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CONTENTS

The Historical Consciousness of
Georg Lukács

Toshikko HIRAI 1

Japanese Exports in the Nineteen-Fifties: Their Characteristics
and Weaknesses

Noboru KAMAKURA 15

Criticism of Arguments on
Service Labour and National Income

Isao HASHIMOTO 30

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THE HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF GEORG LUKÁCS

By Toshihiko HIRAI*

I Lukács in Eastern Europe

It is twenty years since numerous socialist nations were established after the last World War and during this period it has been observed that multiple phenomena are being produced within the circle of socialist nations, such as the confrontation between the Soviet Union and Communist China, not to speak of the many different ways of socialism being put into practice by each socialist country in Eastern Europe. But it is very doubtful whether I can present those images of socialism common to Eastern Europe in this paper or not, and I have no such ability to do so either. Nevertheless what I intend to do now is to clarify several problems, such as the meaning of History and Class Consciousness (1923) which is a painstaking work in the early life of the Hungarian thinker Georg Lukács (born in Budapest on April 13th, 1885), the characteristics of Marxism produced in Eastern Europe and the inevitable problems arising therefrom, which are commonly found in Marxism itself.

It is true that it might be objected that we should regard Lukács as a typical thinker of Eastern Europe for various reasons, such as that after studying

* Assistant Professor of Economics, Kyoto University
at Budapest University he studied at Berlin University and then at Heidelberg, that the background of his thought was formed by his friendly association with Simmel, Rickert and Max Weber, and that such a bourgeois academic baptism had characterized his own interpretation of Marxism\(^1\). Moreover, he has been criticized as "Western European" by a number of literary men who are supporters of the socialist realism of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, because he devoted himself to and admired classical German literature, such as the works of Goethe, and the Enlightenment represented by Lessing. Particularly because of his participation in Hungarian Revolution, by joining Nagy, his academic influence has been shut out from East Germany, and it is further reported that his political position has been in danger\(^3\). The fact that the twelve volumes of *The Collected Works of Lukács*, including his masterpiece "Characteristics of Aesthetics" written in his latest years, have recently been published by Lufterhand in West Germany is an eloquent illustration of his position in Eastern Europe.

Politics frequently revolts cruelly against thinkers. The thinker Lukács took part in two dramatic revolutions, conspicuous in 20th century world history, — the "Hungarian Revolution" in 1919 and the "Hungarian Rising" in 1956, and had to experience their frustration at the risk of his own life. After the collapse of the Hungarian Revolution in 1919 he fled to Vienna for the time being and took refuge in Moscow during the period of Fascism. After the Hungarian Rising took place in 1956, he was forced to live in temporary exile in Bulgaria. Although he had to spend most of his active days in that way, he always kept his eyes on Eastern Europe, particularly Hungary\(^3\). He has never taken refuge in Western Europe before and it is not likely that he will ever intend to go there in the future, however coldly and adversely the wind may blow to him in Eastern Europe at present. The reason is because Lukács' mother country is Hungary in the sense of socialism, being different from a similar Hungarian thinker, Mannheim, who took

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2) Hiroshi Mizuta, *The Country of Fog: The Country of Sun*, p. 110. The evaluation of Lukács in East European countries appears to vary to a great extent, depending on the political situation in each country. In East Germany the severest vigilance is given to Lukács owing to the Hungarian Rising and Harich Problem. If this is interpreted in reverse, it means that the greatest influence of Lukács has been in East Germany and that his mother country is Germany. In Czechoslovakia a thaw seems to have set in towards Lukács, but in Hungary no political intervention has been officially allowed, being looked upon with cold eyes.

3) It is necessary to make these points more specific. Although he participated directly in political affairs in his native country, all his scientific works have been written in Germany. It should not be too hastily concluded that it was because Hungarian academic circles were too narrow-minded to accept Lukács' ideas. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.
THE HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF GEORG LUKÁCS

refuge in England.

Lukács' position in Eastern Europe is that of isolation. We, however, should not turn our backs on his thought just for that reason, because it is not right to think that so-called "orthodoxic" thought always represents Eastern Europe. Needless to say, the relationship between political position and thought itself should always be weighed but it would not be justifiable to condemn the latter merely on the basis of one's own political position.

When we take up History and Class Consciousness by Lukács, it is essential to make a clear distinction between Lukács in his early life and Lukács at the present time. Lukács, confronting the collapse of the Hungarian Revolution in 1919, made a criticism of the Second International, thereby emphasising the "Acuteness of Revolution", and intended to actualise socialist revolution on the basis of the class consciousness of the proletariat. At this time Marxists were split into two trends, producing great disputes. L. Rudas in Germany, A. M. Deborin, I. Lupol, G. Bammel, and I. Weinstein in the Soviet Union criticized Lukács and his followers like K. Korsch, and A. Graziadei, as mere supporters of idealistic subjectivism, and this criticism reached its climax when Bukharin criticized them at "The 5th Communist International Congress" in 1924. The details of these moves will be discussed separately later. Lukács, beginning to reflect on his own view held in his early days, immediately after his life in exile in Moscow in the 1930's, wrote the following description in "About Realism": "I was filled with the excited sympathy of a revolutionary irritation. Bullets of the Red war against the imperialists always hissed about my ears. In my heart was growing the ever-increasing excitement of an illegal struggle in Hungary. I would never have accepted those tumults, that the first wave of the gales of revolution had passed away and that capitalism could not have been destroyed merely by the determined will of the advance-guard of communism. In short the subjective foundation was the revolutionary irritation, and its objective achievement was the book entitled History and Class Consciousness. — This publication was reactionary because of idealism, the incomplete grasp of reflection, and the denial of naturalistic dialectics."
Lukács came to re-evaluate democracy in resisting the storm of Fascism in the period 1930–50, making a search for the origin of the progress in Germany in the “greatness of the German Enlightenment” and for its further origin in rationalism and democracy in France and England in order to confront it with the reaction of Fascism. Needless to say, the most essential problem in the struggle of anti-Fascism was to find the alternative solution of democracy or anti-democracy. Its political conclusion is clearly seen in the anti-Stalin criticism contained in “The Struggles of Progress and Reaction in Present Day Culture”. Here whether democracy is to be followed or not is the first and fundamental problem, and the systematic form in itself such as “the confrontation between capitalism and socialism” is rather neglected, and moreover it is even stated that “any attempt to attribute the problems of today to this opposition by simplifying the complex problem is to be regarded as reactionary”. It is true that the political view of Lukács would mean the co-existence of two systems and consequently Communist China would have to be turned down as a sectionalism merely insisting upon the abstract opposition of principles. The criticism of Communist China made by Lukács in “About the Disputes between the Soviet Union and China” of late can at the same time be taken as the reflection upon his own view in the 1920’s. “The essential problem that has always been taken up by sectionalism is how the answer will be given in the form of abstract performance resulting from the application of the abstract principle to the question ‘what’s to be done?’ instead of ‘making tangible analysis of some tangible situation prior to any particular activity as required by Lenin’. Now, let us take for an example, arguments relating to the Congress of the International Communist Campaign and the participation in elections to that Congress. In those days I was still on the side of the sectionalists. We claimed that parliamentarism had become obsolete in world history, because of the revolution in 1917 and the circumstances under which the whole of Europe was fermenting with the anticipated revolution.”

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10) *Shin*, January 1965, p. 113. This view undoubtedly turns into the theory of the peaceful
There is no knowing of the response in Eastern Europe to the disputes between the Soviet Union and China. However, Lukács' evaluation of democracy and the enlightenment campaign produced very severe criticism in Eastern Europe on the grounds of his participation in the Nagy regime during the Hungarian Rising. For instance, the following hostile criticism was made by Jozef Szigeti, saying that Lukács has distorted the so-called "Blum-Theses", in which the relationship between the so-called reforming of democracy and proletarian autocracy was prescribed when Szigeti contributed his critical writings, entitled "Lukács and his Followers" to the magazine, Aufbau in 1958. "Lukács had been making the general problems of democracy more and more self-supporting. Finally he was intending to find the solution of these problems in a particular historical period intervening between imperialism and socialism, and bourgeois autocracy and proletarian autocracy. Correspondingly the actualisation of socialism had to be put off further and further into the future."

It is all because it would be simply a deviation from Marxism, should the confrontation between capitalism and socialism not have been presupposed, however significant the historical progress of the democratic campaign in the struggle against Fascism might have been. Szigeti, pressing still harder on him, continued to condemn him by saying that Lukács' decidedly opportunistic inclination was nothing but an extreme reaction to the past attitude of sectionalism which he used to hold.

The study of how Lukács' early leftist radicalism became rightist opportunism in his later life is very interesting not only for understanding his thought, but also to see how intellectuals in Eastern Europe had developed their thought. The view held by Lukács in his early days is quite understandable if explained in terms of "the irritative sympathy arising out of the backwardness of Hungary" as confessed by Lukács himself and his view in his later days is understandable in terms of the sympathy arising out of reliance on the stabilized socialist system in Eastern Europe. In this way we find it quite possible to understand Lukács' thought in the light of the stages of development or the situation of a particular society and, generally speaking, it is the step Marxists invariably took, drifting between the two extremes. This particular change in Lukács' thought is a typical illustration of the step taken by all Marxians.

However, we should not stop at this point. Next we must by all means take another step further to know how this change in his view prescribes the dialectics which constitute the nucleus of Lukács' thought and to find out the meaning of the co-existence of two opposing systems, that of economic competition based on productive power, thus coming very close to the idea held by Bernstein who was regarded by Lukács as an immediate antagonist in his History and Class Consciousness.

resulting problem it raises these days. The view in his later days, which had once been destined to be condemned by Lukács himself, is conversely to be judged now by his early view in turn. The development of thought, be it accompanied by the increase of knowledge, can not but often give up its substantially original element without raising its previous content. The dialectics in *History and Class Consciousness*, though idealistic, are of such a nature as to create the future by putting the historical problems of proletarian revolution into practice. What was required here in those days was the most thoroughgoing criticism of capitalist society and breaking free of the past. Contrarily, the dialectics in his later days have been characterized by a very weakened attitude toward the future and are found to be of such a nature as to return to the bourgeois rationalism he criticized in his early days. When dialectics lose the energy of the subject to create the future, they sink down to the level of the past, i.e. bourgeois rationalism in the case of Lukács, and above all the principle of criticism of the ready-made system will be very greatly weakened. Needless to say, it will turn out to be mechanical criticism, unless the days when Lukács used to live and the change in the environment — the change from capitalism to socialism — should be taken into consideration: (the problem of dialectics in the socialist system requires to be discussed separately). Nevertheless, when viewed from his dialectic itself, that is the way of thinking in his later life, it will fall into the “static attitude” with which Lukács had once criticized bourgeois ideology. It is solely because of this reason, when *History and Class Consciousness* is compared with “The Destruction of Reason”, that I am so deeply impressed with the impulse of the spiritual life in the former.

Besides when the practicability — subjectivity — of clearing the road to the future is weakened, dialectics lose their sensitive element and become centralized. Practicability always demands impulsiveness. In *History and Class Consciousness* the entirety of the proletarian personality is conceived — whatever it might be made conscious. Capitalist society would be judged as a partialisation of this entirety of personality. Indeed, it would not mean that the view of this entirety could no longer be found in the writings of his later life, because if so, it would mean giving up dialectics. Nevertheless is there not some inclination for this partialisation to be isolated, irrespective of the entirety? Was this not the very point, which Lukács had once criticized social democracy for? I think that it does correspond to the way Lukács has grasped dialectics as rationalism, but I would adumbrate no more here than the mere presentation of the problem to be solved\(^\text{13}\). We have a firm footing on the road to socialism.

\(^{13}\) *Ibid.*, p. 43, about the relation between rationalism and anti-rationalism and the change of thought.
II The Dialectics to Grasp History by

The German Revolution in 1918 brought about the deaths of Rosa Luxemburg and Liebknecht and the treachery of social democrat. Lukács, who joined the Communist Party at the peak of the European Revolution in December 1918, took part in the Hungarian Revolution, giving assistance to Bela Kun in 1919, and accepted the post of Minister of Education under the proletarian regime. But very soon the Revolution collapsed due to Rumanian military intervention and he was obliged to take refuge in Vienna. Owing to the frustration of the Hungarian Rising in 1956, he was again purged from the position of Minister of Education, this time fleeing to Rumania. Thus he had to go through, indeed, most peculiar encounter with history.

What was the cause of the frustration of the 1919 Revolution? What was to be done in order to criticize the opportunism of social democracy and to take steps to proceed to the new proletarian revolution? One of Lukács' answers to these questions was to make the meaning of class consciousness in history clearer, because he firmly believed that "the fact that one class has a mission to pre­dominate would mean that this particular class can so organize the whole of society as to meet the interest of the ruling class, but it is only possible when it is done on the basis of the class interest or the class consciousness of that particular class. And the essential problem which ultimately determines any class struggle is which class can act with its own will at a given moment on the basis of this ability and this class consciousness."[14] The reason why the problem of class consciousness could have been proposed in this way as a force acting on history is partly because "the syndicalism of Erwin Szabó and the ideology of leftist socialism which had the strongest influence in Hungary"[15] happened to be in perfect accordance with the consciousness of crisis held by Lukács as an intellectual who lived in a period fermenting with the European revolution and partly because of the acquisition of the profound knowledge of classical German philosophy, changing from subjective idealism to objective idealism as pointed out already[16].

The fact that Lukács could have proposed the role of consciousness in history in this way might appear to be very paradoxical, but such circumstances must be
taken into consideration as that the carrier of history had to be sought in reality not in the proletariat but in class consciousness, because the proletariat was not so extensively in existence in those days in backward Hungary where the development of capitalism was still immature. From this standpoint, if the words of Mr. H. Mizuta are taken in a reverse way— it would be quite understandable that both Lukács, who devoted himself class consciousness in his search for the objectivity of cognition, and Mannheim, who devoted himself to the intellect of the intelligentsia going beyond class consciousness, happened to have been the same intelligentsia of the leftist radicalism that joined the Hungarian Revolution in 1919, and also that the principle of creative ideology should have been formed by Hungarian thinkers in the 1920's.

It was in this way that Lukács proposed the positive role of class consciousness in reforming history when confronted with the crisis of capitalism in those days, but what objective problem did it then raise for the European circle of thinkers particularly for to Marxism? During this period determinism based on economic factors was predominant in Marxian epistemology and the problem of making history by human consciousness was exclusively taken up by the idealistic interpretation of history. The materialistic view of history understood by M. Weber, bourgeois social scientist in those days, was explicitly a mere economic determinism, which was represented by Kautsky. What the Marxian principle was concerned with was either to take up "the reflection of existence and idea" as in opposition to idealism, in conformity with the classification of materialism and idealism formulated by Engels in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Conclusion of Classical German Philosophy*, without taking up the problem of consciousness as its subjective matter, which should make history and grasp it: or to take up only naturalistic dialectics to grasp the law of the movement of nature by which would transcend consciousness. This idea was pointed out very clearly by Bukharin, the

18) F. Engels, "On Feuerbach", Collected Essays of Marx & Engels, Vol. 15, B., p. 448. In opposition to the way Marxism is characterized by the materialistic aspect instead of idealism, strong opposition raised by Lukács in the opening statement of an essay entitled "The Marxist, Rosa Luxemburg" runs as follows: "The point which decisively differentiates Marxism from bourgeois sciences is not whether the dominance of economic factors is accepted in its view of history or not, but whether the particular view of totality is accepted or not ...... Therefore, what was intended by Marx was to correct Hegel in a very decisive and fruitful way, not from the standpoint either of materialism or idealism but from that of this very entirety." (G. Lukács, ibid., pp. 39-40). It is for this reason that the ideological methodology of Lukács has been seriously taken up these days, being criticized even at present, and it is on the grounds of this ideological methodology that Lukács' thought is regarded as creative and unique. When any critic of Lukács make an objection against this point, I am of the opinion that they are in most cases not making any more progress with the problem than Lukács, but are simply rewarding it because in most cases the most important principle of materialistic dialectics which, in a quite different way from idealistic dialectics, were produced as a result of the change in the ideological entity, has not yet been brought to light.
THE HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF GEORG LUKÁCS

author of The Materialistic Interpretation of History (1921) who was also the editor of Pravda after the October Revolution19).

Moreover Marxian objectivism had something in common with the opportunism held by Bernstein who devoted himself to bourgeois ideology. “Class consciousness” interpreted from the aspect of popular Marxism must have the same inner composition as that of the bourgeois”20). The immediate rival to Lukács was none other than the tendency towards objectivism of social democracy. Most of the leaders of the Second International, having no dialectics of consciousness to frustrate history, could not do anything but examine those facts that they experienced as they were, being prepossessed with the law of nature which had been produced by capitalist society. If so, their only exact “scientific methodology” could be nothing other than the methodology applicable to capitalism. Putting it in an other way, “it is by replacing the phenomena of our living in such an environment in conformity with its own lawfulness, without being disturbed in reality and in thought by any intervention of other phenomena, that the pure facts of natural science can be established. And this process through which the pure facts can only be established becomes stronger and more secure, when it becomes possible to reduce the phenomena of our living into some substance which can be expressed in terms of numerical figures. Under such circumstance all opportunists overlook the fact that capitalism is substantially producing phenomena in this way”21).

Assuming that Marxism could not help falling into the technique by which the lawfulness in the objective world could only be scientifically sought without giving due consideration to the active performance of consciousness, it would naturally lead to either of the following two results — both the materialistic view and the idealistic view must share each field in the way of peaceful co-existence in the same epistemological horizon, or each of them must defend a fortress of its own, despising the other. Or rather, according to Lukács’ methodological consciousness, materialism can be regarded as nothing other than reversed idealism. If bourgeois ideologies are to be criticized, then the substantial difference in principle from Hegelian idealism must be clearly pointed out. If the materialistic

19) N. Bucharin, Théorie des historischen Materialismus. Gemeinverständliches Lehrbuch der marxistischen Soziologie, Hamburg, 1922. Writing a review of this book in 1925, Lukács, on the ground of the idea of simple economic reflection of the nation and the sterile proposition of the critical succession between Marx and Hegel, “pointed out clearly that these ideas mean false objectivity”. Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, Jg. XI, 1925, S. 218.

20) G. Lukács, ibid., S. 81, Transl., p. 324. In the aforementioned criticism of Bukharin Lukács made a statement that, since Bukharin’s principle gets closer and closer to that of the materialism of bourgeois and natural science, it becomes categorized as a science in the sense of French.

21) G. Lukács, ibid., S. 18. Lukács made a thoroughgoing criticism in his essay “What is Orthodox Marxism”, of the point that the vulgar Marxism of Bernstein didn’t stand on dialectical methodology.
view is to be confronted with the idealistic view, then its own principle must go beyond the traditional materialistic horizon. To do so, it is necessary to establish the common sphere which should lie beyond mere abstract opposition. It is not until materialism goes out of itself that its content can be enriched, because the creative development of thought could not be achieved without going through the throes of making a strikingly sudden and great change.

Then how did Lukács intend to raise Marxism and develop a new view? It is by establishing the subjectivity of the class which creates history as already pointed out. As a result history and society become something that acts in self-contradiction, having a different composition in quality from that of nature. It is here that the peculiar sphere of intrinsic historical society which is different from the objects of natural science is established, and Lukács’ dialectics are originally the very method to solve the problem by. In this connection, what should be borne in mind is the idea that history is to be made by man, but the world conceived objectively is isolated from man and contrarily it stands opposite to him, and moreover it presses upon him with the inevitability of involving him in the world. Here “The Philosophy of History” by Hegel is quoted, but the way the objective world as blind inevitability is put in opposition to consciousness appears to be rather obsolete. It is when the disunion of consciousness and objectivity contrarily absorbs consciousness into the world of inevitability that the principle of antithesis and avoidance comes to be systematized. Owing to this disunion, consciousness is obliged to be conceived objectively. Putting it in an other way, if Mr. Kuno’s words are to be quoted, “the dialectics to create history by” (Principle of Existence) simultaneously are “the dialectics to grasp history by” (Epistemology) according to Lukács’ conception. If so, it is quite understandable that it is likely to be identified with realism, because of the emphasis placed on the role of consciousness in history. However, when Lukács goes on in respect to metaphysical methodology to say that “the objective substance as an object of consideration should be left immutably as it is without being taken up”, and when he makes an assertion that “the very reform of reality is the central problem of metaphysical methodology”, the two entities would be come disunited.

Goldmann classified Marxian thoughts — “Marxian Sociology” as termed 22) The concept of avoidance which raises problems so frequently these days could not have come into existence in the period of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. Lukács holds the opinion that although he can see its original form in Rousseau as it were, in “The Young Hegel”, it is not until the period when the capitalist system came to be firmly established, in other words not until the time had passed from Hegel to Marx, that such a category has come to be systematized, because unless society inevitably gets hold of the entity, the denied entity will not proceed to the transformation of society.


24) G. Lukács, ibid., S. 16.
by him — into two types. One type is “the trend which places emphasis on social momentum, resistance of environment and physical force” and the other “the trend which places emphasis on human behaviour and the possibility for man to reform the world”. And among the latter type are listed Lenin, Luxemburg, and History and Class Consciousness by Lukács. Goldmann’s central problem was the ideology necessary to prove that universal truth exists in the consciousness of the proletariat. In this case the change of reality and the cognition of history are combined, because of Lukács’ emphasis on consciousness in human conduct. “The act of being conscious and the act in itself are combined together actually and substantially”, and therein lie the peculiarity of Lukács’ ideology, the role of consciousness in reflecting history, and his characteristics as one of the many Marxists of Western Europe, and at the same time we should not forget that it was Lukács’ tragedy that the act of being conscious of reality could never be any immediate change of reality.

III Individual Consciousness and Class Consciousness

Man in society is the entity that produces it, and at the same time he is also a product of the historical process. Society is something produced by man and yet it initiates action, independently of him, in conformity with its own law of nature. This objective world accepts the form of antithesis and this materialized world absorbs man into its own form. Needless to say, what is said applies to society producing capitalist commodities. Lukács has made an excellent analysis of the process of materialization (Verdinglichung), which is to disunite everything that exists. This process of materialization pervades thoroughly from the lower composition to the higher composition, from objective to subjective, and finally to the extremities. It is not intended to discuss it here, but I want to point out that such emphasis on disunion of the capitalist society does have something in common with Utopian socialism, romanticism, and the capitalist view of realism.

Now, the peculiarity of the Lukács’ thought was to treat the entity which reflects the historical process, i.e. consciousness and to criticize bourgeois ideology. In this case we can also see a variety of the Hegelian “Philosophy of History” in

26) G. Lukács, ibid., S. 14. In the beginning of the essay “What is Orthodox Marxism?” it is prescribed that “materialistic dialectics are the dialectics of revolution”, since the objective process of history is the class consciousness of the proletariat according to him and the proletariat is the unification of subject matter and object matter in history.

Discussions of the proletarian relationship between existence and consciousness as varieties of Marxian thought are seen in Mizuta, “The Position of Marxism in European Socialist Thought”, Shiso, December 1964.
Hegel sought the entity, which penetrated through history and produces history, in the mind of nation, whereas Lukács replaced the entity which reflected the objective process of history with class consciousness. The class consciousness had nothing to do with the individual consciousness as typically conceived in Western Europe during the period of the Enlightenment, and Lukács' view of history is somewhat contrary to the atomistic theory wherein the independent individual appeared from the collective body is regarded as the entity to form society. "Class consciousness is neither the sum total of what individual members constituting the class think and feel, nor its average. Yet any act bearing some historical meaning to the whole class is after all prescribed not by the will of any individual but by class consciousness." Moreover experimental psychology based on the momentary consciousness of an individual simply ignores this objective process as something unable to be grasped from the very beginning. Because the individual has no knowledge of what is the objective state of society, although society is made by himself, Engels called this individual consciousness "False Consciousness." 29)

Speaking of the objective truth of history, particularly the problem of objectivity in social science, since man does not exist merely as an individual in history but is placed in a definite relation to production, consciousness which reflects history could never be sought in the intellect of the intelligentsia transcending class consciousness in the way Mannheim tried to do. If it were, it would mean an escape from history. In this sense we must say that it is right that Lukács sought it in class consciousness, or rather in the consciousness of the proletariat, which clears the road to the future in history. Lukács made a criticism of bourgeois ideology as follows: "the mistake of the bourgeois science of history lies in the fact that they intended to find that tangibility of the historical occurrence in the experimental and historical entity and in the consciousness given to the individual through experience. Nevertheless, contrary to their expectation when they believed that they had found something most tangible, they had in fact failed to find it." 30)

In this way, as far as bourgeois ideology is prescribed as psychological consciousness of individuals and the entirety of history as the consciousness of the proletariat, and still further as consciousness based on the relation of immutable production, we must conclude that the idea held by Lukács was also social de-

27) G. Lukács, "Autobiography of Lukács Thought", ibid., pp. 251–52. "What I have pursued was merely the Hegelian dominance of content over form; namely the attempt to unite Hegel and Marx into one philosophy of history, substantially based on Hegel".
30) G. Lukács, ibid., p. 61, Transl., p. 278.
terminism\textsuperscript{31}, and it will require further discussion whether it is a predestined characteristic inherent in Marxism or not. Nevertheless we can not overlook the ideas of reducing individual consciousness and class consciousness as being bourgeois ideology and the reducing of the consciousness of the proletariat into the relationships of production, and then dividing them into two. What can we infer from it in relation to Lukács’ concept of history? I think that what was lying in the background of his concept of history was none other than the consciousness of history in Eastern Europe in opposition to the communities in Western Europe. The reason is because Lukács in those days simply thought that capitalism would bring forth materialized phenomena and accordingly the part it would play in history had never been duly evaluated: particularly the inclination of the bourgeois tending to deny the feudal system and becoming independent, and the weight of its individual consciousness had never duly be considered. Though it is admitted that classical German philosophy had been evaluated, it was not applied as methodological individualism. In this case what was in his mind was the subjectivity of society — consciousness — in a sense that the capitalist society would become conceived as one united whole going through the process of becoming self-supporting. Therefore, the relation between each individual and society is, contrary to atomistic individualism, regarded to be such that class consciousness would rather appear in individuals, since it is society that would press on them.

This must be considered from such circumstance under which the carrier of history was obliged to be sought in the consciousness of the proletariat by criticizing bourgeois social system, i.e. the bourgeois ideology in the midst of the proletarian revolution in Europe, and it can also be easily understood from the fact that the development of bourgeois society in Hungary was immature then. For this reason Lukács made the qualitative distinction between bourgeois revolution and that of the proletariat, making a serverance between the two, and lost sight of the part to be played by democracy. From this point of view I think that a more positive appraisal should be made by Lukács, who is now living under a socialist system, and we should all fully appreciate such interesting problems arising therefrom, such as the historical significance for socialism and the part to be played by those intellectuals who are living in such societies. These thoughts will also make it clear to understand what Lukács inferred from Rosa Luxemburg, who exerted the greatest influence on him during the revolutionary period and how he confronted her. Lukács, by arriving at his conclusion of the cognition of the entirety which constitutes the nucleus of his dialectical methodology — the predominance of the entirety over partial and individual cognition — from \textit{Accumulation of Capital} written by Rosa Luxemburg, devoted himself to his theory

\textsuperscript{31} L. Goldmann, \textit{ibid.}, Transl., p. 35.
of the automatic destruction of capitalism. At the same time he went on, in a quite different way from Rosa Luxemburg, to say that “democracy is nothing but a tool of proletarian autocracy”, and finally declared that “freedom should serve for proletarian predominance but the converse does not hold good”\(^3\). Thus the road to revolution not by the people in general but the party (the organized people) has come to be paved by Lukács as well as by Lenin.

The way in which class consciousness was conceived by Lukács was on a background different from the individual consciousness of Western Europe. His lifelong theme was confronting bourgeois ideologies with popular Marxism. That of have seen that when class consciousness closes its door to individual consciousness, the passage from individual consciousness to class consciousness is closed, and when class consciousness is held by a specific individual, it is to be transformed into the ‘abstract mind’ of Hegel. The relation between individual and class, existence and cognition in its historical sense, always gives rise to major problems which we must tackle unceasingly.

\(^3\) G. Lukács, \textit{ibid.}, S. 206. \textit{History and Class Consciousness} contains two essays about Rosa Luxemburg —— “Rosa Luxemburg as Marxist” and “Critical Supplements to ‘Criticism on the Russian Revolution’”. Though it is found that Lukács’ view on Rosa in both of these writings have a great many points in common, he is very critical on the latter and he explicitly supports Lenin in the controvers between Rosa and Lenin.