ライプニッツの創造論 (一)

Abstract

Creation has never played a central role in Leibniz studies : Possible Worlds has enjoyed a far better fortune recently. In this paper the author attempts to remedy this and give Creation its due. Traditional interpretations focus upon only one point in Leibniz's view of the creation of the world, namely, the selection of the best of the all the possible worlds through the divine calculation of compossibility within every possible world. Thus they overlook the modal difference between a possible world and the actual, created world. In reality, Leibniz agrees with Kant completely in asserting that the existence is not a predicate. An actual, created world is not a possible world with the predicate of existence added. The structure of the possible world is radically different from the created one. Pace its name, a possible world is not a world. It rather means a world-version of the complete concept of the individual substance. It makes no sense to add one more predicate to this concept and shout "Fiat mundus!". Again in harmony with Kant (but of course mutatis mutandis), the Leibnizian Creation signifies the change of world's relation with the Creator i.e. existence as an absolute position. God's knowledge of, and relation to, the possible world is immediate and totum simul. Conversely, a possible world can only be that which is known in this immediate and totum simul way. Creation brings the alteration in God's knowledge and governance of the world. The author thinks that we have here the key to the solution of the contradiction of the man's freedom and God's foreknowledge.