Stealth Privatization: Power Dynamics behind Sustainable Fisheries Governance

ステルス民営化：持続可能な漁業ガバナンスの背後にあるパワーダイナミクス

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Kyoto University

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Name:

Alayna Deanne Irene Ynacay-Nye

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Abstract

In the era of the "blue economy", corporate actors are playing a more influential role in shaping and commodifying fisheries governance processes. Stealth privatization is a new process of exclusion, where regime actors use their instrumental, material, and discursive power to capitalize on the vulnerabilities faced by rural fishing communities. This research aims to understand how regime actors legitimize stealth privatization projects and to illuminate the impact on alternative groups within the fisheries governance structure. To do so, I utilized Newell and Levy's (2006) approach to power, an analytical framework used to examine how and why corporate actors use their power in global governance. This research employed a multi-method approach, a case study method based on semi-structured and unstructured interviews coupled with secondary data analysis. Using this approach I analyzed stealth privatization projects in three different contexts, the Momonoura Special Economic Zone for Fisheries in Japan, the Pebble Mine in the United States, and the Chana Industrial Estate in Thailand. This research yielded two main results. The first result showed that both corporate and government actors work together to shape and legitimize "sustainable" fisheries governance by commodifying the vulnerabilities of rural fishing communities. This research uncovered three main techniques to do so, through disaster capitalism, exploiting inequitable access regimes, and appropriating social development schemes. The second main result came from the analysis of alternative groups in each community studied, which uncovered unique processes of food sovereignty that help to emphasis the skills, values, and resources fishers already have into decision-making processes for the future. Food sovereignty for fishers must confront the structural inequalities driven by regime actors at its roots by emphasizing the cultural values of each community. Future research should look into how to create checks and balances for regime actors in cases of stealth privatization, especially focusing on what kind of systems need to be put in place to redistribute power equitably within fisheries governance.

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

3.11 Disaster Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster (2011)

BNPP *Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani* (Patani National Liberation Front)

BRN *Barisan Revolusi Nasional (*National Revolution Front)

BRN-C *Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate* (National Revolution Front-Coordinate)

CIE Chana Industrial Estate

CPM-43 Civilian-Police-Military Command-43

DoF Department of Fisheries

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FJ Fisherman Japan

GAMPAR *Gabungam Melayu Patani Raya* (Greater Patani Malayu Association)

GSF Green South Foundation

HDI Hunter Dickinson Incorporated

IMF International Monetary Fund

IRPC Integrated Refinery and Petrochemical Complex Public Company Limited

ISOC Internal Security Operations Command

IUU illegal, underreported, and unregulated

IQ individual quota

JCFU Japan Coastal Fisheries Union

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

MLP multilevel perspective transition theory

MoU memorandum of understanding

MSY maximum sustainable yield

NPO non-profit organization

NGO non-governmental organization

NRC National Reconciliation Commission

NWLLC Natural Way of Life Learning Center

OSM oyster shelling machine

PAD People's Alliance for Democracy ("yellow shirts")

PPP Palang Pracharath Party (People's State Power Party)

PULO *Pertubuhan Pembebasan Bersatu Patani* (Patani United Liberation Organization)

SEZ special economic zone

SEA strategic environmental assessment

SFAC Sea-Area Fisheries Adjustment Committee

SBPAC Southern Border Province Administrative Centre

SBPPBC Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command

SPAO Songkhla Provincial Administrative Organization

TAC total allowable catch

TDRI Thailand Development Research Institute

TNI Transnational Institute

TPI Polene Thai Petrochemical Industry Polene Public Company Limited (also TPIPP)

UK United Kingdom

US United States of America

UTBB United Tribes of Bristol Bay

UN United Nations

Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Research Background

The UN Ocean Conference held in June-July of 2022 highlighted the importance of scientific collaboration and knowledge-sharing in the fight against our ocean's many challenges (United Nations (UN), 2022a). They argue that the solution to such challenges as detrimental climate change impacts, increasing pollution from micro-plastics, and the threat of illegal, underreported and unregulated fishing, will have science, technology, and innovation to play a greater role than ever before (UN, 2022b). Such will ensure that the international community can take responsibility in playing a bigger role in meeting the Sustainable Development Goal 14: Life below Water.

The conference explored a variety of solutions for the fisheries sector, focusing on better ways to monitor and measure human impacts through fish stock assessments, maximum sustainable yield (MSY) improvement, and strengthening data collection challenges faced in developing countries (UN, 2022b). These measures have been promoted as an exemplary way forward for how "…stakeholders can come together to transition towards a sustainable ocean-based economy and, as a result, protect biodiversity, community livelihoods and climate resilience" (UN, 2022b). Significantly, UN representatives at the conference also claimed that a collaboration of government agencies, small-scale fishing groups, and scientists, without the barriers of "top-down hierarchical systems of knowledge," are needed to bring these new innovations to light (UN, 2022a).

A number of presentations highlighted the importance of investment and financial support for the development of the "blue economy". The blue economy is defined by the World Bank as the "sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and jobs, and ocean ecosystem health" (2017). The concept, as promoted by international organizations such as the World Bank and transnational fishing corporations, often express three overlapping goals: environmental protection, economic development, and social development (Transnational Institute (TNI), 2021). Many projects using the term "blue economy", however, encourage processes of privatization based on the perception that fisheries resources and spaces are more effectively governed under private management (Carothers and Chambers, 2012). For example, some blue economy projects encourage the creation of sustainable seafood certifications or coastal redevelopment for sustainable tourism. Such projects require private corporations to be more active in governance process, which often lead to the enclosure of common pool resources and the creation of new rules and regulations.

1.1. Scope of this Dissertation and Research Gaps

Since the main goal for corporations is profit-maximization, their increasing role as governance actors must be critically analyzed (Newell and Levy, 2006). As fisheries governance continues to rapidly transition into the hands of corporations, privatization under the banner of the blue economy is also expected to increase (Campling and Havice, 2018; Mansfield, 2007). How privatization is shaped and legitimized in the blue economy has yet to be thoroughly examined (Donahue, 1989; Bush and Oosterveer, 2019). Wiber et al. (2010) described privatization under the guise of sustainability as 'stealth privatization'. Thus far, stealth privatization has been described by scholars as a discursive tool used by corporate actors as an approach to make their privatization activities appear attractive. Due to this, stealth privatization could be described as simply a method of "green-washing", a marketing technique used to improve the image of corporate projects. However, due to the broad implications of stealth privatization on economic, political, and social systems, the concept requires more significant attention to understand how and through what processes corporate actors are able to promote, develop and secure their dominance in the sustainable fisheries discourse and governance. Through using the concept of stealth privatization, this dissertation brings attention to the existing structures that continue to benefit the capitalist elite and the motivations behind their growing influence fisheries governance.

1.2. Problem Statements and Research Objective

As influence of corporate actors in fisheries governance increases under the blue economy, stealth privatization projects are on the rise (Carothers and Chambers, 2012; Bush and Oosterveer, 2019). However, stealth privatization has yet to be thoroughly analyzed as something that goes beyond mere green-washing techniques. *How* corporate actors engaged in stealth privatization projects utilize their power to legitimize and secure the system as-is and the impacts on other governance actors has yet to be examined. Specifically, the relationships between corporate actors and the government actors (the regime), as well as the impacts of regime power dynamics on alternative governance groups[1] have yet to be thoroughly analyzed in the context of stealth privatization projects in fisheries governance.

To fully understand the implications of how and why corporate actors have played a role in sustainable fisheries governance, I examine the power dynamics behind what I term as stealth

[1] "Alternative governance groups" is the terminology chosen for this dissertation to describe social groups that govern fisheries resources peripheral to the regime in each community studied. Other words that can be used to refer to these groups is "niche", which describes social groups on the "micro-level where radical novelties emerge" (Geels and Schot, 2007, p. 400).

privatization in coastal fishing communities. Through the analysis of the ways in which private actors have increasingly embedded themselves into fisheries governance, the objective of this research is to examine the forms of power utilized by the regime, and shed light on alternative governance groups working outside of the stealth privatization project. By doing this, this research further clarifies the way regime actors have transformed discourses behind sustainable fisheries governance through stealth privatization in diverse structural contexts.

1.3. Significance of this Dissertation

This dissertation contributes to two major literature gaps through: 1) uncovering how regime actors frame and legitimize stealth privatization projects in the era of the "blue economy", and 2) illuminating the challenges and strengths of alternative governance groups who work outside the stealth privatization projects for sustainable governance in their communities.

The first significance of this dissertation is its attempt to shed light on the deeper issue of behind actors engaged in stealth privatization projects. Oftentimes, the actual motivations and interests of regime actors are hidden behind corporate privacy or national security which makes it difficult to critically examine their activities. While critical scholars have conducted numerous studies on the negative impacts of privatization and corporatization in fishing communities, this study has examined the structure behind the scenes of these projects. The power dynamics behind stealth privatization projects have fundamentally shaped and promoted their development. The power structures constructed are solidified by the unique structures they are built in. This research illuminates the structures intentionally created to ensure the fisheries governance structure continues as-is, benefiting the capitalist elite.

The second significant contribution of this research brings attention to alternative fisheries governance groups that are often left out of decision-making due to the power imbalance in existing governance structures. In addition to illuminating the challenges they face during the development of stealth privatization; this research also proposes we turn our attention to the solutions created from the bottom-up. Alternative strategies are often dismissed by government and corporate actors due to their niche level, however this dissertation is aimed at examining how the visions behind alternative groups could combat future appropriation of sustainable fisheries governance.

1.4. Research Questions

This dissertation is guided by two main research questions. The first, *how do regime actors legitimize stealth privatization for sustainable rural fisheries governance?* This question aims at analyzing the tools with which regime actors have legitimized and pursued stealth privatization, securing their position as a governing actor. The second research question is, *how does stealth privatization impact alternative groups within the fisheries governance system*? In other words, this dissertation also aims at analyzing how local niche groups have resisted, or adapted to the introduction of stealth privatization projects?

While each case study is guided by the same overarching questions, it is important to note that due to the different contexts of the case studies, further more specific questions are introduced and discussed in each case study chapter.

1.5. Analytical Framework

In order to understand how powerful actors legitimize their agency for these projects it is necessary to use a political economy approach, specifically using a power lens. This research will therefore be conducted based on perceptions of critical and (neo-) Gramscian approaches, acknowledging both the role of agency and the characterizations of the structure as equally important and interconnected in terms of power dynamics. Emphasizing the intentional activities (agency) of actors in these stealth privatization schemes and their relationship to the embedded structure is a crucial focal point of this analysis.

The analytical framework used in this dissertation is based on Peter Newell and David Levy's (2006) approach to corporate power. This framework aims at dissecting the ways corporate actors use their political economic power to pursue their own interests. Their framework has created broad indicators of power to be used as a tool to critically analyze the ability of corporate actors to play a more influential role in governance. The forms of power introduced by this approach are, institutional (or organizational) power, material power, and discursive power. Each form of power allows for corporate actors to influence and legitimize their activities in governance. Institutional power can be analyzed from a variety of levels, from the level of the firm to the macro-level, emphasizing the embeddedness of their influence in the overall structure (Newell and Levy, 2006). Material power can refer to a corporate entity's 'technological' or 'innovative' advantages that improve their positioning and influence policy development. Material power goes beyond material advantages, but the processes behind developing product or technological *strategies* as well. Finally, discursive power refers to the creation of a particular image or narrative to improve their positioning. Discursive power goes beyond marketing techniques,

often manipulating 'scientific' data, or creating false consumer demand to promote their own interests (Newell and Levy, 2006).

This dissertation also is aimed to expand this framework in two ways. The first is to incorporate state actors as more than bystanders, but as active players pursing their own mutually beneficial interests. Second, this dissertation is aimed to broaden the scope of Newell and Levy's framework from focusing only on power dynamics behind environmental global governance to dynamics that shape all aspects of sustainable governance, including social, political, and economic lenses that were not directly addressed in Newell and Levy's original framework.

1.6. Methods and Methodology

This dissertation employs a multi-method approach: embedded case study method based on semi-structured and unstructured interviews, alongside secondary data analysis.

The analysis of secondary data has been an important contribution due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic that caused travel restrictions all over the world. Due to this, collection of first-hand data in the field was limited.

The embedded case studies for this dissertation were chosen based on different structural contexts, as the strategies and actions taken by the regime actors are often in response to existing issues faced by the targeted community. I aim to show the ways in which continued interference of corporate entities into decision-making is taking place through diverse and intentional processes that are different depending on the locality of the project. Since privatization projects and their implications will differ, it was important to choose three very different contexts in order to show a pattern regarding overall trends of regime influence. The cases chosen in this dissertation are based on my previous research conducted and previous research connections to governance actors in each of these countries.

The first case analyzed is the Special Zone for Reconstruction of Fisheries in Momonoura District within Miyagi Prefecture, Japan. The Special Zone is a special economic zone (SEZ) for private fishing corporations, created in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster. The second case study is the Pebble Mine project in the Bristol Bay region in the State of Alaska, United States of America. The Pebble Mine is a project created to extract precious metals, mainly copper, in an area that is historically and economically essential for the world's most productive salmon fishery. The third case is the Chana Industrial Estate in Chana district, Songkhla Province, Thailand. The Chana Industrial Estate (CIE) is a deep-sea port planned to be constructed to increase trade and develop green technologies, though its

location displaces small Muslim fishing communities along the coast. Each case study also includes examples of niche initiatives that offer alternative solutions to the stealth privatization project, unique to each individual context.

Each of these case studies reflects different ways in which regime actors use their power to influence and legitimize stealth privatization projects for their own interests.

1.7. Structure of this Dissertation

The structure of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 provides an in-depth literature review of the development of stealth privatization and illuminates the research gaps for this dissertation. Chapter 3 justifies and describes the methodological framework and analytical lens utilized throughout this dissertation, as well as important background information for each case study. Chapters 4-6 are the findings of this research's analysis, divided into individual chapters based on case study location. Each chapter utilizes the same methodological framework but includes unique questions and implications of each diverse context. Each result chapter also includes a brief overview of an alternative governance group in the case study location that introduces unique strategies and lessons to be learned. Chapter 7 is the discussion chapter where I answer my research questions based on evidence from my findings. This chapter will also dive into the implications of this dissertation to broader questions of food sovereignty for fishers and the future of sustainable fisheries governance. Finally, chapter 8 concludes this dissertation with an overview of the results of analysis as well as implications and potentials for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Research Questions

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to trace the way in which previous studies have documented how stealth privatization emerged and was legitimized in policy-making and public discourse. This chapter first conducts a literature review of the privatization discourse from which stealth privatization would develop. Based on this review, I show how the sustainability discourse for privatization has changed over time due to the growing influence of corporate actors in governance systems. I then introduce how alternative concepts, such as commons governance and food sovereignty, have been formed as critiques of the conventional[2] privatization debate. This chapter will then introduce the concept of stealth privatization, specifically focusing on how literature distinguishes it from existing concepts such as green-washing and ocean-grabbing in the context of political economy. Finally, I conclude this chapter by elucidating the research gaps made clear through this literature review which will form the foundation of this dissertation hereon.

2. Is the Privatization and Efficiency Debate Over?: 'Tragedy of the Commons" (1950's-) to Thatcherism and Reaganomics (1970's-) to Food Sovereignty (1990's-)

2.1. Legitimization of Privatization as a Management Strategy

Privatization is an ambiguous and complex term; its nuances vary between disciplines and its moral considerations are constantly debated. Whether or not to privatize a public good or service, is known as "the privatization decision", which asks which group, either public or private, would manage more efficiently (Donahue, 1989). The conventional understanding of privatization and its link to efficiency has its roots in economics and management literature, which focuses on the effects of shift in the ownership and management of public services from the hands of the government to the private sector. According to economic literature, the choice comes down to "to make or to buy" (Bailey & Pack, 1995). Or, in other words, should citizens collectively pay for a particular good or service (through taxation), or should it be paid only by the individuals who make use of the good or service? (Donahue, 1989). While economists tend to agree that privatization is more beneficial than not when it comes to the ownership and

[2] "Conventional" as terminology is used in a sense of how privatization is understood and debated about in its earliest and most simplistic form. However, this kind of privatization is still prevalent in academic literature today, particularly as it relates to the ongoing shift of public services and goods being transferred to private entities (train lines, electricity distribution, etc.).

management of public services they also acknowledge, to some extent, that regulation and monitoring would be necessary (Bailey & Pack, 1995). For example, for sectors that are reasonably competitive and offer no significant market failures, it is argued that policies should prioritize increasing competition while improving regulation to avoid giving all control over monitoring to the private sector. Therefore, from some economic perspectives, if all power is given to private entities, there is the potential for "inefficiencies" (Bailey & Pack, 1995).

Privatization is often seen in two forms: first, the transfer of government services to private management; and the second, government selling or distributing common-pool resources to private hands. The first form mainly emphases the rationale that private management is more efficient, ranging from financial, labor, and time efficiency. The first form of privatization is described as a solution to government inefficiencies perceived by both economists and the public in Western (namely the United Kingdom and the United States) countries during the 1980's and 1990's. This form of privatization is the transfer of management of public (government) services and goods to private entities. The main reasons behind the proponents of this form of privatization focus on the consequences of government ownership, as it was perceived that governments often lacked the capacity to manage certain goods and services (Bailey & Pack, 1995).

The second form of privatization, the main focus of this dissertation, regards property rights particularly as it relates to open-access systems or, as research in the 1950's and 1960's defined, common-pool resources. Privatization in this form was made famous by Garrett Hardin's 1968 publication of "The Tragedy of the Commons"[3]. Hardin theorized for common-pool resources, rational beings would always seek to maximize their own gains by over-accumulating resources. These rational beings, which would inevitably lead to the system's collapse, i.e. the tragedy (Hardin, 1968). Hardin was heavily influenced by Malthusianism[4] and criticized the "welfare state", as it encourages "breeding" without conscious awareness of the consequences of over-population, which, he argued, would lead to pollution and overconsumption of resources (Hardin, 1968, p. 1246). Hardin proposed that a way to solve this problem was to shift toward processes of privatization, which would place limits on the

[3] The first instance of the negative impacts of unregulated common-pool resources is actually documented by William Forster Lloyd in the 1880's (Lloyd, 1980). However, the concept and terminology of 'Tragedy of the Commons' would be made infamous by Hardin in 1968, which is why Lloyd's work is not emphasized in this dissertation.

[4] Malthusianism is a term used to describe the ideology made famous by Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus, who theorized that population growth will outpace food production, which will cause poverty and depopulation. This in turn would 'correct' earth's population to sustainable levels. While this theory is still cited to this day, ultimately, it has been debunked, due to the lack of acknowledgement to technological advancements or empirical evidence.

amount of resources taken, or exclude certain individuals. Hardin's work emphasized that private ownership is not only more efficient, but also more sustainable because it excludes actors that take advantage of the common pool resources.

There are several case studies that further develop and legitimize Hardin's original theory. One of the most influential in fisheries studies is Scott Gordon's work which emphasized that the lack of private property rights as the reason behind the depletion and overexploitation of ocean resources (Carothers and Chambers, 2012; Gordon, 1954). Gordon also emphasizes that the rational fisher would catch as many fish as possible in fear that there may not be fish for tomorrow, also known as the "race for fish" (Transnational Institute, 2016; Gordon, 1954). Another study by Agnello and Donnelley (1975), emphasized how coastal oyster beds on the east coast of the United States should be privatized in order to do away with the issues associated with common property rights, namely, disinvestment, congestion, over exploitation, and government restrictions. They claimed that "communal property rights have a significant adverse impact on labor productivity", and explains how common property areas cause over-utilization, leading to depletion and decline in productivity (Agnellow and Donnelley, 1975, p. 522). They found, in comparison, privatized oyster farms showed higher labor productively overall.

These case studies emphasizes that privatization processes are more beneficial than commons governance because they utilize resources and labor more "efficiently" or "sustainability", in relation to environmentalism. However, neither of these articles discussed the effects on social, cultural, or political aspects of sustainability as a result of privatization. On the contrary, Hardin states that, "Injustice is preferable to total ruin", proposing that deliberately discounting the social justice mindset is a necessity in the face of the Malthusian catastrophe (Hardin, 1968, p. 1247). Therefore, the logic behind privatization discourse in the past assumed that privatization was a more efficient and sustainable way to manage common pool resources because it excluded those who would contribute to the "Tragedy of the Commons".

2.2. Privatization in Practice: Policy Making from the West

Research on privatization was influential amongst policy makers in the west due to the structural context at the time Hardin's work was most influential. Privatization became a key policy practice in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly during the Margaret Thatcher administration in the United Kingdom (UK), followed by the United States (US) during the Reagan, Carter and Bush administrations (Donahue, 1989). Starting from this period, privatization, in a conventional, or bureaucratic sense, was seen simply as a way to limit government spending and shift managerial responsibility of public services

to private hands (Donahue, 1989). The beginnings of privatization literature started in the Western countries, which would expand to other countries around the world through development projects via the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The reason privatization became popular was due to several "success stories" of privatization that came to light at the time which boosted its legitimacy on a global scale. For example, the Thatcher administration in the UK was one of the most fiscally conservative administrations in its history. Its policies and reforms were shaped by neoliberal ideology in the form of reduction of state intervention, emphasis on a free market, and marginalization of trade unions. Triggered by the recession in the 1980s, the privatization boom in the UK started as an effort to relieve the government of fiscal pressure (Seymour, 2012). Privatization started with the transportation industry (National Freight Company in 1982) and eventually expanding to telecommunications sector (British Telecom in 1984), which famously marked the UK's rise in neoliberalism (Ward, 2020).

On the other side of the Pacific, the US government was facing an image problem. After a highly controversial Vietnam War (1955-1975) and the major Watergate scandal by the Richard Nixon administration (1972-1974), US citizens' trust in their own government had begun to dwindle. In addition, the economic impacts of the Nixon Shock[5], the 1970's oil crisis[6], and the 1973-1975 recession[7], lessened the confidence of the American public for its government to help them in times of crisis. The distrust and economic failure brought on by the Nixon administration set the stage for Ronald Reagan, who came into office with the promise of "Let's Make America Great Again"[8], who focused his campaign on promising the American public economic growth to a country suffering from stagflation and high levels of unemployment. During both of his terms as president, Reagan's administration would be marked with a series of economic policies that laid the platform for privatization in the US.

[5] The Nixon Shock is a phrase that envelopes a series of economic polices during the Nixon administration that included tax cuts, charges on imports, a freeze on prices and wages, and suspension of the USD convertibility into gold, which ultimately led to the exit from the Bretton Woods system and stagflation in the 1970's.
[6] Due to the US's support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War, Arab state members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placed an embargo on a number of countries, which led to the rise in oil prices and oil shortages. The crisis would also showcase US dependence on foreign oil and the direct influence it would have on the everyday lives of US citizens.
[7] This economic recession was a direct result of both the fall of the Bretton Woods system, the 1970s oil crisis, and the Nixon Shock, all of which caused economic stagnation and high inflation (stagnation) and high unemployment.
[8] Despite the popularity of the "Make America Great Again", or "MAGA", phrase by Former President Donald Trump, the phrase "Let's Make America Great Again" was first used by Ronald Reagan in the 1980 during his first presidential campaign, and again by Former President Bill Clinton during various campaign speeches in the 1990's.

"Reaganomics,"[9] as it was referred, pointed to a shift in economic policy driven by neoliberal rationale, focusing on the supply side of the national economy. Many of these policies practically implemented through privatization projects. Namely through, 1) the 1987 sale of Conrail (government freight railroad), which led to the selling off of five billion dollars in government loans; 2) the increased use of outside contractors to check backgrounds of applicants for government jobs, collect on bad debts, and audit the books of the General Services Administration, and 3) the Superfund Environmental Cleanup Program (1981), where 80-90% of the Environmental Protection Agency's annual budget devoted to national decontamination efforts were diverted to private contractors (Donahue, 1989).

2.3. Privatizing the Oceans

For this dissertation, I focus on privatization in the second form, the privatization of the common-pool resources, or specifically in this case, the oceans. Privatizing the oceans has been in discussion since Hardin's thesis best known through "The Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin, 1968). Hardin directly describes how the environmental degradation and eradication of marine species will continue to suffer due to commons ideology. He states, "Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the 'freedom of the seas.' Professing to believe in the 'inexhaustible resources of the oceans,' they bring species after species of fish and whales closer to extinction" (Hardin, 1986, p. 1245).

Privatization discourse has continuously dominated fisheries research and policy due to it appearing as common sense facts, easily convincing capitalist political elites via "science", or, mathematical modeling and scientific abstraction. Privatization discourse also tends to link to broader goals such as profit maximization and resource conservation have made privatization appear to have several positive outcomes (Carothers and Chambers, 2012). The 1992 United Nations (UN) Conference on Environment and Development highlighted these evident impacts of overfishing and environmental degradation forcing a shift in discourse away from economic optimization toward promotion of sustainable management of marine resources (Bush and Oosterveer, 2019). Drawing from Hardin, the UN determined that, "…'the traditional regime of freedom of the seas' should be transformed into a regime that is characterized 'by more purposeful and detailed management' at the transnational scale" (Bush and Oosterveer, 2019, p. 26). Furthermore, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' (FAO) recent publication "Blue Carbon-The Role of Healthy Oceans in Binding Carbon" (FAO, 2009), drew attention to the financialization and commodification of coastal land and its resources

[9] Reaganomics is also referred to as 'supply-side economics', 'trickle-down economics', 'free-market economics', or 'voodoo economics' by opponents.

(Probyn et al., 2020). Here, too, describes the traditional sense of privatization, whereby privatization is utilized as the ultimate solution to providing efficient management in a way that government or public entities would not be able to (Partlow et al., 2019). The link between environmental conservation and economic development, the win-win solutions, continue dominate privatization discourse to this day.

3. Critiques of the Privatization Debate: The Rise Food Sovereignty Literature

Even now, the sustainability dialogue goes hand-in-hand with privatization. Some argue that even with efficiency driven goals, it is necessary to incorporate the impacts to social issues (Partlow et al., 2019). In doing so, it is important to consider the relation of efficiency to concepts such as, well-being, environmental conservation, and economic growth. Taking into account societal issues is important as corporate actors play a bigger role in fisheries governance, emphasizing profit-maximization goals above all else (Powell and Newell, 2006).

3.1. Tackling the Tragedy: Ostrom's Sustainable Governance

In early privatization literature, there was little to no distinction between the common-pool resources and open-access areas (source). Elinor Ostrom was one of the first to articulate the difference and aimed to debunk the popular theory Hardin created that assumed commons were the reason behind economic inefficiency and environmental degradation. Ostrom emphasized how commons property regime can successfully, and sustainably, govern shared space and its resources (Ostrom, 1990). Her theory of collective action highlights eight principles that local communities demonstrate that show how with common-pool resources, local actors create rules for usage and monitoring, shared values, tools to handle conflict, and consider environmental impacts cooperatively (Ostrom, 1997). Ostrom's work asserts that many of these commons communities self-organize and self-regulate sustainably through a type of "property rights system", i.e. rule-making, distinct from the logics around private ownership or top-down government solutions. Ostrom also set the stage for future research that would encourage researchers to seek alternatives to top-down, command and control management strategies from existing commons governance structures (Ostrom et al., 1999). This amplified the idea that in fact commonly governed spaces are actually more sustainable, due to the willingness and cooperative activities of local actors who have traditionally relied on certain governing activities for several generations.

The conceptualization of common-pool resource governance as introduced by Ostrom, and the command and control management as introduced by Hardin, is where we see the first big gap in privatization literature for the fisheries sector. On one side, researchers following Ostrom's

methodology tend to be from critical social sciences, namely in the field of international development, political science, and sociology (Carothers and Chambers, 2012; Clark, 2020; Mills, 2018; Moreda, 2018 Probyn et al., 2020; Yaka, 2020). On the other hand, we still continue to see Hardin's theoretical base demonstrated in research from mainstream economics, business management, and environmental economics. However, while in the past, economic efficiency and sustainability for the purpose of excluding certain actors was the main focal point of research, now, privatization is shaped and legitimized by corporate actors for their own benefits, particularly to influence policy in their favor (Powell and Levy, 2006).

3.2. Drawing Attention to Equity: Food Sovereignty

One of the biggest gaps in privatization literature that continues to this day is the lack of incorporation of the structure and its impacts on local governance and decision-making, specifically the impacts from capitalism and the global neoliberal economy (Carothers and Chambers, 2012). Specifically, the recognition of the relationship between the agency of local fishers and the broader structure in which they are embedded. More critical social scientists have made the effort to show that fishers make certain decisions based on the larger structures they are embedded in. One study emphasized that local governance, or governance structures of common pool resources, does not necessarily guarantee sustainable practices or techniques due in particular to the pressures of the neoliberal market (Soper, 2020).

La Via Campesina is one of the first global social movements to bring attention to the lack of representation and rights of local small-scale producers in the policy making process. La Via Campensina is a transnational social movement created in response to the growing push for neoliberal, free-trade, and industrial agriculture forming in Latin America in the 1980's. Free-market globalization and regional free-trade agreements gradually began having a serious impact on peasant farmers, particularly through crop and livestock price drops (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2010). The transition to industrial agricultural systems brought inequality and exploitation of peasant workers and indigenous communities, which motivated small-scale producers to organize themselves and fight against the 'capitalist world order' (La Via Campesina, 2021). As La Via Campesina expanded outside of Latin America, their message of frustration against both profit-seeking transnational corporations and unreliable, corrupt governments began to solidify. The concept of food sovereignty was first introduced at the World Food Summit in 1996, and has since been modified several times for improve inclusivity to emphasize the importance of traditional knowledge, diversity, and conservation, newer struggles faced

by small-scale producers, due to the impacts of the climate crisis and the role of GMO's and intellectual property rights in industrial agriculture (La Via Campesina, 2007). As the world changes and new problems arise, La Via Campesina has adapted to ensure the foundational message of protecting small-scale producers against neo-liberalization has continued. The current definition of food sovereignty is, "The right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute, and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations" (La Via Campesina, 2007). It argues that local production is about more than just profit-seeking, or a product to sell in the market, but it also encompasses many different aspects of a rural livelihood. It also creates a base political agenda that seeks to advocate for producers who do not usually have a voice in decision-making.

While La Via Campesina originally drew from the agricultural sector, fisheries are far from excluded from their movement. Food sovereignty is based on the notion of a *peoples' sovereignty*, which includes the need to promote both farmers and fishers as producers of food (McMichael, 2018). Aquaecology is another concept developed by La Via Campensina specifically for the fisheries sector. Aquaecology, promotes, "a natural approach to fisheries, based on species-specific equipment and techniques, following life-cycle and breeding patterns, protecting coastal ecosystems, and adhering closely to catch limitations" (Probyn et al., 2020). Aquaecology is used to resuscitate small-scale fisheries as a public resource for food security and nutrition. It is also used as a movement to democratize communities and regional food systems, which includes respecting the rights of small-scale fishers to produce food, embracing gender equity and rights for workers, and determining territorial rights for First Nations people (Ertor, 2020).

3.3. Privatization and Food Sovereignty

The food sovereignty movement as promoted by La Via Campesina has always held strong views against privatization processes. La Via Campesina argues against both the privatization of seed distribution and the privatization of land for producing food (La Via Campesina, 2017). Food sovereignty implies that distribution, access, and control over resources must be fair, equitable, and must acknowledge the socio-environmental aspects of the land, sea, and their resources (La Via Campesina, 2017). For example, La Via Campesina sees land-grabbing as, "…the control (whether through ownership, lease, concession, contracts, quotas, or general power) of larger than locally-typical amounts of land by any persons or entities (private, foreign or domestic) via any means ('legal' or 'illegal') for

purposes of speculation, extraction, resource control or commodification at the expense of agroecology, land stewardship, food sovereignty and human rights" (La Via Campesina, 2017). From this understanding, it is impossible to separate ownership of land and its resources to that of equity and power dynamics. Due to influence from La Via Campesina and other advocacy groups, the increasing privatization and marketization of fishery access rights has generated much resistance from fishers and researchers alike. The negative impacts of privatization projects, particularly through the topic of land-grabbing, and in coastal communities through ocean-grabbing, has been begun to be studied (Clark, 2020; Franco et al., 2014; Moreda, 2018). This research relates to the impacts of privatization on fisher communities, focusing on the impacts on indigenous groups and the direct take-over of common places and sold to private corporations (Clark, 2020; Moreda, 2018). Researchers have also discussed the monopoly of power, expressing the need for fairness and equity by re-politicizing privatization discourses and processes (Carothers and Chambers, 2012). Specifically, how commodification, or marketization, of fishing rights by means of privatization, redefines human-nature relationships through narrow economic and environmental lenses (Carothers and Chambers, 2012). Research has also looked at the development of fisher's justice movements as a result of increasing impacts from various forms of privatization (Carothers, 2011; Ertor, 2020; Mills, 2018; Probyn et al., 2020; Yaka, 2020).

4. The Rise of Stealth Privatization

4.1. Broadening of the Conceptualization of Privatization

While economic efficiency was considered a reasonable argument for privatization in the past, now, with the growing global attention toward environmental destruction, sustainability has become an unavoidable discourse. According to the Transnational Institute (TNI), there are largely two sustainability narratives powerful actors push to legitimize privatization (2016). The first, is the need to expand industrial food production in order to feed a growing world population (TNI, 2016). This is an extension of the Hardin's conventional argument that private entities are more efficient to solve and prevent world hunger. The second discourse is conservationism, or the push to save critical habitats that are being exploited (TNI, 2016). Both of these discourses relate to fisheries issues such as overfishing, lack of food security, pollution, and climate change, to the lack of, or insufficient property rights.

Many have aimed to broaden the conceptual understanding of privatization, going beyond the public to private ownership transition, but putting focus on additional aspects of society that are also privatized (Carothers and Chambers, 2012; Foley and McCay 2014; Mann, 2020). Privatization is now

more broadly understood as, "…the transfer of the control over social processes related to the governance, use or distribution of resources from either open access or common property to private organizations, selected groups, or individual(s)" (Partelow et al., 2019, p. 750). This includes control over the distribution of resources in the market such as eco-labeling in fisheries and forestry (Foley and McCay 2014; Pattberg 2005), or control of information, technology or decision-making processes related to resources governance and its institutions (Partelow et al., 2019). Elizabeth Mann (2020) describes this as "newer processes of exclusion", which include climate change and mitigation agendas that couple with the more traditional ideas of privatization. These "newer processes of exclusion" are a result of established structures that put more focus on more profitable sectors, such as large-scale fishing corporations, tourism, oil, and gas (Mann, 2020).

4.2. How to Conceptualize "Stealth Privatization"

Due to the work of scholars, advocates, and fishers alike, negative impacts from more overt forms of privatization have received much attention and criticisms, pushing privatization proponents to engage in "stealth privatization" (Wiber et al., 2010). While the nuances of stealth privatization as an idea have been variously described in several case studies (Carothers and Chambers, 2012; Mann, 2020; Partelow et al., 2019; Wiber et al., 2010), its meaning is still not clearly defined and used uniformly across studies. In one study it is seen as privatization projects done behind the guise of sustainability, while placing the responsibility of resource management and rights allocation into private hands (Wiber et al., 2010). One example of stealth privatization is from Elyse Mills' (2018) looked at how privatization project were framed in an attempt to develop fossil fuel alternatives, which led to the targeting of inland freshwater rivers or their dam projects. These projects, however, actually caused widespread loss of livelihoods, displacement, and contamination, and destroyed fish habitats, all were issues that project organizers recognized could be possible to begin with (Mills, 2018).

While conservation or environmental management has been used as a discourse to privatize coastal waters for a long time, the intensity and rapid rise of these projects reflects the transition of the global governance of fisheries into the hands of corporate actors (Campling and Havice, 2018). Therefore, stealth privatization should be analyzed as a "new process of exclusion", in which the discourse behind these projects reflects the interests and growing role of corporate actors in fisheries governance.

5. Conclusions, Research Gaps, and Research Questions

Privatization of common-pool resources based on its roots in mainstream economics, aimed at placing 'efficiency' as the main indicator of conservation, economic growth, and rural development (Hardin, 1968; Gordon, 1954). However, efficiency discourses themselves tend to limit and depoliticize power, an important aspect when examining governance structures (Taylor, 2015). Efficiency could also be seen less as a tool used to measure success, but rather, a "politically constructed concept" that erases difference in highly unequal contexts (Mann, 2020, p. 190).

Despite modern research debunking these traditional arguments, privatization still plays an increasing role in policy development around the world (Carothers and Chambers, 2012; Ostrom, 1990). Due to the expanded understandings of the negative influences of neoliberal capitalism, the way privatization is legitimized has transformed. Privatization no longer simply defines the process of transferring ownership from public to private. Research now recognizes that privatization and its impacts processes before, during, and after privatization that reflect a particular society's power structure and its future impacts.

An analysis of the growing role of corporate actors in fisheries governance require more consideration. The influence of government actors and their relationship with corporate actors and how they play a role in either the process of privatizing common-pool resources, or benefiting from the effects of it should be examined. For example, blue carbon initiatives involve both governments and corporations to buy credits by "investing in the protection of" coastal areas to offset their carbon emissions (Mann, 2020). By conceptually distancing the impacts of stealth privatization and its negative effects on local communities, we allow corporate actors to legitimize themselves as "champions" against global food crises and allow them to further monopolize the food system (Alonso-Fradejas et al., 2020).

Based off this literature review, I have identified two research questions, one main and one sub question. The main research question is in response to literature that has identified stealth privatization projects as unique processes of privatization falling under the category of sustainability-washing (Partelow, et. al, 2019). In order to appear as legitimate and implement such changes, there needs to be a certain amount of power held and actively wielded by these actors. Therefore, my first research question is, "how do regime actors legitimize stealth privatization for sustainable rural fisheries governance?" The focus on these powerful actors and the structure that reinforces their ability to influence decision-making is a key focal point for this analysis. By focusing on the structure, I aim to not

only shed light on specific actors who engage in stealth privatization, but also demonstrate how and why power imbalances take place (and continue to take place), in decision-making.

My sub question is developed from the literature review on alternative counter movements such as La Via Campesina. On a broader scale, research and advocacy done in opposition to privatization, arguing for alternatives to privatization, were useful starting points for my research. In many cases, research identifies niche, alternative initiatives as avenues of transition, often being the source of creative, innovative practices and ideology for truly sustainable and just pathways (Ostrom, 1990; Geels and Schot, 2007). From this context, my second research question aims to discover avenues for alterity created and sustained by local people on-the-ground. My sub research question is, "how does stealth privatization impact alternative groups within the fisheries governance system?" In other words, how have alternative, or niche groups resisted, adapted, or ignored the introduction of stealth privatization projects? By identifying niche groups, I aim to illuminate grassroots, alternative movements that oftentimes do not get enough attention in decision-making. In addition, I aim to identify gaps in governance structures that would allow for opportunities for alternative groups to be brought to light.

Recent literature has begun to explore how privatization has broadened, particularly through the use of sustainability-washing discourse to legitimize the creation of privatization projects (Partelow et al., 2019). I argue that stealth privatization can be used to improve our description and understanding of the processes that lead up to privatization of resources once held as common-pool resources. By reflecting on the interests and motivations of key actors in governance structures and their power dynamics, which are often hidden or disguised, impacted local communities, I seek to identify avenues for alternatives that prioritize food sovereignty, a necessity for sustainable and just future pathways.

Chapter 3: Methodology and Methods

1. Justification of Newell and Levy's Power Analysis: Realities of a Global Neoliberal Economy

In a world where neoliberalism gradually shapes the global economy, privatization has become a common policy tool to govern the access and usage of marine spaces and resources (Mansfield, 2007). In order to identify the actors and the tools used behind stealth privatization projects, it was necessary to use a power analysis, specifically one that can account for the role of corporate actors in governance. Due to the legitimacy of powerful actors, their actions often appear invisible to the public, leaving much of their activity unanalyzed and minimized. In this context, the growing role of corporate actors needs to be critically analyzed to illuminate the realities behind privatization processes. Peter Newell and David Levy's (2006) research aimed at creating a framework to conceptualize the growing role of corporate actors in global environmental governance. Based on the structrualist, neo-Gramsican perspective of cultural hegemony, they assume (multination) corporations are governance actors, which intentionally influence, create, and in times, block environmental policy for their own interests. Due to the public attention of environmental and social issues created by corporate entities, they have disguised or hidden their bad behavior through green-washing (Newell and Levy, 2006; Rowell, 1996; Utting, 2001). However, due to their positioning in regional and international decision-making, Newell and Levy argue that corporate activities represent more than just marketing schemes, but represent a political response that allows them to create legitimacy and autonomy (Newell and Levy, 2006).

As *political* actors, corporations intentionally create self-interested policy through three main "pillars of hegemony", organizational (or institutional) power, material power, discursive power (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 11). The first pillar is organizational, or from hereon, institutional power. Institutional power is also sometimes described as "instrumental power", highlighting the directness of lobbying activities (Fuchs et. al, 2016). Institutional power can be analyzed from a variety of levels, from the level of the firm to the macro-level, which incorporate structural regimes (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 12). These corporate practices include, "…strategy to improve their market and technological positioning, sustain social legitimacy, discipline labor, and influence government policy" (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 12). The second pillar is material power. Material power represents a corporations' ability to innovate, a form of "technological power". Material power is not just the notion of possessing material objects that give them a financial or, technological advantage. Material power is also the way in which private entities develop product and technological strategies in order to secure their existing and future market positions (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 11). Finally, the third pillar is discursive power. Through the use of

marketing and public relations strategies corporations actively work toward constructing a particular image of their brand, regardless of their actual practices, or scientific evidence that may prove otherwise. According to this, discursive power may begin to sound a lot like green-washing. However, by simply regarding their practices as "cynical public relations", we neglect the increasingly significant role private actors play in governance systems (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 13).

1.1. Broadening of the Framework

As described in Chapter 2, an analysis of privatization of the commons must incorporate wider interpretations of ownership and access, particularly in relation to sustainability and how a resource system should be governed. Ownership goes beyond managing the environment, it incorporates livelihoods, culture, and existing political structures. Therefore, it was necessary for me to broaden Newell and Levy's framework to allow for analysis of the more diverse impacts of privatization processes.

Newell and Levy's power framework was originally designed to identify the ways in which private entities play a significant role as a political actor in governing processes, specifically in cases of environmental policy. Newell and Levy briefly mention instances of 'blue-washing', or marketing tactics used to disguise social issues, but do not go into detail of influence beyond environmental policy. In this dissertation, I aimed at broadening this framework in two ways. The first was to expand the scope of this framework to include more than just environmental policy, but to further highlight how social, economic, and political discourse is often used to justify their activities. The second, was to incorporate government entities as more than being part of a corporate entity's institutional power, but as active and continuous beneficiaries of privatization. Oftentimes the benefits to government actors continue on even after privatization. For example, as explained in Newell and Levy's chapter, one form of institutional power is often depicted as lobbying. However, lobbying extends far beyond the initial transfer of ownership in processes of privatization, as ongoing political support benefits a public official's career going forward. Therefore, I aimed at analyzing other ways government actors benefit throughout the entire privatization process.

The categorization of both corporate and government actors in stealth privatization as described in this dissertation are referred to as "regime actors", drawn from "sociotechnical regime", a term developed from the multilevel perspective (MLP) on transitions (Geels, 2005; Geels and Schott, 2007). The MLP describes sociotechnical regimes as a social groups embedded in institutions that define cognitive rule systems (Geels 2005; Geels, 2006). When in alignment, sociotechnical regimes create

"stability" and use this state of constancy to coordinate their own activities (Geels, 2006, p. 170). In this dissertation, powerful corporate actors and government actors have shaped the structure in which these stealth privatization projects are conducted. Therefore, examining of the power they wield analyzes how these actors have formed the regime, and continue to ensure a state of "stability" to pursue stealth privatization projects.

2. Methods

For this dissertation, I utilized a mixed method approach which included three case study analyses and a secondary literature analysis.

2.1. Secondary Data Analysis

Secondary data analysis was carried out due to limitations from the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the pandemic, the number of interviewees and the field work time frames were limited, as many potential interviewees are located in rural fishing communities[10]. Secondary data analysis was carried out on legitimate online and in-print newspaper articles, official government reports, published corporate data, local fisheries Facebook groups, and research articles relevant to this dissertation theme. Secondary data for this dissertation was found through the Google search engine and Google Scholar. Key words used for search included, privatization, corporate power, green-washing, and other relevant key words for each individual case (i.e. Chana Fisheries, or, Native Bristol Bay Fishing Culture). In cases where I was not a native speaker of the local language[11], I utilized both online translation programs, including Google Translate and DeepL, and translation and interpretation services from a native speaker for confirmation and clarity.

[10] Some potential interviewees expressed concern about interviewing in person due to the fear of the spread of COVID-19. In addition, due to the increased stress and workload from the pandemic, many potential interviewees expressed they were extremely busy and were unable to provide information even through Zoom or email. In other instances, potential interviewees were in remote communities with little access to internet services, or they themselves did not have knowledge of how to use Zoom or other video applications. Finally, due to my location being in Japan, phone conversations with interviewees in other countries was extremely limited, and heavily relied on email and Zoom communications.

[11] For the first case study in Japan, I have an intermediate-advanced level of Japanese language ability therefore field work and literature review was mainly done on my own, though reviewed by a native Japanese speaker for confirmation. For my case in Thailand, literature review and field work on this case was conducted in English and Thai. Due to a lack of Thai language ability, Thai language literature was translated with the above tools. Interviewees conducted in Thai were translated through a native Thai speaker using consecutive interpretation services. Terminology used in the Thai case were also reviewed by a Thai national for confirmation. As a native English speaker, field work and literature review conducted for the case in the United States was done on my own.

2.2. Case Study Analysis

First-hand data collection (field work) was conducted from the period of 10 months from February 2022-December 2022 in three countries, Japan, the United States, and Thailand. The total of 36 interviewees were selected based on either their relation to the local fisheries governance structure, or through snowballing from previous interviewees. Aside from snowballing, to find interviewees, I utilized Google to search for experts and main actors for each case study based on newspaper articles or official government documents on the selected stealth privatization project. All interviewees were first reached out through their official organization mailing list, then contacted individually from thereon. On average, interviews lasted anywhere from one hour to one and a half hours, each were recorded on a portable audio recording device with verbal consent of each interviewee. For interviews conducted on the Zoom application, most were recorded through the Google Chrome application VMaker. For each interview, a list of approximately ten open ended questions were prepared. Questions asked included topics such as, their opinions on the privatization project in general, their opinions on other actors engaged with or affected by the privatization project, and their view about alternatives to the privatization project or reasons for their promotion of the privatization project. Depending on the flow of conversation, or the answers of previous questions, not all questions prepared for each interviewee were necessarily asked. Additional or follow-up questions, both prepared and not, were also asked depending on the answers from previous questions. Follow-up questions and additional questions were also open-ended, usually "how" or "why" questions. After each interview, all the audio recordings were transcribed and saved to an external storage device.

2.3. Justification of Cases

By tracing the diverse development of privatization in each case, I was able to understand the underlying historical context of each case. The analysis of each context is essential for understanding private entities' power dynamics because their political economic contexts inherently shape, reinforce, and can ultimately transform, their legitimacy (Newell and Levy, 2006). Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony, the power of ideology, values and beliefs in shaping class relations, can only be understood by having a deeper understanding of the historical bloc, the social order that produces and legitimizes the dominate class in a social structure. In addition, in the field of political economy, it is necessary to recognize how regimes are embedded in the broader structure, while at the same time analyzing how actors engage with particular issues under specific conditions (Newell and Levy, 2006). Therefore, I trace how privatization was created and legitimized by politically and economically powerful actors who work

to secure their place in their historical bloc. This historical analysis will lay the foundations for the findings in chapters 4-6 as they relate to how private entities in each country have utilized their gained legitimacy to promote, strengthen, and sustain stealth privatization projects.

Choosing multiple case studies from different structural contexts was done to show how the continued interference of corporate entities into decision-making is diverse and intentional depending on the locality of the project. Since privatization projects and their implications will differ, it was important for me to choose three very different contexts in order to show a pattern regarding overall trends in transitions. However, all three countries chosen have traditional fishing communities and utilize local ecological knowledge. In general, all are capital-based market systems, with some niche alternative present. In each, governance abilities taken away from local people for the political economic interests of regime actors in a guised way. This shows different ways in which stealth privatization is legitimized and implemented based on the structural vulnerabilities local fishers face. All cases are suffering from similar issues outside of privatization schemes including: climate change effects, declining rural populations, and lack of or little political agency for small-scale fishers.

3. Case Study 1: Momonoura District, Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan

The first case analyzed in this dissertation is the Fisheries Reconstruction Special Zone, (水産業復興特区, *suisangyofukkotokku*)[12], created in Momonoura District, Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan. For this case, a total of 15 interviews (semi-structured and unstructured) were conducted through field work over three time periods, Match 7th-21st, 2019, February 5th-11th, 2020, and February 21st-24th, 2022 (Table 1).

3.1. The Precursors to the SEZ: Socio-Economic Background of Momonoura District

Momonoura District, in the Tohoku region of northeastern Japan, has long been considered one of Japan's richest fishing grounds (Image 1). While most known for its oyster cultivation in Ishinomaki City, Miyagi prefecture, dating back to the Edo period (1603-1868), this is just one small part of its long fishing history (Fisherman Japan [FJ], 2017). Within Ishinomaki City lays Momonoura district, a small fishing community encompassed by a small coastal bay. Similar to many fishing communities in rural Japan, Momonoura faces several socio-economic challenges including population decline, due to urban

[12] Hereon referred to as the Momonoura Special Economic Zone (Momonoura SEZ), due to its focus on economic and business development and growth (Momonoura Oysters Producer LLC, n.d.).

migration and overall aging, and the perceived stagnated economic development. Greater societal perception of work in the fishing sector has also contributed to this continued population decline. Its hands-on nature, tends to be associated as difficult, (きつい, *kitsui*), dirty (汚い, *kitanai*) and, dangerous (危, *kiken*), or the '3K image' (FJ, 2014). The population of Ishinomaki City was 160,826 in 2010, but it is expected to decrease to 109,021 by 2040 (Miyagi Prefecture Citizens Center, 2015).



Image 1: Location (in red) of Momonoura District (Kahoku Newspaper, 2018)

3.2. The 3.11 Disaster and the Prefectural Recovery Plan

Population decline and social perceptions of a fishing career were incredibly detrimental to Momonoura's fishing community, but the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster (3.11 disaster) on March 11th, 2011, would aggravate them for communities throughout the Tohoku region. Just 72 kilometers east of the coast of Ishinomaki City, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake triggered a massive tsunami which devastated the entire Tohoku coast. The tsunami itself reached up to 8.8 meters high in Ishinomaki City, completely wiping out over 20,000 buildings, damaging over 30,000 more and, killing 3,329 people[13] in a matter of minutes (Ishinomaki Community & Information Center [ICIC], 2019). The fishing industry was also completely devastated, demolishing all 244 fishing facilities (port and marine processing) and 2,585 ships, totaling over 260 billion yen (approximately $24 billion USD) in damages

[13] This number does not include the 420 people in Ishinomaki City still missing (but presumed deceased) as of December 2016 (ICIC, 2019). This statistic also does not include the number of people who died as a result of suicide from survivor's guilt or other issues relating to the disaster after the fact.

(ICIC, 2019). On top of the massive earthquake and tsunami, the disaster triggered explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, releasing radioactive material into the air and ocean.

Table 1: List of Anonymized Interviewees for Momonoura District Case Study

Anonymized Name	Position	Organization	Interview Date
Fisher A	Fisher, CEO of Fishery	A Ishinomaki Seaweed Fishery	February 22nd, 2022
Fisher B	Fisher	A Ishinomaki Salmon Fishery	March 13th, 2019
Fisher C	Fisher, CEO of Fishery	A Ishinomaki Salmon Fishery	March 13th, 2019
Fisher D	Fisher, CEO of Fishery	A Ishinomaki Salmon and Oyster Fishery	February 11th, 2020
Fisher E	Fisher, CEO of Fishery	A Ishinomaki Fish Processing Factory	February 5th, 2020
Ishinomaki Fish Market Representative	Fisher, Former CEO, Special Advisor to Fish Market	Ishinomaki Fish Market	February 9th, 2020
Prefectural Union Representative	Director	Iwate Prefectural Farmer/Fisher Union	March 9th, 2019
National Union Representative	Secretary General	Japan Coastal Fisheries Union	March 3rd, 2019
City Government Official	Director of Reconstruction Office	Ishinomaki City Government	February 7th, 2020
Consumer Co-Op Representative	Public Relations Representative	Miyagi Consumer Cooperative	February 6th, 2020
Miyagi Cooperative Representative	Fisher, CEO	Miyagi Prefectural Fisheries Cooperation	February 7th, 2020
Researcher A	Professor	Tohoku University	February 24th, 2022
Researcher B	Researcher	Norinchukin Research Institute	October 3rd, 2021
Researcher C	Researcher, Director	Miyagi Prefecture Fisheries Research Center	February 7th, 2020
Prefectural Government Representative	High Ranking Government Official	Miyagi Prefectural Government	February 7th, 2020

Post-3.11 disaster, Miyagi Prefecture started its reconstruction efforts by investing their allocated funds to infrastructure, which included roads, train lines, medical facilities, and an offshore seawall to create a barrier against future tsunamis. While most major infrastructure had been rebuilt by 2015, this did not include the restoration of permanent housing, fishing harbors, and farmland, which the local people needed to live and work (Miyagi Prefecture Citizen's Center, 2015). Fishers, in particular, felt that many of the reconstruction efforts were "working against them"[14]. For example,

[14] Data collected from Fisher C.

fishers saw seawalls as a security issue since it cut off visibility to the sea where their nets and boats were. Seawalls also physically separated fishers from the ocean, making it difficult to see when storms come or changes in weather that might impact their fishing (Lim, 2018).

3.3. The Development of the Momonoura SEZ and its Criticisms

One way to assist the fishing industry in Momonoura in recovering from the 3.11 disaster was the creation of the Momonoura SEZ (Image 2). Under the influence of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) deregulatory neoliberal policy framework, the governor of Miyagi prefecture announced the SEZ just two months after the 3.11 disaster (The Ups and Downs, 2012). The SEZ was designed specifically to, "…promote a swift and smooth reconstruction of the disaster-stricken area severely damaged by the Great East Japan Earthquake, for local fishers to take the lead in working together with private companies to reconstruct in areas (coastal areas)…" (Momonoura Oysters Producer LLC, n.d.). From the government's perspective, the SEZ would allow for easier entry of new businesses by bypassing the rigid and time-consuming entry barriers of the fisheries cooperatives, thereby encouraging economic growth. In addition, by creating the SEZ, the newcomers working at these businesses would help populate the local area, thereby mitigate population decline and contribute to the local economy.

The implementation of the SEZ was not without its criticism, particularly from local fishers and local fisheries cooperatives, causing significant conflict within the community (Ryuzuaki, 2014). Many fishers spoke out against the decision, claiming it was decided without proper consultation with the local fishers, and the very idea of the SEZ disregarded the local fisheries cooperatives, which have played a conventional, long-standing role in fisheries governance (Akama, 2015b). There were also concerns about whose interests the SEZ was serving and how the project would actually help local people and the efforts to revitalize the community (Akama, 2012b).

Image 2: Layout (in red) of the Momonoura SEZ (Kahoku Newspaper, 2018)

3.4. The Momonoura SEZ: Stealth Privatization via Disaster Capitalism

Disaster capitalism is well-known concept in various disciplines but has yet to be directly linked to stealth privatization. Disaster capitalism is a term first used by Naomi Klein in her book, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. Klein defines disaster capitalism as a phenomenon where companies and governments take advantage of the vulnerability of devastated populations after a disaster, or other external shocks, to implement economic projects without the appropriate consent of those directly impacted (Klein, 2007). In her book, Klein often refers to privatization as a re-occurring theme for recovery tactics after an external shock. Parallel to this, Klein touches on the various forms of power by regime actors that push the privatization projects forward. These projects demonstrate the institutional and material power of corporations, backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which compelled nations into widespread privatization after the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Klein, 2007). It also includes the discursive power of corporations, exemplified in the "reconstruction" (rather than occupation) of Iraq after the 2003 invasion by the United States. Disaster capitalism tends to blur the lines between private and public entities, as many cases show the interplay of a complex and interdependent network of influence from both sides (ibid). This is also a key aspect of stealth privatization.

In the case of the Momonoura SEZ there are many indicators that point to it being a stealth privatization project by means of disaster capitalism. Specifically, 1) the immediate introduction of the project post-disaster, 2) the exclusionary aspects of the SEZ, and 3) the manipulation of discourse by public and private actors to justify their actions to the local communities pursue their own interests. With this understanding, the aim of this case study was to examine how stealth privatization is implemented through disaster capitalism.

3.5. Local Initiative for Self-Governance: Outside the Regime

The alternative governance group in this case study was identified through snowballing, as many interviewees were aware of this group. The alternative is Mori wa Umi no Koibito (森は海の恋人, *mori wa umi no koibito*), an NPO located in Kessenuma City in Miyagi Prefecture. While Mori wa Umi no Koibito has not directly spoken out against the Momonoura SEZ, the activities they conduct do not align with those promoted by the Momonoura SEZ, which encourages short term market solutions, directing reconstruction through external capitalist resources. The introduction of Mori wa Umi no Koibito aims to bring forth an alternative to revitalization that promotes the community's value of care, especially care for human-nature relationships.

4. Case Study 2: Bristol Bay, State of Alaska, United States of America

The second case studied for this dissertation is the Pebble Mine, which was planning on being developed north of Lake Iliamna, in the Bristol Bay region, State of Alaska, United States of America. For this case, a total of 11 interviews (semi-structured and unstructured) were conducted through field work from August 27th-September 8th, 2022 (Table 2).

4.1. Background of Bristol Bay Native Fisheries

Bristol Bay is located in the southwestern region of the State of Alaska (Image 3). The Bristol Bay region is interconnected through an expansive watershed, encompassing about 50% of total area, linked together with the Nushagak and Kvichak Rivers and six major river basins (Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2022). Bristol Bay is known as the world's most abundant area for Sockeye salmon fishing, and is incredibly resource rich. In 2022, Bristol Bay had a record high salmon return, with approximately a $70 million in profit made in total (Schandelmeir, 2022).

Outside of the commercial fishery activities, Bristol Bay is home to several indigenous peoples, namely Alaska Natives stemming from Yup'ik, Dena'ina, and Alutiiq Tribes (United Tribes of Bristol Bay [UTBB], n.d.). While some Alaska Natives actively participate in the commercial fishery, they also engage in subsistence livelihoods, which incorporates a season-based cycle of resource accumulation for their own, and their families', consumption or trading. In Bristol Bay, subsistence livelihoods are focused on the salmon fishery, but also include berry picking and hunting. Subsistence from all sources accounts for 80% Native Alaska's protein intake, and 52% of that harvest is salmon (EPA, 2022). For thousands of years, Alaska Native Tribes have not just depended on Bristol Bay's resources for subsistence, but feel interconnected with the land spiritually as well. Therefore, culturally, economically, and socially, Bristol Bay's ecosystem is essential for local livelihoods (Carothers, et. al, 2021).

4.2. Nurturing Historical Discrimination

Colonialism is arguably the most damaging form of governance in Alaskan history, as it irrefutably dispossessed Native Alaskans from their connection to nature and its resources to this day. Even the

name is evident of Bristol Bay's past, as seen in almost all colonialized nations. Bristol Bay's original name is Iilgayaq[15], though it was renamed by British "explorer" Captain James Cook in 1778.

Starting from Russia, fueled by their interests in the lucrative fur trade in the 17th century, and the "purchase" of Alaska by the United States in 1867, Native Alaska fishers have continued to suffer the impacts of their colonialism to this day. Russian colonialism was the first to bring in capitalist ideology, in that it reflected that of a corporate framework. Specifically by its extensive scale, class system of workers, and treatment of Native workers through a corporate agenda (Lightfoot, 2003). Russia's occupation would come to an end with the Treaty of Cession however, with what would be known as "The Alaska Purchase", or "Seward's Folly" in 1867. Under U.S. rule, colonialism became a structural form of discrimination, one that would embed itself into the policies and regulations that carry on to this day. Systematically, fisheries governance regime actors, and colonial powers, developed a system based on limiting the access rights to Native Alaskans.

Table 2: List of Anonymized Interviewees for Bristol Bay Region Case Study

Anonymized Name	Position	Organization	Interview Date
Fisher A	Commercial Fisher, Boat Owner	A Bristol Bay Fishery	August 30th, 2022
Fisher B	Commercial Fisher	A Bristol Bay Fishery	September 9th, 2022
Fisher C	Commercial Fisher, Boat Owner	A Bristol Bay Fishery	August 30th, 2022
Fisher D	Subsistence and Commercial Fisher	A Bristol Bay Fishery	August 30th, 2022
Fisher E	Subsistence and Commercial Fisher, Boat Owner, Former Pebble Spokesperson, Former Village Corporation Leader	A Bristol Bay Fishery	September 2nd, 2022
Tribal Council Representative A	Council Member, Subsistence Fisher	A local Bristol Bay Tribal Council	October 15th, 2022
Tribal Council Representative B	Council Member, Subsistence and Commercial Fisher	A local Bristol Bay Tribal Council	October 15th, 2022
Trout Unlimited Representative	Bristol Bay Organizer	Trout Unlimited (Fisheries NGO)	August 29th, 2022
United Tribes of Bristol Bay Representative	Staff Member	United Tribes of Bristol Bay	September 29th, 2022
Bristol Bay Native Corporation Representative	Staff Member	Bristol Bay Native Corporation	September 1st, 2022
Expert Researcher	Researcher, Professor	University of Alaska Fairbanks	September 1st, 2022

[15] The exact name *Iilgayaq* is somewhat disputed, some say this name only refers to the Nushagak area. However, given the diversity of the region at the time, it is no surprise there may be multiple traditional names depending on the tribe.



Image 3: Map of the Bristol Bay region, retrieved from the EPA

4.3. Modern Socio-Economic Impacts from U.S. Colonialism

Despite Bristol Bay being incredibly fortunate for their ecological systems, there are many socio-economic problems that plague many rural Alaska Native communities. One interviewee explained the situation as a "significant disparity between our resources"[16], meaning that while the fishery may be a multimillion dollar industry, that wealth does not reflect back in the livelihoods of Native Alaskans.

One of the biggest issues is population decline. The demographic issue is due to rural-urban migration, fueled by the job opportunities in Anchorage or Juneau (bigger cities) (Huskey, et. al, 2004). The lack of economic opportunities is a major issue for the Bristol Bay region. Coupled with demographic issues, several Bristol Bay communities have high rates of drug and alcohol abuse, as well as domestic violence (Bendinger, 2014). Another issue is the high rate of suicide, which is currently the fourth leading cause of death for Alaska Natives (Leavitt, et. al, 2018). Some have traced the fundamental reasons behind the high rates of suicide to the history of colonialization (Kral and Idlout, 2009; Wexler, 2009). Specifically highlighting how, in the process of colonialization, indigenous people were completely stripped of their identity, hope, and future aspirations (McAbee, 2021; Trout and Wexler, 2020). Outside the western, capitalist mindset, traditional values, such as social and familial

[16] Data collected from interview with Fisher E on September 2nd, 2022.

connections, were once used to protect mental health in young people, but has been diminished due to colonialism (McAbee, 2021).

4.4. The Pebble Mine: Stealth Privatization via an Inequitable Access Regime

Alaska Native communities have a long history of colonialism. Colonialism is defined as, "…the establishment and maintenance of rule, for an extended period, by a sovereign power over a subordinate and alien people that is separate from the ruling power" (Forsyth, 2005). The implications of colonialism includes the irrevocable consequences to the very fabric of the colonized society long after. Some impacts include the fueling of capitalist mindsets and political instability for generations to come (Rodney, 1972). Therefore, colonialism's impact extends beyond the immediate destruction caused by "the rule of a sovereign foreign state", but to the future of political and economic stability of the colonized State. In the US, the history of the colonialization and mass extermination of Native Americans is heavily overshadowed in history books, focusing more on the accomplishments of early European explorers "discovering a new world". The subsequent foreign domination and dismantling of Native tribal governance by European conquerors forever impacting future generations, is even less discussed (Carothers, et. al, 2021). Therefore, while colonialism, in some contexts, may be part of a nation's past, it is not something we should dismiss when examining modern political economic structures. As such, it is understood that the structural discrimination in place today is not happen stance, but a system molded, and deliberately created to benefit those in power, determined through specific policies and management approaches of regime entities (Whyte 2018; Lyons, et. al, 2019).

In the case of Alaska, one of the ways we see the extension of colonialism into the modern structure is the monopolization of Alaska Native land by the mining industry, including the Pebble mine. In 1988, Teck Resources (at the time called Cominco Alaska Exploration), discovered a large deposit of copper, gold, and molybdenum, known as "Pebble West", 15 miles north of Lake Iliamna in southwest Alaska. Four years after Northern Dynasty Minerals Ltd., another Canadian mining corporate giant, acquired the claims to Pebble West in 2001, "Pebble East" was discovered to have an even higher concentrated deposit. Since then, Northern Dynasty has continued to drill, accumulating investors from some of the largest mining companies in the world. At the same time, communities surrounding the Pebble deposit became aware of the plans to build the Pebble mine, and immediately went into action to prevent it. The community was afraid of the environmental consequences to their regional fishing industry, as its waste deposits, particularly from copper, are particularly harmful for the salmon population. Despite the intense backlash by Alaska Native fishers and the overwhelming evidence of its

negative impacts, Pebble has made significant strides in getting official approval for the development of the mine.

4.5. Prioritizing Native Fishing Values: Alongside the Regime

In order to identify potential alternatives to the Pebble Mine, it was necessary for me to seek out local entities engaged in alternative governance. Through snowballing, I identified the United Tribes of Bristol Bay (UTBB) Consortium, is a Tribal consortium composed of 15 Tribal governments, which works to protect and preserve Native livelihoods in the Bristol Bay region. It works with local Native councils, government agencies, and the Native American Rights Fund to ensure issues relating to Alaska Native livelihoods are brought to the center of decision making processes. Their work includes government consultation, grassroots organization initiatives, and youth empowerment projects in the region (UTBB, n.d.).

A large part of their work over the past decade has been working alongside local organizations and Tribal governments to advocate against the development of the Pebble Mine, stating its adverse impacts against Native communities in Bristol Bay in particular. Therefore, by analyzing the UTBB, I aimed at exploring alternative viewpoints to the development of Pebble mine, and the sustainable future of Bristol Bay Native fisheries.

5. Case Study 3: Sakom Village, Chana District, Songkhla Province, Thailand

The last case identified for this dissertation is the Chana Industrial Estate (CIE), (**นิคมอุตสาหกรรมจะนะ**, *ni-kom-ud-sa-ha-gam-cha-na*) to be developed across a number of villages in Chana District, Songkhla Province, Thailand. For this case, a total of 10 interviews (semi-structured and unstructured were conducted through field work over the period of December 1st-December 7th, 2022 (See Table 3).

5.1. Background on Chana Fisheries

Chana District is located in the southern area of Songkhla province in the south of Thailand (Image 4). Traditionally a fishing (but also agriculture and forestry) community in the southeast of Thailand is with rich biodiversity from the coastal waters, rivers, and Songkhla Lake. The population of Songkhla as of 2021 was 1,431,536, and in the same year, Chana district's population was 108,245 (7.56%) (Songkhla Provincial Statistical Office, 2022). Songkhla province as a whole, the total number of registered workers in the agricultural, forestry, and fishing sectors was 249,037 in 2022 (Songkhla Provincial Statistical

Office, 2022). According to a survey done by the local Chana government, in 2002, a total of 1,396 people worked in some capacity for the local fishing industry. Chana fishers account for less than one percent (0.56%) of the primary industry workers in Songkhla overall (Chanhom, 2022). Sakom village, similar to many of the villages in Chana District, is around 60% Muslim, and their religion is highly embedded in their social structure, with the importance of having large families, and being connected with nature. The main line of work in Sakom is fishing, which brings in anywhere from 1000-2000baht ($30-60USD) per day. The fishers in Sakom rely on fishing for their subsistence, so even if they don't make a lot of money from fishing, they feel content because they always have something to eat[17]. Many of the fishers in Sakom are older, over 40 years old, but are physically in good shape, due to the intensity of their work. The fish products produced in Sakom are sold through a middleman to nearby communities (Chanhom, 2022).

Image 4: Location of Chana District (Asian Peacebuilding Initiatives, 2014) (edited for clarity)

[17] Data Collected from NGO representative A.

Since power is centralized in Thailand, decisions made at the local level in Chana often less so benefit local areas and more often reflect interests of higher level bureaucracy. One interviewee explained this through the development of seawalls in Chana, how despite the erosion of beaches caused by seawalls, funding for these projects continues to be funneled down year after year. Research by local universities and NGO's have made the public aware of the lack of benefits from these seawalls which have encouraged people to question the rationale of these projects. Protesting has slowly began to encourage change, particularly for seawalls in money-making tourist islands[18]. This example shows that decision-making that impacts fisheries the most in Chana is often carried out top-down, with little on-the-ground coordination.

Table 3: List of Anonymized Interviewees for Chana Case Study

Anonymized Name	Position	Organization/Occupation	Interview Date
Fisher A	Fisher	Small-Scale Fisher	December 4th, 2022
Fisher B	Fisher	Small-Scale Fisher	December 4th, 2022
Fisher C	Fisher	Small-Scale Fisher	December 4th, 2022
Fisher D	Fisher	Small-Scale Fish Processor	September 5th, 2021
SPBAC Representative		Southern Border Province Administrative Centre (SPBAC)	December 2nd, 2022
Researcher A	Professor	Prince of Songkhla University	December 3rd, 2022
Researcher B	Researcher	Thailand Development Research Institute	December 7th, 2022
NGO Representative A		Natural Way of Life Learning Center NGO	December 3rd, 2022
NGO Representative B		Natural Way of Life Learning Center NGO	December 3rd, 2022
Civil Society Representative		Various civil society organizations	September 5th, 2021

5.2. A History of Negative Social Development: Seeds for Distrust

In Songkhla province overall, the fishing industry is mainly surrounded around the lake and is run through several commercial fisheries such as the Thai Union Fish Co. (Thai shrimp company), Man A Fisheries Company (Thai fin fish company), and the Siam International Food Trading Company (Thai fish processing company). The working conditions for fishers working under these TNCs, particularly for contract fishers, are famously known for being horrid. The majority of workers are migrants (registered and unregistered) from Cambodia and Myanmar, with some evidence of slave labor and human trafficking (drugged, robbed and forced to work, traded) as well as unfair, abusive labor practices (minimum wage or social protection benefits do not apply to fishing sector), on top of general unsafe

[18] Data collected from Researcher A, December 3rd, 2022

working conditions. (Chantavanich, et al., 2013). Shrimp fishing has been the most profitable regionally because the area was traditionally biologically diverse. Originally, there were over 30 species of shrimp found in Songkhla Lake as reported in the 80's, however in 2011 it was reported to only have 11 species left (Pornpinatepong, et al., 2010). In the past few decades Songkhla Lake has experienced overexploitation of natural resources due to industrial development (encouraged by government fisheries policies), wreaking havoc on the local environment, which in turn deteriorated local peoples' quality of life (Ratanachai and Sutiwipakorn, 2006). Pollution in the lake initially caused by the industrial and agricultural (including shrimp fish farm) sectors, but mostly by nearby community wastes (~75%) (Pornpinatepong, et al., 2010). Some of the solutions to these issues have been mainly "command and control", i.e. setting a limit to the amount of pollution allowed. These solutions were market-based policies, through the use of corrective taxes and tradable pollution permits (Pornpinatepong, et al., 2010). These policies also have faced hard criticism from fishers and farmers, who assert how much these plans would derail their ability to sustain their livelihoods (Ratanachai, 2009).

Pollution issues have also found their way into smaller coastal fishing communities such as Chana, where pollution from industrial plants have contaminated air and water sources. Local people also say they have experienced noise pollution, which has caused significant impacts on local zebra dove (Jaa Wa Dove) populations, many of which are extremely important to Chana culturally and economically[19]. These projects have created a distrust and discontent for capitalist development in Chana, which has fueled frustration for future top-down decision-making.

5.3. The Chana Industrial Estate: Stealth Privatization via Social Development Schemes

Thailand has faced unique struggles with its political environment, suffering through a series of military coups and civil unrest. Since the 1932 revolution, which abolished the absolute monarchy, the modern Thai government have, or at least claimed, to incorporate democratic idealism, in the form of public elections. One way to describe the political situation is through the "deep state" The "deep state" actor-relationship was first described an institution, where the king would strategically appoint those in his inner circle into positions of power (McCargo, 2005). This concept has been broadened from McCargo's initial work to include important entities which are equally, if not more, influential behind the scenes, including the military, police, and judiciary (Chambers, 2013; Mérieau 2016). Ungpakorn (2016) has also urged scholars to incorporate corporate actors into discussions surrounding Thai governance,

[19] Data collected from Researcher A, December 3rd, 2022

by emphasizing the importance of recognizing Thailand as a capitalist, society, where the ruling class rarely participates in democratic processes, yet often shape its decision-making (Ungpakorn, 2016).

On January 21, 2021, the national cabinet approved a proposal to establish a special development zone in Chana district. The project would completely restructure the entire district of Chana, building deep-sea ports, relaying roads to connect to the main highway, electricity, solar and renewable energy facilities (Theparat, 2020). This restructuring of Chana district would force many of the residents already living there to relocate. The CIE organizers claim it will create over 100,000 new jobs in the area, and make Chana a gateway for import and export trade to the rest of the region (Theparat, 2020). Despite the clear message from local Chana fishers that they do not want the CIE, it is still underway. In this case, I aimed at examining how the Deep State, the Monarchy, the military, and corporations, have together utilized their influence for current social development schemes, and how they have embedded and legitimized themselves in rural development for their own interests.

5.4. Activism for Self Determination: Fight Against the Regime

Through snowballing, the alternative case identified for this dissertation was the Chana Rak Thin network, literally translating to *Chana Loves their Homeland Network*[20] (**เครือข่ายจะนะรักษ์ถิ่น**, *kreua-kai-cha-na-rak-thin*), a network of local organizations aimed at promoting local development from the bottom-up. By utilizing social capital and taking advantage of the internet, Chana Rak Thin has single-handedly brought the case of the CIE to the international stage. The group actively fights against the regime, organizing protests in the country's capital. By analyzing the responses by Chana Rak Thin and their view on the development of the area, I aimed at identifying key alternative strategies to the CIE.

6. Conclusion

In this chapter I have described the methods and methodology used to guide this dissertation's analysis. By broadening Newell and Levy's (2006) approach to power, I aim at analyzing regime actors'

[20] The translation of Chana Rak Thin into English can have several interpretations and is also a play on words. **จะนะ** (*cha-na*) is Chana District, **รัก** (*rak*) means love, and **ถิ่น** (*thin*) can mean homeland or locality. However, the character **ษ** (*sor*) used in Chana Rak Thin (**จะนะรักษ์ถิ่น**) is also used in the word **อนุรักษ์** (*anu-rak*) (originally derived from the word **รักษา**, *rak-sa*), meaning to conserve or preserve. When used in Chana Rak Thin, the character **ษ์** (the name of this character phonetically is *sor-rue-si-ka-ran*), when the upper tonal is added, the character becomes silent when spoken, but the nuance of the meaning conserve, or preserve, remains. Therefore, Chana Rak Thin can be interpreted as, Chana Loves their Homeland, or, Chana Conserves/Preserves their Locality, or both.

power to create and legitimize stealth privatization projects and the impacts to alternative niche groups in each case. The cases chosen for this dissertation aim to demonstrate how stealth privatization occurs in diverse fishing community contexts. Each case, the Momonoura SEZ (Japan), the Pebble Mine (USA), and the Chana Industrial Estate (Thailand), will analyze both the structure in which each privatization project is embedded as well as the actors within the fisheries governance structure and their interactions with each other. Power, institutional, material, and discursive forms, of regime actors, both private and government, will be critically examined. This dissertation will also introduce other groups from each community, highlighting alternatives to the stealth privatization project put forward. While each case is unique in its structural context, all of them will demonstrate the ways in which regime actors transform and solidify "sustainable" fisheries governance through stealth privatization.

Chapter 4: Stealth Privatization through Disaster Capitalism at the Special Economic Zone for Fisheries Reconstruction Project

1. Introduction

The first case presented for this dissertation is the power dynamics behind the development of the Momonoura Fisheries Reconstruction Special Zone (SEZ). In the aftermath of the March 11th, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster (hereafter referred to as the 3.11 disaster[21]), regime actors, namely the prefectural government and large-scale fisheries corporations, developed the Momonoura SEZ to try to support the recovery and revitalization efforts of the community after its devastating effects of the disaster. Significantly, the Momonoura SEZ was also created to develop the community beyond merely supporting its recovery back to its pre-disaster state. This is because many of the issues the project aimed to solve were issues already existing long before the disaster. However, local fishing entities, including the Fisheries Cooperative, have advocated against the Momonoura SEZ, claiming it only pursues short-term profit-making, based on values that are inconsistent with the community's vision of local governance (Miyagi Prefecture Fisheries Cooperative, 2011). The conflict between regime interests and those of the local fishing community raises two main questions for this chapter, 1) *How do regime actors shape and legitimize reconstruction policy after a disaster?*, and 2) *How can we ensure the values of the local people are integrated in revitalization efforts*?

1.1. Stealth Privatization via Disaster Capitalism: Negating Community Values

The case of the Momonoura SEZ is not necessarily unique, in the sense that development projects put forward after a disaster is not uncommon. It is natural to want to rebuild after communities are torn apart by natural disasters, and rebuilding the economy is an important part. That being said, the justifications made for such projects, as well as the interests and benefits received by actors engaged in the project are important aspects to consider, specifically there reasons behind the decision-making process. Instances where recovery projects are implemented based on the interests of corporate actors, rather than those of community members has come to be understood as disaster capitalism. Disaster capitalism is a term first used by Naomi Klein in her book, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (2007). Klein defines disaster capitalism as a phenomenon where companies and

[21] Other terminology used is 'Fukushima disaster' or, the 'TEPCO disaster'. The former refers to the location of the nuclear explosion, while the latter refers to the company that operated the facility responsible for the contamination. Both terms have their own criticisms. Therefore, we have chosen to refer to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster as '3.11 disaster', which is also commonly used to refer to the date, due to sensitive nuances of the other two.

governments take advantage of the vulnerability of devastated populations after a disaster, or other external shocks, and to implement economic projects without the appropriate consent of those directly impacted (Klein, 2007). More specifically, Klein refers to privatization as a re-occurring theme for recovery tactics after an external shock. Parallel to this, she touches on the various forms of power by regime actors that pushed the privatization projects forward (Klein, 2007). Therefore, disaster capitalism offers a useful, critical lens that can be used to examine the reasoning behind the Momonoura SEZ. In order to further uncover the rationale behind the Momonoura SEZ, the first section of this chapter will dive into theoretical considerations linking disaster capitalism and power analysis. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to understand how disaster capitalism can be seen as a form of stealth privatization. The Momonoura SEZ illuminates several indicators that point to it being a stealth privatization project by means of disaster capitalism. Specifically, 1) the immediate introduction post-disaster 2) the exclusionary aspects of the SEZ, and 3) the manipulation of discourse by public and private actors to justify their actions and pursue their own interests.

Due to the chaos that ensues, both socially and structurally, after any disaster, it is difficult to identify a pathway toward sustainable redevelopment. However, I introduce a local non-profit organization (NPO), *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*[22] (森は海の恋人), as an example of commons revitalization through processes known as the caring economy. The concept of the caring economy was derived from feminist critical theory and Kevin Morgan's (2010) politics of care, describes a transformation of thinking about governance, one that encourages human morality in shaping decision-making (Tronto, 1994). It challenges our conceptualization of how we should express care, eliminating the misconception that political decisions should be absent of morality (Morgan, 2010). In other words, decision-making should reflect the values of the community's morale, commons governance that integrates our humanistic urge to care for *others* above self-serving interests alone (Chang, 2019). In his article, Morgan highlights La Via Campesina's food sovereignty concept as an example of *how* we can express care stating its goal as, "…to mobilise enough political support to get these principles of social justice and ecological integrity embodied in emerging global governance regimes…"(Morgan, 2010, p. 1864). Therefore, organizations such as *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* represent more than *what* their community values, but its activities represent *how* the community chooses to express its care. If reflective of the community's values, revitalization should show how fishers have redefined their relationship with nature post-disaster, one

[22] According to their website, their name translates to "The forest is longing for the sea, the sea is longing for the forest".

that values balance with the environment and human settlements. These expressions of care are lost in cases of stealth privatization via disaster capitalism because the manipulation of discourse and the reflection of power imbalances negate the community's values of care, a governance structure that gives and takes with the local environment, rather than acting as simply extractors of natural resources.

1.2. Structure of the Chapter

The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section, section 2, will introduce main issues relevant to this case study, as well as identify and examine interests of main actors engaged in the development of the Momonoura SEZ. This section will introduce major policy decisions, the politics that paved the way for the creation of the Momonoura SEZ, and the political economy of fisheries in Japan and the region pre and post 3.11 disaster. After introducing the fisheries governance structure, section 3 will utilize Newell and Levy's (2006) power analysis framework to critically examine how regime actors use their various forms of power to develop stealth privatization projects in vulnerable rural fishing communities affected by the 3.11 disaster. After the initial results using Newell and Levy's power analytical framework, section 5 will introduce a potential alternative to the thinking behind the Momonoura SEZ. Specifically, I introduce *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*, a local NPO whose activities focus on reshaping the community's relationship with nature, pursuing commons governance that strengthens the local economy by engaging with its environment and existing social capital. *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*'s activities also aims to redefine the community's values in terms of human-nature relationships, encouraging decision-making to be made in the vision of human morals, rather than only efficiency. Finally, section 6 will briefly conclude with the broader application to understanding regime power in rural fishing community revitalization. I will also discuss lessons learned from the alternative niche, namely, how the food sovereignty movement can play an important role in its future revitalization.

2. Setting the Scene: Fisheries Governance in the Japanese Context

In order to fully understand the power dynamics reflected in Momonoura SEZ project, it is important to understand the fisheries governance structure in which it is embedded, and the politics that enabled its enactment, even before the 3.11 disaster. This section briefly explains the neoliberal policy development in the fishing industry and the political structure in Japan that fueled the Momonoura SEZ.

2.1. The Fisheries Act Revision: Reaffirming Neo-liberalization in the Fishing Industry

One of the most impactful modern changes made to Japan's fisheries governance was the Fisheries Act revision, which was passed by the National Diet in December of 2018. Up until this revision, Japan's national fisheries policies have been aimed at increasing food production and overall economic growth in the fishing sector (Katsukawa, 2019). Nowadays, the Japanese fishing sector, specifically transnational large-scale fisheries faces very different challenges, stemming primarily from international pressure to tackle environmental issues such as overfishing and the overall degradation of ocean biodiversity (Jolly, 2013; Ryall, 2013). There are also several structural barriers within the fisheries sector that policy-makers aimed at solving through the Fisheries Act revision. For example, one barrier, as perceived by the Japanese government, is the difficulty of new fishers in joining the local fisheries cooperatives, which were the sole governing body allowed to allocate fishing rights (Akama, 2015b).

The Fisheries Act included three major revisions:

a. addition of new species to the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) list,
b. changing the appointment process of members of the Sea-Area Fisheries Adjustment Committee (SFAC), and,
c. changing the prioritization of fishing rights allocation

The first revision increased the number of species under the TAC list. However, as is the case in other counties, a TAC system alone will not solve overfishing issues, and it has been shown to open the door for exploitation and illegal, underreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices (Villasante et al., 2010; Nihira, 2020). TAC is calculated yearly, however, due to the fluctuating nature of catch by certain fisheries, such as long line fishing (延縄, *haenawa*) of Bluefin tuna, small-scale fishers who do not reach their individual quotas (IQ) will lose their allocated quota the following year (Nihira, 2020). In response, the Japan Coastal Fisheries Union (JCFU) has spoken out publicly against the Fisheries Act revision and its focus on TAC and IQ schemes. Specifically, they called out the unjust nature of these regulations, claiming some fishers had already fished their maximum allowed amount and now were left without financial security for the rest of the year (JCFU, 2019). The JCFU also claimed that the TAC and IQ systems are unfairly targeting small-scale fisheries, while large and mid-scale fisheries are still able to overfish juvenile tuna with large purse sein nets (JCFU, 2019).

Several fisheries cooperative groups have also spoken out against the second Fisheries Act revision claiming that it is also a move to reduce democratic processes (Nagano, 2018). The second revision involved the appointment process of the SFAC, changing it from a public electoral process to an appointment process. The SFAC was originally designed in the Fisheries Law as a way to help develop a

democratic system for the coordination of prefectural fisheries (Ruddle, 1992). Specifically, these associations were designed to provide a link between the national and prefectural government levels in Japanese fisheries governance. The SFAC would prepare plans for fishing grounds and has the responsibility to provide decision making for the eligibility of fisheries rights and licenses, conflict mediation, and provide advice to the local government on the management of marine resources (Ruddle, 1992). However, after the revision, this important aspect of fisheries governance is no longer accessible to the public, as the responsibilities are now fully under the control of the prefecture. Specifically, the appointed members are decided by the prefecture's governor. In the case of Miyagi Prefecture, Governor Murai would be responsible for appointing the members of the SFAC, giving him monopoly control of the fishing rights decision-making and accessibility.

Finally, the third point of revision in the Fisheries Law is essential to the Momonoura SEZ. Before the revision, the SEZ would have been impossible because only individual entities were allocated fishing rights, and membership with the Fisheries Cooperatives was necessary to obtain fishing rights. However, with the revision, fisheries corporations are now able to apply for fishing rights directly from the prefectural government (Nihira, 2020). Therefore, the political affiliation of the governor became an important factor to understand the context in which the SEZ was formulated.

2.2. The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan: Situating Japanese Local Politics

Since the 1950's, the ruling political party in Japan has been the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), whose ideology is positioned through conservatism, neoliberalism, and Japanese nationalism (Hrebenar and Nakamura, 2018). The LDP has generally focused its attention on its economic development policy, including export-based economic growth, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and economic liberalization. In former Prime Minister Abe's famous speech relating to special zones, he stated that he, "…aims at creating the world's most business-friendly environment by implementing bold regulatory and institutional reforms" (Creating the World's Most Business-friendly, 2013). Whether or not Abe's economic policies actually improved the overall economy or eased impacts from demographic decline is up for debate (Lincoln, 2020), however, its approach reflected policy trends within the LDP and reshaped the framework of regional policies across the nation.

In fisheries, the LDP promoted an aggressive, export-oriented fisheries sector. This includes creating geographical indicators and intellectual property rights, developing legislation to promote tourism through branding through "local" and "hometown" specialties, and strengthening initiatives along the food chain; processing, distribution, sales and export (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

[MAFF], 2022). As a national law, the Fisheries Act revision, therefore, set the tone for policy making and revitalization projects to be carried out by local governments.

Overall, the Fisheries Act revision has given unprecedented power to regime actors. By giving the governor sole responsibility for fishing rights distribution, the private fishing corporations can appeal directly to the prefectural government to gain direct access to fishing rights. Not only does this undermine traditional governance processes by excluding representatives elected by local people, it also reinforces and strengthens the relationship between the prefectural government and private fishing corporations, legitimizing their coalition (Nihira, 2020). This shift, however, would not have been possible without the various forms of power held by the regime actors, promoting and reinforcing the privatization process. Therefore, in the following sections, I will analyze regime actors' forms of power by utilizing Peter Newell and David Levy's (2006) three sources of power, institutional, material, and discursive, and how their activities have impacted the fisheries governance structure.

3. Results

Newell and Levy's research utilizes a power analysis approach to specifically analyze environmental governance. For this analysis, I attempt to strengthen the approach by extending it to stealth privatization, or more specifically, disaster capitalism. In my case study, regime actors worked together to develop the SEZ. In the following sections I will examine the strategies used by regime actors, namely the national and prefectural governments and Sendai Fisheries Ltd., to develop and legitimize the SEZ as a pathway to sustainability. First, I will analyze the regime actors' institutional power, specifically the backdrop of the public-private coalitions and how fisheries policy-making has increasingly corporatized fisheries governance. Second, I will look into their material power, by examining the way in which regime actors have utilized advanced technology to give them competitive advantage. Finally, I will examine regime actors' discursive power, highlighting how they have utilized the discourses of 'sustainability' and 'revitalization' as tools to legitimize their actions and secure their place in fisheries governance.

3.1. Institutional Power

In this section, I will examine two key points in the structure that reflect the regime actors' institutional power; 1) the business relationships of Governor Yoshihiro Murai, and 2) the influence of the construction lobby. By analyzing these examples of institutional power, it is possible to illuminate the structural circumstances by which powerful regime actors have been able to encourage and push the stealth privatization projects through.

3.1.1. The Role of Miyagi Prefecture's Governor Yoshihiro Murai

One of the key figures involved in the development of the SEZ is the Miyagi prefectural governor, Yoshihiro Murai. On November 1st 2021, Governor Murai won his fifth consecutive election under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Murai Wins 5th Term, 2021). His campaign focused on promoting further use of the private sector and revitalization of various industries (Murai Wins 5th Term, 2021). Governor Murai is also a member of the Reconstruction Promotion Committee of the Reconstruction Agency under the national government, which was created specifically to initiate and analyze reconstruction projects for recovery after the 3.11 disaster. Due to his position of power, Governor Murai's political ideology is significant to policy making in the fishing industry in Miyagi prefecture. There is also an overall feeling in the fishing community in Miyagi that SEZ was a project created by the governor for his own image and reputation[23]. Overall, the goals of the SEZ are reflective of the LDP's overall fisheries policies (i.e. the Fisheries Act revision), while improving economic conditions after the 3.11 disaster by "new investment and job opportunities for young people" (Loew, 2013).

Governor Murai's close connections with the Japan Business Federation (日本経済団体連合会, *nippon keizai dantai rengokai*) should also be considered. The Japan Business Federation is an organization that represents corporate Japan through the process of "collective lobbying" (Daimon, 2009). Governor Murai's relationship with the Japan Business Federation is important not just because of its tendency for lobbying activities, it is also important because it represents the institutional power of corporations to play a role in the efforts to revitalize the Tohoku region. Specifically, the federation's efforts in promoting competitiveness of primary industries as a whole, growing the tourism industry, and promoting innovative technologies are just some of the goals for the Tohoku region (The Japan Business Federation, 2013). They work with local governments to promote projects aiming at economic growth through private sector leadership (The Japan Business Federation, 2013). The concept of the Momonoura SEZ was first proposed by the Japan Economic Research Institute, a think tank with ties to the Japan Business Federation back in 2007 (Miyagi Prefecture Fisheries, 2013). However, it was the 3.11 disaster that finally pushed the project into action (Miyagi Prefecture Fisheries, 2013).

The influence of private entities in the form of "consultants" and "advisors" to government actors is one way business has gradually become an essential actor in sustainable governance by legitimizing their

[23] Data collected through interviews with Fisher A and a Miyagi Cooperative Representative

position of power (Newell and Levy, 2006). This is prevalent in the Momonura SEZ as private entities are seen as a source of knowledge for reconstruction of disaster stricken areas. The financial influence of private actors in stealth privatization projects is also an important aspect of institutional power, through both collective lobbying, such as the Japan Business Federation, but also individual lobbying, as seen in the construction sector. The next section will expand on this.

3.1.2. Lobbying in the Fisheries and Construction Sectors

Lobbying is a way in which private actors attempt to influence the decisions of public actors for their own interests. Lobbying can take on many forms such as, paying off politicians, position statements, or press conferences used to pressure governments (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 5). Lobbying is considered to be a 'traditional political activity' of corporations, though the concept should be expanded to account for market-focused activities as well (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 7). Lobbying for the fishing industry in Japan is well documented, particularly due to the recent Atlantic bluefin tuna ban opposition, ultimately blocked by Japanese lobbyists (Abend, 2010). The decision is not surprising however, considering Japan imports the large majority (80%) of the Atlantic bluefin tuna and its usage in high-end sushi makes the fish extremely valuable (CITES Bluefin trade ban, 2010).

One of the most influential lobbying patterns in reconstruction after the 3.11 disaster, is in the construction sector. Japan has been labelled as *Doken Kokka*, or the "construction state", referring to its massive government spending on development projects coordinated by the so-called "iron triangle", a formal and informal network of politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats (Feldhoff, 2002). These relationships are associated with "…collusive bidding, bribes and kickbacks to politicians and regulatory burdens…" (Pempel, 1998, p. 183). According to Transparency International, the construction industry is considered one of the most corrupt in Japan, from both individual and institutionalized corruption (O'uchi et al., 2006). In Tohoku, several popular news articles have exposed several scandals involving elicit activities between government officials and corporate actors. Some of these activities include, distribution of slush funds to major contractor executives (i.e. Shimizu Corp., Ando Hazama, Kajima, Taisei Corp.) (Ichida and Hanano, 2020; Former Kajima Executive, 2021), as well as payoffs to Kansai Electric by a former assistant major to have his own subsidiary companies work for the reconstruction efforts (Matsuura and Namima, 2021).

Lobbying is a powerful indicator of institutional power, as it emphasizes the direct link between public and private sectors through financial and relational ties. While there is no evidence of direct lobbying with the Momonoura SEZ, it is important to recognize the lobbying relationships already built

between regime actors that have shaped the overall reconstruction process. In the case of the reconstruction of Miyagi prefecture after the 3.11 disaster in general, the institutional power of regime actors through lobbying has played a significant role in shaping the Momonoura SEZ.

In conclusion the institutional power of SEZ actors is most prevalent through the business relationships of Governor Murai and the lobbying activities in the reconstruction process after the 3.11 disaster. Each of these activities highlight the interdependent, structural relationship between government and private entities that have helped support and promote the Momonoura SEZ and the overall corporatization of the fishing sector. In the following section I will discuss how these public-private collations have also utilized their material power to promote the SEZ through access to finances and technology, as well as their domination of technical knowledge structures.

3.2. Material Power

The fisheries processing facilities for Momonura SEZ itself have been described as 'state-of-the art', with its total construction costing approximately 400 million yen (or, around $3.1 million USD) (Ishinomaki Momonoura Oyster, 2015). Equipment includes washing machines, purification water tanks, an x-ray machine, a proton freezer, a metal detector, bagging machines and electric steam convection machines, and a scent manufacturing machine (Ishinomaki's Momonoura Kaki, 2014). Regime actors were able to build these facilities due to their foundational material power. However, material power is not just the possession of material objects that give them a financial or technological advantages. Material power is also the way in which private entities develop product and technological *strategies* in order to secure their existing and future market positions (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 11). Therefore, regime actors shaping and manipulating avenues of financial and technological advantage is representative of their material power. In this section, utilizing the example of an oyster shelling machine (OSM), I will illuminate how regime actors have secured their market position thorough secured financial systems, allowing them to demonstrate technological advantages.

3.2.1. The Technological Treadmill: The Cure for the Aging Problem?

Technology as a cure for population decline and the aging of society has been a popular discourse in Japan (Makishima, 2022). Private actors have often taken the side of technology as being the road to the future. While it is unreasonable to assume all technological advances are negative, it is important to recognize the impacts and processes of technological innovation in society (Hansen, 2019). Particularly, to highlight the actors who benefit, and those who benefit less, or perhaps are burdened by such inequitable changes. Critical scholars have coined the term, 'agricultural technology treadmill', to

describe the unending race for farmers to adapt to better and better farming technologies to enhance productivity over others (Cochrane, 1979). Advancement in technologies often produce 'losers' in development, groups that bear heavy social and economic consequences due to the structural change (Hansen, 2019). The term has been strengthened to address concerns on how such technology is produced and distributed (McMichael and Buttel, 1990) and how structural change is reliant upon diverse social organizations in a particular context (Friedland et al., 1981; Ward, 1993).

In 2015, a high-tech oyster shelling machine (OSM) was commissioned by the Momonoura Oyster Producer Joint Company to be built in collaboration with Kobe Steel Co., Ltd., a manufacturer of high-pressure processing equipment. This technology utilizes high pressure to open the shells of oysters as they are heated, which makes the adductor muscles and shells easier to separate. Kobe Steel worked to create a special machine that would utilize high pressure without heat-treatment to avoid the oysters losing value in the market (Shirakashi, 2016). The main reason behind the development of the OSM was to adapt to the aging and declining workforce (Shirakashi, 2016). By having machinery, it will make up for the loss in the number of workers by doing the job for them.

> "It's sad but the Momonoura members don't have successors, their own children, those who would do fishing. I think that's the number one reason people join the SEZ. I think that if they had a lot of children doing fishing they wouldn't have joined the SEZ. There was one young member there, a 40 year old, but he left quick, severed ties with the company."[24]

In order to gain access to these advanced technologies, SEZ actors have secured a strategic financial system. One way the SEZ has secured its funding was through the prefectural government, coming from public taxes. The OSM was purchased for 2 billion yen (or, approximately 15.5 million USD) in 2015, in part funded by public tax sources (Momonoura Oyster Producer, 2015). The OSM has caused some controversy because it used around 50% of public funds despite it currently sitting idle now[25]. In addition, alongside the OSM machine, the SEZ's financial transactions in general are kept secret from the public. From the perspective of the SEZ, this is due to corporate privacy. However, from the perspective of citizens, the funds being used are directly from their tax revenue and they feel they have the right to know how their money is being used[26]. Due to financial data not being publicized, it is

[24] Data collected through interview with Fisher A.
[25] Data collected through email communication with Researcher B
[26] Data collected through email communication with Fisher A.

difficult to confirm how much the OSM has actually contributed to factory productivity. However, the SEZ is currently in debt, despite promising to be turning a profit three years after its opening (Akama, 2018a).

Another way the SEZ was funded was through investments from private corporations. The financial backing for the OSM was also in part through the Mitsubishi Corporation's Disaster Relief Foundation (MCDRF). The MCDRF is a project created by Mitsubishi Trading Company (a main group under the Mitsubishi keiretsu), to financially support efforts after the 3.11 disaster (MCDRF, n.d.). However, it is important to note that Mitsubishi Financial Group is one of the top stakeholders in Kobe Steel, the company that was commissioned to construct the OSM (Factbox: Kobe Steel, 2017). Therefore, the public relations image of donating financial support to the victims of the 3.11 disaster also demonstrates the strong financial ties between Kobe Steel and the Mitsubishi keiretsu group. As one researcher stated, "In the end, the prefectural funds are being used to back up the politicians' interests" (Hamada, 2012). In this case, the Momonoura SEZ's company was backed by large corporations like Kobe Steel, securing their access to advanced technologies. Independent fishers apart from the SEZ do not have access to these technologies and the lack of successors makes it impossible for them to continue independently without some sort of solution.

3.3. Discursive Power

It is important to analyze how discourses influence decision-making, and how they link to other avenues of power. In this section, I will highlight the revitalization discourse regime actors utilize to advance and legitimize the SEZ, specifically through the appropriation of the "Sixth Sector Industrialization" and "localization" discourses, and the promotion of 'salarymenization' of fishers, or the transformation from self-employed fisher to white collar worker (漁師のサラリーマン化, *ryoshi no sarariman-ka*).

3.3.1. "Revitalization" from External Shocks

The overall discourse behind the SEZ used by regime actors is its ability to help Momonoura "revitalize" after the 3.11 disaster. In 2011, Governor Murai stated that, "…it is necessary to borrow the strength of private companies in order to *revitalize* the coastal fishing industry heavily impacted by the disaster"[27] (Japan Coastal Fisheries Union, 2013). The way language is used is very important when discussing discourse analysis, as it is the foundation of how nuances can drive a narrative. Revitalization,

[27] Italics added by author for emphasis.

or recovery, in Japanese, has several possible translations with nuanced differences. Some terminology used to describe revitalization or recovery efforts include; *fukkō* 復興 (reconstruction), *fukkyū* 復旧 (restoration), *saisei* 再生(regeneration/revitalization) and, *ningen no fukkō* 人間の復興 (human-based reconstruction)[28]. The way in which the nuanced terminology is used reflects the way in which regime actors have approached revitalization in the Tohoku region. For example, while *fukkyū* implies the restoration of something as it was before destruction, *fukkō* implies re-invigorating something that was weakened, and could therefore mean completely restructuring the disaster-affected area, and re-draw what the community should look like. The nuanced use of this term, therefore, tends to exclude local people in the decision-making process, which leads to the neglect of traditions and long-standing histories in the local areas (Tashiro and Okada, 2012). These terms are often used interchangeably by regime actors, often trying to infer revitalization through economic growth. Under the umbrella of "revitalization", SEZ organizers focus on two main sub-topics of discourse strategies for the SEZ: 1) 6th Sector Industrialization, and 3) localization.

3.3.2. Sixth Sector Industrialization

Sixth sector industrialization, in its original context in Japan, is used to explain how producers can diversify economic activities along incorporating the three economic sectors of industry to create new local businesses or creating new value-added products and services. Sixth sector industrialization refers to the combination of: a) the primary sector industry (forestry, fisheries, and agriculture), b) secondary sector industry (processing), and c) the tertiary sector industry (selling and services)[29] (MAFF, 2022). For example, in the fishing industry, one fisher might process and dry their fish to make a new product and then sell it to their local restaurants. The goal is to promote diversification and cooperation within fishing communities (Hidaka, 2018).

Gradually, this phrase has been used by regime actors, specifically promoting "sixth sector industrialization" as a new business model for the fishing industry (MAFF, 2022; Sendai Fisheries, n.d.). In the case of the Momonoura SEZ, it is being used as a way to promote monopolization of the entire production line, referring to Sendai Fisheries' role in the SEZ is to produce, process and sell their own products (MAFF, n.d.). "We want to use the Fisheries Reconstruction Special Zone to work toward the

[28] Additional terminology includes: *sōzō-teki fukkō* 創造的復興 (Creative reconstruction), *sai kōchiku* 再構築 (rebuilding), *seikatsu no saisei* 生活の再生 (lifestyle revitalization), and *komyuniti no saisei* コミュニティの再生 (community revitalization).

[29] The logic of the sixth sector industrialization is the addition of 1(a) + 2(b) + 3(c) = 6 (MAFF, 2022)

government recommended vision of sixth sector industrialization" (Sendai Fisheries, n.d.). Sendai Fisheries is a Sendai City, the capital city of Miyagi prefecture. This form of monopolization is glorified, emphasizing that this framework is used to "go beyond reconstruction (復興), by promoting the region and revitalizing (再生)/reconstructing (復興) the fishing industry" (Sendai Fisheries, n.d.).

The appropriation of this phrase is important because as a grassroots notion, it was originally designed for producers to add value to their products on their own, without being exploited by external capital (Matsubara, 2021). It is also used to encourage local producers to organize themselves in groups and cooperate with each other and diversify their own businesses (Matsubara, 2021). However, the way SEZ organizers are utilizing this concept allows for the vertical integration of the local market and local fisheries resources to be legitimized, and justified, as a form of reconstructing and revitalizing the local community. Even organizations like the Japan Business Federation also play a big role in promoting Sixth sector industrialization by working with local governments to expand logistics of agricultural and marine products abroad (The Japan Business Federation, 2013).

Sixth sector industrialization in and of itself is not an inherently negative concept and many fishers engage in aspects of this process. However, the regime actors' form of sixth sector industrialization in the fisheries sector is very different from the traditional forms of fisheries governance. In the past, fishers worked and lived in villages (集落 *syuraku*), and as a group, together with fishing cooperatives, worked to produce and sell their products collectively[30]. One Miyagi fisher commented on the sixth sector industrialization used by Momonoura and how this business strategy might be difficult for many small-scale fishers[31].

> "Sixth sector industrialization is when you do everything from [collecting] raw materials to [making] products. They [the government] have been doing that [sixth sector industrialization] for around 30 years or so. That company, the Momonoura's company, is also doing it. You conduct aquaculture yourself, you fish your own oysters, then process, and then you sell them yourself. Well, this is good, but in the past, for places like Taro Fisheries Cooperative or Omoe Fisheries Cooperative, when they did sixth sector industrialization, they failed. Taro and Omoe are separated from the city. I, on the other hand, am closer to Sendai and Tokyo, so doing sixth sector industrialization is

[30] Data collected through interview with Fisher A.
[31] Data collected through interview with a Miyagi Cooperative Representative.

easy. I think the reason fishers opposed the SEZ is because they didn't want to break up the so-called social order. "[32]

This critique is also backed by other studies done in the agriculture sector, where farmers did not possess the knowledge to simply start food processing or retailing (Nakano, 2014). Sixth sector industrialization, as interpreted by regime actors, creates the image that fishers should just engage in more steps along the production chain in order to increase production and expand product marketability. However, going back to the original meaning of sixth sector industrialization, there are contradictions based on the SEZ activities. Since sixth sector industrialization is focused on promoting the diversification of small-scale producer activities, the relationships with the local market and other local businesses should be a priority. However, the activities of the SEZ, from producing to selling, are completely detached from the local community (Akama, 2018a). One issue that came to light was the SEZ's disregard for sell date rules created by the local fisheries cooperatives. In Miyagi, the local fisheries cooperatives decide on a schedule for oysters to be sold at local markets. This is to avoid rushing to sell the oysters while they are still not yet to mature size, and considered as lower quality due to their smaller size (Raw Oysters, 2016). However, despite this local governing of market structure, the SEZ actors ignored these rules and sold their oysters well before the sell date. This caused outrage from local fishers, as this system has been in place for a long time and brought up concerns about quality and brand representation (Raw Oysters, 2016). In this sense, not only does appropriating the discourse of sixth sector industrialization legitimize regime actors' promotion of the SEZ, it also enabled them to completely contradict its original meaning by effectively separating themselves from the local market system and undermining local traditional market governance systems.

3.3.3. Localization Marketing: Placing Miyagi on the Map

Another discourse promoted and utilized by regime actors is "promoting the Miyagi brand", which emphasizes the locality of fisheries products. Locality as a marketing scheme is not new, and is very popular in both agricultural and fisheries production systems in Japan (MAFF, 2014). In fact, promoting local products, specifically increasing knowledge of diverse fish species and eating or cooking techniques is quite helpful, as it encourages new links between consumers and producers. However, the way in which local branding is used needs to be critically analyzed due to the common appropriation of this concept, as it is often simply used as a competitive advantage (Born and Purcell, 2006). By simply including one aspect of a local community, a brand can completely transform itself into a brand that

[32] Data collected through interview with Fisher A. Translated by author.

supports the local community. This is known as the "local trap", warning us about simply taking "local" products by their label and assuming they are sustainable and socially just (Born and Purcell, 2006). Actors of the SEZ have also taken the locality approach to fisheries marketing as a way to revitalize fishing and to spread awareness to consumers about Miyagi fisheries products after the 3.11 disaster (Momonoura Oysters Producer LLC. (n.d.). By employing local fishers and selling Momonoura-caught oysters, it will promote the 'local' brand, and put the area on the map. Therefore, the SEZ aimed at marketing their fisheries products using the 'Miyagi' brand, emphasizing the locality of their products (Sendai Fisheries, n.d.).

Analyzing at the actual activities of SEZ, there are some contradictions as to whether or not the SEZ represents the local community. As mentioned in the previous section, when the SEZ decided to sell before the sell date, they risked selling smaller, lower quality oysters, which can damage the reputation of "Miyagi oysters" (Raw Oysters, 2016). In addition, some of the oysters they sold were not even caught in Miyagi, despite labelling them as so. In doing so, it made local fishers feel that it could impact the way consumers view the "Miyagi oysters" brand, damaging the local image (Raw Oysters, 2016). From the perspective of Governor Murai, 'the sell date rules are not law, so there's no issue', however, the disregard of local fishers is problematic (Akama, 2018a). Additional contradictions stem from a promise made by regime actors at the time of the SEZ creation. At first, they had promised that they would employ at least 55 local fishers to encourage local employment. However, at the time of their evaluation they had only employed 40 local people (Akama, 2018a).

3.3.4. Transformation to White Collar Worker: Ryoshi no Salariman-Ka

Another common discourse by regime actors to primary industry workers is the idea that their livelihoods can be improved by transforming their working style to suit white collar working standards. This process is known as '*salariman-ka*" (salarimanization)[33], or the transformation to white collar worker lifestyle. This discourse is often used as a way for regime actors to justify the modernization of primary industries such as the replacement of workers via mechanization and technological advances. *Salariman-ka*, or salarymenization, refers to the transition from blue collar worker to white collar worker[34].

[33] *Sarariman* (サラリーマン) is translated to 'salary man'/ 'salaried worker'. *Ka* (化) literally means to transform or change.

[34] The process of salariman-ka can be described as a similar process to proletarianization, a traditional Marxist concept that reflects the transition from self-employed workers to employees (wage workers). However, the

For fishers, *ryoshi*[35], this process is known as '*ryoshi no salariman-ka*'(the salarymenization of fishers). One of the ways SEZ actors have controlled access to labor is by creating financial incentives to lure workers in with the promise of stable salaries and working conditions. In the case of the Momonoura SEZ, these incentives were advertised, particularly to young workers and bring in labor from the outside. However, it is not just corporate actors pushing this incentive, the Miyagi prefectural government also believe that by emphasizing the salaryman lifestyle, hoping it will encourage young people to join the industry (Murai's Prefectural Government (2), 2020).

Being a fisher requires flexibility and adaptability. It is quite common that a fisher's income will change frequently, due to climate conditions, seasonal changes, or just luck (Akama, 2015a). Schedule-wise, fishers tend to wake up very early in the morning, sometimes being out on the water by four or five in the morning[36]. In addition, fishing is often seasonally based, certain species can be caught only during specific seasons (Akama, 2015a). These are stark differences to a salaryman lifestyle under the SEZ. One interviewee commented that people's sense of responsibility and their ability to work changes when you are a SEZ fisher versus being an independent fisher.

> "After all, as an individual, there's risk. I mean, its individual responsibility. A company is not the responsibility of one person, it's the responsibility as a whole. I think that's the difference. For example, when there's low air pressure, when the weather is bad, when aquaculture equipment breaks, you have to do it yourself, you go out immediately and fix it. But when you're with the company, you don't just go out and fix it yourself. I mean, you have to discuss and decide as an organization. Another [difference][37] is the Labor Standards Laws, or 'labor laws'. In the case of individual management, it's not that it is completely unrelated but, it's not as strict. But when it comes to companies, labor laws constrain activities. Like, for an average fisher you work before the crack of dawn. But with a company, the basic wage is from 8am to 5pm, anything longer than that is 1.5 times the normal wage. These kinds of restrictions apply. You don't work without

nuanced emphasis on class dynamics and historical conflict implied in proletarianization is much more complex than salariman-ka, which is why this term is not used as a direct translation in this dissertation.

[35] *Ryoshi* (漁師) is translated to fisher, by the author. *Gyogyousha* (漁業者) is the formal term used to describe workers in the fishing industry, an overarching translation meaning 'fishing industry worker'.

[36] Data collected through interview with Fisher A.

[37] Terms in brackets are added by the author for clarity purposes.

company instructions or orders. For work in fishing there's a lot to be done in the morning so you need to work at that time."[38]

In actuality, the income of a fisher is not as unstable as it is described by regime actors. Small-scale fishers tend to supplement their off-seasons by doing other work on land, and the on-seasons tend to more than make up for losses from the off-seasons (Akama, 2015a). Despite having a consistent salary, the salary for a contract salaried fisher is much lower compared to the average independent fisher (Akama, 2015a). However, especially due to the deeply rooted negative image, it is made to seem more appealing, especially for young families, to be promised a consistent salary and work schedule.

4. Local Initiative for Self-Governance: Outside the Regime

Learning from Ivan Cucco and Maria Fonte's application of E.O Wright's 'Real Utopia's Project' framework (Wright, 2010), the activities introduced in the following section can be understood as an interstitial ("ignore the state") strategy of transformation (Cucco and Fonte, 2015). The interstitial strategies by alternative niche activities build off a similar message, reflecting non-commodified and diverse activities for the society as a whole (Cucco and Fonte, 2015). While many of these niche alternatives often start off at the fringes of society, once they come together, they can create new spaces for empowerment and transition of the dominant regime (Cucco and Fonte, 2015). At this point, the organization introduced in this section still lays on the margin of mainstream society. According to Cucco and Fonte (2015), many times we see interstitial initiatives start out on the fringe but can change once consolidation of ideals form consensus amongst individuals. Therefore, there is still the potential that the group introduced in this section may form or help develop towards a collective movement in the future.

In this section, I aim introducing *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*, an NPO that works outside the dominant regime and provides alternative activities and ideology to the Momonoura SEZ. While neither *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*, nor the founder, Shigeatsu Hatakeyama, have directly spoken for or against the Momonoura SEZ itself, they passionately promote activities that do not align with those of the Momonoura SEZ. For instance, *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* focuses on utilizing local natural resources to revitalize the local community from the bottom-up. While the Momonoura SEZ, while using local natural resources, specifically the coastal resources for oyster cultivation, does not rely on local social capital, as

[38] Data collected through interview with Fisher A.

it employs workers and companies from outside the region and ignores traditional governance structures meant to sustainably manage common-pool resources of the region. Therefore, I aim to provide an example of an alternative way in which fishing communities can revitalize after a natural disaster led by local people for their own interests through self-governance.

4.1. *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*: Revitalization through the Region's Natural Power

Mori wa Umi no Koibito is a NPO well known in the Tohoku region. The NPO was created in 2001 by Shigeatsu Hatakeyama, an oyster farmer in Kesennuma City, north of Momonoura district. *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* was inspired by an incident back in the 1980's after Hatakeyama discovered that the quality of his oysters had declined due to the red tide, which occurred as a result of pollution trickling down from local rivers (FEATURE: 'Grandpa Oyster', 2017). This pollution was due to the poor management of farm and forest lands, causing nutrient-dense run-off into the coastal waters, impacting the quality of oysters. As such, *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*'s activities are based on the concept of *satoyama* (里山), which describes the connection and interdependence of ecosystems on land, or 'human settlement', *sato* (里), and the mountainous area upland, or *yama* (山) (Takeuchi, 2010). Further extending this to the ocean, the concept of *satoumi* (里海), refers to the interrelationship between land, *sato* (里), and sea, *umi (*海). These concepts highlight the importance of sustainability governing the relationship between humans and nature (Ministry of Environment, 2009).

Based on the above mentioned concepts, *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*'s recent activities have mainly focused on environmental education, specifically toward school children to promote and revitalize the local environment. The NPO also works on community development projects, by publishing news articles and knowledge exchange study sessions with experts about sustainable use of natural resources.

Mori wa Umi no Koibito's message, in line with *satoumi* values, also reflects aspects of the international food sovereignty movement, in that it brings our attention back to governing socio-ecological systems that support fishers right to sustainable production. Food sovereignty, as a concept developed by La Via Campesina, emphasizes producers' rights to "…healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems…"(La Via Campesina, 2007). The beginning of *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*'s activities were based on Hatakeyama's realization that without protecting the local ecology, both terrestrial and marine, food sovereignty cannot be realized. In this sense, *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*'s emphasis on the local ecosystem and promoting sustainable management and use of the region's forests for the future fisheries creates the foundation for producers to define their own food system.

After the 3.11 disaster, like many others in the region, Hatakeyama's oyster farm and livelihood was destroyed and he lost his business, worth approximately ¥200 million (US$2.5 million) (Barrett et al., 2012). He was however, not without hope, and immediately began to promote reconstruction of the region. He asserted that reconstruction should start by taking advantage of the region's forest resources to help rebuild homes, which will lead to the sustainable use and management of local forests. In doing so, the downstream effects would help bring nutrients to the oceans (Barrett, et al., 2012). Therefore, by understanding and sustainably maintaining the ecology as a whole, reconstruction can be done through the regenerative powers of the natural environment.

Mori wa Umi no Koibito has also advocated against the development of sea walls. Seawalls have become a common reconstruction installment in the Tohoku region meant to reduce the damage of future tsunamis. Their construction, however, has caused great contention amongst fishers who loose direct access to the sea (Lim, 2018). Seawalls also disrupt the local environment by causing erosion, and degrade the local habitats of fish species (The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate, 2023). In areas such as Moine district, north of Momonoura district, *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* helped local residents advocate against the building of a seawall to protect the natural environment from potential harm. The goal behind such opposition activities was to leave as many resources behind as possible for future generations (*Mori wa Umi no Koibito*, 2019). The NPO asserted that the building of seawalls as a form of reconstruction fundamentally misaligned with their values.

While representatives from *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* have not directly spoken out against the Momonoura SEZ, the values they promote do not align with the SEZ's goals. *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*'s activities promote a commons governance structure, one that brings the local economy and local ecology in cohesion with each other. *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*'s activities promote sustainability, for both the environment and the economy, based on the promotion of local community values. The NPO's main message is that of sustainability, based on the *satoumi* concept, emphasizing that the relationship between humans and nature should be managed with care, and the revitalization projects after the 3.11 disaster should align with these values. The Momonoura SEZ, on the other hand, promotes economic growth by bringing in external entities, corporate actors and outside employees, and only commodifies the "local" while ignoring the potential of both present and latent social and ecological capital in the local region. It promises short term solutions (capitalist economic growth) without tackling complex long term problems (population and economic decline). It was to be constructed for the political economic interests of regime actors, rather than with those of the community. This stealth privatization project

negates community values of care, whereas *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* encourages it. This highlights *Mori wa Umi no Koibito's* usage of the politics of care, the communal desire for revitalization projects do be done with values they place on human-nature relationships in mind.

4.2. Discussion and Conclusion

The goal of the Momonoura SEZ is "…to go beyond the basic framework of simply reconstructing this fishery, but to promote, revitalize, and reconstruct the fishing industry as a whole" (Sendai Fisheries, 2020). However, the analysis in this chapter showed that the power regime actors have utilized with the SEZ was to promote and maintain their own political or economic interests. The socio-economic issues in Momonoura, and rural fishing communities across Japan, are complex problems, exacerbated by the structural elite further deconstructing local governance structures. To do so, regime actors, prefectural politicians and corporate fisheries, used various forms of power to legitimize the Momonoura SEZ as a one-size-fits-all, inevitable solution to the complex issues faced by local fishers predating the 3.11 disaster.

Food sovereignty teaches us that local producers should be at the forefront of decision-making. Without conserving and promoting human-nature relationships based on care, food sovereignty cannot take place. In the aftermath of a disaster there are many opportunities for regime actors to take advantage of the vulnerable state of the people impacted by the disaster. As described by the concept of disaster capitalism, the discourse of 'reconstruction' opens the door for re-interpretation, which is often taken advantage of by those in power. Whereas, niche groups such as *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* provides an example of putting community values back into decision-making through a politics of care approach. The NPO's activities reflect the community's desire to reimagine a local economy that engages and encourages the interdependencies between its social capital and its local environment. To do so, revitalization projects as imagined by the NPO incorporate the *satoumi* concept as it uniquely applies to their local context. Therefore, *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* shows that as one way to avoid instances of stealth privatization through disaster capitalism, engaging in a care economy approach and targeting a community's inherit values could be an effective form of advocacy and can encourage a new form of governance outside the capitalist regime.

Chapter 5: Stealth Privatization through a Inequitable Access Regime at the Pebble Mine

1. Introduction

For this chapter I will introduce the case of the Pebble Mine, a potentially lucrative copper mine in the Bristol Bay region of the State of Alaska in the United States of America (USA). The main actors involved in the development of the Pebble Mine has been Northern Dynasty Minerals Ltd. (its subsidiary Pebble Limited Partnership), and a number of politicians working for the State of Alaska (although they have officially denied their support for the project until only recently). The development process to legitimize the project to push it toward has been going on since the 1980's, which has resulted in back and forth negotiations between supporters and advocates against the project. As recently as May 14, 2023, members of the tribal consortium, United Tribes of Bristol Bay (UTBB), visited the White House and President Biden to celebrate the government's support in safe-guarding part of the Bristol Bay region, which would prevent at least part of the Pebble Mine to be built. I argue that the Pebble Mine represents more than a failed privatization project. Rather, the Pebble Mine represents the continued systematic exclusion of Native Alaskans in decision-making processes, fueled by the regime actors' own political-economic interests. Research has shown that impacts of colonialization and a history of discrimination has had detrimental effects on modern governance structures in Alaska (Williams Sr. et al., 2016; Lyons et al., 2019; First Alaskans Institute, 2019; Donkersloot et al., 2020; Carothers et al., 2021). This history has continued to lay the groundwork for modern fisheries policies and regime-led economic development projects (Carothers et al., 2021). In order to understand the modern structure of fisheries governance in Alaska, it is necessary to uncover the history of power dynamics in the region. By doing so, we can begin to see how and why certain actors have been able to benefit from the structure more than others. Due to this, I aimed at answering the following questions. 1) *How has a history of colonialism impacted Alaska Natives' fisheries governance structure to this day?* and 2) *How do the power dynamics of said structure influence stealth privatization processes?*

1.1. Theoretical Background: How a History of Colonialism Strengthens Regime Power

Under U.S. rule, the way colonialism was carried out became a structural form of discrimination, one that would embed itself into the policies and regulations that carry on to this day. Systematically, fisheries governance regime actors, and colonial powers, developed a system based on limiting the access rights to Native Alaskans, while granting special privileges to corporate actors. This form of 'stealth privatization' is subtle in that this history of colonialism is seen as an issue of the past, rather than a continuous process of discrimination.

The history of colonialism in Alaska is essential to understanding how structural discrimination is prevalent in the livelihoods of Native Alaskans to this day. Colonialism as a textbook definition is defined as, "…the establishment and maintenance of rule, for an extended period, by a sovereign power over a subordinate and alien people that is separate from the ruling power" (Forsyth, 2005). The implications of colonialism extend beyond simply controlling a people, but includes irrevocable consequences to the very fabric of the minority society long after. In his infamous book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Walter Rodney described the political and economic exploitation of Africa, stating that the impacts of European colonialism and imperialism have led to Africa's 'underdevelopment' (Rodney, 1972). Rodney describes underdevelopment as going beyond the contemporary understanding of 'rich versus poor', but highlights it as the fuel to generate the modern capitalist system based on structural dependence and political instability as symptoms of post-colonial rule (Rodeny, 1972). He also claimed that colonialism's impact extends beyond the immediate destruction caused by 'the rule of a sovereign foreign state', but to the future of political and economic stability of the colonized State. In the United States, the history of the colonialization of Native Americans is heavily overshadowed. The subsequent foreign domination and dismantling of traditional Native tribal governance is even less discussed (Carothers et al., 2021).

Colonialism as a factor to the acceleration of capitalism's rise, and eventually enclosure or, privatization, has been discussed in critical political economy as well. Marxists argue one of the earliest forms of primitive accumulation of capital began with the exploitation of colonial labor and its resources and domination of political power (Blaut, 1989). Food regime scholars argue the first two eras originated from colonialism, exploiting tropical colonies for European empires to develop, ushering in the U.S.-led food regime and then corporate food regime to come (McMichael, 2005). David Harvey's Theory of Accumulation by Dispossession interpreted Marx's understanding of primitive accumulation as a continuous process, how privatization is a key example of how profit is created by the dispossession of peoples or nations (Harvey, 2004). Within Marxist theory privatization is understood that the shift of power, from public to private, or commons to private, serving solely the interests of the capitalist class, and at the same time, generating profit through the capitalist mode of production (Harvey, 2004). Marx's understanding of primitive accumulation includes processes of commodification and privatization in which property rights in common, collective, or state forms are converted to private property rights, suppressing rights to the commons, commodifying labor power, and suppressing indigenous forms of production and consumption (Harvey, 2004). These include colonial, neo-colonial and imperial processes of appropriation of natural resources, monetization, land use, and more.

In 2015, Michael Levien, in response to Marx's primitive accumulation and Harvey's accumulation by dispossession, argued that these two concepts were inadequate in understanding land dispossession. Specifically, Levien argues that in India, during its economic liberalization in the early 1990's it experienced a transition to a neoliberal 'regime of dispossession', the institutionalized restructuring of land to private entities. Levien states that the contradictory nature of new structures redistribute land for private investment for financial capital, rather than simply compelling farmers through normative power (Levien, 2015). Levien also argues that India's neoliberal regime of dispossession is a separate case from the previous developmentalist regime of dispossession post-colonialism, emphasizing that researchers should first understand how and why nations structure themselves to dispossess land (Levien, 2015).

On one hand, it is important to recognize Levien's contribution in that, the role of the state has its own agency in privatization process and recognizes the importance of analyzing its motivations and methods toward legitimization in each historically diverse cultural context. On the other hand, one could argue that the history of colonialism in many former colonial states is an important factor in the development of future regimes, even if the former foreign power is no longer making direct decision-making. One example could be India's 'willing' participation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank development programs, organized and standardized by Eurocentrism, or, former colonialist states (Brohman, 1995). Therefore, while colonialism, in some contexts, may be part of a nation's past, it is not something we should dismiss or underestimate when examining modern political economic structures.

There is also a strong discourse that colonialism is no longer relevant to modern social issues. However, research now is just beginning to recognize colonialism's impact on the structural discrimination of Alaska Natives continuing to this day, by bringing attention to the history of colonialism and how Alaska Native livelihoods were irrevocably changed (Williams Sr. et al., 2016; Lyons et al., 2019; First Alaskans Institute, 2019). Many of these studies aim to bring attention to the link between the history of colonial dispossession and the ever-growing issue of limiting fishery rights for Alaska Natives (Lyons et al., 2019; Donkersloot et al., 2020). Even today, the residual impacts of colonialization of Alaska Natives is still seen in modern policy development and decision-making in Alaska, through regulatory fishing closures and dispossession of commercial fishing rights (Carothers et al., 2021). Several scholars in the Alaskan fisheries governance field, highlight that in order to create a more equitable, inclusive governance structure for Alaskan Natives, it is necessary to understand the

way in which the history of colonialism has impacted the modern issues that persist in these rural communities (Lyons et al., 2019; Carothers et al., 2021).

Power is the epitome of what allows for winners and losers in the capitalist system, steadfast by the relenting remnants of colonialism (Rodney, 1972). As such, it is understood that the structural discrimination in place today is not happen stance, but a molded system, and deliberately created to benefit those in power, determined through specific policies and management approaches of regime entities (Whyte, 2018; Lyons et al., 2019). Therefore in order to begin de-colonizing for the future of sustainable governance, it is necessary to examine the forms of power that allow for regime entities, those with colonial privilege, to legitimize and further promote a structure that suits their own interests. How the forms of power in which regime actors maintain influence atop an inequitable rights access structure has not yet been examined. Specifically, it is imperative to assess how and with what tools do government and business actors work together to exploit and perpetuate systems of discrimination and exclusion for their own benefit. Therefore, I would argue, that stealth privatization through an inequitable access regime, not only reflects a continuous cycle of structural discrimination, but solidifies and strengthens powerful actors' legitimacy and influence in decision-making.

1.2. Structure of this Chapter

The structure of this chapter is described as follows. First, Section 2, analyzes the overall structure, which examines how a history of colonialism has impacted the Alaska Native Fisheries governance to this day. Section 3 highlights how regime actors have utilized their institutional, material, and discursive powers to promote and encourage the privatization of a natural resource, excluding local people from further access to the resource due to the mine's irreversible damage. I will also explore an alternative to the privatization project, the United Tribes of Bristol Bay, which aims to lift up the voices of Alaskan Natives and envision a sustainable future that incorporates the morals and values of traditional Alaskan Native People's values. Section 5 discusses the results, specifically how regime actor's forms of power could impact the future of Alaskan Native Fisher's food sovereignty and how regime actors' power have continuously worked to exclude Alaskan Natives through rights exclusion. I will also discuss the necessity to not focus on just one mining project, like the Pebble Mine, but recognize that the power that regime actors possess represents the capabilities of the extractive industry in Alaska in general.

2. Analyzing the Alaskan Fisheries Governance System: How a History of Colonialism Can Lay the Foundations for An Inequitable Access Regime

This section gives an overview of the fisheries governance system in Bristol Bay, in which this case is situated. In the United States, fisheries governance is managed mainly through state and local level administrations, rather than top-down from the national level. Understanding this structure is essential to examining the main entities in this case, specifically the political structure of leadership in the State of Alaska and their relationships with Native governing bodies. The regime in this case is formed from strong personal relationships between state politicians and corporate actors, long supported by inequitable representation of Alaska Native entities in decision making.

2.1. How Oppression Laid the Foundation for Structural Discrimination

How the United States first perceived Alaska Native Peoples and their worth is evident in their language and legal classification of their rights from the very beginning. Under the Treaty of Cession, Alaskan Native Peoples were labelled 'uncivilized tribes', with no legal recognition unless they could prove they had Russian blood, and they lived like 'white men' (Schneider, n.d.). Alaskan Native Peoples were first frustrated by the fact their land had been sold to the United States, without any sort of consultation or admission of their very existence. However, as time went on, land disputes became a serious issue, as more outsiders began to flock to Alaska in the midst of the Gold Rush. However, during this time, Alaskan Native Peoples were not considered to be U.S. citizens, therefore any sort of complaint, legally or otherwise was ignored. It would take several court cases before Alaskan Native Peoples were considered 'civilized', and for the language in the treaty to be changed and to contribute to any kind of step toward recognizing Alaskan Native People's rights (Schneider, n.d.).

By the 20th century, the gold rush and the Alaska Railroad had begun to bring in labor and outside influence into Alaska. Even the fishing industry was booming, with canneries opening all along the Aleutian Islands (in fact, due to the sudden influx, many marine mammal populations almost went extinct). There was also a social push to incorporate Alaska as a State, particularly for its strategic benefits demonstrated during World War II, but also after the discovery of oil. The drive for oil would bring land issues back into the spotlight, which has continued to be a source of contention to this day (Coile, 2005). However, during this time, the U.S. government did not recognize Alaska Native People's claim to the land or its resources, which naturally often brought tension and conflict over land ownership. In 1959, Alaska officially became a state and was divided into sixteen boroughs organized by regional governments, which ramped up several landmark legal battles that set the stage for future policy development (Sullivan, 2021). It was this eagerness and greed that brought about the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). During this time, Alaskan Natives had spent the last few decades

watching and Native American Indian Tribes be divvied up into reservations, watching as their rights were taken away by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Sullivan, 2021). Therefore, in 1966, in order to keep as much land as possible and continue to have direct control over it, hundreds of Alaska Natives gathered to advocate and lobby for their rights. The crowds drew so much attention, the state could no longer ignore it. Especially, after a particularly rich reserve of oil was found in Prudhoe Bay, the U.S. government was eager to settle any land disputes with Alaskan Native Peoples to make way for an oil pipeline (Sullivan, 2021). Therefore, the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), was developed to not only resolve the long-standing issues surrounding indigenous land claims, but also to incentivize economic development throughout the state. The settlement transferred titles to twelve Alaska Native Regional Corporations and over 200 village corporations. This settlement put seven times (24,000km^2) the amount of Alaska land in the hands of the federal government and encouraged Native peoples to engage in corporate capitalism, arguing that this was the only way for Native populations to survive the changing of times.

2.2. ANSCA: Development of Native Corporations

As part of ANSCA, regional and village Native corporations were created to act as resource allocators for Alaska Native Peoples, in which they lease land and offer social services depending on the area they are stationed in (Alaska Resource Development Council, 2021). However, these responsibilities are often difficult to manage due to the mix of being for-profit, yet preserving cultural heritage[39]

The Bristol Bay area, which traditionally included several different Alaskan Native tribes, came under control of the Bristol Bay Native Corporation (BBNC). The BBNC now employs approximately 4,000 people worldwide (40% of whom are actually in Alaska) and had a gross revenue of $1.7 billion in 2019. BBNC insists on their updated mission of 'Fish First' which guides their land management policy programs (2019). The Fish First policy states that, 1) salmon is and always has been the principal means of subsistence for the cultures of the region and must be protected for that reason alone; 2) salmon contributes to the economic health of our state; 3) because Bristol Bay produces the world's largest wild sockeye salmon fishery, we have a global human and environmental responsibility to protect this stock. This corporatization of Alaskan fisheries, for the benefit of bringing economic prosperity to Native peoples requires further attention. However, it is important to note that within Bristol Bay there are also several village corporations. Village corporations are not necessarily vertically incorporated under BBNC, and they have different responsibilities. The BBNC is responsible for 25 village corporations. An

[39] Data collected from interview with Fisher E in Anchorage, Alaska on September 2nd, 2022.

interviewee for this study described the BBNC as being responsible for 'the subsurface', meaning they control and manage the mineral estate. The village corporations on the other hand manage anything on 'the surface'[40]. Between these two entities, the regional corporation and the village corporations, the relationships are contentious. Another interviewee described it as, "a small number of people doing a whole lot of work"[41]. This is a result of the interconnected nature of Alaskan Native communities, due to its tight knit nature and personal relationships. Especially in communities with less than 100 people, many of the governing actors take on multiple positions, making relationships between different entities complicated. Adding further complexity to any decision-making process within and between these small communities is the familial or social ties that often spread across generations[42].

Despite there being no explicit top-down relationship structure, the village often relies on the BBNC for funding and support. Amongst some village level corporations there is also the opinion that this power relationship is often disingenuous, in that there is an unfair distribution of support and services to certain villages in Bristol Bay. Within Bristol Bay, one interviewee described wealth distribution between the east and the west, the former being villages such as Ugashik and Igiugig, which tend to receive less attention and opportunities from BBNC[43]. While ANSCA was created for Alaska Natives to own and control the land by which they live on, it does not mean there is no conflict or influence from non-Native governance actors and institutions. In addition, since Alaska's Statehood and the creation of ANSCA, Alaska Native governance has become corporatized and rights have been gradually commodified. These changes have had devastating impacts on Alaska Native Peoples' sense of self and livelihood within their communities.

2.3. *Modern Government Structures: The United States Federal Government's Role in Fisheries*

The United States' government operates under federalism, by which regulation is divided between the federal government and individual state governments. The power dynamics between the two are often negotiated, as both have exclusive and concurrent powers. Under this system, in general, the federal government has limited power over all states, its focus is on creating laws determined by the U.S. Constitution (such as, making currency or managing the military). This leaves state governments to regulate within their boundaries, but under generally broader range of legislature than that of the federal government. These laws range from managing the police force to health and welfare of its

[40] Data collected from interview with Bristol Bay Native Corporation Representative
[41] Data collected from interview with United Tribes of Bristol Bay Representative
[42] Data collected from interview with Bristol Bay Native Corporation Representative
[43] Data collected from interview with Fisher E

citizens. Therefore, under this system, each individual state has primary control over day to day actions, including land rights and usage.

In the case of fisheries governance in Alaska, rather than a top-down governance structure, it is better to think of a separation between the U.S. federal government and the State of Alaska. At one level, there is the federal government, or specifically the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which creates broad laws for conservation security of U.S. fisheries and ocean resources. This is known as concurrent powers, or duel sovereignty. While there are over 40 laws and policies guiding federal fisheries management, there are four main ones: the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA); the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)[44]; the Endangered Species Act (ESA)[45]; and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)[46]. In order to enforce these laws, NOAA has their own security department called Office of Law Enforcement (OLE), which carries out patrols and inspections of vessels and fishers (NOAA, n.d.). The OLE also carries out criminal and civil investigations, working with state and territorial enforcement agencies as well as international government agencies and regional fishery management organizations (RFMOs) to ensure these laws are enforced by U.S. citizens domestically and internationally.

Due to difference in jurisdiction, despite the existence of these federal laws, state government are generally in charge of situations on the ground within their own jurisdictions. Unless the conflict encroaches on constitutional rights, the federal government does not generally play a role in the day-to-day conflicts within the individual states. Hence the reason many of these State laws encompass a wider range of issues. Therefore, when analyzing the political economic structure of fisheries governance, the role of the individual state government is just as, if not more, prominent.

2.4. The Conservative Republican Party in the State of Alaska: Neoliberal Fisheries Governance

One of the most important aspects in understanding Alaska state governance is the political structure in which it is developed. Since the 1970's Alaska has been, for the most part, a Republican Party-led state. Republicanism and conservativism ('right-wing' politics) in the U.S., is defined as a

[44] The MMPA aims at preventing overfishing on marine mammal species and stocks (including whales, dolphins, porpoises, seals, sea lions, walruses, polar bears, sea otters, manatees, and dugongs) and restoring those that are endangered. This law also prohibits the 'take', or harassment, hunting, capturing, collecting, or killing, of marine mammals within the U.S. EEZ (NOAA, n.d., 2).

[45] The ESA law manages species at risk for extinction while at the same time working toward conserving their ecosystems they need to survive (NOAA, n.d.)

[46] This law allows for NOAA to assess environmental, social, and economic impacts of proposed actions, also known as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

political ideology that aims for less government intervention in the economy (Britannica, 2022). For example, the Republican Party in the U.S. often support lowering taxes and heavily support the private sector, in other words, privatization. This ideology is prevalent in Alaskan politics, seen that a Democratic Party presidential candidate has not received the majority vote since the 1964 election of Former President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Even the locally elected officials in Alaska, there tends to be an overwhelming number of Republican candidates. The current Governor is Mike Dunleavy, a Republican Party politician who has held office since 2018. In Alaska's Senate, we have Lisa Murkowski (Republican) and Dan Sullivan (Republican). For the House of Representatives, Alaska is only allowed one seat in the House due to its small population. Since 1973, for *49 years*, Donald Edwin Young (Republican) was Alaska's at-large state representative in congress. It wasn't until his death in 2022 that a new candidate came into play through a congressional district special election. In September of 2022, however, Mary Pelota (Democratic) won against Former Governor Sarah Palin in the state's first ranked-choice general election. Pelota's win was historic in many ways, as Pelota is the first Alaska Native (Yup'ik) member of congress in the history of Alaska state politics, and the first Democratic Representative since 1972.

Due to Alaska's abundance of natural resources, resource extraction has always been an important topic of discussion in Alaska politics. In general, in combination with the laid in conservative ideology, Alaskan politicians have overwhelmingly been pro-development and pro-big business. To justify these activities, officials such as Dunleavy and Palin, have steadfastly denied the impacts of human activities as the cause for climate change and environmental degradation, calling the transition to renewable energy as 'fraud', further encouraging 'resource development' (George, 2022). Therefore, one of the key focal points of Alaska politics recently has been the Pebble Mine development project.

For the most part, while many regime actor relationships are often concealed and left to speculation, the Pebble Mine case gives us a unique perspective into the stealthy underpinnings of politics. Due to the controversial 'Pebble Tapes' released, we are now able to see how ingrained the extractive industry's influence is in Alaskan politics. In some parts of the tapes, Ronald Theissen and Tom Collier, top Pebble Mine project executives, brag about the guaranteed assurance that the Pebble Mine project will receive thanks to the state's dependence on the extractive industry[47]. The two Pebble Mine project executives also brag about how they believe the state would be willing to overlook some

[47] Data collected from transcription of audio from the 'Pebble Tapes', released by the EIA on September 21st, 2020

potential negative impacts of the mine and approve expansion in the future, as long as it brings profit to the State of Alaska[48].

Unfortunately, due to the dependence on extractive industries, there is less attention on industries that generate less profit, specifically those that impact small-scale Alaskan Native communities. Specifically, if there are no direct and consistent benefits to the state's economic revenue, such as Alaskan Native fisheries, there seems to be little to no interest in policy circles at the state or regional levels. One interviewee highlighted the "…blatant ignorance of cultural dimensions of fisheries…" that tend to be overshadowed in favor of profit-motivating goals[49]. Another interviewee at UTBB explained the difficulty in communicating with politicians higher up, stating how it, "…always feels like a big hurtle, we really have to educate them. They are so disconnected from what's going on here"[50]. Therefore, there is a gap in understanding from top executives and state officials to the realities surrounding impacts of the Pebble Mine Project or extractive industries in general. At the local level in many of Native villages, a very different reality exists, one that has been sustaining livelihoods for thousands of years. Alaska Native livelihoods often go beyond the monetary value of the land's resources and treat their fisheries and what they have to offer as a part of themselves and their spirits.

In this section, I have outlined a brief history of the Alaskan state, aimed at highlighting key points in which regime actors have taken advantage of, and often thrived on. In the process of commodification throughout the history of Alaska, we have seen how the discriminatory access regime has been developed to benefit those in power. Due to this 'inaction', and the benefits to regime actors to keeping the structure as-is, many of the potential impacts of the Pebble Mine project to rural Alaska Native fishing communities are ignored. In the next section, I am to dive deep into a particular case that demonstrates exactly how regime actors, the State of Alaska and Northern Dynasty Minerals Ltd., have used this framework to intensify their power in three forms, institutional, material, and discursive (Newell and Levy, 2006). By analyzing how regime actors have influenced and maintained their positioning, we can open the door to finding alternatives.

3. Results

In the following sections, I will highlight how regime actors have used three forms of power, institutional, material, and discursive, as elaborated by Newell and Levy (2006), to stabilize extractive

[48] Data collected from transcription of audio from the 'Pebble Tapes', released by the EIA on September 21st, 2020
[49] Data collected from interview with Expert Researcher
[50] Data collected from interview with United Tribes of Bristol Bay Representative

industries' legitimacy and influence for future development in rural Alaska. First, I will analyze their institutional power, which is seen through the relationship between the State of Alaska and extractive industry corporations by examining their interdependent relationship. Second, I will analyze the material power of Northern Dynasty Minerals, Ltd., including the financial power of an interconnected web of mining companies, as well as their ability to produce and market employment opportunities. Third, I will analyze the discursive power used by regime actors to ensure the future of mining in rural Alaska by painting themselves as the inevitable solution to solving rural issues in Native communities.

3.1. Institutional Power

In this section, I will examine two key points in the structure that reflect the regime actors' institutional power; 1) the interdependent relationship between the State of Alaska and extractive industries, and 2) the history of lobbying for the Pebble mine and its relationship with investors. By analyzing these examples of institutional power, it is possible to illuminate the structural circumstances by which powerful political economic actors have been able to encourage and push the stealth privatization project through.

3.1.1. *The Interdependent Relationship: Extractive Industries and the State of Alaska*

The State of Alaska and the mining industry have always had an interdependent relationship. Due to being rich in natural resources, oil, gas, logging, and other extracting industries have been targeting Alaska since the 1950's (Alaska Conservation Foundation, 2022). The mining industry is extremely profitable, grossing $985 million in total wages in 2021. In addition, in the same year alone, Alaska's mining industry paid the State of Alaska approximately $83 million[51], and local governments approximately $44 million[52]. In addition, $98 million was payed to various Native Corporations. In total, the extractive industries brought in $10.19 billion. To compare, Alaska's total GDP in 2021 was $50.3 billion, making the extractive industries almost 30% of the total GDP. Almost 85% of the State's budget comes from the oil industry alone (State of Alaska, n.d). This financial dependence by the State of Alaska on extractive industries, and the benefits officials receive from it, has created strong political relationships between the two. In the Pebble Tapes, we hear Ronald Thiessen and Tom Collier, pebble

[51] Another source claims the State of Alaska earned $112 million from the mining industry, which included royalties, rents, fees, taxes, and other government-related revenues (Simonelli, 2020)
[52] Another source claims this number to be $37 million (Simonelli, 2020)

people, bragging about their various connections with top government officials, insinuating that these personal relationships would help the Pebble mine be approved.[53]

While the Alaskan economy has relied on these industries they have in no doubt caused a number of issues to the local environment and local communities. In fact, many small, low income communities in Alaska have become 'sacrifice zones', a term famously coined by Robert D. Bullard. Sacrifice zones refer to communities on the geographical periphery of industrial projects, that are usually occupied by poorer, or minority groups. In Alaska, there is a general consensus that mining and similar industries are necessary for the state's economy. However, where these mines are located is often a point of contention. It is often that many of these industrial projects are located in areas populated in majority by Alaska Natives, whose populations are shrinking, with little to no none-mining economic resources. When it comes to a mine being built in Bristol Bay, people are, for the most part, opposed to it. Bristol Bay's commercial fishing economy is just 'too important' to the region. Many of my interviewees stated something similar, such as, "we're not against all mining, but we are against this mine"[54]

However, in smaller areas, such as near Crooked Creek, an infamous gold mine is to be built called the Donlin mine. The only difference is the amount of people and the striking difference in economic development of the region[55]. These smaller areas are often seen as a risk worth taking in comparison to areas with larger populations. However, the areas that tend to be these 'sacrifice zones', tend to be the ones with less economic development for the state and big businesses. The Donlin mine is not the only one of its kind. A mine called Red Dog is another infamous mine created in these so called 'sacrifice zone', which nearest communities are Kivalina, Noatak and Kotzebue. Red Dog is one of the world's largest zinc and lead mines, though has had its fair share of controversies, ranging from complaints by neighboring communities about toxic releases and their newborns getting sick (Nobel, 2018).

The creation of these so called 'sacrifice zones' are not coincidence. Land use laws and regulations in Alaska is not just has historically been directed to benefit those in power. The interdependent relationship between regime actors has created a hard to reach barrier for local Alaska Natives, often hidden behind complex legal frameworks and high up policy decisions. One of these frameworks is the 1985 Bay Area Plan, which identifies resource management for the Bristol Bay region, including land use. Under this plan, much of the land in Bristol Bay is classified as 'subsistence', or 'fishing'. In 2005,

[53] Data collected from transcription of audio from the 'Pebble Tapes', released by the EIA on September 21st, 2020
[54] Data collected from interview with Trout Unlimited Representative
[55] Data collected from interview with Trout Unlimited Representative

Governor Murkowski's administration amended the plan to include 'mineral development', without a public process. Once local tribal governments found out about the change, they sued the State of Alaska and won, revising the plan to represent the ideas of citizens instead[56].

The institutional power of extractive industries with the State of Alaska far extends the Pebble mine. According to the Pebble Tapes, discussions on joining forces with developers at the Donlin mine were already taking place.[57] The institutional power of Pebble executives with the State of Alaska is even further actualized as they continue to explain how, by several mining projects working together, they could even better influence the state government[58].

3.1.2.Pebble's Rocky Relationship with Investors: Lobbying for Pebble

The benefits of the mining industry's relationship with the State of Alaska is seen in Pebble's extensive lobbying history. Pebble Limited Partnership has contributed the most money for lobbying in D.C., over the entire mining sector. Under the Trump administration, in 2019, just under $1.6 million was spend on Pebble's lobbying, adding to the total of over $11 million spent since 2007 (Reynolds, 2020; Hall, 2020).

While lobbying may be common among political actors in the United States, it is still necessary to critically analyze the motivations and meanings behind it. For example, one reason why Pebble is struggling to maintain their positioning in D.C. may be due to their rocky history with investors. Due to the public outcry mainly by environmental NGO's, several investors were quick to drop the project, including Mitsubishi Corporation (withdrew in 2011), Anglo American (withdrew 2013), Rio Tinto (withdrew 2014), and First Quantum (withdrew 2018). Some of these companies are among the largest mining companies to exist today. First Quantum is the third largest mining company in Canada, with a total of $6.9 billion in revenue (Johnston, 2022). However, Rio Tinto and Anglo American are among the largest in the *world*, placing at third ($41.8 billion revenue) and eighth ($27.6 billion in revenue), respectfully (Johnston, 2022). Therefore, rather than dismissing the power of lobbying, by looking at the context as a whole, the inability for Northern Dynasty to get what they want through lobbying alone is not due to the ineffectiveness of lobbying, but the loss of trust within the financial market.

3.2. Material Power

[56] Data collected from interview with a representative from Tribal Government Representative A.
[57] Data collected from transcription of audio from the 'Pebble Tapes', released by the EIA on September 21st, 2020
[58] Data collected from transcription of audio from the 'Pebble Tapes', released by the EIA on September 21st, 2020

In this section I give an overview of the Pebble mine's incredible financial power, uncovering the complex, and often hidden relationship with bigger mining companies. I will also introduce the material power as demonstrated through extractive industry's ability to create jobs, and how this form of material power, with the foundation of their institutional power, has driven the discourse for mining in Alaska.

3.2.1.Pebble Limited Partnership's Financial Backing

Many assume the financial power of Pebble Limited Partnership is limited only to its one company, which contributes to its resilience to stay alive. However, digging deeper into the relationships amongst some of its top executives illuminates how and why Northern Dynasty Minerals, Ltd. has been, and will continue to be, able to support itself financially. The most outspoken and well-known pro-Pebble executive is Ronald Thiessen. Thiessen is also the CEO of Northern Dynasty Minerals, Ltd., the public company created solely for the purpose of starting the Pebble Mine project. Therefore, unsurprisingly, on top of being CEO for Northern Dynasty Minerals, Ltd., he is also the director of the Pebble Limited Partnership. However, Thiessen's influence spreads beyond just one company within the mining industry. He is also the CEO at Hunter Dickinson Incorporated (HDI), which many are unaware is the actual parent company behind both Northern Dynasty Minerals, Ltd. and Pebble Limited Partnership (Kuyek, 2018). In other words, HDI is the actual company that funds salaries, bonuses, exploration work, administration, and all other expenses from shareholders for the project (Kuyek, 2018). HDI, a global mining group based in Vancouver, Canada, has been in the extractive industry business since 1985. HDI is often labelled as a junior mining company within the extractive industry, however the total assets of HDI far exceed those of an average junior mining company (Kuyek, 2018). HDI is also one of the largest mine development groups in Canada. Within HDI, there have been 16 different subsidiary companies created for 19 mines around the world, all of which have been overseen by the same personnel over and over again. According to MiningWatch Canada, Robert Dickinson, Ronald Thiessen and Russell Hallbauer, and their families, own 50% or more of HDI (Kuyek, 2018). Ronald Thiessen alone has been the top executive (CEO, Director, or President) of 12 subsidiaries under HDI, including Taseko Mines Limited, Quartz Mountain, Tri-Gold Resources Corp., and more (Kuyek, 2018). Therefore, on first glance, the Pebble mine might seem like just a small project by one mining company but the actual financial backing of the project far exceeds that. To only analyze Pebble Limited Partnership, or even Northern Dynasty Ltd. on its own would not adequately illustrate the vastness of a few mining company executive's material power, nor would it effectively represent the ability of these companies to continue

to lobby and pour financial resources into the Pebble project. In addition, HDI and its executives' influence in the mining industry exceeds beyond their own subsidiaries. For example, one subsidiary Thiessen is the Chairman of the Board and Director of is Taseko Mines, which holds the controversial[59] Gibraltar gold mine in British Columbia, Canada. In 2010, Russell Hallbauer was appointed as a company director, after leaving his previous position at Teck Cominco Ltd. Teck Cominco Ltd., the third largest mining company in Canada, is the lead in another controversial mine, Red Dog (Taseko, 2010) (Johnston, 2022). Coincidently enough, it was Teck Cominco Ltd. that first 'discovered' the Pebble West deposit back in the 1980's, which Northern Dynasty Ltd. later purchased the state leases from in 2001 (UTBB, n.d.)

The influence of the company's material power despite the project's public backlash is also evident in a recent royalty agreement. It was recently released in July of 2022 that an anonymous investor entered into a $60 million royalty payment in return for the right to receive a portion of the minerals (2% of gold and 6% of silver) generated from the future Pebble Project (Northern Dynasty Minerals, Ltd., 2022). While the royalty holder's identity is still unknown, it is not far-fetched to assume it would be from an investor in the extractive industry who would benefit from receiving raw minerals.

Overall, the vastness of the material power of the executives behind the Pebble project should not be dismissed, and a deeper look into the overlapping financial power of the 1% of executives in the mining industry should not be overlooked. Pebble Limited Partnership is just one project, but is representative of the executive board's drive to monopolize the mining industry sector.

3.2.2. Alaska's Main Employer: Extractive Industries

Employment in rural areas, specifically communities populated mainly by Alaska Natives, is one of the most challenging issues for the State of Alaska to overcome on its own. 'Graying of the fleet' is a concept created by Courtney Carothers and Rachel Donkersloot (2016), aiming to explain the counterproductive policy frameworks that have helped produce the rapidly aging fishing fleet in rural Alaska. These regulatory frameworks often result in limiting access to fisheries for new entry fishers through various financial barriers (i.e. unrealistic costs of fishing licenses, state limited entry programs, etc.) (Carothers and Donkersloot, 2016; Coleman, et al., 2019). As was found through a survey in the Bristol Bay region, most young people do not include fishing as part of their future plans due to the

[59] The Gibraltar mine has its own controversies with local Native communities, most famously the recent fight against waste discharge into the Fraser River, which is utilized by locals for their livelihoods (Lavoie, 2021).

limitation of job opportunities, the unattractive nature of those jobs, the social challenges faced, and the necessity to go to bigger cities for higher education (Coleman et al., 2019).

In response to the rural population issues, much of the responsibility has been outsourced to private companies. The ability for these private entities to create job opportunities is indicative of their material power because it represents their ability to seemingly solve a social issue through their financial and innovative means. One interviewee who was paid to support the project explained how when the Pebble project came along it, "…helped generate self-worth…by introducing, "…fun, cool jobs…" such as managing helicopters. My interviewee argued that Pebble positively impacted local villages[60]. The extractive industries in Alaska produce some of the most lucrative jobs in the state, approximately twice the average salary of any other sector (approximately $112,800 annually) (Simonelli, 2020). However, the idea that the Pebble mine would actually be a long term solution to the issue of employment is highly debated, and is often assumed that Northern Dynasty exaggerates its claims without backing them up.[61]

Several interviewees questioned the type of job the mine would offer local people. With an absence of technical knowledge of mining, many local people will be left with jobs that do not offer stability for their livelihoods[62]. Also, the worry that many jobs that would be created would actually be for outsiders, rather than local people or even Alaskans in general. Currently only 62% of metal mining jobs are done by Alaskans, and only 39% of specialized mining jobs with advanced technical skills (Simonelli, 2020). Corporations utilizing this discourse focus more on creating a larger number of job opportunities, rather than the quality of jobs. While the mine might bring in a more job opportunities, it is questionable as to whether or not it would be more economically beneficial as opposed to improving the fishing industry. One interviewee explained how the fishing industry itself creates plenty of quality jobs year to year, and that the trade-off for the Pebble Mine did not make sense.

> "…you know, in comparison to that [the Pebble mine], you have a fishing industry, I mean if you just talk about the commercial fishing industry that's been there for 150 years, it's been a hugely important economic driver for the region, thousands of jobs, millions in wages, billions in

[60] Data collected from interview with Fisher E
[61] Data collected from interview with Trout Unlimited Representative
[62] Data collected from interviews with Trout Unlimited Representative

economic activity every year. The region just doesn't want to risk that. And they certainly don't want to trade it."[63]

Overall, the material power of Northern Dynasty with the backing of the State of Alaska, is indicative of the financial backing of the extractive industry's top executives and the capacity to create job opportunities. In addition, many question as to who these jobs are for, especially considering how many Alaska Native fishers would not be qualified for the kind of jobs the Pebble Mine would offer.

3.3. Discursive Power

In this section, I will highlight the sustainability discourse regime actors utilize to advance and legitimize the Pebble mine. I will also describe how Pebble actors have utilized a 'for the welfare' of Alaskan Natives, as a discourse to position themselves as the saviors of social problems in rural Alaska.

3.3.1. Mining for the Sustainable Future: At What Cost and for Who?

One of Pebble's backbone discourses is the necessity of Pebble due to its contribution to the future of green energy technology and the boost in economic development for Alaskans (Northern Dynasty, n.d.). One of the most talked about minerals aiming to be extracted from the region is copper. Studies have predicted the demand for copper will double by the year 2035 as the world shifts toward alternative energy technologies such as wind, solar, and electric power (Blackmon, 2022). As the demand for materials such as copper have been expected to increase, mining companies have been working behind the scenes to prepare for this transition. Copper is a particularly concerning metal for communities that rely on water sources for their livelihoods. In a 2012, Earthworks, a U.S. based NGO compiled state and federal documents from the U.S. Geological Survey, and reviewed the U.S. top 14 copper mines. They found that all of these mines experienced some sort of spill or accidental release, with 13 of those mines failing to control the contamination, resulting in significant water quality impacts (Earthworks, n.d.). In addition, copper is often extracted and treated utilizing chemicals, such as sulfuric acid, which is part of the waste that ends up in water and groundwater sources (Poonia, 2021). The dust that is created by drilling into the ground with heavy machinery also contributes to air pollution in surrounding communities (Poonia, 2021).

The Pebble Limited Partnership does not claim that the mine would do absolutely no environmental damage, but merely denies the extent of the damage in the long-term[64]. The project

[63] Data collected from interview with Bristol Bay Native Corporation Representative
[64] Data collected from interview with Trout Unlimited Representative

claims they will also create a storage facility to store the ground-up material after extraction (Pebble Limited Partnership, n.d). However, to what extent the project would actually go through with this and for how long is also a concern. Some of my interviewees explained that there seem to be no long term mitigation or solution to many of their concerns, including the inevitable environmental clean-up, or the state of the region once the project finishes[65]. Despite these concerns, Pebble Limited Partnership assures the public they engage in 'responsible mining', claiming their tailings are only 12% toxic, and are mostly a byproduct of the natural environment (Pebble Limited Partnership, n.d.). The project above all assures that, "…mining and fishing *do* coexist in Alaska. We believe Pebble won't harm the fishery, and we're confident the permitting process will validate it." (Pebble Limited Partnership, n.d.; Northern Dynasty Minerals, Ltd., n.d.). However, locals are skeptical, as many are well aware of the impacts of mining to the environment. One interviewee at the BBNC clearly explains the interconnectedness of the salmon rivers, to the environment and the health of the fish, stating that, "…the first 20 feet down is like a sponge…you could put dye up in a water body someplace, and you're gonna find it eventually in all sorts of other places, very far away, where this stuff is all hydrologically interconnected."[66]

Pebble's discourse of its potential to contribute to broader societal goals, particularly the green energy transition is a powerful tool. The 'inevitable' nature of the devastating environmental impacts of mining for copper is a common discourse by regime actors. Despite the evidence and concerns brought up by local people, the discursive power of Northern Dynasty continues to push these discourses forward.

3.3.2.Enhancing the Social Wellbeing of Alaskans: Pebble as a Social Solution

Another discourse utilized by Pebble, or the mining industry and the State of Alaska in general, is the idea that creating a mine in these communities would bring about positive social change. Pebble has made impressive attempts at getting on the good side of Alaska Natives in communities that would surround the mine. Northern Dynasty has claimed to, "…engage openly with stakeholders to develop constructive relationships and key partnerships with local communities, Alaska Natives and commercial fishing interests. In 2017, we created the Pebble Project Advisory Committee, composed of prominent Alaskan and national figures" (Northern Dynasty, n.d.). Through their Pebble Project Advisory Committee, they aim to, 1) be more responsible of stakeholder concerns, 2) enhance partnerships with Native corporations and Bristol Bay residents, 3) create transportation agreements with Alaska Native

[65] Data collected from interview with Trout Unlimited Representative
[66] Data collected from interview with a Bristol Bay Native Corporation Representative

landowners, 4) create programs to benefit Bristol Bay fishers, 5) revitalize Southwest Alaska's economy, 6) enhance fish habitat and productivity, and 7) 'reinvigorate' processes with Elders and Youth from the Bristol Bay region (Northern Dynasty, n.d.). The company does not go into detail about how these initiatives will take place or specific program information. However, the Pebble Tapes revealed the deceitful nature of the Pebble Advisory Committee, particularly in the placement of Ben Stevens, who was Chief of Staff to Governor Dunleavy.

> "…three or four years ago we formed what we called the Pebble Advisory Committee. We reached out to important politicians and environmentalists and native leaders in the state and brought them in to a committee that would advise me personally on how best to go forward on this pebble project…The governor has to be out there playing politics and kissing babies, where the chief of staff is sitting at his desk running the state government. And that's a guy who was on the pebble advisory committee."[67]

It is, however, no secret that the bribes, or payoffs, to Alaskan Natives is Pebble's main attempt at winning the hearts of locals[68]. One of my interviewees was an advocate for the Pebble mine and worked with Pebble to spread their message and promote its development to people in small Native communities and policy-makers around the world. They describe their experience as being "wined and dined" all over the world to promote Pebble's message of "hope"[69].

According to one interviewee at the UTBB, it is no coincidence that the social welfare benefits offered by Northern Dynasty are accessible to communities outside many opportunities offered by government agencies. This inequitable access to support is due in part to the jurisdiction of many of these communities being too far away from the region's center economic hub in Dillingham[70]. With the support of local people, Pebble pushed the discourse that development of their mine would be the best solution to the issues faced in their communities. Even more so, they have pushed the discourse that a development project, such as Pebble, is the only thing that could help their communities. The manipulation of discourse to try and assert themselves as society's saviors has worked to confuse many people into thinking it's either Pebble, or nothing.

[67] Data collected from transcription of audio from the 'Pebble Tapes', released by the EIA on September 21st, 2020
[68] Data collected from interview with Fisher A
[69] Data collected from interview with Fisher E
[70] Data collected from interview with United Tribes of Bristol Bay Representative

On the local level, however, there are people working toward a future that does not involve Pebble, specifically working on a sustainable future that incorporates local peoples' food sovereignty, ensuring that fishers get to choose the livelihood they want to engage in based on their own cultural context. In the next section I will highlight the activities of the United Tribes of Bristol Bay, a consortium of Native governing entities that has not only worked hard to fight against the Pebble mine, but has worked behind the scenes with local people to help determine what future they want to see in Bristol Bay.

4. Alternatives to Pebble: United Tribes of Bristol Bay Consortium

The ongoing attention to Bristol Bay has motivated some outside actors to focus more on the region. Many of my interviewees talked about how important it is for Bristol Bay to have something as simple as reliable internet access, which could provide many new opportunities for local people. With the attention from the Pebble project, people from all over the country have started thinking outside the box, looking at alternatives for the future, outside of the Pebble mine and even extractive industry development. One of the most common comments made by my interviewees was the fact that oftentimes Alaska Native fishers are never heard, and if they are, they rarely drastically influence decision-making, especially in smaller communities near Lake Iliamna, where the Pebble Mine is planned to be built[71]. Therefore, this section aims at bringing more attention to a local initiative who has been working on sustainability in the vision of local Alaskan Natives, the Untied Tribes of Bristol Bay (UTBB).

The UTBB is a Tribal consortium composed of 15 Tribal governments, which works to protect and preserve Native livelihoods in the Bristol Bay region. Within the Bristol Bay region there are three main Native cultures the UTBB aims to protect: the traditional Yup'ik, Dena'ina, and Alutiiq Tribes. The UTBB works with local Native councils, government agencies, and the Native American Rights Fund to ensure issues relating to Native livelihoods are brought to the center of decision making processes. Their work includes government consultation, grassroots organization initiatives, and youth empowerment projects in the region (UTBB, n.d.). Their mission is "…to protect our way of life. And we cannot accomplish our mission without ensuring our communities are sustainable and strong. So our work includes helping to promote and support self-sustaining and self-determined communities."[72] The UTBB is unique because it goes beyond advocacy against the Pebble project. It has tried to focus their efforts on creating a collective vision of what Bristol Bay Native people want their future to look like outside of Pebble.

[71] Data collected from interview with Fisher E
[72] Transcription documented from video recording of the Sustainability Summit (UTBB, 2019).

Part of UTBB's activities are guided by the Bristol Bay Regional Vision Project, an initiative created by several regional Native associations[73] to gather the views and opinions of Bristol Bay Native residents to compile a clear message, straight from the local people themselves. While the final report was published in 2011, this Vision Project is still used to this day for many Native associations and Tribal governments as a foundation for decision-making, including the UTBB. The Vision Project involved over 50 meetings in 26 different Bristol Bay communities, asking community members questions about the aspirations for the future of their region. At the end of the project, organizers analyzed there similar major themes[74] local people wanted for their future (Bristol Bay Regional Vision, 2011). Together, local people proclaimed they wanted a future that respects and incorporates their traditional practices and values; addresses drug/alcohol abuse and domestic violence; fosters sustainable economic development; develops an education sector; and increases cooperation amongst Bristol Bay governing bodies (Bristol Bay Regional Vision, 2011).

Another incentives created by the UTBB was the 2019 Sustainability Summit, which aimed at bringing together the region's residents, Native governing bodies, small business owners and entrepreneurs, to discuss and work toward Bristol Bay's sustainable economic future. At the Sustainability Summit, UTBB's Executive Director, Alannah Hurley gave a passionate speech about changing the predetermined conception of economic sustainability, and to go back to the roots of Alaska Native culture to interpret the path to their future (UTBB, 2019). She emphasized how traditional Alaska Native cultures measure wealth, not by the amount of money, but by how much you can give away. She also stated how local Native people have continued to struggle with the impacts of colonialization, and how that struggle has, "…at times overshadowed this foundation of our identity. The foundation of our people placing value on our collective well-being..."[75]

At the end of the Sustainability Summit, participants were asked, 'what does economic sustainability mean to you?'[76] Many of the responses were clear opposition to projects, such as the Pebble mine, that may offer some economic benefits to Bristol Bay, but clearly come at a social and ecological cost that the people of Bristol Bay are not willing to suffer (See Table 1 for full list of responses). They are also very clear about preserving and applying their Alaska Native values and traditions to their economic

[73] The associations were the Bristol Bay Native Association, Bristol Bay Native Corporation, Bristol Bay Area Health Corporation, Bristol Bay Housing Authority, and the Bristol Bay Economic Development Corporation.
[74] These themes were 1) culture and subsistence, 2) safe and healthy families, 3) economic development, 4) education, and 5) regional and community-wide cooperation
[75] Transcription documented from video recording of the Sustainability Summit (UTBB, 2019).
[76] Data collected from interview with United Tribes of Bristol Bay Representative

future, highlighting that without these values, sustainability cannot occur. Finally, another conclusion that can be made is that the people of Bristol Bay recognize that in order to survive in a modern, capitalist economy, there needs to be easier access to opportunities and less roadblocks preventing them from developing on their own terms.

Table 1: List of Responses from Attendees to the 2019 Sustainability Summit

1	"Sustainable economic development is a way to help the people of the land grow financially while maintaining their connection to the land."
2	"To be able to continue to live in our community by creating our own way to rely on each other."
3	"Use of resources in a way that future generations are able to continue developing the economy of the area."
4	"Economic development that thrives without destroying natural resources."
5	"Becoming self-sufficient as an individual, as a community and as a region. Especially as a state!"
6	"Bolstering, training and supporting economic growth and small business for not only locals but newcomers to the region. This involves partnership programs with city planners for tax incentives and 'roadblock' avoidance for entrepreneurs."
7	"Keeping subsistence alive and continuing to protect our Bristol Bay salmon."
8	"Make our community we live in more affordable."
9	"Successful enterprises without taking away from our Native people."
10	"Keeping the economy stable, clean, safe."
11	"Building lasting prosperity."
12	"Preserving our land and cultural subsistence practice."
13	"Keeping our traditions and ways of our Native values alive."
14	"Making money in rural areas without destroying the land and water."

Since their enactment, one of the main issues the UTBB has been working on is their activism against the Pebble mine. The UTBB has focused its efforts on protecting the watershed that has, "…sustained the Indigenous people of the region since time immemorial; a commercial fishery that has been going strong for more than 130 years; and a habitat that gives birth to the world's largest wild salmon run" (UTBB, n.d.). The UTBB recognizes the wealth of resources the region has provided Native livelihoods for generations and fights to emphasize the irreversible damage the mine would bring upon

the whole ecosystem. In December 2020, the UTBB alongside their Tribal partners launched "The Call to Protect Bristol Bay", a proposal to the EPA to enact permanent protections to the Bristol Bay watershed. If passed, the bill would be categorized under the 404(c) Clean Water Act, which would prioritize the protection of the salmon habitat and ban any toxic mine waste indefinitely. In doing so, it would be impossible for any large-scale mining project to be constructed along the region's waterways.

Despite the attention on the Pebble mine project, there are diverse local initiatives brewing in the Bristol Bay region. It is necessary to refocus our attention on the actual local issues, and the solutions the people of that place want to see in their own communities. One of my objectives of presenting the UTBB case was to provide and illuminate an alternative to stealth privatization that are already taking place on the ground, by local people. Spreading awareness to these local initiatives in the region, where the spotlight has consistently been focused on the Pebble mine, is essential for sustainability in the long run. Therefore, in the following section, I would like to revisit the concept of food sovereignty, and how the UTBB offers an avenue for local people to incorporate this concept.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

Throughout this chapter, I have presented how a history of colonialization and perpetuated systematic discrimination has given regime actors leverage, allowing them to successfully corporatize the governing process. Through regime actor dominated governance, stealth privatization through this inequitable access regime has taken place due to regime actors' institutional, material, and discursive power. I would argue, the discriminatory history of Alaska Native's exclusion to access rights, has legitimized and empowered regime actors, which has allowed them to consistently shape society for their own interests.

From this chapter, we see that privatization is more than sustainability-washing because regime actors in this case take advantage of a disadvantaged population wrecked by an inequitable access regime that has left them powerless and vulnerable, unable to execute their own autonomy and self-determination. The structure itself is already faulty, and regime actors have taken advantage of that. They do so with their institutional power to keep hold of their own interests (i.e. a capitalist system), specifically their relationship with the State and their interdependent and co-benefiting relationship. Through their material power, they utilize financial power and their ability to create jobs, to take advantage of some of the most vulnerable aspects of Alaska rural issues. Finally, through their discursive power, regime actors claim for the future of sustainability and for the health and welfare of Alaska Natives.

The execution of regime actors' power to benefit from and secure a structure that encourages inequitable distribution and access for Alaska Natives must be recognized and put to a halt. As researchers, we must not allow these issues to be overlooked, and always bring the attention back to the fundamental issues, no matter how complex or wicked, that solidify structural discrimination and cover up the realities of simple fixes (privatization) to complex issues (rural poverty, loss of opportunity, economic decline, etc.). I would argue in this case, despite the 'win' in Bristol Bay, we can still see there is a discriminatory nature to Native fishing rights in Alaska. This is due to the systematic racism carried out through the current capitalist regime. Despite some actors saying they are against the Pebble mine project for environmental and social reasons, they have done almost the exact opposite to other 'sacrifice zones'. The comparison with other mining project development demonstrates that the Pebble mine opposition does not necessarily represent a greater role of Native fishers in fisheries governance in the form of political or economic power, but instead overshadows the already systematic discrimination of Native fishers through colonialization of property rights regimes by regime actors benefiting in the mining industry. While we can celebrate the 'win' so far in Bristol Bay, we need to continue to drive our attention to the systematic discrimination of Native fishers, as their food sovereignty continues to be threatened due to the continued influence of the mining industry and the corporatization of communities. As one Native fisher mentioned, the stop of the Pebble mine project is great, but it's extremely rare[77].

I would also argue that Pebble is just one example of the attempt by regime actors to take advantage of vulnerable populations devastated by a long history of structural discrimination and reap the benefits of a capitalist society created by foundations in colonialism. I would call this a form of stealth privatization, as the fundamental reason behind the fuel that ignites regime entities' power is the underlying structural discrimination that has dismantled the power and autonomy of Alaskan Natives. The Pebble Mine project itself is a political spectacle, and in no way reflects the autonomy of Alaska Native fishers to develop a livelihood based on their own conception of food sovereignty. This case demonstrates the lack of political agency Native fishers have. Despite the Pebble Mine possibly being stopped, the fundamental problem, the lack of power and structural agency for Native fishers, is still there. Stealth forms of privatization, particularly in the form of structural discrimination, still heavily exist, through entry entitlement and quota allocation schemes which do not benefit local community interests and led to a decline in local ownership of fisheries in Alaska.

[77] Data collected from interview with Fisher D

I aimed at positioning the case of UTBB as a potential alternative to the Pebble mine project. Specifically, I aimed to highlight how the UTBB represents a sustainable future for local people that is actually determined by themselves. The UTBB represents a core aspect of food sovereignty, by ensuring that producers get to choose, for themselves, to produce, distribute, and consume food from their own visions. The UTBB also represents the autonomy and agency of Alaskan Natives by engaging in activities to drive decision-making away from the corporate mindset of 'individual wealth generation', and back into traditional forms of wealth accumulation through the ability to 'give away'. I would argue UTBB's vision and activities align with the food sovereignty concept and represent the key first step in ensuring the voices of Alaska Natives are heard and respected.

To conclude, if the vision of local people in Bristol Bay aligns with their conceptualization of food sovereignty values and visions, regime actors' push toward privatization is not the direction they should pursue. This is due to the fact that by pursuing the Pebble mine project, local peoples' wants and needs would not be met, nor would it put the region on a pathway into the sustainable economic future. However, I also would argue the attempt by Pebble to create a mine in an established fishing community represents more than the classic "local people versus giant corporation" fight. It is necessary to further question what this fight represents below the surface, by examining the reasons behind its development, and question the way in which regime entities have continued to use their power to push the project through. The Pebble mine is not a standalone project, extractive industries have had a long history of pillaging rural Alaskan Native communities, alongside the support by the State of Alaska, which benefits financially from the exchange. By examining this case, we can begin to see what cracks in the foundation that can be taken advantage of for future sustainability pathways, but also, illuminate the instances where, to put it lightly, we just got lucky. Unfortunately, the future of Bristol Bay, and other rural Alaska Native communities, has consistently been in the hands of regime actors who benefit from a structure of corporate colonialization, while attempting to legitimize themselves and their activities as 'Saving Native land, Saving Native fishers'. By creating a mine, Pebble will effectively exclude Alaskan Natives from access rights to the fishery due to its irreversible ecological damage. The 'win' against the Pebble Mine should be viewed with caution, as stealth privatization is often reflective of existing power imbalances within the governance system.

Chapter 6: Stealth Privatization through Social Development Schemes at the Chana Industrial Estate

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will introduce a stealth privatization case in Chana district, Thailand. This case centers on the power dynamics behind the plan to create the Chana Industrial Estate (CIE), an economic hub that would transform the coast of small fishing communities to a large-scale trade and development zone. The CIE was first created by regime actors, namely the Southern Border Province Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and corporate entities in the energy and gas industry, aiming to develop Chana for the future. However, for who's future and to what end, is questioned throughout this chapter. Local residents of Chana have assembled together, advocating against the industrial development of their area, as they believe this project would only negatively affect them. Therefore, the main questions for this chapter are, 1) *how can we uncover the actual motivations behind development projects*, and 2) *how do we ensure rural development projects are democratic and equitable by putting the voices and opinions of local people at the forefront of decision-making*? Arguments in this chapter are based on the belief that development should not be only about economic efficiency of resource use or accelerate industrialization, but instead aim at improving local livelihoods in the vision of those most affected. This chapter will utilize Newell and Levy's power analysis to uncover how and why decisions for development are made, in order to identify ways in which the governance structure responsible for development can be improved. I also introduce the Chana Rak Thin network, a group of community initiatives working from the bottom-up to create visions and goals for the future development of Chana. This case emphasizes how and why development thus far has not been sustainable and has lacked the incorporation of local producers.

1.1. Rural Development for Whom? Corporatization of Fishing Communities

In Thailand, while the official government is under a constitutional monarchy system, in the recent decade the Thai government has claimed to be shifting towards incorporating more democratic processes. With this understanding, development projects, in which regime actors claim to be aiming for the sustainable future of each community, should be held to the same standard. In countries such as Thailand, a certain amount of economic development is highly encouraged by the industrialized world. Thailand's path to development has been similar to many countries that experienced rapid industrial growth, plagued with environmental degradation treated as an externality under neo-liberal economic growth. These struggles have created conflicts with rural communities that still rely on primary

industries, such as fisheries or agriculture, which are encouraged, or forced, to industrialize in a way that benefits the national economy. Since the 1932 revolution, which abolished the absolute monarchy, the modern Thai government have, or at least claimed, to incorporate democratic idealism, in the form of public elections, in some form. However, Thailand has also faced unique struggles with its political environment, suffering through a series of military coups and civil unrest.

The complex political situation in Thailand has been described in various ways, with the most prevalent being the concept of the 'deep state'. The deep state actor-relationship was first described as the situation, where the king would strategically appoint those in his inner circle into positions of power (McCargo, 2005). McCargo referred to this as "network monarchy", an informal power structure that extends the influence of the military within the monarchy system, specifically through appointment of military officials in the King's Privy Council (2005). This concept has been broadened from McCargo's initial work to include important entities which are equally, if not more, influential behind the scenes, including the military, police, and judiciary (Chambers, 2013; Mérieau 2016). Ungpakorn (2016) has further urged scholars to incorporate corporate actors into discussions surrounding Thai governance. Ungpakorn emphasizes the importance of recognizing Thailand as a capitalist society, in which the capitalist ruling class rarely participates in democratic processes, yet often shape its decision-making (Ungpakorn, 2016). As Thailand intensifies its neoliberal growth policies in the face of economic transition, corporate actors have taken a stronger position in governance. In the case of Thailand, three powerful entities, the Monarchy, the military, and corporate entities, or the "Deep State", work together to shape the future of rural communities for their own interests. How the "Deep State" is legitimized and influences decision-making should be critically analyzed.

By examining the "Deep State's" forms of power, the study aims to illuminate gaps in influence by bringing forth an alternative, created by local actors to ensure the interests and livelihoods of local fishers are prioritized. Despite the growing role of corporate actors in Thai governance, research has yet to deeply analyze their role beyond being just an investor in development projects. The way corporate actors have embedded themselves into political processes is crucial to truly understand Thailand's modern political economy. In addition, since the Thai government claims to practice democratic processes, analyzing how, and in what ways, local peoples' visions of their future are incorporated in Thailand's development strategies is essential to assure sustainable transitions. Therefore, the objective of this research is to illuminate the growing influence of regime actors in sustainable fisheries governance by analyzing the forms of power used to legitimize their activities through processes of

'stealth privatization'. In this case stealth privatization is justified under the narrative of idealism of social development. Social development, or social sustainability, can be described as meeting basic human needs, reducing poverty, malnutrition, or improved housing, but it also refers to development that ensures jobs, energy, and conserving resource bases (Vallance et al., 2011). While the idea behind social development aims at bringing our attention back to the needs of social issues, it is often difficult to separate social development, with that of "growth" and wealth accumulation. In cases which regime actors deem it necessary to "develop" social aspects of a community for the "future", a future that is generalized as "industrial", "green", or "modern". Due to this, social development is often completely different from what the local communities envisage for their own development. Oftentimes the idea behind social development is from the viewpoint of regime actors, often acting in ways that benefit themselves, rather than for the local community itself. In this sense, regime actors have manipulated the ideology of 'social development', claiming their activities are for the future benefit of the local society, while pursuing projects that benefit their own interests.

In Chana district, there is a community of Muslim fishers who already do not get much opportunity to make decisions for their own communities within the structure of a politically unstable southern regions, which will be explained further on in this chapter. Corporate actors are very aware of these circumstances and have developed strong relationships with local development actors and government entities to take advantage of the situation. Specifically, corporate actors often undermine the traditional fishing livelihoods of Chana fishers by positioning their privatization products as social development for the future of all of rural Thailand. In fact, Chana is just one of the first rural fishing communities aimed at becoming 'cities of the future' surrounding the Gulf of Thailand. The ways in which corporate actors are conducting these schemes needs to be critically analyzed in order to identify gaps for alternative governance and allow for development to be based on the needs of local people.

1.2. Structure of this Chapter

This chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 2 is an overview of political context in Thailand and the key actors that influence fisheries governance. Section 3 examines concrete examples of how the "Deep State" actors have gradually taken a stronger role in the CIE's development, through their three forms of power, institutional, material, and discursive. Section 4 provides an alternative to the corporatization of Songkhla's rural development, the ideology promoted by the Chana Rak Thin network. The Chana Rak Thin network is an unregistered group working towards fighting against the development of the Chana Industrial Estate. Their activities have focused on assembling likeminded

organizations, organization protests, and engaging with local people for their vision of local development. In this section I also discuss Thailand's rural fishing communities' development, specifically how civil society and alternative governance actors working together can help advocate and fight for the self-determination of local fishers and encourages local development geared toward producers, rather than corporate actors. Finally, in section 5, I concluded this chapter with final thoughts and suggestions for future research for this case.

2. Examining the Foundations of the Structure: Politics that Influence Chana Fisheries

This section aims to clarify the context in which this case study is situated. Since the 1932 revolution, Thailand has been under a constitutional monarchy system, in which a constitution grants authority and power to the sovereign (i.e. the King). The current King, Maha Vajiralongkorn has been King of Thailand since 2016, since the passing of his father, the former King of Thailand Bhumibol Adulyadej. Currently, the King has little direct influence over every day decision-making, and power is handed down to the prime minister or national cabinet, known as the Privy Council of Thailand[78]. The 1997 Constitution, placed more responsibility and political power in the hands of its prime minister (Suehiro, 2014). Since the revolution, the military has played a strong role in Thai government, initiating 13 successful coups, ten of which were during Former King of Thailand Bhumibol Adulyadej reign (Wongcha-um and Johnson, 2020). In particular, attention is given to the influence of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose time in office brought attention to the role of corporate actors in government but also significantly impacted the growing conflict in the southern provinces. I will also analyze how this context plays out in the fisheries sector, specifically how decision-making is carried in Chana district. By analyzing the structure, it is possible to understand how and in what ways power in the governance structure has shifted toward Deep State actors and set the backdrop for the analysis of the CIE examined in this chapter.

2.1. The CEO of Thailand: Former Prime Minister Thaksin's Influence

[78] The Privy Council of Thailand is a group of appointed advisors to the Monarchy. The members are appointed by the King himself.

One of the most influential, and controversial, prime ministers in recent history is Thaksin Shinawatra, serving from 2001 to 2006. Thaksin became prime minister after him and his party[79], the Thai Rak Thai party, won by a landslide, marking the largest voter turnout in Thai history at the time (The Nation, 2005). His campaign focused on invoking populist ideals in rural areas, particularly through the promotion of social welfare programs such as the One Tambon (village), One Product program[80] or the "30-baht" universal health care system[81], which made him very popular with north and northeastern rural communities[82] (Sipinski, 2023). However, Thaksin had another "face", which attempted to drastically shift Thailand toward economic liberalization and modernization (Suehiro, 2014). As a multibillionaire himself, Thaksin's politics were frequently referred to as "Thaksinomics", which emphasized a corporate approach to government processes (Suihiro, 2014). Thaksin saw himself as the "CEO" of Thailand, and emphasized how the management of a country is the same as a company (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2004). Many of his policies were aimed at developing massive infrastructure projects, including the Suvarnabhumi Airport (Bangkok International Airport). Thaksin also heavily encourage privatization of state-owned enterprises, namely in the telecommunications and energy sectors (Mutebi, 2006). This included the privatization of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand, now known as PTT Public Company Limited, a national oil and gas company in 2001 (Arnold, 2006). However, many of his planned policies would not come into fruition due to the numerous accusations of corruption and abuse of power during his political career. One of the most infamous cases being his "war on drugs", created in 2003, which had 2,873 people killed in 3 months after being accused of being involved in the drug trade (Choonhavan, 2013). This "blacklist" of people were rounded up and killed by police and local authorities, approved by the Ministry of Interior (Choonhavan, 2013). Abuse of power allegations range from evading taxes, concealing assets, and purchasing land for family members at low prices (Profile: Yingluck, 2008; MacKinnon, 2008). One particular case stems from his obvious attempts to shape media attention surrounding him and his family's activities by censoring the media through his

[79] The Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party was founded by Thaksin in 1998. It was dissolved in 2007 and briefly replaced by the People's Power Party (PPP). However, only after a few months, the PPP was replaced in 2008 with the current Pheu Thai Party (PTP), which is one of the main political parties in Thailand now (Phoonphongphiphat, 2023).
[80] The One Tambon, One Product (OTOP) program was based off of Japan's One Village One Product (OVOP) scheme, which promotes local products in national, regional, and international scales to generate income and revitalize economies in rural communities (Thi Anh, 2013). Originating in Oita prefecture in Japan, the concept focused on local branding to promote regional resources and create new added value (Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), n.d.)
[81] "The 30 Baht Program" refers to the 30 baht copay that enrollees pay per visit health services.
[82] According to the World Bank poverty in Thailand dropped from 21% to 11% from 2000 to 2005, during Thaksin's time in office, which continues to make him very popular to this day (The Downfall of Thaksin, 2006; Sipinski, 2023).

personal connections and financial investment in the sector (The Downfall of Thaksin, 2006). Thaksin's company, Shin Corp was a monopoly in the media sector and was frequently used to manipulate and shape discourse about his private and public affairs (The Downfall of Thaksin, 2006).

2.2. The Background of the Conflict in the Southern Provinces

The Thai southern provinces, Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla, were originally part of the Sultanate of Patani, a Malay sultanate, governed under local Islamic laws. To this day, the majority of the population in this region identify as Malay Muslims, their dialect descending from a mixture of Thai and the local Malay language, *Jawi* (Human Rights Watch, 2007). The Patani region was a prosperous maritime trading port for the Southeast Asian region, namely due to its natural resources and its beneficial geographical location to other coastal Malay cities (Manan et al., 2022). There were years of conflict and warfare over territory and political control between Patani sultans and Thailand, formally known as the Kingdom of Siam. In 1909, the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Siam, signed the Anglo-Siamese Treaty, which officially established the border between Thailand and Malaysia. Under this treaty, the southern provinces came under Thai jurisdiction (Manan et al., 2022). During this time the region's politics were heavily decentralized which allowed for some autonomy for local Malay leaders (Engvall, 2019). However, in the early to mid-20th century, Thailand would impose several social campaigns, including the government's cultural mandates which emphasized "Thai-ness" and aimed to create a uniform image of Thai identity (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2010). These campaigns impacted the southern provinces in particular because at this time many cities were still majority Muslim, speaking Malay dialects in schools and local shops (The Downfall of Thaksin, 2006). The intolerance and prejudice for the Islamic culture in this region, the Thai government tried to assimilate and suppress the southern provinces (Human Rights Watch, 2007). The prime minister at the time, Field Marshall Plaek Phbulsongkram, created controversial policies aimed directly at the Malay Muslim community, by banning minority languages and requiring all citizens to take a Thai name (Melvin, 2007). In an effort to bring back Islamic law and campaign for cultural rights in the region, Haji Sulong, the founder of the Patani People's Movement submitted a petition to the Thai government (Human Rights Watch, 2007). By this time, the Thai government was under a nationalist military dictatorship which had been trying to impose Thai language and culture since the 1930's (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2010). Therefore, Haji Sulong's petition for autonomy was seen by the Thai government as an act of treason and "Anti-Thai", and he was arrested in 1948. Shortly after being released in 1952, Haji Sulong and others in his party disappeared without a trace. Though it is believed he and the others were assassinated by the military

police (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2010), no arrests have been made nor has anyone claimed responsibility for the disappearance and assumed killing (Hamidong and Juarez, 2015). This event however, mark the start of years of social and political tension within the region and would make Haji Sulong an iconic figure in the resistance to come and triggered a state of emergency. By the 1950's the conflict had spurred several Malay Muslim separatist groups had formed focusing on promoting independence of Patani, including the Patani National Liberation Front (in Malay language, *Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani* (BNPP) (formed by Tengku Abdul Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong), the Greater Patani Malayu Association (*Gabungam Melayu Patani Raya*, GAMPAR), the National Revolution Front (*Barisan Revolusi Nasional*, BRN), and the Patani United Liberation Organization (*Pertubuhan Pembebasan Bersatu Patani*, PULO) (Islam, 1998; Melvin, 2007). Until the 1980's these groups were responsible for several violent attacks on police and government buildings, including an attempt to assassinate King Bhumibol in 1977 (McCargo, 2014). Only when General Prem Tinsulanonda, originally from Songkhla province became prime minister, steps toward political negotiations began (Melvin, 2007). In 1981, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) was established in an attempt to (and somewhat achieved to) improve local governance and administrative affairs for the Malay Muslim community (Wheeler, 2010). In addition, the Civilian-Police-Military Command-43 (CPM-43) was created in hand with the SBPAC to establish security operations and suppress violent resistance in the region. The SBPAC was created under the Ministry of Interior, originally as a committee to ensure decisions by national departments were implemented (Wheeler, 2010). For the most part, the SBPAC created a space for the Malay Muslim community to reach out to for complaints about government officials, even if the SBPAC was not able to fully address many of the underlying issues in the region due to its lack of political power as an individual entity (Wheeler, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2007). Nevertheless, due to its active role in the region, the amount of violence in the region decreased until the 2000's.

2.3. Thaksin's Role in the Southern Provinces

Thaksin is heavily criticized for his role in escalating the conflict in the southern provinces. By the time Thaksin took office, the Thai national government assumed the resistance movements in the southern provinces had died out due to the number of attacks reducing (Human Rights Watch, 2007). This, coupled with Thaksin's desire to solidify control in the south led him to dissolve the SBPAC and CPM-43, effectively transferring most authority in the region to the police. To secure control and legitimacy in the region, Thaksin wanted to, 1) to reduce the political power of Prem who had constructed a strong network in the south, and 2) completely stop the conflict altogether (McCargo,

2006). This would help weaken the strong links between the Democratic Party and southern politicians and push Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party in the lead for the next round of elections (McCargo, 2006). Therefore, Thaksin's activities in the south were heavily influenced by his own political interests and conflict was a direct challenge to his authority (McCargo, 2006). After launching his "war on drugs", resistance groups were given the push they needed to re-organize, especially the BRN (now the National Revolution Front-Coordinate (BRN-C)) (Human Rights Watch, 2007). For the first time, the resistance in the south was more unified and attacks became more frequent and more organized. In response to the resurgence of the resistance groups, in January of 2004, Thaksin's government confiscated hundreds of weapons from a resistance camp, which proved the resistance groups to be more organized than first believed (The Downfall of Thaksin, 2006). Realizing the lack of control in the region, in April of 2004, Thaksin attempted to create the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPBC), a military-police controlled version of the former SBPAC, though without important relationships to the Malay-Muslim community (McCargo, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2007). That same month, resistance groups carried out a series of attacks on 10 police stations across the region, afterward seeking shelter in Krue Se Mosque. After an 8 hour stand-off with police, 32 people were killed and the incident marked a severe turning point for resistance groups. Another incident happened at the city of Tak Bai in October of 2004. In response to an arrest of alleged supporters of the resistance groups, 1,500 protesters outside the police station in Tak Bai were arrested and herded into army trucks. On the 6 hour journey to a Pattani army camp for interrogation, it was found that 78 people had died from asphyxiation (Harish and Liow, 2007). The Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai incidents and growing intensity of the violent conflict in the region, King Bhumibol pressured Thaksin to find peaceful solutions to the conflict, which lead to the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) (Melvin, 2007). The NRC was headed by former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun and various stakeholders to recommend steps for the government to take to end the southern insurgency. The report created by the NRC explained that the root cause of the conflict in the south was poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of cultural representation in the system (Melvin, 2007). Despite these findings, Thaksin ignored them, taking no steps toward the suggestions for negotiations as recommended by the NRC (Melvin, 2007).

2.4. When the Military took Control: The 2006 and 2014 Coups

By 2006 Thaksin had more focused on the political tensions in Bangkok, as the corruption and nepotism rampant during his time in office had begun unraveling. By this time, his relationship with the monarchy and the military had weakened due to his corporate government and monopolization of

power (Melvin, 2007). The straw that broke the camel's back was Thaksin's sale of his company, Shin Corp, a scandal which completely turned the public against him. Thaksin sold his company to Temasek, a Singaporean company for 73 billion baht ($1.9 billion USD) (Arnold, 2006). Under Thaksin's own government, Thai law stated that Thai businesses could only be owned by foreign companies up to 50%. However, Thaksin sold Shin Corp at 49.5%[83], which lessened the amount of taxes he would have to pay in Thailand. This made the transaction seem unpatriotic and did not align with his ultra-nationalist government image he had won the election with (The Downfall of Thaksin, 2006). Essentially the Thai public, namely the urban middle class, believed that Thaksin had sold out to Singapore and saw Thaksin as a greedy billionaire. In 2005, Sondhi Limthongkul formed the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), also known as the "yellow shirts"[84] (Profile: Yellow Shirts, 2013). By 2006 the PAD had taken to the streets, protesting Thaksin's government which would be the catalyst for his removal from power. On September 19th, 2006, led by Lieutenant General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who was appointed by Thaksin in 2005, the Royal Thai Army staged a coup d'état while Thaksin was in New York for the UN general assembly (Walker, 2006). The coup was rumored to have been instigated by Prem, who had been in conflict with Thaksin for years, and was the Privy Council Chair to the King at the time. The coup declared martial law and an interim government with support from King Bhumibol, ousted Thaksin from government. The newly appointed Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, was a retired army commander and member of the Privy Council to the King under Thaksin's government. Thaksin's party TRT was outlawed and he and many of his party members were barred from politics. After the coup, Thaksin fled has since been in self-exile, avoiding returning to Thailand for fear of prosecution. Immediately following the coup, there was hope that the new government would help create negotiations and seek peace in the south after public comments from Sonthi weeks after (Harish and Liew, 2007). Prime Minister Surayud apologized to the southern provinces for the injustices they suffered, notably the Tak Bai incident. At the same time, Surayud called for the reinstatement the SBPAC and CPM-43. However, the SBPAC was placed under the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), which gives the military authority over its decisions, resembling Thaksin's former organization the SBPPBC. This restructuring under the ISOC makes it difficult for the SBPAC to regain trust from local people (Wheeler, 2010). Even in exile, Thaksin and his party's corporate management style of government still have significant influence over decision-making in Thailand. In 2011, the younger sister of Thaksin, Yingluck Shinawatra

[83] By September of 2006, Temasek owned (directly and indirectly through subsidiaries) 76% of Shin Corp (The Downfall of Thaksin, 2006).
[84] The color yellow was used for their image because it is traditionally associated with the Thai monarchy.

became prime minister under the Pheu Thai Party, the third successor organization of Thaksin's TRT Party. Yingluck's government was heavily criticized due to its links with her brother Thaksin, claiming it to be a proxy government as he ruled from overseas (Ex-Thai PM's, 2017). Her government and the public's reaction to it reignited the unrest and resentment that had been building since the 2006 coup, once again sparking the attention of the "yellow shirts". Lead by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, serving as the Minister of Defense, the military once again led a coup d'état on May 22nd, 2014. Prayut became prime minster of Thailand with support from the Monarchy, and is still in power to this day[85].

In conclusion, politics in Thailand has been incredibly unstable in the past few decades, especially following the 2014 military coup d'état, which placed a military junta in complete control. The political instability in Thailand has created blurred lines between the military and politicians. In addition, the influence of Thaksin's government brought attention to the growing influence of corporate actors and the emergence of the influence business in Thailand's decision-making. For the southern provinces, the religious and cultural conflict was not caused by one person or one government, though has been severely accelerated by the powerful actors involved. It is a result of competing and overlapping positions of powerful actors, including the military, the monarchy, and corporations, which prolong the instability and violence in the south (Melvin, 2007).

2.5. Fisheries Governance in Chana, Thailand

Since power in Thailand is centralized, many of the decisions for land usage and financial decisions are determined by high level officials. The fisheries governance structure is reflective of this as a top-down resource management system, in which total allowable catch (TAC) and command and control schemes are the main forms of regulation. Before 2015, fisheries access was determined through a licensing system, though it was determined to be inefficient due to its lack of centralized data and lack of enforceability. This led to fake or double licensing schemes and lying on what kinds of equipment were being used on boats, allowing trawl fishers to take advantage of the ability to cheat the system. The Department of Fisheries (DoF) (now known as Krom Pramong) is the overall governing body for fisheries resources and activities in Thai waters and fishers going outside Thai coastal waters. In 2015, the Thai government began to recognize the importance of dealing with illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU) fishing, and restructured its administration to tackle these issues, including 76 local administration offices in every province and 527 district offices (Department of Fisheries, 2021). The DoF then created

[85] In the 2023 general election, the Move Forward Party, a reformist, progressive party, won the most seats in the lower house.

three committees, which were comprised of roundtable discussion meetings with various actors. These meetings created science-based, or the 'worldwide standard' of fisheries management in Thailand, the development of TAC based on maximum sustainable yield (MSY) (Kulanujaree, 2020). However, the issue of how to regulate or enforce these quotas is still a huge issue in Thailand, showing that despite these top-down schemes, their regulatory abilities are still limited. In 2015, the European Union (EU) criticized Thailand's inability to manage IUU fishing giving it a "yellow card", a warning that could lead to more serious punishments such as import bans (EU, 2019). In response, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha cracked down, creating a series of new laws and regulations to combat IUU fishing (Cabinet passes sweeping measures, 2015). In one instance, his government revoked 8,024 fishing licenses after compliance checks found they were in violation of licensing rules (Prime Minister revokes, 2015). On the ground however, these policies were met with much criticism from the fisheries sector, claiming the new laws were too strict and were too expensive, which could deter future workers from joining the industry (Wonsamuth, 2019). This resulted in fishers going on strike, claiming that there was not enough time or warning for them to adjust to the new regulations (Kowitwanij, 2015). The EU later lifted the ban in 2019 praising the Thai government for their steps toward eliminating IUU fishing.

The top-down regulation for the fishing industry by Prayut's government was done without consulting the fishers on the ground. This decision-making style is seen on the local level as well. Since power is centralized in Thailand, decisions made at the local level in Chana often less so benefit local areas and more often reflect interests of higher level bureaucracy. One interviewee explained this through the development of seawalls in Chana, in which despite the erosion of beaches caused by seawalls, funding for these projects continues to be funneled down year after year. Research by local universities and NGO's have made the public aware of the lack of benefits from these seawalls which has encouraged people to question the rationale of these projects through protesting. This protesting has slowly began to encourage change, particularly for seawalls located in money-making tourist islands. Though the Thai government is still slow to respond to these protests, often denying claims in the press and violently removing or tear gassing protesters from government buildings[86]. This shows that decision-making that impacts fisheries the most in Chana is often carried out top-down, with little on-the-ground coordination.

The top-down decision-making in Thailand has carried over into the creation of the Chana Industrial Estate (CIE). The CIE is one project aimed at developing the southern region of Thailand under the

[86] Data collected from Researcher A.

government initiative, The Triangle of Stability, Prosperity, and Sustainability, a project approved by the national cabinet on October 4th, 2016. The SBPAC would later add Chana district to this project, the CIE, in 2019, an 18.6 billion baht (approximately $598 million USD) project, the largest industrial estate under their command (Rujivanarom, 2021). The CIE would completely restructure the entire district, not only the coastal areas to be built for the new port, but also the locations of housing, shops, and local industry will all be moved. For local people the location of their new homes are already decided. While the new locations have not yet been disclosed, they have been named 'Happy Village'[87]. CIE organizers claim the project will create over 100,000 new jobs in the area, and make Chana a gateway for import and export trade to the rest of the region (Theparat, 2020). Vice President of Songkhla City Development Company Pairoj Chaichiratikul stated that "Chana will be attractive to investors and it will also facilitate the movements of investment, skilled labor, and technologies to the four southern border provinces" (The Government Public Relations Department, 2020). The decision to propose the CIE was met with several protests in 2020 by the Chana Rak Thin network, including traveling to Bangkok and demonstrating in front of the Government House (Rujivanarom, 2021). The majority[88] of Chana residents are in complete opposition to the project, claiming it to be a project that will completely take away their livelihoods[89]. From the perspective of Chana residents, they like the way their life is now, and would not want to change their way of life for a life as an industrial worker. Malay-Muslim communities in the south in general tend to feel that the resources from the South are exploited for the interests of outsiders, especially due to the inequitable socio-economic conditions (Melvin, 2007). For Chana fishers in particular, the history of industrial development has left a feeling of distrust. The Chana Industrial Project also reminds them of previous industrial projects done in their city, including Thai and Malaysian gas factories, and a durian processing plant, both of which determinately impacted air quality levels, and clean water availability for local residents[90] (See Chapter 3, Section 5.2. for further details). Despite the protests by local people, regime actors insist that the CIE is what is best for Chana and its 'sustainable' future. The Deep State regime is rigid and hierarchical, leaving little to no room for local people to make

[87] Data from author's interview with Fisher D.
[88] While I could not find evidence of an exact percentage of people who are against the project, there is an article that explains that approximately 1,000 people showed up to the public hearing in 2020 (Hear the comments of the Chana, 2020).
[89] Data collected from various interviews with fishers and data collected from survey's done by The Natural Way of Life Learning Center.
[90] Data from author's interview with Fisher D.

decisions for their own community. In the next section, I analyze how the Deep State regime has utilized their various forms of power to legitimize and push the CIE stealth privatization project.

3. Results

The following section analyzes the three forms of power, institutional, material, and discursive, used by the "Deep State" to legitimize and influence decisions behind the Chana Industrial Estate (CIE). The power of the "Deep State" in this case is demonstrated through the interconnections between the military, politicians, and corporate actors, many of whom had a role in the most recent coup.

3.1. Institutional Power

Institutional power utilized by Deep State actors in Thailand is especially powerful due to the monarchy system under a military regime that undeniably gives state and military ultimate authority. However, as Thailand continues to develop, corporate actors have been playing a more influential role, as such as created a triangle of power. In this section I highlight how the military, monarchy and private actors influence and legitimize their positions of power through their relationships and nepotism carried out through land deals in preparation for the CIE.

3.1.1. High Level Politicians and Nepotism: Land Deals with Corporate Actors

The main actors involved in the development of the CIE include high level politicians working through the SBPAC, Nipon Boonyamanee and Prawit Wongsuwon, as well as corporate entities Thai Petrochemical Industry Polene Public Company Limited (TPIPP, from here on referred to as TPI Polene) and Integrated Refinery and Petrochemical Complex Public Company Limited (IRPC), the subsidiary of TPI Polene. One of the most outspoken politicians in favor of the CIE is the former Chief Executive Songkhla Provincial Administrative Organization (SPAO), Nipon Boonyamanee. Boonyamanee is also the former Deputy Minister of Interior under Prime Minister Prayuth, and has been a key figure in planning and organizing the CIE. Nipon's political positioning in both regional and national levels gives him leverage beyond those of most politicians[91]. During his time as the Deputy Minister of Interior, he heavily supported the development of the CIE (Chetpayark, 2021). He famously claimed that 90% of the local people agreed with him and his support of the CIE ("Nipon" supports the construction, 2021).

[91] Only after accusations of abuse of power over price-fixing bidding processes, Nipon stepped down from his position as Deputy Minister of Interior (Nipon quits as deputy, 2022).

During his time as Chief Executive of the SPAO, Nipon was accused of abuse of power when he allowed relatives to purchase land in the area were the CIE would be built. Research done by the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) was able to trace land purchases by TPI Polene and IRPC of former politicians and their family members[92]. The land purchased was cheap by family members because at the time it was labelled 'green' or, 'agricultural and environment'. Then, the land was once again sold to TPI for a higher price (Chetpayark, 2021). Once the agricultural land was purchased by TPI, they have been attempting to change the land usage to 'purple', which would allow for 'industrial activities'[93]. One of the politicians accused of these land deals is Nipon, who asserted that the deals were not illegal, and the private sector has a right to buy land if they want to ("Nipon" supports the construction, 2021). However, once the land usage changes, the price of the land will go up, which would make it impossible for local people to live on or use the resources from that area[94]. Some families even claimed that they were forced to sell their land to private corporations, or they would be met with lawsuits (Rujivanarom, 2021). This move also heavily impacts the agricultural sector, decreasing the amount of land farmers can use in the future and increasing costs, despite agricultural costs going down in Thailand as a whole[95]. While this has been met with much resistance from local people, the institutional power of corporate actors to buy off politicians and their property is met with strength through their influence in changing land laws. Due to Nipon's alleged previous knowledge that the CIE was in the works, making a profit from land resales was considered to be a conflict of interest (Rujivanarom, 2021).

3.1.2. The Political Influence of TPI Polene: The Leophairatana Family

The main corporate actors engaged in the CIE project include several energy and gas companies, namely TPI Polene and IRPC, both major investors. TPI Polene is the third largest producer of cement in Thailand, holding 18.5% market share (Nkikomborirak, 2004). TPI Polene was founded and run by the Leophairatana family, which made its fortune in the textile and grain industry in the 1940's (Claessens et al., 1999). They later expanded into the financial sector by incorporating Cathay Finance and Bangkok Union Insurance. TPI Polene was founded in 1987 and expanded rapidly playing a key role in the development of Thailand's petrochemical industry. The CEO of TPI Polene is Prachai Leophairatana, a former senator for the Thai National Assembly. After Thaksin's removal from government (in part due to

[92] Data collected from Researcher B.
[93] Data collected from Researcher A.
[94] Data Collected from Researcher B.
[95] Data collected from Researcher A.

Prachai's financial support to anti-Thaksin groups), Prachai returned to the corporate sector (Tycoon Politics Return, 2007). He has since then supported a number of different political parties stating that, "We'll be in the government… I will join with the Democrats, Pua Paendin, PPP or anyone else", just as long as he joins with the "winners" (Tycoon Politics Return, 2007). The relationships through direct lobbying taking place between TPI Polene and politicians is well known in mass media, gray literature, and the general public, despite a lack of transparency in government documentation of these activities[96]. TPI Polene specifically has been known to lobby for major political parties through campaign donations for Former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in 2005 (Protesters force way, 2010). TPI Polene relationship with politicians also reflects back to Thaksin's government, as he was accused of abusing his authority to restructure TPI Polene's debt, though Thaksin was later acquitted by the Supreme Court in 2019 (Nipon quits as deputy, 2022). TPI Polene's debt was a result of heavy borrowing amidst the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. For the case of the CIE, Prachai bought two tables a fundraising event for the Palang Pracharath Party (People's State Power Party, PPP), listing TPI Polene as one of the event's sponsors (Chetpayark, 2021). The PPP is the party backing military junta leader and prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who publicly stated that the CIE was a done deal, even after the Bangkok protests in 2020 (Chana project 'will continue', 2021).

3.1.3. SBPAC's Sustainable Assessment Committee: Prawit Wongsuwon

In December of 2020, Chana Rak Thin Network members travelled to Bangkok to protest outside the Government House. The protests were successful in the sense that it resulted in the creation of a memorandum of understanding (MoU), which stated the Thai government would put a pause on the CIE until after a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) could be done on the project. However, by 2021, a SEA still had not been done, and local people were starting to worry that the government was stalling (Rojanaphruk, 2021). The SEA itself has caused much controversy itself. Prime Minister Prayut confirmed a committee, the Sustainable Economic Assessment Committee, would be formed to conduct the SEA, and would be led by Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwon. As a major player in the 2014 coup, Prawait has had a long history of political influence in decision-making at the highest levels of government. Prawit is also the leader of the PPP, and is known have a close personal relationship with Prayut after the 2014 coup (Thai ruling party names, 2023).

The mutually beneficial relationships between corporate, military, and political actors highly visible in the case of the CIE. Many of the political actors have direct ties with the military, or previously served

[96] Data collected from Researcher A and Researcher B, individually.

in military positions. In addition, TPI Polene has openly lobbied and supported the campaigns of many of these politicians involved in the development of the CIE. These relationships create and legitimize the development of the CIE in Chana.

3.2. Material Power

As mega energy and construction corporations, CIE's corporate actors have an abundance of financial and innovative abilities to pursue their projects. In addition, due to the interconnected authority of the government and the military, political violence has also been a strategic tool used to control and influence the public. In this section, I highlight how corporate actors alongside the government/military have utilized their material power to legitimize the CIE.

3.2.1. Political Violence Toward Local People

The intersection of violence and political power has its theoretical roots in political science (Oksala, 2011). Political violence is defined as, "…a heterogeneous repertoire of actions oriented at inflicting physical, psychological, and symbolic damage to individuals and/or property with the intention of influencing various audiences for affecting or resisting political, social, and/ or cultural change" (Bosi and Malthaner, 2014, p. 439). In other words, political violence can be seen as any act violent act taken for the purpose of political or social gain. Violence has played a key role in Thai politics for the past several decades. Thaksin's government's "war on drugs" resulted in the deaths of thousands of people at the hands of the government and police force. The southern provinces have suffered from decades of civil war, intensified by the non-negotiations of Thai military officials. Political violence in this case was seen in the 2021 protests, 36 people from Chana were arrested after protesting the CIE in Bangkok, most of the people arrested were local women (Business and Human Rights Resource Center, 2021). It's during these arrests that many of my interviewees explained some of the violence takes place. Interviewees explained that they were attacked with tear gas and rubber bullets, despite the police later commenting they made the arrests without using violence (Bangkok police deny, 2021). Interviewees also claimed that they are often harassed at police check points in everyday life in Chana.

3.2.2. Local Bribery by the SBPAC and Corporate Actors

One of the ways CIE managers hoped to gain support was through bribes. Actors behind the CIE have actively been engaging directly with local people even before it was officially announced. Bribing local people came in many forms, by offering food or even money to local fishers in exchange for supporting the CIE project. Corporate entities would bribe influential figureheads in the community

(community bosses, religious heads, etc.) and falsify meetings in order to show they were getting the approval from community members[97]. While the SBPAC admitted to "supporting" local fishers by providing money and food in our interview, I was not able to find any secondary evidence of these bribes from either the SBPAC or corporate actors. The only evidence of these experiences is from the first-hand accounts of interviewees.

Overall, the material power of both corporate and Thai military and police entities have enabled them to carry out violent attacks on local people in an effort to de-legitimize protesting efforts. In addition, the financial power of corporate actors has also been seen in their attempt to bribe local community members in return for support of the CIE project.

3.3. Discursive Power

There are several discourses used by CIE organizers used to legitimize and frame the CIE. It is important to note that many of these discourses did not even begin until later, after local people were informed of the project and actively protested against it[98]. In this section, I highlight two main discourses used by Deep State actors to legitimize and promote the creation of the CIE.

3.3.1. Peace through Trade

As early as German philosopher Immanuel Kant, the concept that economic relationships could bring peace has been a common discourse for the promotion of capitalist expansion. Thomas Friedman, who popularized the Golden Arches theory, argued that countries with a McDonald's are less lightly to fight with each other because of shared interests in economic stability (Friedman, 1999). One of the discourses pushed by SBPAC is that the CIE will help improve political relations in the south Thailand. Many at SBPAC believe a trade relationship and neo-liberal economic prosperity will improve relations in the region as a whole after over decade of insurgency. My interviewee at SBPAC stated, "The conflict in southern border provinces has lasted for over 100 years. Longer. Now, there is a concept that, if we use a mega project to create jobs and occupations, and to decrease the differences of the people… this is another method which will lead to development… problem solving and development of the Southern border provinces".

The promotion of this discourse should redirect our attention back to the reasons behind the rise in resistance groups in the south in the first place. The conflict began due to the Thai government's

[97] Data from author's interview with Fisher D.
[98] Data collected from Fisher A

intolerance for the Malay-Muslim communities and their attempt at forced assimilation (Wheeler, 2010). Since the issues arose in the region, several peace proposals and proposals for negotiations have been created, including the development of the SBPAC and the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) during Thaksin's government. Both of which insisted that the path to peace lay in creating space for the Malay-Muslim community to air their grievances, to have the religious freedom to practice and educate their community, and to have a spot in decision-making for the future (Melvin, 2007). These foundational requests are still held by resistance groups today, including the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) (Mishra, 2023).

3.3.2. Improving Chana Livelihoods for the "Future": Chana as a "Smart City"

Another discourse is that the CIE will improve the livelihoods of local people in Chana. There is an assumption by the SBPAC in particular that there are not enough good, quality jobs in Chana and therefore the CIE will bring more opportunities and improve peoples' lives[99]. The project facilitators paint a beautiful picture of life with the incorporation of an industrial plant, promising jobs and improved livelihoods, as promises of environmental protection. The Public Relations Department stated, "…the establishment of the Chana Industrial Estate, water and environmental management, and the setting up of a fund *for the development of the quality of life of the people in the southern border provinces*" (The Government Public Relations Department, 2019). In this case, Deep State actors push towards 'improving' the local livelihoods of Chana people. The idea that Chana will be a 'smart city', designed to help steer the world toward green technologies and urban living (TPI Polene, 2018). This discourse is very popular in corporate entities websites and advertising for the CIE. TPI Polene claims that the CIE will transform Chana into a "modernized smart city", with "harmonious smart living", which will ensure livelihoods are operated efficiently and economically (TPI Polene, 2018). This idea also goes in hand with the idea that Chana should 'modernize', undermining the 'traditional' livelihoods Chana people pursue. This discourse in particular has been fought aggressively by local people, as many of them say they would like to keep their livelihoods as they are (Chandran, 2021). The Chana Rak Thin Network has conducted several surveys and worked with the local university to generate studies to demonstrate the social, environmental, and economic benefits of keeping the district as is (Chanhom, 2022).

In conclusion, the discourse strategies used by "Deep State" actors attempt to give rationale behind the CIE by creating the image that Chana is underdeveloped. In order to "modernize" the

[99] Data collected from SBPAC representative

livelihoods of Chana people, the only way to do so is through the development of the CIE. In the following section I introduce the Chana Rak Thin Network, a group that has worked hard to redefine the image of Chana and redirect its development strategies to reinforcement its existing strengths.

4. Alternatives to the CIE: Development for Self-Determination through Food Sovereignty

For many local people, the manipulative tactics used by Deep State actors using their institutional, material, and discursive power are not convincing enough to accept the CIE. With the help of many local governance actors, specifically the Chana Rak Thin network, the protests have ignited strong resistance in the form of protests and getting the attention of the international media, famous celebrities (like Angelina Jolie) and environmental activists' organizations (Leelertyuth, 2020). 18 year old Khairiyah Rahmanyah, a daughter of a local fisher, has become the face of the movement, doing several interviews in international media being dubbed, "the Daughter of the Chana Sea" (Leelertyuth, 2020). Social media has also been booming for the movement, trending on Thai twitter, #SAVECHANA. For many residents, they feel like this is a battle for whether or not the people of Chana have a right to choose their own livelihoods, whether or not the government feels like their way of life is worth conserving and nurturing[100]. For my interviewee, the goal of this resistance is to "…tell the world that Chana is full of natural resources, and how much they would regret it if the sea is lost"[101]. For them, "the sea is not owned by the people of Chana, it's a commons, for everyone."[102]

The Chana Rak Thin Network was created as a way for local people and local organizations in Chana who oppose the CIE to assemble and advocate against the CIE together. The Chana Rak Thin Network, literally translated to Chana Loves their Homeland Network[103] (**เครือข่ายจะนะรักษ์ถิ่น**, *kreua-kai-cha-na-rak-thin*), though in mass media their name is often referred to as 'Chana Rak Thin'. Chana Rak Thin itself is a web of communication amongst several local groups and individuals. Much of Chana Rak Thin's

[100] Data from author's interview with Fisher D.
[101] Data from author's interview with Fisher D.
[102] Data from author's interview with Fisher D.
[103] The translation of Chana Rak Thin into English can have several interpretations and is also a play on words. **จะนะ** (*cha-na*) is Chana District, **รัก** (*rak*) means love, and **ถิ่น** (thin) can mean homeland or locality. However, the character **ษ** (sor) used in Chana Rak Thin (**จะนะรักษ์ถิ่น**) is also used in the word **อนุรักษ์** (anu-rak) (originally derived from the word **รักษา**, rak-sa), meaning to conserve or preserve. When used in Chana Rak Thin, the character **ษ์** (the name of this character phonetically is sor-rue-si-ka-ran), when the upper tonal is added, the character becomes silent when spoken, but the nuance of the meaning conserve, or preserve, remains. Therefore, Chana Rak Thin can be interpreted as, Chana loves their Homeland, or, Chana Conserves/Preserves their Locality, or both.

success has been its ability to communicate and reach out to diverse actors in the local area, including the director of Chana Hospital (Dr Supat Hasuwankit), professors at Prince of Songkhla University, the enLaw Foundation (legal NGO), researchers from TDRI, and the media, to help protest on their behalf from many facets of community resistance. Two local entities involved in Chana Rak Thin to help create future plans for Chana include the Green South Foundation (**มูลนิธิภาคใต้สีเขียว**, *moon-la-ni-thi-pak-tai-see-kiew*) (GSF) and the Natural Way of Life Learning Center (NWLLC) (**ศูนย์เรียนรู้วิถีธรรมชาติเพื่อชุมชน**, *soon-rien-roo-wi-thee-tham-ma-chart-pheu-choom-chon*) (NWLLC). These two groups are examples of local organizations that already had actively been working in the region to promote sustainability, but partnered with Chana Rak Thin in their fight against the CIE. Many of their goals and plans for the future of Chana are similar to each other, and they all are created through meetings with local people. The GSF is a larger environmental NGO in southern Thailand that has a local group of in Chana district. The GSF advocates for environmental rights in the region, and has worked on fighting a number of development projects looking to be created in the region (United Nations, 2022). Another group, the NWLLC is a local entity created by Kitiphop Suthisawang,

Both groups are actively involved in the fishing community in particular. The NWLLC activities specifically include creating marine resource databases for Chana Bay, making activities to preserve and restore it, and creating educational and media events to further promote knowledge and learning about conservation of these local resources (Consumer South Network, n.d.). Under the banner of Chana Rak Thin, the NWLLC also created a list of plans for the future for Chana after consulting with local people on what they want their community to look like in the future. These goals include, a) Expand the database on marine resources in 6 more villages around Chana Bay, b) creating conservation and restoration operations for marine resources around Chana Bay in 6 villages, such as making artificial coral reefs, c) creating a learning process for children and youth and communities using tools such as dramas, storytelling, citizen journalists, d) building a public communication system via Suan Sanan Community Radio (Thai PBS), and e) pushing community measurement to conserve resources and seafood sources around Chana Bay. To realize these goals, they also created a list of strategies (See image and table below) as suggested by local people. They have created their own development plan to help Chana, one that is based on the skills and resources Chana already provides. By using the power of the people and nature, we can see true sustainable rural development in Chana. For the fishing industry in particular, there three main goals developed by the Chana Rak Thin network groups (Chanhom, 2022). The first focuses on promoting innovation in the processing sector to ensure food security. The second aims to preserve the ecosystem by creating eco-tourist activities with community members. This goal hopes to

encourage learning about the local environment. Third, network aims to continue to conserve and restore marine and coastal resources for sustainable fisheries. This includes the government playing a stronger role in enforcing IUU fishing.

Technology has also played a key role in helping rural people become aware of the activities corporate actors are doing right away. This has made Chana Rak Thin very strong, and unlike many community NGOs in other parts in Thailand[104]. Their connections with other types of knowledge have made their arguments seem more convincing to policy-makers and outsiders. As one researcher, supporting Chana Rak Thin's plans for local development commented on the importance of taking a step back, and looking at the CIE from a broader perspective on development taking into account the real 'trade-offs' that severely impact local people and the environment. The researcher stated that, "new sustainable development should take into account social concerns and environmental concerns and determine if that activity hurt or improves livelihoods."

Community Organization Council
Chana District
Sustainable Development Strategy (Article 21)
1. Food Production Site Food Security
2. Solar Energy
3. Community Economy
4. Education
5. Waste Management
6. Water Management
7. Arts and Culture
8. Eco-Tourism
9. Coastal Management
10. Herbal City
11. The Capital City of the Zebra Dove
12. Youth
13. City Planning
14. Welfare on Baan Porpiang[105] and Baan Mankong[106]



Left Table: English translation of left picture's far left column (specific to Chana district)
Right Image: The list of strategies created by the NWLLC for three districts in Songkhla taken by author

[104] Data collected from Researcher B.
[105] A Community Organization Development Institute project for impoverished people to help repair their homes.
[106] A Community Organization Development Institute project for impoverished people to help with housing security.

Development in rural areas has always involved complicated conflicts due to the differences in interests at the local level and policy-making levels. In particular, as Thailand continues down the path toward neo-liberal economic development, the vision of the Thai coastal countryside is no longer that of small-scale fishing and diverse local markets. Privatizing coastal areas in Chana is seen as a more plausible direction for rural development because those in power, the Deep State, benefit from it the most, then the benefit is considered to be trickled down to local communities. However, local people are not convinced, and their active and loud activism triggered corporate actors alongside the Deep State to change the way they legitimize the CIE. With its institutional, material and discursive power, all of which are interdependent and interconnected, it is easy for the Deep State to push forward the CIE, particularly in a state of political instability for minority communities.

While industrialization and modernization tend to dominate development strategies, alternatives such as Chana Rak Thin propose development by Chana, for Chana. Their organization emphasizes the power of producers and their ability to use their own agency to determine the way they want to live their lives. This idea is similar to the food sovereignty movement created by La Via Campesina, an international peasant movement. Chana Rak Thin takes this concept further by including concepts of *satoumi*[107], in that they aim to use the natural resources and the abilities of producers to create a strategy for development, one that is not on the path of neo-liberalism, but that of true sustainable development.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter illuminated four main key findings. First, I provided empirical evidence of the growing legitimacy of "Deep State" actors in local fisheries governance by use of their institutional power. This institutional power is seen through strategic political appointments and financial ties, lobbying, and land deals. Second, this research has provided several key examples of how regime actors use material power to fortify their position of power. Material power is seen through bribes and threats of violence. Third, regime actors utilize discursive power, by taking advantage of the deep unrest in the region. These discourses include: the ability to create 'peace through trade', and development of 'smart

[107] Satoumi is a Japanese term that refers to the interrelationship between land, *sato* (里), and sea, *umi* (海). The concepts highlights the importance of sustainability governing the relationship between humans and nature (Ministry of Environment, 2009).

cities' for the future of sustainability. Deep State actors have attempted to conform the development of the CIE as a form of social development, by which local people need to 'grow out of their traditional livelihoods' for the future. This discourse is born out of the assumption that this kind of development is inevitable as developing countries "catch up". Finally, this research brings to light to Chana Rak Thin, a network assembled by local people to provide alternatives to economic development focused on the existing skills of local fishers, but also provide room for fishers' food sovereignty (La Via Campensia, 2007).

In conclusion, this research has brought attention to the increasing "stealthiness" of privatization projects in rural fishing communities, highlighting the need for future research to critically analyze what are described as 'sustainable' development projects. It is important to take into account the political economic situation of Thailand placed in the global context, and the vision of the future created by the regime. The incorporation of corporate entities in the Thai governance structure is critical because it corporatizes development strategies to benefit neoliberal economic interest, without incorporating the agency of its local residents. As seen in this case study, regime actors have continuously developed new ways to continue maintain their influence in the regime level by using their various forms of power to legitimize their decision-making. The understanding that stealth privatization is simply a renewed form of sustainability-washing discounts the increasing legitimacy of private entities in socio-ecological governance and its impacts on ownership and food producers food sovereignty. The way the Thai regime defines and navigates its development strategies must ensure the voices and agency of local producers, as it is their livelihoods that would be most impacted by the implementation of development projects. In true sustainable transitions, food sovereignty of local producers must be at the center of decision-making processes and must not be erased by powerful actors and their interests.

Chapter 7: Discussion

1. Introduction

The aim of this dissertation is to 1) examine how regime actors have utilized their various forms of power to legitimize stealth privatization in rural fishing communities, and 2) explore potential alternatives to stealth privatization projects from local niche groups. The objective of this research was based on the idea that corporate actors have been playing an increasing role in fisheries governance (Carothers and Chambers, 2012; Bush and Oosterveer, 2019). It is necessary to critically examine the growing role of corporate actors in governance due to their ability to shape, negotiate, and implement rules (Newell and Levy, 2006). As influence of corporate actors in fisheries governance increases under the blue economy amidst swelling concerns around socio-ecological sustainability, stealth privatization projects, where regime actors mobilize their sources of power to legitimize privatization projects under the guise of sustainability, have also been on the rise (Carothers and Chambers, 2012; Bush and Oosterveer, 2019).

To fully understand the implications of how and why corporate actors have played an increasing role in sustainable fisheries governance, I examine the power dynamics behind what I term as stealth privatization in coastal fishing communities. Through the analysis of the ways in which private actors have increasingly embedded themselves into fisheries governance, the objective of this research is to examine the forms of power utilized by the regime, and shed light on alternative governance initiatives working outside of the various development projects. By doing this, this research further clarifies the way regime actors have transformed discourses behind sustainable fisheries governance through stealth privatization in diverse structural contexts.

In order to answer the above mentioned research questions, I have divided the following sections as follows. Section 2 answers the first research question: How do regime actors legitimize stealth privatization for sustainable rural fisheries governance? In this section I review each power analyzed in the three case studies and discuss key reflections. Section 3 answers the second research question: How does stealth privatization impact alternative groups within the fisheries governance system? This section reviews each alternative group recognized in each chapter and discusses lessons learned from each group. This section also discusses how these results can contribute to the broader discussion of food sovereignty for fishers. Finally, this chapter concludes with ideas for future research.

2. How do Regime Actors Legitimize Stealth Privatization for Sustainable Rural Fisheries Governance?

2.1. Examining the Structure

The first research question aimed at analyzing the tools with which regime actors have legitimized and pursued stealth privatization. To do so, an analysis of the overall governance structure was necessary to understand the context in which the stealth privatization projects were proposed. Through examining the structure of each case, I was able to examine how historical and political structure placed regime actors in powerful positions.

In my Japan case study (Chapter 3), the fisheries governance structure, emboldened by neoliberal economic policy promoted by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was the foundation of how and why the Momonoura SEZ was able to be suggested in the first place. The Fisheries Act revision was of particular importance, which set the stage for the Momonoura SEZ to be allowed because it enabled corporate actors an easier way to obtain fishing rights, without having to work with the Fisheries Cooperatives (the traditional governing body for fisheries rights) (Nihira, 2020). In the case of Alaska (Chapter 4), the history of colonization shaped the structure over generations of Alaska Native communities, which reconfigured tribal governance to benefit the capitalist elite by excluding Native fishers from accessing fisheries resources (through permit systems, total allowable catch schemes, as well as strict access timelines and rules) (Carothers et al., 2021). The conflict between traditional Native governing systems and capitalist intervention is seen clearly through the implementation of the Native Corporations, put into place as a way for the US government to "manage" Native communities rallying for autonomy over their own land (Sullivan, 2021). For my Thai case study, corrupt politicians have taken advantage of, and often fueled, political instability to create space for their own financial interests. The legacy of Thaksin's government intensified the "Deep State" regime, creating powerful relationships and systems to benefit each other, particularly through political positioning and business deals (McCargo, 2005). The political economic systems where each of these cases lay are built and maintained by regime actors to ensure that those in power, stay in power. Regime actors also strategically create and influence policy to keep the structure as-is to pursue their own interests. From my case studies these interests tended to be financial gain for their own private businesses, such as that in the case of the Thaksin government (Arnold, 2006) and the Pebble Mine Project executives in Alaska[108], and/or to

[108] Data collected from transcription of audio from the 'Pebble Tapes', released by the EIA on September 21st, 2020.

improve their political positioning for future decision-making, as was the case for Governor Murai who was given the authority to distribute access rights for corporate fisheries as a result of the Fisheries Law Revision (Akama, 2015b). In addition, the structure as shaped by regime actors in a way that disempowers and/or dismantles resistance or change to the regime. This can be seen in the case of Japan where the Fisheries Law revision that took away distribution rights from local fisheries cooperatives and reduced democratic processes for electing local fisheries counsel officials (Nagano, 2018; Nihira, 2020).

Building off the political economic structure they are embedded in, regime actors draw from their sources of institutional, material, and discursive power, and utilized them as tools to mold and promote themselves as the sustainable solution to socio-economic issues in rural fishing communities, enabling the process of stealth privatization to expand.

2.2. Institutional Power: Re-examining the Role of Government in Privatization Processes

Institutional power, or organizational power, is described by Powell and Newell (2006, p. 12) as building "issue-specific coalitions" or developing relationships amongst groups with common interests. Examination of the institutional power of regime actors in each case brought attention to the role of government in privatization debates. We often assume in the process of privatization, the government takes a hands-off approach to processes thereafter, i.e. we inherently assume privatization is 'private'. However, if government actors privately benefit, or the project suits their private interests, we should include government actors as actors, who play a critical role in the enclosure of the commons, as they benefit from its consequences.

For each stealth privatization case in this dissertation, every corporate entity involved in the project had lobbied politicians to support their project. Lobbying is a direct way that corporate actors show support for, or influence policymaking. In the case of Japan, the influence of construction lobbyists helped form the "iron triangle", a strong network between politicians, businesses, and bureaucrats to encourage spending on development projects (Feldhoff, 2002). In Alaska, Pebble Limited Partnership contributed the most money to lobbying in the entire mining sector in 2016 for the Pebble Mine to be pushed through (Reynolds, 2020; Hall, 2020). In Thailand, Prachat Leophairatana, the CEO of TPI Polene admitted he would campaign for any political party that would support his own interests (Tycoon Politics Return, 2007).

While reviewing the cases of lobbying in each context, I also uncovered the personal relationships between many of the regime actors. By personal relationships, we refer to any activity or

meeting outside of their responsibilities as public servants. In the case of Japan, I found that Governor Yoshihiro Murai had a very close relationship with the Japan Business Federation, an organization that collectively provides advice on major policy decisions (The Japan Business Federation, 2013). In addition, the powerful actors in Thailand were often linked back to relationships they had in the past during the 2007 or 2014 military coup d'états, which gave them advantages in political positioning in the future. For example, Prawit Wongsuwon and his relationship with Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who was assigned by Prayut to be the head of the Sustainable Assessment Committee for the CIE, despite having a conflict of interest as a former military official (Thai ruling party names, 2023).

Government actors engaged in stealth privatization should be recognized as powerful actors who can act and create policy in ways that are unjust, biased, and self-serving. It is important to continue to observe and analyze the behavior of politicians and government entities even after privatization takes place. In this sense, we should not assume an 'either/or' situation, either private or public, but a complex, interdependent, and mutually beneficial relationship before, during, and after privatization implementation. In fact, due to the government's political positioning as the image of legality and judgement, these actors should be more responsible, more criticized, as leaders of our society. Therefore, this dissertation emphasizes the importance of classifying stealth privatization actors as the "regime", which incorporates the activities and interests of both private and public actors in privatization discourse.

2.3. Material Power: Interdependent Nature of "Power"

Material power is described as the ability for corporate actors to develop innovations and to secure their position in the market for the future (Newell and Levy, 2006). Therefore, material power can represent both the material objects that give them an advantage, but also the *process of obtaining or creating* materials. The idea that technology or innovation gives certain actors the advantage can be connected to the "agricultural technology treadmill" as described in Chapter 4 (Section 3.2.1.) (Cochrane, 1979). The agricultural treadmill explains how innovations are often inequitably developed, often resulting in less powerful actors struggling to keep up with high-pace, competitive market standards (Hansen, 2019). In each case the financial and innovative advantages of regime actors was prevalent. For example, the "state-of-the-art" facilities created at the Momonoura SEZ (Ishinomaki Momonoura Oyster, 2015), or the incredible amount of financial security the Pebble Mine had from Hunter Dickinson Incorporated (HDI) (Kuyek, 2018).

However, the "agricultural technology treadmill" concept also reflects a structure that builds off existing unequal power dynamics. In this sense, it is difficult to give power to material objects without the power of institutions to legitimize and promote them. That is why the "agricultural technology treadmill" is referenced in connection with conventional agriculture and how the structure reflects productivity pressure and price changes (Hansen, 2019).

2.4. Discursive Power: How is Power Used?

Newell and Levy (2006, pp. 11-12) describe discursive power as how corporate actors use public relations to portray their company and activities in a way that is appealing to the public, through sustainability stewardship, and corporate citizenship. Regime actors also use discursive power to legitimize their own importance for the sector they are in, or for society as a whole (Fuchs et al., 2016). In each case I found that the discourse used by regime actors often paint the stealth privatization projects as "solutions" to the existing issues in each community. For example, Momonoura district is one fishing community in the Tohoku region that has been struggling to recover after the 3.11 disaster. Much of the discourse promoting the creation of the Momonoura SEZ stemmed from the need to "revitalize" the fishing industry, often making it seem like the only way to recover was to introduce capitalist modes of production, such as the SEZ (Japan Coastal Fisheries Union, 2013). In addition, due the political instability in the southern provinces in Thailand, regime actors have used the CIE as a way to promote peace in the region. The SBPAC claims that the CIE would help bring peace due to the trade relations the CIE would bring[109].

Analyzing the discursive power of regime actors in these cases made me wonder how we should define and conceptualize "power" as used in this framework. Throughout this dissertation, the "power" of regime actors has been referred to both as a "form" or "source" as well as a "tool" or "method". According to the framework used in the analysis of this research, Newell and Levy describe this power as "sources", which *enable* corporate actors to carry out their own interests. However, Doris Fuchs' research (2007) on the power of business in global governance starts her analysis from the assumption that corporate entities are inherently embedded in governance structures due to globalization and also sees business activities as an "exercise of power", which can be drawn from their "sources of power" (Fuchs, 2007). In the case of Alaska, one of the discourses used to promote the Pebble mine was that it would improve the livelihoods of Native Alaskans, especially by creating welfare benefit programs (Northern Dynasty, n.d.). This discourse was targeted to communities near Lake Iliamna specifically,

[109] Data collected from SBPAC representative

where many of the resources and benefits from Dillingham, the region's major city, do not reach due to being outside their jurisdiction[110]. In this sense, one-way discursive power was used in this case as a tool to shape the image that they could be the solution to social issues in the region. Another way this can be interpreted is that the discursive power could be seen as a "source of power" because regime actors draw from the inequalities perpetuated in the structure to create a particular image. Therefore, it seems when identifying the power and analyzing its effects, visualizing power both as a "source" and a "tool" could help deepen the implications of analysis.

Finally, the utilization of the power framework as an analytical framework, as a tool to identify singular indicators of power, came with its challenges. For example, in the case of the Momonoura Special Economic Zone (Chapter 4), I categorized the regime's ability to create jobs under material power, as labor can be seen as a financial and physical resource. However, the ability of corporate actors to promote job development for the area could also be seen as a form of institutional power, in that the relationships with the state would be necessary to legitimize themselves as appropriate employers. In addition, this example could also be seen as a form of discursive power, in that the ability to frame their employment as "a good opportunity" or "the only alternative" would also give the regime power. While the framework enabled the identification of the different sources of power and their effects, it is important to note that each example of power could be further examined more deeply by unpacking the interconnected nature of its power relations.

3. How does Stealth Privatization Impact Alternative Groups within the Fisheries Governance System?

The secondary research question for this dissertation aimed at analyzing how local niche groups have resisted or adapted to the introduction of stealth privatization projects. At the start of this research, I assumed that the concept of food sovereignty, developed by La Via Campesina, would be an important concept as I began to search for alternatives. This section aims to describe the messages alternative groups aimed to carry out and analyze how lessons can be learned from their experiences to strengthen fishers' food sovereignty for the future.

3.1. Illuminating the Activities of Alternative Governance Groups

I found that each alternative niche group emphases the need to redirect development toward utilizing, or improving the resources, values, and skills their communities already possess. For the case

[110] Data collected from interview with United Tribes of Bristol Bay Representative

study in Momonoura, Japan, I introduced the NPO *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*, an organization dedicated to revitalizing the community in a way that encourages sustainable relationships between human and nature, based on the concept of *satoumi*. The analysis of *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* highlighted the importance of emphasizing human values into political decision-making, specifically collective morals and values of the community, such as caring for *others* (Morgan, 2010). The second case study in Bristol Bay is the United Tribes of Bristol Bay (UTBB), a consortium of 15 tribal governments that work to conserve and promote the traditional livelihoods of Alaska Native Peoples in the Bristol Bay region. UTBB argues that the foundation of development in their region should be based on the traditional values that have been lost due to a history of colonialization, the value of collective well-being over capitalist wealth accumulation for individuals alone (UTBB, 2019). Finally, the Chana Rak Thin network comprises of a group of locally based civil society organizations. Chana Rak Thin was originally developed as a way to collectively protest against the development of the CIE, but has since developed into an organization that creates space for generating ideas for the future of Chana with local people. Chana Rak Thin emphasizes the importance of self-determination for local development, and aims to illuminate the rich resources and cultural value Chana has to offer outside of the CIE (Chanhom, 2022).

For each of these alternative governance groups, I also highlighted the similarities to the food sovereignty movement, aiming to find ways in which the concept can be broadened to incorporate the unique struggles faced by fishing communities in the era of the "Blue Economy". But of course, the question is how do we practically carry out food sovereignty in each individual context in an ever-changing global community? The issues faced in the communities introduced in this dissertation, Momonoura, Bristol Bay, and Chana, depend on its unique context while at the same time are often a result of much broader issues: the growing demand of capitalist economies, the climate crisis, rapid urbanization, generational poverty, and more. Due to the inherent diversity of struggles faced by each individual community, it is impossible to assume the same solution, privatization, would be appropriate.

3.2. Lessons Learned from Alternative Governance Groups: Food Sovereignty as a Process

By examining the food sovereignty movement at face value, it may seem obvious that food sovereignty cannot be achieved under stealth privatization because of the inherent inequitable power dynamics that must occur for stealth privatization to be realized. However, a question I have kept coming back to throughout this research is whether the concept of food sovereignty is enough to be considered an alternative to stealth privatization. Now, more than ever, we are seeing the enclosure of coastal fishing communities through various forms of privatization, especially due to the increasing role

of corporate actors in coastal governance. We have to ask ourselves how we can develop a structure that enables the rights of small-scale producers to be respected now and in the future.

The concept of food sovereignty starts with focusing on a producer's right to produce, but does not directly tell us what kind of structure or mechanisms are necessary to achieve this "goal". This limitation has left some 'frustrated' due to the inability to implement food sovereignty concepts into actual policy (Claeys, 2013). This gap has some wondering if a commons framework should be incorporated to the concept of food sovereignty (De Angelis and Diesner, 2020; Holt-Giménez and van Lammeren, 2018). A commons framework would bring attention back to the issues faced within the governing structure itself, one that perpetuates existing inequalities backed by powerful actors at its roots. In the case of stealth privatization, regime actors not only take away or give fishers the ability to produce a certain way, but thereby also legitimize and solidify their role as leaders in sustainable governance. Due to this, thinking about food sovereignty as a process, for community members to explore and shape over a period of time, would help the concept become more relevant for fishing communities now and in the future (Edelman, et al, 2014). This would require us to break down food sovereignty to basics, without eliminating the core values of the concept, and allow it to be interpreted at the community level. It would also require us to take steps toward peeling back the inequalities developed from the structure that has secured regime power. It turns food sovereignty into more than an advocacy concept, but practical strategies taken by communities to take back the structure that has been constructed to act against them.

This way of thinking could help explain the results from this dissertation. In the case of fishing communities introduced in this research, some of the main issues that held fishers back were the burdens and risks, both in pursuing fishing in the first place and continuing to carry out a fishery livelihood. These burdens and risks range from buying and maintaining a fishing vessel or license, the lack of successors to carry on the family business, or the inability to market or sell their products for a fair price. Fisheries communities are often targeted with market-led reform of "sustainable solutions", coupled with state led resource management (Campling and Havice, 2018). The marketization of fisheries issues is a common issue, which is why solutions often require economic or financial solutions, rather than tackling the broader socio-economic issues in these communities. In this dissertation I have found that many of these stealth privatization projects claim to eliminate many of these issues on the surface level. For example, in the case of the Momonoura SEZ, it is claimed that fishers would not have to worry about the responsibilities and struggles of being an individual boat owner. In a salaried

position, fishers would be granted financial stability, while continuing to work in an industry they choose. It is a key struggle for small-scale fishers to "keep up" with the demands of a growing capitalist market regime. This is why many of the stealth privatization projects emphasize the ability to create job opportunities and why this discourse is so effective. In reality, looking from a broader lens, however, the struggles faced by small-scale fishers are a result of much more complex issues at the structural level. Examining these issues at face value, as a "can or cannot" question, and ignoring the structural inequalities at the root, *commodification of vulnerabilities* of fishing communities will always be put forward as a solution by regime actors. In other words, the long-term structural issues faced by the fishing communities have been treated as a good that can be shaped, marketed, and sold to powerful actors who benefit from the capitalist regime. Therefore, the process of food sovereignty, as shown in examples from the alternative governance groups, must also encompass the process of disarming structural imbalances step by step.

4. Conclusion

The analysis of the three case studies has been organized using Newell and Levy's (2006) approach to power, which examines three sources of power used by corporate actors to influence global environmental governance. The three sources of power, institutional, material, and discursive, set the framework to explore the motivations behind stealth privatization projects and the dynamics that shape "sustainable" fisheries governance in rural areas. Overall, utilizing a power framework analysis may require future researchers to allow for flexible interpretations. This highlights the struggle faced by those who study power dynamics, due to its unclear and complex nature, i.e. "wicked". In this research, I also found that government actors and corporate actors are in a mutually beneficial relationship in return for legitimizing and promoting privatization. These regime actors create "new processes of exclusion" through the institutional, material, and discursive power to legitimize and maintain their position in a structure that benefits them. In addition, stealth privatization as a "new process of exclusion", commodifies the vulnerabilities faced by affected fishing communities, actively ignoring and perpetuating structures that disempower fishers. Finally, the alternative governance groups introduced in this research emphasis the resources, values, and skills already processed by fishers, and their activities to promote and execute these ideals should be considered processes of food sovereignty.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This dissertation utilized Newell and Levy's approach to power (2007) as an analytical framework for three case studies, Momonoura District in Japan, the Bristol Bay region in the United States, and Chana District in Thailand. For each case, the institutional, material, and discursive powers of regime actors were critically examined to determine how and why stealth privatization projects were promoted and implemented. This research also identified and analyzed alternative groups and their activities in each case to see how they responded to or ignored the stealth privatization project being implemented in their communities.

The research questions for this dissertation were as follows:

1. How do regime actors legitimize stealth privatization for sustainable rural fisheries governance?
2. How does stealth privatization impact diverse actors within the fisheries governance system?

In response to the main research question, this dissertation found that regime actors, both private and public entities, used their sources of institutional, material, and discursive power as tools to legitimize and promote privatization as "sustainable" solutions to socio-economic issues in small-scale fishing communities. In the case of Momonoura (Chapter 4), regime actors engaged in the Momonoura SEZ instrumental power was demonstrated through the business relationships of Governor Yoshihiro Murai and his close connection to the Japan Business Federation, responsible for through the process of "collective lobbying" for neoliberal economic reconstruction projects in the Tohoku region (Daimon, 2009). These relationships are solidified with the coalition of the "iron triangle", a network of politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats who promote industrial development projects for the construction industry (Feldhoff, 2002). Regime actors behind the Momonoura SEZ also use their material power in the form of expensive technologies used to build the facilities, with the financial backing of keiretsu group Mitsubishi (MCDRF, n.d.). Finally, prefectural government actors and the fisheries corporations engaged in the SEZ have shaped the project to be a solution to the socio-economic impacts in the fishing industry, intensified by the 3.11 disaster. These discourses target the community's aging crisis as well as the perceived economic decline of the fishing industry. Overall, in the case of Japan, regime actors, namely the prefectural government, the construction industry, and corporate fishing corporations all worked together to legitimize the Momonoura SEZ, taking advantage of the vulnerability of local fishers in the aftermath of the 3.11 disaster. This is indicative of disaster capitalism via stealth privatization, one way regime actors legitimized stealth privatization in this dissertation.

In the case of the Pebble mine in Bristol Bay (Chapter 5), the interdependent relationship between the State of Alaska and extractive industries is reflective of their institutional power. The financial dependence of the state on the industry, as well as the expensive lobbying that has taken place in favor of the Pebble mine are examples (Reynolds, 2020; Hall, 2020). In addition, the material power of Pebble Limited Partnership was illuminated after an introduction to the interconnectedness of extractive industry CEOs and managers, particularly under the umbrella of Hunter Dickinson Incorporated (HDI) (Kuyek, 2018). The material power of Pebble organizers is also seen through their ability to be an important supplier of jobs for the State of Alaska. Finally, the discursive power used by Pebble mine actors focus on building the image that the mine is for the betterment of livelihoods for Native Alaskan communities in the region (Pebble Partnership Limited, n.d.; Northern Dynasty Minerals, Ltd., n.d.). Native Alaskans have faced discrimination and racism due to the embedded impacts of colonialism seen to this day (Lyons et al., 2019; Carothers et al., 2021). The regime actors in the Pebble Mine case took advantage of the vulnerability of Alaska Natives in colonial structure that reflects an unequal access to rights by the regime actors via stealth privatization.

For my final case study, the CIE in Chana, powerful actors with interconnected relationships between the military, corporate sector and monarchy form the “deep state”, practicing nepotism in the form of land deals and corrupt abuse of power (Chetpayark, 2021; "Nipon" supports the construction, 2021). Many of the key actors engaged with the CIE have personal connections with actors who took part in the 2006 and 2014 coup d’états, key military officials such as Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, who still hold office to this day (Thai ruling party names, 2023). The material power of these actors is also seen through the bribes and political violence that has taken place toward local Chana people who have protested against the development of the CIE. Finally, the discursive power is demonstrated by the framing of the CIE as “modernizing” Chana livelihoods and promoting peace through trade amidst the political instability in the southern provinces. The CIE as a project to increase social development is reflects another form of stealth privatization.

The results of the first research question show that regime actors, both corporate and governments, work together to legitimize privatization projects by commodifying existing vulnerabilities through the development of ‘sustainable’ privatization frameworks. The techniques used by regime actors to commodify vulnerability include, but are not limited to, disaster capitalism (Chapter 4), inequitable access regimes (Chapter 5), and social development schemes (Chapter 6), framed as solutions to existing vulnerabilities.

In response to research question two, the niche groups introduced demonstrated diverse responses to these projects and the actors behind them. In chapter 7, I also discuss the relation between the abovementioned alternative groups and the food sovereignty movement for fishers. I found that each alternative group brought forward an important aspect that can be used toward de-commodifying development surrounding fisheries issues. The activities promoted alternative development through the skills, resources, and values already existing in their communities. While each niche group existed in different periphery to the regime, working outside the regime, working with the regime, or fighting the regime, all of them promoted activities and solutions for their communities based on the concept of food sovereignty, bringing the rights of production back to small-scale fishers. For example, in the case of *Mori wa Umi no Koibito* (Chapter 4, Section 4), they emphasized the need to conserve the local ecology in order to govern sustainability for the future. Similarly, Chana Rak Thin and their network (Chapter 5, Section 4) focus development of their coastal communities toward improving their local economic system by promoting native fish species. Apart from *Mori wa Umi no Koibito*, who did not directly oppose the stealth privatization project analyzed, they all promote activities and values that clash with development projects dominated by external entities and resources. In addition, each of the niche groups tend to stray away from capitalist motivations for development in their communities and draw more toward governance through commons ideology. For example, United Tribes of Bristol Bay (Chapter 6, Section 4) aims to focus their attention on revitalizing the cultural aspects of Native Alaskan livelihoods that promote their traditional economic values of sharing and 'giving away' in order to drive development plans for their region. Each of these alternative governance groups emphasize values of their local fishing communities that would not align with the stealth privatization projects proposed and implemented by regime actors. Overall, emphasizing the skills, values, and resources brought forward by local fishers can help to de-commodify development surrounding fishers' livelihoods, and work toward developing concrete *processes* of food sovereignty from each unique context.

To conclude, this dissertation aimed at critically analyzing the motivations and interests of regime actors behind the development of stealth privatization projects in small-scale rural fishing communities and their impacts. *How* corporate actors engaged in stealth privatization projects utilize their power to legitimize and secure the system as-is and the impacts on other governance actors have been critically analyzed throughout this dissertation. As privatization becomes more hidden and disguised under the blue economy as sustainable solutions to complex socio-economic issues in rural fishing communities, I aim to promote stealth privatization as a concept to emphasize the commodification of vulnerabilities and the overlooked power dynamics behind privatization projects. Future research should look into

examining what further steps are necessary to disassemble the structures that has disadvantaged small-scale fishers. The alternative groups introduced in this dissertation provide some examples of how alternative groups can play a role in dismantling the power regime actors hold over the structure through activities that promote and achieve food sovereignty. These include sustainability for the next generation (to pass the fishing culture down, we must conserve the environment), ensuring food security (to make sure family and the community is fed), and having self-determination (to be able to freely and justly choose what they want to do with pride), are steps in ensuring food sovereignty in these communities is pursued. However, due to the overwhelming amount of power regime actors hold, alternative activities may not always be enough to completely transform the structure, nor is that always their goal, or responsibility. For food sovereignty processes to happen, we must find ways to ensure the inclusion of transparent governance, open access to knowledge structures, financial freedom, and a governance structure that emphasizes the voices and opinions of local community members to overcompensate for the inequitable position they start from. Further questions for this research should also include how to regulate the indirect or hidden benefits to regime actors in instances of privatization, and what kinds of systems need to be put into place to create checks and balances for powerful actors.

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