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CONTENTS

The Marxian Theory of International

Value

Kiyoshi MATSUI 1

The Historical Stage of German

Capitalism

Eiji OHNO 18

Changes of Government Employment

Policy in the Face of Economic

Growth in Japan since World War II

Kaichi MAEKAWA 44

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THE HISTORICAL STAGE OF GERMAN CAPITALISM

— AN ANALYSIS OF THE BISMARCK REGIME —

By Eiji OHNO*

Prologue

The subject matter of my report is to elucidate the historical characteristics of German capitalism which was one of the forces driving a prodigious turn in world history in the transitional process during the period of the "Great Depression" at the end of the 19th century¹⁾, so to speak, from the world of Marx's "Capital" to the world of Lenin's "Imperialism". The period of this "Great Depression" began during the crisis of 1873 and lasted up to the mid-1890's, almost for a quarter of a century²⁾. Just in those days *the basic composition of the Bismarck Regime* (1871–1918) which was created by the unification of Germany in 1871, came to be carried out to its full extent, but at the same time its many contradictions came to be aggravated in the midst of this "Great Depression", and with the fall of Bismarck in 1890 as the turning point this Regime was obliged to suffer the process of collapse.

The aim of this report is not to analyze the "Great Depression" itself, but to

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1) This essay is a revised version of the essential points of my report originally prepared for one part of the common subject entitled "The Stage of the Great Depression at the End of the 19th Century viewed from the Aspect of World History and its Fundamental Composition", for the Autumnal Science Convention of the Agrarian History Society (TOCHISEIDOSHIGAKKAI) for the year 1969.

2) Vgl. Hans Rosenberg, *Grosse Depression und Bismarckzeit, Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa*, Berlin 1967, SS. 25 ff. In this connection, grasping the "Great Depression" according to view of recurrent long-time alternations of the "Long Waves" such as prosperity-period during 1849-73, depression-period during 1873-96 and prosperity-period during 1897-1914, Rosenberg arrested attention with his contention that the "Great Depression" was not a local event only in England, but was an international common phenomenon which was experienced in Europe and America as well. But the basic question to be raised here, is how to grasp the characteristics of the crises which arose from *the intensified aggravation of the co-existence of unbalanced developments of the national economies of the various countries* during the period of those depression days, i.e. problematic character of the crises brewing on top of inflammable raw materials of worldwide-scale in the "Age of Imperialism". About this point, see Eiji Ohno, *German Capitalism*, Tokyo 1965, Introduction "Social Basis of Crises". About the characteristics of the "Great Depression" at the end of the 19th century, see Masaharu Tokiwa, *Studies on the Agricultural Crises*, Tokyo 1966, Chapter 2, Agricultural Crises at the End of the 19th Century and the Character of Economic Crises in the Early 20th Century.

grasp the historical characteristics of the social structure of Imperial Germany which existed for nearly half a century from 1871 to 1918, i.e. to ascertain the characteristics of the Bismarck Regime. Although we think that the Bismarck Regime has some historical characteristics which be defined as "*pseudo-Bonapartism*", what I intend here, is to present some problems for further discussion by showing how we analyzed the *social structure* of Imperial Germany in actuality, with respect to subjects such as whether or not it is possible to describe the characteristics of the Bismarck Regime as "*pseudo-Bonapartism*" as one of the varieties of absolutism, or in other words, "what kind of task for social change had to be raised in the process of the November Revolution and the formation of the Weimar Republic?"

I The Historical Position of the Bismarck Regime

To begin with, it is necessary to determine the historical position of the Bismarck Regime in the course of development of German capitalism which was an industrial latecomer. There would be no objection, I should think, in stating that industrial capital was established in Germany during that period; then a transition from the stage of industrial capital to that of monopoly capital or finance capital, or to that of imperialism took place; and it was the very period of the said "Great Depression" that formed a watershed between these two stages. Now, the problem at issue lies in making clear how such a course of development of German capitalism took place, in other words, in what particular form was the general law of capitalism made to penetrate? i.e. *the historical type of its penetration*.

(1) The Establishment of German Industrial Capital

The first point to be examined is concerned with the very way in which the establishment of German industrial capital is to be grasped. It may confidently be said that the results of various recent studies in this country about the German industrial revolution are of such extremely varied kinds that they may well be represented as being in a kind of nebular state³⁾. However, for the time being I should like to summarize them in the following way according to my own view.

It seems possible to assume that *the starting period* of the German industrial revolution can be sought in the days when the development of the home market came to be made due to formation of the German Customs Union (Der deutsche Zollverein) in 1834, after passing through the period of primitive accumulation of the "Prussian type" through the acceleration of bourgeois reform initiated "from above" (von oben), making its start from the "peasant emancipation" (Bauernbefreiung) by Stein and Hardenberg after 1807. Needless to say, it was observed that *both the manufacturing and factory system had been mixed up* before this time, and it was

3) Minoru Morota, "Development of the Industrial Revolution in Germany: A Sketch based on the Latest Studies", *The Review of Economics and Commerce (SHO-KEI RONSO)*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1967; and Eiichi Hizen, "On the Pattern of Industrialization in Germany", *The Journal of Agrarian History (TOSHISEIDOSHIGAKU)*, No. 39 (Vol. X, No. 3), 1968.

impossible to determine the "manufacturing period proper" and still harder to find out a precise *turning point* when the transition was made from the manufacturing to the factory system. Nevertheless I should like to attend to the process in which the immaturity of spontaneous conditions for the transition to the factory system was forced to be substituted and supplemented by the formation of the Customs Union "from above".

The terminating period of the German industrial revolution can be sought in those days of 1870's when the products of modern mechanical industry came to determine the social value of the goods⁴⁾ — in this case the textile industry, and particularly the cotton industry, each of which was the kind of the industry which played the part of the main axis of the industrial revolution, giving rise to a problem to be disputed — and the machine industry that secured *the fitting foundation of production technique which made modern mechanical industry stand on its own feet*, and above all the machine tool industry came to be in full operation⁵⁾. As a criterion we can point out the foundation of the Reichsbank in 1875 when the consolidation of a new credit system was expedited as a finishing touch of the Industrial Revolution. A whole credit system essentially centering around bank capital, which might well be defined as the specifically German type of bank (*Der spezifisch deutsche Banktyp*) was consolidated, culminating in the operation of the Reichsbank⁶⁾. Moreover, "the alliance between the East Elbe and the Rhine"⁷⁾, which was aimed by the upper class of the Rhine bourgeoisie like Gustav Mevissen, was realized not under the initiatives of the Rhine, but rather *adversely* under the initiatives of the East Elbe⁸⁾.

Now, as for the social carriers of the German industrial revolution, I am of opinion that three "types of capital" can be detected. According to the results of the history of such studies⁹⁾, *the type of commercial entrepreneur* (*Der Verlagsunternehmer*), which was principally found in the weaving industry, had its ubiquity during

4) Vgl. Friedrich Engels, "Vorwort zur zweiten, durchgesehenen Auflage »Zur Wohnungsfrage«", in: *Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels-Werke*, Bd. 21, Berlin 1962, S. 330.

5) For instance, the machine industry in Berlin grew to be able to compete against the British machine industry in the days when the new German empire was established, and established its dominance in the field of modern mechanical industry. See E. Ohno, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

6) E. Ohno, *A Study on the Genesis of German Finance Capital*, Tokyo 1956.

7) Helmut Böhme, "Gründung und Anfänge des Schaaffhausenschen Bankvereins, der Bank des Berliner Kassenvereins, der Direktion der Disconto-Gesellschaft und der (Darmstädter) Bank für Handel und Industrie", *Tradition-Zeitschrift für Firmengeschichte und Unternehmerbiographie*, 10. Jahrgang 1965 4. Heft, S. 199.

8) About the point that the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership as a result of Bismarck's so-called "revolution from above" during the period 1866-71 became to be a decisive impetus to incorporate even the Rhine bourgeoisie into the hierarchy of Prussian society, see Friedrich Zunkel, *Der Rheinisch-Westfälische Unternehmer 1834-1879*, Köln und Opladen 1962, S. 130.

9) Vgl. Heinz Sachtler, *Wandlungen des industriellen Unternehmers seit dem Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Dissertation Halle 1937, S. 7; Tomoo Matsuda, *Basic Study on German Capitalism*, Tokyo 1967, pp. 65-71.

the "period of the pre-March Revolution" ; overwhelmingly so in Eastern Germany and extensively so in Southern and Western Germany. *The type of engineer entrepreneur* (Der Technikerunternehmer), which was mainly found in the spinning industry developed extensively during the "period of the pre-March Revolution", and it too was the type formed generally in Southern and Western Germany and particularly in the Rhineland. *The type of aristocratic entrepreneur* (Der grundherrliche Unternehmer), which was found in an *antediluvian* combination of three kinds of managements such as mining and manufacturing administrators, farm land owners and forestry owners, was a typical type found particularly in Upper Silesia in South-eastern Germany. This type may be classified into the following two sub-types — one type of entrepreneur that clearly indicated the direction of the breaking down of antediluvian combined enterprises in those days when the new German empire was established like Corporation of Count Renard, "Die Minerva, Schlesische Hütten-, Forst- und Bergbau-Gesellschaft", and another type of entrepreneur that maintained antediluvian combined management which characterized the administrations by landed magnates (Magnaten), up to the times of the collapse of Imperial Germany by holding the regalian rights (Bergregal) i.e. the mining privileges and also by shifting the emphasis of mining and manufacturing operation from iron to coal or zinc, like the privileged enterprising group of Count Henckel — a group of enterprises which was defined by Max Weber as a specific representative of "Starostenindustrie" (vassal industry)¹⁰ or as "Pertinenzien der Gutsbezirke" (adjunct of Estate Districts)¹¹: the latter of these two sub-types commanding the more dominant position than the former.

Now, the German industrial revolution, though basically being driven by the type of engineer entrepreneur, did come to establish industrial capital under the predominance of the type of commercial entrepreneur, involving therein the opposition between *the uprising* of the former and *the confrontation* of the latter, in such a manner that the transition of manufacture towards the factory system did not eliminate the way of forming a new factory system caused by the transformation of antediluvian capital into industrial capital, i.e. the dominance of the type of commercial entrepreneur and the type of aristocratic entrepreneur. In this specific way in which German industrial capital came to be established, there lies the very reason why an extensive continuance of the so-called "combination of agriculture and industry"¹² operating at the bottom of the social structure was permitted, and at the stage where a modern mechanical industry had a dominant influence, this combination i.e. the foundation of relative happiness which labourers used to enjoy was transformed into that of mercilessly low wages. It was this extensive

10) Max Weber, "Agrarstatistische und sozialpolitische Betrachtungen zur Fideikommißfrage in Preußen (1904)", *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, Tübingen 1924, S. 353 Anm.

11) *Ibid.*, S. 342 Anm.

12) F. Engels, *op. cit.*, S. 332.

social stratum of the old middle classes itself that should be regarded as the principal social basis of the social structure of "pseudo-Bonapartism" and for this reason we should pay attention to the fact that "twofold compositions of the industry" came to be formed in such a way.

(2) The Foundation of Monopolies in Key Industries

In this way, while at the bottom level of society there remained the old middle classes in stagnation to an extensive extent, *a progressive advance of the industrial composition* was accelerated and at the same time the gigantic scheme of monopoly capital came to be in operation at the beginning of the 20th century, passing through the period of the "Great Depression", based on the progressively higher organic composition of capital in the key industries, taking the course of unbalanced development such as a rising in the department of the means of production and a stagnation in that of the articles of consumption.

Now, firstly let us see the coal and steel industry. In Western Germany like Rhine-Westphalia and Lorraine-Luxembourg, 24 "mixed works" (*gemischte Werke*) i.e. combined management produced some 23% of the total coal output of the German empire which amounted to about 120 million tons in 1903 and some 73% of the total pig iron output which amounted to about 10 million tons; "mixed works", in which successive production processes in the fields of coal and ore mining, iron and steel manufacture, rolling and machine making, etc. were vertically combined together, composed the nucleus of the commanding monopoly in the coal and steel industry in Western Germany, the fact of which could well be indicated by the establishment of the Second Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate in 1903, the Pig Iron Syndicate at Düsseldorf in 1897 and Steel Works Federation (*Stahlwerksverband*) in 1904. Besides a number of production agreements and price agreements were concluded during the period of the "Great Depression", not to speak of Coal Export Union in 1877 and the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate was established in 1893 which carried an epoch-making significance in the history of the centralization of capitals in the coal and steel industry in Western Germany. Thus it was made possible to recognize *the formation of, so to speak, premature monopoly*, all the facts of which lead to an aspect that *the problem of monopolized mine-lots* lying in the background of the market control as one of its causes should be taken up for our further consideration.

Because the ownership of mining-lots is separated from land ownership under the so-called principle of the primacy of the mining right owner and the mining capitalist generally is the owner of mining-lot, any surplus-profit accruing from the owned mining-lot is not separated as mining rent, without being handed over to the landowner; both of mining rent and profit are combined together without being separated and belongs to the mining capitalist. Thus, because mining rent, namely in this case differential rent due to the different fertility between better mining-lots and worse ones, has an important meaning in so-called "profits" of mining capital, it follows that the principal target for the mining capital is

directed toward the security of the surplus-profit by acquiring better mining-lots¹³). Because of the intervention of the problem relating to the monopoly of mining-lots which come to be raised in such way, there is a possibility that *the discrepancy of concentration and centralization* of mining capital becomes considerably accelerated, in fact of which we can find one of the factors leading to the formation of premature monopoly. Moreover, since the "mixed works" became the main axis of monopoly to play its commanding sway, which were produced from the blending of processes of concentration and centralization of capital in the field of the coal mining industry and the iron and steel industry as well, taking the form of "tied" coal-mines (Zechenhütten) where certain coal mines were combined with certain steel works or "tied" steel works (Hüttenzechen) where certain steel works were combined with certain coal mines, it was natural that the said problem of monopolized mining-lots lying in the background of their market control should not leave the formation of monopoly by the coal and steel industry without giving a certain branding in any shape.

At Upper Silesia in Eastern Germany about 10 "mixed works" had commanding control of some 24% of the total coal output and some 8% of the total pig iron output of the German empire at the beginning of the 20th century. This kind of "mixed works" was none other than that antediluvian combined management which was spontaneously produced on the basis of the landownership of a few of the landed magnates (Magnaten) and Prussian Exchequer (Preußischer Fiskus). What composed the background of such antediluvian combined management by operators of mining and manufacturing industries like coal, lead, zinc, iron, steel, etc. and owners of farm land and forestry was the very ownership of colossal landed estate (Latifundium) fixing into the "Fideikommiß" (entailed estate) which had a mining privileges (Bergregal) deserving to be called as "a state within a state"¹⁴), wherein the semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom in the East Elbe predominated. Besides in the case of Silesia the so-called principle of primacy of the landowner was adopted (as an instance, Grundeigentümersbergwerk i.e. landowner's mine)¹⁵), and since the Magnaten were the landowner of the surface of the earth, the owner of the mining-lot in the earth and generally the operators of the mining and manufacturing industry, in the strict sense the surplus value in Magnaten's hands carried a different historical character from the surplus value of the mining industry in Western Germany. Here we should give attention to

13) Mikio Sumiya, *Analysis of the Japanese Coal Industry*, Tokyo 1968, pp. 425-426. And interesting is the following chart as it gives a conspectus of the actual distribution of mining-lots in 1904 among the principal mine owners in Rhine-Westphalia: *Die Entwicklung des Niederrheinisch-Westfälischen Steinkohlen-Bergbaues in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, hrsg. vom Verein für die bergbaulichen Interessen, Bd. 10, Berlin 1904, Tafel XIII. Der Felderbesitz der wichtigeren Bergwerkseigentümer in Westfalen und am Niederrhein.

14) Norman J. G. Pounds, *The Upper Silesian Industrial Region*, Indiana University Publication 1958, p. 27.

15) Zensuke Ishimura, *Studies on Mining Rights*, Tokyo 1960, pp. 11-16.

the fact that ground-rent and profit were also in Eastern Germany combined together without being separated. Now, when we consider the following facts that the monopolistic sway of the coal and steel industry was established in Upper Silesia, too, due to the establishment of Upper Silesian Pig Iron Syndicate in 1901, Upper Silesian Steel Works Federation in 1904, Upper Silesian Coal Convention in 1898, etc., that the basis for such monopoly was provided by some 10 "mixed works" owned by Magnaten, that the Prussian Exchequer had a monopolistic position, and finally that two large coal dealers in Berlin had overwhelming circulating control, it follows that the historical peculiarities of monopoly in the coal and steel industry in Upper Silesia were characterized by *a monopoly of modern type added to the type of antediluvian monopoly while the latter was being firmly maintaining.*

Next, the type of *a newly-rising key industry* such as the electrical industry as well as the chemical industry comes to arrest our attention. The type of monopoly to be formed in these fields is evidently of *modern monopoly* on the basis of the progressively higher organic composition of capital. In the field of the electrical industry the establishment of Siemens & Halske Co. in 1847 was the starting point. Its monopolistic position in Europe was secured in the section of light current engineering already in those days of the 1870's. However, this industry in those days could not simply be anything more than one of subsidiary sections of the iron and machine industry. In those days in the 1880's the section of heavy current engineering began to expand its operations on an ever greater scale, utilizing a series of technical innovations, culminating in the invention of a dynamo by Werner Siemens in 1866. In this way the means of mechanical mass production, spreading from the section of heavy current engineering to that of light current engineering, the electrical industry came to constitute a newly-rising key industry. The German electrical industry in the days immediately prior to the crisis of 1900 consisted of as many as 27 major companies divisible into 7 groups, and in 1904 the monopolistic sway of the Siemens-Concern and the AEG-Concern was established.

In the case of the chemical industry, which is another newly-rising key industry, its revolution in the modes of production was realized in Germany since 1860, based on the development of the dye industry. On the other hand, England played a leading role also in the development of the chemical industry with the soda industry as nucleus, because the rapid growth of the textile industry in England had to make a sudden expansion of the soda market for the purpose of bleaching and dyeing. However, her monopolizing position was overthrown by the Solvay-Concern in Belgium with the new invention of Ernest Solvay's ammonia-soda process in 1862 and furthermore her leading position in soda production also had to give way to the German chemical industry, in which the electrolysis soda process was adopted in 1890. As a result of success in synthesizing new chemicals such as alizarin by Karl Graebe and Karl Liebermann in 1868 and indigo by Adolf Bayer in 1878, the German dye industry made remarkable progress, producing on the eve of the World War I 95,000 tons of synthesized dye out of roughly 110,000 tons of the world total

output. For that reason it is not without reason that as far as dye was concerned, "all the textile industry of the whole world, as it were, was dependent upon the German chemical industry"¹⁶). In such a process of development the monopolistic enterprises, which towered up on the foundation of the many-sided and integrated managements (combined management), came into existence, and two great agreements of community of interests (Interessengemeinschaft) were effectuated in 1904 between BASF and AGFA, and between HOECHST and CASSELLA. Thus monopolistic sway was established in the field of the chemical industry.

(3) High Rising in Industrial Composition and the Aggravation of Contradictions

As stated above the key industry in Germany began to show its own gigantic features of monopoly capital in the West Elbe at the beginning of the 20th century after passing through the "Great Depression". Now, in such a process *the high rising in industrial composition* was made as shown in Table I *from the stage of light industries to that of heavy and chemical industries*¹⁷). Karl Erich Born also made the following statement: "Among German industries the consumer goods industry had yet the greatest weight in the 70's. Two-thirds of the factory labourers were engaged in the consumer goods industry and it was the textile industry that enjoyed the leading position in German exports of goods. During a period of several decades afterwards the center of gravity shifted to the iron and machine industry and their exports exceeded twice as much as that of the textile industry in 1913"¹⁸). In this connection the point, which we should not fail to take notice of, is the fact that with the said conversion the center of gravity of economical sway shifted from the East Elbe to the West Elbe. According to Hans Rosenberg, during the "Great Depression" agriculture lost its primacy in the whole national economy and such change took place in the 1880's¹⁹).

The high rising in industrial composition during the period of the "Great Depression" resulted in aggravating the contradictions of the Bismarck Regime. In other words, on account of interlacing of the phase of the rapid shifting to the stage of higher monopoly capitalism *in the West Elbe* and the phase of the crises of Junkerdom arising out of the impact of the agricultural crisis *in the East Elbe*, the contradictions which were aggravated during the period of the "Great Depression"

16) Wl. Woytinsky, *Die Welt in Zahlen*, Bd. IV, Berlin 1926, S. 322.

17) As it is pointed out in the detailed elucidation by Moritaro Yamada, *The Stage of the Structure of Reproduction and Agrarian Problems in Post-war Japan*, Research Material of Institute of Social Science of Senshu University, Tokyo 1964, pp. 1-4, it was observed in the case of Japanese capitalism that such high rising of the industrial composition from the stage of light industries to the stage of heavy and chemical industries began from about 1929-30 and was made in passing through the war economy of World War II. This point is one of the most essential points which should be taken into consideration when the problem is to be discussed from the aspect of comparative history.

18) Karl Erich Born, "Der soziale und wirtschaftliche Strukturwandel Deutschlands", in: *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, hrsg. von Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Köln-Berlin 1966, S. 280.

19) H. Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, S. 39.

TABLE I The Structure of Employees according to the

Period	Stone & Clay Industry	Metal Proct-ion	Metal Produces-ing	Chemical Industry	Textile Industry	Leather Produc-tion	Clothing Industry & Leather Processing
	%	"	"	"	"	"	"
1841/61	5.0	1.7	9.1	0.8	21.0	0.9	23.5
1875	6.5	2.9	11.7	1.3	18.0	0.9	20.9
1882/90	7.3	2.9	11.8	1.6	14.1	0.8	20.7
1891/1900	8.2	3.1	13.7	1.9	12.6	0.7	17.9
1901/10	8.0	3.6	15.4	2.2	11.0	0.6	16.0
1911/13	7.2	4.0	16.9	2.5	10.3	0.5	14.4
1925/34	5.5	21.7		3.3	10.4	0.5	13.5
1935/39	5.3	27.3		3.6	8.8	0.4	11.1
1950/59	4.6	33.4		5.0	6.5	0.4	8.3
	1,000 people	"	"	"	"	"	"
1846	146	43	296	18	734	35	817
1852	165	53	318	28	820	34	859
1858	215	80	378	32	772	37	889
1861	244	81	378	38	813	35	966
1875	333	150	601	65	926	44	1,078
1882	380	166	635	86	909	46	1,278
1885	414	173	690	94	905	47	1,309
1890	609	216	932	123	987	55	1,398
1896	637	244	1,081	149	1,023	58	1,409
1900	784	314	1,394	177	1,030	59	1,522
1904	768	327	1,388	198	1,037	58	1,518
1908	780	377	1,545	231	1,050	55	1,529
1913	752	443	1,887	290	1,101	60	1,544
1924	599	2,665		377	1,160	64	1,482
1928	730	2,812		387	1,302	62	1,643
1932	354	1,491		277	823	41	1,165
1936	650	3,103		410	1,060	58	1,367
1939	821	4,544		576	1,420	60	1,642
1950	414	2,268		365	622	41	847
1959	489	4,116		618	615	41	773

Note: All statistical figures are computed with respect to the following territories.

- (1) Up to 1870 all territories of the German empire excluding Alsace-Lorraine.
- (2) For 1871-1917 all territories of the German empire including Alsace-Lorraine.
- (3) For 1918-1944 all German territories excluding Austria and the Sudetenland, but after 1934 including the Saar.

Branches of German Industry and Handicraft: 1846-1959

Wood Processing & Engraving	Paper Production & Processing	Foods & Beverages Industry	Gas, Water & Electricity Supply	Building Trade	Graphic Trade	Jewelries, Toys & Musical Instrument Industry	Total: Industry & Handicraft
//	//	//	//	//	//	//	1,000 people
10.5	0.9	14.3	0.1	10.6	0.5	1.1	3,676
10.1	1.6	13.1	0.3	10.3	0.9	1.6	5,153
10.0	1.9	13.1	0.3	12.7	1.2	1.7	6,515
9.1	2.1	13.0	0.4	14.1	1.5	1.6	7,923
9.0	2.4	12.7	0.7	14.7	1.9	1.7	9,533
8.7	2.6	12.7	0.9	15.6	2.0	1.8	10,742
8.3	2.5	13.9	1.5	14.6	2.8	1.6	10,531
7.3	2.5	12.1	1.6	16.8	1.8	1.4	13,041
6.5	1.9	9.5	1.7	19.2	1.6	1.4	9,827
//	//	//	//	//	//	//	//
361	20	455	1	338	15	28	3,305
379	31	538	1	368	18	37	3,649
410	45	558	6	444	23	49	3,938
433	45	586	9	473	24	62	4,187
522	84	676	15	530	46	83	5,153
542	102	749	14	515	64	94	5,580
599	112	827	17	648	69	101	6,005
674	141	933	23	1,045	82	119	7,337
718	165	1,050	29	1,088	123	135	7,909
811	195	1,092	43	1,239	146	144	8,950
857	211	1,187	56	1,367	169	157	9,298
883	245	1,263	78	1,455	194	172	9,857
924	282	1,427	96	1,630	224	197	10,857
915	266	1,435	151	1,243	234	254	10,845
1,116	306	1,552	160	2,075	326	227	12,698
574	198	1,365	145	775	258	100	7,566
904	279	1,517	195	2,086	248	171	12,048
1,061	383	1,736	249	2,524	238	200	15,454
634	147	867	146	1,463	136	85	8,035
643	224	1,023	181	2,260	189	162	11,334

(4) For the period after 1945 all territories of the Federal Republic of Germany excluding the Saar and West Berlin.

Vgl. Walther G. Hoffmann, *Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschafts seit dem Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin-Heidelberg 1965, SS. 68-69, 196-199.

TABLE II The Structure of Total Occupation according to Classified Industrial Division: 1849-1959

Period	Agri- culture, Forestry & Fishery	Min- ing & Salt- Works	Industry & Handi- craft(a)	Trans- port (b)	Com- merce, Banking, Insur- ance & Restau- rants	Do- mestic Em- ploy- ees	Other Services including National Defence	Total No. of Occupied Popu- lation	Propor- tion of Occupi- ed Popu- lation against Total Popu- lation
	%	"	"	"	"	"	"	1,000 people	%
1849/58(c)	54.6	0.9	24.3	1.1	5.0	9.3	4.8	15,126	43.9
1867/71(d)	50.9	1.3	26.3	7.2		8.8	5.5	16,450	43.0
1878/79	49.1	1.4	27.7	2.0	6.6	7.7	5.5	19,416	43.7
1880/84	48.2	1.6	28.2	2.1	6.9	7.5	5.5	19,992	43.7
1885/89	45.5	1.6	30.7	2.3	7.2	7.1	5.6	21,302	44.7
1890/94	42.6	1.8	32.4	2.6	7.9	6.7	6.0	22,651	45.1
1895/99	40.0	2.0	33.7	2.8	8.7	6.4	6.4	24,277	45.3
1900/04	38.0	2.4	34.4	3.1	9.7	5.3	6.6	26,043	45.1
1905/09	35.8	2.6	35.1	3.5	10.6	5.6	6.8	28,047	45.2
1910/13	35.1	2.8	35.1	3.6	11.0	5.2	7.2	30,243	46.0
1925	31.5	2.4	37.7	4.7	12.5	4.4	6.8	31,033	49.7
1933	33.9	1.6	31.0	4.9	14.6	4.0	9.9	26,687	40.9
1939	27.4	1.9	38.9	5.2	12.4	3.8	10.2	39,680	
1950/54	21.6	2.8	40.7	5.7	14.6	2.8	11.8	21,541	45.0
1955/59	16.5	2.6	44.2	5.6	16.9	2.5	11.7	24,521	48.6

Note: (a) Technical Staffs of the Postal Service and Railways are included up to 1913.

(b) Technical Staffs of the Postal Service and Railways are excluded up to 1913.

(c) Average for 1849, 1852, 1855 and 1858.

(d) Average for 1861, 1867 and 1871.

Vgl. W. G. Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, S. 35.

— particularly the contradiction that the mutual struggle of the two antagonistic classes became more and more serious because of the fact that the bourgeoisie in the West Elbe, economically speaking, were rising to a more and more dominant position, while the Junker class in the East Elbe, politically speaking, was maintaining its dominant position and *the class nature of the state power* remained unchanged — came to the forefront, being spurred by the withdrawal of Bismarck in 1890. Now the Bismarck Regime began to trace the road of collapse. If we grasp this

point from the aspect of economic policies, we can see that solidarity protectionism based on the "protective customs for corn and iron" in 1879²⁰⁾ — "compromise between iron and rye"²¹⁾ or "alliance between »knight's estates (Rittergut) and blast furnace (Hochofen)«"²²⁾ — had to face the critical situation of its dissolution by the policy of "New Course (Der neue Kurs)" of Caprivi (1891–94). But it was not until the bourgeois revolution in 1918 that the Bismarck Regime, which was primarily based on the solidarity bloc of the Junker class and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie, collapsed, due to the transient success of the reorganization and reinforcement of the ancien régime by the "Policy of Uniting" (Sammlungspolitik) at the meeting of the 19th and 20th centuries, which consisted of the two main stays of the Second Fleet Law in 1900 and the Customs Law in 1902.

II The Social Structure of "Pseudo-Bonapartism"

With reference to the Bismarck Regime Shiso Hattori made a contention, alluding to the "Process of Collapse of Prussian Absolutism" in an article entitled "Absolutism" contained in Vol. 9 of the series of "Lectures on Marxism" published in 1928, that during the period from 1848 to 1871 a *dark change* of the absolute monarchy into "modern Bonapartistic empire"²³⁾ or into "Bonapartism of the new German empire"²⁴⁾ was undergone and that the transition into a modern state of Bonapartism was anyhow observable in the new German empire even if "many vestiges of the ancien system of absolutism were still found there."²⁵⁾ Next, Moritaro Yamada defined the new German empire as "pseudo-Bonapartism" and grasped the characteristics of the process of reproduction in German capitalism, which made establish the industrial capital in this regime, by considering her internal connection with the dual structure of German agriculture such as the predominance of Junker estates in the East Elbe and the continuance of peasant proprietors in Southern and Western Germany. He summarized the points as follows: "German capitalism was peculiarly characterized with the co-existence of the domination of Junkerdom and the sections of peasant proprietors, which composition was established under the rule of seeming constitutionalism [Scheinkonstitutionalismus] (1848–66)

20) Jürgen Kuczynski, *Die Bewegung der deutschen Wirtschaft von 1800 bis 1946*, 2. Auflage, Meisenheim am Glan 1948, S. 208. As to the character of these protective customs, they were already grasped by F. Engels as a "coalition of the bourgeois and Junker" and it was stated that the Junker had the "lion's share". (Friedrich Engels, "Gliederung des Schlußteils des vierten Kapitels der Broschüre, »Die Rolle der Gewalt in der Geschichte«, *Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels-Werke*, Bd. 21, Berlin 1962, S. 465.)

21) Alexander Gerschenkron, *Broad and Democracy in Germany*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1943, p. 45.

22) H. Böhm, *Prolegomena zu einer Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt am Main 1968, S. 86.

23) S. Hattori, "The Concept of Absolutism in Marxism", in: *Absolutism, Collected Works of Shiso Hattori*, Vol. 4, Tokyo 1955, p. 35.

24) *Ibid.*, p. 28.

25) *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

and pseudo-Bonapartism (1870) after the secondary »provincial-Prussian« March Revolution (1848), starting from the bourgeois reform (1808–13) which was forced to practice »from above« by the lateral pressure of Napoleon's supremacy, under the circumstances of the sway of Prussian absolutism during the period subsequent to the mid-18th century”²⁶⁾. It seems that the following points are implied there: in comparison with *modern Bonapartism*, which had the extensive social stratum of peasant proprietors created by the French Revolution as its social basis, the concept of *pseudo-Bonapartism* was formed for the reason that the Junkerdom which came into existence through the bourgeois reform initiated “from above” instead of passing through the bourgeois revolution raised “from below” (von unten) lay as its social basis. In other words we find there a basic viewpoint that the different nature of “peasant emancipation” in France and in Prusso-Germany — the difference in the historical nature of the land reforms — determined the different nature of modern “Bonapartism” and “pseudo-Bonapartism”.

On the other hand Tomoo Matsuda grasped “pseudo-Bonapartism” in the following *three antagonisms* by correlating them with the aspect of the regional composition of German capitalism. He maintained that “it was built up on the three antagonisms, i.e. the antagonism between Western Germany and Eastern Germany, between the industrial capitalists and labourers within Western Germany and between the Junker estates owners and agricultural labourers within Eastern Germany: and its social basis was composed of the old middle classes (alter Mittelstand) which were on the point of downfall, the new middle classes (neuer Mittelstand) including professionals and small producers and the Junker estates owners: these classes were the social basis of the German empire after 1871”²⁷⁾. Furthermore it is worthy of note that Yasushi Yamanouchi recently pointed out, as a part of his studies on the argument of the German capitalism held by Marx and Engels, that the Prussian absolute monarchy shifted to Bonapartism during the period from 1848 to 1871 in an unmarked manner, based on the “reversed or reactionary reform”²⁸⁾, of which essential nature could not be grasped without using a paradoxical expression of Marx such as “the gravedigger of the revolution in 1848 was found to become its executor”²⁹⁾, and as a result *the bourgeois transformation of the social structure* could be accomplished. In this connection it must be noted that the grasping is made in such a way that the path “from above” of the development of capitalism was rooted and the way of recognizing the specific type of “German

26) M. Yamada, *Analysis of Japanese Capitalism*, Tokyo 1934, Introduction, p. 2.

27) T. Matsuda, “The Historical Type of German Economy”, in: *Dictionary of Economics*, Vol. II, Tokyo 1955, p. 591.

28) Yasushi Yamanouchi, *Marx and Engels on the World History*, Tokyo 1969, p. 235.

29) See the followings about this expression of K. Marx: F. Engels, “An den italienischen Leser·Vorwort zur italienischen Ausgabe (1893) des »Manifests der Kommunistischen Partei«”, in: Karl Marx·Friedrich Engels·Werke, Bd. 22, Berlin 1963, S. 365; F. Engels, “Einleitung zu Karl Marx' »Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich 1848 bis 1850«” (1895), in: *Marx·Engels·Werke*, Bd. 22, S. 516.

capitalism which was still in operation on the decisive axis of Junker economy"³⁰), of which the nature was quite different in quality from British capitalism, began to become matured in the thought of Engels particularly in those days after 1875.

In this way we can find a variety in the history of studies relating to the characterization of the Bismarck Regime pursued in this country over the last 40 years. But next I shall add some of the other views held about the characterization of the Bismarck Regime which were found in recent German writing. According to Eckart Kehr, who has left his imperishable footmarks in the historical study of German imperialism, methodologically speaking, under the overwhelming influence of Max Weber and Karl Marx in the 1920's, the Bismarck Regime is grasped as "Bismarckian crypto-absolutism"³¹ or "Kaiserian absolutism"³² and according to Karl Dietrich Bracher as "monarchical *de-facto*-absolutism supported by a strict reorganized bureaucracy and a powerful army"³³), concerning with the historical significance of German unification Wolfgang Zorn grasped the point that "the establishment of the empire rather strengthened that authoritativeness of the leading strata of the East Elbian-agrarian Prussia"³⁴). And Ralf Dahrendorf goes as far as to describe Imperial Germany by using an expression like "an industrial feudal society with an authoritarian welfare state"³⁵). Such an expression, needless to say, is a mere metaphor, of which the implication is suggestive of an industrial society based on the tenacious status-hierarchy characterized by the patriarchal rule effectuated by the mixture of the so-called "whip and sweetmeat" like the anti-Socialist Law and the Social Insurance Laws. Be the matter as it may, the very existence of varied views relating to the Bismarck Regime as described in the above does suggest to us that the above mentioned state power or, if it were not a floating existence, the historical nature of the social structure in the Imperial Germany should not be allowed to be hastily grasped as something of a modern or bourgeois nature.

(1) The Mechanism of Junker-Prussian Rule

When we glance at the political framework of the Bismarck Regime, we shall see that its nucleus is the mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule. The new German empire was composed of 25 states. The King of Prussia was the Emperor (Kaiser),

30) Y. Yamanouchi, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

31) Eckart Kehr, "Das soziale System der Reaktion in Preußen unter dem Ministerium Puttkamer (1929)", in: ders. *Der Primat der Innenpolitik, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Berlin 1965, S. 70.

32) E. Kehr, "Die deutsche Flotte in den neunziger Jahren und der politisch-militärische Dualismus des Kaiserreichs (1927)", in: ders., *Der Primat der Innenpolitik*, S. 125; cf. E. Ohno, "Basic Viewpoint of the Analysis of German Imperialism by Kehr", in: *Collected Essays in Commemoration of Torazo Ninagawa's 70th Birthday, Present Days' Economy and Statistics*, Tokyo-Kyoto 1968, pp. 310-311.

33) Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik*, Stuttgart und Düsseldorf 1957, S. 8.

34) Wolfgang Zorn, "Wirtschafts- und sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge der deutschen Reichsgründungszeit (1850-1879)", in: *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, hrsg. von H.-U. Wehler, S. 269.

35) Ralf Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland*, München 1965, S. 74.

the Prussian Prime Minister was Imperial Chancellor (Reichskanzler), the government was responsible only to the Emperor, and the Federal Council (Bundesrat), of which chairman was the Imperial Chancellor, was commanded by the representatives from Prussia. The Prussian hegemony in this new German empire and the federalistic particularism in the empire were in reciprocal relationships. This framework was so constructed that the Junker class holding the sway over Prussia by the Three-class Franchise Law such as unequal, indirect and open election system in the Prussian Lower House, could well protect their own interests, based on the above-mentioned mechanism, even in the whole empire where there was the Imperial Diet (Reichstag) to be operated through its universal, direct and secret election systems. Moreover the authoritative position of the Junker class had two great supports *in the army and bureaucracy* which formed the corner-stones of state power.

(2) Junker Estates Ownership in the East Elbe

The material foundation of the mechanism of the Junker-Prussian Rule was none other than the Junker estates ownership in the East Elbe, where the semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom — the surplus value in the Junker's hands — predominated.

The typical categories of farm labourers on the Junkerdom were (I) the labourers "bound by contract" — "Instleute", "Deputanten" and "Gesinde". (a) Instleute ("attached labourers") meant (1) those hired by the estates owner on the basis of annual contracts including their whole family: (2) to whom a garden-plot of about 1 morgen (25.2 ares) in the neighbourhood of their cottages and a ridge of 1–2 morgens in the farming field were allotted and crops like corns, potatoes, vegetables, and flax, etc. were raised on those allotments: (3) grazing privileges were approved: (4) wood and feed were in kind given: (5) money wages to the extent of pocket money for temporary works etc. were paid: (6) a certain threshing portion (Dreschanteil) which was a share for threshing labour in the winter as a most important earning, was paid and this constituted the nucleus of the community of interest (Interessengemeinschaft) between the Junkers and Instleute: (7) for the above-mentioned rights, Instleute were obliged to work with their own scythes and flails etc. and it was not until such time when these instruments of labour on the part of Instleute and the instruments of labour like main farm implements and machines for cultivation, cropping, refining, and work-cattles etc. on the part of the landlord were combined together that the labour-process could be carried on: (8) ordinarily Instleute were obliged to supply one or two extra hands as subsidiary labourers (Scharwerker) to the landlord either by using family members or employing people from outside: (9) moreover all of these above-mentioned relationships between the Junkers and Instleute were backed up by the jurisdictions inherent in the Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke) of the Junkers, and thus their reproduction was evidently guaranteed by the intervention of *extra-economic pressures* (*außerökonomischer Zwang*)³⁶. (b) On the

36) Vgl. M. Weber, "Die Verhältnisse der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland", *Schriften*

other hand Deputanten ("deputat labourers") came to the forefront after the mid-19th century, particularly during the period of the "Great Depression" accompanied with the agricultural crisis, replacing Instleute. The former threshing portion (Dreschanteil) was replaced then with a certain quantity of allowance in kind (Deputat). So, the objective conditions to form the community of interest (Interessengemeinschaft) with the Junkers were narrowed, the point of which distinguished this category of Deputanten from Instleute. (c) Similarly Gesinde ("unmarried domestic servants") were those labourers who were "bound by contract" and that well-acquainted Domestic Servant Regulations (Gesindeordnungen) were none other than a *policy* to be applicable not merely to Gesinde but also to all of these labourers. (II) The "free" labourers were those category of labourers who were temporarily engaged in seasonal work during the busy farming season like day-labourers. The point which we should not fail to note is the fact that, as the number of migratory labourers from the East Elbe to the West Elbe at the closing period of the 19th century increased, the number of foreign seasonal labourers — particularly Polish — began to increase gradually, taking the place of the German seasonal labourers. (III) In the meantime the trend of the relationships between the Junkers and Instleute to develop into those between the Junkers and Deputanten was an accommodated counter-move which was formed by reorganizing the former semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom for the purpose of checking the formation of the relationships between the Junkers and "free" labourers to be caused by dissolution of the relationships between the Junkers and Instleute — in short, for the purpose of checking a transformation which might give rise to a capitalistic reformation of Junkerdom. This relationship between the Junkers and Deputanten carried a commanding significance in the labour relations of Junkerdom from about the mid-World War I to the time of land reform in East Germany of the post World War II³⁷⁾.

Now, if we mention here *the dominant rule of the Junkers in their Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke)* which supported production relations of Junkerdom, the Prussian local government law of 1853 allowed the Junkers to hold the power of police and jurisdiction in their Estates Districts³⁸⁾. Though the new Prussian local government

des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Bd. 55, Leipzig 1892, SS. 13–18: Ders., "Entwicklungstendenzen in der Lage der ostelbischen Landarbeiter", *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Tübingen 1924, SS. 479–490.

37) Vgl. Constantin von Dietze, *Die ostdeutsche Landarbeiterverhältnisse seit der Revolution*, Berlin 1922, S. 54. Dietze pointed out that the early period of the Weimar Republic was characterized by the formation of the unified stratum of Deputanten as the principal farm labourers under Junkerdom (Vgl. *ibid.*, SS. 191–192, 227).

Besides, speaking of the relationships between the Junkers and Deputanten, it should be considered, as referred to in the Epilogue, that their historical characteristics underwent a change in quality after the collapse of the mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule due to the bourgeois revolution in 1918 and the transition to the Weimar Republic and above all after the extinction of *extra-economic pressures* which guaranteed the reproduction of the semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom owing to the dissolution of the Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke).

law of 1891 prescribed the incorporation of the Estates Districts into a local government, because this incorporation required the approval from the Circle Executive Committee (Kreisausschuß), of which seats were institutionally occupied by the Junkers in majority, only 641 of 15,612 Estates Districts went out of existence by the time of World War I³⁸⁾. P. Molt made a statement that "it meant that *the status-hierarchy* of Prussian autonomy could continue its full operation without collapsing until the revolution in 1918."⁴⁰⁾

Furthermore, *the dominance of the Junkers in the army and bureaucracy* which were the corner-stones of state power, in spite of the development of the phenomenon of so-called "conversion of the Junkers into the bourgeois" (Verbürgerlichung des Junkers)⁴¹⁾, began to be reinforced as a result of the phenomenon as so-called "Junkerization of the bourgeoisie" (Verjunkerung der Bourgeoisie)⁴²⁾, or "feudal-

38) Vgl. Peter Molt, *Der Reichstag vor der improvisierten Revolution*, Köln und Opladen 1963, S. 118. And with respect to their *legislation* the patrimonial jurisdiction of the feudal lords was already abrogated by the Regulations of 2 January 1849. For further information see, Kiyoshi Suekawa, "About the Rights of »Obrigkeit« of the Owners of Knight's Estates in Prussia", *Ritsumeikan Bungaku*, No. 228, 1964, p. 43.

39) P. Molt, *op. cit.*, S. 119.

40) *Ibid.*, S. 119. As to the Estates Districts see, Okio Murase, *The Contemporary History of Germany*, Tokyo, 1954, pp. 23–24. He made the following statement: "Gutsbezirke is a political remnant of the feudal rule of the peasantry through Gutsherrschaft (Landlord's Estates) in the 20th century. Administratively speaking, its position is at a lower level than Circle (Kreis) and is a local autonomy of low class which is on an equal with a village (Landgemeinde) or a small town. Gutsbezirk is an administrative unit which is independent from village administration, taxation, etc. and the chief executive of the said district is the Gutsvorsteher (Chief of Estates). He handles the administration within his district as a private affair in fact and the inhabitants there are not allowed to assert their rights. When his district covers more than 1,000 morgen (about 250 hectares), this can form the regional lower police jurisdiction district (Amtsbezirk), regardless of the number of inhabitants there. In this case the Chief of Estates also assumes the post of the chief of police jurisdiction (Amtsvorsteher). He also engages in the lower court serving as public prosecutor's assistant. In this way, holding both administrative power and police power in his hand, he makes himself an absolute lord in his district, participating even in the judgements of the court. In addition he is held responsible for the control and administration of roads, bridges, etc. in his district and especially when there is a church or a school in his district, he has the patronage of the church (Kirchenpatronat) and the patronage of the school (Schulpatronat)." (Vgl. Schoplick, *Das Recht der Gutsbezirke in Preußen*, Berlin 1910, SS. 7 ff.).

41) According to E. Engelberg, owing to the "revolution from above" in 1866–71 "the decisive steps were taken towards the gradual transformation of the Prussian feudal-bureaucracy monarchy into the bourgeois monarchy which was embodied in the form of the Bonapartistic dictatorship of Bismarck". (Ernst Engelberg, "Zur Entstehung und historischen Stellung des preußisch-deutschen Bonapartismus", in: *Beiträge zum neuen Geschichtsbild*, hrsg. von Fritz Klein und Joachim Streisand, Berlin 1956, S. 246). Moreover he pointed out that on the transition of the form of rule from absolutism to Bonapartism, what is especially important is the very process of the conversion of the nobility, above all their upper strata, into the bourgeois. (*Ibid.*, S. 237). When we indicate the phenomenon of the "conversion of the Junker into the bourgeois", we have a grasp, having a different viewpoint from Engelberg's, that the semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom were still carried on, basically speaking, even after the establishment of the new German empire.

izing« of the bourgeoisie” (»Feudalisierung« des Bürgertum)⁴³⁾.

In the Prussian army the patriarchal relationships between officers of Junker origin and soldiers of 3 years' service of Instleute origin, constituted the principal axis. But as the flowing out of the rural population and the accumulation of the proletariat in towns were accelerated, the relative weight of soldiers of proletarian origin became greater, and the dissolution of the Insten-stratum in the East Elbe which had been a principal supply source of soldiers, was facilitated on account of the agricultural crisis which was an undercurrent of the "Great Depression". Thus, the Prussian militaristic monarchy shifted the supporting point to maintain Prussianism (Preußentum) in the army from the former Instleute soldiers stratum to the reserve officers corps of the "new feudalized bourgeoisie"⁴⁴⁾. After the 1880's the materialization of the reserve officer system was facilitated and in that way it was intended to make it possible to reinforce troops while maintaining Prussianism⁴⁵⁾.

Similarly the dominance of the Junkers in the bureaucracy was reinforced⁴⁶⁾, and particularly marked was the development of reactionary policies by Robert Puttkamer, Minister of the Interior from 1881 to 1888: (I) coupled with the above-mentioned policy of promoting the reserve officer system as an impetus to create the "type of new German feudal bourgeois"⁴⁷⁾, (II) among administrative officials the way of promotion to a higher rank was only open to those who had experience as reserve officers and among the judicial officials a policy of alienating those who had liberal ideas in politics was put into effect, e.g. by taking steps to reduce the numbers of the court of justice⁴⁸⁾. It is seen in the so-called "feudalizing of the bureau-

42) Oskar Stillich, *Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland*, Bd. II, Der Liberalismus, Leipzig 1911, S. 105.

43) F. Zunkel, *op. cit.*, S. 249.

44) E. Kehr, "Zur Genesis des Königlich Preußischen Reserveoffiziers (1928)", in: ders., *Der Primat der Innenpolitik*, S. 59.

45) Vgl. *ibid.*, SS. 53-63.

46) The average percentage of the Junkers in Prussia during the period covering 1888-1914 was reported as follows: 27% of Chiefs of Circle (Landrat): 34% of Presidents of Governmental District [subdivision of a province] (Regierungspräsident): 38% of Presidents of Province (Oberpräsident). (Lysbeth Walker Muncy, *The Junker in the Prussian Administration under William II. 1888-1914*, Providence 1944, p. 191). As G. Gothein reached the conclusion that "in the last analysis Prussia is ruled by the Landrat" (Georg Gothein, *Agrarpolitisches Handbuch*, Berlin 1910-11, S. 453, zit. von L. W. Muncy, *op. cit.*, p. 180), the Landrat was the stronghold of the Junker class in the East Elbe. See O. Murase, *op. cit.*, pp. 45 ff.

47) E. Kehr, "Das soziale System der Reaktion in Preußen unter dem Ministerium Puttkamer", in: ders., *Der Primat der Innenpolitik*, S. 73.

48) It is pointed out also by H. Rosenberg that such a *project* to secure the political uniformity of administrative as well as judicial officialdom was accelerated under the direction of Bismarck, taking advantage of the changing political and economic circumstances during the period of the "Great Depression", and a kind of personnel administration to alienate any one who was in possession of liberal intentions, was carried out in the thoroughgoing Prussian manner for the purpose of "unification" (Gleichschaltung), particularly in Prussia in 1880's. (Vgl. H. Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, SS. 140-141, 180).

cracy"⁴⁹) or conversion of the bureaucracy into *public servants* in the interests of the "tendency towards feudalizing the bourgeoisie"⁵⁰): (III) moreover the institution of the entailed estate (Fideikommiß) began to play more and more important part as an impetus to expedite the "feudalizing of the bourgeoisie" or the "Junkerization of the bourgeoisie"⁵¹, coping with the increasingly frequent replacements of the owners of Knight's Estates (Rittergutsbesitzer)⁵².

In this way at the closing period of the 19th century the "ennoblement" (Nobilitierung) of the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie through the establishment of Fideikommiße was expedited, and by including them as the "new nobility" (Neuadel)⁵³ in the authoritative-hierarchical social structure of the Bismarck Regime which was prescribed by Max Weber as the "social preference of the landownership"⁵⁴, Prussian land policy began to develop in order to fortify a bulwark for Junker-Prussian rule. Max Weber concentrated his severe criticism on Prussian land policy⁵⁵. His matter of concern was the reorganization of the social structure of Imperial Germany in which the mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule was still maintained, and he considered that the very attempt to reform the distribution of landownership in the East Elbe by expediting internal colonization and to dissolve Junkerdom operating as a supply source of the army and bureaucracy which formed the corner-stones of the state power of Imperial Germany, would provide the principal impetus for such reorganization. It was disclosed by his analysis of the Fideikommiße that Prussian land policy was quite contradictory in nature to the facilitation of the above-mentioned internal colonization.

Be the matter as it may, the development of the phenomena such as the "Junkerization of the bourgeoisie" or "»feudalizing« of the bourgeoisie" in the Bismarck Regime implied that the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie was included in the mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule as the "new nobility" and that this very stratum of the "new nobility" was the social stratum who came to prominence with the fall of Bismarck as a turning point and who was a major driving force for the "Policy of Uniting" (Sammlungspolitik), i.e. "*Junker-Bourgeois imperialism*". This reorganization of the ruling class was not what promoted the dissolution of the social structure of the Bismarck Regime, it was rather nothing but the materialization of the inten-

49) E. Kehr, *op cit.*, S. 68.

50) *Ibid.*, S. 80.

51) Vgl. E. Kehr, *op. cit.*, SS. 64-86; Yasutoshi Ueyama, "German Policy and Society 1871-1918", *Kyoto Law Review (HOGAKURONSO)*, (Pt. 1-5), Vol. 83, No. 1, 2, 4, 5 and Vol. 84, No. 2, 1968; in addition see E. Ohno, "German Economic Policy in Transition: The Policy of Uniting (Sammlung) versus Radical Union", *The Kyoto University Economic Review*, Vol. XXXV, No. 1, 1965, pp. 20-41.

52) Cf. L.W. Muncy, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

53) F. Zunkel, *op. cit.*, S. 132.

54) M. Weber, "Agrarstatist. u. socialpol. Betrachtungen z. Fideikommißfrage in Preußen", *G. A. S. S.*, S. 359 Anm.

55) Cf. Kazuhiko Sumiya, *Friedrich List and Max Weber*, Tokyo 1969, pp. 287 ff.

tion to reorganize and reinforce the Bismarck Regime⁵⁶).

(3) The Types of Bourgeoisie

Thus we can find the principal type of bourgeoisie in the Bismarck Regime in the above-mentioned bourgeoisie who assumed the behaviour of pro-Junker. Besides, when we take note that such a type of bourgeoisie who assumed contrariwise the behaviour of anti-Junker carries some significance, we would like to contend that what is essential, is the formation of the types of bourgeoisie, i.e. if their foundations of accumulation are to be further considered, then naturally the formation of the types of capital⁵⁷), instead of allowing to grasp the German bourgeoisie sweepingly as a homogeneous entity in nature. Suggestively, K.E. Born pointed out that, although it was possible to find a group which could be summarized by a general concept such as the "citizen class" (Bürgertum) at the time of the establishment of the empire, on the eve of World War I there no longer existed such a "citizen class" as a status or social stratum⁵⁸), and they were split into separate groups, none of them having any common social denominator, as a result of an intense differentiation of economic, social and political interests. The following information gives a good indication of this state of affairs. For example, the iron and steel industry, the textile industry and the chemical industry had almost equal weight respectively in the Central Association of German Industrialists which was a kind of pressure group of the bourgeoisie formed in 1875, while the greater part of the chemical industry and the textile industry who were disunited in 1895, formed a Union of Industrialists by themselves including the various finished products' industry⁵⁹), and setted forward different line of policies⁶⁰). Viewed from the aspect of the formation of the types of German bourgeoisie, it becomes only possible to arrive at a rational understanding of the intricate circumstances under which the left-wing block, as widely known, "from Bebel to Bassermann" was formed on the eve of World War I and owing to the subsequent conversion of the Center Party a new parliamentary majority in the Imperial Diet, which became to be a *prototype of the Weimar Coalition*, came into existence⁶¹).

56) About the point that the phenomenon of the "ennoblement" (Nobilitierung) of capital was observed not only in Germany but also in England, but that its meaning in Germany was quite different from that in England, see R. Dahrendorf, *op. cit.*, SS. 63-64.

57) Eiji Ohno and Kazuhiko Sumiya, "Analysis of German Capitalism and »Types of Capital«", *Shiso*, Pt. 1: Vol. 476, No. 2, 1964 and Pt. 2: Vol. 488, No. 2, 1965; Akihiko Yoshioka, "An Analysis on the »Final Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Depression of Trade and Industry, 1886«", in: Takenobu Kawashima and Tomoo Matsuda, ed., *Types of National Economy*, Tokyo 1968, p. 234. It is very suggestive for our viewpoint, that according to the indication of A. Yoshioka, "the question of two different lines in Britain each making an approach towards Imperialism — Liberal Imperialism on the one hand and Social Imperialism on the other hand — based on the mutually antagonistic interests between the types of capital in the empire" is raised in the said report relating to the "Great Depression" in the British empire.

58) K. E. Born, *op. cit.*, S. 279.

59) *Ibid.*, S. 282.

60) Vgl. H. Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, SS. 149-150.

(4) The Types of Labour Relations

Lastly we shall refer to the problem of the types of labour relations under the Bismarck Regime. Now, the following three points may be indicated as economic moments expediting mutual penetration by integrating the heterogeneous economic circulations in the East and West Elbe: (I) commodity circulation, particularly the exchange of industrial products from Western Germany with agricultural products from Eastern Germany⁶²); (II) investment of the surplus value in the Junker's hands in Eastern Germany in West German industry through the intermediary of bank capital or the Securities Exchange⁶³); and investment of part of the industrial profits gained by West German industry in East German land⁶⁴). In this sense furtherance of the "conversion of the Junkers into the »bourgeois«" and "Junkerization of the bourgeoisie": (III) Migration of labourers. What gives rise to a problem here is the movement of labourers particularly from Eastern Germany to Western Germany. In this movement of labourers are found two types: the one is the type of temporary migrant labourers and the other the type of migrant labourers whos settle down. The movement to Western Germany of farm labourers away from Junkerdom in the East Elbe played the role of bringing down the wage level in Western Germany, which consequently narrowed the home market and made the extent of dependency of German industry upon the foreign market greater.

In the meanwhile the movement of labourers from Eastern Germany to Western Germany began to be conspicuous particularly after German unification⁶⁵). They moved from the East Elbe provinces such as East Prussia, West Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, Posen, etc. first to the industrial regions of Berlin and Saxony, and then to the industrial region in Rhine-Westphalia. During the period of the "Great Depression" the number of emigrants to the U.S.A. and so forth surpassed by far the number of internal migrants from the East to the West, but after the period of the "Great Depression" this relative weight was reversed⁶⁶) and a considerable

61) Vgl. George W. F. Hallgarten, *Imperialismus vor 1914*, Bd. II, München 1951, S. 326.

62) Reference should be made here with respect to the facilitation to form the home market due to the construction of the railway network and the close correlation between the construction of the railway network in the East and the iron and steel industry in the West. (Vgl. W. Zorn, *op. cit.*, S. 260).

63) For the time being the participation in stock speculation for the construction of the railway network by the Junkers in East Elbe may be pointed out (Vgl. W. Zorn, *op. cit.*, S. 260).

64) What should be remembered in this connection is the view maintained by Max Weber with respect to the typical nature of the German bourgeoisie: he disclosed the inner relationships between the rapidly increasing establishment of Fideikommiße in the closing period of the 19th century and the "Nobilitierung" of the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie. He pointed out that this phenomenon has a correlation with the historical nature of the social structure of the Bismarck Regime, making a statement that "the tendency of bourgeois capital towards landaquisition lies not only in the East, but it is a quite general tendency and it could be weakened only when the *social* preference of landownership came to disappear." (M. Weber, *op. cit.*, S. 359 Anm.).

65) Hiroshi Fujise, *Formation of Modern German Agriculture*, Tokyo 1967, pp. 452-453.

66) K. E. Born, *op. cit.*, S. 272.

decrease in overseas emigration and a marked increase in internal migration from East to West were noted⁶⁷). If the inflow of migrant labourers to the Ruhr coal mining region is further examined, the total number of coal miners in the Ruhr coal mining region originally coming from the East Elbe was as few as 16 in all according to the population statistics in 1861, while according to the statistics in 1893 the corresponding figure was as many as 34,928 and among them the total number of coal miners whose mother tongue was Polish, was as many as 17,919. So those miners originally from the East Elbe played their part next to those local miners from Rhine-Westphalia⁶⁸). In this connection it should be noted that this movement of labourers also played a role in the maintenance of "patriarchal (Herr-im-Hause) labour relations".

Generally speaking, the changes in the labour-process resulting from the progressively higher organic composition of capital due to the development of modern mechanical industry and the advance of the division of labour in the interior of a factory tended to dissolve the subordinate labour relations of the old type and gradually caused the reorganization of the old type into rational labour relations of the new type and made labourers of the new type specialized in performing partial work, come to the forefront taking the place of the labourers of the old type engaged in manifold work and characterized by craftsman. Even after the transition to the factory system was completed, however, on many occasions patriarchal relations such as "master-journeyman-apprentice"-relations which were typically in a craft remained with tenacity in the form of the intermediary master system (Zwischenmeistersystem) or contract master system (Akkordmeistersystem) in the course of the reorganization of the contract system in the interior of a factory, and the functions of a master which were commonly described as "absolute rule by a master" (absolute Meisterherrschaft)⁶⁹) over gang labourers (Kolonnenarbeiter) played the role of supporting subordinate labour relations of the old type, i.e. the so-called "patriarchal standpoint" (Herr-im-Hause-Standpunkt). Now, what played the corresponding part of the intermediate master system or contract master system in the interior of a factory in the labour relations in the interior of a coal mine, was the function of the face boss (Ortsältester) and foreman (Steiger) over a miners-gang (Kameradschaft). Relations supporting labour discipline, which might well be called "coal mine militarism" (Grubenmilitarismus), were found there⁷⁰).

Needless to say, from the closing period of the 19th century toward the early 20th century the development of labour movements and the expansion of trade

67) H. Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, S. 40.

68) Lorenz Pieper, "Die Lage der Bergarbeiter im Ruhrrevier", *Münchener Volkswirtschaftliche Studien*, 58. Stück, Stuttgart und Berlin 1930, S. 69.

69) Conrad Matschoss u. Georg Schlesinger, *Ludw. Loewe & Co. Actiengesellschaft Berlin 1869-1929*, Berlin 1930, S. 69.

70) Ernst Michel, *Sozialgeschichte der industriellen Arbeitswelt*, 4. Auflage, Frankfurt am Main 1960, S. 130.

unions came to promote gradual reorganization for rational labour relations of the new type⁷¹). Yet the subordinate labour relations of the old type based on the "Herr-im-Hause-Standpunkt" which could be compared with Junker rule in the Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke) in the East Elbe, were still predominant. Otto Jeidels made it clear, inquiring about 60 works in the iron and steel industry in Rhine-Westphalia at the beginning of the 20th century, that the labourers were only individually concerned in the matter of deciding the piece wages of the modern industry, the tendency to deny any collective agreement with labour organizations was predominant, and there existed no organized agreement about the wage rate⁷²). In general, it was not until the bourgeois revolution in 1918 and the transition to the Weimar Republic were carried out that wage rate agreements came to be concluded by collective bargaining on the principle of equal rights for employers and employees and rational labour relations of the new type could be established. After the November Revolution a new stage was marked in the labour relations through the extensive effectuation of wage rate agreements and the enactment of the Works Council Law (Betriebsrätegesetz) on 4 February 1920.

Epilogue

The German defeat in World War I resulted in the collapse of "Junker-Bourgeois imperialism" and the mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule which had composed the nucleus of the Bismarck Regime was broken down owing to *the bourgeois revolution* in 1918 and the transition to the Weimar Republic⁷³). The full stop was clearly put by (I) the proclamation of the Council of People's Commissars (Rat der Volksbeauftragten) on 12 November 1918 and the abrogation of the Prussian Three-class Franchise Law through the Reich Electoral Law (Reichswahlgesetz) on 30 November 1918 and (II) the signing of the Weimar Constitution (Reichsverfassung) on 11 August 1919 and its promulgation on 14 August. Moreover a series of the following measures should also be noted. (III) The abrogation of Domestic Servants Regulations (Gesindeordnungen) and Saving Clauses against

71) For example, a number of the following labour movements should be recalled: the general strike of moulders in 1890 which was the first one in the history of the metal workers' movement in Berlin: the strike of moulders in Berlin in 1904: the coal mine disputes in the Ruhr in 1889 and 1905. The organized percentage of the total number of miners after the Ruhr coal mine dispute in 1905 was as much as 70%: in particular about 100,000 miners belonged to the Old Union of the Social Democratic Party, about 66,000 miners to the Trade Union of Christian Miners, about 25,000 miners to the Polish Craft Union and about 2,000 miners to the Hirsch-Duncker's Trade Union. See also E. Ohno, *German Capitalism*, pp. 265-266, 305, 329-330, 351-353.

72) Otto Jeidels, *Die Methoden der Arbeiterentlohnung in der rheinisch-westfälischen Eisenindustrie*, Berlin 1907, SS. 147-149.

73) Cf. Hisashi Sekiguchi, "German Revolution 1918-1923, Some Crucial Problems: Social, Economic and Ideological", *The Journal of Economics (KEIZAIGAKU-RONSO)*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1968, pp. 19-55; Hisao Otsuka, "The Present and the Duality of Nationalism", in; *National Economy, Collected Works of Hisao Otsuka*, Vol. 6, Tokyo 1969, pp. 314-315.

Agricultural Labourers (Ausnahmebestimmungen gegen die Landarbeiter) due to the proclamation of the Council of People's Commissars on 12 November 1918. Thereafter organizations of agricultural labourers began to make rapid progress⁷⁴⁾. (IV) The promulgation of the Reich Land Settlement Law (Reichssiedlungsgesetz) on 11 August 1919: Thus the lines of the land reform to divide Junker estates in the East Elbe was restrained and the lines of the internal colonization policy began to be materialized. (V) Abolition of the regalian rights (Bergregal) in Prussia due to the law of 19 October 1920. (VI) Compulsory Dissolution Decree (Zwangsaufhebungsverordnung) of the Fideikommiße (entailed estates) in Prussia on 19 November 1920: each one of these was put into effect according to the prescription in Article 155 of the Weimar Constitution⁷⁵⁾. (VII) Lastly the dissolution of the Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke) in Prussia according to the law of 27 December 1927, which was of the most outstanding significance. This meant the fulfilment of an item of the proclamation of the Prussian Government on 13 November 1918 and it was noted that it was carried out so as to unify and improve the administration of local governments and also to vest the rights of communal election in the estates-inhabitants⁷⁶⁾. In those days there were about 12,000 Estates Districts which had a population of about 1,500,000 — 4% of the population of Prussia proper⁷⁷⁾ and an area of about 8,470,000 hectares — 29% of the area of Prussia⁷⁸⁾. These Estates Districts were dissolved and were either integrated into other local governments or transformed into new separate local governments. Only those Estates Districts, to which these procedures were not applicable on account of geographical circumstances or some other reasons, were left as they were⁷⁹⁾. About

74) For instance, the total number of members of the German Agricultural Labourers' Union which was established in 1909 and belonged to the Free Trade Union of the Social Democratic Party, was no more than about 17,000 in 1912 and about 10,000 in 1918, but in 1921 it counted as many as about 780,000. Again the total number of members of the Central Union of Agricultural Labourers which was established in 1912 and belonged to the Trade Union of Christian Labourers of the Center Party, was no more than about 3,000 in 1913 and about 7,000 in 1918, but it counted as many as about 150,000 in 1921. (C. von Dietze, *op. cit.*, SS. 28–35).

75) Yasaka Takagi, Sanji Suenobu & Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, ed., *Collected Human Rights Declarations*, Tokyo 1957, pp. 213–214.

76) Heinz Maull, *Die Landgemeindeordnungen Preussens*, 2. Auflage, Berlin 1930, SS. 173–174.

77) Population in the Estates Districts occupies no small weight, if compared with the proportion of rural population or with that of the population in the Eastern Provinces. For example, during the period prior to World War I, it is said that 20% of the rural population in Prussia, 36% of the total population of Pomerania, 28% of the total population of Posen lived in the Estates Districts in subordination to the landlords without having any communal autonomy of their own. (P. Molt, *op. cit.*, S. 119).

78) If about 12,000 of the total number of Estates Districts are to be subdivided according to the number of inhabitants, the following composition is obtainable: no inhabitants ... 269: 1–50 inhabitants ... 3,118: 51–100 inhabitants ... 3,163: 101–150 inhabitants ... 2,235: 151–200 inhabitants ... 1,276: more than 200 inhabitants ... 1,800. (H. Maull, *op. cit.*, S. 174).

79) Victor von Leyden, "Wandlungen im Gemeinderecht", in: *Recht und Staat im neuen Deutschland*, hrsg. von Bernhard Harms, Bd. I, Berlin 1929, SS. 329–330.

450 Estates Districts which were left were assumed to be mostly covered with huge forests⁸⁰). It should be brought to our careful attention that the dissolution of these Estates Districts meant *the extinction of extra-economic pressures* which had guaranteed the reproduction of the semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom, and was *a reformation to demolish the basic framework of Junker-Prussian rule*, together with the abrogation of the Prussian Three-class Franchise Law.

H. Rosenberg also made the following statement. "The politically exceptional position [of the Junker class] which was connected with the Three-class Franchise Law [of the Prussian Lower House] and the control of the Upper House was maintained successfully up to 1918. It was in 1927 that the final demolition of the *administrative* remnants of the Gutsherrschaft (Landlord's Estates) resulted from the dissolution of the Knight's Estates [Estates Districts] as independent communal-and local police districts. Thus it was by the Weimar Republic that the big-landowners (Großagrarier) were deprived of their aristocratic status-privileges and the symbols of their exclusive domination."⁸¹) Therefore, it should be considered, that the *change in quality* of the social structure of "pseudo-Bonapartism" and its *bourgeois transformation* were at long last carried out by the bourgeois revolution of 1918 and the transition to the Weimar Republic.

In the meantime composite protective customs for agricultural and industrial products were established in August 1925 and monopoly capital intended to form a new solidarity bloc with the Junker class, besides including the peasantry in their bloc. This *second solidarity protectionism*, as it were, was formed, but the Junker class occupied a weaker position on the post-war stage than monopoly capital, while the peasants' position was then just improved⁸²). But the system composed of a compromise between *the high customs tariff for corn* (interests of the Junker class and big peasants) and *the low customs tariff for feedstuff* (interests of the middle-and small peasants) came to collapse in the midst of the new agricultural crisis which accompanied the crisis of 1929. Then the line of policy which was primarily to protect the interests of the Junker class and big peasants was actively carried out, and *the extensive strata of middle-and small peasants* were driven out of the framework of this second solidarity protectionism. For this reason a great part of the strata of the old and new middle classes, not to speak of those peasantry who used to support *Nazi ruralism* enthusiastically, turned to the Nazi camp *in a landslide manner*, and formed the social basis for the *rise* of German fascism. Thus accomplishing "a meteoric ascent"⁸³) in the Diet (Reichstag) election by means of a clever appeal to the economic and psychological interests of the social strata who were in distress economically as well as psychologically in the midst of that depression, above all

80) H. Maull, *op. cit.*, S. 174; H. Sekiguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

81) H. Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierung der Rittergutsbesitzerklasse", in: *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, hrsg. von H. -U. Wehler, SS. 293-294.

82) Cf. A. Gerschenkron, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-118.

83) K. D. Bracher, *op. cit.*, S. 359.

the strata of the old and new middle classes, the Nazis seized power by linking up with the ruling classes i.e. the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie and the Junker class.