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Kyoto University
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I Introduction

Marx wrote in the "introductory remarks" to his "Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" a list of eight categories "as a point to be discussed here and also as a point to be kept in mind", of which the fifth category runs as follows:

The "dialectic of the two concepts "productive powers" (means of production) and "relations of production" is a dialectic for determining their limitations, and yet one which in reality does not remove the distinction). It is by no means an easy task to understand the meaning of this brief sentence. Not a few people, I think, would simply laugh it off when the dialectic with respect to productive powers and the relations of production should happen to become a topic of discussion, by saying that every one nowadays has the opinion that it is simply a matter requir-
ing no further explanation if seen from the aspect of the common sense-view of the theory of the materialistic interpretation of history, and that it only shows how foolish it would be to go through all the trouble of taking up such problems these days after so long a time. Nevertheless, I can't help thinking that the logical structure between these two concepts has not yet been clarified completely and sufficiently. As far as my knowledge is concerned, Mr. Kichiroku Tanaka has a most thorough-going understanding with regard to one phase of logic which I shall discuss in this paper, and I have been grateful to him for helpful advice and instruction. Yet I can't think that all the relationships between productive powers and the relations of production could be fully explained in the light of Mr. Tanaka's understanding. Needless to say, I don't dare to say that I can give a complete answer to this problem myself, but what I want to try to do is to demonstrate my way of approaching the problem for a start, and then to suggest that the logic pertaining to the relationships between productive powers and the relations of production naturally leads to ultimately having some connection with other fundamental problems of political economy.

II How to Grasp Dialectical Reasoning

The way of thinking of Marxian economics is characterized by the dialectical way of thinking. However, although such a particular way of thinking seems to be something firmly established as far as diction is concerned, it is in reality no more than "so many men, so many minds", or "every man having his own way". It is not rare occasion that among certain people a certain way of thinking which can by no means be regarded as dialectical thinking is pretended to be dialectical thinking. Before further proceeding to take up the problems arising out of the correlations between productive powers and the relations of production in this paper it would be suitable for me and convenient for the readers to define, first of all, what I want to call a dialectical structure, because it would help readers to understand my view and also because it would be a natural course to ask for criticism. Therefore, I would like to give my own view on this particular point, before I take up the main issue of the problem.

In the first place, when dialectical logic is to be defined, we have two ways. One of the two is called the "identity of things in opposition"

For example, reference can be made to the “Note on Philosophy” by Lenin, in which he made the following statement: “In short the dialectic can be defined as “a theory concerned with the identity of things in opposition” 6). In the second place, when the logical structure of the dialectic is talked about, three specific categories “These-Antithese-Synthese” or “Affirmation-Negation-Negation of Negation”, — are taken into consideration where the structure of this logic is shown in the form of a “Triade” or “Triplicity”.

It was Mr. Sozo Kitagawa who fully discussed “which one of these two definitions was right” 4). At that time the original word ‘Einheit’, was expressed as ‘unification’ by him in conformity with the prevailing practice of those days, and he drew the conclusion that the first type of definition was right.

I also agree with Kitagawa’s view, but I can’t agree with his idea that these two different ways of thinking mutually exclude each other. I am of the opinion that it should, rather, be considered that these two different ways of thinking are the results of two different definitions of the structure of the dialectic advanced from two different angles, and that the way of approach of the first type would be more basic or original than the other. Generally speaking, the dialectical logic is a generalized concept used to substantiate the universal structure of historical realities, and an attempt to express that universal structure in a straightforward manner naturally leads to the concept of the “identity of things in opposition”. But, just because realities are inherently of a historical nature, it becomes essential to express this structure in a dynamic manner. In doing so, the dialectical logic comes to be expressed in the form of Triplicity. Therefore, it is correct to say that the structure of dialectical logic is fundamentally shown in the form of the “identity of things in opposition”, and consequently the second definition may be thought of as its corollary 5). Then, it would not be entirely adequate to consider that the two different definitions mentioned above are in opposition to each other. However, if we should choose the more original definition of these two, it should be the “identity of things in opposition” 3).


6) The logic of the “Self-identity of Absolute Contradiction” maintained by Kitaro Nishida can also be counted as one definition of the dialectic, though it is often disliked by Marxian economists. All such terms as things in opposition, absolute contradiction, self-identity and unification appear to me to denote one and the same state of things.
Now, we should consider some twofold problems: one is what is meant by "things in opposition" and the other is "identity."

(1) Opposition or Things in Opposition

The terms "opposition" or "things in opposition" are the ordinary translations of the word "Gegensatze". What do these words mean in dialectical logic?

Generally speaking, there exist different kinds of opposition. What we are going to discuss now is the three kinds of opposition. The first is contrary opposition. For example, it is the opposition of the colour red against the colour white. Although opposition of this kind may so occur that opposition in sports might of necessity result in having different colours for rooters' pennants, it is after all opposition in the form of a difference in colour. As we can conceive a colour field in the background of the opposition of red against white, this kind of opposition exists as the two extremities in this field. And there can exist a variety of intermediate points between the two extremities. In other words, there exists the extremity of red on the one side, and the extremity of white on the other: between these two extremities there exist miscellaneous intermediate colours such as pink, crimson, etc. etc. Those other miscellaneous tones of colour are all no more than mixtures of the two extremities, and we can say that the colours nearer red are composed both of the affirmation of red and the negation of white, and, contrariwise, that the colours nearer white are composed both of the affirmation of white and the negation of red. Again, north-contra-south, east-contra-west, right-contra-left, up-contra-down, etc. are examples of contrary opposition, but they all represent a kind of opposition which is only possible under a certain condition. For example, a particular place which is located to the north of a given place comes to be to the south when viewed from a place located further north than it, and likewise a particular direction to be thought of as the right side comes to be the direction facing toward left side when one turns his body round. So, contrary opposition is a relative opposition. And when we widen our field of vision, or change the position of our body or enlarge our consciousness, the opposition ceases to exist. For this reason, this opposition is an abstract kind of opposition.

7) My view, with respect to the way of thinking of dialectical logic is given in my "Current Thoughts on the History of Economics", Japanese ed., 1968, p.25. My writing there was very briefly made as a footnote with the intention of only helping easier understanding of the meanings of the wording 'unification of affirmation and negation', but I don't think that it was noted by many readers. That is why I want to further discuss here how to grasp the meaning of identity of affirmation and negation.
The second kind of opposition is *contradictory opposition*. Such opposition is caused by the competition between two extremities in opposing each other: if one of them can stand, the other is forced to fall; only one of the two extremities can maintain its existence. Opposition of this kind is characterized by the two extremities rejecting each other, negating each other not partially but totally, and having no room to be generous enough to acknowledge and affirm the opponent. It will give help for easier understanding if a game is taken as an example. The saying of "A serpent-and-tiger fight" well illustrates an immutably strict rule in the sporting world: a drawn game or a tie being nothing but an improvised disposal for convenience' sake to keep playing games. Just because of the lack of mutual acknowledgement of common ground on which each of them can co-exist, this kind of opposition is deeper than contrary opposition.

Nevertheless, upon thinking the matter over, we find that the second kind of opposition ceases to exist on some occasions. Two wrestlers who fought to the finish in the ring will drink in a happy mood at a congratulatory banquet. Those players who played hard and were encouraged by the roaring cheers of the supporting spectators might praise the good effort of the opposite party by cheering each other. Contradictory opposition too is brought forth only under certain conditions and this kind of opposition also ceases to exist under another conditions. When viewed in this way, contradictory opposition is also of a relative kind.

Ordinarily, when the contradictions in a particular society are talked about, contradictory opposition of this kind is often talked about. When one notices varied kinds of opposition, arising out of the structure or movements of a society many people think that those kinds of opposition in general are of the specific kind of contradictory opposition. When an effort is made to grasp the structure or movements of a society logically, it is true that what has been manifested only vaguely will become clear if the eyes are focussed on "the things in opposition". We can understand the structure through the concept of the "correlations of opposition" or "relations of opposition", and social reality will be disposed of through the "logic of opposition". But in order to do so it becomes necessary for us to further consider the nature of "opposition". And we must know that there does exist another kind of opposition.

By opposition of a third kind we mean such opposition as exists under special conditions where the contradictory opposition of two extremities is negated. By special conditions we mean that the two extremities of contradictory opposition are mutually in need of the existence of the other. In spite of all this, the reason why it is said that "they are opposed
to each other" lies in the fact that they mutually reject each other, each of them treating the other as a nuisance. Furthermore they are in a state where the affirmative relationship and the negative relationship are substantially combined together or are not separated from each other. And opposition of this kind is not relative opposition but absolute opposition. Such opposition is dialectical opposition.

The present writer has made a statement in a foot note given in my "Current Thoughts on the History of Economics" saying that "dialectical opposition in the real sense of the word means a particular kind of contradiction which is given rise to only under such conditions where two propositions, such as "A is B" and "A is not B", could substantially exist simultaneously, and furthermore where one of them could be conditioned by the other". My description in this paper is given with the emphasis placed on "opposition". If readers try to read A or B in the above mentioned sentence as two "extremities", it will help them to understand that the description mentioned in this paper and the foot note mentioned were written to demonstrate one and the same thing.

I had an opportunity this year to read a book entitled "Dialectical Opposition — Forms and Functions" (1964) written by Gottfried Stiehler in the German Democratic Republic. I found that the direction of approach which I had been trying to make for a long time in the past was also taken up by a presumably young scholar. He is a scholar of Hegelian philosophy and a German researcher of the theory of the materialistic interpretation of history, and particularly a man with a mind devoted to the study of the logical structure of ideas such as contradiction and opposition. Although it can't be said that the contents of his book

9) Given here is a list of works by the author Gottfried Stiehler, arranged in calendar sequence: a) Hegel und der Marxismus über den Widerspruch, 1960; b) Beiträge zur Geschichte des vormarxistischen Materialismus, hrsg. von G. Stiehler, 1961. In this book are compiled varied studies of prominent representatives of German materialism and religious criticism during the 17th-18th centuries, which are written by six authors, including Stiehler, being composed of the introduction and studies on five thinkers, such as the atheist in Magdeburg, Gabriel Wagner, Friedrich Wilhelm Stosch, Theodor Ludwig Lau and August von Einseidel; c) Die Dialektik in Hegals, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1964; d) Der dialektische Widerspruch, Formen und Funktionen, 1966. It was in the late autumn of 1963 that I wrote my opinion about dialectical opposition as a foot note to my essay previously referred to. Therefore, Stiehler's book shown as the first item in the above list had already been made public and the book was available at our Library of Faculty of Economics of Kyoto University. But I didn't know of the existence of this book until recently and it was this year that I read the book listed last. It was noted in the introduction to his first book that Stiehler had already made a statement that the problem of dialectic contradictions constitutes the peculiar nuclei of the dialectic, (G. Stiehler, Hegel und der Marxismus usw., S.8.) It was also found that when he began to explain this contradiction in his "dialectical contradiction", he expounded his description exactly in the same order as I did in
are totally filled with novelty and originality or that his research is of the first grade, because something of the remnants of the old principle of authoritarianism based on Stalinism are found here and there, we can at the same time find not a few opinions worthy of note for reference' sake. Now, in this connection by introducing some of his ideas for one thing and by showing my view which I have had for a long time for another, I want to demonstrate what I have been maintaining to be the structure of dialectical logic.

According to G. Stiehler, the distinction between contradictory negation and dialectical negation is made clear in the following way:

".... In other words things or phenomena are after all divided or separated into two classes in the case of contradictory negation — (for example labourers and non-labourers). The fact that these classes stand in opposition is restricted on the basis of a certain indication which shows that class A', which is a supplementary class to class A lacks some substantial characteristics of class A. These two classes are mutually connected together only by negation or by mutual rejection. On the contrary, in the case of dialectical negation, negation and affirmation are inseparably combined. The phenomena of negation and affirmation are mutually combined solidly together by the instrumentality of a given objective systematised relationship (Beziehungssystem) — (for example a close tie between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie through the instrumentality of the means of capitalistic production). Therefore as far as these particular phenomena of affirmation and negation constitute essential factors to build up a systematic relationship such as the means of capitalistic production, they are essentially in accord with each other. It is true that my short writings given above and also in this paper, which might seemingly appear to be a strange coincidence, But I am inclined to think that it was because we were grasping, hand in hand, the structure of the plurality of contradiction itself, rather than to think that it was a mere coincidence.

According to his writings in the "Dialectic in 'Mental Phenomenology' of Hegel", the subject matter of his study is described as follows: "Such efforts as to make a further study more closely of this problem — the role of things in opposition as an element to prescribe the substantial qualities of things — have not been completed even in the voluminous literature concerned with Marxism. What gives rise to a problem under such circumstances is not only the state of things seen from the point of views of existentialism but also the state of things seen from that of epistemology. Generally speaking, if things or phenomena are to be prescribed in some way or other as extremes of certain relationships of opposition (Gegensatzeibhältnisse), and if such a prescription must be the final form of the substantial nature of things or phenomena, then it must also be clear enough that this study ought to play an important role in the particular purpose of the ideological grasping of reality. (Ibid., pp. 77-78.) I am inclined to agree totally with this opinion. In the meantime, when I come across his passage, stating that "the relationship of opposition is one of the most fundamental and the most basic forms" of all correlations of the inherent order of reality, I think that it is a very bold declaration. (Ibid., p. 50.)
they are distinguished by essential characteristics, but at the same time they coincide with each other. Then, the inner contradiction of the two extremities are produced or realised by dialectical negation.\(^{10}\)

These complex relationships between two extremes can be expressed as “dialectical opposition”, but besides this we have many other ways of saying it. Discord (Zwietracht, Nichtübereinstimmung), conflict (Konflikt, Widerstreit), tension (Spannung), mutual exclusion (Sich-Ausschliessen), antagonism (Antagonismus), dissension (Entzweiung), polarization (Polarisation), Disproportion (Disproportion) — these are various expressions of the many phases of dialectical opposition.

(2) Identity or Unity

I have said above of dialectical opposition that it is opposition “under a special state of affairs where the contradictory opposition of two extremities is negated”. This statement means that one extremity mutually depends on the other extremity as the essential condition for its own existence, and thus co-exists in an inseparable state. Hegel changed the wording ‘identity’ into ‘inseparable state’ (Ungetrenntheit) and Lenin, remarking on this term, wrote that such wording is much better than the term ‘unity’ (Einheit)\(^{11}\). The present writer hopes, taking special note of this fact, that superficial understanding resulting from the term “unity” or “unification” could be done away with.

The concept of “unification” has been used widely in ordinary cases. In these cases, it seems that the opposition of two chances is considered to dissolve into each other by uniting themselves together, so that harmony and peace may be produced in a newly developed entity. Again, since unitifying will suggest some practical function, such as controlling or supervising, it is very likely that the use of this term is to be welcomed from the standpoint that dialectical logic has a necessary connection with man’s practical actions. Similarly, when the word “synthesis” was used, one couldn’t be free from this trend of thinking.

Now, when we ask whether there is any expression in use other than “unification”, the answer is “No”. Going back to the classics of Hegel, we can find such expressions as “inseparateness” (Ungetrenntheit), “inseparability” (Un trennbarkeit), “self identity” (Sichselbsgleichheit), “identity” (Identität), etc. and Lenin said that “inseparability” is better than “unification” as mentioned before. In addition, the correlations between two chances are sufficiently well expressed by terms such as “mutual produc-

\(^{10}\) G. Stiehler, *Der dialektische Widerspruch*, S. 25. As to the meanings of “Relationships of Opposition” in this quotation, see what follows.

tion" (Sich-Bedingen). Other terms such as "compromise" (Versöhnung), "concurrence" (Übereinstimmung), "parallel" (Parallelität), "balanced state" (Gleichgewichtszustand), etc. also serve the purpose of communicating the content of these affairs, though with the constant risk of giving rise to misunderstanding.

What counts is that the oppositional existence of two extremities provides the essential condition for each of them to exist. It might as well be termed "mutual dependency", but this is not always an adequate expression, because it is likely to imply the existence of some causal relations between the two extremities. Between two extremities there exists in truth a relationship of simultaneous existence prior to a causal relationship. This relation is primarily an ontological relationship, from which an epistemological relationship arises.

(3) Identity of Things in Opposition

All that was discussed in the foregoing section so far was given in the form of two separate items merely because of my intention of providing an easier understanding of the meanings of the "identity of things in opposition", which shows the structure of dialectical logic: "one entity to be conceived as being two and two entities as one". However, mere analytical thinking in such a manner would only serve to drive understanding of the real structure further and further away. Contrariwise, the mere attempt to grasp two chances synthetically wouldn't serve to grasp the actual state of things. When one's eyes are directed only to one phase of opposition, a peaceful state of identity is lost sight of, and when it is attempted to grasp the whole from the phase of identity, there is no grasping of opposition. Such an idea with respect to the state of two things conceived as one, and the state of one thing conceived as two, is as a matter of fact two phases of one state of things. But when we intend to explain it, we are obliged to take up either one of the two phases to begin with. We are thus led to understand that both of these explanations are in reality none other than a different explanation of dialectical structure.

In this connection I would like to make one more comment about one important point. When dialectical identity is spoken about in an ordinary case, on many occasions it is often considered that a state of things in which there exists a "reciprocal interaction" (Wechselwirkung) between two mutually opposed extremities is called a case of identity, but it must be said that such a way of thinking is far from a complete grasping of the real state of things.

It is quite adequate reasoning to consider dialectical logic under the guidance of Spinoza, who maintained that logical determinations are "negation".
Those who might have the idea that an action of negation arising from one chance on the one side would give rise to another negation in the reverse direction from the opposing chance on the other side, whereby the simultaneous acknowledgement of these two courses of negation would mean the "negation of negation", and that all this should be the state of things which could be expressed in terms of so called unification or synthesis, are likely be led to consider that the very state of things characterized by "reciprocity" would be no more than a unified state of those interactions. Nevertheless, it is impossible to talk about "the identity of things in opposition" only through the category of "reciprocity".

Why is this so? Well, what we can see in "reciprocity" is a kind of circular movement or, if stated more precisely, a number of circular movements, each of which respectively moves in a reverse direction. These movements, indeed, are important and certainly essential to the structure of dialectical logic. However, is it not also true that there is a state of mutual reliance which is a manifested form of the negation of such reciprocity in a state of "identity of things in opposition"? Now, commenting a little on the wording "mutual reliance" used here, it must be noted that each of the two chances is respectively characterized by its rejection of the other of its own accord. And we may with confidence say that the dialectical structure or framework is applied when it is intended to grasp a contradictory self-identity as a whole. Therefore, it follows that those who might have the idea that the logical structure of the dialectic can be demonstrated through the category of reciprocity must have no knowledge of the existence of another factor about things in opposition. An opposition or contradiction in the field of the dialectic is of a very complex nature. It is composed of duplicated oppositions, where one contradictory opposition may involve within itself another contradictory opposition.

Another type of thinking with respect to the logic of the dialectic which seems to me to be quite popular holds that the logic of the dialectic is none other than an ideological sublimation of a practical relationship between subject and object. I would like to express my personal view about this.

It is right to say that the dialectic is a logical cognition of human practical activities. Consequently, if the subject who enforces some action and the object with which the negotiation is being made are compared to two extremities, and their mutual reciprocal actions are to be acknowledge.
ledged and the relationships thus given rise therein in the form of "to make" and "to be made" are logically put in order from the standpoint of cognition, then it can be said that we can see the logic of the dialectic lying right there. Because the reciprocal actions of these two extremities make the object itself on the basis of the cognitive activities of the subject and as a result the dynamic historical process can be brought to light, it can also be said that something worthy of the name of the logic of history may be obtainable from such an idea.

However, one point about which we must be very cautious is that the subject and the object are both kept separate at the beginning, and that the logical reflection is made from the point where the practical negotiation is started. And because it is maintained that the object is to be prescribed by the influence of the action initiated by the subject and at the same time that its reverse is also to be caused and that as a result reciprocity appears, there are fears that the particular phases of artificial "unification" and "synthesis" rather than "identity" are likely to be exaggerated and on the contrary that the particular phase of "indivisibility" of the subject from the object or "identity" is likely to be disregarded and that as a result such a way of thinking is likely to form the idea that the subject and the object can exist even without having any negotiation between them. If such an idea were to be formed, it would become impossible to assert that the dialectical structure has really been cognized, because such an idea is strictly concerned only with a theory of practice at the common sense level. Yet there are, as a matter of fact, a fairly great number of examples in which such a theory of practice at the common sense level has been applied to make assertions as if they were dialectical thinking. This is no way to make a correct elucidation of the dialectic or to improve the dialectical contemplations of such people. We must begin to think from the original linking of the subject and the object.

So much for my view about the "identity of things in opposition".

(4) Relationships arising out of Opposition

It is G. Stiehler, to whom I previously referred, who has attempted to explain the structure of the "identity of things in opposition" through such concepts as "the relationships arising out of opposition" (Gegensatzbeziehung) or "correlations of polarization" (Polaritätsverhältnis) by observing things in opposition and to make it a basic concept for grasping reality. According to him, "the relationships arising out of opposition are substantial component factors for all human affairs. From the view that the human world is nothing but the practice of human beings, all relationships between man and reality come to be represented as the
correlations of polarization"\textsuperscript{13}. According to his assertion, during the 17th and 18th centuries the thought of causal correlations showed the mechanism of changes of things, and in the 19th century such new thoughts as "relationships of opposition" or "correlations of polarization" came to be formed, particularly by the philosophers of German idealism, and he maintains that the train of these new thoughts would be sufficient to elucidate the logical structure of society and history.

I don't think that it would be suitable to go into a thorough discussion here with respect to the extent of theoretical adequateness of the "correlations of polarization" and the effectiveness of this as a basic principle for explaining history and society. But I must take up the following points.

Up to the present it has been held even in the field of practical and experimental sciences such as economics, being influenced by classical scientific theories, that the principal subject matter of cognition is the pursuit of causality. For that reason, to tell the truth, unjustifiableness in the field of epistemology has been brought in and as a result not a few improvised countermeasures have been adopted in various manners. In the field of theoretical cognition it has been held on some occasions that the laws in social sciences, being different from the laws in natural sciences, should be "laws of tendency", and particularly in the field of cognition based on practicalism such unjustifiableness has grown to a conspicuously greater extent, thus being led into difficulty in explaining the relationship and harmony between the causative theory and practical teleology. For example, according to such a way of thinking it will suffice to take up Max Weber's theory of "freedom of valuation". When viewed as a cognition of practical science, it has gone beyond the self-restriction of cognition, and passed to agnosticism.

Also in economic theory some go as far as to argue, being stimulated by the latest achievements of natural science, that the law of economics should not be the law of causality in the strict sense of the word but the law of probability. As to what this means it gives rise to a question requiring further study, but at any rate we may say that the days when the classical concept of law in the field of social sciences used to play its part to the fullest extent are now passing away. Still more, even if the law of causality were to be modified, its intrinsic nature could never be clarified in the field of cognition based on the viewpoint of practicalism. As to epistemology in this field, I think that theories of

\textsuperscript{13}) Stiehler, \textit{ibid.}, S. 47.
a much more revolutionary nature should be further developed\textsuperscript{14}.

Under such circumstance I can’t help thinking that the particular way of thinking through which the structure of history or society is to be grasped dialectically through the category of “correlations of polarization” would promise remarkable developments in the future. But at present I shall have to put off discussing these views to some other opportunity.

III Relationships between Productive Powers and Relations of Production

(1) The Way of Thinking in the Past

It was Karl Marx who formed the idea of the basic structure of a society which was conceived by grasping two states of affairs such as productive powers and relations of production unificatively as a mode of production by including various forms of transportation therein, and by applying his concept of the economic structure or system of society. About this, there would be no need of explanation. I also acknowledge that a pursuit as to how this train of Marxian thought came to be formed is really a worthwhile study. In this connection I would like first to scrutinize with respect to a few points the ways in which the relationships between the two concepts mentioned have been understood by many foreign and domestic Marxists and Marxian economists, and next to try to demonstrate a different way of thinking about the relationships between those two concepts based on a correct way of grasping the structure of dialectical logic which was discussed in the preceding section of this paper. Before going into the discussion of the main subject of this paper, I went into the preceding section a long and abstract discussion. But I think that only with such a preparatory discussion would it be possible for a reader to understand my contention.

Now, under the title of “Form of Value” (in Chapter 1, Paragraph 3 of Volume I of “Capital”) Marx made the following statement: the relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, they are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes—i.e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively to the two different commodities brought into relation by that expression\textsuperscript{15}.

This statement is given in an explanation of the expression of value,

\textsuperscript{14} It is meant here to further consider a society and its history based on such a fundamental structure as the “relationships of opposition” or “correlations of polarization”.

\textsuperscript{15}
and it must be specially noted how excellently the notion of "identity of things in opposition" is described. It is a most precise narration of the real aspect of dialectical opposition between the forms of relative value and the forms of equivalent value. There are many who will understand the meanings of the latter half of this description, but few have a sufficient understanding of the meaning of the first half. Consequently, the very inevitability of the linking of the two forms of value into a close relationship with each other—though the kind of goods which happen to be the two extremities are of an accidental nature—is more likely to become hard to apprehend sufficiently and as a result this situation leads to overcognition of the factor of opposition. It is not until both the idea of the inseparability in the first half and the idea of the contradictory opposition in the latter half are grasped that we can have a clear understanding of the social meaning of gold. Gold as a form of money is, on the one hand, unification of value in use and value in exchange, and on the other hand, a fetish which is a product of labour and has a special natural form. Otherwise, the particular meaning that money, consequently gold, is only a social expression cannot be fully understood, and as a result it leads to a purely technical interpretation, which regards gold as nothing but a convenient means of exchange, thus giving rise to the everpresent error that all the contradictions of capitalism could be solved if gold as money were to be replaced by something else.

The forms of relative value and equivalent value are expressions of the duality of labour—concrete useful labour and abstract human labour—in the forms of commodities. And if we are to think back further theoretically, the relationships between concrete useful labour and abstract human labour—which are also to be conceived in the relationships of dialectical opposition—should be argued by reducing them to the relationships of productive powers and relations of production.

Now, we can estimate how Marx's view of the relationships between productive powers and the relations of production should be interpreted. Marx included some discussion of them in the so-called "Formula of the Materialistic Interpretation of History" in the Foreword of "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" and also in his "Capital", he discussed them a little more concretely. However, he didn't develop his arguments about the entire relationship of the two concepts in so detailed and elaborate a manner as would give us a correct understanding of the two discussions, the former was too simply narrated to deal

completely with the problems involved therein, and in the latter the subject matter treated was concerned mainly with the theoretical inevitability of the decay of the capitalistic mode of production.

(2) Marx's Narration

I want to confirm Marx's view by selecting his most important descriptions.

It is in "Wage Labour and Capital" (1849) that the relationships of these two concepts were plainly narrated. In this work Marx said: — "Capital therefore presupposes wage labour; wage labour presupposes capital. They condition each other; each brings the other into existence," Marx says, "to say that the interests of capital and the interests of the workers are identical, signifies only this, that capital and wage-labour are two sides of one and the same relation. The one conditions the other in the same way that the usurer and the borrower condition each other." As is well-known, wage labour and capital are representations of productive powers and the relations of production in capitalist society. There, on the one hand, each of them mutually produces the other in such a particular manner that each of them presupposes the existence of the other for its own existence in an inseparable relationship and, on the other hand, both of them stand in mutual antagonism. Such a dialectical relationship, is superbly described here. What gives rise to a problem in this connection is "How should we interpret these two expressions?"

Marx also made the following statements in the same work. "The productive powers of labour is increased above all by a greater division of labour and by a more general introduction and constant improvement of machinery." "We thus see how the method of production and the means of production are constantly enlarged, revolutionised, how the division of labour necessarily grows after it into a greater division of labour, the employment of machinery into greater employment of machinery, work upon a large scale into work upon a still greater scale. This is the law that continually throws capitalist production out of its old ruts and compels capital to strain ever more the productive powers of labour for the very reason that it has already strained it—the law that grants it no respite, and constantly shouts in its ear: March! march!" What these words mean is, first, that productive powers appear as a

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result of the division of labour and, secondly, that though they always co-exist with the relations of production, it is the latter that always expedite production: in other words that the relations of production dominate productive powers. On the other hand we note that Marx further made the following statement in the "Summary of the Critique of Political Economy". "What we must bear in mind is that neither the newly developed productive powers nor the relations of production created out of nothing, nor produced in the air or out of self-producing ideas, but that they develop within and against the existing development of production and the old traditional relations of ownership." What is asserted here implies that the relationships of identity between productive powers and the relations of production are of a historical nature, and also that the relations may as well be replaced by the "various relations of ownership". Now, in this connection I must comment here on some arguments which might be expected to be raised against me. Since we know the statements given in the preface of "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", such as "various relationships of ownership which are nothing more than legal expressions of relations of production" some may contend that it is wrong to regard the various relationships of ownership in the same light as relations of production, though they may be the same in contents. To such an argument I would answer that it is not rare in some concepts of social science that, even under circumstances where the same expression is used, when used in a specific science, such a word is interpreted in a specific way which is somewhat different from the ordinary meaning of the word — for example, in the case of right and duty or value and interest. Therefore, I am of the opinion that there is nothing wrong in changing wording such as the relations of production into human relations which can be observed in a production process under a certain kind of ownership of the means of production.

Consequently, if productive powers and the relations of production are to be expressed from the angle of their social nature, they should be expressed as the division of labour and relations of ownership. By the division of labour is meant the state of the conditions of the function of human and physical productive powers, and by the relations of ownership the state of ownership of productive powers. These two states are two motives of productive powers which are not of such a nature that the division of labour must exist before the relations of ownership appear, or conversely

that unless the relation of ownership is first established, the division of labour does not come to be realized. Again, putting it inversely, they are not of such a nature that the relations of ownership come to be established where no division of labour exists or where the division of labour is given rise to before the relations of ownership come to be established. It would not be a correct way of understanding Marxian thought to think that the sequential order between the division of labour and the relations of ownership should be determined.

Now, let us turn our attention to the well-known wording with respect to the dynamic relationships between productive powers and the relations of production. "When a society reaches a certain stage of its development, the material productive powers of that society come to be contradicted by the then existing various relations of production, in which they used to operate or with the relations of ownership which are no more than legal expressions of those relations of production. These relations are destined to become their fetters after having been their developing agency. Then it becomes time for a social revolution .... " I fear that the above quoted expression might be likely to lead to an understanding of the contradictory opposition between productive powers and the relations of production instead an understanding of dialectical opposition. Isn't it true that such an incorrect understanding is fairly popular and widespread? I am inclined to think that such is the reason why Marxian thought is on many occasions erroneously cognized through the above mentioned incorrect understanding. And I dare say that Marx himself was to blame, partly because he used many analogies to illustrate his idea. A few examples may be given here:

In his "Summary of the Critique of Political Economy" he said, "When the well-off development of social individuals — in other words the historical development of productive powers which has been brought about by capital itself — reaches a certain point, it plays the role of checking the growth of capital itself instead of facilitating its development. When this point is passed the development of productive powers begins to become a restriction on capital. Correspondingly, the relations of capital come to restrict the development of the productive powers of labour. When this point is reached, capital or wage labour inevitably begins to turn in respect to the development of social wealth and productive powers into fetters which are destined to be thrown off.
Fessel notwendig abgestreift werden). . . . "23) And "fetters" is immediately changed by "eclysis (Abhüten)"

Next I would like to point out the following fact that the term relations of production is replaced by such terms as "integument" in those widely-known passages of Marx in which he gave a rough prediction of the future of world history in Chapter 25 of Volume I of "Capital"24). If one more example is demanded I also refer to the closing part of Chapter 51 of Book III of the same book. In those passages productive powers are expressed as the "material foundation of the labour process" and the relations of production as the "social form of production", about which the following statement is given:

To the extent that the labour process is solely a process between man and nature, its simple elements remain common to all social forms of development. But each specific historical form of this process further develops its material foundations and social forms. Whenever a certain stage of maturity has been reached, the specific historical form is discarded and makes way for a higher one. The moment of arrival of such a crisis is disclosed by the depth and breadth attained by the contradictions and antagonisms between the distribution relations, and thus the specific historical form of their corresponding relations of production on the one hand, and the productive forces, the productive powers and the development of their agencies, on the other hand. A conflict then arises between the material development of production and its social form25). When we read this passage, we are apt to think that productive powers are material concept, while relations of production are a social concept, or regard the former as the content, and the latter as the form. This way of thinking is a misunderstanding. Nevertheless I think that there might be no fear of causing such a misunderstanding, if we have grasped the true relationships between the two concepts as stated above.

(3) Varied Interpretations

Let us make a historical review of some of the outstanding aspects — foreign and Japanese — with respect to the relationships between productive powers and the relations of production. I will arrange these views in the calendar sequence of their publications.

I will examine Plekhanov's view to begin with. His mature thought can be seen in the "Fundamental Problems of Marxism" (1908). Generally

speaking, Plekhanov's view is in a sense simple. Because his materialistic interpretation of history is characterized by a marked tendency of French objectivist materialism, his view is more scientific than Hegel and Marx. For that reason he does not think about the positive role of the subjective entity in dialectical relationships. Therefore, I can't help contending that this tendency leaves no small room for criticism. But his view is soundly grounded and even at present his thought is worthy enough.

His views on the problems with which I am concerned primarily lie in the point that the development of the various powers of production depends on physical geographical conditions. Plekhanov's tendency towards geographical materialism has been frequently criticized. But he considers the diversities of nature and his materialism is more concrete than vulgar materialism which has only the uniformity of nature in view.

In this respect, I agree with him.

Plekhanov's view with respect to the relationships between the two concepts before mentioned is none other than "reciprocity", about which my criticism was previously given in the first section of this paper. His assertion is as follows:

"Now, we know that the development of productive powers which ultimately prescribe all social relations depends in itself upon the nature of physical geographical conditions. But certain social relations, once established, exert a very strong reaction in the development of productive powers. Therefore, what was originally a result becomes in turn a cause in itself. Among productive powers — its development and social orders — are brought forth reciprocal actions, and these actions take very different forms indeed at different times."

The point we must make a special note of in this connection is that the relations of ownership established at a certain stage of development of productive powers tend to facilitate the further development of such powers during a certain period of time, but, begin to retard its development when that period passes away. ......"

What "we must make a special note of in this connection" is the point that Plekhanov, who prescribed dialectical opposition as "reciprocity", drew a line of demarcation between the two specific periods in the historical development of economy and he regarded the former

26) G. Plekhanov, Die Grundprobleme des Marxismus, hrsg. von D. Rjazanov, Marxistische Bibliothek, Bd. 21, 19, S. 46-47. This text is the one translated from Russian version into German by Karl Schmucke. As a German version there is another text translated by M. Nachimson, which the author took the trouble to read through. This was published as the "autorisierte Uebersetzung" by Dietz of Stuttgart in 1910. I haven't compared them carefully in every point, but there is a difference in wording to some extent. My translation here is made from Rjazanov.

27) Ibid., S. 61.
period as days of development for productive powers and the latter period as days of retardation for them. I have no intention at all of saying that it is meaningless to divide economic organisations which are historically changing into two separate periods, but if viewed more closely, it is clear enough that since productive powers and the relations of production conceived in terms of dialectical opposition are also connected together in the relationship of "mutual reliance" then the development of the former is, always, being expedited at any stage of development. Taking capitalist economic organisations as an example, even when contradictory oppositions are growing severely, there are instances where productive powers keep developing, being expedited by capital, and their development is never totally retarded. If Plekhanov's words were read literally, such a state of things would not take place, but it is contrary to the established facts. It can be admitted that the contradictions between capital and labour are extremely severe these days in any capitalist country, and yet it would be wrong to say that such contradictions are so severe that no development of productive powers can be observed there. The progress of science and its applied uses are making such great strides even when a war is being fought that this must be one of the greatest representations of all social contradictions. Any theory that does not acknowledge these actual facts is abstract. But the only problematical point is that such development of productive powers under the specific current capitalist system is being actualized not for the benefit of human emancipation but for the advantage of capital, owing to the restraint on capital as originally contended by Marx, or rather that the result and development of productive powers is now making the state of human alienation more and more intensified, and also making the realization of primary human nature inflect in an unsound direction. In this sense I can conclude that Plekhanov is wrong in his way of understanding the changes in the relationships between the two concepts.

Nextly let us see the interpretation made by Tamizo Kushida (1883–1934). He wrote an article entitled "Relationships of Conditions in the Materialistic Interpretation of History" (about 1925)28). This treatise was written as a criticism of one of the writings by Hajime Kawakami (1879–1946): there Kushida called the relations of production "economic relations of a society arising out of the relationships of the division of labour and privately owned property", while he regarded productive powers as "socially applied natural powers, human powers and techniques". And he further went on to criticize Kawakami's wording such as "each is the cause of the other", contending that such a term as "cause" shouldn't be

used to denote such a relationship and that it should be described as “mutually mediating”. The above reveals that Kushida also regarded the relations of dialectical opposition as reciprocity. Nevertheless we should appreciate that both Kawakami and Kushida had an idea, though vaguely, that there exists something beyond the causal relations between the two concepts mentioned. In addition it must be particularly mentioned here that their attention was adequately directed toward the fact that productive powers is a “more dominant motive”, compared with the relations of production.

Kawakami who was criticized in this way by Kushida did not show any theoretical progress as far as our immediate problems are concerned. Since his most coherent writing is in fact a book entitled “The Second Story of Poverty” (1929-30), I shall take up his final view in this publication

Kawakami held that productive powers is “more influential” than the relations of production, but this has not been substantiated. Furthermore his explanation of the relationships of opposition between those two categories is also insufficient. In addition he made a statement in trying to clarify “the identity of things in opposition” — evidently he must have felt the necessity of this clarification by Lenin — that “the relations of production come in themselves to be component elements for productive powers under certain conditions,” but such an explanation is awkward. This awkward explanation is a result of there being no proper knowledge of the dialectical meanings of the concept of “identity” on Kawakami’s part.

However, the one point we must make a special note of regarding Kawakami’s view is that the relationships between the two concepts are explained by using the analogy of the relationships between the human body and the clothing to cover it. Such an explanation might have come to be used perhaps partly because Marx himself used such terms as “integument” and “take it off” and partly because Kawakami was also in the habit of using analogical reasoning, but after all he didn’t make enough progress to demonstrate any logical structure beyond the level of analogy. As already mentioned, a man and his clothes are of such a

29) Taken from the Works of Hajime Kawakami, Vol. 2. In “The Second Story of Poverty” is written that it was intended to make an “elucidation” of Lenin’s narration about the materialistic interpretation of history. This indicates his very honest personality, but at the same time it also shows a propagating tendency which was his academic tradition. There is a doubt whether it is desirable for the progress of science that scientific study should be used for the purpose of propagation. As to this point I agree to some extent with the view held by Prof. Nobuyuki Okuma.

30) Ibid., pp. 208-211.

31) Ibid., p. 211.

32) Ibid., pp. 212-213.
nature that each of them can exist independently of each other, and when he puts on his clothes, the relationships such as a good fit or a bad fit come to be brought forth, but the productive powers and the relations of production are by no means of such a nature. From the very beginning they are two categories which stand in mutual opposition to each other and which are united in one at the same time. Two phases of unification and opposition are combined together and the logical structure of the dialectic, indeed, is formed in a so to speak twofold opposition. Judging from these thoughts, I can’t help saying that Kawakami never attained dialectical recognition.

Now, turning to Professor Kyuzo Asobe, he made his “Value and Historical Materialism” (1950) public shortly after the end of the War. He attempted in this book to elucidate the Marxian theory of value by following the context of Hegelian logic. Moreover he engaged himself in the contemplation of the views held by philosophers in the Soviet Union, such as Mitzin and Rarizevitch, as well as by economists such as Duokol, Abegaus and Koffman. And he drew the conclusion that productive powers and the relations of production are to be explained by the categories of content and form.

Productive powers and the relations of production can be understood to some degree by the concepts of substance or content and form, as it is possible to understand economy and law by these concepts. But we can not understand the total relationships by these concepts. If we hold the Hegelian view point of absolute idealism, the identity of substance and form can be recognized, because the former realizes itself by attaining the latter and the latter realizes itself by containing the former in itself. But when we examine the correlations of the two concepts in reality, we can see a more complex correlation, than that of substance and form. It is more tangible to correlate the two concepts on the basis of the “identity of things in opposition” in the sense explained above.

Next, in order to become familiar with the situation in Soviet scholastic circles during the Stalinist period, I shall mention the enunciations given in “Historical Materialism” compiled by F. V. Konstantinov of the Academy of Sciences of USSR.

It was a general tendency in essays of social sciences in Soviet Russia, particularly in the Stalinist period to repeat and obtrude specific views.
rather than to make logical statement, and to divert one's attention from the main problem at issue by quoting the "authoritative" words of Marx, Engels and Lenin so that readers might well be forced to agree that only those particular views were right and that any standpoints other than those were wrong. The books we are going to take up are also much characterized by this tendency.

Now, Konstantinov—the part which we are taking up was written by this compiler—correctly asserted that the form of ownership of productive powers prescribes the relations of production, but the logic of the relationships between the two state of affairs is not clear enough. Although it is asserted that the mode of production is formed by "a combination" of the two\(^{35}\), his explanation of the way this "combination" is made doesn't go beyond reciprocal interaction, and he also regards productive powers as the content and the relations of production as the form\(^{35}\), which I have already criticized above. In short as far as the relationships between the two concepts concerned, Konstantinov's view is no better than the popular view of reciprocity.

Lastly let us take up the view held by Mr. Kichiroku Tanaka. What I am going to discuss here is concerned with his two essays: one written in 1951 and the other in 1960\(^{36}\).

According to his assertion, logic termed by him the "logic of circular movement" is essentially required to grasp the relationships between productive powers and the relations of production in a dynamic way. What is implied by the "logic of circular movement" is dialectical logic, which is different from the ordinary logic through which things are grasped, as it were, graphically on a flat level. Tanaka's view is very hard to understand. Upon realising it, he himself is often obliged to repeat his efforts at expressing it by saying "in plain words" and "for an easier understanding". In spite of all this we feel great difficulty in following his narration. Nevertheless it is written on a much higher level than any analysis or synthesis we have ever seen before. He shows the processes of how practical human being and society come to be established, starting from material production and then through human consciousness. It can be appreciated as one of the most advanced theoretical treatises we have so far had.

According to this writer, Marx has made clear the creative process of nature from material production to practical subject of humanity. And

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this process means that the original nature returns to itself through the objectivation of humanity by practical activity. This movement is, in a sense, a circular movement.

Mr. Tanaka explains this movement by dividing it into two kinds. One is the development of vertical movements. There it is maintained that productive powers keep developing to the productive entity and then to cognitive entity and finally to the social and practical entity; it serves the purpose for the original nature to accomplish the essential qualities of nature through the instrumentality of “humanized nature”, thus, to make a comeback to nature and to actualize the actuality of nature. The other is the development of lateral movements, where the very human entity, itself created out of nature, first turned to the relations of production and then to the forms of circulation, and finally induced the development from primitive life to life of a higher level through the instrumentality of communications, such as spoken as well as written language. The improvement of the subjective entity to a higher and higher level means the return to nature through the instrumentality of self negation. Thus tribal communal life is to develop into a global society.

What supports these two kinds of development is, “the logic of circular movements”: in other words, the logic of repeated movements of progress and regress in succession by pursuing a process of disunion and unification. Such is Mr. Tanaka’s standpoint.

In these works is treated the problem of unification of productive powers and relations of production in the productive process. Putting it in other words, the structure through which a particular mode of production developes into the whole society is aimed at. In short what he is treating there covers much wider field than our problem is concerned with. As to our problem, since nothing is written in detail except the movements toward “vertical development” and “lateral development”, I cannot content myself, but I feel grateful to find that his work contains a great many suggestive points. Only it is a matter of regret that as a result of his effort to stick to the materialistic standpoint, his tenacity in holding to “material substance” and “nature” prevents him from free thinking.

IV Summary of My View

I think that my own positive view should be given now, comparing the varied ways of thinking which I discussed above. But I haven’t arrived at a final conclusion yet. All that I can do now is to present
here some materials to ask the readers for criticism by summarising my view.

The starting point to consider is nature in her original state. Nature created human beings in the course of reproduction and evolution. A man born of such nature begins to cognize his own purpose. He finds himself standing in opposition to nature and behaves practically to actualize his purpose. The practical activities of man come to actualize the unification of nature, though standing in a relation of opposition to nature, by modifying the movements and changes of nature and by imposing his will upon the movements of natural phenomena.

This unification is not a simple thing to accomplish. When he has not enough knowledge of the substance of natural phenomena and the means of actualizing his will, his practical intention comes to be clashed with the force of nature. Nevertheless, man's cognition of the substantial qualities of nature and the means of actualizing his will—since a man himself is part of nature, too, the means of actualizing his will can't be found, needless to say, a part from the cognition of the substantial qualities of human made nature—keep progressing while mutually standing in opposition. Thus, nature and man actualize the unification by repeating the processes of the two movements, first of mutual cooperation in a state of opposition and secondly of opposition to each other in a state of cooperation. Hence, man's movements, if viewed from a wide point of view, become something to which an old saying, "partaking in the constant process of the evolution of nature" seems to be applicable, and the movements of nature actualize themselves by comprehending human activity. From a macro aspect, the history of nature is brought in line with human history. That Marx made use of the word naturalism in the same sense as humanism in his "Economic Philosophical Manuscripts" (1844) is to be understood in such a way.

Marx's thought was based on such a gigantic background. As to whether or not such a magnificent structure is suitable to cover the history of nature and humanity, we are not able to determine. But he dared to enact such a grand play of contemplative thought and there is no need to say that it was on the "real basis" that a corner stone of his thought was founded, and the very corner-stone of that foundation was the mode of production, and in the idea of the mode of production was included the whole of productive powers and the relations of production. By productive powers is meant the various effective conditions, concerned with subjective and objective entities in the course of human making. The word "making" is an English translation of "poiesis" which we often come across in classical Greek thoughts. Not all productive powers are
matter. Indeed, some of them, such as land or underground resources is matter, some like the organs of the human body are also biological organs, but some are tools or instrument which are produced by man’s labour and can be regarded as extensions and magnifications of human bodily organs, and sometimes scientific abilities, which are not matter at all. Furthermore, the very ability to unite the various factors of productive powers together is counted as a kind of productive powers. These abilities are represented in “concrete useful labour” and this labour actualizes itself in the form of cooperation or the division of labour.

On the other hand, what is meant by relations of production are human relationships as a whole arising out of the forms of ownership of productive powers which are brought forth in human “acting”. The word ‘acting’ used here to make a distinction from ‘making’ is “praxis” as used in classical Greek thought. The ability of acting is represented by “abstract human labour”. Acting comes to actualize its substantial qualities when it is considered in connection with man’s motive or purpose. Whether it is intended from a selfish motive or in the public interest determines its substantial qualities.

We must make a special note of the fact that making and acting overlap each other, resulting in human activity. Human activities must be considered in this duality. By the ownership of productive powers is meant social conditions under which production is carried on. According to the ownership of productive powers, the social conditions of production are different.

There are different cases of such conditions. There are some where productive powers are for the most part buried in the whole society, as in a primitive community. There are some, where, although a part of them may be commonly owned by the people as a whole, the rest of them are owned by particular groups and each group can determine, use or dispose of them as in feudal society. But in modern capitalist society, all productive powers, as a rule, are owned by individuals and these individuals have the right to use or dispose of them freely. —In these different cases, we speak of collective or private ownership. Productive powers represent themselves in the shape of ownership and discharge their own special functions. There we have varied types of human relations. And all such relations arising out of human acting in producing economic goods are called the relations of production.

Human activity has two phases of making and acting. It is neither that one phase is main purpose and the other its means, nor that one is the content and the other the form. Yet each of them does exist, respectively carrying a peculiar significance, and for that reason each of
them stands in opposition to the other as an extremity, without being comprehended by the other. In short, making and acting form the relationship of dialectical opposition mentioned previously.

If each element of productive powers as an element of making is put separately, it does not work at all or does not work efficiently. The elements work unified together in the labour process.

On the other hand, if we regard productive powers as an element of acting, they are owned either collectively or individually. And we have some relations of ownership with each other.

In this way, productive powers and relations of production have respectively a specific existence of their own, and neither of them is a thing to be comprehended by the other. Yet they do not exist in two different states. Just in the sense that making is acting seen from the subjective point of view—or in the sense that acting is making when seen from the objective point of view, so productive powers and relations of production are two phases of one and the same labour process, i.e. two phases standing in opposition to one another. Although the two have a dual structure, they are one social reality which is in one dynamic state. In this sense productive powers and the relations of production are two, and at the same time only one: in other words they are in the relationship of "dialectical opposition".

Now, I think that I could describe the basic aspect of my view with respect to productive powers and the relations of production through all that was discussed above. However, if I intend to develop the problem more concretely, I shall further have to touch on a few more complex and important points of discussion. When the form of ownership is to be argued, we must take into consideration the fact of alienation. But in this paper, I must omit this important issue.