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**THE SOCIAL BASIS OF NAZISM**

By Eiji OHNO\*

I

Passing through the 1918 Revolution, the collapse of the authoritative-hierarchical social structure which was prescribed by Max Weber as "the *social preference of the land ownership*"<sup>1)</sup> led to Weimar Republic,<sup>2)</sup> but this Weimar Republic fell, as is well-known, into a critical condition through the impact of the World Economic Crisis of 1929 and soon invited the establishment of Nazi dictatorship. In the transition period from the destruction of Weimar Republic to the formation of Nazi dictatorship special attention has to be paid to the phenomenon that Nazi vote dramatically increased in the diet (Reichstag)-election with the 1929 Crisis as a turning point. As given in Table 1<sup>3)</sup>, the Nazis

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1) Max Weber, *Agrarstatistische und sozialpolitische Betrachtungen zur Fideikommißfrage in Preußen (1904)*, in: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, Tübingen 1924, S. 359 Anm.

2) Hisashi Sekiguchi, *German Revolution and Fascism*, in: "KEIZAIGAKU RONSŌ" (*The Journal of Economics*), Vol. 34, No. 2, 1968; Hajime Shinohara, *Introduction to the History of German Revolution*, Tokyo 1956; Eiji Ohno, *German Capitalism*, Tokyo 1965.

3) Meinrad Hagmann, *Der Weg ins Verhängnis, Reichstagswahlergebnisse 1919 bis 1933 besonders aus Bayern*, München 1946, S. 9.

TABLE 1 Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties in the Diet (Reichstag)-Election (1919~1932)

Diet (Reichstag)-Election of	Number of qualified persons (Unit : 1,000)	Percentage of Vote	NSDAP and Nationalistic Movement	DNVP	DVP	DDP (=DSP)	Zentrum BVP CVP	SPD USPD	KPD	DBP WP BBB	Other Parties
19. 1. 1919	36,766.5	83.0	—	8.6	4.4	18.1	18.8	45.5	—	0.9	0.7
6. 6. 1920	35,949.8	79.2	—	15.1	13.9	8.3	19.1	39.6	2.1	1.1	0.8
4. 5. 1924	38,375.0	77.4	6.6	19.5	9.2	5.6	16.6	21.3	12.6	2.4	6.2
7. 12. 1924	38,987.3	78.8	3.0	20.5	10.1	6.3	17.3	26.4	8.9	3.3	4.2
20. 5. 1928	41,224.7	75.6	3.5	14.3	8.7	4.9	15.2	29.8	10.6	6.1	6.9
14. 9. 1930	42,957.7	82.0	18.3	7.0	4.5	3.8	14.9	24.5	13.1	4.9	9.0
31. 7. 1932	44,226.8	84.0	37.2	5.9	1.2	1.0	15.7	21.6	14.3	0.8	2.3
6. 11. 1932	44,373.7	80.6	33.1	8.3	1.9	1.0	15.0	20.4	16.9	0.7	2.7

NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei  
(National Socialist German Labour Party)

DNVP Deutschnationale Volkspartei  
(German National Peoples Party)

DVP Deutsche Volkspartei  
(German Peoples Party)

DDP Deutsche Demokratische Partei  
(German Democratic Party)

DSP Deutsche Staatspartei  
(German State Party)

Zentrum (Center Party)

BVP Bayerische Volkspartei  
(Bavarian Peoples Party)

CVP Christliche Volkspartei  
(Christian Peoples Party)

SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands  
(Social Democratic Party of Germany)

USPD Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei  
Deutschlands  
(Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany)

KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands  
(Communist Party of Germany)

DBP Deutsche Bauernpartei  
(German Peasant Party)

WP Wirtschaftspartei  
(Economic Party)

BBB Bayerische Bauern-(und Mittelstands) Bund  
(Bavarian Peasant-(and Middle Class) Union)

achieved a tremendous increment from a small, right-wing and aggressive sect into a mass movement based on a broad social basis in only a few years. It has been made clear by analysis of a series of election statistics conducted at the end of 1920's through the beginning of 1930's—"graduator for force in class struggle"<sup>4)</sup>—that the behaviour of the middle class (Mittelstand) offers a key for understanding such a rise of Nazism.<sup>5)</sup>

It had originally been pointed out that the social carriers and supporters of Nazi movement were the middle class people first of all<sup>6)</sup> but "meteoric rise"<sup>7)</sup> of the Nazis in the election of September, 1930, revealed so clear the basic changes of political situation of Weimar Republic that it became a matter of urgent necessity to make a study of the social basis of the rise of Nazism. One of those who pointed out the existence of the problem correctly and immediately after the election was Theodor Geiger.

He disclosed that the victory of the Nazi was brought about through a landslide shift of the middle class, the wide strata occupying a weight of 1/3 or more of total population of Germany, to the side of the Nazis and at the same time urged a need to develop policies including appropriate measures toward the middle class and steps against unemployment<sup>8)</sup>, anticipating that such a trend means a

4) Heinz Neumann, Die internationale Bedeutung der deutschen Reichstagswahl, Internationale Pressekorrespondenz Nr. 69 vom 15. August 1930, in: Theo Pirker, *Komintern und Faschismus 1920-1940*, Stuttgart 1965, S. 152.

5) Cf. Iring Fetscher, Zur Kritik des sowjetmarxistischen Faschismusbegriffs, in: *Von Weimar zu Hitler*, herausgegeben von Gotthard Jasper, Köln. Berlin 1968, S. 157. One example of analysis of such election statistics is Werner Stephan, Grenzen des nationalsozialistischen Vormarsches, in: *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Bd. 21, Berlin 1932. Refer to Okio Murase, The Political Trend of Peasants in the Age of Weimar Republic (1919-1932), in: "KEIEI TO RÖMU" (*Management and Labor*), ed. by Society in Commemoration of 60. birthday of Prof. Noda, Tokyo 1955.

6) Cf. H. Tittel, Die faschistische Gefahr in Süddeutschland, Internationale Pressekorrespondenz Nr. 243 vom 27. Dezember 1922, in: Th. Pirker, op. cit., S. 141 f.

7) Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik*, 2. Auflage, Stuttgart. Düsseldorf 1957, S. 359.

8) Cf. Theodor Geiger, Panik im Mittelstand, in: *Die Arbeit, Zeitschrift für Gewerkschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftskunde*, Berlin 1930, Heft 10, SS. 637-654. According to estimation by Th. Geiger in the study the old middle class was composed of 4,900,000 peasants (with 20 or less ha land), 3,070,000 artisans (with 10 or less journeymen), 2,300,000 merchants and 3,300,000 rentiers thus totaling 13,570,000 and the new middle class totals 9,932,000 which is broken down into 7,000,000 salaried employees, 2,300,000 civil servants, and 532,000 professionals. Accordingly overall middle class marked 23,502,000 after the old middle class is added to the new middle class, which composes 1/3 of the aggregate German population (ibid., S. 641 f.). After that Th. Geiger issued "*Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes*, Stuttgart 1932" in which he tried to make a deeper statistical analysis on the construction of social strata in Germany under the reign of Weimar Republic, established the weight of the middle class (ibid., S. 73), pointed then out, "The problem of the so-called middle class is now closely related to the problem of

mere explanation of a transitional panic situation of the middle class. The progress of the history, however, was switched to another line in the direction of "The Third Reich" with no effective policies taken shape in connection with policies for the middle class and policies to deal with the crisis by the Republic Government. The Nazis, which had risen by laying hold of the middle class, seized political power being tied up with the German ruling class including the upper bourgeoisie and the Junker class.

The middle class, which had still put confidence in Weimar Republic immediately after 1918 Revolution, faced an irrevocable ruin in the process of development of inflation policies and promotion of industrial rationalization movement and began trusting its aspiration to the Nazis which had advocated the so called "middle-class socialism" amid the "Great Depression" starting in 1929 Crisis being estranged from the Weimar Republic which lacked economic policies to protect the middle class. The "middle-class socialism" was composed of three main pillars: "peasant socialism" (Bauernsozialismus), "artisan socialism" (Handwerkersozialismus) and Nazi ruralism which aimed at establishment of a new type of "rurban community" as an intermediary ring connecting both the formers<sup>9)</sup>, and above all the Nazi Left pushed it to the front for the purpose of representing interests of the middle class which became radical.<sup>10)</sup>

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National Socialism." (ibid., S. 109), and extracted a fact that the economic distress for both the new and the old middle class had created a psychological situation aspiring petty bourgeois radicalism and such a psychological tendency of the middle class had a close connection with Nazi ideology (Cf. ibid., SS. 109-122). Besides this work by Th. Geiger attention has to be placed on the following work, which reveals the social basis of Nazi dictatorship before its establishment, Hans Jäger, Die Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei, Internationale Pressekorrespondenz Nr. 46 vom 3. Juni 1932, in: Th. Pirker, op. cit., SS. 158-167.

- 9) Arthur Schweitzer, *Big Business in the Third Reich*, Bloomington 1964, pp. 113, 201.  
 10) Cf. Reinhard Kühnl, *Die nationalsozialistische Linke*, Meisenheim am Glan 1966. The Nazi Left exhibited a platform to create a new peasantry through a land reform aiming to divide large land ownership in relation to the agrarian and land problem and at the same time to maintain the peasantry in the Autarkie system protected by protective tariff policy (ibid., SS. 79-85) and in respect to criticism of capitalistic system attention has to be paid on its stress put on solidarity of interests between the new middle class and the working class by hammering out policies against capitalism from viewpoint of the new and the old middle classes (ibid., SS. 67-70). However, even if the Nazi Left proposed expropriation of large land ownership or struggle against dictatorship of finance capital or ruling by capitalistic monopoly, it has to be kept in mind that "The left National Socialists represented essentially a socialism for petty bourgeoisie", as pointed out by R. Kühnl (ibid., S. 86), since they admitted in principle that private ownership of means of production has to be maintained (ibid., S. 64). One of those examples that pricks the reality of the pseudo-socialism of the Nazi Left led by Strasser Brothers is an address made by R. Hilferdings criticising G. Strasser at the diet (Reichstag) on May 11, 1932 (*Nationalsozialismus und Marxismus*, Rede [Rudolf] Hilferdings nach dem aml. Reichstagsstenogramm, Berlin 1932.).

As against this trend the party leaders led by Adolf Hitler which tried to seize power by entering into an alliance with the social upper class as well as appealing to all different groups of the middle class did not hesitate to sacrifice the interests of the broad middle class, their supporters, for the sake of coalition with the upper class<sup>11)</sup>. Accordingly, prior to the command of power by the Nazis the political lines of "middle-class socialism" stressed by the Nazis had been gradually deprived of their original meaning in parallel with restraint of the Nazi Left including exclusion of Otto Strasser group in summer, 1930 and purge of Gregor Strasser at the end of 1932 and after the seizure of power became in ruin with the Ernst Röhm purge of June 30, 1934 as the decisive turning point. After that, the public work policies, which took into account the interests of artisans, were moved backwards and the rearmament policies responding to interests of monopoly capitals came up to the surface<sup>12)</sup>.

Anyway, it might be said that an analysis of the behaviour of the middle class plays an indispensable role as a preparatory work for understanding the transition period from Weimar Republic to Nazi dictatorship. Ernst-August Roloff said, "September 14, 1930, was recorded in history as one of the most significant and disastrous fatal days of Weimar Republic."<sup>13)</sup> and established a question, "Who elected Hitler?", as "a thesis for socio-economic history of Weimar Republic". It seems to be of contemporary significance above all to shed light on the social basis of Nazism by carrying out further study from such a point of view<sup>14)</sup>.

11) Refer to R. Kühnl, op. cit., SS. 89, 135.

12) Cf. A. Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 160-162. Incidentally, Gerhard Kroll pointed out too that in the initial stage of Nazi Regime policies were changed from provision of work for unemployed (Arbeitsbeschaffung) to rearmament (Wiederaufrüstung) policies (G. Kroll, *Von der Weltwirtschaftskrise zur Staatskonjunktur*, Berlin 1958, SS. 467, 470, 473, 477 ff.), but Wolfram Fischer (*Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik 1918-1945*, Opladen 1968, SS. 62, 95) and Dieter Petzina (Hauptprobleme der deutschen Wirtschaftspolitik 1932/33, in: *Vierteljahrheft für Zeitgeschichte*, 15. Jahrgang 1967 1. Heft, SS. 43, 55) took a negative stand as to whether economic policies in the initial stage of Nazi Regime should be classified into two, the period of work-providing and rearmament and claim that policies of rearmament governed from the beginning. For example D. Petzina clarifies his conclusion as follows: "Despite of such an importance of agrarian sector and in this connection all the yields made toward agriculture, however, we have not disregard that economic policies had as a whole from the beginning a decide orientation to aim at rearmament which takes shape only by big industry. Therefore the dogmas and wishes for the peasantry and the middle classes, however important at the beginning these might be from tactical consideration, played only a secondary role and its significance disappeared soon after the period here inspected (accordingly after 1934)". (D. Petzina, op. cit., S. 55).

13) Ernst-August Roloff, Wer Wählte Hitler? in: *Politische Studien, Zweimonatsschrift für Zeitgeschichte und Politik*, München, 15. Jahrgang 1964 Heft 155, S. 293.

14) To take an example, the fact that National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), regarded as a Neo Nazi party, gained the

## II

In analyzing percentages of votes obtained by parties in the diet (Reichstag)-elections under Weimar Republic in accordance with Table 1, one can recognize three transitional phases. In the first phase the parties of Weimar Coalition (SPD, Zentrum, DDP) maintained a ruling stand with total percentages of votes of 82.4 % in 1919 and 67.0 % in 1920. However, the percentages of votes obtained by all the parties in Weimar Coalition could not reach the majority after 1924 when the revolutionary period from 1918 Revolution came to an end. The second phase in 1924 and after shows signs of reinforcement of conservatives. This is disclosed in the change of the votes obtained by DNVP<sup>15)</sup> from the election in May, 1924, to that in December, 1924. This phase, which corresponds to the so-called relatively stable period (1924-1928), changed into the third phase with the 1929 Crisis as a turning point. Amid the "Great Depression" when a riotous situation was again brought about as seen at the end of 1923<sup>16)</sup>, Germany entered the phase of Nazi advancement. As already pointed out, the Nazis became ranked second in all the parties as a result of getting 6,400,000 votes or 18.3 % in the election of September, 1930, and Weimar Republic stood faced with a decisive turning point. This Nazi advancement culminated in the election of July, 1932, when the World Economic Crisis reached the rock-bottom level and it is supposed that the formation of such a broad social basis of the Nazis was not only based on the considerable number of votes of former nonvoters and newly qualified persons for the Nazis but also the landslide shift of the electo-

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most vote at an election of Bavaria in November, 1966 in the districts where played a role of stronghold of the Nazis in the past in Middle Franconia and other districts (*Süd-deutsche Zeitung*, 21-22 November 1966, 22. Jahrgang Nummer 278-279) gives a hint as an indicator for understanding political current in West Germany. Now, if it is admitted the phenomenon of Fascism movement has arisen internationally at the stage of general crisis of capitalism, it would be necessary to conduct an analysis from comparative historical viewpoint on its social basis. When comparison is made between social basis of German Fascism and Japanese Fascism, a work by Masao Maruyama, *Thought and Movements of Japanese Fascism*, in: *Thoughts and Behaviour of Contemporary Politics*, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 29-87 (Cf. *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, ed. by Ivan Marris with Author's Introduction to the English Edition, Oxford University Press, 1963) has to be referred to. The work by Seymour Martin Lipset, which tried to make a comparative analysis on Poujadism of France, Socialist Movement of Italy (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI), McCarthyism of U.S.A., etc. in their social basis gives a suggestion since these movements have regarded as Neo Fascism in post War days. (Cf. S. M. Lipset, *Der "Faschismus"—die linke, die Rechte und die Mitte*, in: *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Köln-Opladen, 11. Jahrgang 1959 Heft 3, SS. 401-444.).

15) As for characteristics of DNVP refer to Seiji Kimura, *German National Peoples Party in 1918-20*, in "*Shigaku-Zasshi*" (*Historical Journal*), Vol. 77, No. 2, 1968, pp. 1-44.

16) Cf. Arthur Rosenberg, *Der Faschismus als Massenbewegung*, in: O. Bauer·H. Marcuse ·A. Rosenberg, u.a., *Faschismus und Kapitalismus*, Frankfurt am Main 1967, S. 132.

rate supporting formerly bourgeois parties except the Center Party (Zentrum) and the swing of even some portion of the electorate supporting the left-wing parties to the Nazis. The supposition derives from Table 1 on one hand and is also clarified from an analysis of the diet (Reichstag)-elections centered on Lower Saxony made by G. Franz. He presents an assumption that the voters for the Nazis were roughly broken down as follows in the election of July, 1932:<sup>17)</sup>

Voters for NSDAP in 1928	96,000	8.2%
Votes lost by DNVP after 1928	40,000	3.4
Votes lost by DVP after 1928	192,000	16.4
Votes lost by DDP after 1928	70,000	6.2
Votes lost by Welfen after 1928	148,000	12.7
Votes lost by other parties	187,000	16.0
Votes by former abstentionists and newly qualified persons	429,000	36.7
		100.0%

Although it is of course not admitted to generalize the cases of Lower Saxony (its electoral districts divided into East Hanover, South Hanover-Brunswick and Weser-Ems), the fact that the right-wing and middle-road parties lost 38.5% of their votes (total votes lost by DNVP, DVP, DDP, Welfen), new voters and newly qualified persons obtained 36.7% and other parties lost 16.0% of votes (various left-wing parties are included) among the votes obtained by the Nazis in the election of July, 1932, justifies that it is not a mistake to attribute the factors inducing the new situation to the above-mentioned reasons.<sup>18)</sup>

Then, in reviewing the shift of the percentages of votes obtained by the Nazis in the electoral districts of the diet (Reichstag) on the basis of Table 2<sup>19)</sup>, attention has to be paid first of all to the phenomenon that the Nazis won a considerably high percentages of votes in such districts as Mecklenburg, Franconia, Upper Bavaria-Swabia, Lower Bavaria, Thuringia, Merseburg, etc. in

17) Günther Franz, *Die politischen Wahlen in Niedersachsen 1867 bis 1949*, 3. ergänzte Auflage mit einem Anhang: Die Wahlen 1951 bis 1956, Bremen-Horn 1957, S. 61.

18) By making a comparison among votes obtained by parties in main districts of Germany in respect to the election of May, 1928, and September, 1930, Arthur Dix assumes that the working class of marxism did not change their support into the Nazis since the reduction of votes of the Social Democratic Party was easily off-set by increase of votes obtained by the German Communist Party (Cf. A. Dix, *Die deutschen Reichstagswahlen 1871-1930 und die Wandlungen der Volksgliederung*, Tübingen 1930, SS. 47-49). If it is admitted that his estimate can be made roughly, the fact has not to be dismissed that even some electorate of the left-wing parties shifted their support to the Nazis. A. Rosenberg estimates that big increase of Nazi votes from some 800,000 in May, 1928 election to some 17,300,000 in March, 1933 election was classified into some 7,000,000 votes from former right-wing electorate, some 8,500,000 votes from new voters and some 1,000,000 votes from former left-wing electorate (A. Rosenberg, op. cit., S. 134).

19) M. Hagmann, op. cit., S. 10 f.



TABLE 2 Percentages of Votes Obtained by the Nazis Classified by Electoral Districts of the Diet (Reichstag) (1924-1932)

Electoral District	Ratio of Population Classified by Religion		Ratio of Population Engaged in Agriculture and Forestry	1924	1924	1928	1930	1932	1932
	Catholic	Protestant		I	II			I	II
Schleswig-Holstein	4.0	88.2	22.2	7.4	2.7	4.0	27.0	51.0	45.7
East Hanover	4.9	91.8	35.0	8.6	4.4	2.6	20.6	49.5	42.9
Frankfurt a. d. Oder	10.9	85.9	33.4	5.0	3.2	1.0	22.7	48.1	42.6
Liegnitz	17.2	79.2	28.3	1.5	1.5	1.2	20.8	48.0	42.1
Pomerania	3.9	92.4	38.1	7.3	4.2	1.5	24.3	47.9	43.1
East Prussia	15.8	81.5	42.2	8.6	6.2	0.8	22.5	47.1	39.7
Chemnitz-Zwickau	3.3	89.4	5.9	7.7	4.2	4.3	23.8	47.0	43.4
South Hanover-Brunswick	12.0	81.2	20.9	7.6	3.4	4.4	24.3	46.1	46.6
Mecklenburg	6.0	89.6	33.4	20.8	11.9	2.0	20.1	44.8	37.0
Magdeburg	6.8	87.1	22.1	4.9	3.0	1.7	19.5	43.8	39.0
Pfalz	42.3	54.9	21.1	5.7	1.9	5.6	22.8	43.7	42.6
Hessen-Nassau	28.1	66.8	21.4	5.6	2.5	3.6	20.8	43.6	41.2
Breslau	36.9	58.0	22.7	4.0	1.4	1.0	24.2	43.5	40.4
Thuringia	8.2	84.2	18.4	9.9	5.4	3.7	19.3	43.4	37.1
Hessen-Darmstadt	31.0	64.1	21.5	2.9	1.3	1.9	18.5	43.1	40.2
Merseburg	5.1	89.9	20.1	8.7	4.3	2.7	20.5	42.6	34.5
Franconia	48.4	49.6	29.6	20.7	7.5	8.1	20.5	39.9	36.4
Dresden-Bautzen	6.1	85.3	10.8	4.5	1.5	1.8	16.1	39.3	34.0
Weser-Ems	26.3	69.1	28.7	7.4	4.8	5.2	20.5	38.4	31.9
Potsdam I	8.2	82.8	21.1	5.8	2.8	1.6	18.8	38.1	34.1
Baden	58.3	38.1	25.1	4.8	1.9	2.9	19.2	36.9	34.1
Leipzig	4.1	83.4	8.1	7.9	1.8	1.9	14.0	36.1	31.0
Hamburg	5.9	79.3	2.1	6.0	2.3	2.6	19.2	33.7	27.2
Potsdam II	11.1	71.4	4.2	6.5	2.9	1.8	16.7	33.0	29.1
Düsseldorf-East	43.5	46.2	2.5	3.9	1.6	1.8	17.0	31.6	27.0
Württemberg	33.8	62.2	28.3	4.1	2.1	1.9	9.4	30.3	26.2
Oppeln	89.1	9.7	25.7	2.6	1.5	1.0	9.5	29.3	26.8
Koblenz-Trier	75.7	22.5	35.5	1.3	—	2.1	14.9	28.8	26.1
Westphalia-South	42.7	50.2	7.4	1.5	1.1	1.6	13.9	27.2	24.8
Upper Bavaria-Swabia	86.4	11.0	28.9	17.0	4.8	6.2	16.3	27.1	24.6
Düsseldorf-West	65.4	28.4	7.9	2.6	0.9	1.2	16.8	27.0	24.2
Westphalia-North	52.0	44.3	18.9	3.5	1.3	1.0	12.0	25.7	22.3
Berlin	11.1	70.2	1.2	3.6	1.6	1.4	12.8	24.6	22.5
Lower Bavaria	94.7	4.8	47.3	10.2	3.0	3.5	12.0	20.4	18.4
Köln-Aachen	80.9	14.3	11.5	1.5	0.6	1.1	14.5	20.2	17.4
German Reich	32.7	61.2	21.0	6.6	3.0	2.6	18.3	37.2	33.1

the election of May, 1924. In four electoral districts (Mecklenburg, Franconia, Thuringia, Merseburg) out of these six, German National Peoples Party had formerly held its position on the basis of electorate in rural districts (with less than 2,000 population) mainly composed of protestants but such the strata are apparent to have switched to the Nazis since they became radical as a result of inflation causing their straitened circumstances<sup>20</sup>. In case of other two electoral districts (Upper Bavaria-Swabia, Lower Bavaria) it is conceivable that the Nazis caught successfully hold of the special political situation of Bavaria since they sprung from there and particularism or separatism movement was centered there.

However, after the inflation was combated and the German economy marked a transition to the relatively stable period, local rise of the Nazis collapsed and the general tendency of their decline was made clearer as given by the percentages of votes in the elections of December, 1924, and May, 1928.

The so-called "Golden 1920's" crumbled because of break-out of the 1929 Crisis and a decisive turning point was given then to invite drastic rise of the Nazis. The Nazi advancement had clearly close relationship with the World Economic Crisis. If intensity of the crisis is assumed to be measured by unemployment rate in case of urban districts and by debt rate in case of rural districts, it was found that percentages of votes obtained by the Nazis developed a tendency to interrelation with the unemployment rate in urban districts and debt rate in rural districts<sup>22</sup>. However, it is without saying that the Nazi advancement differed in accordance with difference of area so that an analysis on socio-economic structure has to be made in respective districts since it is insufficient to relate the Nazi rise to intensity of the crisis in elucidating such a local difference.

### III

Let us compare the electoral district where the Nazis won the most percentages of votes with that where they obtained the least ones in the election of July, 1932, based on Table 2. Roughly speaking, the Nazis got the largest support mainly in districts dispersing in Northeastern Germany and Middle Germany particularly of agricultural nature, while the districts in which the Nazis accepted the strongest resistance were in Westsouthern Germany and big cities specifically

20) Werner Kaltefleiter, *Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland*, 2. Auflage, Köln und Opladen 1968, SS. 31, 34.

21) Ibid., S. 34. Incidentally see G. W. F. Hallgarten, *Imperialism and Present*, ed. by M. Nishikawa, Y. Tominaga and T. Kage, Tokyo 1967, p. 238.

22) Vgl. W. Kaltefleiter, op. cit., SS. 40-44.

of industrial nature<sup>23)</sup>. At the same time, it is true that the Nazis shifted the weight of their movement from South Germany to Northeastern Germany clearly in the process of their advancement to find out a main resonance board there.

Firstly, a study will be made on Schleswig-Holstein district where the advancement of the Nazis was most remarkable.

(1) Immediate advancement of the Nazis was seen in urban districts in Schleswig-Holstein but they spread to rural districts in the course of time and as a result the Nazi strongholds were not built in urban districts but in rural districts. Rural districts of Schleswig-Holstein are classified by R. Heberle into three major zones in respect to socio-economic structure, the coastal marshes (Marsch) in the west, the rolling sandy Geest (high and dry land) in the middle, and the Baltic hill (Hügelland) zone in the east<sup>24)</sup>. In the hill zone, particularly in East Holstein of its eastsouthern part (both districts of Oldenburg and Plön) the ruling of large land ownership of Junkers continued in existence<sup>25)</sup>, the socio-economic structure of rural districts belonged to the type of the east of the Elbe. As against this the Marsch zone and the Geest zone belonged to the type of the west of the Elbe. In the Marsch zone commercial farming connected with dairy farming and stock farming and specialization of management has been developed, class differentiation of the peasantry was remarkable and the big farmer class (50-100 ha), who had life style and consciousness regarded as "peasant aristocracy" (Bauernaristokratie), was widely formed. In this way, daily social intercourse and connubiality lacked between the farmer class and agricultural labourers, and discrimination consciousness existed between them from standpoint of social standing and antagonistic class consciousness was also created<sup>26)</sup>. In comparison with the Marsch zone, formation of a big farmer class was limited in the Geest zone, where the peasantry is centered on middle farmers (10-20 ha) with emphasis of farming placed on stock farming including pig raising. The socio-economic structure in the Geest zone features gradual development of class differentiation of the peasantry, less status-distinctions between farmers and Gesinde (servants) and day labourers and maintenance of ties of community like "neighbourhood" (Nachbarschaft) than in the Marsch zone.<sup>27)</sup> Attention

23) Cf. James K. Pollock, Foreign Government and Politics, an areal study of the German-electorate, 1930-1933, in: *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXXVIII No. 1, Wisconsin 1944, pp. 89-95.

24) Cf. Rudolf Heberle, *Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus*, Stuttgart 1963, SS. 48 ff. It is quoted as *Landbevölkerung*. Cf. R. Heberle, *From Democracy to Nazism, a Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany*, Baton Rouge 1945.

25) *Ibid.*, S. 64.

26) *Ibid.*, SS. 15-16, 52.

27) *Ibid.*, SS. 93-95. It is pointed out that "village community" (Dorfgemeinschaft) was kept more intensely in the Geest zone than the Marsch zone or the hill zone (East Holstein), but main components of the community are community ties which still remained after the solution of the community as a result of abolition of field compulsion

has to be placed on the fact that the penetration of the Nazis differed correspondingly to the difference of socio-economic structure of rural districts in Schleswig-Holstein.

Here we have, first of all, to discuss the functions of the crisis as a factor inviting radicalism of rural population. The agitation activities of the Nazis started as early as 1927 in Schleswig-Holstein when the first sign of agricultural crisis appeared<sup>28)</sup>. The more the commercial farming specialized, the more easily they have impact of the crisis, so that the footholds of the Nazis were established in the Geest zone and the Marsch zone where more such farming existed particularly in Schleswig-Holstein. This can be assumed from figures listed in Table 3<sup>29)</sup>. On the contrary, the Nazi advancement was made moderately at the areas where the crisis had operated rather gently since multiple agriculture covering dairy farming, stock farming, corn raising, etc. was developed as Angeln district located in the northern part of the hill zone of Schleswig-Holstein where the big farmer class (20-100 ha) were dominant. It was not until 1932 when prices of milk and cereals dropped suddenly that the crisis acted acutely in Angeln district and it is reported that the artisan class and the "small" people (Kleine Leute) turned to the Nazis at first and then the upper stratum of the peasantry became to support the Nazis along the beginning of 1933<sup>30)</sup>.

Secondly, we have to take up the problem of difference of "social stratification" (soziale Schichtung) of rural population among the three zones mentioned above in Schleswig-Holstein. It is said that the Nazis achieved the first and biggest success at the areas where ties of village community were strongly maintained without distinct class differentiation among rural population. The Geest corresponded to such a case. It was because progress of class differentiation was moderate in general in the Geest zone, while an intense social tension with discrimination of social standing mixed with class antagonism existed between the widely formed the big farmer class and agricultural labourers in the Marsch zone, and between large landowners remaining in East Holstein in the eastsouthern part and agricultural labourers in the hill zone. The difference of this kind depending on respective zones is clarified in that agricultural labourers in the Marsch zone mainly supported the Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the Communist Party (KPD) as was the case with the hill zone, while those in the Geest zone voted, though thin in stratum, for the National Peoples Party (DNVP) in almost all cases and secondly for the Nazi Party.<sup>31)</sup>

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(Flurzwang) and division of common (Allmende), and their remnant can be seen in cooperative collaboration of peasants in case of embankment or drainage work in relation to the Marsch zone (ibid., SS. 53, 80, 95).

28) Ibid., S. 160.

29) Ibid., S. 97.

30) Ibid., SS. 70, 73-74, 78.

31) Ibid., S. 100.

TABLE 3 Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties in Rural Communities (under 2,000 population) of Schleswig-Holstein (1919-1932 I)

Election Year and Area	NSD-AP	Land-volk	DNVP	DVP	Landespartei	DDP	Other Parties	SPD	USPD	KPD
<b>Marsch Zone</b>										
1919	—	—	7.6	9.0	8.2	29.3	—	45.9	—	—
					37.5					
1921	—	—	29.0	20.1	5.0	6.4	0.1	27.6	6.4	5.4
					11.4					
1924 I	6.4	—	40.6	10.4	—	9.3	5.8	19.0	1.3	7.2
1924 II	3.1	—	41.4	11.5	—	11.5	3.4	24.7	—	4.4
1928	7.9	0.5	29.6	9.3	—	4.6	15.4	27.6	—	5.1
1930	41.2	7.0	5.3	3.1	—	2.8	6.8	25.5	—	8.3
	48.2									
1932 I	61.6	—	6.2	—	—	—	4.0	19.4	—	8.8
<b>Geest Zone</b>										
1919	—	—	3.9	4.7	38.4	21.8	0.1	31.1	—	—
					60.2					
1921	—	—	25.3	13.0	27.5	5.7	0.9	22.1	3.5	2.0
					33.2					
1924 I	9.4	—	47.3	11.7	—	6.7	6.9	14.1	0.5	3.4
1924 II	2.4	—	49.9	18.1	—	8.6	3.3	16.1	—	1.6
1928	15.9	1.1	24.3	14.0	—	3.6	21.7	17.5	—	1.9
1930	45.9	14.2	3.7	3.7	—	3.0	11.6	14.7	—	3.2
	50.1									
1932 I	78.7	—	3.8	—	—	—	4.5	9.7	—	3.3
<b>Hill Zone</b>										
1919	—	—	15.8	6.3	14.3	21.7	0.3	39.6	2.0	—
					36.0					
1921	—	—	28.2	15.6	6.2	7.8	0.4	34.6	4.9	2.3
					14.0					
1924 I	5.5	—	38.7	13.7	—	6.7	2.8	24.0	1.0	7.6
1924 II	1.9	—	40.9	15.7	—	6.9	2.0	29.2	—	3.4
1928	2.0	0.4	32.7	15.0	—	4.3	10.0	32.6	—	3.0
1930	24.3	10.4	10.9	6.1	—	5.2	10.4	27.8	—	4.9
	34.7									
1932 I	57.1	—	10.0	—	—	—	4.9	21.4	—	6.6

\* Marsch Zone=Eiderstedt, North and South Dithmarschen.

Geest Zone=Kreis Rendsburg, Flensburg, Schleswig, North and South Dithmarschen.

Hill Zone=Flensburg, Schleswig, Eckernförde, Plön, Oldenburg, Landesteil Lübeck (Freistaat Oldenburg).

Similar situation appeared in East Prussia, it was reported. At the election in July, 1932, the Nazis gained the biggest success in Masuren district of peasant type, while the National Peoples Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party won comparatively high percentages of votes in typical large land ownership area with differentiated classes<sup>32)</sup>.

Thus it is made clear that the social basis of Nazi penetration is not con-

32) R. Heberle, *Hauptprobleme der politischen Soziologie*, Stuttgart 1967, S. 232. It is quoted as *Hauptproblem*.

cerned with urban districts but rural districts in general and that the problems lie in areas where middle and small farmers were maintained rather than the areas where large landowners or big farmers governed in respect to rural districts.

Let us consider the relation of social classification of the peasantry in Schleswig-Holstein with the advancement of the Nazis. (1) Lower limit of independent peasant farming lies in a scope of some 10 ha. (2) A scope of 20 ha or more begins to be too large for family labourers. (3) In case of a scope of 50 ha or more, employed labourers become necessary remarkably and farmers are not engaged in farm labour except for harvest time. (4) Non-independent peasant farming is a scope of 10 or less ha, and it is classified into (a) farming of a scope of 5-8 ha which depends on interval wage labour for the sake of big farmers and large landowners and (b) farming of a scope of 2-3 ha which depends on regular wage labour for supplementing income. (5) The lowest limit of peasant farming of a scope of 0.5-2 ha is held mainly by day labourers and farm labourers and utilization of such a small land fragment helps to supplement their wages. Such farm labourers occupied naturally higher weight in the areas where big farmers and large landowners were dominant, and in such an area the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party relatively gained success in the elections.

On the contrary, such an advancement of the Social Democratic Party or the Communist Party was not recognized in the areas where there existed small farmer class with a scope of 2-10 ha and middle farmer class with a scope of 10-20 ha. It was in these areas that the Nazis achieved success in election<sup>33)</sup>.

The same can be said to some extent in relation to the areas where big farmers with a scope of 20-100 ha governed, but since the opportunity of penetration of the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party became larger in proportion to the dependence rate of farming on employment of external wage labourers, it can be roughly spoken that the landmark between favorable and unfavorable conditions for Nazi advancement existed between peasant farming scope of 20 ha and 50 ha<sup>34)</sup>.

With regard to indebtedness problem of farmers, peasant farming of 5-10 ha showed higher debt rate than peasant farming of 20-100 ha, which means that middle and small farmers suffered from debt most<sup>35)</sup>. The correlation of the debt rate of the farmers to the advancement of the Nazis has been detected not

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33) Th. Geiger, *Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes*, S. 90. The Geiger in general attends to the fact that the Nazis gained the most percentages of votes in the typical small peasant area, and suggests that especially lower stratum among the middle and small supported the Nazis.

34) R. Heberle, *Landbevölkerung*, SS. 114-116.

35) *Ibid.*, S. 133.

only in Schleswig-Holstein but in East Prussia and Pomerania<sup>36)</sup>.

Anyway, although the advancement of the Nazis was based on the radicalized political aspirations of the middle and small farmer class shocked by the agricultural crisis, emphasis has to be put on the fact that the Nazi advancement could not solely be attributed directly to crisis but the essential reasons of the so-called "shift of social regrouping" (soziale Umschichtungen) proceeded inside Weimar Republic running as undercurrent.

The problem of land reform in 1918 Revolution had been converged upon the line of the internal colonization policy, and this policy disorganized the continued long-term tenants relations (Zeitpachtverhältnisse) particularly in East Holstein. Now that the colonization corporation made its appearance as a creditor instead of the patriarchal ruling by former large landowners of Junkers towards the farmers emancipated from conventional long-term tenant relations and the farmers newly colonized through the internal colonization policy, the farmers felt as if they were actually governed by "Finance Capital" under the pressure of no other than "Slavery of Interest" (Zinsknechtschaft)<sup>37)</sup>.

In parallel with changes occurring inside the rural districts we should not disregard the loss of political power which the upper strata of rural population, particularly large landowners of Junkers had possessed in Prussia in prewar days or exercised in the Reich by way of Prussia. Here will be specifically taken up the abolition of Prussian Three-class Electoral Law (Dreiklassen-Wahlrecht) which accorded with the proclamation of the Council of People's Commissars (Rat der Volksbeauftragten) on November 12, 1918, and the Reich Electoral Law (Reichswahlgesetz) on November 30, 1918, and the dissolution of the Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke)<sup>38)</sup> in Prussia according to the law of December 27, 1927, which embodied the proclamation of Prussian Government on November 13, 1918. The former was the cornerstone which supported the mechanism of so-called Junker-Prussian ruling in the Reich and the latter had acted as the nucleus of the system of non-economic compulsion (außerökonomischer Zwang) which played a part to insure the reproduction of semi-feudal production relations of Junkerdom composing the material basis of such the mechanism. Political power status of large landowners greatly swayed in Schleswig-Holstein because of collapse of these two main pillars to support them. It cannot be dismissed that the struggle between the conservative parties such as the National Peoples Party and the Nazis in rural districts of Schleswig-Holstein had an aspect of the struggle between conservatives of large landowners and big farmers and politically radicalized middle class in rural districts expecting Nazi politics in respect to intention of the large landowners for reconstruction of political ruling

36) W. Kaltefleiter, op. cit., S. 56.

37) R. Heberle, *Landbevölkerung*, S. 134.

38) Heinz Maull, *Die Landgemeindeordnungen Preußens*, 2. Auflage, Berlin 1930. S. 173.

—intention for restoration to Imperial Germany<sup>39)</sup>.

In Schleswig-Holstein all the efforts for conservative large landowners and big farmers to restore political ruling were in vain, and as a result the former rural upper classes were excluded from political leadership status because they were regarded as cooperators to the "system", so that reinforced penetration by the Nazis brought about the change of political leaders in the rural districts, thus giving a status for political power to the middle class<sup>40)</sup>. For the middle

39) R. Heberle, *Landbevölkerung*, S. 136 f. Further study is necessary as to what extent such an aspect is generalized in rural districts to the east of the Elbe. Refer on this point to the above-mentioned papers by O. Murase as well as "Leaders and Masses in the Weimar Republic", in: *Political Leadership in Mass Democracies, The Annals of Japanese Political Science Association*, Tokyo 1955. O. Murase makes in them an assumption that the supporters of the National Peoples Party tended not to oppose to but to cooperate with the Nazis in the rural districts, too and a certain division of labour in politics was made possible between both parties because of difference in supporters judging from the inclination of vote for the Nazis and National Peoples Party at the end of Weimar Republic (*The Annals*, p. 66). From this viewpoint O. Murase claims that the cooperation between the Nazis and the Junkers was thought to be a sort of coalition and not their unification. It is true that a sort of coalition was formed between the Nazis and the Junkers but it cannot be disregarded that the supporters of both sides were duplicated and latent opposition relation existed between them if remarkable advancement of the Nazis was ascertained in the areas where the National Peoples Party retreated greatly (Vgl. Peter Wulf, *Die politische Haltung des schleswig-holsteinischen Handwerks 1928-1932*, Köln und Opladen 1969, S. 65. See Table 3).

40) The behaviour of the artisans having a significant meaning together with the peasantry out of the old middle class in Weimar Republic have already been clarified in Wilhelm Bock, *Stand und Bedeutung der Handwerkerbündebewegung*, Stuttgart 1932, but no mention has been made of the penetration of the Nazis to the artisans. In this respect the above-mentioned book by P. Wulf shed light on the case in Schleswig-Holstein. It reveals that the parties supported by the artisans shifted roughly from the Democratic Party (DDP) to the National Peoples Party (DNVP), the Economic Party (WP), and Nazi Party (NSDAP) in Weimar Republic. Particularly the artisans in rural districts and in middle and small cities suffering from deteriorated economic conditions began to strongly oppose Weimar Republic—the "system"—which ran short of the policies for the middle class (Mittelstandspolitik) with 1929 Crisis as a turning point and shifted their support from the Economic Party to the Nazi Party by staging a decisive swing explicitly to "struggle against the system" (Kampf gegen das System) in the middle of 1931. The political intention of the radicalized artisans class, anti-capitalistic and anti-socialistic in nature, had appeared against the Social Democratic Party above all which had been regarded as a supporter of Weimar Republic or the current "system" (Cf. P. Wulf, op. cit., SS. 26, 36, 46, 50, 54, 56, 85, 88, 110-112, 126, 145). William Sheridan Allen, who depicted detailed situation of the rise and ruling of the Nazis in Nordheim, a small town to the south of Hanover with a population of 10,000 in 1930, analyzes the structure of strata of the town in the following way: (a) Lower stratum (unskilled and semi-skilled labourers) 37%, (b) Lower middle stratum (skilled labourers, salaried employees, peasants, rentiers) 32%, (c) Upper middle stratum (master artisans, civil servants, businessmen) 27%, (d) Upper stratum (businessmen, self-manager, professionals) 4%, and at the same time points out that the broad strata of petty bourgeoisie formed the social basis of



class in each village who developed movements centered on "communities of fate" (Schicksalgemeinschaften), the new politics of the Nazis advocating a platform of ruralism seemed to realize their hope<sup>41)</sup>.

(2) Now let us turn our eyes on the rural districts where Catholic was prevalent in Bavaria from Protestant-dominant rural districts in Schleswig-Holstein. Bavaria had widely distributed middle and small farmers and was the spring place of the Nazis. When the percentages of votes obtained by

TABLE 4 Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties in Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria and the Reich (1920-1932 I)

Election Year and Area	NSDAP	Land-volk	DNVP	DVP	DDP	Zentrum BVP	SPD	USPD	KPD	Other Parties
1920										
Reich	—	—	14.4	13.9	8.5	19.6	21.6	18.8	1.7	1.5
Schles.-Hol.	—	—	20.5	18.4	9.4	0.8	37.3	3.0	6.1	4.5
Bavaria	—	—	7.0	10.5	8.1	38.9	16.4	13.0	2.0	4.1
1924 I										
Reich	2.6	—	19.5	9.2	5.7	16.6	20.5	0.8	12.7	12.5
Schles.-Hol.	7.4	—	31.0	12.1	8.1	1.0	24.9	—	10.2	5.3
Bavaria	5.4	—	9.5	2.1	3.0	35.2	17.7	0.5	8.0	17.0
1924 II										
Reich	3.0	—	20.5	10.1	6.3	16.1	26.0	0.3	9.0	8.7
Schles.-Hol.	2.7	—	33.0	14.6	8.7	1.1	30.3	—	6.7	2.9
Bavaria	5.1	—	14.4	4.3	3.8	34.6	21.1	0.4	5.1	11.2
1928										
Reich	2.6	2.9	14.2	8.7	4.9	15.2	29.8	—	10.6	11.1
Schles.-Hol.	4.0	0.3	23.0	13.7	5.7	1.1	35.3	—	7.9	9.0
Bavaria	6.4	0.1	10.0	3.8	3.1	31.1	24.4	—	3.8	17.4
1930										
Reich	18.3	3.2	7.0	4.5	3.8	15.7	24.5	—	13.1	9.9
Schles.-Hol.	27.0	3.8	6.1	7.3	4.7	1.0	29.8	—	10.6	9.7
Bavaria	17.9	4.3	2.0	1.9	1.8	31.1	20.9	—	5.9	14.2
1932 I										
Reich	37.3	0.3	5.9	1.2	1.0	15.7	21.6	—	14.3	2.7
Schles.-Hol.	51.0	—	6.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	26.2	—	10.7	1.6
Bavaria	32.9	—	3.1	0.9	0.5	32.3	17.1	—	8.3	4.9

Nazi movements and the Nazi victory can be elucidated from aspirations of bourgeois strata of Nordheim to suppress the lower class, particularly their political representative, the Social Democratic Party (Cf. W. S. Allen, *Das haben wir nicht gewollt. Die national-sozialistische Machtergreifung in einer Kleinstadt 1930-1935*, Gutersloh 1965, SS. 24, 280. Anyway note that the intention of the middle class had appeared against Weimar Republic and the Social Democratic Party.

41) R. Heberle, *Landbevölkerung*, S. 171.

TABLE 5 Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties in Urban Communities of Bavaria and Rural Communities of Bavarian Middle Franconia

	Number of Qualified Persons	Ratio of Population Classified by Religion 16. 6. 1933		Ratio of Population of Forestry and Agriculture	Ratio of Population of Labourers	Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties in the Diet (Reichstag)-Election of July 31, 1932				
	Unit: 1,000 1932 I	Catholic	Protestant	17. 5. 1939	17. 5. 1939	NSDAP	DNVP	BVP	SPD	KPD
<b>I Urban Communities</b>										
München (Upper Bavaria)	517.0	81.1	15.2	1.1	40.3	28.9	3.2	37.4	17.8	4.4
Nürnberg (Middle Franconia)	302.9	32.1	62.7	1.2	47.6	37.8	2.9	8.4	33.5	12.6
Augsburg (Swabia)	120.6	79.0	18.9	1.3	48.5	23.1	4.2	30.3	26.7	12.8
<b>II Rural Communities</b>										
Ansbach (Middle Franconia)	22.0	5.1	94.6	49.6	23.5	76.3	13.2	3.0	4.3	0.8
Dinkelsbühl //	15.9	15.1	84.5	59.4	21.0	71.2	10.4	7.4	8.8	0.9
Eichstätt //	14.9	97.7	2.3	54.3	27.3	18.8	1.1	63.4	7.2	5.5
Erlangen //	9.2	18.4	80.9	29.8	41.5	48.1	7.2	7.3	31.1	3.4
Feuchtwangen //	16.7	35.9	63.7	58.9	22.3	53.8	10.1	29.4	3.6	0.4
Fürth //	20.3	7.0	92.4	27.0	45.1	60.2	6.6	1.7	23.1	5.9
Gunzenhausen //	20.8	18.1	80.6	55.5	19.0	72.5	8.9	11.7	3.9	0.9
Hersbruck //	15.6	6.6	93.4	37.3	29.6	60.8	10.0	2.8	20.2	3.0
Hilpoltstein //	14.7	75.9	23.7	61.1	21.7	31.5	1.9	60.0	3.1	1.2
Lauf //	18.7	41.0	58.0	18.5	49.5	37.3	4.4	14.7	28.0	12.2
Neustadt a. d. Aisch //	20.4	3.0	96.4	50.7	22.3	79.2	10.0	1.1	6.9	1.1
Nürnberg //	17.2	10.9	88.3	23.2	43.8	58.9	4.0	3.5	25.8	5.1
Rothenburg ob der Tauber //	12.4	5.8	93.7	70.8	18.8	83.0	9.8	3.9	1.6	0.4
Scheinfeld //	11.7	40.9	58.0	59.4	20.7	62.3	5.0	22.5	5.9	1.1
Schwabach //	22.4	24.3	75.1	33.2	39.1	47.0	9.3	10.3	25.9	3.5
Uffenheim //	20.4	6.3	93.1	51.3	25.4	81.0	10.8	3.3	3.1	0.4
Weißenburg i. Bay //	18.6	29.4	70.2	46.9	29.1	55.8	7.3	18.3	13.1	2.3

parties are compared between Schleswig-Holstein and Bavaria in Table 4<sup>42)</sup>, one notices that Bavarian Peoples Party (BVP), a Catholic party separated from the Center Party, maintained a strong influence and the advancement of the Nazis slowed down at a rate less than the national average in Catholic governed Bavaria as against Schleswig-Holstein where Protestants were dominant with least influence of the Catholic Center Party.

However, it is needed to carry out deeper study on the situation on the basis of Table 5<sup>43)</sup>. In the Geest zone in rural districts of Schleswig-Holstein where the Nazis made the most remarkable advancement, the middle and small farmers or the so-called "family-sized farm" were dominant, doing marginal farming because of poor, sandy soils in most cases.<sup>44)</sup> Next will be taken up a study on Middle Franconia in Bavaria featuring such the farming. As given in Table 5, there existed a remarkable difference in percentages of votes obtained by parties depending on the difference of the ratio of population classified by religion and the ratio of population of labourers in rural districts of Middle Franconia.

The Nazis obtained an overwhelming percentages of votes in the areas, where Protestant was dominant and the ratio of population of labourers was low, as shown in 76.3 % in Ansbach, 71.2 % in Dinkelsbühl, 72.5% in Gunzenhausen, 79.2 % in Neustadt a. d. Aisch, 83.0 % in Rothenburg ob der Tauber, 81.0 % in Uffenheim<sup>45)</sup>. Here are given the Nazi strongholds corresponding to the Geest zone in Schleswig-Holstein.

However, in Catholic-dominant areas in the rural districts in the same Middle Franconia with less ratio of population of labourers Bavarian Peoples Party occupied supremacy. It is so in the cases of 63.4 % in Eichstätt and 60.0 % in Hilpoltstein in percentages of votes obtained by the Bavarian Peoples Party.

In the rural districts of East Prussia Catholic-dominant Ermland had relative immunity from penetration of Nazis in the election of July, 1932, showing no more than 15-25 % of votes for the Nazis in comparison with other surrounding areas where Protestant was dominant and the Nazi advancement was remarkable. Such situations can be detected in Catholic-dominant Westphalian districts and the border of Upper Silesia with dominant Catholic<sup>46)</sup>.

In this way, different political behaviour was expressed between Catholic

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42) Charles P. Loomis and J. Allen Beegle, The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas, in: *American Sociological Review*, Volume 11 Number 6, 1946, p. 728.

43) Composed from M. Hagmann, op. cit., Tabellenwerk, SS. 1-17.

44) C. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegle, op. cit., p. 726.

45) In respect to difference of economic conditions among these areas refer to *Die ländliche Arbeitsverfassung im Westen und Süden des Reiches*, herausgegeben und bearbeitet von Konrad Meyer und Klaus Thiede, Heidelberg 1941, SS. 191-211.

46) R. Heberle, *Hauptprobleme*, S. 240.

and Protestant although they belonged to the same strata<sup>47)</sup>. Protestant is not bound to obey a particular political party<sup>48)</sup>. On the contrary, in the areas where Catholic was dominant, the obedience of the Catholic electorate to the church, the traditional obligation to vote for the Center Party since the war of culture (Kulturkampf), the influence of Christian trade unions, artisan's unions, societies of university graduates and other Catholic interest associations, and the like prevented the Nazis penetration into these districts.<sup>49)</sup>

When taking into consideration these points in relation to major large cities in Bavaria, Bavarian Peoples Party held strong influence and obtained 37.4 % of votes in the election of July, 1932, at München, "Capital of Movement"<sup>50)</sup> (Hauptstadt der Bewegung), since Catholic was dominant, while the Nazis only obtained 28.9 % of votes far below the national average rate. However, at Nürnberg, a large city in Middle Franconia, where the Nazis frequently held their party congress, Protestants dominated and the Nazis obtained 37.8 % of votes slightly over the national average and the Social Democratic Party 37.8 % of votes considerably over the national average rate. Thus the tendency presented more clearly in rural districts in Middle Franconia can be detected similarly in large cities in Bavaria.

In this way the resistive power of "politically organized Catholicism"<sup>51)</sup> against the Nazi had ignorable significance. Furthermore, since the Catholic strata organized in the Center Party or Bavarian Peoples Party was duplicated actually with the strata into which the Nazis intended to advance, hatred of the Nazis toward the "system" was more seriously focused on the Center Party<sup>52)</sup>. Anyway, even if the functions of the World Economic Crisis and features of the socio-economic structure conditioned basically the advancement of the Nazis, it would be impossible to analyze the matters concretely with only such viewpoints. We have to take into account that no other than "Religion" played a role of independent factor in the formation of political wills.

The progress of urbanization, however, brought forth an inclination to slacken binding of the Catholic electorate to the Center Party<sup>53)</sup>, thus reduced the meaning of being Catholic. It was so in the big industrial districts, particularly in the heavy industrial districts. There the labourers belonging to big industry tended to become involved in the Social Democratic Party through

47) Vgl. M. Rainer Lepsius, *Extremen Nationalismus*, Stuttgart 1966, S. 32.

48) W. Kaltefleiter, op. cit., S. 52.

49) R. Heberle, *Hauptprobleme*, S. 240; M. R. Lepsius, op. cit., S. 33.

50) Karl Borcharding, *Münchener Zeitgeschichte 1918-1945*, 3. Auflage, München 1967, S. 27.

51) M. R. Lepsius, op. cit., S. 32.

52) Th. Geiger, op. cit., S. 112.

53) W. Kaltefleiter, op. cit., S. 51.

TABLE 6 Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties in Urban Communities

	Reich	Berlin									Dortmund (Westphalia-South)			Leipzig (Leipzig)			Riesa (Dresden-Bautzen)			Werdau (Chemnitz-Zwickau)								
		Berlin-Wedding			Berlin-Zehlendorf			Berlin-Steglitz																				
Number of Qualified Persons (1932 I)	44,211,216	266,336									47,104			139,857			370,535			500,892			17,885			15,139		
Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties	% 1932 I	1928	1930	1932 I	1928	1930	1932 I	1928	1930	1932 I	1928	1930	1932 I	1928	1930	1932 I	1928	1930	1932 I	1928	1930	1932 I	1928	1930	1932 I	1928	1930	1932 I
NSDAP	37.3	0.8	9.0	19.3	1.8	17.7	36.4	2.9	23.3	42.1	0.6	8.3	19.6	2.3	13.8	23.3	1.3	13.6	28.4	5.2	36.9	53.4						
DNVP	5.9	4.1	8.7	4.6	30.1	21.1	19.4	26.5	17.7	15.6	5.6	3.9	4.9	7.4	3.7	4.5	9.5	4.7	5.4	9.1	3.9	4.1						
DVP	1.2	2.6	1.6	0.2	18.5	11.7	3.0	16.7	11.8	2.1	13.9	8.6	1.3	16.6	13.0	2.9	10.5	6.9	2.6	15.6	4.6	1.0						
Zentrum	15.7	2.6	2.7	3.4	3.7	4.0	7.4	3.4	3.6	5.4	18.8	17.4	18.6	0.8	0.8	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.4	0.7	0.7	0.9						
DSP (=DDP)	1.0	4.6	3.0	0.9	10.7	8.9	3.2	9.1	7.1	2.4	4.5	2.5	0.6	6.7	3.4	2.0	3.8	3.6	1.0	3.1	1.1	0.6						
SPD	21.6	34.0	27.0	27.8	23.2	19.7	21.2	22.9	18.8	19.0	37.1	28.4	23.7	37.7	34.9	34.1	43.6	43.1	38.2	32.4	23.4	20.0						
KPD	14.3	40.3	42.9	42.6	5.8	7.4	8.5	11.2	9.6	12.3	12.8	20.2	27.9	17.1	18.5	30.3	13.3	12.5	11.2	14.5	15.1	16.1						
Social Structure (1925)	%																											
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery	30.5	0.4			2.6			1.4			0.6			0.6			2.6			1.1								
Industry & Handicraft	41.4	58.6			24.1			31.2			58.3			47.7			57.2			66.7								
Commerce & Transportation	16.5	23.7			23.9			30.7			22.7			30.1			21.6			15.8								
Management & Profession, etc.	6.5	7.1			22.3			17.7			6.8			8.9			7.1			5.6								
Household, etc.	5.1	2.3			13.8			6.1			4.3			2.8			2.4			2.0								
Self-management	17.3	13.0			30.5			21.7			12.1			19.1			12.8			15.6								
Civil Servants & Salaried Employees	16.5	22.3			34.4			44.6			23.6			33.4			29.1			21.5								
Labourers	45.1	61.9			22.2			26.7			60.7			45.1			54.0			59.0								
Sectarian Belonging	%																											
Catholic	32.5	8.8			9.7			9.6			40.0			3.6			4.8			4.2								
Protestant	62.7	68.5			80.9			82.5			53.6			77.9			85.0			88.8								

the medium of trade unions irrespective of sectarian belonging, and the trade unions had the same function for the sake of the Social Democratic Party as the Catholic Church for the Center Party<sup>54)</sup>. It is also said that unemployed labourers of big industry tended to vote for the Communist Party irrespective of sectarian belonging<sup>55)</sup>.

(3) Next, big industrial districts will become the subjects of our study. In the electoral districts of Rhine-Westphalia, Berlin and Saxony, all major industrial districts under Weimar Republic, the Nazi advancement was not so remarkable except Chemnitz-Zwickau as given in Table 2.

First of all, Berlin will be observed. Berlin, being classified into 20 districts, had the electoral districts of Berlin, Potsdam I and Potsdam II. Here, comparison will be carried out among Wedding district belonging to Berlin electoral district, Zehlendorf district belonging to Potsdam II electoral district and Steglitz district belonging also to Potsdam II electoral district. Table 6<sup>56)</sup> show that these three districts clarify different percentage of votes obtained by parties in reflection of difference of their socio-economic structures.

In Berlin the influence of the Center Party was feeble because of dominance of Protestants. Now, in Wedding district an overwhelming number of industrial labourers and unemployed labourers resided<sup>57)</sup>, who were mainly composed of labourers in big factories of electric industry, mechanical industry, metal industry, and the like, and they contributed to establish the strongholds for the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party. However, it cannot be denied that the Social Democratic Party tended downward amid the World Economic Crisis and it is assumed that some portion of its supporters shifted to the Communist Party or even the Nazi Party.

As is well-known, although the Social Democratic Party took the policy of "Tolerance" towards Brüning Cabinet on the basis of the theory of so-called "smaller evilness" for the purpose of drawing a clear line from the Communist Party, the Communist Party directed fire not on Brüning, Papen or Schleicher who had arranged for a road to Nazi dictatorship, but on the Social Democratic Party on the basis of the theory of so-called "social Fascism", with which it had to establish a united front against Fascism<sup>58)</sup>. Thus the labour front of

54) Ibid., S. 52.

55) Cf. *ibid.*, SS. 67-70.

56) *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Bd. 403-404 (Berufszählung. Die berufliche und soziale Gliederung der Bevölkerung in den Ländern und Landesteilen) Berlin 1929; Bd. 434 (Die Wahlen zum Reichstag) Berlin 1935; Bd. 451 (Volkszählung. Die Bevölkerung des Deutschen Reichs nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung 1933) Berlin 1936; K. D. Bracher, *op. cit.*, SS. 652-654.

57) Cf. A. Rosenberg, *op. cit.*, S. 135.

58) Vgl. K. D. Bracher, *op. cit.*, S. 379; Lothar Berthold, *Das Programm der KPD zur nationalen und sozialen Befreiung des deutschen Volkes vom August 1930*, Berlin 1956, SS. 169-171; Yasushi Yamaguchi, *Adolf Hitler*, Tokyo 1962, pp. 197-202.

Germany entered into a tragic situation of split but, be the matter as it may, in Wedding district percentages of votes obtained by the Nazis was checked at a level of 19.3% even in the election of July, 1932, because a firm left-wing majority was maintained there in the form of stronger the Communist Party than the Social Democratic Party.

On the contrary, the situation considerably differed in Zehlendorf district. The district comprised suburban residential quarters for rather wealthy citizens where civil servants, salaried employees and self-managers<sup>59)</sup> occupied higher weight in population and the ratio of commerce and management corresponded almost equally to industry. The conservative National Peoples Party had maintained relatively strong influence to cope with such a social structure, and the middle class occupied a high weight together with the upper class, so that percentage of votes obtained by the Nazi reached 36.4% nearly the same level as the national average rate in the election of July, 1932. In this district, moreover, a typical residential quarter of civil servants, and salaried employees, the new middle class weighted heavier than the old one among the middle class and so it will be necessary to understand percentage of votes obtained by the Nazis of 42.1% surpassing the national average rate in the election of July, 1932, in comparison with such a social structure<sup>60)</sup>.

When a reference is made on Leipzig, a large city in industrial district of Saxony, and Dortmund, a large city in industrial district of Rhine-Westphalia, we can find out a nearly similar phenomenon there to that detected in Wedding district of Berlin, if disregarding that the Center Party had kept deep-rooted influence in Dortmund where Catholics occupied a rate of 40.0% of all the religious population. In either large city the advancement of the Communist Party developed in a marked contrast to the wear of the Social Democratic Party under the impact of the World Economic Crisis, and it is conceivable that the existence of the Center Party and formation of firm left-wing majority in Dortmund and the existence of an overwhelming left-wing majority in Leipzig successfully checked the advancement there of the Nazis.

It is natural to admit that various bourgeois parties except the Center Party broken down as a result of not only a landside swing of their supporters to the Nazis but a shift of even some part of supporters of left-wing parties to the Nazis amid impact of the World Economic Crisis and thus inviting "meteoric rise"

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59) "Self-manager" (Selbständige) contains owners (Eigentümer), lease-holders (Pächter), directors (Directoren) and business men (Geschäftsführer) in its category, and it is regarded as an index to find out the "statistical middle class" (statistischer Mittelstand) together with "civil servants and salaried employees" (Beamte und Angestellte) (W. Kaltefleiter, op. cit., S. 54). Note the fact that the old middle class is all included in this "self-manager". No mention will be necessary on that the new middle class is included in the category of "civil servants and salaried employees".

60) Cf. S. M. Lipset, op. cit., SS. 413-416.

of the Nazis, but it is also clear that influential left-wing parties were still alive in large cities in big industrial districts to check the penetration of the Nazis. The Nazis could not destroy "Supremacy of 'Red'"<sup>61)</sup> in large cities.

The political meaning of such a socio-economic structure, particularly resistive power of working class in large cities (100,000 or more population) of big industrial districts against the right-wing radicalism above all could not have generality in middle cities (20,000-100,000 population) or rural cities (2,000-5,000 population) where different situations were detected considerably. This point will be discussed in respect to two middle cities in industrial districts of Saxony in particular. Riesa is a city in electoral district of Dresden-Bautzen and Werdau is a city in electoral district of Chemnitz-Zwickau.

As a reference was made previously, an unusual high percentage of votes was marked by the Nazis in electoral district of Chemnitz-Zwickau among major industrial districts. As given in Table 2, the Nazis marked percentages of votes in electoral districts of major industrial districts in the election of July, 1932; 20.2% in Köln-Aachen, 24.6% in Berlin, 25.7% in Westphalia-North, 27.0% in Düsseldorf-West, 27.2% in Westphalia-South, 31.6% in Düsseldorf-East, etc. These percentages of votes were comparatively low below the national average rate, but percentage of votes only in Chemnitz-Zwickau showed 47.0% far above the national average rate. The two cities were selected to shed light on this result.

In reviewing the results of the election of July, 1932, the Nazis marked remarkably different percentages of votes between Riesa and Werdau, both middle cities of which belonged to the same industrial district of Saxony. Urban population of Werdau was composed of 59.0% by labourers, and industry and handicraft occupied 66.7% in the social structure, so that it was a city most industrialized. It had a rate of unemployment of 28.3% at that time<sup>62)</sup>. In Werdau the population engaged in textile industry occupied 31.3% of all the urban population, followed by commerce with 10.5% of the population, and middle and small business marked a high weight, so that the industrial structure in which the so-called "middle class industry"<sup>63)</sup> (mittelständische Industrie) was dominant or the industrial structure in which middle and small business was dominant, was maintained. Urban population of Riesa was also composed of 54.0% by labourers, and industry and handicraft occupied 57.2% in the social structure, so that Riesa was a highly industrialized city. It had a rate of unemployment of 31.8% at that time. It can be said that the industrial structure in which big industry was dominant was found out there on the contrary, since steel industry acted as the nucleus of the industrial structure, ab-

61) K. D. Bracher, *op. cit.*, S. 115.

62) Cf. W. Kaltefleiter, *op. cit.*, S. 49.

63) *Ibid.*, S. 48.



sorbing 20.9% of all the urban population. The status of Riesa, which played a role of stronghold of the Social Democratic Party originally, did not sway despite the impact of the World Economic Crisis and the firm existence of left-wing parties including the Communist Party checked the advancement of the Nazis at a level of 28.4% even in the election of July, 1932, while in Werdau the Nazis marked a percentage of votes of 36.9% in the election of September, 1930, and 53.4% in the election of July, 1932, since the influence of the Social Democratic Party declined greatly and even some of its supporters turned to the Nazis amid the World Economic Crisis.

In such a contradictory tendency, in other word, in comparison of Werdau, a city of textile industry where middle and small business was dominant, with Riesa, a city of steel industry where big industry was dominant, the significance of problems is displayed in the form of pure cultivation, as it were. The difference of organizing power of trade unions cannot be disregarded because it brought forth such a situation. Steel industry and coal & mining industry operated under big business with higher organization rate of trade unions, while textile industry was based on middle and small business with a higher rate of women workers causing less organization rate of trade unions. In general, the working class became tied up with the Social Democratic Party or the Communist Party through the medium of organization power of trade unions, applying the brake to the swelling of "reservoir of latent right-wing radical electorate"<sup>64</sup>, and as a result the Nazis could only penetrate into the electorate of bourgeois parties.

However, in the case of the industrial structure in which middle and small business was dominant, trade unions had less organization rate. Lacking an opportunity to unite labourers into trade unions, and without binding like obedience to Catholic churches, the radicalized working class shocked by the crisis became to be supporters of the Nazis<sup>65</sup>.

In contrast to heavy industrial district of Ruhr where the Communist Party penetrated powerfully because of radicalization of labourers amid the World Economic Crisis, the same radicalization of labourers resulted in distinct advancement of the Nazis in textile industrial district of Chemnitz-Zwickau.

In this way, although the Nazis were checked by the counter force such as organization power of trade unions and obedience to Catholic Churches, they penetrated into the urban and rural districts where the "middle" class was dominant. The major social basis of Nazism was formed there.

64) Ibid., S. 48.

65) This point will be apparently certified in other districts in general. To take an example, such a tendency is found out in Solingen and Remscheid of electoral district of Düsseldorf-East and Iserlohn and Siegen of electoral district of Westphalia-South, cities of iron industry, where middle and small business was dominant.

## IV

As stated above it has been demonstrated with relatively concrete facts that major resonance boards with the rise of the Nazism were formed in the urban and rural districts, where Protestants was dominant and jet the middle class was dominant, under Weimar Republic which fell into a critical situation having impact of "Great Depression" from 1929 Crisis. However, an inquiry has to be made into the grounds why such the social basis of Nazism was fermented. In other words, not only a question, "Who elected Hitler?" but also "Why did they elect Hitler?" have to be solved, and after solving these questions the question, "Why was a Nazi triumphal parade possible in a country having Kant and Goethe?" or "How was Auschwitz made possible?"<sup>66)</sup> can be answered. For this purpose, all the facts have to be analyzed above all the way how the middle class was involved in the rapid stream of social class differentiation, and the actual situation in which they were oppressed psychologically and economically on the one hand, and on the other, further analysis will be needed on a series of policies including a review of economic policies of Weimar Republic which could not develop effective policies for the middle class and policies to deal with the crisis, a review of political lines of the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party which failed in grasping the economically and psychologically deteriorated middle class in which particularly the old middle class including the peasantry and the artisan class, and the studies on policies of the Nazis which succeeded to gain support of the broad middle class based on Nazi ruralism as claimed by Herbert Backe, "The Third Reich will be a peasant Reich or it will be nothing at all"<sup>67)</sup>. This paper presents only a part of premise for reaching these tasks<sup>68)</sup>.

Kyoto  
May, 1969

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66) Ralf Dahrendorf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland*, München 1965, S. 17.

67) Frieda Wunderlich, The National Socialist Agrarian Program, in: *Social Research*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1946, p. 34.

68) Refer to a my paper compiled in "*History of Economics*", Collected Works of Economics (Chikuma-Shobo), Vol. 3, ed. by Y. Uchida, E. Ohno, K. Sumiya, M. Itoh, S. Hirata, Tokyo 1970.