N. BUKHARIN AND G. LUKACS

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I Controversies over the Materialistic Interpretation of History in the Early Part of the Nineteen-Twenties

It is since the very beginning of this century that problems such as the role consciousness has played in history and the active part to be played by the upper structure have been discussed from the viewpoint of bourgeois idealists in opposition to Marxism. We can see the most typical example of this in Max Weber’s *Ethics of Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904). Nevertheless this problem has not been directly taken up by any Marxist for a long time since then. Because of the thesis expounded in the illustrious work, *Materialistic Interpretation of History* which had been formulated in the *Critique of Political Economy* by Marx, consciousness was dealt with as a mere reflection of existence and emphasis on the role of consciousness had never been seriously considered, being regarded as bourgeois idealism in opposition to the materialistic interpretation of history. It was, however, only from 1923 that these problems began to gain a position in the materialistic interpretation of history and some Marxists began to make a re-appraisal of these problems. We can see some such keen-sighted work or forerunners’ achievements in *History and Class-Consciousness* by Lukács and *Marxism and Philosophy* by Korsch.

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I attempted to search for the significance of these two works in the history of thought in several previous brief essays and have made the following point clear: that the purpose of these works—Lukács’ book written when the Hungarian Revolution collapsed in 1919 and Korsch’s book written when the German Revolution broke down in 1918—viewed in relation to the Marxist family-tree, was to make a re-evaluation of Marx’s *Thesis on Feuerbach* against objectivism based on the dialectic of nature in *Anti-Duhring* by Engels\(^1\). Above all other things “materialistic dialectic should be revolutionary dialectic” according to Lukács who was aiming to reproduce the proletarian revolution in Europe by criticising the Second International\(^2\). It was necessary for that purpose that contemplation, which had been transformed into bourgeois ideology maintained by social democrats, had first to be confronted. The main current of the II International did in fact force its way into history. But because of a lack in the dialectic of consciousness of the subjective entity which could have taken a part in history and because it was prejudiced by the natural lawfulness created by capitalist societies, all that they could do was nothing but to wait and see the facts they experienced as they were\(^3\). But the important question in this connection is how man and his environment should confront each other by the dialectic which should build up history and create the future. Putting it more concretely, the problem to be solved is how should the subjective entity of various classes placed in a fixed relationship of production become conscious of the objective environment of history and how should each of them interact? The field of conduct (dialectic to produce history) and the field of cognition (dialectic to grasp history) are something linked together as an entity which can revolutionalise actuality.

From this standpoint Lukács made the following criticism of *Anti-Duhring* by Engels. “Engels, setting the way to form through dialectical methodology in opposition to metaphysical methodology, made an extremely sharp assertion, saying that the inflexibility of a concept (and corresponding object to that concept) would dissolve in dialectic. In short, a dialectic is a ceaseless process, changing from one stipulation to another, a continual giving up of various oppositions, and their inter-transition. Therefore, any one-sided and inflexible causality should be dissolved by such interaction. Now it must be borne in mind that one of the most substantial interactions is none other than the dialectic relationship between subjective entity and objective entity in the process of history, but no mention had ever been made of this problem by Engels, not to speak of due consideration of it in his methodological considerations. But for this prescription, the dialectic

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3) G. Lukács, a.a.O., S. 100.
methodology would cease to be revolutionary method—even if it is admitted that
it might contain some variable concepts, they would after all simply have to become
something superficial. The difference between dialectic and metaphysics lies in
that, while on the one hand all metaphysical contemplation can not simply be
anything more than mere making observations because the objective entity to be
contemplated has to be left unaltered as it is without being even touched and con­
templation in itself remains theoretical and consequently it can not be anything to
be translated into action, on the other hand the central problem of dialectical
methodology is nothing but to revolutionalise the realities of life”).

Thus, Lukács proceeded to contemplate that the very dialectic to bring forth
changes in the realities of life should be concerned not with the mere opposition
between materialism and ideology but with “the dialectic relationship between
subjective entity and objective entity in the process of history”, and that it must be
the only element of thought to pave the road to the future of history. Nevertheless,
as history has been always ironical, so this very subjective dialectic which was
brought forward only to criticise the objectivism of the II International was refuted
by the Marxists of the III International. In regard to this refutation my opinion
has been expressed to some extent in my little essay “Dialectic of Actions in Karl
Korsch”, but it is Deborin who raised a fairly complete objection to this new
problem raised by Lukács. In the Criticism of Lukács and his Marxism, 1924 Deborin
gave a good scolding not only to History and Class-Consciousness, but to K. Korsch,
Fogarasi and Reway, who should have been Lukácsists, on the ground that they
were all in a position, being prejudiced ideologically, to deny Engels’ dialectic of
naturalism, and the center of his criticism was then placed on the problem of the
“Identity of Subject and Object” or “Identity of Thinking and Existence”. Debo­
rin, further adding to his criticism, saying that a train of thought of this kind deviates
from Marxism, which maintains that theories and thoughts are a reflection of
reality, continues to make the following criticism, “that according to Lukács any
theory in itself, accordingly even cognition, too, is something independent from
material substance and independent from reality, that Lukács’ grasping of action is
conceived ideologically in the same way as the theory is conceived, and finally that
his understanding of dialectic deviates from that of Marx’s and Engels’ under­
standing.” Moreover, when the active part to be played by consciousness is
emphasised, it inevitably leads to the voluntarism of Mach which Lukács had to
criticise. “The voluntarism of Mach unavoidably leads to recognition of the
existence of the world of volition. In other words, this is none other than the
idealism of consciousness and this tendency is also indicated in Lukács.”

4) G. Lukács, a.a.O., SS. 15-16.
5) A. Deborin, „Lukács und seine Kritik des Marxismus”, Arbeiter-Literatur, Nr. 10, S. 624.
6) A. Deborin, a.a.O., S. 625.
much as a human being is an existence that behaves consciously in historic reality, he is something physical and conscious. However, according to Deborin "these features are distinguished as two separate entities. Accordingly thinking and existence are something different from each other and existence exists independently from cognition as an objective entity. Cognition and speculation are a mere reflection of what actually exists." If it is true, then it follows that there is no necessity to distinguish the dialectic of society, which intrudes into actuality as an objective entity from that of nature.

Indeed it is accepted by Deborin that "the history of nature has been governed by a law completely different from that which governs the history of human beings," but after all no fundamental difference between these two cases has ever been demonstrated. In the same magazine, a criticism by Ladislaus Rudas, "The Class-Consciousness of Lukács" was published, which attempted to prove that "the point of view held by Lukács is ideological and agnostic." It is not known what Lukács' answer to those objections was then, but in a fairly complete book-review by him in 1925 in Collected Essays on the History of Socialism and Labour Movements which was written to raise objections to the Theory of Historical Materialism, 1922 by N. Bukharin, Lukács levelled expressly bitter criticism against materialism based on natural science.

It goes without saying that Deborin, Ludas and Bukharin are all based on the same materialism of natural science, but it must be noted that there is a difference between Bukharin and Deborin, much wider than that from Rudas. Therefore, it is not reasonable to believe that Lukács' criticism of Bukharin can be taken to be his direct answer to Bukharin. Nevertheless, it can be said, viewed from the standpoint of Lukács, that they belong fundamentally speaking, to the followers of Bukharin's materialism as far as the controversies during the early part of the 1920's over the materialistic interpretation of history are concerned. Needless to say, the author has at present no intention of describing all the arguments developed in full detail in those days in this brief essay. What is intended rather is to find the theoretical difference between the subjective dialectic held by Lukács and the materialism based on natural science held by Bukharin in the light of the opposition between Lukács and Bukharin. By doing so it will become possible as a matter of course to elucidate from the aspect of the history of thought that the very opposition of the two ideas—be it in a more refined or in a more weakened form

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7) A. Deborin, a.a.O., S. 630.
8) A. Deborin, a.a.O., S. 632.
— is none other than the background from which the same arguments are currently springing forth among many Marxists.

To do so, we must explain the logical structure of the historical dialectic conceived by Lukács out of the underlying ground of the consciousness of urgent crisis during his revolutionary days, contrasting it with materialism based on natural science. Needless to say, we get such a dialectic as to conceive an idea of society in the form of a totality that includes all objective entity, if the identity of speculation and existence and subject and object is brought against such an objectivism that interprets speculation in terms of existence and objective entity by disuniting speculation and existence, subject and object. Consequently it becomes something connected with the dialectic of voluntarism and determinism and the relationship between teleology and the law of causality. For these reasons it is clear that the base of this logical structure was the consciousness of history to cut a path from the present to the future and the author hopes to confirm that Lukács occupied an unshakable position in the history of Marxist thought during the period of the nineteen-twenties and that his thought constitutes an important position in Marxist philosophy even today.

Yet we can not simply go back to the stage of History and Class-Consciousness in the early part of the nineteen-twenties. Going back to history would mean grasping the problems at issue as they were in those days and bringing them back to the present. This statement would hold true especially in the case of the history of thought. In order to determine the present significance of Lukács, the unsolved problems arising out of History and Class-Consciousness need to be clarified. An argument should always mean to turn outwards from oneself and to make a critical study of one's own position. Therefore, the dialectic of subjective entity should deal with problematical questions arising out of objective materialism. Putting it in other words, Lukács viewpoint criticising Bukharin must contrariwise be turned back from Bukharin to Lukács. Once the viewpoint is reversed in this way, it then becomes possible to visualise how the dialectic of the “identity of subjective and objective entity” in terms of class-consciousness maintained by Lukács is led to be transformed from the “dialectic to produce history” into the “dialectic to grasp history”, and correspondingly it also becomes possible to understand the reason why the “identity of subjective and objective entity” presupposed by Lukács can be actualised in terms of consciousness and how reforming by consciousness is identified with actual revolution. What is now intended by the author at this point is to look into the realistic grounds for the dialectic of the “identity of subjective and objective entity” conceived by Lukács. In other words, to do so means to demonstrate the realistic and ontological grounds of proletarian class-consciousness. Viewing it in this way, does it not of necessity lead to acceptance of the category of “combined labour” raised by Bukharin—be it based on the viewpoint of the materialism of natural science or on the theory of productivity?
Of course it does not follow that this collective power which is proposed to provide
the ground for the existence of society can be conceive simply in terms of objective
and physical productivity exactly in the way asserted by Bukharin. Is it not
true that it is not until this idea can be reconceived as an ontological ground for the
dialectic of reforming history that it becomes possible to grasp a medium by which
“consciousness is converted into physical force” as asserted by Marx, and from
which it surely becomes possible to find the way to penetrate through the limits
of consciousness of Lukács?

II Materialism based on Natural Science and
the Dialectic of History

Lukács regarded the essence of Marxism as a state of practical enforcement,
under which man, who lives in the historical reality of life, being governed by a
social environment on the one hand and at the same time participating in historical
actuality as a conscious and subjective entity on the other, was to revolutionalise
actuality and proceed to build a road to the future. “One of the most important
functions of historical materialism lies in no sense of the word in pure scientific
cognition but it lies in the point that it is composed of action or conduct.”11) It
is only from this point of view that the foundation for looking out over the future
can be provided. This idea is duly evaluated by Josef Révai, who is a critic of
Lukács in a review of History and Class-Consciousness. “According to Lukács it was
not because the dialectic was elucidated post festum, outside of the historical process,
but because it was perceived on the basis of the revolutional interaction between
subjective and objective entity in the midst of the historical process that Marx
developed his dialectic in the way Copernicus did. Marx brought the future
into the revolutionary dialectic. Of course it was not in the form of action in
conformity with natural law or teleological purposiveness, but in the form of some
active realities as something inherently prescribing actualities.”12) Needless to
say, this idea was repeatedly insisted on by Lukács himself to the effect that “the
reason why Marxism happens to be the theory of revolution is because it indisputably
grasps the very essence of its process and because it indicated the trend of essential
processes of great importance to show the future to come or to produce”.13) If
ture, Marxism ought to be the dialectic of history to produce the future by practical
means, and it follows that it can not be discussed from the viewpoint of deciding
whether the ultimate factor lies in consciousness or in existence. Whether nature

11) G. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, 1923, S. 231.
12) Josef Révai, „Literaturbericht, Georg Lukács, Geschichte über marxistische Dialektik, 1923“, Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, Jg. 11, 1925.
13) G. Lukács, a.a.O., S. 263.
or speculation, each of them is after all nothing but one and the same thing seen respectively from two different angles. In this connection Lukács says as follows: "The decisive point which distinguishes Marxism from bourgeois science is not whether the dominance of economic causes is duly acknowledged in the interpretation of history, but whether the viewpoint of totality is taken or not. The category of totality in this sense, i.e. complete and decisive dominance of totality over partiality, is nothing more or less than the very essence of Marxist methodology which succeeded from Hegel and on which Marx formulated his new theory after making a complete re-systematisation." When viewed in this way, it ought to be helpful to understand why it was not until Lukács came to hold this view of action or practice that he started from the category of the identity of subject and object.

Needless to say, Bukharin also admitted that man is an entity composing society. "It is certainly by men that varied social phenomena are produced. Society is composed of men who think, feel, establish purpose and work." Therefore, it is impossible for us to distinguish Lukács from Bukharin on these grounds. Furthermore, it is also a position common to Marxism to maintain that society produced by men is an objective and independent entity and is forced to conform with law, and as far as this view is concerned, both Lukács' and Bukharin's views are in conformity with 

According to Bukharin "various social phenomena exist independently from human consciousness, sympathy and volition.......It is because social products as results of human volition do not always keep pace with goals established by many people and moreover that because they are frequently found to be even contradictory to their goals that the events of social life are independent from human volition. Such autonomy of objectivity has also been persistently accepted by Lukács. As far as this view is concerned, it is decisively different from bourgeois idealism, which urges the autonomy of individual consciousness. When Lukács developed his "class-consciousness", he started from the idea that "the true motive power of history is something independent from human consciousness in the psychological sense". If so, the one cannot be distinguished from the other as far as these two views are concerned. The distinction between subjective dialectic and objective materialism lies in whether the relationship between subject and object can be broken off or not—which the subjective entity, although being limited within a given social relationship, is to be in turn regarded as something changing such a relationship, or whether the viewpoint of being a mere spectator watching objective natural lawfulness is to be assumed. Or rather, ac-

16) N. Bucharin, a.a.O., S. 32.
cording to the viewpoint of the dialectic of subjective and objective entity, man is subject to the influence of natural lawfulness, since he can be regarded as an alienated entity in conformity with the nature of material phenomena, and it follows that objectivity is something constantly in motion due to contradictions of its own, but at the same time it is something to be reduced to human relationships. Thus, the structure of objectivity in itself ought not to be in the form of nature but in the form of something social. (It will be elucidated in the next chapter that the sense of 'something social' is very vague according to Lukács.) If so, it is impossible to consider the objective natural lawfulness of society as something inflexible. According to Lukács "History is a record of changes of forms taking place when human beings gather together to build up a society, or it is nothing but a history of the changes of forms which govern the whole of mutual human relationships, starting from economic and physical relationships 19).

However, since materialism based on natural science is likely to fall into vulgar Marxism and to be prejudiced by the natural lawfulness produced as the result of capitalist society, all they can do is to consider facts that have been experienced as they are. This is because reality is not grasped from the viewpoint of changing actualities. It was on this point that the main point of Lukács criticism of the "Historical Materialism" held by Bukharin was focussed. “Bukharin’s theory is very similar to materialism of the bourgeois type and of natural science taking on the form of a science in the sense of French, and for that reason it obliterates, because of its frequent application of this science, one of the most important requisites of Marxist methodology to reduce every economic and sociological phenomenon a mutual social relationship” 20). If it is true, will it not, from the Lukács viewpoint, lead to a technical argument that will consider natural lawfulness to be something fixed and inflexible according to the “materialism” of Bukharin?

Lukács says, focussing his criticism upon the autonomy of natural lawfulness of technique supported by Bukharin, that “Bukharin is as a matter of fact expecting a totally impossible role from technique, and he is doing so in such a way that is not applicable to the spirit of dialectical materialism. Bukharin further made a statement that the conventional system of social technique prescribes the system of all relationships of labour among men…….The immaturity of ancient exchange and the predominance of spontaneous economy are prescribed as results of undeveloped techniques…….Emphasis is placed on the fact that, whenever any change takes place in technique, the corresponding change will take place in the division of labour within a society, too.” 20) It is, indeed, true that Bukharin, as far as he

himself held the Marxist point of view, did not simply accept the idea of regarding technique only as something spontaneous. For example, Bukharin bitterly criticised *The Position of Technique in Marxist Economics* by Heinrich Kuno, asserting that a technique is so connected with natural conditions that the production of a certain material will determine the creation of a fixed technique.

However, because Bukharin himself also applied the aforementioned 'science' of natural science to the materialistic interpretation of history, it was impossible for him to grasp techniques in themselves in a critical way. This point was cross-examined by Lukács as follows: “Nevertheless, why is it not possible that such an appropriate and critical attitude of Bukharin against Kuno should be taken against technique? Is not such an idea that the development of a society depends on that of technique, even if it may be more refined than its older conception, after all erroneous naturalism like the similar theory of Kuno which ended in the theory of environment in the 18th and 19th centuries?……As far as an autonomous technique is taken to provide the basis of development, all we can see in it is that it only serves to rebuild a crude naturalism into something more dynamic and delicate. The reason is because, if the improvement of technique is not grasped as a system of production at a given time, and if its improvement is not explained in terms of the development of social forces, then the technique is, as it were to be understood as something similar in nature to a principle of worshipping something transcending and confronting man, just like natural factors such as climate, environment and raw materials. Of course, Lukács himself has no reason whatever to deny the active role of technique, or rather he does accept the improvements of technique in relation to the development of productivity, but technique is ultimately ascribed to various economic relationships. “It is because some changes do take place in the structure of a society, or in the possibility and condition of labour that technique is decisively forced to change its course of improvement.”

In this way the reason why Bukharin made a very high evaluation of technique is because it is reasonable to think that the new productive development of society during the period of the establishment of socialism after the Revolution of 1917 was in itself a mere reflection of historical inevitability which happened to be a strikingly significant class-struggle. Bukharin himself put the following description in his introduction: “Some of the problems to which I used to pay almost no attention when I was involved in a previous period of urgency began to strike me with seriousness at the present stage of revolution.” Without any historical background, arguments would undoubtedly turn out to be abstract. But putting this aside, because the characteristic features of the Marxist history of thought

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22) G. Lukács, "Literaturbericht", S. 220.
in the Soviet Union placing emphasis on natural science permeate throughout Bukharin, his idea makes a sharp contrast to that of Lukács which is based on a social dialectic.

Without taking up all human conduct or actions which revolutionise objective entity and by taking an attitude of wait and see as things take place, Bukharin restricted his subject of study just to that of the law of cause and effect in terms of natural science. Lukács, concluding that this attitude is of the same posture which used to be held in common by Kant, continues to say as follows: "As far as the mathematical relationship or the inevitability of natural law is taken to be a doctrine of cognition, such cognition can no longer be anything more than a stereotyped relationship or an attitude merely to wait-and-see lawfulness. Besides, what is peculiar to Lukács is the view saying that such an attitude explaining cognition prescribes the structure of existence of a cognitive entity without remaining within a scientific framework. "The viewpoint of explanation from a wait-and-see attitude or from a critical attitude tends more and more to get rid of all subjective and irrational elements or all that are human from such an attitude. Then, the cognitive entity, being farther and farther shut off from man, can not but become something purely formalistic. This is, to Lukács, none other than the same posture held by the so-called vulgar Marxists whose viewpoints were inverted to take the Neo-Kantian standpoint.

Révai made the following statement in a review of History and Class-Consciousness, pointing out the distinctive characteristics of Neo-Kantian Marxism, to the effect that "since such study of Marx deals with developments of phenomena in a society and history in accordance with the law of causation, it represents various individual sciences which are intrinsically and substantially of the same nature as the problems of the world-views." And even an orthodox Marxist, like for instance, Plekhanov goes as far as to say that if "a dialectic is to be based on naturalism", the mutual interaction of Hegel is to be grasped as a relationship of causality, and that "because of its distortion the relationship between the world-mind and history in the Hegelian sense must be based on the relationship of the law of causation." Such a dialectic based on naturalism as pointed out by Révai penetrates through Bukharin's, Materialistic Interpretation of History and it is added that for Marxism the important problem to solve is that of pursuing the relationship of causality of social phenomena in conformity with the laws of nature by going thorough the dialectic of naturalism maintained by Plekhanov. "We can observe a certain orderliness or lawfulness in our social life or in the life of a human society. However complex and diversified social life may be, we do find and accept a fixed lawfulness in it. For instance, the more remarkable progress capitalism makes, the faster the labouring
class grows and develops, the more frequently socialist campaigns spring forth and
the more extensively Marxist theory is spread."28) In this way, according to Bukha­
rin, it is seen that even the growth of the labouring classes and the theoretical develop­
ment of Marxist theory are all reduced to a natural lawfulness of objectivity. If
so, is there any possibility of a cognitive entity intervening in the system of the
natural law of cause and effect? Needless to say, Bukharin denies voluntarism,
and moreover such a system of causality has nothing to do with teleology.

Indeed Bukharin himself, quoting as an example the difference between
"Spiders, bees and architects" given in the theory of labour-process in Capital which
is frequently referred to whenever teleology is brought into the discussion, has stated
that "it is right, viewed from the purposiveness of man, that Marx drew a line
between human beings and the other world."29) Even so, Bukharin is opposed ei­
erther to characterise social science with teleology in that way, or to see voluntarism
intervene there. Bukharin consistently refuses to accept the idea that Stammler
distinguished social science from natural science as a science of purpose in Economics
and Laws in the Light of the Materialistic Interpretation of History. The reason is because
Bukharin thinks that even human volition and consciousness should be interpreted
through a fixed law of causality. "Even if it is admitted that man can prescribe
everything consciously by himself and everything in his society can be achieved
exactly in the way he wishes, what is essentially required for the explanation of
multiple phenomena is not teleology but the study of causes of those phenomena, i.e.
the way to find lawfulness in conformity with natural causality. Therefore, the
distinction between a social science and a natural science is not involved in this
problem."30)

"When the problem of relationships between the two theories of causality and
teleology in social science was made a big issue in the field of bourgeois social science,
and when Weber raised the problem of causality peculiar to social science in the
'Objectivity of Perception of Social Science and Social Policy', the fact that Bukha­
rin kept himself away from the problems raised by Weber and consequently the
attempt to make this problem retrogress back to the stage prior to Weber cannot be
free from criticism."31) In this connection Lukács made no direct objection to
Bukharin, but if it is grasped that the cognitive entity participates in historical
reality and that objective actualities move on account of self-contradictions, it is
impossible to grasp it monistically merely by the single law of natural cause and
effect. Particularly when the dialectic of the identity of consciousness and existence,
and subject and object are linked together with the dialectic of totality which intends

to explain the relationship between totality and partiality, there is no way left for
teleology but to concern itself with the theory of causality. "If any study is to be
pursued in a concrete way, it should concern itself with society, because it is not
until society as one whole totality is concerned that the impulsive consciousness of
man who is cognitive of his own existence at every moment can be substantially
prescribed to the fullest extent."32) In other words when the entity of action
concerns itself consciously with the whole process of society, individual conduct or
reality inevitably can not help concerning itself with the trend of development of
society as whole or the ultimate purpose of society. In this way it is only when
an individual actuality in the category of totality is appraised as a medium of histori­
cal growth that it can have any meaning. "It is not until speculation comes to
manifest itself in the form of reality or as a medium in the total process that it can
overcome its own inflexibility dialectically and can be attributed with the nature
of growth. In the meantime what is meant by growth is to serve as a medium
between past and future. ...... The concrete "here" and "now" which may pass
away in the process, even if it may be an instant that may pass away, can be an
opportunity to provide a very deep and extensive mediator to produce something
new."33)

III Combined Labour and Cooperative Consciousness

It is not reasonable to say that there is no problem in the way Lukács put his
ideas into shape merely on the grounds that Lukács denigrated materialism based
on natural science as maintained by Bukharin and criticised the objectivism which
found its way into the III International as pseudo-objectivism. Although it is
true that Lukács certainly intended to accept the idea of the active part to be played
by consciousness in Marxism in the past and that by doing so consciousness to pave
a road to the future was cleverly conceived, his dialectic based on identity of specu­
lation and existence or the relationship between subjective and objective entity that
was brought forth only to overcome simple objectivism was of an extremely deter­
ministic nature as far as the problem of the bearer of this consciousness and the
structure of its existence were concerned34). The first problem to begin with in
this connection is the fact that Lukács, by dividing this consciousness into individual­
and class-consciousness, raised sharp criticism of his own presumption that individual
consciousness is bourgeois consciousness. It can be seen that this view comes to a
rupture with existentialism, which accepts the idea of the role of consciousness in the
same way, and for that reason existentialists in turn look upon Lukács as being

32) G. Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, SS. 61-62.
33) G. Lukács, a.a.O., S. 223.
34) L. Goldmann, Sciences et philosophie, 1952.
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prejudiced with objectivism. What we should solve is not only concerned with how to clear a path from class to individual but also to open a path from class to individual. The author intends to further discuss this problematical question of today's Marxism at some other opportunity.

The second problem lies in the epistemological way through which Lukács, by prescribing that class-consciousness is determined by "the form of position occupied in the process of production", grasped class-consciousness. Undoubtedly Lukács attitude is based on a footing of conduct or action on the one hand. However, on the other, once consciousness is taken up it is interpreted as a mere reflection of the structure of objective existence and the relationship between cognition and conduct is unified by the Hegelian concept of cognition. According to this idea the "dialectic to produce history" is found retreating and the "dialectic to grasp history" is found advancing forward. For that reason if consciousness were to perceive existence properly, it would appear as if revolution might be possible. It is all because the structure of existence is grasped in the form of consciousness that it would ultimately lead to the formation of the system of an idea that is locked up by the identity of consciousness and existence. In short, this idea would say that the very process through which proletarian consciousness might logically pursue its once denied or alienated state would become identical with the process of revolution, which is an idea of the same kind asserted in the Logic of Self-Consciousness by Prof. Kakehashi. When the entity of revolution is sought in consciousness, subjective radicalism is produced, and when it is sought in the existence of the proletariat or the spontaneity of an objective form of production, opportunism is produced.

When Lukács ascribes the identity of consciousness and existence to the consciousness of the proletariat, it is necessary that a further question should be raised as to the structure of such class-consciousness. In this case it is impossible for us to grasp consciousness as something living and existence as something dead. Viewed from the standpoint of conduct or action, existence in the form of history must also be something to gain upon consciousness. Furthermore, since class-consciousness in itself is something prescribed by the structure of actual proletarian

36) This represents the significance of "Kakehashi's Economic Philosophy" a discussion of which was given in an other paper, referring to the meanings of Prof. Kakehashi's "System of Economic Philosophy", one of the most painstaking original works in the field of economic philosophy in this country: Ritsumeikan University Economics, Vol XI, No. 5 & 6, February 1963. However, according to Prof. Kakehashi, since the 'dialectic to grasp history' is advanced forward, as in the case of Lukács, the entity of being self-conscious had to be taken as a conscious activity of life. Accordingly, since the way Prof. Kakehashi grasps "parallel existence" is one-sided, the process of labour which should be a conscious activity of life has never been grasped in a concrete shape and it could not but lead to the "Theory of Petty-Bourgeois Self-Consciousness". What supports this "Theory of Self-Consciousness" is considered by the author to be "Combined Labour": Adam Schaff, ibid., p. 148.
existence, it is once again necessary to consider the problem of class-consciousness in contract to the process of production. In short the realistic foundation of "the identity of existence and consciousness" must by all means be solved. In this case the relationship to production (or man) brought about in the process of physical metabolism between man and nature should be the foundation for class-consciousness. In this sense we are obliged to go back to the category of parallel existence in terms of the production-process of Marx, and therein lies, I think, the link combining the *Economic-philosophical Manuscripts* with *German Ideology*. It can be said that the string to tie the early and later stages of Marx together can also be found there. Moreover, the foundation of the realistic existence of Lukács' class-consciousness can be brought to light by this idea of combined labour. In this connection it was Bukharin who underlined the significance of this basic principle of combined labour in capitalist society, though only in the limited sense of productive power. It is noteworthy that this category had been drawn from *Capital* in those days when *German Ideology* had not yet been published to make it the foundation of 'something social', and it can also be easily seen that there would be no other way to break through Lukács' idea of class-consciousness unless such a category of some social relationship based on the principle of such combined labour should be taken up.

Bukharin, contrariwise to Lukács, conceived on the other side of consciousness and still on the farther side of collective consciousness one realistic totality which was composed of the constant mutual interactions of the individual elements of society. It is, so to speak, some objective and spontaneous process of history which is unpercievable and unorganisable. It has definitely the nature of objectivism in the sense that the structure of existence on the rear side of Lukács' class-consciousness is questioned. "As far as there exists one sphere of constant mutual interaction, there should exist one specific system, or one specific realistic totality. And a society ought to be neither more or less than a system composed of the most extensive mutual interaction which includes all ever-lasting interaction taking place among men."\(^{37}\) The idea of such interaction was drawn from Plekhanov's understanding of both Hegel and Bukharin, recognizing the lawfulness peculiar to the social process in such interaction, called the "Condition of Social Equilibrium". Then, what can that—a condition peculiar to the social process, or in other words the foundation by which a society can be distinguished from another system—be? According to Bukharin, the original from of human social relationships is assumed to be the combined labour of men. "The condition of Equilibrium for a whole system is the combined labour of men which may particularly be called social labour or which may be, either consciously or unconsciously, called mutual human labour."\(^{38}\)


The reason why combined labour is regarded as a “fundamental social combination” is because society draws up energies from nature by means of such combined labour and maintains its existence, and it is not simply because “the process of social reproduction” becomes possible. This combination provides society with a productive power which cannot be materialised by individuals alone. In this connection the following quotation from Marx’s *Capital* may be given here, which says that “the effect of the combined labour could either not be produced by isolated individual labour, or it could only be produced by a great expenditure of time, or on a very dwarfed scale. Not only have we here an increase in the productive power of the individual, by means of co-operation, but the creation of a new power, namely, the collective power of masses.”

It was accepted by Bukharin that this combined labour is the carrier of the twice as strong as individual productive power. Furthermore, it is within this labour in copartnership that an individual can free himself from physical limitation to produce a new dynamic power. “The social combination by itself provides an individual man with a new power.”

The characteristic of Marxism in this sense lies in that it has established a road from society or a collective body to the individual, the converse of which can never be true. Needless to say generally speaking Bukharin did grasp this idea of social combination with emphasis on productivity, but should this productivity be disregarded, Marxism might substantially be conceived just from the same point of view that used to be held by visionary socialism or romantic alienationism. Furthermore, if the point that this collective power is presumed to constitute an actual foundation of class-consciousness should be put out of mind, the motive power to overcome alienation would have to be searched for in subjectivity—consciousness or alienationism. If true, it would become impossible to free the proletariat to actuality only through the mere realisation of alienationism, and this result would naturally lead to criticism of bourgeois ideology such as Lukács made, or to following up reminiscences of the logical process of alienation as Prof. Kakehashi did. It is true that the sense of alienation or the practical intuition of alienation may make a good springboard for action or enforcement, but mere thinking or speculation in itself can not materialise or actualise any revolution. The author is of the opinion that the realistic foundation of the “dialectic to produce history” and “dialectic to grasp history” should not be based on a consciousness which might be regarded as mere “parallel substance”. It should be something conscious and simultaneously something to exist—“parallel substance” which should exist in the process of production or labour—and I think, in other words it would mean “combined labour”. It can also be seen

that this idea could make the logic of objective possibility peculiar to Lukács more realistic in this way.

Then, it follows that the “combined labour” maintained by Bukharin must have a different meaning. In particular combined labour as conceived by Bukharin is the motive power of productivity of an objective society which is set up in opposition to human beings, and it is in itself something natural and material. It is something to be formed consciously or unconsciously and in this sense it is something having the nature of objectivism and something having natural and physical qualities. Nevertheless, when this category is placed on the side of the entity of revolution, it undergoes a complete change of meaning. The reason is because it is considered, according to Marxism, that the category of this combined labour or joint labour is not only regarded as a foundation for productive power or the relationship of production in a spontaneously produced society, but is also assumed to be a parent body to produce collective consciousness or cooperative consciousness exuviated from individuality. Putting it in reverse, the essential qualities of this social consciousness are conceived in the process of labour in the field in which combined labour operates, and capitalist society is, indeed, a society in which such consciousness is to come in to existence. It is not only a carrier of productive power but is also the consciousness driving revolution in practice and its material power. The process of labour is a field where productive power is being materialised and at the same time a field where consciousness of the entity of revolution is being formed. Unless viewed in this way, Capital would mean nothing more than the mere recognition of laws of objective movements of capitalist society and could not have any significance as a logical formation of the entity of revolution. It is not until such an assertion is made that the significance of the inconsistency arising out of the relationship of production, disclosing how badly collective power or combined labour is distorted under private ownership, can be brought to light. The author intends to make a further study of the class-consciousness brought out by Lukács, digging still further down to the category of “combined labour” which is presumably a foundation of realism and existentialism. By doing so it is hoped that the link to connect the theory of consciousness and theory of organisation together might be elucidated.