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On Historical Research in Social Sciences

By Yuzo Deguchi

I

What significance does the historical research have to social sciences?

Two methods would be possible in any consideration of the relations between social sciences and history. One method would inquire into the significance of the historical study in the specific sciences belonging to the category of social sciences, while the other would probe into what behavior the student of historical science should show in relation to the cognition as entertained by social sciences. In other words, the former method presupposes history as seen from the angle of social sciences, while the latter would try to determine the attitude toward the cognition of social sciences as seen from the angle of history. These two methods are naturally born of the fact that there is, in Japanese universities, a distinct line of separation between the study of social sciences and science of history. And as far as the present situation in Japan is concerned, the historical research by the latter method apparently is more in vogue. In the history of culture as well as the history of the economics and politics, remarkable results have been achieved by the process of take up and elaborate upon the fruits of study in social sciences. And we must remember that this process is not the one which had been taken in the past on the basis of a rough application of the materialistic conception of history with no substantiating fact supporting it, but the one which, penetrating into the domain of study at issue, draws the categories of social sciences out of the subject-matter, and, thus acquiring a foothold on which to support the assertion by allocating a proper place for the theory of historical materialism, proceed to observe and organise the facts relevant to the problem at issue. Inasmuch as such process is pursued from the viewpoint of the actual problem which requires to be solved, the researcher himself is spurred on by the feeling that he is discharging his own practical mission for the country, and this impression is liable to be shared by the readers of his research.

There is a doubt, on the other hand, about the achievement the
first method has succeeded in yielding. Take the economics, for instance. In economic history and history of the economic theory, we receive the impression that few attempts have been made for an exposition, based on a clearcut recognition of the scientific nature of the economics, of the relation between the specific historical research and the cognition itself of the economic theory, or, the relation between the historical research and the studies of theory and policy. To be more precise, it would be possible to assert that the recent trends in general practice in the historical study of the economic are presupposing a general understanding or a tacit concurrence of theory and policy, to conduct a historical research of such cognition.

As a consequence, the following situation is to be observed in the circles of the economic study. While, on the one hand, among those who concur in the presuppositions of the historical study, it is generally considered that the extent, to which the results of such historical study coincide vividly with the theory of economics, or the power to justify the political stand presupposed in such study, determines the intrinsic value of the study; But, on the other hand, among those who reject the theoretical and political presupposition, the study is thought to be nothing better than a self-styled dogmatism, unworthy of any serious consideration. Although it is admissible that the existence of "two economics", as well as that of the "two worlds" points to the extraordinary situation which confronts the world today, inasmuch as in scientific research there is a stronger demand for objectivity than in the politics, it should be conceded that such appraisal of the historical research contains much to be seriously reflected upon. As soon as we begin to think that the results of historical study can take any shape depending on the fundamental standpoint the study happens to take, the study of history is inevitably reduced to a secondary position in relation to the study of theory or to the exposition of policies. And then, it becomes void of any meaning that the historical truth is to face the theory or policy with its own inherent authority and that it ought to be equipped with the authority to determine the worth of the theory and the propriety of any specific policy. If this should happen, it will naturally follow that historical research fails to be appraised, rightly, and, further, unduly made light of, by the social scientists.

The second tendency which is to be expected from the foregoing, is as follows. While conceding that the historical research should be conducted based on the respective political or practical standpoint of
the researcher, too much emphasis on this particular point would inevitably result in the historical study to be made little of, and, therefore, it would be considered to be more to the purpose in the hiscal study, without placing undue emphasis on the practical standpoint, to tackle the historical fact without any prejudices in an effort to gain factual evidences. This attitude, it is acknowledged, would be subject to some extent of criticisms; however, it would be anyway capable of bequeathing something tangible to posterity. To bequeath something tangible to posterity would be considered to be far better than to waste time and energy in abstract discussions of the standpoint to be employed. There, of course, exists the difficulty of what method to be employed as far as the historical study of social sciences is concerned. But, by tracing the data faithfully and without bias, this particular branch of study will by degrees be built up into a concrete substance. It is felt that, keeping pace with the general trend toward the pre-war nationalistic pattern of thinking in to-day's Japan, such attitude relative to historical study in social sciences has apparently come up to the fore as a wing in these sciences. This should be called and criticised strictly as the tendency to reversion of Japan in the field of social sciences.

Thus, we find that, in comparison with the way of reflection from the science of history to social sciences, the way from social sciences to history, is still void of any meritorious achievement.

II

A reflection on this situation will unavoidably lead one to the basic problem of what method is to employ in the social sciences. Although the methods employed in science in general follow two processes of both attaining abstractum from concretum and vice versa, it should be noted that the way of reflection that leads to history from social sciences differs in some respect from the inverse way of reflection. To hasten to the conclusion: the way of reflection from history to social sciences apparently is eligible for being handled scientifically more easily compared with the other ways of reflection in the opposite direction. This conclusion will be understood from the following explanation. The study of historical science finds its starting point in the substantial interest in reality on the part of the researcher, a fact which needs no reiteration, and the interest is highly vivid and subjective in the researcher himself. The researcher, equipped with such positive interest and concern, boldly faces the factual historical reality.
While directing his interest simultaneously to social sciences, he tries
to reach abstract categories of the social sciences from these facts.
Supported by the social scientific truth, the thought acquires the founda-
tion for being true, and, while re-producing in consciousness the
original historical facts, it re-converges on them and succeeds in re-
producing another historical fact, next in order, as the historical
knowledge. It in itself is embodied with a substantial content, and
thus the objective of the historical cognition will have been attained.
Thus, it will be seen, in the way of reflection from history to social
sciences, that the principle of epistemology that concretum leads to
abstractum and vice versa can be applied without any modifica-
tion. However, the inverse way of reflection, that is, reflection from social
sciences to history will demand more methodological operations.
While the starting point of the study of social sciences, needless to
say, is likewise a practical interest of the researcher, it should be
necessary that the object of study be limited abstractively as an econo-
ic phenomenon, and, further, a definite answer should be given to
the inevitability of such a phenomenon existing as a historical reality.
The ontological ground for research, in the final analysis, should be
the common ground of social sciences and history and the point on
which both stand. Once such ground and starting point is acquired,
such a subject-matter will have been proved as a definite historical
fact. However, the determination of this historical fact alone does
never mean the end of the mission borne by the historical researcher
of the economic science. He is further required to explain this fact
in relation to the theory of the economics. Unless the fact is ex-
plained in the light of the category of the economics, the work will
hardly worth being considered a research into either economic history
or history of the economic thought. However, another problem comes
up to the fore, here. If it is required that a historical fact, after
being established as a historical reality, should be explained in the
light of the categories of are economics, this fact, after being grasped
as a concrete reality, will apparently have to pass through another
process of abstractivisation, for the categories of economics, in a
word, are nothing but attributes of a specific generalised fact seen
under a given premise. This process of abstractivisation which a
historical fact is required to undergo before being grasped with any
concreteness, is unavoidable in the consideration of history from the
standpoint of social sciences.

Therefore, when a researcher of history produces a certain positive
and practical proposition to reality from his social scientific conclusion as long as he conducts his study from a practical standpoint, it is inevitable that he should produce a positive and practical proposition—he will be required to become conscious of the abstraction which lies in the essence of this conclusion (which lies in the essence of the branch of social sciences that he studies), and be aware of the method by which he is enabled, extricating himself from this abstraction, to make a concrete and positive statement in the face of reality. If not, it may happen that he hastens to force an abstract scientific proposition on reality (one example is the mechanical application of the materialistic conception of history), or by forcing a practical passion on an abstract proposition, deceives himself as if he were making a concrete statement on reality (one example of this is found in the case in which he one-sidedly stresses an abstract conclusion and loses sight of the entity of the problem, although this attitude, in itself, is not to be labelled as a mistake). The accusation that such propensity in thinking is expected in the researcher of economics originates, in the lack on his part of the awareness of the method as described in the preceding lines.

The accusation that the study of history from the standpoint of social sciences lacks tangible achievement in comparison with the study of social sciences from the standpoint of history is based on the difficulty experienced by the student in taking full cognition of the abstraction inherent in the conclusion of social science and replacing it with a concrete and effective statement. This state of things was directly alluded to by the present writer when he, in the preceding lines, declared that a basic problem of what method to employ would unavoidably be confronted.

III

This basic problem of method arises from the scientific characteristics of social sciences. In order, therefore, to solve this problem, it would naturally be necessary to allude to the position social sciences should occupy in the theory of sciences.

Confining the issue to the economics, the scientific properties of economics were first begun to be considered in comparison with natural sciences only when the classic economics entered the stage where it began to play the role of apologetics and in this case the philosophy of positivism was adopted. In this sense, what J. S. Mill achieved concerning the position of political economy in the moral and political sciences was of vast significance. However, the classic
economics which Mill tried to defend, or rather the naturalistic economics, were never to be considered to have been based on a way of thinking peculiar to social sciences, because its fundamental standpoint was to consider a social being on the model of a natural being, and the characteristic feature of this particular standpoint was to consider that nature and society as well as nature and history are consecutively co-related to each other.

It was on the standpoint of placing emphasis on history that the economics were considered to be of different structure compared with natural sciences. And here, needless to say, the pivot of this structure was to be found in the historical properties of the object at issue. With the rise of the Historical School in Germany, study of economics in its scientific method was undertaken, and, either from the standpoint of positivism or from that of the Neo-Kantianism, scrutiny of the special properties of social sciences, considered under the name of spiritual sciences, cultural sciences or historical sciences, as sciences of a different category from natural sciences, was made. Especially in Japan, the Baden School of Neo-Kantianism was widely adopted in the decade of 1920. However, it should be recalled that, prior to this, various attempts in this direction, had been made in Western countries.

To lead the trend, Helmholtz stood for spiritual science as opposing natural science, while Lotze drew a line between natural science and historical science. However, the economists of the Historical School were not satisfied with this method of distinguishing between these two kinds of science, and, among them it was Karl Knies who tried seriously to substantiate his own position from the standpoint of method to be employed. He follows the pattern of Helmholtz’s thinking and tries to think of science in terms of the distinction between nature and spirit as far as their respective object is concerned. In the course of his study, he look notice of the existence of a third science, which belong to neither of these. According to him, while natural science has for its object the exterior world which can be felt sensuously and spiritual science deals with the interior spiritual phenomena of man, there exists a group of objects which belong to neither of these two and this is precisely that category of science in the center of which stands economics. This group of objects refers to “man’s conduct and doings” and “the various situations of life community, arising on the basis of man’s conduct or doings, which have been made orderly and legalised.” Although
they are such phenomena that can be felt sensuously, their meaning are clarified only when inquiry is made into the co-relation between these phenomena and man's spiritual life. Naming this particular category of science "Staats-und-gesellschafts-wissenschaften", Knies proposed that it be placed in a third category (K. Knies, Die Politische Oekonomie vom Geschichtlichen Standpunkte, 1883). This attitude, peculiar to Historical School, which tries to classify sciences according to the characteristics of the subject matter, however, should be called abstract as far as it remains in this stage, and as such, is open to criticism. However, it should be conceded to have been a method more to the crux of the issue, if compared with such idealistic method in which attempt was made to classify sciences only in terms of the difference existing in the various methods employed, a tendency which came to the fore in later years.

It should be noted, however, that the Neo-Kantian school coloring, which became the leading tone of the later theories of science, served to sweep Knies' third science theory off his footing. In the scientific theory followed by the Baden School, the intention to make more distinctive the characteristics, respectively, of natural science and another science which is distinguished from it in terms of the method employed, ended in overshadowing the entity of science, and failed to dictate an independent method to social sciences and, eventually, had to be contented with giving such a vague nomenclature as an "intermediary domain." It would be unnecessary to reiterate here that Max Weber, by endeavoring to work out a peculiar theory of method for this "intermediary domain", has succeeded in achieving his remarkable results.

In Dilthey, who, while fundamentally differing from Helmholtz in the theory of method employed, followed him as far as the method of classification was concerned, by virtue of the "fact of life", which was already discernible in Knies, and made a substantial contribution to the epistemology of the spiritual science comparable in its importance with what the Baden School did, social sciences failed to be indicated as a science in the third category, with cultural sciences and social sciences being designated as subdivision of spiritual science. He divided spiritual science into science of Kultursystem (system of culture) and that of äussere Organization der Gesellschaft (external organization of society) (Cf. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 1883). Of course, Dilthey conceded that the objects of these two sciences, respectively, were closely inter-related in actual reality. However,
as the domains of objects of science, they had to be such as can be distinctly divided. If this theory of science is applied to economics, it would be impossible to gain a comprehensive perspective of the issue involved in science. The economic life, while, it is in one respect, a system of culture aimed at the accumulation and pursuit of wealth, is, at the same time, as far as its concrete being is concerned, a national economy which more or less is subjected to control exercised by the national will, and the assertion that it is important to grasp it in its realistic form, was commonly shared by those belonging to the Historical School. If it is so, it naturally follows that the economic science, while being a science of *Kultursystem*, on the one hand, is, on the other, a science of *äussere Organization der Gesellschaft* controlling the *Kultursystem*. Dilthey asserts that the world of laws constitutes the point of contact between *Kultursystem* and *äussere Organization*. Therefore, the economic life as seen under these two sciences, is bridged over by "laws", and probably is considered to become a unified world of subjects-matter.

Such epistemological specification of economics is nothing less than a frank and explicit manifestation of the standpoint adopted by Historical School. That is to say, economics in so far as it is a science of *Kultursystem* had been severely criticised as abstract school, and, in so far as economic *Kultursystem* exists under the guise of *äussere Organization*, special scope of study is considered to be able of being established, inasmuch as co-working of non-economic factors can duly be taken into consideration. To think that laws play the role of a bridge between these two is an undisguised manifestation of a petit-bourgeois bureaucratic standpoint taken by the teachers of Historical School. Thus, when, for instance, a study of history is made from the standpoint of Historical School, there naturally would follow that the study be tinged with a propensity of placing emphasis on the history of jurisprudence, and then, it would be no wonder that the issue was taken up in relation to the ideology as was entertained by the ruling class of 19th century Germany. The conclusion is that, even from the standpoint as was taken by Dilthey, the necessity of crowning social sciences with the nomenclature of a third category, which had been foreshadowed by Knies, was eventually to disappear from the epistemology.
The intention to include the social sciences in the third category was also discernible in the philosophy of Kitarô Nishida, the well-known philosopher in Japan. He thought that social sciences were, after all, not to be considered as something taking its place between natural science and history, but was something equipped with peculiarly characteristic features, and, he gave the sciences a name of science of type. The fact that this kind of science was to be given a specification from the nature of its world of objects, which he calls, "something which is seen from the fact that we are living in this world of reality", amply shows that the Nishida's philosophy is sometime above such as places the first emphasis on the method employed. However, even here it is not shown how to enter into the domain of economics and undertake further reflection on its scientific theory. It is, in a word, a theory forced metaphysically, which we can never find satisfactory, but find endowed with a number of reasons for resentment. To illustrate this, the following extract may be quoted from Nishida's writing:

"All sciences which are considered to be cultural sciences would be able to be considered a science of type, this applying to so-called social sciences and economics as well as the sciences of art and of morals. Especially among them, economics deal with a world of materialistic desires, and, as such, would be considered nearer to natural science. However, as far as its object itself and its method are concerned, it should be considered to be of a pattern different from natural science." ("The World as a Dialectical Being in General," The Collected Works of Kitaro Nishida, Vol. 7, pp. 402, 403)

Even in a treatise written five years afterwards, be failed to show any progress in his theory on social sciences, but, on the contrary, the impression would be unavoidable that he had even retrogressed:

"The world of social sciences could only be considered when the poiesis-ego or man is placed in the world. Our poiesis is, self-contradictorily, nothing but the world's self-formation and from here is formed the poiesis-ego. The laws of self-formation of such contradictorily self-identificational world, should become the laws of social sciences, and, therefore, it would be able to be considered, at the same time, as historical sciences, too." ("The Empirical Science," The Collected Works, Vol. 9, p. 287).

The reason why we made the statement that Nishida's philosophy is open to the accusation that it has retrogressed, is that, whereas
formerly social sciences were thought of as equipped with different essentials compared with either natural science or the science of history, the distance at which it is placed from the science of history in his thought of the later days, has become rather vague and undefined.

Thus, we must say that all the attempts hitherto made in an endeavor to place social sciences in the third category in the classification of science, have so far resulted in a failure. Further, in the attempt to define a science which stands diametrically opposed to natural science, opinion differs widely, some taking up the science of history, while others choosing the name of cultural science. Therefore, it would only be a natural result that the significance of the historical study in social sciences can be interpreted in various ways.

V

The present writer, for himself, is of the opinion that here it would be absolutely necessary to define accurately social sciences as distinguished either from natural science or from the science of culture. Although such attempt can not be easily and simply accomplished, progress in this direction might be expected to be made gradually from the following angles of observation.

It would be thought that the main reason why all the attempts to specify social sciences as one equipped with special character have been ended in failure was that sufficient notice was not taken of the social nature of the human existence. The present writer will explain this according to the main currents in the development of modern social science. The main currents could be called, 1) naturalism in the 17th and 18th centuries, and 2) historicism in the 19th century. In the consideration of human existence, naturalism took the position that, under the dominance of the conception of continuity, the individual-being should be considered basically, which, then, extends to family, class, and race, and, eventually, to mankind, and, that, by thus unilaterally and continually expanding this conception of individuality, all the aspects of his social existence could fully be grasped, and, here, needless to say, a strikingly large abstraction, both in regard to the historical nature and social nature, should be pointed out. As opposing to this standpoint, the thinking of historicism was that the historical nature of human existence should be most emphasized and that the self-consciousness of being a historical man should lie at the root of the study of cultural science or social sciences. This emphasis of the historical
nature of social sciences has contributed substantially towards the progress of the sciences, and, here, for the first time, three separate epistemological branches of history, theory and policy were established in social sciences, and it was thought a unification of all these would constitute the essence of such scientific cognition. Thus, it was gradually established that in social sciences, the historical study and political study amount to something more than a mere pedantry or a pre-scientific curiosity-hunting, and are the subjects which deserve to be studied with the same amount of prestige and authority as the study of theory. These contributions on the part of historicism to social sciences should even be borne in memory.

However, it should be noted that the petit-bourgeois nature of the historical school, bewildered by its emphasis of the historical nature of human existence, committed the same blunder, as did naturalism, with regard to the social nature of human existence. It is there treated as though there existed no class in the actual society. For instance, the fact that man's social existence has a class formation and is unified by virtue of the threat of disintegration inherent in it — we can see it in enterprise, public organisation, or, nation — was lost sight of, and it was thought that the individual being was expanded into a social sphere, and, when this was organically unified, the result was the formation of the family and the race. This is the theory of organism peculiar to the historicism. And, this organism in itself was thought to make no historical movement, ever trying to preserve its own identity. The theory of social organism is not the theory formulated on the facts of Man's social existence itself, but is a theory formulated on the mode of the existence, whether it be a physiological theory of organism, or whether it be a transcendental or metaphysical theory of organism. Therefore, if the foundation of this pattern of thinking is sought in man's existence itself, it must be inevitably reduced to the same pattern as in naturalism, namely, the individual being. In other words, the standpoint taken by historicism leads us to the conclusion that the consciousness as a historical being has been materialised in an individual being in social existence.

The ideas of all such researchers, which have so far been taken up as the theories of science, have not, it should be noted, stepped out of the standpoint of individual being essentially interpreted in this meaning. Even in case the race is considered as the subject, the actual aspect of the social existence implying the class division and
the unification on its basis was not discerned, and, thus, it means nothing but the individual as opposing the whole in the sense as is interpreted by the theory of organism, and, therefore, it should be said that it in itself does never deviate from the standpoint of the individual.

_The cardinal point involved in the true interpretation of social existence lies in shifting the historical self-consciousness of an individual to that of a social man._ This is possible only on the standpoint of socialism, and never on that either of the naturalistic or historical standpoint. This is because the socialistic standpoint accepts the society as the subject, and views the individual as its constituent factor of this subject, and a working factor to modify its organisation historically, and, from this standpoint, the historical nature of man's existence could be considered not from the non-historical angle (for, the standpoint of the individual has been acquired by abstracting the historical properties from the modern bourgeoisie's standpoint), but, on the contrary, from the dynamic and historical angle, which itself is likewise subject to the modifications resulting from the historical structure. Both object and subject would be enabled to have a thorough self-consciousness of its historical nature only on the standpoint in which the society is accepted as the subject. This is to say that a thorough self-consciousness of the historical nature is possible only in conjunction at the same time with that of the social nature of man's existence. The view in which the society is accepted as the subject and individual is taken as meaning nothing more than a constituent factor which works to change its historical structure, in short, means, so far as it occurs in a class society, that due notice is taken of the class formation of the society, and that man's consciousness is grasped as a class consciousness, and, thus, further, that human conduct is considered only in terms of a class struggle.

While it has been stated that the socialistic standpoint presupposes the transplanting of the historical self-consciousness of the individual man to that of the social man, there also exists a standpoint, as opposing the individualistic standpoint taken in the bourgeois society, in which a non-historical self-consciousness takes places in a social man. That is the very standpoint taken, in general, by what is understood as the utopian socialism, or, more precisely, the petit-bourgeois or romantic socialism. There, because the self-consciousness has been non-historical in its nature, mankind in general, freedom in
general, and equality in general alone have been emphasised, and thus it has been impossible to grasp fully the entity of mankind, freedom and equality as existing at a specific historical moment, with the result that the idea itself, contrary to the subjective intentions, has unavoidably been forced to play a reactionary rôle to the social movement.

It would be insufficient for the clarification of the entire issue involved to state merely that social sciences treat as its object the social relations of mankind and various social phenomena arising therefrom. It would be more to the point to think that such social relations can become the object of social sciences only when they are grasped in the course of working to produce changes in its structure. This, in its turn, would tend to give the impression that the significance of the individual in relation to society and history is unduly minimized. True, there exists a domain of life where the significance of the individual personality commands an imposing value. Even in a socialistic society it would be sufficiently possible that the individual as such retains his own independent meaning. It should be noted, however, that it occurs only in the domain of the cultural life, which is taken up as the object of the cultural science, and can never be seen in the domain treated particularly by social sciences.

Thus, may it not be said with safety that the characteristics of social sciences exist in accepting as its subject matter special aspects of these social relations of social life? (It would be needless to remind that cultural life likewise is closely related to such domain of life where the society is the subject. Especially, the economic life is one with which it is most closely related. Thus, it follows that the economic science is numbered among the social sciences).

VI

If it is established that the special characteristics of the subject matter to be taken up by social sciences can safely be interpreted as described in the foregoing lines, then it would follow that the meaning of the historical studies in social sciences can fully be grasped. And, this meaning would be twofold: first, in relation to the object of research and, secondly, in relation to the researcher himself.

As for the object of research in social sciences is concerned, the meaning of its historical study would be as follows: while, generally speaking, the objective of the historical study lies in the understanding of the historical individuality, that is to say, the only-one-time-ness, the individuality or only-one-time-ness in social sciences,
should not be taken in their respective strict sense of the term. On the contrary, here the individual phenomenon as an example of the "pattern"—the meaning of which we have had no liberty to clarify in this short treatise—is made an issue, and to the researcher of social sciences, what really matters is the group of individual phenomena belonging to the same pattern. No historical phenomenon, unless it is massive in quantity, would be sufficient in itself to draw the intrinsic interest of a researcher of social sciences. For instance, the new religious movement initiated by Martin Luther and his attitude toward the Agrarian War would well become the object of detailed research, but, the real aspects in detail of these entire movements would not draw the researcher's attention; on the contrary, his task would have been accomplished if he could succeed to clarify, on the basis of these real aspects involved, the part Luther played from the point of view of the class struggle. For the researcher of social sciences it would be enough to enunciate what result Luther's attitude brought about, within the confines of the category of the economic science, to such cry for liberation raised by peasants in the feudalistic caste society. In this sense, it could be said that the historical study would serve to give the possibility of various categories of the economics to approach to historical actuality. In other words, the historical study makes it possible to analyse historical economic existence by theoretical categories, and, at the same time, to the contrary, to file theoretical categories into a historical stage. In the economic science, all the tools of idea have their respective corresponding objective being in the historical actuality, and such theoretical categories as can be certified through the historical study will be unable to realise a proximity to actuality, and, therefore, the theory that is formed on the basis of such categories must be rather harmful than useful to social sciences.

The historical study of social sciences, as far as it is related to the researcher himself, is burdened with the following implications. In the social sciences, where society is accepted as its subject matter and where the individual, its constituent factor, works to change it historically, the class which works in the world of object and the individuals who compose it, while having different time and locality in comparison with the subject matter of the study, takes a definite stand of being either its ally or foe, in the place of the class struggle, as far as its relation to the subject of the study is concerned. When facing the historical object, the actual passion of the researcher, so
to speak, is stirred up. And, thus, it would be that its own practical ego is established as one burdened with a historical background. This is to say that through his historical study the path will be opened to him which might lead to his own class self-consciousness. This, in its turn, will serve to offer a guiding principle for practice. Thus, it would be asserted with safety that for the progress of social sciences historical study as would fail to stir up, whether positively or passively, the practical passion on the part of the researcher, would be rather harmful than useful in every sense.