cognition is present. On the other hand, in the case of causing a cognition of an already cognized object, the relation of the thing to be substantiated and the substantiator is present.

B.2.5 The scope of poetical inference

In this context, when the relation of the thing to be cognized and the causer of cognition [exists], we have an instance of poetical inference.

B.2.6 The distinction between poetical mark and $arth\bar{a}n$ - $tarany\bar{a}sa$ when the relation of samarthya and samarthaka exists

But when the relation of the thing to be substantiated and the substantiator exists, [in verses] where the reason is the meaning of words and is expressed explicitly to function as a reason, there no rhetorical figure exists, as, for example, in cases such as " $n\bar{a}gendrahast\bar{a}s$ tvaci karkaśatvād" and so on. However, in a case where the already expressed object functions as the reason, as in the exemplified context

of "mṛgyaś ca darbhāṅkuranirvyapekṣā" and so on, there exactly poetical mark is present. However, in a case where the sentence meaning is the reason, and it is adduced to function as a reason without stating this fact, there we find [also] poetical mark. However, if an adduced object, as long as it is something uninvolved, is a reason, there is arthāntaranyāsa.

B.2.7 The distinction of the scopes of the two rhetorical figures

Thus in such tabulation, if a sentence meaning, either being a result or being a cause, is a reason, that exactly results in poetical mark; because the substantiated sentence is not something independent as long as it expects [a substantiator]. From this point, the scope of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ is only the relation of universal and individual.

B.2.8 In *arthāntaranyāsa*, a result and its cause are the thing to be substantiated and the substantiator respectively

Again, if it is said that $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ is a substantiator because it exists in [the relation of] cause and result, that disregards the previously defined [kind of] poetical mark, because the followers of Udbhaṭa rely on a different definition which takes that [substantiation] as its scope. But if one accepts the definition stated [by us], it can be shown that poetical mark has a distinct scope with regard to $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, [as in] the case " $yat\ tvannetra$ " and so on. Therefore, in $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, a result and its cause were previously shown as being an object to be substantiated and its substantiator. Such paraphrase is to be followed.

B.2.9 Conclusion

In this way, the two rhetorical figure based on logical principles as their base are expounded here.

Appendix C

Description of the Manuscripts of the $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}kara$, the Abbreviations and Sigla

The present critical edition has used all of the available manuscripts of the AlRat except for one manuscript preserved possibly in Darbhanga, reported as deposited in the house of a local pandit in *A Descriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts in Mithila*, volume II (1933), but I have not yet been able to verify the current location of this manuscript, or whether it even still exists. Besides the description of all these manuscripts, the abbreviations used in the previous discussions and in the critical edition as well as the sigla are given here.

C.1 Description of the Available Manuscripts of the $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}kara$

 J_a MS preserved at the Raghunath Temple, Jammu.

The title of this manuscript given on the cover is $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}karah$. It is documented in Patkar (1973), pp. 266–267, index code 805 Gha. According to the information therein, its size is 35.5×19.2 cms and it consists of totally 128 folios, but folio 12 and 16 are missing. Each folio contains 12 lines, and each line contains 29 or 30 akṣara-s (folios 1 to 6), or 36 akṣara-s (starting from folio 7). The manuscript is incomplete, and the pagination ends firstly at 74, then a separate pagination starts and continues up to 54. It is a paper manuscript written in what can be called "Jammu-Devanāgarī" script. The explicit reads kṛtir mahopādhyāyabhaṭṭa-trayīśvaramantraputrasya tatrabhavataḥ paṇḍitabhaṭṭaśrīśobhākaramitrasya

śrīśrīvaśarmaputreṇa prajñālavavatā mayā ratnākarābhidhaḥ pauṣe laṃkāro likhitaḥ śubhaḥ, so we know that the scribe is the son of a Śrīvaśarman, or his name is exactly Śrīvaśarmaputra, and he copied this text in Pauṣa month. The manuscript is well preserved and contains both $s\bar{u}tra$ -s and vrti-s. The main text are followed by $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ for the Prakrit verses and $S\bar{u}trap\bar{a}tha$. The date of copying is unknown.

In J_A , sa and ma appear similar in many occasions, and we can only determine the correct one with the help of context. In some cases, pa is also written in a similar way as that of sa and ma. The "Jammu-Devanāgarī" script with thick strokes also makes the identification of each letter more difficult. The sign of the vowel e and o can be misplaced in some cases, as in the sentence anayoś ca hatverthasya yadāder upadānāc chābdam sādhanatvam, where hatverthasya should be corrected to hetvarthasya. aksara-s of nasal consonants are in most cases replaced by anusvāra. Full stop of sentence is denoted by blank space in most places, as we can see in the first, second, eighth, ninth and twelfth lines of Figure C.1, and in the remaining cases denoted by single or double danda-s. The omission of initial vowel is not denoted by avagraha or any other sign. When a line ends with an independent vowel akṣara which is the initial of an independent word, this vowel is denoted with a short vertical stroke on its lower right, as we can see at the end of the eighth and the twelfth lines.



Figure C.1: Folio 83v(9v2) of J_A Content: the rhetorical figure of $sam\bar{a}dhi$ (promotion) and $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ (poetical substantiation)

 J_o MS preserved at the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, Jodhpur.

The title of this manuscript given on the cover is Alankāraratnākara. It is documented in Jinavijaya (1968), pp. 370–371, catalogue number 7043

E, deposit number 11105. According to the information provided by Jinavijaya, its size is 17.4×24.9 cms and it consists of totally 121 folios. Each folio contains 24 lines, and each line contains 18 to 20 akṣara-s. The manuscript is complete. It is a paper manuscript written in Devanāgarī script. The explicit reads kṛtir mahopādhyāyabhaṭṭatrayīśvaramitraputrasya tatrabhavataḥ paṇḍitabhaṭṭaśrīśobhākaramitrasya śrīśrīvaśarmaputreṇa pra-jñālavavatā mayā ratnākarābhidhaḥ poṣe laṃkāro likhitaḥ śubhaḥ. The manuscript is well preserved and contains both sūtra-s and vṛtti-s. The date of copying is unknown, but Jinavijaya suggests that the text was copied in the 20^{th} century. The catalogue documents the name of the scribe as Śrīvaśarmaputra.

Like the situation in J_A , sa, ma and pa are also mixed up in J_O . The Devanāgarī script in this manuscript shows thick strokes, which also makes the identification of similar akṣara-s difficult. The sign of the vowel e and o can be misplaced in some cases. na and la can also be mistaken in some cases. akṣara-s of nasal consonants are in most cases replaced by $anusv\bar{a}ra$. Full stop of sentence is denoted by blank space. Omission of initial vowel is not denoted with avagraha or any other sign.



Figure C.2: Folios 82v and 83r of J_o Content: the rhetorical figure of $vy\bar{a}pti$ (universal pervasion) and $anum\bar{a}na$

K_o MS preserved at the Asiatic Society, Kolkata.

The title of this manuscript given on the cover is Alankāraratnākaraḥ. It is documented in Shāstrī (1931), p. 429, catalogue number 4855, deposit

number G 1553. Shāstrī mentions that "Yaśaskara wrote the Devī-stotra for illustrating each of the sūtras of Śobhā-kara; and Ratna-kaṇṭha in the middle of the 17th century explained how a verse of the hymn explained a sūtra." According to the curator's record and the information in the catalogue, its size is 17×25.5 cms and it consists of totally 72 folios. Each folio contains 30 lines, and each line contains 30 akṣara-s. The manuscript is complete. It is a Kāśmīrā paper manuscript written in mediaeval Kāśmīrī (Śāradā) script. The explicit reads kṛtir mahopādhyāyabhaṭṭa-trayīśvaramantraputrasya tatrabhavataḥ paṇḍitabhaṭṭaśrīśobhākaramitrasya śrīśrīvaśarmaputreṇa prajñālavavatā mayā ratnākarābhidhaḥ poṣe laṃkāro likhitaḥ śubhaḥ. The manuscript is damaged by worms, as visible in the marginal of Figure C.3, and it contains both sūtra-s and vṛtti-s. The date of copying is unknown, but it seems to have been old.



Figure C.3: Folios 46v and 47r of K_o . Content: the rhetorical figure of $sam\bar{a}dhi$ and $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$

This manuscript contains plentiful marginal notes. It may have been used for study of the AlRat, since the marginal notes include quotations from the AlSar, auto-commentaries to difficult phrases and words, corrections of aksara-s, and partial $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ for the Prakrit verses. Two $citrak\bar{a}vya$ -s (figurative poetry¹³⁹) are drawn on the front cover, one being in the form

 $^{^{139}}$ This term has several alternative expressions: citra, citrabandha, bandhacitra or simply

of a sword, and the other in the form of a lotus. Two passages containing discussion on grammatical topics are written in the blank area between the two $citrak\bar{a}vya$ -s. $Jihv\bar{a}m\bar{u}l\bar{i}ya$ and $upadhm\bar{a}n\bar{i}ya$ appear before k/kh and p/ph respectively instead of the normal visarga.

The two *citrakāvya*-s are actually the first two examples of the rhetorical figure *citra* (pictorial poetry) in the AlRat. I decode the text contained in them as follows:

```
Sword (khadgabandha):
sādarā pāpaharaṇe saṃcārajitasārasā |
sā rātu hāsabhāsā tu mukhapadmā rasāvahā ||
sā durgā pātu vo dhairyadhūtadānavasāhasā |
sārasābhamukhacchāyā jitasaṃtatatāmasā<sup>140</sup> ||
Lotus (padmabandha):
yā mahāptihatāpāyā yā pātārtiharābhayā |
yā bharāt kṛtarucyāyā yāñcā ruddhamahāmayā ||
```

As for the khadgabandha, first we need to rotate it by 90 degrees with its blade directing downward. We start from the $s\bar{a}$ in the center of the sword, then move upward and read da $r\bar{a}$ $p\bar{a}$ pa ha ra pe on the hilt; then start from the left tip of the longer cross-guard and read sa $\tilde{n}c\bar{a}$ ra ji ta $s\bar{a}$ ra and come back to the centric $s\bar{a}$. In this way, we get the first $p\bar{a}da$. The second step also starts from the centric $s\bar{a}$ and continues from the right tip of the longer cross-guard, reading $r\bar{a}$ tu $h\bar{a}$ sa $bh\bar{a}$ $s\bar{a}$ tu, then move to the left tip of the shorter cross-guard and read mu kha pa $dm\bar{a}$ ra $s\bar{a}$ va $h\bar{a}$ until the right tip. In this way, we obtain the second $p\bar{a}da$. The third step starts again from the centric $s\bar{a}$, then we read the left side of the blade downward until the $s\bar{a}$ on the tip of the blade as $s\bar{a}$ du $rg\bar{a}$ $p\bar{a}$ tu vo dhai rya $dh\bar{u}$ ta $d\bar{a}$ na va sa ha $s\bar{a}$. In this way, we get the third $p\bar{a}da$. The last step starts from the $s\bar{a}$ on the tip of the blade and read the right side of the blade upward as $s\bar{a}$ ra $s\bar{a}$ bha mu kha $cch\bar{a}$ $y\bar{a}$ ji ta sam ta ta ta ta ma, and finally ends at the centric $s\bar{a}$. In this way, the fourth $p\bar{a}da$ is also obtained.

Leveille (2017) discovers the way of deciphering the lotus graph. According

bandha. Lienhard translates it as carmen figuratum and observes its two characteristics: one is "limiting the number of phonemes (usually consonants) in a stanza to one, two or only a few", the other is "arranging the syllables in a definite, predetermined order" (Lienhard 1984, p. 154). Battistini states that "can indicate both word plays in general (riddles, palindromes, tongue-twisters) and pictorial stanzas in a narrower sense" (Battistini 2014, p. 21, fn. 2). In this paper, citrakāvya is used to denote pictorial stanzas.

 $^{^{140}}$ Śobhākara puts $p\bar{a}da$ c and d first in the AlRat.




Figure C.4: Front cover of K_o

to the method therein, we need to start from the $y\bar{a}$ in the center, then turn to the pedal on the top right with $ma\ h\bar{a}$, next turn to the pedal on the top middle and read $pti\ ha$, next turn to the pedal on the top left and read $t\bar{a}$ $p\bar{a}$, and next come back to the $y\bar{a}$ in the middle. In this way, we obtain the first $p\bar{a}da$ of the padmabandha. The second step also starts from the $y\bar{a}$ in the center, then we need to move back to the pedal with $t\bar{a}\ p\bar{a}$, but read it in an opposite direction as $p\bar{a}\ t\bar{a}$; next move to the pedal on the middle left and read $rti\ ha$; next move to the pedal on the lower left and read $r\bar{a}\ bha$, and move back again to the $y\bar{a}$ in the center. In this way, we obtain the second $p\bar{a}da$. The complete procedure of reading $ak\bar{s}ara$ -s is given in Figure C.5, though the position of each pedal is different from that in Figure C.4:




Figure C.5: The order of syllables in the lotus-formed *citrakāvya* in Leveille 2017, p. 19.

The two $citrak\bar{a}vya$ -s are constructed as separate verses, but they can form one unified text in term of the syntax and content. The whole text depicts a pious devotee to the goddess Durgā. In the following translation, I put the lotus-formed $citrak\bar{a}vya$ before the sword-formed $citrak\bar{a}vya$ and place the second part of the sword-formed $citrak\bar{a}vya$ before the first part, as Śobhākara does in the AlRat.

Leveille only provides the translation of the verse contained in the lotus graph, which runs as follows:

She who kills misfortune by means of her auspiciousness She who fearlessly removes pain with a strike¹⁴¹

 $^{^{141}}$ Leveille's interpretation of $p\bar{a}t\bar{a}rtihar\bar{a}bhay\bar{a}$ is presumably as a compound: $y\bar{a}$ $p\bar{a}t\bar{a}n\bar{a}m$

She one who fully manifests the arrival of light And she one who hinders great sickness by means of her inclination 142

I translate the verses contained in the sword graph as follows:

May Durgā protect you

She who through [her] firmness destroyed the impetuousness of the Dānava-s

The lustre of whose face resembling the red lotus

Defeats the impenetrable darkness

She who is zealous to remove sin

She whose gait defeats that of the swans

She whose lotus-face, shining with a smile, brings gladness

May she give benefit [to you]

O_x MS preserved at the Bodleian Library at Oxford University, England.

The title of this manuscript given on the spine is Śobhākareśvaramitra's Alańkāraratnākara. It is documented in Winternitz and Keith (1905), pp. 142–143, catalogue number MS Sansk d. 87. The manuscript forms the main part of a larger collection which consists of five different texts: a fragment of the seventh act of the Abhijñānaśakuntala; the AlRat; a fragment of the $K\bar{a}mas\bar{u}tra$ and a commentary; a fragment of the $\hat{S}abdavy\bar{a}paravic\bar{a}ra$ of Mammata; and part of the $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ for the Prakrit verses in the AlRat. This last section starts from the Prakrit verses under the twenty-fourth figure $prat\bar{i}pa$ to those under the sixty-eighth figure udreka. According to the information in the catalogue, the size of this manuscript is 8.75×9.625 inches (circa 22.2×24.5 cms). Folio number is written up to 163, but folios 1 to 41 are lost, and folio 79 are doubled, so it really consists of totally 127 folios. Several folios are seriously damaged. Each folio contains 21 lines, and each line contains 25 aksara-s. The AlRat starts from folio 49v and ends on folio 156r, and it is complete. The manuscript is made of birch bark and written in Sāradā script. The explicit of the AlRat reads krtir mahopādhyāyapanditabhattatrayīśvaramittraputrasya tatrabhavatah panditabhattaśrīśobhākareśvaramittrasya // iti śubham / śrīr astu || aśuddhatvam ādarśadosāt | śrīganeśāya namah || om namas sarasvatyai //. The manuscript is generally in good condition and it contains both

 $[\]bar{a}rtihare~abhay\bar{a}$ (with $abhay\bar{a}$ as an adjective). This should be translated as follows: she who is fearless in the removal of suffering from calamities. One could also read $p\bar{a}t\bar{a}rtihar\bar{a}bhay\bar{a}$ as two words.

 $^{^{142}}$ Leveille 2017, p. 18.

 $s\bar{u}tra$ -s and vrtti-s of the AlRat. The date of copying is written on the last line of folio 49r, which reads sam 52 pau suti 11 gurau. This corresponds to January the 14th, 1677 A.D. Winternitz and Keith give 1676 A.D. as the time of copying.

This manuscript has been discussed and analyzed in Vasudeva (2016). Judged from the handwriting style, the $Abhij\tilde{n}\bar{a}na\acute{s}akuntala$ and the AlRat seem to have been written by one hand, the $K\bar{a}mas\bar{u}tra$ and the $\acute{S}abdavy\bar{a}-paravic\bar{a}ra$ seem to have been written by another hand, and the $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ for the Prakrit verses was written by a third hand 143. $Jihv\bar{a}m\bar{u}l\bar{i}ya$ and $upadhm\bar{a}n\bar{i}ya$ appear before k/kh and p/ph respectively instead of normal visarga.




Figure C.6: Folio 120v from O_x Content: the examples and explanations of $anum\bar{a}na$

 $[\]overline{\ }^{143}$ See Vasudeva 2016, pp. 499–500; Winternitz and Keith 1905, p. 142

P_d MS preserved at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune.

The title of this manuscript given on the cover is Alamkāraratnākara. It is documented in Gode (1936), pp. 15-16, catalogue number 227/1875-76. According to the information therein, its size is 14×6 inches (around 35.6×15.2 cms) and it consists of totally 94 folios. Folios 92 to 101 are missing. Each folio contains 12 lines, and each line contains 52 aksara-s. The manuscript is incomplete. It is a paper manuscript written in Devanāgarī script. The explicit reads krtir mahopādhyāyabhatta $tray \bar{i} \acute{s} varamant raput rasya tatrabhavatah panditabhat ta\acute{s} r \bar{i} \acute{s} obh \bar{a} karamit rasya$ śrīśrīvaśarmaputreņa prajñālavavatā mayā ratnākarābhidhah poṣe laṃkāro likhitah subhah. The manuscript is well preserved and contains both $s\bar{u}tra$ -s and vrtti-s. The date of copying is unknown, but Gode thinks that it is not old.

This manuscript is used by Devadhar as the main source of his edition. It also contains plentiful marginal notes. The *akṣara*-s sa, ma and pa may confuse readers and curators of the manuscript because of their similar appearance, but not as frequent as the conditions in J_A and J_O .




Figure C.7: Folio 60v from P_D Content: the rhetorical figure of $sam\bar{a}dhi$ and $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$

P_ś MS preserved at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune.

 (separate pagination 2v-23r). The AlRat in this collection is fragmentary, starting from the middle of the vrtti of the first rhetorical figure punaruktavadābhāsa (seeming tautology) and ends with the first sentence of the *vrtti* of the twentieth rhetorical figure *vinoda* (relief of eagerness). According to the information in the catalogue, the size of this manuscript is 7.25×7.25 inches (circa 18.4×18.4 cms). The manuscript is made of country paper and written in Śāradā script. The explicit reads anyāsangāt kautukavinodo vinodah // asannihite 'nubhūte 'nanubhūte pi vābhilasyamāne rthe praticchanda. The manuscript is generally in good condition, but some passages are comparably vague due to the fade of ink. All manuscripts in the collection are combined together with a leather cover. The date of copying of the AlRat is not mentioned, but the explicit of the $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}karas\bar{u}tr\bar{a}ni$ gives the date as samvat 15 śrā vati astamyām śanivāsare. This era is presumably the Saptarsi era widely used in Kashmir. Characteristically, this era does not indicate centuries. By using the Pancanga 3.14 provided by M. Yano¹⁴⁴, we arrive at three possible dates: August the 2nd in A.D. 1439, August the 21st in A.D. 1639 and September the 1st in A.D. 1839. Further studies on the characteristics of the script in this manuscript are necessary to determine which date was the most probable.

The $Alamk\bar{a}rasarvasvas\bar{u}tr\bar{a}ni$ and the $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}karapr\bar{a}krtag\bar{a}th\bar{a}sam-skrt\bar{i}karanam$ were utilized by Devadhar for reconstructing the lost passages in P_D^{-145} , but it seems that he was not aware of the rest of the whole collection. Two $citrak\bar{a}vya$ -s are attached after the explicit on the last folio, which are generally the same as those in K_O .

 ${f V_a}$ MS preserved at the Sarasvati Bhavan Library, Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi.

The title of this manuscript given by the curator is Alańkāraratnākaraḥ. It is documented in A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts Acquired for and Deposited in the Sanskrit University Library (Sarasvati Bhavana), Varanasi, during the years 1791-1950, Vol. 11, pp. 78–79, catalogue number 41264. According to the information therein, its size is 91×4, without unit of length. It consists of totally 253 folios, but folio 1 and folios after 254 are missing. Each folio contains 7 lines, and each line contains 29 to 32 akṣara-s. The manuscript is incomplete. It is a paper manuscript written in Devanāgarī script. The explicit reads vipphu // visphuritāratnena kaustubhena śobhā yasya taṃ visphuritaratnaśobham / vilāsena pītam aṃbaraṃ yasya tam vilāsapītāmbaram / sahavanamālayāmusyapattram ayyāvartate yas tam

¹⁴⁴https://www.cc.kyoto-su.ac.jp/ yanom/pancanga/.

¹⁴⁵See Devadhar 1942, p. iii.




Figure C.8: Folio 20v of P_{\pm} Content: the rhetorical figure of $nidar \pm an \bar{a}$ (negative illustration)



Figure C.9: padmabandha and khadgabandha on the last folio of P_{\pm}

sava, which is the $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ and explanation for Prakrit verses in the AlRat. The manuscript is well preserved and contains both $s\bar{u}tra$ -s and vrti-s, but some folios show traces of water stains. The date of copying is unknown.




Figure C.10: Folios 151v and 152r of V_A Content: the rhetorical figure of $anum\bar{a}na$

This manuscript contains marginal notes and corrections. The AlRat in this manuscript does not contain its first folio. Its explicit on folio 237r reads kṛtir mahopādhyāyapaṇḍitabhaṭṭaśrītrayīśvaramittraputrasya tatrabhavataḥ paṇḍitabhaṭṭaśrīśobhākareśvaramittrasya. After the AlRat, I find the following additional contents: 6 verses praising Viṣṇu and Śiva (237v to 238r), a complete sūtrapāṭha of the AlRat (238v to 242r), and an incomplete Alaṃkāraratnākare prākṛtagāthānāṃ saṃskṛtīkaraṇam which ends in the middle of the commentary to a Prakrit verse under the rhetorical figure vikalpa (option from two opposite alternatives). I transliterate and translate the 6 praising verses as follows:

yasyaikasyaiva doṣṇāṃ jayati daśaśatī sānvayo dvāri rudraḥ kārāgāre surāṇāṃ patir api ca śacī cāmaravyagrahastā | kanyā tasyaivam ekā rajanicarapater eṣa śuddhāṃtam eko bālo niḥśaṃkam asyāḥ praviśati ca namas tejase vaiṣṇavāya¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶This verse can be found in the AlVim, within the commentary to the rhetorical figure *parikara* (entourage of attributes).

|| 1 ||

The unique one (*i.e.* Bāṇāsura), whose one thousand arms are triumphant, he at whose door Rudra together with retinue is [standing guard], he in whose prison [languish] the lord of gods (*i.e.* Indra) and Śacī, turning the chowrie in her hand; this lord of Rakṣasas (*i.e.* Bāṇāsura) has one daughter (*i.e.* Uṣā); and one boy (*i.e.* Aniruddha), fearlessly enters her harem¹⁴⁷. Homage to the glory of Viṣṇu!

vajram mālyati kuṭṭimaty atha sarinnāthaḥ phaṇī hārati śrīkhaṇḍaty analo marud vipinati dhvāṃtaṃ tamīkāṃtati | pīyūṣaty api kālakūṭam upalo ratnaty arir mitrati śvabhraṃ harmyati yady asau bhava bhavatpādāravindha¹⁴⁸stutiḥ || 2 ||

Lightning is like a garland, the ocean looks like stucco¹⁴⁹, serpents act like [pearl] necklaces, fire resembles sandalwood, storm wind behaves like a swaying forest, darkness acts like the moon, even poison acts like nectar, rock looks like jewel, enemies act like friends, cliffs look like palaces. If, O Śiva, this praise to your lotus-feet $(p\bar{a}d\bar{a}ravinda)$ [is recited], then [these miracles will take place]!

paryaṃke gahane vane sapavane kūle jale sīmani vyomni svairiṇi yāmni¹⁵⁰ dhanvani phale mūle dale kandale | vyāle maṃtriṇi potriṇi dviradane kīṭe kva te na sthitis tenodgaccha kuto pi darśaya mukhaṃ śaṃbho nibaddho ṃjaliḥ || 3 ||

On a bed, in an abyss, in a forest, in the wind, on a shore, in the water, on the boundary, in the sky, in an independent process of going/independent invocation, in a bow, in a fruit, in a root, on a leaf, on the cheek, in a tiger, in a minister/an enchanter, in a boar, in an elephant, in a worm: where do you not exist? Therefore, come forth from wherever you are and show your face,

¹⁴⁷The story of Uṣā, daughter of Bāṇāsura, and Aniruddha is narrated in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, Skandha 10, Chapter 61–63. See also Mani 1975, p. 43.

 $^{148 \,} sic$

¹⁴⁹Resembling milk-ocean because of white color.

 $^{^{150}}$ Should be corrected to dhāmni?

O Śambhu! [My] hands are formed in salutation [to you].

kaḥ śrīkhaṇḍataruṃ vihāya bhajate saktiṃ karīrāṃtike
kas tyaktvā pikahuṃkṛtāni kurute kākadhvaniṃ karṇayoḥ |
kaṃṭhe kācalalantikāṃ diśati ko nirmucya muktāvaliṃ
hitvā tvāṃ śaśikhaṇḍaśekhara paraṃ lokaḥ śrayaty¹⁵¹ atra kam
|| 4 ||

Who, scorning the sandal wood tree, enjoys being near the *karīra*-shrub?

Who, turning away from the cooing of cuckoos, gives ear to the sound of crows?

Who, discarding a pearl necklace, displays a necklace of glass beads on his neck?

Except you, whom does the whole world depend on, O you whose crown is the digit of the moon?

```
āsvādagandhadhavalatvaguṇā yathaiva
nābhedato na ca pṛthag ghanasārakhaṇḍe |
nityas tathā paramadhāmani posphurīti
ko py eṣa devagurumaṃtramayas taraṃgaḥ || 5 ||
```

This eternal, inconceivable wave consisting of gods, preceptors and sacred words (mantra), shines forth repeatedly in the supreme domain, neither [three elements] in amalgam nor separately, just as the qualities of refreshing power (literally tasting), fragrance and whiteness [existing] in the wood of the camphor tree.

ekayā dve viniścitya trīṃś caturbhir vaśīkuru | paṃca jitvā viditvā ṣaṭ sapta jitvā sukhībhava || 6 || ekayā prajñayā dve kāryākārye viniścitya trīn śatrumitramadhyasthān, catu

Discriminating the two (Right and wrong) by means of the one (Intellect), bring under thy subjection the three (Friend, stranger, foe) by means of four (Conciliation, gift, disunion and severity), and also conquering the five (Five senses) and knowing the six (Treaty, war, etc.), and abstaining from the seven (Women, dice, hunting, harshness of speech, drinking, severity of punishment,

 $^{^{151}}$ The manuscript reads *śravati*.

waste of wealth), be happy 152 . Discriminating by means of the one, *i.e.* by intellect, the two, *i.e.* right and wrong. The three [means] friends, stranger, and foe. [By means of] four...

C.2 Observations

Here I provide some observations concerning the relationship between these manuscripts according to my experience in making a critical edition of selected sections of the AlRat.

C.2.1 Similarity of J_a and J_o

In comparison to other manuscripts, these two share similar readings in most of the passages. Both mix up sa and ma in many occasions, in some cases even mix them up with pa. As for the different readings between J_A and J_O , a number of them are due to the similarity of cursive writing of letters (e.g. na and la), wrong placement of vowel sign and loss of $anusv\bar{a}ra$. The scripts used in these two manuscripts with thick strokes also makes the identification of each letter more difficult. It is possible that they come from one group of the transmission of the AlRat.

C.2.2 Common points of K_o and P_d

Except for aksara-s and ligatures with similar appearances, which have been pointed out by $Slaje^{153}$, K_o shares in most places the same marginal notes as those in P_D . The content includes the explanation of the current text, the demonstration of other relating figures and Ruyyaka's opinion in the AlSar. I take the following two pictures as examples:

As is visible in the two pictures, there are three different marginal notes to the main text. I transliterate them as follows (Figure C.12):

anyatra saṅkhyāniyame pūrvaṃ chekānuprāsaḥ || (AlSar 4) sarpa sarpa liṅga liṅga ity atra arpa inga inga iti dvayoḥ dvayoḥ svaravyanjanasamudāyayoḥ sāmyam || (AlRat 3) vyañjanamātrasamudāyayor veti vāśabdodāharaṇam āha | kim

 $^{^{152}}$ Translated by P. C. Roy in the $Mah\bar{a}subh\bar{a}sitasamqraha$

 $^{^{153}{\}rm Slaje}$ 1993, p. 43–45.



Figure C.11: Folio 2v from $P_{\scriptscriptstyle D}$




Figure C.12: Lower half of folio 2r from $\rm K_{\rm o}$

vāṣpeti atra binduvṛnde ity atra vyañjanamātrasamudāyayor va sāmyam | na tu (Figure C.11 reads tu na) vyañjanasamudāyayoḥ | yataḥ pūrvadvike ikāra ukārayoḥ svarayoḥ samudāyaḥ | dvitīyadvike ṛkāra ekārayoh iti svaravaisādṛśyam | vyañjanadvayasamudāyasya tu na kiñcid sādṛśyam | bindu ity atra yathā nakāra vakārayoh samudāyaḥ tathā vrnda ity atrāpi anayor eveti bhāvah ||

Contents in bold is directly quoted from the AlSar and the AlRat. The first marginal note quotes from the AlSar, and the second and the third are commentaries to the rhetorical figure $chek\bar{a}nupr\bar{a}sa$ (alliteration of similar pair sounds) in the AlRat. These notes imply that their author is probably a learned scholar well-versed in Sanskrit rhetorics. In addition, the readings in K_o and P_D usually agree with each other, though in some cases we observe differences such as wrong spelling of vowels or consonants. Therefore, on the basis of these two points, we can make a supposition that K_o and P_D form a separate group in the transmission of the AlRat.

C.2.3 Features of O_x and V_a

 O_x is quite unique with regard to other manuscripts because of the following two features: firstly, it is the only manuscript made of birch bark, which means that it is comparatively old; secondly, it contains extra contents which can help improve the readings in Devadhar's edition and reconstruct lost passages therein, although it sometimes does not help much and even makes mistakes. The common point of O_x and V_a is that when editing the sections of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, $anum\bar{a}na$ and hetu, I find that V_a and O_x usually provide the best candidate readings to improve Devadhar's edition when these two manuscripts read the same or similar. This demonstrates the possibility that they come down to scholars from the same "ancestor". Therefore, they can also form a separate group in the transmission of the text. Here I take the last part of the section of hetu as the example.

In my critical edition, this passage should read kvacit tu parimlānam $p\bar{\imath}-nastanety\bar{\imath}dau$ $n\bar{\imath}_tak\bar{\imath}_disu$ $n\bar{\imath}_nam$ $ity\bar{\imath}_dyabh\bar{\imath}_ave$ 'pi prakaranadivasena svayam paramarsaniscayad anumanam eva | evam ca na $j\bar{\imath}_ta\bar{\imath}_taragasarvasvety\bar{\imath}_dau$ sva-paramarsaniscaye hetvalankaro 'yukta iti ||. O_x and V_A read exactly the same, except that V_A mistakes $p\bar{\imath}_nastanety\bar{\imath}_dau$ as $p\bar{\imath}_nastanetradau$. J_O reads basically the same, but with more minor mistakes. J_A , K_O , P_D and Devadhar's edition do not contain the content from $n\bar{\imath}_tak\bar{\imath}_disu$ to $r\bar{\imath}_gasarvasvety\bar{\imath}_dau$. The extra content here actually has a close connection to its previous context because there Śobhākara is explaining the difference between anumana and hetu. For examples of anumana, the use of words such as $n\bar{\imath}_nam$ (now, at present) and $j\bar{\imath}_nam$ (I

know) is optional, and the key point is that these examples must contain an ascertainment of one's own reflection ($svapar\bar{a}mar\acute{s}ani\acute{s}caya$). If this ascertainment does not exist, such example can only be a case of hetu. The verse starting with $pariml\bar{a}nam$ $p\bar{i}nastana^{154}$ does contain the ascertainment of the speaker's reflection; so is the verse starting with na $j\bar{a}t\bar{a}$ $r\bar{a}gasarvasva$, quoted in the main text of the AlRat. Therefore, even though we do not find words such as $n\bar{u}nam$ and $j\bar{a}ne$ in these two verses, they are definitely cases of $anum\bar{a}na$, not of hetu. However, Devadhar's edition reads kvacit tu $pariml\bar{a}nam$ $p\bar{i}nastanety\bar{a}dau$ $svapar\bar{a}mar\acute{s}\bar{a}ni\acute{s}caye$ $hetvalaik\bar{a}ro$ yukta iti, which is a wrong analysis of the verse.

C.2.4 Features of P_{\pm}

This collection of the six manuscripts is particularly valuable in that it includes the polemics among the three aforementioned texts, the AlSar, the AlRat and the AlVim. However, as has been mentioned previously, Devadhar only utilized the $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}karas\bar{u}tr\bar{a}ni$ and the $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}karapr\bar{a}krtag\bar{a}th\bar{a}samskrt\bar{i}karanam$ in this collection to reconstruct the missing passages and improve the readings in the P_D .

Consequently, an important point that has not been noticed by Devadhar is that if one carefully compares the subtly different handwriting, it is clear that this collection is made up of three sections, each copied by a different scribe. The AlSar, the $Alamk\bar{a}rasarvasvas\bar{u}tr\bar{a}ni$ and the $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}karas\bar{u}tr\bar{a}ni$ consist of the first section, and they share a continuous pagination. The $Alamk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}karapr\bar{a}krtag\bar{a}th\bar{a}samskrt\bar{i}karanam$ and the AlVim can be grouped together as the second section due to their graphic similarity. The AlRat alone form the third section.

The first folio of the AlVim provides us with a specific date of copying, sam 6 $\bar{a}s\bar{a}dha$ $\acute{s}uti$ 12 bhau re, i.e. in the year 6 of the Saptaṛṣi era, on the twelfth day in the waxing fortnight of Āṣāḍha month, Tuesday. This corresponds to June the 27th, 1730 A.D. (June the 16th in Julian). This date is different from any of the three possible dates of copying given in the description of $P_{\acute{s}}$ (August the 2nd in A.D. 1439, August the 21st in A.D. 1639 and September the 1st in A.D. 1839). Therefore, I presume that the three sections were copied separately, then the combination of the three sections happened at some time after Devadhar produced his edition.

 $^{^{154}}Ratnar{a}valar{i}nar{a}tikar{a}$ 2.13: pariml\bar{a}nam p\bar{i}nastanajaghanasang\bar{a}d ubhayatas tanor madhyasy\bar{a}ntah parimilanam apr\bar{a}pya haritam | idam vyastany\bar{a}sam \bar{s}lathabhujalat\bar{a}k\bar{s}epavalanai\bar{h} kr^{\bar{s}}\bar{a}igy\bar{a}h samt\bar{a}pam vadati nalin\bar{i}pattra^{\bar{s}}ayanam ||

C.2.5 Temporary Conclusion

On the basis of previous analyses and observations, it is clear that J_A, J_O, K_O and P_D all contain the reference to the same scribe: the son of Śrīvaśarman. I presume that the passage with the reference to the scribe was copied from an apograph by all these manuscripts or one of them is the apograph for the other, either directly or indirectly; yet for J_o, it is not a copy of this apograph because it contains the extra part of the anumana section skipped by the other three. Its position in the stemma of manuscripts remains unclear for the time being. Therefore, if we only take the sections of anumana and hetu into consideration, J_A , K_o and P_D can form a separate group in the transmission of the AlRat. O_X and V_A can form the second group based on the similarity of features described above. Yet, to group P_{\pm} is not an easy task so far, since its features deserve further discussions and investigations. I presume that since the AlSar and the AlVim are transmitted together with the AlRat in the collection that includes P₅, this collection was probably intended for studying the theoretical difference between all the three Sanskrit rhetorical treatises by organizing them together chronologically for remembrance and comparison. The mysteries about the manuscripts of the AlRat can be solved only after the relation between the witnesses is discovered, especially by collating other parts of the text and finding more similar connecting errors. This will be one of the goals of my future research.

C.3 Sigla

Bhuvanapāla Hāla's Gāhākosa (Gāthāsaptaśatī) with the Sanskrit Commentary of Bhuvanapāla. 1980. Edited by Prof. M. V. Patwardhan. Prakrit Text Series No. 21. Ahmedabad: Prakrit Text Society. This is the first volume which contains Bhuvanapāla's commentary. The second volume contains translations, notes and explanations for all the verses quoted in the first volume.

Devīstotra Devīstotra of Yaśaskara Kavi. Edited by Dr. Kālī Prasāda Dube. Laghu-Granthamālā Vol. 57. 2001. Varanasi: Publication Institute, Sampurnanand Sanskrit University. The Devīstotra of Yaśaskara is believed to have been composed in the 16^{th} or 17^{th} century A.D. Its author utilized the $s\bar{u}tra$ part of the AlRat to illustrate each rhetorical figure with a verse in praise of Devī. There are different readings between the $s\bar{u}tra$ part of the two texts, but these generally remain at the level of paraphrasing core ideas of those rhetorical figures.

Pramānasamuccaya Pramānasamuccaya of Dignāga. See Kitagawa 1965.

 $\boldsymbol{Pram\bar{a}nav\bar{a}rttika}$ $Pram\bar{a}nav\bar{a}rttika$ of Dharmakīrti. See Miyasaka 1972.

Weber Saptaśataka. See Weber 1881.

Appendix D

A Critical Edition of the arthāntaranyāsa, anumāna and hetu Sections of the Alankāraratnākara

In this critical edition I will not report the following in the apparatus, unless other additional variation appears in the manuscripts: the interchangeable use of anusvara and homorganic nasal $(\dot{n}, \tilde{n}, \dot{n})$, the omission of avagraha, the change of visarga to $s/\dot{s}/\dot{s}$ before another $s/\dot{s}/\dot{s}$. The symbols \dot{h} and \dot{h} are used for $jihv\bar{a}m\bar{u}l\bar{i}ya$ and $upadhm\bar{a}n\bar{i}ya$.

The siglum P_{SP} is used only in the apparatus register for the $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ of Prakrit verses. The readings of the $Dev\bar{i}stotra$ and P_{SRS} for a given $s\bar{u}tra$ are presented in the apparatus only when they differ from the otherwise constituted text. That is to say, the apparatus is fully positive because the $Dev\bar{i}stotra$ and P_{SRS} are treated as testimonia. The abbreviations used in the previous chapters are also applied in the critical edition.

ante correcturam, i.e. the reading before the correction by the scribe post correcturam, i.e. the reading after the correction by the scribe

conj. conjecture
corr. correction
em. emendation
padma deleted by scribe

om. omitted

 Σ The reading in all of the manuscripts except for one

ca+++ti Unreadable or vague

D.1 Arthantaranyasah

D.1.1 Arthāntaranyāsasya lakṣaṇam

višesasyānyena samarthanam arthāntaranyāsa
h||76||

 $83^{v} J_{A}, 81^{r}$ $J_{O}, 46^{v} K_{O},$ $117^{v} O_{X},$ $60^{v} P_{D},$ $146^{v} V_{A}$

yatra viśeṣo 'bhihitaḥ sāmānyena vyāptipradarśanarūpatayā samarthyate sthirīkriyate so 'rthāntaranyāsaḥ |

D.1.2 Hetvarthāntaranyāsodāharaṇānāṃ bhedopāyaḥ, tasya kāraṇaś ca

ihoktārthopabṛṃhakatvena kadācit kāryasya kāraṇasya vopādānaṃ kvacid viśeṣasya kvāpi sāmānyasya | tatra kāryakāraṇayor upapādakatvenopavṛṃhakatvena vakṣyamā-

- 6 ņanītyā hetvalaṃkāraḥ | viśeṣasya sāmānyaṃ prati pratītiviśadīkaraṇarūpatayopavṛṃhakatve sāmānyoddiṣṭānām ekasya nidarśanam udāharaṇam ity udāharaṇālaṃkāraḥ | sa copamāprastāve ivādyupādānena śābda udāhṛtaḥ | anupādāne samānanyāy-
- atvād ārthaḥ sa eva, na tv arthāntaranyāsaḥ | yato na vyāptipradarśanarūpaṃ 147^r v_A samarthanaṃ viśeṣakāryakāraṇānām asti pratītiviśadīkaraṇātmakaṃ ca sāmānyāder hetutvenopādānākhyaṃ ca viśeṣasāmānyayor iti sarvatraikalakṣaṇānuvidhānādhigamābhāvād alaṅkārabheda eva | tena viśeṣasyaiva sāmānyena vyāptidarśanena dārdhyopādānam arthāntaranyāsah |

D.1.3 Arthāntaranyāsasya vibhāgāḥ

ayam ca sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām dvividhaḥ san hiśabdādyupādāne śābdas tadabhāve tv ārtha iti caturvidhaḥ | vyāptipradarśanasya tu pūrvapaścādbhāvena 118 r O_X vaicitryābhāvān na bhedahetutvam |

D.1.3.1 Śābdaprakāraḥ sādharmyeṇa

krameņa yathā-

2 viśeso] $\Sigma,$ viśe
ṣaḥ $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{X}}$ **2** 'bhihitaḥ] P_{ED} , bhihitaḥ $J_A J_O K_O P_D$, abhihitas O_X , bhihitas V_A ${\bf 2}$ °pradarśana°] $\Sigma,$ °pradarśane O_X ${\bf 2}$ °rūpatayā] $\Sigma,$ °rtapatayā ${\bf 3}$ 'rthāntaranyāsa
] $P_{ED},$ rthāmtaranyāsa $J_AJ_O,$ rthāntaranyāsa
 $K_OP_D,$ rthāntaranyāsa
ḥ O_X , rthāṃtaranyāsa ḥ V_A 4 ihoktārtho°] J_AJ_OO_XV_A, iharthārtho° K_O, 4 °opabr
mhakatvena] $O_{\rm X}P_{\rm ED},$ °opavr
mhakatvena ihārthārtho P_{ED} , ihorthārto P_{D} $J_A J_O K_O V_A$, °opāvṛṃhakatvena P_D ${\bf 5}~{\rm upap\bar{a}daka^{\circ}}~]~{\rm J_AJ_OK_OP_{ED}V_A},~{\rm up\bar{a}d\bar{a}naka^{\circ}}~{\rm O_XP_D}$ $\begin{array}{llll} \textbf{5} \text{ °opabṛmhakatvena } & O_XP_{ED}, \text{ °opavṛmhakatvena } J_AJ_OP_DV_A, \text{ °o+vṛmhakatvena } K_O & \textbf{6} \\ \text{°viśadīkaraṇa°} & J_OO_XP_{ED}V_A, \text{ °viṣadīkaraṇa } J_AK_OP_D & \textbf{7} \text{ ekasya } \end{bmatrix} & \Sigma, \end{array}$ ekaṃsya J_A 8 °prastāve] $J_OO_XP_{ED}V_A$, °prastāvaṃ $J_AK_OP_D$ 8 śābda] $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$, śabda O_XV_A 8 anupādāne] O_XV_A , anupādāne tu $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$ 9 na] Σ , om. V_A 10 °viśadī°] Σ , °viṣadī° O_X 11 sarvatrai° Σ , +thatrai° V_A 11 °ānuvidhānā°] Σ , °ānuvidhinā° O_X $\textbf{13} \ \mathrm{d\bar{a}rdhyo}^{\circ} \] \ P_D P_{ED}, \ \mathrm{d\bar{a}rdhy\bar{a}}^{\circ} \ J_A J_O K_O O_X V_A \qquad \textbf{14} \ \mathrm{ayam} \ \mathrm{ca} \] \ O_X V_A, \ \mathrm{ayam} \ J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$ 14 san hi°] Σ , sa+i° K_O 14 °upādāne] Σ , °upādāme V_A 15 °bhāvena] Σ , °bhāvane J_A 16 vaicitry \bar{a}°] Σ , vaicitry a° P_D ac

saralānā paäikadhinā majjham lahiūna kim va na kunanti | jam sihinehi bhuānam annonnaviloanam pihiam | 403 |

18

24

27

atra stanabhujalaksanasya viśesasya prastutasya saralānām ityādih sāmān- $147^v V_A$ yarūpo 'rtho 'prastutah | pūrvam samarthakatayopāttah | yacchabdopādānāc ca śābdatvam ||

Ārthaprakārah sādharmyena

yo 'sau jātyā caranarahito 'nūrur anvarthanāmā citram so 'yam tapana bhavatā sārathitve niyuktah | pādāghātaih śamam upanayan dhvāntam ārohati dyām sevāsangāt kim api mahatām yānti tucchā mahattvam | 404 |

atrānūror arkaprasādād viyadākramane sāmānyam sadharmakatayā paścāt samarthakam |

D.1.3.3 Dvitīyodāharanasyāhetvalankārakāranam

yady apy atra mahatsevā kāranarūpā tucchotkarsasyopabrmhatayopāttā tathāpi na hetvalankārah kāranasya sāmānyālambanenaiva samarthakatayopādānāt evam anyatra kāryasya kāraṇasya vā sāmānyadvāreṇa samarthakatvam arthāntaranyāsa eveti jñeyam || 33

18 saralānā corr., saralāņa Σ , saralāņam O_X 18 °kadhiņā] $J_A J_O K_O P_D V_A$, °kathiņa O_X , °kaṭhiṇā P_{ED} 18 majjham] $P_{ED}V_A$, majjam $J_AK_OO_XP_D$, sajjam J_O 18 lahiūṇa] O_X , na hioṇa J_AP_D , lahioṇa J_OV_A , na hi khuṇa K_O , laddhūṇa P_{ED} 18 va] Σ , vā V_A ac 19 jam] Σ , ja P_D 19 sihiṇehi] O_X , siheṇahi $J_A P_D$, sihoṇahi J_O , siheṇ+h+ K_O , thaṇaehiṃ P_{ED} , thaṇaehi V_A 19 bhuāṇaṃ] $O_X P_{ED} V_A$, bhuāja $J_A K_O P_D$, tuāṇa J_O 19 annonna°] $P_{ED}V_A, \ annona° \ J_AJ_OK_OO_XP_D \qquad \textbf{20} \ \ saral\bar{a}n\bar{a}m \ \] \quad \Sigma, \ saral\bar{a}nam \ O_X \qquad \textbf{20} \ \ ity\bar{a}dih \ \] \ \ V_A, \ ity\bar{a}dis$ $J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}P_{D}P_{ED}, \ ity\bar{a}di^{\circ}\ O_{X} \qquad \textbf{21} \ 'prastuta\dot{h} \] \quad \textit{corr.}, \ prastuta\dot{h} \ J_{A}K_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED}, \ prastava\dot{h} \ J_{O},$ prastuta V_A **21** pūrvaṃ] Σ , pūrva° V_A **21** °opādānāc] $J_A K_O O_X P_D P_{ED}$, °opādānāś J_OV_A **24** °nāmā] Σ , °nāmār V_A **25** so 'yaṃ] P_{ED} , mayaṃ J_A , se yaṃ J_OP_D ac, so yaṃ $K_{O}O_{X}P_{D}$ $^{pc}V_{A}$ **25** tapana] Σ , trapana J_{A} **26** śamam] Σ , śasam V_{A}] $J_{O}K_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED}$, upanayaṃ J_{A} , upana+n V_{A} **26** ārohati] Σ , ārahati J_{A} saivā° V_{A} **27** mahatāṃ] Σ , mahatā P_{D} **27** tucchā] Σ , tacchā J_{O} **27** sevā $^{\circ}$] Σ , 27 mahattvam **28** °prasādād] $J_AJ_OK_OP_{ED}V_A$, °prasād O_X , °prasādad ņe J_A ac **28** sadharmakatayā] Σ , sadharmatayā O_X $J_{A}J_{O}P_{ED}V_{A}$, mahatvam $J_{A}J_{O}P_{D}$ P_D **28** °ākramaņe] Σ, °ākrameņe J_A ac $\mathbf{30} \ \ \mathrm{mahatsev\bar{a}} \ \] \quad \Sigma, \ \ \mathrm{mahatseva}^{\circ} \ \ \mathrm{V_{A}} \qquad \mathbf{30} \ \ \mathrm{tuccho}^{\circ} \ \] \quad \Sigma, \ +\mathrm{ccho}^{\circ} \ \ \mathrm{V_{A}} \qquad \mathbf{30} \ \ \mathrm{^{\circ}op\bar{a}tt\bar{a}} \ \] \quad \Sigma,$ °aipāttā O_X 31 °āvalambanenaiva] $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$, °ālambanenaiva O_X , °āryalaṃbanenaiva

 V_A 32 samarthakatvam] $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$, samarthakam O_XV_A 33 jñeyam] O_XV_A , vijñeyam

 $61^r P_D$

 $148^r~{\rm V_A}$

 $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$

¹⁹ chāyā: saralānām prakrtikathinā madhyam labdhāh kim iva na kurvanti | yat stanair bhujānām anyonyavilokanam pihitam || K_O gives na hi labdhā instead of labdhāh. Untraced.

D.1.3.4 Śābdaprakāro vaidharmyeņa

jeņa parakkamaņihiņā akkamiā sattasāaruddesā | na hu kāarāna dhukkai ovāso niagharesum pi || 405 ||

atra saptadvīpākramaņasya višeṣasya kātarāṇām nijagṛhe 'py avakāśābhāvaḥ sāmānyātmā khalv iti śābdatayā vaidharmyeṇa samarthakaḥ |

39

42

36

D.1.3.5 Ārthaprakāro vaidharmyeņa

vidhāya bhūmes talam astakaṇṭakaṃ vavarṣa hemnā sa saharṣam arthinām | akurvatām arthijanārtikhaṇḍanaṃ vṛthā taḍitpallavacañcalāḥ śriyaḥ || 406 ||

 $84^{\it v}~{\rm J_A}$

atra vidharminā sāmānyena samarthanam

D.1.3.6 Adhyavasāyagarbhaprakāraḥ

kvacid adhyavasāyagarbho 'pi bhavati | yathā—

udite bhāskare kvāpi gamyate timirotkaraiḥ | tejasvinam anālokya prabhavanti malīmasāḥ || 407 ||

 $82^r J_{\rm O}$

⁴⁰ Vikramānkadevacarita 17.1: vidhāya bhūmes talam astakanṭakam vavarṣa hemnā sa saharṣam arthinām \mid akurvatām sarvajanārtikhandanam vṛthā taditpallavacañcalāḥ śriyaḥ $\mid\mid$

³⁵ parakkama°] $P_{ED}V_A$, marakkama° $J_AJ_OK_O$, parikkama° O_X , sarakkama° P_D 35 °ṇihiṇā] Σ , °ṇihiṇā O_X 35 akkamiā] $J_AJ_OO_XP_DV_A$, akkadiā K_O , akkamio P_{ED} 35 sattasāaruddesā] corr., sattāmāagadramā J_A , sattāmāarāddomā J_O , sattāsāaraddisā K_O , sattāsāaroddosa O_X , sattāsāarāddomā P_D , sattasāarudesa P_{ED} , sattasāaruddosā V_A 36 kāarāṇā] O_XP_{ED} , kāaraṇā $J_AJ_OK_OP_D$, kāaraṇā V_A 36 dhukkaï] V_A 36 parama V_A 36 ovāso] O_X , ovāsa $J_AK_OP_D$, ovāsa V_A 36 dhukkaï] V_A 37 'py] V_A 0, niagharesuṃ V_A 0, niagharesuṃ V_A 1, niagharesuṃ V_A 3, inagharesuṃ V_A 4, inagh

³⁵ chāyā: yena parākramanidhinā ākrāntaḥ saptasāgaroddeśaḥ | na khalu kātarāṇāṃ ḍhaukate 'vakāśo nijagrheṣv api || P_{SP} reads: yena parākramanidhinā ākrāntas saptasāgaroddeṣaśaḥ | na khalu kātarāṇāṃ ḍhaukate 'vakāśo nijagrheṣv api || Untraced.

 $\begin{array}{c} 118^{v} \; {\rm O_{X}}, \\ 148^{v} \; {\rm V_{A}} \end{array}$

 $61^v P_D$

atra tejasvimalīmasarūpo 'rtho 'bhedenādhyavasitaḥ sāmānyarūpo vaidharmyeṇa 48 samarthakaḥ \mid

D.1.4 Prativastūpamādṛṣṭāntayor viṣayo 'rthāntaranyāsād bhinnah

evam sāmānyasya višeṣasamarthakatāyām arthāntaranyāsatve višeṣasya višeṣāntarasamarthanam prativastūpamādrṣṭāntayor eva viṣayo nārthāntaranyāsasya |

51

D.1.5 Rudraţakṛtodāharaṇasya cārutvaṃ nārthāntaranyāsāt, niścayālaṅkārahetukaṃ tu

tataś ca **athavā na citram etad dahati himānī hi bhūmiruham** ityādau viśeṣasya viśeṣāntareṇa samarthanāt sārūpyeṇāpy ayaṃ bhavatīti na vācyam | citratvasyābhihitasyāthavā na citram ityādinonmūlanenābhihitasamarthanāsambhavāc 54 ca | ata eva vihitaniṣedhād evamādau niścayālaṅkārahetukam eva cārutvaṃ nārthāntaranyāsāt ||

57

D.1.6 Ārthodāharaņasya prakārau

niddoso na hu koi vi na hu koi vi savvahā gunavimukko |

52 cit. KAR 8.90: janayati saṃtāpam asau candrakalākomalāpi me citram | athavā kim atra citraṃ dahati himānī hi bhūmiruhaḥ ||

⁵⁸ chāyā: nirdoṣo na khalu kaścid api na khalu kaścid api sarvathā guṇavimuktaḥ | kṣīrasamudre 'pi visam ratnāny api visadharaśirahsu || Untraced.

60

66

khīrasamudde vi visam raäṇāṇi vi visaharasiresu || 408 || guṇānām eva daurātmyād dhuri dhuryo niyujyate | asañjātakinaskandhah sukham svapiti gaur gadī || 409 ||

 $149^r~{\rm V_A}$

ityādau punaruktanītyā sāmānyaviṣayāyāḥ pratīteḥ sadharmaṇā vidharmaṇā ca viśeṣeṇa viṣadīkaraṇa udāharaṇasyaivārthatvam |

D.1.7 Arthāntaranyāsodāharaṇayor vivekasya saṃgrahaḥ

kāryādinā yad anyasya viśeṣaṇopapādanaṃ | hetuḥ so 'rthāntaranyāsaḥ sāmānyenetarasya tu || sāmānyasya viśeṣād viṣadīkaraṇaṃ vitanyate yatra | ārthodāharaṇaṃ syāt tatrevādiprayogaviraheṇa ||

iti vivekah ||

D.2 Anumānam

D.2.1 Anumānasya lakṣaṇam

sādhanāt sādhyapratītir anumānam ||78||

 $85^{v} J_{A}, 83^{r} J_{O}, 47^{v} K_{O}, 120^{r} O_{X}, 62^{r} P_{D}, 150^{v} V_{A}$

yatrāpratīto 'rthaḥ sādhyarūpaḥ sādhanāc chābdenārthena vā vṛttena svayam $_{151}^r$ v_A avagamyate tad anumānam |

60 cit. Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa 4.56, v. 125, KP 10.109, v. 480, AlVim ad AlSar 35. 69 Devīstotra 77: sādhanāt sādhyapratītir anumānam || yatrāpratīto 'rthaḥ sādhanāc chābdenārthena vā vṛttena svayam avagamyate tad anumānam |. P_{ŚRS} 78: sādhanāt sādhyapratītir anumānam |

 $\mathbf{59} \ \mathrm{kh\bar{i}rasamudde} \] \ P_{\mathrm{ED}}, \, \mathrm{k\bar{i}rasamudde} \ J_{\mathrm{A}}, \, \mathrm{k\bar{i}rasamudda} \ J_{\mathrm{O}}, \, \mathrm{k\bar{i}ra} + \mathrm{mudde} \ K_{\mathrm{O}}, \, \mathrm{cch\bar{i}rasamudde} \ O_{\mathrm{X}},$ kīramamuddo P_D , bīrasamudde V_A 59 visam | Σ , visa P_D **59** raänāni P_{ED} , raänā **59** °hara°] Σ , °haya° eva daurātmyād] Σ , evādau+tmyād V_A 60 dhuri] Σ , dhari V_A Σ , **60** niyujyate na yujyate V_A (The reading of V_A is also possible, but not attested in other sources.) 61 $\mathrm{gad\bar{i}} \] \ J_{A}J_{O}P_{D}P_{ED}V_{A}, \ \mathrm{gal\bar{i}} \ K_{O}, \ \mathrm{gat\bar{i}} \ O_{X} \qquad \textbf{62} \ \mathrm{ity\bar{a}dau} \] \ J_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED}V_{A}, \ \mathrm{i} \ \mathrm{ity\bar{a}dau} \ J_{A}K_{O}$ 62 °viṣayāyāḥ] $J_AK_OP_DP_{ED}V_A$, °viśeṣāyāḥ J_O , °viśeṣayāyāḥ O_X 63 viśeṣeṇa] Σ , viśeṣaṇa K_O 63 viṣadī°] Σ , viśadī° V_A 64 viśeṣaṇo°] O_XV_A , viśeṣasya yad anyeno° $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$ 64 °opapādanam] $J_OO_XV_A$, °opādāne J_AP_D , °opādānam K_OP_{ED} 65 °etarasya] Σ , °ottarasya J_O 66 viṣadīkaraṇam] Σ , viṣadī+raṇam K_O 66 viṭanyate] $J_OO_XP_{ED}V_A$, vibhuvyate J_AK_O , $vibh\bar{u}vyate\ P_D\quad \textbf{67}\ \text{°evā}\text{°}\]\ P_{ED},\ \text{°aivā}\text{°}\ J_AJ_OK_OO_XP_DV_A\quad \textbf{71}\ yatr\bar{a}prat\bar{\iota}to\text{°}\]\ J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}V_A,$ yatra pratīto $^{\circ}$ O_X 71 sādhyarūpaḥ] J_O, sādhyartharūpas J_A, sādhyarūpas K_OO_XP_DP_{ED}V_A 71 °nārthena] $J_OK_OO_XP_DP_{ED}V_A$, °nārthenā J_A 72 svayam avagamyate] $J_AJ_OO_XP_DP_{ED}V_A$, svaya+vagamyate K_O

D.2.2 Daņḍāpūpikayodāharaņam

krameņa yathā—

caṇḍīśakodaṇḍam avāpa bhaṅgaṃ manye prabhāvāj jalajātmajāyāḥ | jagāma rāmas tadasannidhānāt khedaṃ yad ākhaṇḍalakārmuke 'pi ||416||

atra caṇḍīśakodaṇḍabhaṅgaṃ prati jānakyāḥ kāraṇatvaṃ rāmasya prakāraṇatse^r J_A vaṃ sādhyam | tadviyuktasya rāmasyendradhanuṣi tādṛśakāryānupalabdhyā 48 r K_O daṇḍāpūpikayānumīyate | tathā ca yasyendradhanuṣi kuṇṭhitatvaṃ sa kathaṃ candīśakodaṇdabhaṅgaṃ kuryāt |

D.2.3 Hetvalankārah parārthānumānarūpah, nānumānālankārah

yathā ca—

mugdhākṣi nūnam adhunā tvadapāṅgakelivātāyane vasati kāmukalokapālaḥ | karṇāvataṃsakusumopanibaddhavāsaḥ sevāparo yad iha ṣaṭpadagāyano 'yam ||417||

atra gāyanarūpasevakakāryadarśanāt sevanīyakāmukalokapālāvasthitiḥ kāraṇa- 87 rūpānumīyate | atra ca yady api mugdhākṣyāḥ sambodhyamānatvaṃ tathāpi na parārthānumānarūpo hetvalaṃkāraḥ | svayaṃ pramāṇāntareṇa pratipannaṃ vastu parasyānavagataṃ pratipādyate tat parārthānumānam | atra tu mayā 90

74 avāpa] $J_A J_O K_O O_X V_A$, athāpa $P_D P_{ED}$ $\textbf{75} \quad \mathrm{manye} \quad] \quad \mathrm{O_{X}V_{A}}, \quad \mathrm{satya}^{\circ} \quad \mathrm{J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}P_{D}P_{ED}}$] $J_A J_O O_X P_D P_{ED} V_A$, jānakyā+ K_O 78 kāraņatvam] $J_A J_O K_O$ $^{ac}O_X P_D P_{ED} V_A$, kāraņatve **78** rāmasya] O_XV_A , om. $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$ **79** prakāraņatvam] O_X , om. $J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}P_{D}P_{ED},\;ca\;k\bar{a}raṇatvaṃ\;V_{A}\qquad\textbf{79}\;\;°\bar{a}nupalabdhy\bar{a}\;\;]\;\;O_{X}V_{A},\;°\bar{a}nupapatty\bar{a}\;J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}P_{D}P_{ED}$ $\mathbf{80} \ \mathrm{daṇd\bar{a}p\bar{u}pika^{\circ}} \] \ J_{\mathrm{A}}J_{\mathrm{O}}O_{\mathrm{X}}P_{\mathrm{D}}P_{\mathrm{ED}}V_{\mathrm{A}}, \ \mathrm{daṇd\bar{a}p\bar{u}pik\bar{a}^{\circ}} \ K_{\mathrm{O}} \qquad \mathbf{81} \ \mathrm{kury\bar{a}t} \] \ J_{\mathrm{A}}J_{\mathrm{O}}K_{\mathrm{O}}O_{\mathrm{X}}P_{\mathrm{D}}P_{\mathrm{ED}},$ 83 mugdhākṣi \rightarrow madhunā] $O_X P_{ED} V_A$, lacuna before nā $J_A J_O K_O P_D$ vidadhy $\bar{a}t$ V_A 85 karņāvatamsa°] $J_A J_O K_O O_X P_D P_{ED}$, karņāvatam ca V_A 85 °kusumopanibaddha°] $J_{o}K_{o}P_{D}P_{ED}V_{A},\ ^{\circ}kusumesanibaddha^{\circ}\ O_{X},\ ^{\circ}kumsumopanibaddha^{\circ}\ J_{A}$ 85 vāsah J_0 vāsas 87 °rūpasevakakārya°] conj., °mevarūpakārya $J_AJ_OK_O$, $J_A K_O P_D P_{ED} V_A$, $v\bar{a}sa^{\circ} O_X$ °rūpasevakārya° O_X , °mevarūpakāryya° P_DP_{ED} ac , °sevakād rūpakādya° P_{ED} pc , °rūpasevākārya° V_A 87 °lāvasthitiḥ] J_O $^{pc}O_XP_D$ $^{pc}P_{ED}V_A$, °lavasthitiḥ J_AJ_O $^{ac}K_OP_D$ ac 88 tathāpi] $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}V_A, \, tath\bar{a}\; O_X \quad \textbf{90} \; \text{ `syānavagatam] } \; J_AJ_OO_XP_{ED}V_A, \, \text{`syāvagatam } O_X, \, \text{`syānavagatam } O_X, \, \text{$ P_D 90 pratipādyate] J_AJ_OO_XP_DP_{ED}V_A, pratipā+yate K_O 90 mayā°] O_XV_A, maṭa° J_AK_O, mada
° ${\rm J_OP_D}$ $^{ac},$ mahā
° ${\rm P_{ED}P_D}$ pc

84

81

75

 $120^v O_X$

⁷⁴ Untraced.

sevakadarśanāt kāmukalokapālāvasthitir avagateti pratipattipratipādanam, na tu pareņānavagatasya pratyeyasya vastunah pratipādanam |

D.2.4 Dvitīyodāharaņasyānumānatvahetuļ

evam ca vastupratipādanatātparyābhāvāt pareņa vastunaḥ pratipattāv apratipat- 83^v Jo tau vā pratipattipratipādanasya viśeṣābhāvāt pareṇānavagatatvam aprayojakam ity anumānam eva | evam udāharanāntaresv abhyūhyam |

D.2.5 Hetvanumānayor bhedasya samgrahah

pareṇāpratipannasya vastunaḥ pratipādanam |
parānumānarūpo hi hetvalaṅkāra iṣyate ||
mayāyaṃ pratipanno 'rtha iti yatra nivedyate |
tatrānumānaṃ tena syāt pratipattinivedanāt ||

 $152^r V_A$

iti sangrahah |

D.2.6 Pūrvodāharaņadvayor sādhanatvam śābdam

anayoś ca hetvarthasya yadāder upādānāc chābdam sādhanatvam

D.2.7 Ārthānumānasya udāharaņau

102

atra nāyakadarśanākhyasya kāraṇasya tatkāryaśarīrāsvāsthyaviruddhasvāsthyopalambhenābhāvo 'numitaḥ | atrāpy adṛṣṭavaty adarśanajñātatvān na jñāpyetety adarśanaṃ tvayā gopitam apy asmābhir avagatam iti pratipattipratyāyanam eva | yathā ca—

 $152^v V_A$

 $121^r O_X$

na jātā rāgasarvasvasamāptir iha ced vidheḥ | kiṃ pāṇḍurāṇi padmāni tena sṛṣṭāni kānicit ||419||

108

atra keșucit padmeșu raktatvākhyakāryaviruddhapāṇḍuratvopalabdhyā kāraṇarū-

102 $vannavasie \rightarrow amg\bar{a}im$] cit. Weber No.478. Bhuvanapāla v. 480: vannavasie viacchasi saccam ciya so [tae] na saccavio | na hu huṃti tammi diṭṭhe $satth\bar{a}vatth\bar{a}\tilde{i}$ $amg\bar{a}\tilde{i}$ ||. The edition has lost tae between so and na saccavio, which can be attested in the commentary to this verse. The replacement of saccavio for sambhavio is better. See Bühler 1879, p. 98. The sanskritized form is $saty\bar{a}pita$, meaning "seen".

102 vaņņavasie] $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$, vaņņarasasae O_X , vaņņabhasue V_A **102** viatthasi V_A 102 saccavio] O_X , saṃbhavio P_{ED} , seccavio J_O , samca+io K_O , saccabio J_AP_D , saścabhio $\textbf{103} \ \, \text{sutth} \\ \bar{\text{a}} \text{vatth} \\ \bar{\text{a}} \text{i} \ \, \text{J}_{\text{A}} \text{J}_{\text{O}} \text{P}_{\text{D}} \text{P}_{\text{ED}} \text{V}_{\text{A}} \\ \text{of short} \ \, anusv\\ \bar{a} ra), \ \, \text{satth} \\ \bar{\text{a}} \text{vatth} \\ \bar{\text{a}} \text{i} \ \, \text{J}_{\text{A}} \text{J}_{\text{O}} \text{P}_{\text{D}} \text{P}_{\text{ED}} \text{V}_{\text{A}} \\ \text{of short} \ \, anusv\\ \bar{a} ra), \ \, \text{satth} \\ \bar{\text{a}} \text{vatth} \\ \bar{\text{a}} \text{i} \ \, \text{J}_{\text{A}} \text{J}_{\text{O}} \text{P}_{\text{D}} \text{P}_{\text{ED}} \text{V}_{\text{A}} \\ \text{otherwise} \\ \text$ $\mathbf{103} \ \mathrm{amg}\bar{\mathrm{a}}\tilde{\mathrm{i}} \ \big] \ P_{\mathrm{ED}} J_{\mathrm{A}} J_{\mathrm{O}} V_{\mathrm{A}} \ (\mathrm{the \ latter \ three \ shows \ no \ mark \ of \ short \ } \mathit{anusv\bar{a}ra}), \ \mathrm{ang}\bar{\mathrm{a}}\tilde{\mathrm{i}} \ K_{\mathrm{O}} P_{\mathrm{D}},$ angaim O_X **104** °ākhyasya] $J_AJ_OO_XP_DP_{ED}V_A$, $\bar{a}+sya~K_O$ **105** °sthyopalambhenābhāvo] $J_AJ_OO_XP_D$ $^{pc}P_{ED}$, °sthyopalambhenābhāvo P_D ac , °sthyopalambanābhāvo V_A **105** 'numitaḥ]] Σ , °j \bar{n} ā+tv+n K_O 105 j \bar{n} āpyetety] $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$, j \bar{n} āpyetedy O_X , j \bar{n} āpyety V_A adarśana $m \rightarrow apy \mid O_X$, adarśanatvayogo pi tam $J_A J_O P_D$, adarśanatvayogo pi tad P_{ED} , adarśanamjñātatvān na jñāpyety adṛṣṭavatī adarśanaṃ jñātatvān na jñāpyatety adarśanaṃ tv ayāgo 'pi tam apy V_A 106 asmābhir] Σ , asmabhir J_A 106 °pratyāyanam] Σ , °pratyayanam O_X 108 °samāptir] Σ , sumāptir V_A 108 iha] O_X , iti Σ 108 ced vidheh] $J_AK_OP_{ED}V_A$, yed vidhe
h $J_{O},$ ca dvidha
h $O_{X},$ ced vidhe P_{D}
 $\bf 109$ pāṇḍurāṇi] $K_{O}O_{X}P_{ED}V_{A},$ pāṇḍurāṇi
 $J_{A}J_{O},$ pa+ṇipāṇḍurāṇi P_{D}
 $\bf 109$ kānicit] $\Sigma,$ kānicet
 J_{A}
 $\bf 110$ keṣucit] $\Sigma,$ keṣucid
 P_{D}
 $\bf 110$ padmeșu rakta°] $J_A J_O K_O O_X V_A$, padmeșv arakta° $P_D P_{ED}$

¹⁰² $vannavasie \rightarrow amg\bar{a}im$] P_{SP} reads vannavasidra(?)ti to indicate the verse in the original text. The sanskritized form is exactly the $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ given in the printed edition. P_{ED} reads $sambh\bar{a}vitah$ instead of $saty\bar{a}pitah$. Bhuvanapāla gives a different $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ for the former half-verse, which reads: $svade \hat{s}av\bar{a}sini\ vilokyate\ satyam\ eva\ sa\ tvay\bar{a}\ na\ drṣṭah$ | 102 $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$: $varnava\hat{s}ite\ vikatthase\ satyam\ eva\ sa\ tvay\bar{a}\ na\ saty\bar{a}pitah$ | $na\ khalu\ bhavanti\ tasmin\ drṣṭe\ svasth\bar{a}vasth\bar{a}ny\ ang\bar{a}ni$ ||

120

123

pasya rāgasyāsambhavo 'numitaḥ | ubhayatrātra hiśabdādyanupādānāt sādhanasyārthatvam |

D.2.8 Udāharaņayoś cārutvakāraņam

asya ca gāthāyām upacārādiviraheṇa śuddhatve 'pi vicchittiviśeṣasadbhāvāc cārut-114 vam | anyeṣv atiśayoktyādigarbhatvena |

 $63^r P_D$

D.2.9 Vicchittiviśeṣābhāve nālaṅkāratvam

vicchittiviśeṣābhāve tu tarkānumānavan nālaṃkāratvam | yathā—
yo yatkathāprasaṅge chinnacchinnāyatoṣṇaniḥśvasitaḥ |
sa bhavati taṃ prati raktas tvaṃ ca tathā dṛśyase sutanu ||420||
evaṃ hetvalaṃkārādau jñeyam |

D.2.10 Yatraitā laharītyādir atiśayoktimūlatvān neha ruyyakamatiḥ prayojyā

yatraitā laharīcalācaladṛśo vyāpārayanti bhruvaṃ yat tatraiva patanti santatam amī marmacchido mārgaṇāḥ | tac cakrīkṛtacāpasañcitaśaraḥ preṅkhatkaraḥ krodhano dhāvaty agrata eva śāsanadharaḥ satyaṃ sadāsāṃ smaraḥ ||421||

ityādau tu praudhoktyullikhitatvena śāsanadharatvaśarapatanādyasambandhe

¹¹⁶ yo yat→sutanu] cit. Vyaktiviveka p.104: yo yatkathāprasange chinnacchinnāyatoṣṇaniḥś-vasitaḥ | sa bhavati taṃ prati raktas tvaṃ ca tathā dṛśyase sutanu || cit. AlVim ad AlSar 58: yo yatkathāprasange cchinnacchinnāyatoṣṇaniḥśvāsaḥ | sa bhavati taṃ prati raktas tvaṃ ca tathā dṛśyate sutanu ||

¹¹¹ rāgasyāsambhavo] $J_AJ_OK_OO_XP_DP_{ED}$, rāgasya saṃbhavo V_A 111 ubhayatrātra hi°] O_XV_A ubhayatrātrā hi° $J_AJ_OK_OP_D$ ac, ubhayatrāha P_D pc, ubhayatreha P_{ED} 113 asya] $J_AJ_OK_OO_XP_DV_A$, asyāś P_{ED} 113 gāthāyām] $J_AJ_OO_XV_A$, gāthāyās $K_OP_DP_{ED}$ 113 upacārā°] $J_AJ_OK_OO_XV_A$, tūpacārā° P_DP_{ED} 113 śuddhatve] O_XV_A , viśuddhatve $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$ 113 'pi] P_{ED} , pi $J_AJ_OK_OO_XP_D$, ri V_A 113 °sadbhāvāc] $J_AJ_OO_XP_DP_{ED}$, °sad+āvāc K_O , °sadbhāvāś V_A 114 anyeṣv] O_XV_A , anyeṣu tv $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$, 115 vicchittiviśeṣā°] $J_AJ_OK_OO_XV_A$, vicchittir viśeṣā° P_DP_{ED} 116 yatkathāprasaṅge] Σ , yaḥkathāprasaṅge O_X 116 chinnachinnā(written as chinnaśchinna)°] O_X , chinnachinnā° $J_AJ_OK_OV_A$, cchinnabhinnā° P_D , chinnabhinnā° P_D 116 °oṣṇaniḥśvasitaḥ] P_D , °oṣṇaniḥśvasitaḥ P_D , °oṣṭhaniḥsvasitaḥ P_D , °oṣṭhanihsvasitaḥ P_D , °oṣṭhanihsvasitaḥ P_D , °oṣṭhanihsvasitaḥ P_D , °oṣṭhanihsvasitaḥ P_D , °oṣṭhanihsvasitaḥ

'pi sambandha ityatiśayoktimūlatvād alamkārāntaraviviktam iti na vācyam ||78||

D.3 Hetuh

D.3.1 Hetvalankārasya lakṣaṇam

parapratyāyakam lingam hetuh ||79||

pareṇānavagatasya vastunaḥ pratipādakaṃ gamakarūpaṃ liṅgaṃ hetuḥ | 126 paragrahanam anumānavailaksanyārtham |

D.3.2 Hetvanumānayor bhedaḥ

tena svayam lingāt pratipattir anumānam | lingena parapratyāyanam parārthānumānarūpam kāvyalingāparaparyāyo hetvalamkārah | 1

D.3.3 Yady apy anumānasyaiva dvaividhyam tathāpi hetuḥ pṛthag lakṣitaḥ

yady apy anumānasyaiva svārthaparārtharūpatvena dvaividhyam tathāpi pratipādi-

119 yatraitā→smaraḥ] cit. Vṛtti ad KP 117 and Vṛtti ad AlSar 58, reading marmaspṛśo and añcitaśara instead of marmacchido and añcitaśaraḥ. cf. Bhartṛhari's Śṛṅgāraśataka 11: nūnam ājñākaras tasyāḥ subhruvo makaradhvajaḥ | yatas tannetrasañcārasūciteṣu pravartate || 124 ityādau tu→na vācyam] cf. Vṛtti ad AlSar 57: atra yoṣitāṃ bhrūvyāpāreṇa mārgaṇapatanaṃ smarapurogāmitve sādhye 'nalaṅkṛtam eva sādhanam iti śuddham anumānam | prauḍhoktimātraniṣpannārthaniṣṭhena ca vicchittiviśeṣāśrayaṇāc cārutvam | 125 Devīstotra 78: parapratyāyikaṃ (ac: parapratyāyakaṃ) liṅgaṃ hetuḥ || pareṇāvagatasya (sic!) vastunaḥ pratipādakaṃ gamakarūpaṃ liṅgaṃ hetuḥ |. Pṣ̃RS 79: parapratyāyakaṃ liṅgaṃ hetuḥ |

 $\mathbf{119} \ \ lahar\bar{\iota}cal\bar{a}cala^{\circ} \ \] \ \ P_{ED}, \ \ lahar\bar{\iota}cal\bar{a}\bar{m}cala^{\circ} \ \ J_{A}J_{O}P_{D}, \ \ lahar\bar{\iota}cal\bar{a}\bar{n}cala^{\circ} \ \ K_{O}, \ \ dahar\bar{\iota}cal\bar{a}\bar{n}chala^{\circ}$ O_X , laharīcalaṃcala° V_A 120 amī] $J_O K_O O_X P_D P_{ED} V_A$, asī J_A 120 marmacchido] $J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED},\,mandaspṛśo\,\,V_{A}\quad \textbf{120}\,\,margaṇah\,\,]\,\,\,\Sigma,\,margaṇa\,\,P_{D}\quad \textbf{121}\,\,^{\circ}capasańcitaśarah\,\,]$ O_X , °cāpam amcitaśirah J_AJ_O , °cāpam ancitaśirah K_O , °cāpasamcitaśirah P_D , °cāpam amcitaśara° V_A 121 preńkhatkara
ḥ] $K_OO_XP_{ED}$, preṃkhatkara Ḥ J_AJ_O , °preṅkhotkara Ḥ P_D , °preṃkhatkara Ḥ $V_{A} \quad \textbf{122} \ \, \text{satyam} \ \, \big] \ \, J_{O}K_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED}V_{A}, \, \\ \text{satye} \ \, J_{A} \quad \textbf{122} \ \, \text{sad\bar{a}s\bar{a}m} \ \, \big] \ \, P_{ED}V_{A}, \, \\ \text{sac\bar{a}yam} \ \, J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}P_{D}, \, \\ \text{sacz} \quad \, J_$ sadāsam O_X 122 smarah] $J_AJ_OO_XP_{ED}V_A$, sma[ra] K_O , smara P_D 123 tu] $J_OK_OO_XP_{ED}V_A$, 123 praudhoktyullikhitatvena] Σ , praudhokte llikhitatvena J_A śāsanadharatva°] Σ , lacuna between $ś\bar{a}sana$ ° and $^{\circ}tva$ V_{A} 124 °mūlatvād] $J_{A}K_{O}P_{D}P_{ED}V_{A}$, °mūlatvad J_O , °mūlatvā° O_X 124 alaṃkārāntaraviviktam] P_D , alaṃkārāṃtaraviviktam $J_{A}J_{O}V_{A},\, alaṅk\bar{a}r\bar{a}ntaraviviktam\,\, K_{O}O_{X},\, alaṃk\bar{a}r\bar{a}ntaraṃ\,\, viviktam\,\, P_{ED} \quad \textbf{125}\,\, liṅgaṃ\,\, hetuḥ\, \big]\,\,\, K_{O},$ gamakarūpam] Σ , lacuna between ga° and °karūpam V_A 126 lingam hetuh] $K_OO_XP_{ED}$, $\underset{\longrightarrow}{\text{limgam}} \text{ hetuh } J_A J_O V_A, \text{ linga hetuh } P_D \qquad \textbf{128} \text{ lingat }] \ J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED} V_A, \text{ lingat } O_X$ pratipattir] Σ , pratipattipattir P_D 128 °pratyāyanam] Σ , [praty]āyanam K_O kāvyalingāpara°] corr., kāvyalingapara° $J_{A}J_{O}$, kāvyalingapara° K_{O} , kāvyalingaparam° O_{X} , kāvyaliṃgaṃ P_D , kāvyaliṃga° P_{ED} , kāvyaliṃgāpara° V_A

tavailakṣaṇyāśrayaṇe prācyaiḥ pṛthag lakṣitaḥ tathaivehāpi lakṣaṇam

D.3.4 Ruyyakoktakāvyaliṅgānumānayor vailakṣaṇyam aprayuktam, yathoktam eva vailakṣaṇyaṃ sādhīyaḥ

yat tu parair apratītapratyāyakād anumānād asya sākānkṣatvena pratītasyārthasyopapādakatvād vailakṣaṇyam uktam | tad asad | tathā hi kim vaktrā pratipannasyānumānasyopapādakam lingam uta boddhavyena | tatra nādyaḥ | vaktrā tropapattisahitasyaivārthasya pramāṇāntareṇa pratipannatvād ākānkṣābhāvāt | na hi svoktād vākyād ākānkṣoparamate svāśrayaprasangāt | nāpi dvitīyaḥ | boddhavyenāpi pramāṇāntareṇāpratipanna evārthaḥ | tasmād eva vākyād avagatatvena pratītopapādanābhāvāt pratītopapādakam kāvyalingam, apratītapratyāyanam anumānam ity aviveka eveti yathoktam eva vailaksanyam sādhīyah |

D.3.5 Hetvalankārasya trayo bhedāh

asya ca padavākyārtharūpatayā lingasya dvividhate |

133 yat tu parair → vailakṣaṇyam uktam] Vṛtti ad AlSar 58: ihāsti pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāvaḥ | asti ca samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ | tatrāpratītapratyāyane pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāvaḥ | pratītapratyāyane tu samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ | tatra pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāve 'numānam ... evaṃ cāsyāṃ prakriyāyāṃ kāryakāraṇavākyārthayor hetutve kāvyalingam eva paryavasyati | samarthyavākyasya sāpekṣatvāt tāṭasthyābhāvāt |

130 anumāna°] Σ , a+māna° K_O 130 dvaividhyam] Σ , dvividhyam P_D , dvividhyatāyā 131 °pi pratipādi
tavailakṣaṇyāśrayaṇena] V_A , °pi pratipādi
 lacuna ṇa $J_AJ_OK_OP_D$, °pi pratipāditavailakṣaṇyāśrayaṇe O_X , °vi pratipādi lacuna ņa P_{ED} ac , °pi pratipāditarūpeṇa P_{ED} pc 131 pṛthag lakṣitaḥ $J_OK_OP_DP_{ED}V_A$, pṛthag alakṣitaḥ J_A , pṛthak lakṣitaḥ O_X 131 tathaivehāpi] $J_OO_XP_DP_{ED}V_A$, tathaivaihāpi J_A , tathevaihāpi K_O 132 parair] Σ , surair P_D 132 anumānād] $O_X V_A$, anumānā $lacuna J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$ 132 asya sākānkṣatvena] O_XV_A , $lacuna~J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}~~\textbf{133}~asad~]~O_XV_A,~amad~etat~J_A,~asad~etat~J_OK_OP_DP_{ED}~~\textbf{133}~tath\bar{a}~hi$ $\| J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED} V_A$, om. O_X 134 pratipannasyānumānasyo° $\| J_A J_O O_X V_A$, pratipannasyo° K_0 , pratimānasyo
pamaranasyo° P_D , pratimānasyo
pamanasyo° P_{ED} ac , pratītasyānumānasyo° P_{ED}^{pc} 135 °ktropapatti°] $J_OO_XP_{ED}V_A$, 134 nādya
ḥ] $J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED},$ nadya
ḥ V_{A} 135 pratipannatvād] $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED} V_A$, pratipādatvād O_X °ktropapattih $J_A K_O P_D$ ākāṅkṣā°] $K_OO_XP_{ED}$, ākāṃkṣā° $J_AJ_OV_A$, ākāṃkhya° P_D 135 °bhāvāt] Σ , °bhāvān V_A pratītopapādānabhāvāt O_X^{pc} , pratītopamādanubhāvāt P_D , pratītirūpādanubhavāt P_{ED} $^{\circ}pap\bar{a}dakam\]\ J_{A}J_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED}V_{A},\ ^{\circ}pap+dakam\ K_{O}\ \ \ \mathbf{138}\ aprat\bar{\imath}ta^{\circ}\]\ J_{A}J_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED},\ aprat\bar{\imath}+^{\circ}$ K_{O} , apratīti $^{\circ}$ V_{A} 139 $^{\circ}$ pratyāyanam] $O_{X}V_{A}$, $^{\circ}$ pratyāyakam $J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}P_{D}P_{ED}$

prajānām vinayādhānād rakṣaṇād bharaṇād api | sa pitā pitaras tāsām kevalam janmahetavah ||422||

141

ityādau pitrtvasya kāraṇasya vinayādhānādiḥ kāryarūpaḥ śābdo hetur na vaicitryāvaha iti padārthasyārtham eva hetutvam | vākyārthasya śābdam ārthaṃ veti trayo bhedāḥ |

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D.3.6 Vakṣaḥsthalī rakṣatv ityādau alaṅkāratvam eva, na dhvanih

kramena yathā—

vakṣaḥsthalī rakṣatu sā jaganti jagatprasūter garuḍadhvajasya | 147 śriyo 'ṅgarāgeṇa vibhāvyate yā saubhāgyahemnaḥ kaṣapaṭṭikeva ||423||

atra vakṣaḥsthalyā jagadrakṣakatve jagatprasūtitvaṃ kāraṇarūpaṃ padārtho hetuḥ | pitur hi nijaprasūter vakṣasi lālanam ucitam | na cātra sambhavamātreṇa 150 garuḍadhvajaviśeṣaṇatve jagatprasūtitvasya paryavasite, paryavasānād vākyārthasya, rakṣaṇaucityaṃ vakṣaḥsthalyā eva jagatprasūtitvād ity arthāntarasya vyañjanavyāpāragamyatvād dhvanir iti vācyam | yato vyaṅgyasyāpi tasya vakṣaḥsthalī- 153 rakṣaṇarūpavācyārthahetutvena vācyopaskārāṅgatvād, guṇībhūtavyaṅgyatayālaṃ-

141 prajānāṃ→janmahetavaḥ] Raghuvaṃśa 1.24

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kāryatvābhāvād alaṃkāratvam eva |

D.3.7 Pratīyamānārthagarbhīkārodāharaṇam

156 evaṃvidhapratīyamānārthagarbhīkārabhāve punaḥ-

samjīvaņosahim miva suassa rakkhaï aṇaṇṇavāvārā | sāsū ṇavabbhadamsanakaṇṭhāgaajīviam suṇham ||424||

ityādau kaṇṭhāgatajīvitatvāder viśeṣaṇasyārthe 'pi rakṣaṇādihetutve sarvatrettham | viśeṣaṇatayā hetor abhidhānasambhavād vaicitryābhāvenānalaṅkāratvam

¹⁴⁷ vakṣaḥsthalī] V_A , vakṣasthalī $J_A J_O K_O O_X P_D P_{ED}$ 148 ' \dot{n} gar \bar{a} ge \dot{n} a] P_{ED} , \dot{m} gar \bar{a} ge \dot{n} a $J_{A}J_{O}P_{D},\ \, {\rm \acute{n}gar\bar{a}ge\dot{n}a}\ \ \, K_{O}O_{X},\ \, {\rm gar\bar{a}ge\dot{n}a}\ \ \, V_{A} \qquad {\bf 148}\ \ \, {\rm vibh\bar{a}vyate}\ \ \,]\quad \Sigma,\ \, {\rm vi+vyate}\ \ \, K_{O}$ kaṣapaṭṭike°] $J_A J_O O_X P_{ED}$, kaṣapaṭdhike° K_O , kaṣapuṭṭike° P_D , kapapaṭṭike° V_A vakṣaḥsthalyā] corr., vakṣasthalyā $J_AK_OP_DP_{ED}$, vakṣasthalā J_O , vakṣasthalyā O_X , vakṣaḥsthalyo V_A 149 jagadrakṣakatve O_XV_A , jagadrakṣakatvam $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$ 149 kāraņarūpam $J_A J_O K_O O_X P_D P_{ED}$, kāraņarūpa V_A $\label{eq:continuous_problem} \mbox{] } O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED}V_{A}, \ \ \mbox{pittu} \ \ J_{A}K_{O}, \ \ \mbox{pitta} \ \ J_{O}$ **150** lālanam] $J_A J_O K_O O_X P_D P_{ED} V_A$ pc, lalanam V_A ac150 cātra sambhavamātreņa O_XV_A , cātrāsambhavamātreņa $J_AJ_OP_DP_{ED}$, cātrāsambha+treņa K_O 151 garudadhvaja°] $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED} V_A$, garudādhvaja° O_X **151** °višesanatve $J_A J_O K_O O_X P_D P_{ED}$, °višepra(?)natve V_A 151 paryavasānād] Σ , paryavasāyād K_O 152 rakṣaṇaucityaṃ] $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}V_A$, rakṣaṇocityaṃ O_X 152 vakṣaḥsthalyā] $J_OK_OP_DP_{ED}V_A$, vakṣaḥsthalyāḥ J_A , vakṣasthalyā O_X $\textbf{152} \ \text{arth\bar{a}ntarasya} \ \big] \ \ \Sigma, \, \text{arth\bar{a}mintarasya} \ V_{A} \quad \textbf{153} \ \text{``gamyatv\bar{a}d} \ \big] \ J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}P_{D}P_{ED}V_{A}, \, \text{``gamyatv\bar{a}mintarasya} V_{A}$ J_AJ_OK_OP_D, °paskāra° O_X, °paskāryā° P_{ED} 154 gunībhūtavyangyatayā° | O_x, gunībhūtayā $J_A K_O P_D$, guņībhūtavyamgyatayā $J_O V_A$, guņībhūtasya P_{ED} 155 alaṃkāryatvā°] J_AJ_OP_DV_A, °lamkāratvā° O_X, alankār[ya]tvā° K_O, alamkāyatvā° P_{ED}

iti vicāranipuņāḥ |

D.3.8 Hetuparikarayor vailakṣanyam

asya ca hetvādirūpam vācyādim artham prati vyangyasyopaskārakatvam ity evam lakṣaṇāt parikarād vyangyopaskṛtasyaiva vācyasya tam eva prati hetutā na svata ity evam ātmakasya bhedo 'vaseyaḥ |

vācyopaskārakatā sadaiva vyangyasya parikare jneyā | vyangyāśliṣṭo vācyo vācyam praty eva hetur iti || saṃkṣepaḥ |

157 samjīvaņosahim—suņham] cit. Weber No.336: samjīvaņosaham miva suassa rakkhaï aṇaṇṇavāvārā | sāsū ṇavabbhadaṃsaṇakaṇṭhāgaajīviam soṇham || Bhuvanapāla v. 286: samjīvaņosaïm piva suyassa rakkhaï aṇannavāvārā | sāsū navabbhadaṃsaṇakaṃṭhāgayajīviyaṃ sunham ||

] $O_X P_{ED}$, sasu $J_A J_O$, sasū K_O , samū P_D , masū V_A 158 ņavabbha°] P_{ED} , ņamadaḥchabhaṃ° J_AK_O , ņamada $lacuna^\circ J_O$, ņavacabbha $^\circ O_X$, ņamadacchabha $\dot{m}^\circ P_D$, vabba $^\circ V_A$ 158 °daṃsaṇa $^\circ$] $P_{ED}O_X$, "saṃṇa" $J_AK_OP_D$, "lacuna maṃṇa" J_O , "daṃsṛṇa" V_A 158 suṇhaṃ] P_{ED} , sāhaṃ $J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}P_{D}, \text{ suho } O_{X}, \text{ svāhām} \quad V_{A} \qquad \textbf{159} \text{ kaṇṭhā}^{\circ} \text{ }] \ \ J_{A}J_{O}K_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED}, \text{ ka } \textit{lacuna } V_{A}$ $\label{eq:controller} \begin{tabular}{ll} \circ jīvita$$^\circ$ j $J_AJ_OK_OO_XP_DP_{ED}$, $^\circ$t̄ivita$$^\circ$ V_A & \textbf{159} $^\circ$ hetutve $]$ O_XV_A, $^\circ$ hetutvam $J_AJ_OK_OP_{ED}P_D$ & \textbf{160} $^\circ$ sarvatrektam O_X & \textbf{160} $^\circ$ bhāvenā$$^\circ$ & \textbf{160} $^\circ$ bhāvenā$$$ 160 °bhāvenā°] O_XV_A , °bhāvena J_O , °bhāve $J_AK_OP_DP_{ED}$ 160 °nalaṅkāratvam] O_XV_A , nālaṃkāratvam J_OP_{ED} , vālaṃkāratvam J_A , nālaṅkāratvam J_OP_D , vālaṃkāratvam J_A , nālaṅkāratvam J_OP_D 161 vicāra°] Σ , +cāra° K_O 162 asya] $O_XP_{ED}V_A$, yasya $J_AJ_OK_OP_D$ 162 hetvādi°] O_XV_A , hetutvādi° $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$ 162 vācyādim] $O_X V_A$, vācyam $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$ 162 °paskārakatvam | J_AJ_OP_DP_{ED}V_A, °[pa]skārakatvam K_O, °pakarakatvam O_X 163 lakṣaṇāt $I_AJ_OK_OO_XP_{ED}V_A$, lakṣalaṇāt P_D 163 parikarād $J_OO_XP_DP_{ED}V_A$, parikārād J_AK_O **163** °paskṛtasyaiva] O_XV_A , °paskṛtasya $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$ vācyasya] $O_X V_A$, vācyasyaiva $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$ **163** hetutā na] $J_A J_O K_O P_{ED} V_A$, bhāra O_X ātmakasya] $J_A J_O K_O P_{ED} V_A$, mātmakasya O_X 164 bhedo 'vaseyaḥ] $J_O P_{ED} V_A$, bhede vameyaḥ J_A , bhedo vaseyaḥ $K_O P_D$ pc , bhedāvaseyaḥ O_X , bhede vaseyaḥ P_D ac 165 vācyopaskārakatā] $J_A J_O K_O O_X P_{ED} V_A$, vācyopaskāravṛttā J_O , vācyopaskārakatvā P_D 165 sadaiva vyaṅgyasya] O_X , vyamgyasya sadaiva $J_AJ_OP_{ED}P_DV_A$, vyangyasya sadaiva K_O **165** parikare] Σ , parikaro J_0 **166** hetur Σ , he[tu]r K_0

157 chāyā: saṃjīvanauṣadhim iva sutasya rakṣaty ananyavyāpārā | śvaśrūr navābhradarśanakaṇṭhā-gatajīvitāṃ snuṣām ||

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¹⁵⁷ saṃjīvaṇosahiṃ \rightarrow sunhaṃ] P_{SP} reads: sañjīvanauṣadhim iva sutasya rakṣaty ananyavyāpārā | śvāśrūr nnavābhradarśanakaṇṭhāgatajīvitaṃ snuṣām || Bhuvanapāla reads exactly the same as $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$.

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D.3.9 Abhedādhyavasāyagarbhīkāraṃ śābdahetūdāharaṇam

ayi pramatte sicayam gṛhāṇety uktāpi sakhyā na viveda kācit | magnā hi sā tatra rasāntarāle yatrāntaraṅgo bhagavān anaṅgaḥ ||425||

atrāvedane kārye rasāntaramagnatvam kāraṇarūpam hiśabdopādānāc chābdo hetuḥ | atraiva rasaśabdasya jalavācitve na jalamadhyanimagnatvasyoktyā vedanam ucitam iti śabdaśaktimūlam vyaṅgyam abhedādhyavasāyād dhetutvena pratīyate |

D.3.10 Vākyārtharūpalingam śābdahetūdāharanam

vathā vā—

saṃkalpatulyo na babhūva bandhuḥ śatruḥ sugātryāś ca na tatsamānaḥ | asūtrayad durlabhakāntasaṃgam anaṅgam utpādya ca yad babādhe ||426||

atra bandhutvaśatrutvayoḥ kāraṇayoḥ kāntasaṃgāsūtraṇādiḥ kāryarūpo yacchabdopādānena śābdo vākyārthahetuh |

D.3.11 Viruddhakāryagarbhīkārodāharaṇam

anyato naya muhūrtam ānanaṃ candra eṣa sarale kalāmayaḥ |
mā kadācana kapolayor malaṃ saṃkramayya samatāṃ sameṣyati ||427||
atrānyato mukhanayanaviruddhānayanakāryam sāmyāpādakam malasamkrama-

¹⁶⁷ uktāpi] Σ , ukte pi V_A 167 sakhyā] Σ , saṃkhyā P_D 167 kācit Σ , [ka]cit 168 rasāntarāle] $P_{ED}V_A$, rasāntarālam $J_AJ_OK_O$, nasāntarāle O_X , rasāmtalam P_D ac , rasāmta<rā>lam P_D pc 169 atrāvedane] $K_OO_XV_A$, atra vedaine J_A , atra vedane $J_OP_DP_{ED}$ J_AK_O , chābdahetuḥ V_A 170 na jalamadhyanimagnatvasyoktyā em., jalamadhyanimagnatvasyoktyā na $J_A J_O P_D P_{ED}$, jalamadhyanimagna[syo]++ K_O , na jalamadhyanimagnasyokta O_X , na jalamadhyanimagnasyokta O_X jalamadhyanimagnasyoktya $\rm V_A$ 170 vedanam] Σ , nivedanam J_0 171 °dādhyavasāyād dhetutvena] $J_A J_O O_X P_D$, °dādhyavasāyād dhetutv[e]na K_O , °dādhyavasāyāt hetutvena P_{ED} , °dādhyavasāyād hetutvena V_A 175 śatru
ḥ] $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$, śatrus O_X , śaṃtvas V_A sugātryāś ca na] O_XV_A , sugātryā na ca $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$ 176 asūtrayad] $J_AP_DV_A$, amnetrayad $J_{O}, \; +++yad \;\; K_{O}, \; am\bar{u}trayad \;\; O_{X}, \; as\bar{u}trayat \;\; P_{ED} \qquad {\bf 176} \;\; durlabha^{\circ} \;\;] \;\; J_{A}J_{O}P_{D}P_{ED}, \;\; dur[la]bham$ K_{O} , dullabha° O_{X} , durllabha° V_{A} 178 °saṃgāsūtraṇādiḥ] em., °saṃgamasūtraṇādiḥ $J_{A}J_{O}$, °saṅgamasūtraṇādi
ḥ K_{O} , °saṅgasūtranādi ḥ O_{X} , °saṃgamamūtraṇādi ḥ
 P_{D} , °saṅgagamasūtranādi ḥ P_{ED} , °saṃgāsūtranādiḥ V_A 179 śābdo] $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$, śabdo $O_X V_A$

narūpam hetutayopāttam iti viruddhakāryopalabdhir ārthī lingam | yathā vā—

D.3.12 Vākyārtharūpalingam ārthahetūdāharanam

harihii piassa ņavacūapallavo paḍhamamañjarisaṇāho | mā ruvasu putti patthānakalasamuhasamthio gamanam ||428||

atra niṣidhyamānasya rodanasya kāryāyāḥ prasthānanivṛtteś cūtapallavākhyena 186 kāranāntarena janyatvam iti kāranarūpa ārtho hetuh |

D.3.13 Hetvanumānālankārayor vicāraļ

ayam cānumānahetvalamkārayor vicāra āśrayanīyo yad utsargata eva śabdoc-

180 anyato naya→sameṣyati] cit. Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa p. 437: anyato naya muhūrtam ānanaṃ candra eṣa sarale kalāmayaḥ | mā kadācana kapolayor malaṃ saṃkramayya samatāṃ nayiṣyati || 184 harihii→gamaṇaṃ] cit. Weber No.143, Bhuvanapāla v. 344.

180 muhūrtam] Σ , muhūrttam P_D 180 muhūrtam ānanaṃ] Σ , muhū+ā+naṃ K_O 180 sarale] Σ , sa \Leftrightarrow <rale> P_D 181 mā] corr., sā $J_AJ_OK_OO_XP_DP_{ED}V_A$ 181 kapolayor malam] J_OV_A , kapolayotpalam $J_AK_OP_DP_{ED}$, kapolayor madam O_X 181 samkramayya \rightarrow samesyati] Σ , saṅgamadhya *lacuna* meṣyati O_X 182 atrānyato] $J_A J_O K_O O_X P_D$, atra anyato P_{ED} , anyato V_A 182 mukha°] Σ , smākaṃ O_X 182 °kāryaṃ] $J_A J_O K_O P_D P_{ED}$, °kārya° 182 mala°] $J_{O}V_{A}$, pala° $J_{A}K_{O}O_{X}P_{D}P_{ED}$ 183 °opāttam] $K_{O}P_{ED}$, °opātum $J_{A}O_{X}P_{D}V_{A}$, °opātam J_{O} 183 °kāryo°] Σ , °karyo° V_{A} 183 °palabdhir O_XV_A , °t
pattir $J_{A}J_{O}K_{O},$ °t
pattir $P_{D},$ °t
patti
h $P_{\rm ED}$ 183 ārthī liṅgaṃ] K_OO_X , ārthī liṃgaṃ 183 yathā vā] O_XV_A , yathā $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$ $J_A J_O P_D V_A$, ārtham lingam P_{ED} harihii] $J_AO_XP_{ED}$, hārīhii J_OP_D , harīhii K_O , harihai V_A 184 piassa] $P_{ED}V_A$, piyaassa $J_A J_O K_O P_D$, piyassa O_X **184** ņavacūapallavo $J_A K_O P_D P_{ED}$, ņavaāapallavo J_O , ņavacoapallavo O_X , ņavacūapallave V_A 184 padhamama \tilde{n} jari $^{\circ}$ P_{ED} , pumasamamjari $^{\circ}$ J_A , padhusamamjari $^{\circ}$, dhamasamañjari° K_0 , padhamasañjari° O_X , phapasamañjari P_D , padhasamaṃjari° V_A "saṇāho] $O_X P_{ED} V_A$, "maṇāho $J_A K_O$, "saṇāho J_O 185 mā] Σ , sā P_D 185 ruvasu] $K_O P_{ED}$, bhavasu $J_A P_D$, tavasu J_O , ruvasi O_X , roasi V_A 185 patthāṇakalasamuhasaṃthio] P_{ED} , patthāṇasusahasaṃstio $J_AJ_OP_D$, patthāṇamusahasaṃstio K_O , pakkhānakalasumuhaṃ saṃsthiti O_X , pakkhaṇakālasamuhaṃ saṇṭhio V_A **185** gamaṇaṃ] $O_X P_{ED}$, gamaṇa $J_A J_O K_O P_D$, gamaṇam **186** nişidhyamānasya] $J_AJ_OK_OP_DP_{ED}$, nişidhyamāna° O_X , nişidhāmāṇasya V_A rodanasya] $J_A J_O K_O O_X P_D P_{ED}$, rodhanasya V_A 186 kāryāyāḥ] Σ , kāryāyā+ O_X 186 prasthāna°] Σ , +++ O_X 186 °nivṛtteś] J_O , °nivṛtteḥ $J_A K_O O_X P_D P_{ED}$, °nivṛtte V_A 186 °vākhyena] $J_A J_O O_X P_D P_{ED}$, °vākhye+ K_O , °vāgyona V_A 187 kāraṇāntareṇa] $O_X P_D P_{ED}$, kāraṇāmtareṇa $J_A J_O V_A$, +āraṇāntareṇa K_O 187 ārtho] $J_O K_O O_X P_D P_{ED}$, ārtha° J_A , āvi asma V_A

184 chāyā: hariṣyati priyasya navacūtapallavah prathamamañjarīsanāthah \mid mā rudihi putri prasthānakalaśamukhasamsthito gamanam $\mid\mid$

¹⁸⁴ $harihii \rightarrow gamanam$] $P_{\acute{S}P}$ reads harihiisi and gives the following $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$: harisyati priyasya $navac\bar{u}tapallavah$ $prathamama\~njar\bar{\imath}san\bar{a}tha\.{h}$ | $m\bar{a}$ rudihi puti $prasth\bar{a}nak\bar{a}lasammukhasamsthite$ gamanam || P_{ED} reads $prasth\bar{a}nak\bar{a}lasammukhasamsthito$ instead of $prasth\bar{a}nak\bar{a}lasammukhasamsthite$.

cāraṇasya parārthatvāt parasya sambodhanīyatvābhāve 'pi padavākyārtharūpasya liṅgasya parapratyāyakatvena hetvalaṅkāraḥ eva | yatra tu jāne nūnam ityādipadaprayogamahimnā svapratipattiniścayas tatrānumānam | kvacit tu **parimlānaṃ pīnastane**tyādau nāṭakādiṣu nūnam ityādyabhāve 'pi prakaraṇādivaśena svayaṃ parāmarśaniścayād anumānam eva | evaṃ ca na jātā rāgasarvasvetyādau svaparāmarśaniścaye hetvalaṅkāro 'yukta iti ||79||

192 parimlānam pīnastanetyādau] cit. Ratnāvalīnāṭikā 2.13: parimlānam pīnastanajaghanasangād ubhayatas tanor madhyasyāntaḥ parimilanam aprāpya haritam | idam vyastanyāsam ślathabhujalatākṣepavalanaiḥ kṛśāngyāḥ saṃtāpam vadati nalinīpattraśayanam ||

Appendix E

An Annotated Translation of the arthāntaranyāsa, anumāna and hetu Sections of the Alaṅkāraratnākara

E.1 Arthāntaranyāsaḥ

E.1.1 The definition of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$

The substantiation of a specific case by another [general case] is [the rhetorical figure of] $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa^{155}$.

Where a specific case is stated [and then] substantiated, *i.e.* made firm, by a general case that takes the form of showing universal pervasion, that is [the case of the figure of] $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$.

¹⁵⁵On the translation of the term $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, there are several possible choices. Gerow suggests the translation "introduction of another matter" or "apodixis", but both do not thoroughly cover the extent of this figure. For Śobhākara, the core of this figure is a substantiation (samarthana) of a general case by means of a specific one, so only the appellation "substantiation" is not enough to fully describe it. Therefore, I keep the term untranslated.

E.1.2 The method to distinguish poetical reason, $arth\bar{a}n-tarany\bar{a}sa$ and exemplification, and the reason for such a method

In this context, sometimes the explicit expression of an effect or of a cause [functions] as the promoter or the purpose of the object, in some [other] cases [the explicit expression] of an individual or also of a universal. Among them, when a cause and its effect are explicitly mentioned as [such] a promoter, there arises the rhetorical figure of poetical reason which is to be described later. When something referred to as universal is a promoter because it takes the form of an elucidation of a cognition, the illustration of one individual with regard to the universal is the rhetorical figure of exemplification ($ud\bar{a}harana$). When there is a mentioning of comparison by the explicit expression of the word "iva" and so on, it ($ud\bar{a}harana$) is called explicit, but if there is no explicit expression [of "iva"], then, by the same token, it (udāharana) is exactly implicit, but not [the different rhetorical figure] arthāntaranyāsa. Since something which is an indication of universal pervasion cannot be a substantiation of individual effects or individual causes; and since it cannot have the nature of elucidating a cognition of universal [effects or universal causes and so on; and since individual and universal cannot be explicitly expressed as reasons, there is no way to follow an identical definition in all these cases, thus there is definitely the division into [different] rhetorical figures. Therefore, only the concrete expression of an individual by an illustration of universal pervasion as universal is arthāntaranyāsa. While it can be divided into two subtypes according to [the distinction between] homogeneity and heterogeneity; when there is an explicit expression of the word "hi" and so on, this is the explicit [subtype]; but when there is absence of that, this is the implicit [subtype]; thus there are four kinds [of subtypes]. Since a prior or latter placement of the illustration of universal pervasion does not enhance the strikingness, there is no reason for [further] subdivision.

E.1.3 The divisions of arthantaranyāsa

E.1.3.1 The "explicit" subtype based on similarity

An example runs as follows:

What are those who are inflexible by nature not capable of, when among the simple-minded? [They can do anything]; for the breasts can prevent the arms from seeing each other¹⁵⁶.

¹⁵⁶ sarala literately means straight, and also means straightforward people. kathina means hard

In this example, with regard to the specific case of breasts and arms which are the main topic (*prastuta*), [the expression] "for *sarala*" and so on in the form of a general case is not the main topic. It is accepted as being the substantiator appearing previously. And since the word "for" is explicitly expressed, [this example] is a case of an explicit [substantiator].

E.1.3.2 The "implicit" subtype based on similarity

That very "thighless" charioteer of the sun (i.e. the dawn)¹⁵⁷, legless by birth, true to his name, is appointed to be a charioteer by you, O Burning one (i.e. the sun). How strange (citram)! He (i.e. the dawn) rises to the sky, dispelling the darkness by kicks with his feet/by a flood of rays $(p\bar{a}d\bar{a}gh\bar{a}taih)$; for the insignificant approach greatness, somehow by attending to the service of the Great.

In this example, with regard to the dawn ascending to the sky because of the brightness of the sun, the general case (*i.e.* the fourth pada) is the substantiator presented later by similarity.

E.1.3.3 The reason for the second example not being the case of poetical reason

Although in this example the service rendered to great people is a cause accepted as a supplement for the elevation of the poor, nevertheless there is no rhetorical figure of poetical reason, because the cause is expressed as being a substantiator only by depending on a general case. In this way, it should be understood that in other cases where either the result or the cause is [presented as] the substantiator by means of a general case, we have [the figure of] $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$.

E.1.3.4 The "explicit" subtype based on dissimilarity

For him who possesses the treasure of heroism conquers the region between the seven oceans (*i.e.* the whole world), cowards do not get a chance [to win a victory] in their own houses.

In this example, with regard to the specific case, *i.e.* the conquering of the seven continents, [the fact that] cowards definitely do not have a chance even in their

and inflexible. It is possible to say that this verse may be describing the lifestyle of the court. In this way, the two arms may denote the king and good ministers, and there are bad ones standing in middle between them to prevent communication.

 $^{^{157}}an\bar{u}ru$ also means "thighless".

own houses, which is of the nature of a general case, is the explicit substantiator by means of dissimilarity.

E.1.3.5 The "implicit" subtype based on dissimilarity

Having made the surface of the earth free of trouble makers, he showered joyfully gold on deserving petitioners. Prosperity which is unsteady like a tendril of lightning is pointless for those who do not assuage the pain of the needy¹⁵⁸.

In this example, the substantiation [is presented] by means of a general case which possesses a heterogeneous property.

E.1.3.6 The subtype with intrinsic "determinative ascertainment"

In some cases there is also [the subtype which] incorporates a determinative ascertainment ($adhyavas\bar{a}ya$). For example,

When the sun rises, the mass of darkness departs elsewhere. When a bright one is not seen, the dark ones/the wicked ones become powerful.

In this example, a subject, such as a bright one or a dark one/a wicked one, ascertained as being not different [from each other], is the substantiator in the form of a general case by means of dissimilarity.

E.1.4 The difference of the scope of $prativast\bar{u}pam\bar{a}$ and $drst\bar{a}nta$ from $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$

In this way, since $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$ exists in [cases where] a specific case substantiates a general one, a substantiation of a specific case by another specific case is only the scope of [the rhetorical figure of] $prativast\bar{u}pam\bar{a}$ and $drst\bar{a}nta$, not [the scope] of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$.

E.1.5 The poetical beauty in Rudrața's example is not because of $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$, but the rhetorical figure of $ni\acute{s}caya$

Moreover, in the example "or rather, it is not strange that the snow burns this tree" and so on, it should not be argued that this verse is [a case of arthāntaranyāsa]

¹⁵⁸ Vikramadevānkacarita 17.1.

by means of similarity because [here] a specific case is substantiated by another one. Furthermore, with regard to the strangeness explicitly expressed, by the expression "or rather, it is not strange" which cancels it, it is not possible to substantiate the explicitly expressed meaning. Therefore, since in such examples there is the negation of what was stated, the poetical beauty is caused by the rhetorical figure of *niścaya*, not by *arthāntaranyāsa*.

E.1.6 Two examples of "implicit" exemplification ($ud\bar{a}harana$)

Certainly, nobody is faultless, and certainly, nobody can entirely lack [any] virtue; [for] even in the ocean of milk there is poison, and even on the heads of snakes there are jewels.

It is due to the perniciousness of good virtues that a capable person is harnessed to a heavy burden; [for] a lethargic bull¹⁵⁹, whose shoulder does not have a scar [because of hard work], sleeps comfortably.

In such examples which is based on the principle of tautology (*punarukti*), a comprehension which takes a general case as its scope is elucidated by means of a specific case which [possesses] the same property or a different one, [the figure of] exemplification is implicit.

E.1.7 Summary verses of the distinction between $arth\bar{a}n-tarany\bar{a}sa$ and exemplification

When the presentation of the special point of another thing by a result and so on is the reason, that is [the figure of] $arth\bar{a}ntarany\bar{a}sa$. But where an elucidation of a specific case (lit., "other") by means of a general case, or where an elucidation of a general case based on a specific case is made, there must be [the figure of] implicit exemplification because there is no application of the word "iva" and so on.

Such is the distinction.

 $^{^{159}}$ PW p. 634 gives a meaning "ein träger Ochs" for gadi and quotes this verse. On p. 711, it gives the meaning "ein kräftiger aber träger Stier" under the word gali.

E.2 Poetical inference

E.2.1 The definition of poetical inference

The comprehension of a thing to be proven from its proof is [the rhetorical figure] of poetical inference. (78)

That [rhetorical figure] in which an object not yet comprehended is understood by oneself¹⁶⁰ from its proof by means of explicit verbal expression or by means of implicit expression is poetical inference.

E.2.2 An example by means of the principle of the stick and cake $(dand\bar{a}p\bar{u}pik\bar{a}ny\bar{a}ya)$

An example runs as follows:

The breaking of Śiva's bow, I think, was achieved through the power of the daughter of foam $(i.e. \, S\bar{\imath}t\bar{a})^{161}$; for without her presence, Rāma became exhausted even by Indra's bow $(i.e. \, a \, rainbow)$.

In this example, the thing to be proved is that with regard to the breaking of Śiva's bow, Sītā is the cause and Rāma is [only] in the background. This thing to be proved $(s\bar{a}dhya)$ is inferred through the principle of the stick and cake¹⁶² by the non-perception $(anupalabdhy\bar{a})$ of such an effect [of breaking] in the case of a rainbow when he was separated from her. To explain, for one who is weak with regard to a rainbow, how can he achieve the breaking of Śiva's bow?

E.2.3 The rhetorical figure of poetical reason takes the form of an inference for the sake of others, but the figure of poetical inference does not

A further example:

¹⁶⁰"By oneself" means by the reader.

 $^{^{161}}$ The compound $jalaj\bar{a}tmaj\bar{a}$ means "daughter of foam", and this foam refers to the foam produced from the churning of the Milk Ocean. Among the products from the Milk Ocean, there is Lakṣmī who has an incarnation as Sītā. This reading is only attested in the earliest manuscript O_X , which is a *lectio difficilior*. The original reading $janak\bar{a}tmaj\bar{a}y\bar{a}h$ is supported by all other manuscripts and editions and is more common. However, I accept the reading $jalaj\bar{a}tmaj\bar{a}y\bar{a}h$ because in the transmission of a text, difficult readings can be easily changed into easy ones and such simplification is a common phenomenon.

¹⁶²The principle of "stick and cake" $(dandap\bar{u}pik\bar{a}ny\bar{a}ya)$ is explained in the section of poetical presumption (arthapatti). This example is a case of poetical inference containing poetical presumption.

Oh innocent-eyed woman! Surely now the king of lovers (i.e. Kāmadeva) rests in the entertainment window that is the outer corner of your eyes;

- 1) for this bee-singer here is intent on enjoying (or: service) $(sev\bar{a})$ the fragrance adhering (upanibaddha) to the flower of your ear ornament.
- 2) for the bee-singer here, who is attracted by fragrance/wearing perfume, is intent on frequenting the flower of your ear ornament 163.

In this example, the presence of the king of lovers (Cupid) who is worthy of service, taking the form of a cause, is inferred from observing the effect, which is a servant in the form of singer (i.e. the bee). And here, even though the innocent-eyed woman is being addressed, nevertheless there is no rhetorical figure of poetical reason which takes the form of an inference for the sake of others. In an inference for the sake of others, a thing which is [already] ascertained by oneself by means of another means of valid knowledge, and which is not yet understood by others is communicated [to others]. But here, there is the communication of a comprehension: "the presence of the king of lovers is understood by me from seeing the servant [in the form of a bee]"; it is not a communication of a thing which is not yet understood by others and which needs to be comprehended.

E.2.4 The reason for the second example being a case of poetical inference

In this way, since there is no intention to communicate a thing, whether other people understand the thing or not makes no difference as far as communicating the comprehension is concerned, the state of being not understood by others is not a motivating factor. Therefore, [this example is] definitely [a case of] poetical inference. Such is to be inferred in other examples.

E.2.5 Summary of the distinction between poetical reason and poetical inference

The communication of a thing which is not ascertained by others is said to be the rhetorical figure of poetical reason, because it takes the form of an inference for the sake of another. Where [the idea that] "this object has been understood by me" is communicated, there must be a poetical inference, because there is the communication of the comprehension by that [idea].

 $^{^{163}}$ The latter half of this example suggests that the heroine's side glance is right at the edge of her eye.

The stanzas above are the summary.

E.2.6 The two examples are cases of explicit proof

The two [examples above] are [cases] of explicit proof, since they contain expressions such as "for (yad)" in the sense of reason.

E.2.7 Two examples of implicit poetical inference

O you who swayed by his fame! You are [just] boasting. In truth you have not met him; had you seen him, your body would not be in healthy state¹⁶⁴.

In this example, the absence of the cause, *i.e.* the meeting with the hero, is inferred through the perception of the healthy state [of a lady's body] which is contradictory to an unhealthy state of the body that would have been the result of it (*i.e.* seeing him). Also, since here the not-seeing by her who has not seen him $(adrstavat\bar{\imath})$ is [already] known, it is not what is being communicated. Therefore, although [the fact that] there is no meeting is kept secret by you, we still know [that you did not meet him]. Hence this is exactly [a case of] demonstrating a comprehension. Another example:

If the creator had not used up all of the redness/passion [in creating you], why did he [go on to] create some white lotuses¹⁶⁵?

In this example, by the perception of whiteness which is contrary to the result called redness in the case of some lotuses, the red color or passion, taking the form of a cause, is inferred as impossible. Here in both examples, since there is no usage of the word "for (hi)", the proof is implicit.

¹⁶⁴Kulkarni 1990, part 1, p.563; Part 2, p.222: "You are fascinated only by the reports of his merits, beauty and qualities. Actually you have not seen him. You are bluffing that you have. Had you really met him, all your limbs would have betrayed you!"

 $G\bar{a}hakoso$ 480 reads viacchasi for viatthasi, and gives the following $ch\bar{a}y\bar{a}$:

svadeśavāsini vilokyase satyam eva sa tvayā na dṛṣṭaḥ |

na khalu bhavanti tasmin dṛṣṭe svasthāvasthāni aṅgāni ||

The editor of $G\bar{a}hakoso$ Patwardhan translates this as follows: "O you who stay at home (and never move out), you are seen by me (*i.e.* I have seen through your untrue statement that you have seen him). As a matter of fact you have never seen him. For had you really seen him, your limbs would no longer have continued to be so healthy in their condition."

 $^{^{165}}$ There is a possible śleṣa in this stanza: $r\bar{a}ga$ means both red color and love.

E.2.8 Why the two examples contain aesthetic beauty

In the [previous] $g\bar{a}th\bar{a}^{166}$ [example], even though it (*i.e.* the proof) is pure because of the lack of figurative expression, it [still contains] aesthetic beauty due to the existence of a specific strikingness. In other cases, [there will be a strikingness] due to the incorporation of hyperbolic language and so on.

E.2.9 When there is no specific strikingness, there is no ornament of speech

However, if there is no specific strikingness, there is no ornament of speech, as seen in an [ordinary] logical inference. For example:

Whoever, when somebody is being talked about, shows long and hot sighs interrupted repeatedly, is passionate with regard to that person; and you seems to be such, slender one!

The same should be understood in the case of poetical reason and so on.

E.2.10 Ruyyaka's idea should not be applied in examples such as " $yatrait\bar{a}\ lahar\bar{\imath}$ " because these are based on hyperbolic language

Since these arrows, piercing the vulnerable points, fall continually only there, to where those young ladies with unsteady glances gesture with their eyebrows, the wrathful Love-god, who is their envoy, truly always runs in front [of them], pulling back with his hand the arrow joined to the bow that has turned into a circle.

In such stanzas and so on, however, even though the state of being an envoy and the falling of arrows and so on are not [actually] related, a relation arises through the clever expression of the poet. Therefore, since [the expressions in this stanza are] based on hyperbole, we should not say that it is different from other rhetorical figures.

¹⁶⁶Here $q\bar{a}th\bar{a}$ refers to the first example of the two.

E.3 Poetical reason

E.3.1 The definition of the rhetorical figure of poetical reason

The mark which causes another person to understand [something] is [the rhetorical figure of] poetical reason. (79)

The mark which ascertains an object that is not yet understood by another person and takes the form of informing¹⁶⁷, is the poetical reason. The use of the word "another person" is for the purpose of distinguishing [it] from poetical reason.

E.3.2 The distinction between poetical reason and poetical inference

Therefore, poetical inference is a comprehension from an inferential mark by oneself, [while] the figure of poetical reason, which has "poetical mark" ($k\bar{a}vyalinga$) as its synonym, causes another person to understand by means of an inferential mark, and it takes the form of an inference for another person.

E.3.3 Despite the two types of logical inference, poetical reason is defined separately

Even though logical inference itself has two different types because it takes [either] the form of [an inference] for the sake of oneself or the form of [an inference] for the sake of another person; nevertheless, the old [rhetoricians] defined them separately on the basis that the thing expounded is different. In this section the definition is also [given] exactly as such.

E.3.4 The distinction between poetical mark and poetical inference given by Ruyyaka is not correct, the abovementioned distinction is preferred

However, when some others [such as Ruyyaka] say that this [poetical reason] which conveys an object that is already comprehended is different from poetical inference which causes the comprehension of an object not yet comprehended,

¹⁶⁷Here *gamakarūpa* probably refers to Dandin's *jñāpakahetu*.

because it has an expectation of that [object]¹⁶⁸, then this is not correct; for, in that way, does this inferential mark convey an inference already understood by the speaker or by the person being informed? In this situation, it is not the first one. For the speaker, since the [already] ascertained object understood through other means of knowledge does not have any expectation. For it is not the case that an expectation can cease by one's own words; otherwise, there would be the unwanted consequence of self-dependence. The second one is also not [correct]. For the person being informed, on the other hand, the object is not [yet] understood through other means of knowledge. Since he does not convey an already comprehended object because he understands it only by that speech [of the speaker], it is certainly not a distinction to say that "poetical proof/mark conveys an already comprehended object, poetical inference makes others understand a not yet comprehended object." Therefore, exactly the differentiation stated above is preferrable.

E.3.5 The three subtypes of poetical reason

This inferential mark is twofold; it either takes the form of the meaning of words, or it takes the form of the meaning of sentences.

By educating, protecting, and maintaining [his] subjects, he was [virtually] their father; their [biological] fathers were merely the causes of their birth.

In this verse and in similar cases, with regard to the cause, *i.e.* the identity of a father, the education and so on take the form of its result. Since an explicit

¹⁶⁸cf. AlSar 58: ayam atra piṇḍārthaḥ | ihāsti pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāvaḥ | asti ca samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ | tatrāpratītapratyāyane pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāvaḥ | pratītapratyāyane tu samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ | tatra pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāve 'numānam | samarthyasamarthakabhāve tu yatra padārtho hetus tatra hetutvenopādāne nāgendrahastās tvaci karkaśatvād ityadāv iva na kaścid alaikāraḥ | yatra tūpāttasya hetutvaṃ yathodāhṛte viṣaye mṛgyaś ca darbhānkuranirvyapekṣā ityādau tatraiva kāvyalingam | yatra tu vākyārtho hetus tatra hetutvapratipādakam antareṇa hetutvāyopanyāse kāvyalingam eva | taṭasthatvenopanyastasya tu hetutve 'rthāntaranyāsaḥ | evaṃ cāsyāṃ prakriyāyāṃ kāryakāraṇavākyārthayor hetutve kāvyalingam eva paryavasyati | samarthyavākyasya sāpekṣatvāt tāṭasthyābhāvāt |

 $^{^{169}\}mathrm{Here}\ I$ accepted the reading apratītapratyāyana provided by $\mathrm{O_X}$ and $\mathrm{V_A}.$ apratītapratyāyaka is also possible, and it is easier to understand because of the expression pratītopapādaka in describing poetical proof/mark. However, the -ana suffix also expresses the meaning of tool and method, so apratītapratyāyana can have the same meaning with apratītapratyāyaka. Moreover, the reading apratītapratyāyana is supported by the passage in the AlSar 58: tatrāpratītapratyāyane pratyāyapratyāyakabhāvaḥ | pratītapratyāyane tu samarthyasamarthakabhāvaḥ | tatra pratyāyyapratyāyakabhāve 'numānam |

reason does not bring forth any aesthetic beauty, the meaning of the words as the reason is only implicit. The meaning of sentences [as the reason] is either explicit or implicit. Therefore, there are three subtypes.

E.3.6 In the case "vakṣaḥsthalī rakṣatu" etc., there is only a rhetorical figure, not suggestion

Examples run as follows:

May the chest of the world-procreator whose banner bears [the likeness of] Garuḍa (i.e. Viṣṇu) protect mankind, [for] with the [traces] of Śrī's cosmetic powders, it appears like a touchstone for the splendour called conjugal felicity.

In this example, with regard to the chest being the protector of the world, the procreating the world takes the form of a cause which is a reason expressing a word-meaning. In fact, it is well-known that a father caresses his own child on his chest. We should not say that, merely because it is likely, in this example the state of being the procreator of the world exhausts itself in being an attribute to "possessing Garuḍa as banner"; [and] since the sentence has been [then] completed, that the additional idea $(arth\bar{a}ntarasya)$, namely that the chest is fit for protection because of the condition of [his] being procreator of the world, is known through the operation of "suggestivity" $(vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}vy\bar{a}p\bar{a}ragamyatv\bar{a}d)$, and that therefore this is an instance of suggestion (dhvani). To explain, even that suggested meaning is an element of ornamenting the literal meaning because it is the reason for the generation of literal meaning in the form of the protecting power of [Viṣṇu's] chest, it is not fit to be ornamented by virtue of being a subordinated suggestion, [thus] there is only literal ornamentation [in this example].

E.3.7 An example containing suggested meaning

When such kind of suggested meaning is subsumed, a further example [runs as follows]:

The mother-in-law, neglecting all other tasks, protects her daughter-in-law, as if she were the revivifying herb for her son; [the daughter-in-law, whose] life has risen to her throat (*i.e.* she is near death) when she sees the new rain clouds.

In such examples, even though the attribute "having one's life come to the throat" is the implicit reason for protecting and so on, it is the same in all places.

Those who are skilled in consideration will say that since the reason appears through literal denotation as an attribute, there is no strikingness; therefore, it is not a case of ornamentation.

E.3.8 The difference between poetical reason and parikara

Moreover, since this suggested sense is an ornament towards a literal sense that functions as a reason, [and] because this accordingly qualifies as [the figure of] parikara, the literal sense ornamented by the suggested sense functions as the reason towards it, and not just [the literal sense] itself. One should determine this type to be such.

In [the figure of] *parikara*, the suggested sense should be known to be always an ornament to the literal sense. A literal sense embraced by a suggested meaning is a poetical reason with regard to another literal sense.

Thus is the epitome.

E.3.9 The example of explicit poetical reason containing the ascertainment of oneness ($abhed\bar{a}dhyavas\bar{a}ya$)

Even though her friend said: "Alas! Careless lady! Grasp your garment!" A certain lady is heedless; for she is immersed in the *rasa* (lit. water/sentiment) space where the blessed Cupid is the innermost.

In this example, with regard to the result, *i.e.* not being conscious, the state of being immersed in rasa in the form of a cause is the explicit reason; because the word "for" (hi) is employed here. Within the very example, when the word rasa expresses the meaning "water", it is suitable [to say that] she does not know as long as the state of being immersed in water is expressed. Therefore, the suggested meaning ["water"] rooted in the power of the word [rasa] is cognized as the reason because of the ascertainment of oneness ($abhed\bar{a}dhyavas\bar{a}ya$).

E.3.10 The example of explicit poetical reason containing a mark in the form of the meaning of sentence

Or like the following verse:

There is no kinsman equal to resolve, there is no enemy for a beautiful lady equal to it. Since, contriving a meeting with her beloved, and having aroused love, it [then] foils it.

In this example, with regard to the cause, *i.e.* being a kinsman and being an enemy, the arranging of a meeting with the lover etc., in the form of a result is the explicit reason expressed by the meaning of sentence, because the word "for (yad)" is employed.

E.3.11 The example containing an opposite result

For now, avert your face, O good lady! The black-spotted moon shall never equal [your beauty] by transferring his stain to [your] cheeks.

In this example, the result of not moving the face in the form of transferring the impure black spot, opposite to moving the face, causes the sameness [of beauty]; and it is accepted as the reason. Therefore, the mark is the implicit perception of an opposite result.

E.3.12 The example of implicit poetical reason containing a mark in the form of the meaning of sentence

Do not weep, O young girl! The fresh spray of mango tree, adorned with the first buds¹⁷⁰ and placed on the mouth of the [auspicious water-filled] jar at the time of departure, will restrain [your] beloved one from going away.

In this example, with regard to the heroine's tears being held back, the result, *i.e.* the hero giving up on his departure is produced by another cause, namely the mango flower. Therefore, the reason [in this example] is implicit and takes the form of a cause.

E.3.13 The examination of the rhetorical figures of poetical inference and poetical reason

This examination of the rhetorical figures of poetical inference and poetical reason should be accepted:

Generally, [poetical reason arises] because there is the explicit enunciation for the purpose of another person; but even if another person is not addressed, as long as the mark, either in the form of the meaning of words or in the form of the meaning of sentence, makes another person understand [something], [that

¹⁷⁰Fresh mango flowers appear from February to March, and spring comes soon after that. Therefore, they can be regarded as the sign of the coming of spring.

is] exactly [the case of] the rhetorical figure of poetical reason. However, where there is the ascertainment of one's own perception by the power of using words like "I know $(j\bar{a}ne)$ ", "surely now $(n\bar{u}nam)$ ", etc., there arises poetical inference. However, in some instances, such as in dramatic passages like "parimlānaṃ $p\bar{n}nastana$ " and so on, even though there is no expression like "surely now" and so on, poetical inference [appears therein] because one can by oneself ascertain through consideration according to context. In the same way, in the verse "na $j\bar{a}t\bar{a}$ $r\bar{a}gasarvasva$ " and so on where one's own consideration is ascertained, the rhetorical figure of poetical reason is unsuitable 171.

 $^{^{171}}$ Here we expect that the verse beginning with $na~j\bar{a}t\bar{a}~r\bar{a}gasarvasva$ is accepted as an example of poetical inference, but both O_X and V_A read $hetvalamk\bar{a}ra~eva$. This means that O_X and V_A regards the verse beginning with $na~j\bar{a}t\bar{a}~r\bar{a}gasarvasva$ as a proper example of poetical reason, which is definitely a crucial misunderstanding of Śobhākara's theory.

Chapter 6

Abbreviations

AlRat Alamkāraratnākara of Śobhākaramitra. See Devadhar 1942.

AlSar Alamkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka. See Janaki and Raghavan 1965.

AlVim Alamkāravimarśinī of Jayaratha. See Dvivedi 1969.

KĀd Kāvyādarśa of Dandin. See Belvalkar 1924.

KABh Kāvyālaṃkāra of Bhāmaha. See Sastry 1970.

KP Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa. See Vāsudevaśāstrī 1921.

KAR Kāvyālaṃkāra of Rudraṭa. See Durgâprasâd and Panśîkar 1928.

KASS Kāvyālamkārasārasamgraha of Udbhata. See Banhatti 1982.

NB Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. See Malvania 1955.

NBh Nyāyabhāsya of Vātsyāyana. See Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha, 1936.

NM Nyāyamañjarī of Bhatta Jayanta. See Varadacharya 1969–1983.

NV Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara. See Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha, 1936.

NS Nyāyasūtra of Gautama. See Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha, 1936.

 $\mathbf{P}_{\pm\mathbf{p}}$ Alamkāraratnākaraprākṛtagāthāsaṃskṛtīkaraṇam in \mathbf{P}_{\pm} .

 $\mathbf{P_{\acute{s}rs}}$ $Alaṃk\bar{a}raratn\bar{a}karas\bar{u}tr\bar{a}ni$ in $\mathbf{P}_{\acute{s}}$.

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