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Kyoto University
"The Doctrine of *Amalavijñāna in Paramārtha (499-569),
and Later Authors to Approximately 800 C.E."

Michael RADICH

1. Introduction

Like other ideas in his corpus, Paramārtha's (Ch. Zhendi 真諦, 499-569) notion of
*amoluooshi 阿摩羅識, or *amalavijñāna, "taintless consciousness", occupies an

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その意義,” on October 18 2008. I thank Richard STANLEY for permission to cite his unpublished
ANU doctoral dissertation. Finally, I thank Eunsu CHO for helping me to find a useful article at
the eleventh hour. Naturally, responsibility for any remaining errors is entirely my own.

Conventions: In citing the Taishō (T) and Xuzangjing (X) Chinese canons, I give the number of
the text, followed by the volume, page, register and line nos., thus: T1616:31.863b05. Through-
out, I regularly repunctuate citations from Chinese canonical texts without notice. I have aimed
for this repunctuation to show clearly my interpretation of each passage.

2 For purposes of argument, I will throughout this paper use “Paramārtha” (abbreviation: P) to
refer indifferently to the historical person and also to the corpus attributed to him. In so doing,
I am eliding important problems in determining authorship of these texts. I have in preparation
a study in which I attempt to use methods of computer-assisted statistical analysis to examine
this problem of authorship.
important place in the common understanding of the development of East Asian Buddhist thought. In particular, it is frequently linked to claims about the “sinification”, or “making Chinese”, of Buddhist ideas. It has also often been interpreted as an attempt to forge links between Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought, that is, to bring about a synthesis between two major strands of Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine. For these reasons, an accurate understanding of *amalavijñāna is important to our understanding of Buddhist doctrinal history. Towards this end, this paper studies primary sources for the doctrine of *amalavijñāna in detail, first in Paramārtha’s extant corpus, and then in other sources to the close of the eighth century.

In Sections 2 and 3, I present a full analysis and translation of all passages in Paramārtha’s extant corpus mentioning *amalavijñāna, containing in total approximately twenty instances of the concept. I interpret each passage in relation to its context, and with full reference to available Chinese, Sanskrit and Tibetan parallels. I also present an analysis of the generally neglected Abhidharmakōga passage in which the word amalavijñāna occurs for the only known time in Sanskrit, and its relation to Paramārtha’s concept.

In Section 4, I present an analysis of what is said by more than twenty-five authors, in several dozen texts, in about the first two and a half centuries after Paramārtha, comparing this evidence carefully with what is learnt about *amalavijñāna from examination of Paramārtha’s extant works. I proceed in three main steps, examining in turn: (1) claims about *amalavijñāna that are found only in later authors, and are not matched in Paramārtha’s works; (2) areas of overlap between later authors and Paramārtha; and (3) aspects of Paramārtha’s doctrine that are never repeated in later works.

Finally, in Section 5, I summarise the conclusions of this study. My main contentions will be as follows. (1) The neglected Abhidharmakosabhāṣya passage surrounding the mention of the word amalavijñāna does have some clear relations with Paramārtha’s idea of *amalavijñāna, especially as found in the Jueding zang lun. (2) In Paramārtha’s own works, we find not one but two largely distinct doctrines of *amalavijñāna; one featuring in Jueding zang lun alone, and the other in the remaining

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3 See n. 490.

4 This count is approximate because there are, in one or two places, textual problems and variant terms that may or may not constitute separate instances.
works where the concept occurs. Of these two versions of the doctrine, it is likely that
the _jueding zang lun_ is closer to the original doctrine. (3) There is relatively little overlap
between Paramärtha's own attested doctrine(s) of *amalavijnana, and characterisations
of the doctrine in later authors — even when those authors purport to be describing the
doctrine as Paramärtha taught it. (4) This suggests that Paramärtha's ideas may
sometimes have been misunderstood and misrepresented by the tradition. Later authors
may thus not be very reliable sources of information about Paramärtha's thought, and
due to over-reliance upon them, our understanding of Paramärtha's though may not be
entirely accurate.

2. Paramärtha's concept of *amalavijnana in the primary sources

To my knowledge, there exists no complete study of Paramärtha's concept of
*amalavijnana. In this section of this study, I will analyse all the instances of the term
in Paramärtha's corpus. We will first examine the passages in which the concept occurs
one by one. I will then attempt to summarise the doctrine of *amalavijnana as it appears
in these sources into a synthetic, general picture.

5 There is certainly no such study in any Western language. By "complete study", I mean a study
that takes full account of all the instances of this term in P's corpus. Some Japanese and
Chinese studies do survey nearly all of the sources I will treat below, but typically do not suffi-
ciently put passages in context; and I believe every scholar except Yoshimura misses at least
some instances of the term. Few scholars have studied P's texts against their parallels in
reference to this question. Perhaps the closest study of primary passages is IWATA (1972[a]),
which presents nearly all of the primary passages in which the term amalavijnana appears in
P's extant corpus, and identifies parallel terms in Indic texts. However, IWATA does not mention
the four instances of the term in SWXL. Further, his work is largely restricted to translating
single sentences and identifying Sanskrit parallels, and he pays far too little attention to the
larger conceptual contexts. IWATA has further studied *amalavijnana extensively, and often re-
dundantly, in a long series of other articles, listed in my bibliography. These articles typically
do not add anything not already said in this 1972 article. Yoshimura (2007a) surveys all perti-
nent passages, but only briefly, in preparation for consideration of later Shelun doctrines.
Other important studies include relevant portions of KASUMATA; Yinshun; Lu Cheng's essay on
*amalavijnana collected in _Li Cheng foxue lunzhu xuanji_; and comments by Shengkai in his
Shelun xeipai yanjiu. See also UI 6, 486-488, 539, 753-754; MOU 350-351, 355; FUKAURA 1, 338,
341-344; Ye 15, 247, 253-255, 474; HAKAMAYA 10-13, 17. The most important Western language
studies of *amalavijnana to date are undoubtedly FRAUWALLNER; and GIMELLO, 277 ff. ("The Ear-
ly Chinese Appropriation of Yogacara and Tathagatagarbha Buddhism"). See also LA VALLÉE
POUSSIN (1928-1929), 109-113; DEMIEVILLE (1952), 56 ff.; LIEBENTHAL 369 ff.; RUEGG 439-444
("L'Amalavijnana"); BUSWELL (1995), 77, 92-104; LUSTHAUS 369 ff; p. 379-380 n. 46; LAI, 76; PAUL
The term 阿摩羅識 *amalavijnāna is not found in any parallels to the Paramārtha texts in which it appears. However, there are extant Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese parallels to passages in which the term appears, which sometimes even make it possible to identify terms to which it corresponds. These provide valuable clues to the meaning of the term and its context, and I have attempted to make full use of them.

2.1 Amalavijnāna in AKBh

It has seldom been observed in secondary literature on *amalavijnāna that the term amalavijnāna is in fact attested in Sanskrit — though not in the sense Paramātha famously gives to it; and not in parallels to any of the passages where he expounds his

In utilising parallels to interpret P's Chinese, I have tried to bear in mind two principles, which pull in opposite directions. (1) P most likely usually had before him a Sanskrit text that said something very similar to other versions of the text, and was trying to convey at least one plausible meaning of that text. Where possible, then, his Chinese must therefore be interpreted in a sense reconcilable with parallels. (2) As we shall see, it is also clear that P did at times depart from his source text in various ways, and this is corroborated by a general examination of his entire corpus. Therefore, where P's text cannot plausibly be reconciled with parallels without doing violence to it, we must translate P, and not the parallels.

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Throughout this paper, I use the asterisk that denotes reconstruction in referring to the term *amalavijnāna as the presumed equivalent of P's amoluoshi etc. By contrast, in reference to this sole attested Sanskrit instance of the term in AKBh, the asterisk is obviously unnecessary.

I am grateful to MUROJI Yoshihito and OTAKE Susumu for reminding me that it is also necessary to consider the possibility that the term P had in mind in coining amoluoshi was not *amalavijnāna, but *nirmalajñāna, as has been argued by IWATA (see esp. 1971) (see also n. 17). There are some good grounds for this argument. First, it is odd that a purified jñāna, proper to the Buddhas, would be called viññāna rather than simply jñāna. Second, as IWATA points out, there are passages in which a nirmalam jñānam is discussed, where that concept seems to correspond quite well with what we see of *amalavijnāna in P. See e.g. BBh: asaktam anavaran am, suviśuddham nirmalam jñānam, WOGIHARA 405; XZ 無滯無餘最極清淨無垢智, T1579:30.574b13; like *amalavijnāna, this nirmalam jñānam is associated with aśrayaparavṛtti. So too MSA 14.28: 出世間無上 / 無分別離垢 / 此智 etc., T1604:31.625b08-09, lokottaram anuttaram/ nirvikalpam malapētam jñānam, LÉVI (1907, 1911) 1, 93 and 2, 167; this jñāna is also associated with aśrayaparavṛtti (14.29, T1604:31.625b14, LÉVI 1, 94 and 2, 168), is viśuddha (14.32, T1604:31.625c05, LÉVI 1, 942, 168) etc. I will examine this possibility further in future work on the background of P's concept (see n. 490). For the present, though I am sure this idea of nirmalam jñānam is certainly part of the background to the concept, I will assume that since the present AKBh passage provides us with a form that corresponds more exactly to the Chinese transcription amoluo, and because shi for jñāna would be unusual, *amalavijnāna is the most likely reconstruction.
The term occurs in Abhidharmakośa (AKb) 5.28 ff. and the accompanying Bhaśya (AKbh). The context is a discussion of when “latent tendencies” (anusāya) attach to dharmas, how many attach to each dharma, of what kind they are, etc. AK here distinguishes between sixteen kinds of consciousness. The first fifteen kinds are associated with the three “realms” (dhatu: kama, rūpa, arūpya); the sixteenth, however, is “pure”, or “free of outflows” (anāsrava). Paramārtha uses several translations for this last “pure consciousness”.

The centre of gravity in this passage as a whole is this concept of “consciousness without outflows” (i.e. *anāsravavijnāna). Only in verses does Vasubandhu refer to this concept by the term amalavijñāna, and also by the epithet amala (twice, with vijnāna elided). In the prose Bh, by contrast, he consistently uses anāsrava. It is thus likely that he uses amala etc. metri causa. For Vasubandhu, the rare term amalavijñāna was thus most likely a nonce coinage, a mere poetic equivalent to *anāsravavijnāna.

Thus, the term amalavijñāna itself occurs only once in Vasubandhu’s Sanskrit:

duḥkhahetudṛgabhyaśapraheyalah kamadhatujah / svakrutyakarapiptāmalavijñānagocarāḥ. (5.29)

“The [dharmas] produced in the kamadhatu that are to be abandoned by insight into [the Truths of] Suffering and the Origin [of Suffering]/are the objects (gocara) of three [kinds of consciousness proper to] their own realm; of one [kind of consciousness] obtained in the rupadhatu; and of pure consciousness (amalavijñāna).”

Paramārtha translates: 見苦集修滅 / 是欲相應法 / 自界三一色 / 無垢識境界.

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9 Pradhan 301-303; La Vallée Poussin (hereafter VP) 4, 67-69. La Vallée Poussin (1980) 4, 67 n. 3, points out that the discussion here follows *Mahāvibhāṣa T1545: 27. 449a23 ff.

10 This emphasis is exceptionally clear when we note that the discussion in the *Mahāvibhāṣa, upon which this AKbh passage is based, speaks only of *anāsravavijnāna (無漏識 in Xuanzang’s [XZ] translation). See e.g. T1545:27.449a29, 449b08, 449b14, 449b20, 449c01, 449c10, 449c18 etc. The idea of *anāsravavijnāna was thus, presumably, a firmly established piece of Vaibhāṣika doctrine by the time of AKbh.

11 Pradhan 302; VP 4, 67.

Strikingly, Paramārtha does not translate *amalavijnāna in his own understanding of the term. The term he does use, wugoushi, only ever appears in Paramārtha’s corpus.¹³

In 30ab, this “pure consciousness” is identified merely by the epithet amala (with vijñāna elided); Paramārtha translates jingshi.¹⁴ Paramārtha uses this term twice in SWXL<1> and SBKL<2> to discuss *amalavijnāna. He also uses a closely related location¹⁵ in JDZL<4>.

In a summary verse that concludes the discussion, the “pure consciousness” is again called amala; here, Paramārtha translates wuliu, more usually his translation for anāsrava.¹⁶ This translation is far from arbitrary, but rather reflects the real centre of gravity at issue. Aside from the exceptional (probably metri causa) instances of amala etc., Skt. too usually calls the same “pure consciousness” anāsrava (with “consciousness” elided but comprehensible from context). In one instance, Paramārtha translates wuliu for anasrava.¹⁷ Elsewhere, Paramārtha translates several times 無流心, for which we might expect Skt. *anāsravacitta.¹⁸

¹³ This suggests that wugoushi and *amalavijnāna may have been distinct for P himself. Yet wugoushi was taken quite regularly as an unproblematic equivalent for P’s *amalavijnāna by later scholastics in East Asia; see n. 191.

¹⁴ svakadharatrayordhvaikamalana, n rupadhatujah; 1 -E, _E—y a  fs~,

¹⁵ C,CAhio MA*. . T1584:30.1031a08-09; see the end of JDZL<4> below .

¹⁶ T1559:29.260b07, Pradhan 303, VP 4, 69. (T1559:29.175c25, 176a04, 226c09; HIRAKAWA 2, 463.) P also uses wuliu for amala elsewhere in Akbh, and also for nirmala; T1559:29.284c21, Hirakawa 2, 463.

¹⁷ The very term wuliu for anāsrava itself is one of the most striking hallmarks of P’s translation style; it occurs approximately 430 times in his corpus, and otherwise only once each in two texts (T398, T659) before or contemporaneous with him. It is unsurprising, therefore, that wuliu is extremely rare, occurring, outside the present passage, only ever in a single passage of P’s MSgBh (where it appears four times): T1595:31.168c24-169a12.

¹⁸ T1559:29.260a17, 260a20, 260a23, 260b03, 260b05, 260b17. P had also translated 無流心 for
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In this AKBh passage, then, the single instance of *amalavijnana clearly does not mean precisely what *amalavijnana = amoluoshi comes to mean in other passages in Paramārtha. Neither is the concept of "consciousness without outflows", whose discussion forms the larger context, identical to Paramārtha’s *amalavijnana. This may be why scholars have tended to disregard this passage when studying Paramārtha’s concept of *amalavijnana. Yet this passage may provide us with clues to part of the background of Paramārtha’s concept. Certainly, we can at least be sure from this passage that Paramārtha knew Vasubandhu’s use of amalavijnana. It is therefore likely that when he elaborated his own notion, he was picking up on Vasubandhu’s term and infusing it with new content.19

Neither is the meaning of amalavijnana in AKBh entirely unrelated to Paramārtha’s *amalavijnana. As we will see below, two key parts of Paramārtha’s doctrine of *amalavijnana are: (1) that it is free of defilements (klesa), a claim which is related to freedom from “outflows” (asrava);20 and (2) that the realisation of *amalavijnana brings freedom from the attachments that condition future rebirth, which also seems to be a consideration at play in the present AKBh passage’s consideration of anusaya. These factors also make it likely this AKBh passage formed part of the background to Paramārtha’s coinage of his own *amalavijnana.

To conclude, it is likely that: (1) Vasubandhu coined amalavijnana as a nonce equivalent, metri causa, for *anāsravavijnana; and (2) Paramārtha picked this rare term up as a label for his own ideas, and bent it flexibly to that use.

We now turn to the consideration of “*amalavijnana proper”, that is, the term *amalavijnana as it is used to articulate the distinctively Paramārthian notion of a “pure consciousness” in the context of the Yogacāra system, usually represented by the transcription amoluoshi 阿摩羅識. The term appears in four texts: Jueding zang lun, Shiba

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Pradhan 302 samasata ime ṣoḍasa dharmah kamaroparaparpyavacaram pañcaprapakaram anāsravāś ca, T1559:29.260a09; but I think, as VP’s translation suggests (“dharmas pur” VP 4, 67), that this is in error for anasravah dharmah.

19 This seems to be a time-honoured technique — a thinker picks up a rare or unusual (and therefore suitably ill-defined) term from some nook or cranny, and reshapes it to fit the new concept. Examples might include the standard concept(s) of dharmakaya; Zhiyi’s Yogacāra and Tathāgatagarbha uses of prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta; and even Mahāyāna śūnyatā.

20 In fact, the last paragraph of the passage I call JDZL<4> below, following the final mention of *amalavijnana in the text, explicitly mentions anāsravavijnana.
2.2 Jueding zang lun

The term *amalavijnāna occurs most frequently in four passages in the Jueding zang lun 決定藏論 (JDZL), T1584.21

2.2.1 JDZL <1>

*Amalavijnāna occurs, most importantly, eight times in one short passage in JDZL. This passage is thus the most important source for information about what Paramārtha meant by the term. Significantly, the context is a discussion of the “revolutionary transformation of the basis” (āśrayaparānytti) of Yogācāra theory, and the relationship between it and the “storehouse” or “base” consciousness (alayavijnāna).22

“All that is included under [the head of] defilements (煩惱, *klesa)23 in the category (? 種)24 of karmic conditioning [i.e. ‘volition’, sanskāra (skandha), 行]25 is gathered together in the fundamental consciousness (alayavijnāna); [thus, when,] because of intensive and repeated cultiva-

21 JDZL is a freestanding translation of a portion of YBh corresponding to the first portion of the Viṇīcayaśaṅgrahī (XZ She jue ze fen 撮決捨分). For Tib, I have referred to the Tokyo University reprint of the Derge version (Tokyō daigaku . . . ed). Important secondary studies, which were helpful to me in preparing the present article, are HAKAMAYA; Ur 6, 541-790 (“Kettei zō ron no kenkyū”). MATSUDA Kazunobu has identified parallels to nearly half this text in a set of Sanskrit fragments in Nepal (see MATSUDA). According to MATSUDA’s account of the manuscript, it corresponds to JDZL 1025c26-1035a18 (extrapolating from equivalences MATSUDA gives to portions of the XZ YBh). This should mean that it contains a parallel to one instance of the term amalavijnāna, that at 1031a02-04, though MATSUDA also notes that the manuscript is damaged and it will not be possible to reconstruct a complete text on its basis, 18. However, it seems unfortunately that these Sanskrit fragments have not yet been published.

22 Parts of this passage are translated in DEMIEVILLE (1929), 42.

23 Note that Tib. here reads rnam par spros pa, *viprapaṇca. XZ agrees.

24 I presume this 種 is the basis for SAKUMA’S suggestion that there may have been an underlying —gata: “das ṛAyavijñāna die [gesamten] Element(e) aller dieser Arten von (?: "gata") bedingten [Faktoren] . . . ”, Sakuma (1990) 2, 156; I cannot see any basis for this reconstruction in either XZ or Tib.

25 This phrase is somewhat difficult of interpretation. Tib. and XZ are somewhat more expansive. Tib. reads, “[Because] the alayavijñāna is the element/domain of all that is included as (habitual, Hakamaya) conceptual proliferation of (= resulting from?) sanskāra,” kun gshi rnam par shes pa ni ’du byed kyi rnam par spros par bsdus pa de dag thams cad kyi khams pa yin pa[’i phyir]. XZ reads similarly “The alayavijñāna is the element/domain of sanskāras that are included in all praṇaśca” 阿頽耶識是一切慧論所攝諸行界.
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The fundamental consciousness is abandoned, which is to say that a revolutionary transformation (*paravrttī*) is brought about in the nature of the ordinary worldling (凡夫, *prthagjanatva*), such that all the qualities of the ordinary worldling (凡夫法, *prthagjanadharma*) are discarded, then the fundamental consciousness is extinguished. Because this consciousness is extinguished, all defilements are extinguished, and by means of [the] counteragent[s] (對治, *pratipaksa*) to the fundamental consciousness, the *amalavijnāna* is realised (cf. Tib/XZ: “the basis undergoes a revolutionary transformation”, अश्रयपरवर्ती).

“The fundamental consciousness is impermanent (anitya), and is something attended by ‘outflows’ (sāsaravadharma); [whereas] *amalavijnāna* is permanent (nitya), and is something devoid of ‘outflows’ (नासरवधर्म).”

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26 Tib. kun tu brten cing goms par byas, Skt. following HAKAMAYA 66.
27 Tib. de bzhin la dmigs pa'i shes pas.
28 For *prthagjanatva* for *fanfuxing* 凡夫性 in P, see e.g. HRIRAKAWA 1, 241, which shows it is the only Skt. term so translated in the context of AKBh. Within JDZL itself, *fanfuxing* (XZ yishengxing 異生性) corresponds to Tib. so'i skye bo nyid = *prthagjanatva* at T1584:30.1024c11-15 = T1579:30.587b25-29, D 23b4-5. (I am grateful to Ching KENG for pointing out the latter parallel to me.) It is thus implausible to reconstruct *prthagjanagotra with GIMELLO 326.
29 The latter half of this sentence differs in its detailed wording, though not in its general import, from Tib, which reads merely, “A revolutionary transformation is brought about in the basis (gnas 'gyur bar byed, अश्रयपरवर्ती) because of intensive and repeated cultivation on the part of the wisdom that takes Thusness as its objective support. The limitless revolutionary transformation of the basis should be considered to be the abandonment of the fundamental consciousness;” de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i shes pas kun tu brten cing goms par byas pa'i rgyus gnas 'gyur bar byed do// gnas 'gyur ma thag tu kun gshi rnam par shes pa spangs par brjod par bya ste. XZ agrees. Such interpolated expansive glosses are typical of P’s translation methodology.
30 Tib. reads, “The basis (अश्रय) of this fundamental consciousness should be considered as something to be [obtained by being] transformed by [means of, in virtue of] the antidote and counterpart [of that fundamental consciousness],” kun gshi rnam par shes pa de'i gnas ni/ gnyen po dang/ dgra bos bsgyur bar rig par bya'o. XZ is somewhat different again: “We should consider that the अश्रयपरवर्ती, because it is opposite [to it,] can act as a permanent counteragent to the अलायविज्ञान,” 当知轉依由相違故，能永對治阿賴耶識.
32 Tib./XZ *āśrayaparavṛttī, gnas 'gyur pa*, 轉依; so throughout.
33 Once more, Tib. differs slightly, reading len pa mad pa, anupadāna. XZ agrees.
realised by means of the attainment of the path that takes Thusness as its objective support (真如境道，de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i lam, *tathatālambanamarga). 34

“The fundamental consciousness is accompanied by ‘badness’ (dausāhulyasamanvāgama), 35 [that is,] suffering as an effect [of karma] 唯果, *amalavijnāna is free of all ‘badness’ [i.e.] suffering as an effect [of karma].

“The fundamental consciousness is the basis 基本 for all the defilements 煩惱, but does not act 基本 the noble path (聖道, *aryamarga). 37 *Amalavijnāna, on the other hand, is not the basis for the defilements, but only देन acts as a basis for the noble path and the attainment of the path. The *amalavijnāna acts as a ‘cause for the perdurance’ (*pratīṣṭhā-hetu) of the noble path, but does not act as a ‘cause for the generation’ (janma-hetu) [of it]. 38

“The fundamental consciousness does not exert controlling power (自在, vibhūtva) over good and neutral [dharmas; 善無記, kuṣala, (kuṣalākuṣala)-avyākṛta). 39

34 Tib. reads, "... because it transforms by [means of] the path that takes Thusness as its objective support", de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i lam gyis bsgyur ba'i phyir ro. XZ: "... because it is only possible for the basis to undergo revolutionary transformation on the basis of the noble path that takes Thusness as its objective support", 真如境道聖道、方能轉依故.
35 There placement of “badness” (dausāhulya) by “ease” (praśrābdhi) has been traced by SAKUMA as the oldest layer of meaning of the notion of the revolutionary transformation of the basis aṣrayaparavṛtti in YBh. See SAKUMA (1990), esp. 164-165; also SAKUMA (1991), 440-439.
36 Nothing corresponds to this phrase in Tib. or XZ, and it thus seems to be an interpolated gloss on the part of P.
37 Tib. reads, “The alayavijnāna is the cause of the activation (pravṛtti) of the defilements, and yet is not the cause of the activation (pravṛtti) of the path,” etc.; kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyijug pa'i rgyu dang lam gyi jug pa'i rgyu ma yin la... XZ agrees: 是煩惱轉 因 etc.
38 I follow HAKAMAYA in identifying these two types of cause: Tib. gnas pa'i rgyu, skyed pa'i rgyu respectively; HAKAMAYA bases himself upon AKBH; 78 n. 78. Note that Tib. clearly says that it is because the revolutionary transformation of the basis (~ P's *amalavijnāna) is this kind of cause that it acts as a cause for the path: gnas gyur pa ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyi juy pa'i rgyu ma yin pa dang/ lam du juy pa'i rgyu yin te/ gnas pa'i rgyu nyid yin pa dang/ skyed pa'i rgyu nyid ma yin pa'i phyir ro. SAKUMA translates "die Ursache für sein Fortbestehen" and "die Ursache für seine Erzeugung" respectively; SAKUMA (1990) 2, 159. See also SCHMITHAUSEN (1987) 2, 369 n. 570, who translates respectively “the cause which supports [... continuance]” and “the cause which generates ... [for the first time].”
39 P seems to be missing a phrase here. Tib. reads, “The alayavijnāna does not exercise controlling power over good dharmas or dharmas unspecified [as good or bad, i.e. neutral dharmas],
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"When the fundamental consciousness is extinguished, then things appear different. That is to say, the causes of bad [dharmas] and defilements in future existences have been extinguished, and because these causes have been extinguished, the suffering of the five 'rampant skandhas' will therefore not arise again in future existences. In this present existence, the bad causes of all defilements are extinguished, and thus the aggregates of the ordinary worldling (prthagjanaskandha) are extinguished. [The practitioner obtains] controlling power (vibhutva) [with regard to] the body of this [present existence]. It is therefore

whereas āsrāyaparāvṛtti does exert controlling power over all good dharmas and dharmas unspecified," kun gahi rnam par shes pa ni dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa'i chos rnams la dbang mi byed la/ gnas gyur pa ni dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa'i chos thams cad la dbang byed pa'o. XZ agrees.

40 阿羅葉識滅時，有異相貌。There is nothing corresponding to this sentence in Tib. or XZ. 相貌 also strikes me as somewhat colloquial. I therefore suspect that this might be a record of an explanatory lecture comment (see n. 98).

41 The term wu shengyin ku 五盛陰 is relatively rare. This is the only attestation of the term in the extant P corpus. The term first ever appears in the North in Narendrayasas (under the Sui), T397:13.262b25; prior to that is confined to the South.

42 The term fanfuyin is very rare in the canon (only five instances), and other than here, never occurs in a translation text. Other instances are in Huisi 慧思 (515-577), Jingying Huiyuan, and Zhanran. Tib. and XZ parallels (see below n. 47) do not discuss the skandhas in this context. However, the skandhas are linked to āsrāyaparāvṛtti (for which P is consistently substituting *amalavijnana throughout the present passage) in MSg, which was arguably the most important of all Mahayana treatises for P. See RADICH §5.2.10, pp. 1159-1162. It is further notable that in MSg, the parāvṛtti ("revolutionary transformation") of each of the skandhas in turn is described as leading to various special kinds of "controlling power" (vibhutva) proper to the Buddhas. Voluntary control over lifespan is not included among these powers, but may be a connection between P's incorporation of the skandhas here, MSg's similar connection of skandhas to āsrāyaparāvṛtti, and the fact that P, uniquely among our versions of the text, also talks here about controlling power (vibhutva) over lifespan (see n. 43 following).

43 Ordinarily, zizai 自在 would be for Skt. vibhutva, and I have translated accordingly. The logic, as I understand it, is that one who has attained liberation is understood to have power over his own life and death, especially in the case of the Buddha; see La Vallée Poussin, "Notes" (1928-1929), 803, referring to AKBh to VII.34, VP V, 83; AK II.10a and Bh, VP I, 120-121. Further, AKBh 2.10, VP I, 120-124 holds at length that the power of prolonging or abandoning life at will is one of the rādhibāda; this later became part of the standard (expanded) list of ten "masteries" (vasitātva) of the bodhisattva, Edgerton s.v. vāsita; DBh, Rahder 70, so evam kayajñānabhinirhāraprāpto vaśavartti bhavati sarvasatvesu/ ayurvasitam ca pratilabhate nabhilāpyanabhilāpalyakalpāyupramanadhiṣṇānataya/ etc.; Mahāvastu, "Ten powers are declared by the Buddha . . . to be the attributes of the Bodhisattvas . . . power over his own life, and the power of intelligence . . . " etc., Jones I, 234. We can thus perhaps understand that the passage is claiming that the body becomes "like a magical creation" in the sense that it is en-
like a magical creation (nirmāṇa). This is because [the practitioner] has abandoned all bad karmic consequences, and attained the cause and conditions of the *amalavijñāna; [he] thereby attains controlling power over the life force (jīvita) of the present body, [whereby he] can extinguish the causes and conditions of the life force (jīvitapratyaya) in the body, and can also sever [his] lifespan [so that it is] completely extinguished with no remainder (*nirupadhisesa). [By this same process,] all sensations (vedana) are rendered pure, and so forth, as a sūtra explains in detail.47

tirely under the voluntary power of its possessor. In this connection, it is most likely significant that elsewhere in YBh itself (in the final chapter of BBh), voluntary power over lifespan is connected precisely with āsrayaṇaparavṛtti, for which P is here substituting *amalavijñāna; see Sakuma (1990) 2, 150-151; Wogihara 384; Radich §5.2.6, pp. 1134-1135. Parallel texts say nothing about voluntary power over lifespan here. Tib. has only, “The body that is like a magical creation continues to exist,” sprul ba lta bu'i lus kun tu gnas pa; and XZ similarly has “Although the body remains, it is like a magical creation” 其身雖住猶如變化. This would seem to be an interpretation of the passage closer to the notion of “Nirvāṇa with remainder” (sōpadhisesanirvāṇaadhatu) than P’s. It is thus remotely possible that P’s text is intended to convey a similar meaning, in which case we could also read sīzai, unusually, as meaning something like “the body [of the present existence] continues to exist under its own [momentum]”.

44 In giving nirmāṇa I follow Sakuma (1990) 2, 160.
45 Cf. the reference to jīvitapratyaya that appears immediately preceding this locus in XZ and Tib. parallels: 命緣, srog gi rkyen.
46 Note that this concern with sensation (vedana) is a component of YBh’s doctrine of āsrayaṇaparavṛtti in portions of the text outside JDZL. For example, the text proposes that the “basis” that undergoes revolutionary transformation is to be identified with the six (internal) sense-bases (sādāyatana); see such passages as T1579:30.839a25-b04, Sakuma (1990) 2, 206-208; Schmithausen (1969), 43-53, 42, 43 = T1579:30.747c17-21; these passages analysed in Radich §5.2.5, pp. 1130-1134. The problem here seems to be that sensation is ordinarily defiled, and yet it seems clear that arhats and Buddhas continue to function in the ordinary phenomenal world after their liberation: in what sense, then, can we say that they are liberated, when they continue to have (usually defiled) experience?
47 This entire paragraph departs in many details, but not in its gist, from parallels. Tib: “The characteristic of the abandonment (prahanalaksana) of the fundamental consciousness is this: immediately after (samanantaric) this abandonment, [there occurs a further] abandonment of the twofold clinging (dvividhāpadana), and [only] the body, which is like a magical creation (nirmanopamasya kayasya), continues to exist. Because the causes that bring about the regeneration (punarbhava) of defilements in future existences have been abandoned, attachments that [might] bring about regeneration [of existence itself] are [also] discarded; and because all causes of defilements in the present existence have [also] been abandoned, all ‘badness’ (daunshālyā) of [- related to] defilements in the present existence is also abandoned; and only the conditions of the life force (jīvita) itself persist, free of connection with all ‘badness’. Be-
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Thus, we should know that it is (1) by means of thorough comprehension and analysis; (2) by means of the cultivation of wholesome thoughts; and (3) by means of the realisation of the *amalavijnāna* that the fundamental consciousness and defilements together are extinguished.

We may summarise the doctrine of *amalavijnāna* in this rich passage as follows. cause [these conditions still exist, [the person] continues to experience sensation (vedana) up to the limits of his body and lifespan (kayaaparyanta, jivaaparyanta). This is why it is says in words such as these in the sūtras, 'These various [ongoing] sensations in this existence are only experienced for so long as [this existence lasts],’ and so forth;” kun gzi rnam par shes pa de’i spangs pa’i mishan nyid ni de spangs ma thag tu len pa rnam pa gnyis spong ba dang/ spul ba lta bu’i lus kun tu gnas pa ste/ phyi ma la sdug bsgal yang ‘byung bar byed pa’i rgyu spangs pa’i phyir/ phyi ma la yang ‘byung bar byed pa’i len pa song ba dang/ tshe ‘di la kun nas nyon mongs pa’i rgyu thams cad spangs pa’i phyir/ tshe ‘di kun nas nyon mongs pa’i gnyas ngan len thams cad spong ba dang/ gnas ngan len thams cad dang bral shing srog gi rkyen du gyur pa tsam kun tu gnas so// de yod na lus kyi mtha’ pa dang/ srog gi mtha’ pa’i tshor ba myong bar byed de/ de’i phyir mdo sde las kyung ‘di na de’i tshor ba thams cad de tsam gyis na yongs su gtugs par’gyur ro shes rgya cher ji skad du gsungs pa lta bu’o// XZ agrees almost perfectly.

It looks as though two new factors have been introduced in P: (1) P has introduced the old doctrine of voluntary control over lifespan for the liberated person in the present existence (cf. n. 43); (2) P is paraphrasing the ideas of the paragraph, rather than translating closely; in this process, as we have seen (see e.g. n. 42, 43, 46), part of his concern may be to fill in his audience on doctrines (especially those pertaining to āśrayaparāvrtti) which he knew to be contained elsewhere in YBh, but to which they had no access.

This sentence is a summary of a large section of the preceding exposition. The first two categories hark back to parts of the text we have not examined. Relevant for us is the fact that "the realisation of the "amalavijnāna" is the category under which the text summarises the entire section quoted.

57
*Amalavijñāna is realised when alayavijñāna is abandoned through the operation of its counteragents. The process whereby these counteragents operate is equivalent to intensive and repeated cultivation on the part of the wisdom that takes Thusness (tathata) as its objective support (alambana); it is also spoken of as the attainment of the path that takes Thusness as its objective support. The abandonment and extinction of the alayavijñāna amounts to a radical transformation in the being of the practitioner, which is identified as “revolutionary transformation [of the basis]” ([āśraya-] parāvṛtti). The resultant state, in which *amalavijñāna is realised, is diametrically opposed to the state of the ordinary worldling: it is free of defilements; it is also free of all the qualities (dharmaḥ), the skandhas, and the very nature (xing 性) of the worldling (prthagjana). In this state, all causes of future suffering have been brought to an end. By contrast to the ordinary states of consciousness grounded in alayavijñāna, this state is permanent; free of “outflows” (anāsṛava); free of karmic conditioning (samskaras); free of “badness” (dauṣṭhulya); acts as a basis for the noble path; and exerts control over good and neutral dharmas. The state brought about by the realisation of *amalavijñāna is also characterised by power of control over the body and over lifespan.

Comparison with the parallels in Chinese and Tibetan allow us to add, more certainly than on the basis of Paramārtha’s text alone, that *amalavijñāna is clearly a functional equivalent of āśrayaparāvṛtti. This is confirmed by the fact that even in Paramārtha’s text, which does not specifically mention āśrayaparāvṛtti, *amalavijñāna is characterised as “free from ‘badness’ (dauṣṭhulya)” — an old characterisation of āśrayaparāvṛtti itself. It is also confirmed by the fact that quasi-commentarial paraphrases in Paramārtha’s text highlight other ideas known to be connected to āśrayaparāvṛtti doctrine in Yogācāra lore, despite the fact that parallel texts do not mention those ideas — the transformed relationship to the skandhas, power over the body

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50 However, in P, this parāvṛtti is not explicitly identified as of the āśraya.
51 Assuming the phrase that seems to be missing from P as noted above, n. 39; this contrast is arguably implied, in any case, by what does remain in P’s text.
52 Parallel texts have āśrayaparāvṛtti where P has *amalavijñāna throughout. It is clear, even from this first passage, that P’s “translation” practice was different from that of the Tib. translators and XZ, and included unmarked periphrastic glosses. This feature of P’s method has already been very effectively described by Funayama (2005), 97-122. The substitution of *amalavijñāna for āśrayaparāvṛtti could be read as part of this practice.
53 See n. 35.
54 See n. 42.
and lifespan,\textsuperscript{55} and the transformation of sensation (*vedanā*).\textsuperscript{56}

### 2.2.2 JDZL <2>

JDZL next mentions *amalavijñāna* at the end of a discussion about the different kinds of seeds (*bijā*) possessed by three different classes of persons — those still in bondage (*bandhana*), those on the path but requiring further training (*śaikṣa*), and those beyond further training (*aśaikṣa*).\textsuperscript{57} The end of this discussion notes that it has been based upon the fundamental consciousness that is “not established” (*rnam par ma gzhag pa*, *avyavasthita*). The text then considers the alternative perspective, in which seeds are considered on the basis of the “established” (*vyavasthita*)\textsuperscript{58} fundamental consciousness. The discussion in this latter connection is very brief, but Paramārtha differs significantly from parallel texts. Tib. and XZ merely say:

\begin{quote}
“On the basis of the ‘established’ fundamental consciousness, in brief, it should be known that the seeds of all dharmas exist (yod) in/upon the basis of that [fundamental consciousness]\textsuperscript{59}, and they are to be known respectively as either seeds that have not yet been abandoned and seeds that ought not be abandoned [at all].\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

Thus, the discussion here is only phrased in terms of distinguishing between bad seeds and good seeds. One set needs to be abandoned but has not been yet, whereas the other set must be retained in order to attain to the liberated state.

Paramārtha puts the same point this way:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{55} See n. 43.
\textsuperscript{56} See n. 46.
\textsuperscript{57} T1584:30.1022a08-17, corresponding to D 15a1-15b1, T1579:30.584a15-b02.
\textsuperscript{58} It is not entirely clear to me exactly what distinction the text is positing between these two modes of considering the *alayavijñāna*. One possibility is that it is thinking of a difference between the *alayavijñāna* as it should be considered for most provisional purposes of discussion, and a truly definitive view. Another possibility, especially given the way P interprets, is that the pertinent difference is between the *alayavijñāna* as it is “given” in the pre-liberation state, and *alayavijñāna* when it is considered in a “distinctive” perspective that contrasts it with the state succeeding upon revolutionary transformation.
\textsuperscript{59} Tib. has only *de* la, “in that”, but XZ spells it out, saying rather that the seeds of all dharmas are based upon or grounded in *alayavijñāna*: 諸法種子一切皆依阿賴耶識.
\textsuperscript{60} *rnam par gzhag pa la ni mdor bsdu na de la chos thams cad kyi sa bon yod par rig par bya ste/ sa bon de dag ni ma spangs pa dang/ spang bar bya ma yin pa'i chos de dag dang ci rigs su ldan par rig par bya'o/ XZ differs in no significant respect.
“[In the perspective of] the established exposition [of the fundamental consciousness, we would rather say]: All worldly dharmas take the fundamental consciousness as their basis, whereas all transcendent dharmas (一切諸法出世間者,*sarvadharmaḥ lokottaraḥ) and dharmas of the path not to be abandoned (? 無斷道法*aprahaṇtyamārgadharmah?) have *amalavijñāna as their basis.”

In other words, Tib. and XZ’s YBḥ merely distinguish between different types of seeds, and specifically locate them in one and the same alayavijñāna. Paramārtha, by contrast, speaks rather of two different types of vijñāna, one the basis for worldly and defiled dharmas, and the other the basis of transcendent (lokottara) dharmas. Paramārtha substitutes this point for the original text’s assertion that it is important to distinguish between the two types of seeds; and he inserts this distinction in a place that seems to be speaking of alayavijñāna from a kind of “ultimate” or “definitive” (vyavasthāna) perspective.

This passage thus adds to our picture of *amalavijñāna the detail that *amalavijñāna is the separate basis for transcendent dharmas (lokottaradharmas), whereas worldly dharmas (laukikadharmas) are based on alayavijñāna. Further, it is perhaps implied that *amalavijñāna so defined is consciousness as it appears in the perspective of definitive truth.

2.2.3 JDZL <3>

JDZL next mentions *amalavijñāna in another discussion of “seeds” (bija). The basic question at issue is a possible contradiction between the claim that all seeds are universally pervaded by “badness” (dausghulya), and the claim that there is a class of “transcendent” qualities (lokottaradharmas) which lead to liberation. What seeds give rise to these lokottaradharmas? The basic answer is that lokottaradharmas are produced from a different class of seeds, which are based upon (alambana) Thusness itself as their necessary condition, and thus circumvent entirely the order of “impregnated” (vāsana) seeds and their attendant “badness”. The text then explains the difference be-
between four classes of beings (those who have not attained nirvāṇa, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas/Tathāgatas) on the basis of the relationship in each between these seeds of lokottaradharmas based upon Thusness and the two “obstructions” (avaraya). The text summarises the difference between the two orders of seeds thus (Tib. and XZ):

“It should be understood that the continuance (rjes su 'jug pa, *anuvṛtti) of lokottaradharmas [once they have] arisen is due to the increased strength of the revolutionary transformation of the basis (gnas gyur pa'i stobs bskyed pa las, *āśrayaparāvṛttiβālādhānā). This [fundamental transformation of the basis] is the counteragent (gnyen po, pratipakṣa, ‘antidote’) to the fundamental consciousness (alayavijnāna), is [itself] without fundament (kun gzhi ma yin pa, *anālaya), is a realm/element without ‘outflows’ (zag pa med pa'i dbyings, anāsravadhatu), and is free of conceptual elaboration (spros pa med pa, *nihpṛapāñca).”

By comparison, Paramārtha reads:

“The continuum (相續, *samātāna) produced by the lokottaradharmas can only be established on the basis of the *amalavijnāna, since this continuum acts as the counteragent to the fundamental consciousness (alayavijnāna); [this continuum is otherwise] itself without fundament (無住處, more literally ‘without a place wherein it is established’), a realm/element without ‘outflows’ (anāsravadhatu), with no deleterious function, and free of all defilements (煩惱, klesas).”

Once more, the contrast between alayavijnāna and āśrayaparāvṛtti is at stake, and

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64 See Sakuma (1990) 2, 165 and n. 872. I am grateful to Ōtake Susumu for help with this term.
65 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos skyes pa rnam kyi rjes su 'jug pa ni gnas gyur pa'i stobs bskyed pa las rig par bya ste/ de yang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i gnyen por gyur pa dang/ kun gzhi ma yin pa dang/ zag pa med pa'i dbyings dang/ spros pa med pa shes bya'o//'XZ agrees.
66 There is an obvious difficulty in P’s text here. The parallel texts clearly make āśrayaparāvṛtti the subject of the following string of predicates. In P, however, it is difficult to construe the equivalent *amalavijnāna as the subject. It is most rather most natural to interpret these predicates as modifying “continuum” (xiāngxu); but the resulting sense is puzzling, most particularly because the text thus says that the continuum has “no fundament” 住處, where it has just said that it is “founded” on *amalavijnāna. The suspicion that the text is here meant to say, with XZ and Tib, that *amalavijnāna itself has no basis, etc., is strengthened by the fact that it does assert that *amalavijnāna is without basis below; see n. 96.
67 出世法相續，依阿摩羅識而能得住，以此相續與阿羅耶識而為對治。自無住處、是無漏界、無惡作業，離諸煩惱，T1584:30.1025c23-26.
as in JDZL<1> above, *amalavijnana is substituted for aśrayaparāvrtti. New is the idea that the counteragent of alayavijnana is a continuum produced by transcendent dharmas (lokottaradharmah), and that this continuum is based upon *amalavijnana.

2.2.4 JDZL <4>

Finally, JDZL mentions *amalavijnana once more within the context of another discussion of the groundless counteragent to the alayavijnana.68 Significantly, it is clear from all three versions that the original text is indeed discussing a category of pure consciousness.69 Although the term *amalavijnana only occurs once, it is necessary to take into account the fairly long passage that comprises the context in which the term is used to fully appreciate what is at stake.

The passage first asks how “the wise” (mkhas pa, *pandita) [i.e. the Buddhas] can free themselves not only from the immediate passions of attachment and aversion, but even from the underlying latent bondage to the basic conditions of existence, which gives rise to karma and therefore to future existences.70 In answer, the text explains how

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68 The passage in full runs from T1584:30.1030c21-1031a15, corresponding to XZ T1579:30.595b06-c06, D 43a6-44a4. See also on this passage Ut 6, 785; and HAKAMAYA 10-17.
69 For this reason, Ut thought that this passage provided us with evidence that the term *amalavijnana was originally found in Skt. YBh, and had been replaced by aśrayaparāvrtti in the lineage that led to XZ’s translations. HAKAMAYA discusses and refutes this interpretation. Against it, he reasonably proposes, on the basis of XZ and Tib, that the original text most likely had aśrayaparāvrtti; HAKAMAYA 10-12.
70 So we can understand the general thrust, at least, of a question which poses difficulties in all the versions available to us. P: 智人從一切色，乃至行陰，愛等諸結誓伏故，無能生業結。有智慧故，根本永盡。何以知之？; XZ: 若聰慧者於諸色愛，乃至行愛所攝貪纏，能永斷離。於煩惱分所攝發業四身繫縛，亦能永斷。所以者何？; Tib: gang gi phyr mkhas pa ni gzugs rnam pa thams cad nas 'du byed kyi bar la sred pas bsdu pa i 'dod chags kyis kun nas dkris pa spong ba las bral bar 'gyur gyi bag la nyal las ni ma yin no// de'i mdud pa nyon mongs pa'i char gogs pa las kun nas slong bar byed pa dag kyang kun nas dkris pa kho na las spong bar 'gyur ro// Even the usually consonant XZ and Tib versions seem to part company here — a sign, perhaps, that the original text may itself have posed difficulties to its translators. The first four aggregates (skandhas) are here conceived of as the basic conditions of future re-existence; these four, as a group, are taken as the “basis” for a worldly and defiled consciousness, presumably understood as the fifth aggregate (vijnana); and the bondage of this defiled vijnana to the fourfold condition of future re-existence comprised by the other skandhas is understood in terms of the technical Abhidharmic category of “latent tendency” (anusaya). My interpretation is based upon the following observations about the question itself and subsequent discussion in the passage as a whole. (1) All three versions agree that it is the first four skandhas at issue (P: 色乃至行陰; XZ: 色乃至行; Tib: gzugs rnam pa thams cad nas ’du byed kyi bar). These four

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full liberation of the wise differs from the state of the householder (grhin) or the monastic (pravrajita) who is not liberated. Householders are bound to future re-existences by the twofold fetter of desire and aversion (malice, ill-will), in addition to acts by which they harm sentient beings.71 Unliberated monastics are bound to future re-existence by excessive attachment to precepts and rules, which they mistake for the truth.72

These two conditions comprise the foil against which the attainment of full liberation by “the wise” is explained. This is where *amalavijnana comes into play. XZ and Tib. explain as follows:

“By means of plentiful cultivation of the ['supreme' XZ only] counteragent, these twofold desirous latent tendencies (anusaya) are abandoned, and because of this abandonment, one is freed from taking the four skandhas [such as] objective form, sensation etc. as the objective support (alambana) because of defilement; the continuum is thereby eternally (gtan du, *nityam) severed. The cessation of consciousness attended by latent tendencies (anusaya) [brought about] by this severing of the continuum is not grounded (based, gnas, *asritya) upon the bases of consciousnesses associated with form, sensation etc., because of the completely purified conscious-

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71 di ltar khyim pa'i phyogs la brten pa dag ni brnab sems dang/ gnod sems kyi mdud pa dag gis yul la rjes su 'dzin pa'i rgyu las byung ba dang/ sems can la gnod pa byed pa'i rgyu las byung ba'i las kun nas slong bar byed do/

72 rab tu byung ba'i phyogs la brten pa dag ni tshul khrims dang/ brtul zhugs mchog tu 'dzin pa dang/ 'di bden no snyam du mngon par zhen pa mchog tu 'dzin pa'i mdud pa dag gis las kun nas slong bar byed do/

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skandhas are presumably the same set referred to later in the passage as “material form, sensation etc.” (P: 色等; XZ: 色受等; Tib. gzugs dang tshor ba la sogs pa). (2) Tib. speaks clearly throughout of bondage to these skandhas in terms of anusaya (bag la nyal); XZ agrees in places (二種隠殺, 595b15; 隠殺隠殺, 595b17). (3) It is clear later in the passage that these four skandhas, as a set, are understood as a “basis” (P: [四]住處; XZ: 住, 安住; Tib. gnas pa = *āśraya, *sthana etc.). (XZ also speaks unusually of the fourfold set as a fourfold embodiment 四身, 595b07, b13; for skandhas as “bodies” in earlier Chinese tradition, see RADICH n. 1617, and more generally §4.3.6 and p. 556 ff.)
ness (rnam par shes pa rnam par dag pa) that comprises the counteragent (pratipakṣa) of that [basis]. Thus, this [transformation] is known as 'the complete pacification (upasānti) of the cause of the basis'. Because of the cessation of the cause, there will in future never occur any [initial] apprehension or ['coming to] fulfilment' (yongs su rdzogs pa, *paripārṇa) of a body, nor any activation (jug pa, *vṛtti) of a continuum; thus it is called 'the complete pacification of the basis'.

"That purified consciousness (rnam par shes pa rnam par dag pa) which is attained as 'the counteragent of that [basis]' is [itself] said not to be a basis (gnas pa ma yin pa, *anaśraya?). From it as cause, therefore, it is not possible [for further re-existence] to develop (mngon par rgyas pa). Because of the intensive cultivation (bhāvana) of the 'Liberation Gate (vimokṣamukha) of Emptiness (śānyata)', [this state] is deemed to be 'unconditioned' (*asamskāra, *anabhīṣamskāra). Because of the intensive cultivation of the 'Liberation Gate of No Desire (smon pa med pa, *aprānihita)', it is deemed to be 'completely satisfied' (samtusta). Because of the intensive cultivation of the 'Liberation Gate of No Marks (mtshan ma med pa, *animitta)', it is a 'basis' (gnas pa). Thus, for the reasons given, from 'there being no further development [of future re-existence]' to 'its being a basis', it is liberation (rnam par grol ba, vimokṣa)."
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Paramârtha reads (in a somewhat more abbreviated presentation):

"Due to the cessation that comprises the counteragent to these defilements, the desire to take material form etc. [i.e. the first four skandhas] as an objective support (境, *alambana*) ceases; and due to this cessation, the defiled consciousnesses that take the [first] four [skandhas] as a basis no longer [find] a basis (諸識有慾於四住處則不復住). Because these consciousnesses that comprise the counteragents [plural in original, 該對治識] are truly purified, we know that the basis is pacified (*upasânta*); [and] because the cause (緣, *rgyud*) ceases, there will in future never be any re-arising of apprehension or bringing to completion (具足 *paripûrna*) of a continuum. Thus is it called the ‘pacification (*upasânti*) of the basis and reason for [re-]existence’有緣住靜.

"The *amalavijnâna*, which is the counteragent (*pratipaksâ*) of temporal consciousness 世識,*79

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79 *Shishi* 世識 as it is used here is a very unusual term. Excluding false analogies (e.g. across punctuation marks, across line breaks in verse, as part of longer compounds in other senses, etc. — including the only other instance within JDZL itself, where it is part of the term *weilai-shishi* 未來世識), the term does not to my knowledge occur before P. The same term is very rare even in P’s other works. In P’s MSg and Bh the same compound occurs, but in the apparently somewhat different sense of one of the eleven *vijnâpatis*. These are analogous to the Kantian “categories”, as basic ideas or constructs that enter into consciousness of the world: (1) body/self, (2) the embodied subject (*dehin*), (3) sense [organ], (4) sense datum, (5) consciousness of present sensation [pertaining to each of the senses respectively], (6) time, (7) number, (8) place, (9) language, (10) difference between self and other, and (11) *samsâra* comprising good and bad rebirth destinies 身識、身者識、受者識、應受識、正受識世識、數識、處識、言說識、自他差別識、善惡兩道生死識,
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is utterly pure, and is said not to be a basis (不住, anāsraya), and thus this consciousness cannot

T1593:31.118a24-27. In this context, shishi refers to the necessary condition of the unbroken continuity of the “continuum” samtana/samstati of the sentient being through all its lifetimes or incarnations; 世識請生死相續不斷識, T1595:31.181c12; 為明眾生果報無始以來三世生死相續不斷故, 須立世識, T1595:31.184a17-19.

Similarly, the term occurs in this sense in the Xianshi lun (顯識論, *Khyativijñāna-sastra, XSL). XSL is a puzzling text for various reasons, but seems to expound a category of consciousness (“manifesting consciousness”, khyativijñāna = 順識) otherwise primarily known from LAS. Here, the term also appears as part of the same list of vijñāpti. Here, however, we have the added twist that nine vijñāpti are identified as types of *khyativijñānanā, as in the text’s title (nos. 1 and 4-11). Against this, the remaining two types of vijñāpti are identified as two kinds of vastupratikālpa-vijñāna (“consciousness imagining differentiation between phenomenal things” = 某識, a category also deriving from the same LAS contexts), i.e. (2) the embodied subject; and (3) sense (organ); 「識」者有種：一身識、二塵識、三用識、四世識、五器識、六數識、七四種言說識、八自他異識、九善惡生死識。其次「分別識」有二種：一有身者識、二受者識, T618:31.878c27-879a02. In other words, it seems that for XSL, *khyativijñāna are the categories (識, vijñāpti) in which consciousness 識 manifests itself (識, /khyā) as apparent objects of experience, whereas vastupratikālpa-vijñāna are the categories in which consciousness appears as a pseudo-subject, which therefore is conceived of as the agent of false imagining (parikalpa, /kala, cf. vastupratikālpa) of phenomena as existent “things” (rastu).

Finally, the term also appears in P’s translation of Ratnāvalī 1.97: “Such temporal [Tib. ‘gro < loka, thus *laukhikadharmah?idharmas/ Are the fuel for the burning of consciousness/ With its due portion of the light of discrimination/ This fuel of temporal consciousness blazes, and then fades away,” 如是等世法 / 是然識火薪 / 由實量火光 / 世識薪煖盡, T1656:32.495b21-22, corresponding to Tib, rnam shes me yi bud shing ni/ ‘gro chos ’di kun yin par ’dod/ de dog ji bkzin rab ’byed pa’i/ od dang ldan pas bsreg nas shi, HARN 39. This is the only other instance in which the word is used in anything like the sense here in JDZL, i.e. as referring simply to consciousness rather than vijñāpti.

Returning to JDZL, shishi seems intended here to convey two implications about the ordinary defiled consciousness to which *amalavijñāna is the counteragent: (1) it points to consciousness as it is related to the continuum (rgyun, *samtana, *samstati: see also the immediate sequence of the present JDZL locus) of existence bound to the ordinary “world” samsāra; (2) it connects to shishi in the vijñāpti list, where shi refers specifically to time (the “three times” 三世 of past, present and future), indicating that there is not only something “worldly” about this consciousness, but that its worldliness is intimately related to the very stuff of time. My translation as “temporal consciousness” (more literally “world consciousness”) is intended to convey some of this ambiguity: “worldly” and “bound to time”. (There may even be an implication that the “counteragent”, i.e. *amalavijñāna or the “purified consciousness” is atemporal in the sense that it is timeless, i.e. eternal.) This concept of “temporal consciousness” may be an echo of the old notion that consciousness is the origin (samudaya) of the suffering world (loka) (see below n. 175), connected to the Yogacara idea of the bhajanaloaka 器世 (“container world”) etc.
function as the cause of further existence. Because of the thorough cultivation of the 'Liberation Gate (vimokṣaṃsakha) of Emptiness', it cannot give rise to karma 不能生業. Because of the thorough cultivation of the 'Liberation Gate of No Desire', it knows contentment. Because of the thorough cultivation of the 'Liberation Gate of No Marks', it is based in the immovable 住於不動. For these foregoing four reasons, [it is equivalent to] the attainment of full liberation.

"[A consciousness that is pure in this manner, even when it] sees the metamorphoses in phenomenal things 觀行於應, does not have any attachments to [notions of] 'I' and 'mine' (āham iti, mameti, atmāmiya, etc.), and thus, even when visible form (rūpa), etc. [i.e. phenomenal dharmas] are destroyed and pass out of existence 滅障, the mind does not [feel] any hunger 慾愛 [for them; for more of the same]. In these respects 此諸相, the mind is utterly pure 心徳清淨. Because consciousness is pure 認清淨, [it] does not pass out of existence of its own accord 不自滅壞, nor is it destroyed by other conditions [external to it] 亦不復為他所滅. Because there is [thus] no [longer any] continuum (相續, saṅdiśa), it is not reborn again into the places of the ten directions, and it does not hang after life and death; thus it is called 'desireless' (P. nicchāta, "without cravings"). [If] we liken the mind to a tree, and sensation (受, 81

This sentence says the polar opposite of XZ and Tib: "and in the sequence, the passage harks back to an old formula describing the state of a liberated being: "dwells in this life without craving, released, cool, enjoying bliss, become as Brahma", diśhe va dharmecchato nibbuto stti-bhuto sukhapajāsamvedi brahma-bhātata attana viharati; Dighanikāya 33 Saṅgiti-sutta, D (CARPENTER, PTS) 3, 233.1, WALSH 494. (The two Chinese translations of the Saṅgiti-sūtra in the Dirghāgama [T1, T12] seem not to contain any equivalent to this formula. The long Saṅgiti-pajñāyana passage corresponding to the fourfold rubric expounded where D33 features this formula, i.e. four kinds of individual who torment themselves, others etc., also does not seem to contain any equivalent; T1536:26.564a7-583b17; STACHE-ROSEN 1, 122-125.) The present passage is partly structured around the relation of the state of pure consciousness to the epithets "without craving, released, cool, become as Brahma" (as WALSH translates them) respectively; note also the use of "in the here-and-now" (diśheva dhamma = drṣṭe dharme)."
vedana) to its shadow (chaya), then at this time, neither exists [any longer]; [for] where the tree no longer exists, so, too, its shadow no longer exists. Because the temporal mind (*laukikacitta) has been extinguished, this state is called 'complete cessation' in the here and now (dīśe dharma/īhaiva). With reference to the gradual (krama) liberation of undefiled mind (mind 'without outflows', anasravacitta) in which residual practice is necessary (*saikṣavinirmukti), this state is said to have been 'made peaceful' (*santa). With reference to liberation in which no further practice is necessary (*asaikṣavinirmukti) it is said to have been 'purified' (*śri).

The mention of the cessation of vedana in close proximity to talk of liberation “in the here-and-now”, “becoming cool”, etc., also recalls to mind the classic formula “all that is sensed right here, being not rejoiced in, will become cold”, idheva . . . sabbavedayitani anabhinanditani srtabhavissanti, as e.g. at Itivuttaka 44, WINDISCH 38; MASEFIELD 35. Thus, we see, running in order through the passage: “does not rejoice in” (Tib. only, mngon par dga’ ba med pa, cf. P. anabhinanditani) [life and death]; “in the here and now” (cf. P. idheva); the cessation of the sensations (vedana, cf. P. sabbavedayitani); and the notion of coolness (śri etc., cf. P. srti bhavissanti). In its locus classicus in It 44, this formula is associated with the distinction between nirupadhisesanirvānadhatu and soppadhisesanirvānadhatu, “Nirvāṇa with/without a remainder of attachment”, and it likely that this distinction is in the back of the YBh author’s (“Asanga’s”) mind here, too, given that (1) the text lays out a gradated schema of several types of liberation; and (2) it is discussing liberation as a process whereby consciousness frees itself from grasping at (other) skandhas, where nir/sa-upadhi was often interpreted precise as having/not having (a remnant of) grasping at skandhas = upadanaskandha.

I suspect here a nirukti (etymological gloss) in the original text, playing on the homophony between chaya “shadow” and chanda “desire” (or some cognate thereof).

Obviously, strictly speaking, 因無樹是故無影 means “therefore there is no tree; therefore there is no shadow.” However, to say that the tree and shadow no longer exist because both [tree and shadow] no longer exist is tautological nonsense, and I suspect a better interpretation of this phrase is to see in it a clumsy “translationese” equivalent of a Sanskrit yavad . . . tavad construction, or something analogous.

Cf. “temporal consciousness” 世識 in the preceding paragraph of this same passage, JDZL<4>, and n. 79 above. Comparison with XZ and Tib. strongly suggests that the Skt. had here sāsravacitta/sāsravavijnāna, “consciousness/mind with outflows”.

This epithet should correspond to P. nibbuto, Skt. nirvṛta/nīrṇīta, in the underlying DN 33 formula (see n. 82).

This epithet has no equivalent in the DN 33 formula (see n. 82).

The strange word order 時無樹心學解脫故前次第說得寂靜 would literally lead to a translation like “with reference to the liberation of the mind without outflows, in which no further practice is necessary, it is gradually said to be . . .” This makes little sense to me, and I suspect we are looking at an artefact of awkward and somewhat literal translation. I have therefore in part following the lead of the parallels in translating here. I do not know what to make of 前.

Note that Tib. and XZ here both have “cooled”, “coolness”, i.e. *śrti, *śīta; this would make.
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Because the four remaining [skandhas] have been extinguished, [it is a state that has] attained the power of Brahmman (得梵自在, for *brahmabhūta? 91. 92

better sense in light of the allusion to the Saṅgiti sutta running through the passage (see n. 82). It is difficult, then, to see what might have led P to translate “purified” here, since it dampens the resonance of the allusions the passage is based upon. See discussion below.

For brahmabhūta here, see parallels, and the Nikaya/Āgama passage cited n. 82.

Comparison shows that the P translation is slightly scrambled and terse (whether this is because he was working from a different version of the text, or due to the translation process), especially towards its end; without the parallels, it would not be entirely possible to determine accurately the intent of some wording. XZ and Tib. here differ from one another in minor details, but the gist of both is the same. The following is a translation of XZ, noting key differences in Tib: “[Such a consciousness] does not grasp at ‘I’ and ‘mine’ (aham iti, mameti; atmāmīya, etc.) with regard to any [of the things subject to] metamorphosis (行, rgyu bar gyur pa); thus, it does not feel fear (恐怖, Tib. ‘distress’, yi chad pa), even when visible form, etc. [i.e. the dharmas of the phenomenal world] undergo destruction (壊, Tib. ‘change, transformation’, gyur). In virtue of this feature (相貌, rtags), it is manifest that that consciousness has been purified in its very essence (自體已得清淨, Tib. ‘is an essence that is pure-ified’), rnam par dag pa’i blag nyid du snang ngo). Moreover, because this consciousness has been permanently purified (又由彼識永清淨故, Tib. because of the purity of this consciousness rnam par shes pa de ni rnam par dag pa nyid kyi phyir), it enters spontaneously into [the state of] tranquility (任運自然入於寂滅, Tib. ‘into cessation’ rang gi ngang kho nas ‘gag par gyur), without any dependence upon other causes. Because the continuum of consciousness (識相續, rnam par shes pa de i rgyan, tasya viññanasya santanam) is thus cut off once and for all, it never again will tumble through (流轉, Tib. ‘enter’, ‘fall into’, ‘jug pa) the worlds of the ten directions, and does not hanker after (希求, Tib. ‘finds no delight in’ ... la mngon par dga’ ba med pa) life or death; it is therefore said to have left behind desire. Further, because all sensation (vedana) is like a shadow to the tree of consciousness, and because that consciousness, from that time on, will never again exist, it is said to have left behind its ‘shadow’. The extinction of defiled consciousnesses (諸無漏識, zag pa dang bcas pa gang yin pa, yat sāsravam [viññanam, XZ] once and for all in the here and now (於現法中, tshe ’di la, *dṛṣṭe dharma/tathāga), it is called ‘cessation’ (寂滅, mya ngan las ’das pa, nirodha). The gradual, stepwise (隨其次第, rim gyis, krameṇa) liberation of undefiled consciousnesses (consciousnesses without ‘outflow’, 諸無漏識, zag pa med pa gang yin pa, vad anāsravam [viññanam]) in which residual practice is still necessary (隨其次第有學解脫 *saikṣavinirmukti) is called ‘peace’ (寂靜, zhi ba, śānta). The liberation in which practice is no longer necessary (*asaikṣavinirmukti) is called ‘cooled’ (清浄, bsil ba, śīta); because the basis [for it, viz. consciousness] in the other (餘依) [skandhas; Tib. phung po] has been permanently extinguished, [this consciousness] is called ‘purified’ (清浄, tshangs pa gyur pa, brahmabhūta).” 92

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This passage is very instructive. Looking just at XZ and Tib, YBh clearly does understand that: (1) ordinary consciousness, when associated with the other skandhas, is the base for ordinary defiled existence that is entangled in saṃsāra; (2) the counteragent to this base is *a kind of purified consciousness (*viśuddham vijnânam); (3) the liberation brought about by the operation of this counteragent is indeed a cessation of defiled consciousness; (4) this realisation equals the severing of the continuum (saṃtāna); (5) the realisation of this state guarantees that the realised being will never take incarnation, i.e. will never again in future apprehend a body, and thus will not suffer; (6) the purified consciousness is itself not a basis (for future existence in suffering); (7) this purified consciousness is identical with liberation. In these features, the doctrine of YBh echoes the following features of Paramārtha's *amalavijnāna doctrine: it posits a kind of pure consciousness which comprises the counteragent to a kind of defiled consciousness, which is the basis for ordinary, defiled existence; liberation entails the cessation of the defiled consciousness and the severing of the continuum; it involves the cessation of future suffering; and the cessation of future suffering is connected to the complete ending of embodiment. Paramārtha's translation of this passage seems quite faithful, and adds little except that it names the purified consciousness *amalavijnāna.

The passage adds the following to our picture of *amalavijnāna. (1) *Amalavijnāna
is explicitly said to be the counteragent of defiled consciousness.\textsuperscript{95} (2) \textit{Amalavijñāna} qua the counteragent is overtly said itself not to have (or be) a basis.\textsuperscript{96} (3) The passage makes explicit an association between the “consciousness” in question and the vijnānakāndha, and thus seems to clarify somewhat the connections between \textit{amalavijñāna} and the cessation of the skandhas already touched on in earlier passages.

The final paragraph is especially important, even though it does not overtly mention \textit{amalavijñāna}.

Most strikingly, Paramārtha says the polar opposite to parallel texts.\textsuperscript{97} In XZ and Tib, the pure consciousness does not have to depend upon any other causes \textit{in order to cease}, but rather \textit{enters into cessation} of its own accord. At the moment of liberation, consciousness ceases to “exist”, and liberation consists in this cessation. In Paramārtha, pure consciousness “\textit{does not} pass out of existence of its own accord, \textit{nor} is it destroyed by other conditions [external to it].” In other words, the liberated, purified consciousness — \textit{amalavijñāna} — is \textit{permanent}, as we already saw at JDZL<1>. However, it is difficult to be sure what to make of this reversal in meaning. Given the sometimes slightly garbled state of the remainder of the text, which apparently betrays problems in translation, the reversal may result from simple error. This impression might be reinforced by the fact that even Paramārtha goes on immediately to say, ”... there is no longer any continuum (sāntāna/sāntati).” (At least so long as “continuum” refers to consciousness, this would appear to be in direct contradiction to the assertion that purified consciousness “does not pass out of existence”.) However, Paramārtha’s text nowhere else really departs from the gist of the original as seen through parallel texts. Why, then, only at such a crucial juncture? This divergence from the underlying text thus may be deliberate, and for this reason, a significant component of Paramārtha’s

\textsuperscript{95} I.e. rather than (as at JDZL<1>) that which is realised through the operation of the counteragent(s), or (as at JDZL<3>) the basis for a counteragent otherwise identified (e.g. as a continuum produced by the lokottaradharmas).

\textsuperscript{96} Recall that in JDZL<3> above, the text was unclear, but seemed to say that the continuum based upon \textit{amalavijñāna}, rather than \textit{amalavijñāna} itself, was without a basis — in direct contradiction both of its own statement that the continuum \textit{does} have a basis, and also of parallel versions of the text. These textual problems might have led us to expect that JDZL is there, too, like XZ and Tib, meant to say that \textit{amalavijñāna} is without a basis, but the present passage is thus the first place where JDZL has unambiguously made that statement.

\textsuperscript{97} See n. 81.
doctrine of *amalavijnāna — one that sounds rather close to "eternalism" (*saśvatādṛṣṭi, nityādṛṣṭi).

In this final paragraph (in parallels as well as Paramārtha), the passage also explicitly connects the liberating realisation of pure consciousness to anasravavijnāna/anasravacitta, which was a dominant theme in the AKBh amalavijnāna passage. This may show that there is indeed a conceptual link between the AKBh passage and Paramārtha’s use of *amalavijnāna.

Finally, this last paragraph reinforces the idea that the purified consciousness is the vijnānakandha. Liberation is the process whereby that consciousness is freed from attachment to the other four skandhas (aggregates). Here we hear echoes of a very old model, in which consciousness is the apparent subject of both transmigration and liberation. I take this model to be extremely pertinent to the doctrine of *amalavijnāna. We will return to this point below.

2.3 Shiba kong lun

The Shiba kong lun 十八空論 (T1616, hereafter SKBL), or “Treatise on Eighteen [Modes of] Emptiness”, is a text of a type that has been referred to as a “lecture text”.98 SBKL is clearly based upon two sections of the Madhyāntavibhāga (MAY), from Chapters 1 and 3 respectively. It intersperses apparent citations from or paraphrases of that text with comment and expansion.99 Beyond its discussion of *amalavijnāna, the text is of great interest because it makes use of a number of apparently Chinese categories.100 Since Paramārtha separately translated the “root text”, MAV (中邊分別論, T1599), for at least one of the instances of *amalavijnāna, we are in the unusual position of being able to see how Paramārtha himself alternately interpreted the passage into which he inserts...

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98 Following FUNAYAMA (2002). This denomination identifies texts that are thought to result from P’s explanations to his team of Chinese collaborators about the texts he translated, given as they translated; there are reasons to think that some of these expositions were written down, and have come down to us among the P corpus.

99 For details, see Ut 6, 131-204 (“Jūhachi ku ron no kenkyū 十八空論の研究”), esp. 175-204. Ut argues persuasively that the current text is a fragmentary remnant of some longer original, and that the title, which is clearly based upon the first portion only (corresponding to MAV Ch. 1) was also applied to the text later.

100 See, for instance, such categories as li and shi 理事, T1616:31.863b05; or the use of the term ziran 自然 in the discussion of the ninth mode of emptiness (emptiness of “[salvation] unto the final limit” (畢竟空, atyanta-śanyata), T1616:31.861c12-17; etc. I have in preparation a full annotated translation and study of SBKL, in which I intend to explore these dynamics in detail.
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the term. We are also fortunate to have a sub-commentary (ṭīka) on Vasubandhu’s MAV Bhāṣya by Paramārtha’s close contemporary Sthiramati.101 The term *amalavijnāna appears twice in SBKL.

2.3.1 SBKL <1>

*Amalavijnāna first appears in SBKL corresponding to comment upon MAV 1.21-22. The text is discussing the category of prabheda-śānta, “emptiness differentiated” [i.e. into different aspects or characteristics], before moving on to pindārtha-śānta, “emptiness in general”, i.e. a general summation of things that can be said of all the modes of emptiness collectively. In MAV, this corresponds to a section in which emptiness is “proven” as a doctrinal tenet.102 SBKL reads:

“Here begins part four,103 proofs (道理, *sadhana?) that emptiness is differentiated. There are three.

“(1) [The proof that emptiness can be differentiated according to its] purity and impurity. (i) If we were to say that emptiness (śānta) were absolutely 定 impure, then it would be impossible for all sentient beings to attain liberation, because, [emptiness] being absolutely impure, it could not be made pure. (ii) [On the other hand,] if we were to say that [emptiness] is absolutely pure, then there would be no point in cultivating the path (*margāhavaṇa),104 because even before one had attained liberation at [the stage of] the path without taints, emptiness would already be aboriginally 本 and innately 自然 pure of its very substance 体.105 There would therefore be no

101 Obviously, Sthiramati (Sth) never went to China, and so there can be no question of any Chinese influence on his thought. The detailed comparison of P’s and Sth’s ideas, from the point of view of the implications for supposed sinification in P, is an important avenue for future research.

102 Corresponding to MAV and Bh 1.21, NAGAO 26, P T1599:31.463a21 ff.

103 The fact that the text here announces a “part four” is one of the grounds upon which UT argues that our present text is incomplete.

104 At roughly this same juncture, Sth, too, speaks of “meditative development of the path” (margāhavaṇa); YAMAGUCHI 1, 59, STANLEY 77.

105 P’s exposition only loosely follows his MAV model. He reverses the order of the two propositions comprising the proof (numbered i and ii respectively above and in the following, in order to facilitate comparison): “(ii) If it [emptiness] were not defiled, then all embodied beings would be liberated [already]/ (i) If it were not pure, then effort [towards salvation] would be fruitless;” संक्लिष्ट संवाद तत्त्वसाधनोऽवश्य पुनः सत्त्वविशेषतः/ विशुद्ध संवाद तत्त्वसाधनोऽवश्य पुनः सत्त्वविशेषतः. He also paraphrases the basic idea of these two propositions quite loosely and expansively, especially (ii).
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defilements to obstruct wisdom, nor anything that could extirpate [them], and all sentient beings would automatically attain liberation without relying on effort;\textsuperscript{106} [however,] it is evident that sentient beings do not [in fact] attain liberation without effort, and thus, emptiness is not absolutely pure. On the other hand, it is also the case that liberation is [in fact] attained by dint of effort, and thus we know that emptiness is not absolutely impure.\textsuperscript{107} This is the proof of purity-cum-impurity and impurity-cum-purity.

"Additional comment: If we say that the principle (li 理) of emptiness is absolutely impure, then all efforts would be inefficacious, because the essential nature (自性, *svabhava) of the element of emptiness (空界, *sanyatadhatu) itself would be impure; and therefore, even when the path had arisen, one would remain incorrigibly worldly/profane, so that the path would be useless. Because it is not thus, we know that emptiness is not impure by nature.

"Question: If this is the case, then given that there is no impurity by essential nature, there should also be no purity by essential nature. How can it be ascertained that the dharma-realm (法界, *dharma-dhatu) is neither pure nor impure?

"Answer: *Amalavijñana is the aboriginally pure [Skt. 'luminous'] mind (自性清淨心, prakṛtipra-

\textsuperscript{106} According to the sequence of the text, this should correspond to MAV: "If dharmas were not defiled by adventitious defilements when the counteragent [of defilement] had not yet arisen, then because there was no defilement, all sentient beings would be liberated even without effort;" yadi dharmānāṁ sāmyata agantukāir upaklesaṁ anutpanne 'pi pratipakṣe na saṃkliṣṭa bhavet 1, saṃklesābhavad ayatnata iva muktāb sarvā satva bhaveyhi. P would correspond quite closely to this if it read 若無煩惱為能障智慧...則不依功力一切眾生自得解脫. As the text stands, however, it seems that the logical relation among the various clauses is quite different to Skt.

\textsuperscript{107} MAV here reads: "On the other hand, if [emptiness] were not pure even when the counteragent had arisen, then efforts for the purpose of liberation would be fruitless;" atha tāntan 'pi pratipakṣe na viśuddha bhavet mokṣārtham arambho nisphalo bhavet.

\textsuperscript{108} It seems that this sentence corresponds to MAV 1.22ab, "It [viz. emptiness] is neither defiled nor undefiled, neither pure nor impure;" na klīṣṭa nāpi vākliṣṭa sūḍha sūḍha na āśvito sa. 淨不淨不淨淨 could be read as a (somewhat muddy) attempt to convey the idea of being "neither defiled nor undefiled, neither pure nor impure".

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It is only because it is tainted by adventitious dirt that we speak of it as ‘impure’; because of adventitious dirt, [that is,] we establish that it is [also] impure.”

This passage adds to our growing picture of *amalavijnāna as follows. *Amalavijnāna is now identified with *prakṛtiprabhasvaracittasya, i.e. the aboriginal “innate purity of mind”. It accounts for the pure aspect of emptiness, whereas the impure aspect is accounted for by adventitious defilements. Moreover, both the association with *prakṛtiprabhasvaracittasya, and the association between *amalavijnāna and the dichotomy of intrinsic purity and innate defilements, link *amalavijnāna to the pure Thusness of the Ratnagotraśāvatāra (RGV), and via RGV to tathāgatagarbha doctrine (and its Chinese offshoot, the doctrine of “Buddha Nature”, foxing 佛性). Further, the pure aspect of emptiness with which *amalavijnāna is identified here is also identified in turn with the dharmaññatā; this is the beginning of a process that links *amalavijnāna into a chain of identifications for (aspects of) the Mahāyāna “absolute”.

109 IWATA (1972[a]) claims that prabhāsvaratva ... cittasya, i.e. something like prakṛtiprabhasvaracittasya, is the Skt. "original" for *amalavijnāna here, but it is clear from the fact that SBKL also gives a term clearly corresponding to prabhāsvaracittasya that *amalavijnāna does not translate that term, but that rather, a correspondence is being explicitly asserted between the two terms. Further evidence that P does know the difference is that in the corresponding locus in his translation of MAV itself, he simply gives *prabhāsvaratva for this line (prabhāsvaratvāc cittasya), T1599:31.453b01.

110 This line, following on from the correspondence to MAV 1.22ab above, seems to correspond roughly to MAV 1.22cd, "... because of the luminosity of mind, and because of the adventitiousness of defilement;" prabhāsvaratvāc cittasya klesasyāgantukatvātah. However, it can be seen that P has done very much with the bare bones provided by the MAV verse here, making it into the occasion of a whole dialogue of objection and rebuttal.

111 This fourth,分别空道理。有三：一、淨不淨。若言空定是不淨，則一切眾生不得解脫。何以故？以定不淨、不可令淨故也。若言定是淨，則修道無用。何以故？未得解脫無漏道時，空體本已自然清淨故，則於煩惱為能障智慧、又能除，則不依功力、一切眾生自得解脫。現見離功力眾生不得解脫，知此空非是定淨。復由功用而得解脫，故知此空非定不淨。名「浄不浄、不浄浄」道理也。又釋：若言空理定是不浄、一切功力則無果報。何以故？以空界自性是不浄、離復生道、非不可離、道則無用。無此義故、故知此空非不浄。問：若爾、既無自性不浄、亦應無有自性浄。云何分判法界非淨非不浄？答：阿摩羅識是自性清浄心。但為眾生所汚。故名「不浄」，為成種盡、故立為淨, T1616:31.863b06-21. For MAV, see NAGAO 26-27; ANACKER 221. For MAV (including a translation of MAV), see YAMAGUCHI 1, 59-61; STANLEY 76-78; also FRIEDMANN 81-82, STICHERBAHNSKY 99-102.

112 Note that the association between *amalavijnāna’s alter ego, aśrayapaññārtti, and the dharmaññatā is already by this point old, for example in the “Nirvāṇa Chapter” of YBh. See RADICH §5.2.8, 1138-1152, esp. 1139; and ns. 2558, 2560.

113 Similarly, the passage also speaks of li 理, which was eventually to become so important in
The passage translated here comprises only part of a longer section. In the sequence, it becomes clear from the wording of the argument that, as above, emptiness is being identified with the *dharmadhatu (cf. the unusual use of *śūnyatādhatu above, probably as a kind of intermediate term to this identification),\(^\text{114}\) and with Thusness.\(^\text{115}\) All three are therefore implicitly also identified with *amalavijnāna qua the "innate purity/luminosity of mind" (prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta). The identification of more than one of these terms as the topic or locus of absolute purity thus implies an identification of the truest pure substance of mind with the truest substance of all things.

2.3.2 SBKL <2>

Strictly speaking, the second passage in SBKL may not in fact mention *amalavijnāna, but rather a "pure/luminous consciousness" (prabhasvaracitta), which is then qualified as *amala. The passage in question corresponds to MAV 3.14 and Bh. MAV Ch. 3 treats various kinds of reality (tattva, also "truth", "real" etc.). The ninth category under which it does so is prabheda-tattva, or "reality as it is differentiated".\(^\text{116}\) This category in turn is divided into seven different aspects under which reality may be known, approached or apprehended.\(^\text{117}\) The third of these aspects is "the reality of representation only" (vijñaptitattva),\(^\text{118}\) which refers to the fact that in reality, all dharmadhatu, especially in Huayan contexts.

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\(^{114}\) 863b24, b27 etc.

\(^{115}\) These sections are not matched by anything in MAV. As it has for emptiness, the text expounds purity and impurity for the *dharmadhatu, 863b22-c05; and Thusness (tathātā), 863c05-c24 (note in this connection that Sth also brings in Thusness in his exposition of the passage in MAVT: tathātāyam agantukair malaiś sanklīṣṭatbhūyapagantavaty ete, YAMAGUCHI 1, 59.22-60.1). In each case, the basic proposition that the topic is "pure-impure" is expounded in different ways: in the case of the *dharmadhatu, that it is "pure in some respects, and pure in others" or 淨 or 不凈; in the case of Thusness, that it is "both pure and impure" or 不淨. The implicit identification effected by this argument between emptiness, the *dharmadhatu, and Thusness is important; that *amalavijnāna is also identified with the pure substance or essence of emptiness implies a further identification between *amalavijnāna and all three of these instances. The use of 自性淨 to describe the *dharmadhatu, e.g. 863b28-29, echoes the predication of 自性清净 of mind/*amalavijnāna.

\(^{116}\) Note the parallel with the treatment of "emptiness differentiated" in SBKL<1> above.

\(^{117}\) These seven types of tattva are also found in other early Yogācāra texts in addition to MAV, including SdhN, as Sth’s MAVT notes; see SdhN 8.20.2, LAMOTTE (1935) 99, 219; and MSA 19.44 and Bh, LEVI (1907, 1911) 1, 167-168; 2, 275; JAMPSAL et al., 304.

\(^{118}\) I here provide the equivalent found in MAV (where the orthography is in fact - tattva), which is certainly the more relevant here, in that MAV is the text upon which SBKL is based. Note, however, that in other sources (see n. 117), the category may also be called vijñaptitathā (as
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mas are merely representations (*vijñaptimātra*). We will see below that Paramārtha also connected *amalavijñāna* to this category of the third *tattva* in SWXL<1>.119

"Third, we explain the reality of representation only (vijñaptimātra). [This consists in] discerning that all dharmas are only pure consciousness (*vijnapti*-matra-tattva). [This consists in] discerning that all dharmas are only pure consciousness 唯識真實 (*vijñaptimātra*-tattva). [This consists in] discerning that all dharmas are only pure consciousness 淨識, such that there is no subject of ignorance, and also no object of ignorance 無有能疑亦無所疑, as is explained in detail in the Treatise on Representation Only 唯識論.120 There are two senses in which it is proposed that there is only representation.

"(i) First, [in the perspective/stage of] practice (prayoga, 方便),122 [the doctrine of representa-

the other items in this sevenfold rubric are – *tathata*); see e.g. LEVI (1907, 1911) 1, 168; and cf. the term in SWXL, for which see below n. 144. I am grateful to ŌTAKE Susumu for pointing out this variant.

119 Further on P's interpretation of *vijñapti*-matra-tattva, see SBKL T1616:31.864c29-865a03, and GIMELLO 322.

120 The distinction between nenGYI 能疑 and suoyi 所疑 is unique to the present passage and a citation of it in the Zong jing lu (which erroneously attributes it to Kumārajiva's 十二門論), T2016:48.609c03-09. (Chengguan, T1736:36.212b03-05, seemingly uses the two terms in a different sense.)

121 This should refer to Vasubandhu's Viṃśatika, which P translated as the 大乘唯識論, T1589.

122 The terminological distinction between fangbian weishi 方便唯識 and zhengguan weishi 正觀唯識 seems to be unique to the present passage in the entire Chinese canon. The general perspective on *vijñaptimātra* expounded under this head, however, is a feature of P's writings; see GIMELLO 320-323.

The term abhisamaya, “true understanding”, is defined in AKbh to 6.2 as follows: *abhisamaya itti ko 'rthaḥ. abhisambodhaḥ. inn bodhanārthatatvat. kasmad anāśraya eva na sāsravat. sa hi nirvānābhimukhah samyak bodhaḥ. samyaug iti tattvena;* PRADHAN 328.11, VP 4, 122; '對正觀' 者，此句何義？趣向正覺為義。云何此唯無流、非有流？由此趣向於涅槃、緣真實境界、故名「正」。P then adds a comment that is not paralleled in Skt: "It is called bodhi (awakening) because [one] comes to know what was not known before, and because one penetrates to the purified object in accordance with reality” 未曾知知、故名「覺」。如實能通清淨境故, 266b22-25. (*Abhisamaya* is also discussed at AK 6.27a and Bh, PRADHAN 351.7 ff., VP 6, 185 ff., where P however translates simply 視, T1559:29.273c11 ff.) In this AKbh definition, P translates *abhisamaya* as *duizhengguan* 對正観, but in the immediate context also as 觀 alone, T1559:29.266b21; at T1559:219.284c15-16, he also translates *zhengguan*, for *atas catavhy api satyany abhisamayato dharmavetyaprasadalabhah* VP 4, 292, PRADHAN 387.3 It is thus clear that the translation is (as is typical of P) adaptable to circumstance, and also that *zhengguan* does correspond to *abhisamaya*, and further, in a sense that fits the use of the term here.

In places in AKbh, P translates *prayoga* "practice" as fangbian. Once in the same AKbh Ch. 6, fangbian is used in translating *prayogamarga*: 方便道, T1559:29.282b23, PRADHAN 379.1-2. (Note,
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tion only] refers to the perception that there is only alayaviññāna, and no other objects beyond it.

This results in the realisation of the dual emptiness of object and mind, and the complete extirpation of deluded consciousness. This is what is termed ‘representation only [in the perspective/stage] of practice’.

(ii) Second, representation only [in the perspective/stage] of perfect insight (正観, abhismaya). [In this perspective,] we dispose of both the deluded consciousness and mind of samsāra, and of its object, [such that] both are completely purified, and there is only the taintless (阿摩羅, amala) pure/luminous mind (清浄心, prabhāsvaracitta).

however, that the translation of prayoga and even prayogamarga is, once more typically for P, variable even within this chapter; the more regular translation of prayoga throughout the chapter is jiaxing 加行.) This may be compared to P’s Bh to MS g 3.3: 一切法，謂有為無為，有流無流，及四界，三乘道果等。如此等法，實唯有識。何以故？一切法以識為根，真如為體故。

若方便道，以識為相。若入見道，以真如為體，T1595:31.200a19-22. Here, too, the contrast is between (the path of) practice (方便道, prayogamarga) and (the path of) insight (見道, darsanamarga); further, (the path of) practice is related to the realisation that the characteristic of all dharmas is consciousness/representation (shī), while (the path of) insight is related to the realisation that their substance (tī) is Thusness. Thus, it is likely that in correlation with zhengguan "perfect insight", “true understanding”, fangbian is intended to refer to prayoga, “practice”. I am grateful to Otake Susumu for pointing me to this background.

122 See n. 122.

123 This compound is extremely rare. As far as I can ascertain, it never occurs in the Chinese canon before P. It occurs three times in his corpus, in AKBh T1559:29.279c23; here; and in the 四諦論, T1647:32.391a25. The AKBh instance is not indexed by Hirakawa, but occurs at Bh to 6.54a, where it corresponds to vāhana in Pradhān’s Skt, which I read in the causative sense given by Monier Williams in the variant orthography vakha "drawing off, carrying off", Pradhan 370, MW s.v.; La Vallée Poussin (1980) reads bahana and translates "expulse", 4, 244, to which he cites a Yasomitra gloss fn. 3. My translation here remains tentative, due to this relative paucity of information.

125 Third, 明唯識真實：辨一切諸法，唯有清淨，無有能識，亦無所識。廣釋如唯識論。但唯識義有兩：一者，方便、謂先觀唯有阿梨耶識，無餘境界，現得境智兩空，除妄智已盡，名為「方便唯識」也。二、明正觀唯識，依諸生死無妄識心及以境界，一皆清浄，唯有阿摩羅清浄心也, T1616:31.864a22-28. For another translation of the last two paragraphs in my English, see Gimello 325. I am not as confident as Gimello that we can take amoluo here as an abbreviated reference to the "amalavijñāna, but rather think it possible that amala is merely being used as a modifier for qingjingxin; I have reflected this slight difference in reading in my translation. For MAV, see NAGAO 43, O’Brien 236-238, ANACKER 238-239. For MAVT, see YAMAGUCHI 1, 133-135; STANLEY 176-179. Sth, following Vasubandhu’s gloss of the root text to the effect that viññātipitatta (and three other kinds of tattva) are to be identified with the "perfected nature" (parinīśpannasaśvabhāva) (3.14, ekam laksana-viññāti-sūddhi-samyakprapannata, Bh: laksana-tatvādini catvory ekam mala-tatvam parinīśpanna-laksanañ) further says that this is because it
This passage is the first time we have seen *amalavijnāna associated with the doctrine that there is representation only. In Sanskrit, there is a distinction, however tricky, between "representation(s) (vijñapti) and "consciousness" (vijñāna). However, in this Chinese there is none — both are shī 識. It seems clear that the present passage plays on this polysemy, and is predicated on thinking in Chinese: there is only shī, and that is of two kinds, alayavijnāna (at the intermediate stage of practice) and *amalavijnāna (at the stage of insight). This exposition situates *amalavijnāna in relation to an interpretation of vijñaptimātra/weishi typical of the Paramārtha corpus (see e.g. ZSL below), here articulated in terms of the distinction between fangbian weishi and zhengguan weishi. As opposed to a halfway-house understanding of vijñaptimātra that hypostasises alayavijnāna and imagines it to be all there is,126 *amalavijnāna is associated with an ultimate understanding in which alayavijnāna is gotten rid of altogether (as above, e.g. in JDZL<1> and <3>, where *amalavijnāna is associated in various ways with its counterparts). This final perspective is also associated with a non-dualism that transcends the subject-object dichotomy (here, of subject and object of ignorance). Finally, it is also worth noting that the overall context of this passage associates *amalavijnāna with reality or Thusness (tattva, tathatā), thus rendering direct a link that was only indirect in SKBL<1> above, where it was made via emptiness as middle term.

2.4 Zhuanshi lun (ZSL)

The Zhuanshi lun (轉識論,*Pravrttivijnāna śāstra)127 T1587, hereafter ZSL) com-

126 An interpretation which incidentally corresponds quite accurately to characterisations of Vijnaptimātra thought as "idealist", frequently found in the secondary literature; a Vijnaptimātra response to charges of "idealism" might thus be that the term only characterises an imperfect or incomplete Vijnaptimātra.

127 The title of this text poses interesting problems. The term Zhuanshi 轉識 does not actually appear anywhere in ZSL except the title; the vijñānaparīnāma that is the topic of the text is rather called (more logically) shishuan 識轉. Aside from this, Zhuanshi only appears in two places in P’s extant corpus: once in the possibly problematic Yijiao jing lun, T1529:26.285c13-14; and once in a passage in MSg and Bh, where it is part of a verb-object construction meaning “to transform the aggregate of consciousness”, 轉識陰依故, Tib. rnam par shes pa'i phung po [gna su] gyur pa'i phyir (*vijñanaskandhāśraye paravṛtti[-tvat]?): T1593:31.130a22, T1595:31.253b27-28, Lamotte (1973) 1, 86.

On the other hand, although it is elsewhere also quite rare, the term Zhuanshi does appear in the following series of texts. Beginning with Guanabhadra, all three Ch. versions of LAS use the term for pravṛtti/vijñāna, pravṛtti or vṛtti, Tib. 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa etc. (443 C.E.); in Guanabhadra, T670:16.483a29-b3, 484a13-14, corresponding respectively to Nanjo 38.13-15,
prizes a translation of Vasubandhu’s *Trimsīka*, with commentary seamlessly interwoven with the root text. In this sense, ZSL too may answer to the description of “lecture text”. As for SBKL, we have the possibility here of some direct comparison with Sthiramati’s interpretation, as his commentary on the *Trimsīka* is also extant. Sthiramati also comments in detail upon the verse, sometimes to similar effect, but

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44.8; in Bodhiruci (513 C.E.), in addition to passages corresponding to these Guṇabhadra passages at T671:16.522a16-20 and 523a19-23, also at 515a06-08=NANJO 2.13, 523.c10-16=NANJO 47.3-8, 538c02-04=NANJO 126.18, 540b25-27=NANJO 136.12, 559c01-04=NANJO 235.17, 571c12-13=NANJO 300.11; and in corresponding loci in Śīkṣānanda’s translation (700-704); see also SUZUKI (2000) 120, 412. A large number of these loci feature the conceit of the arising of the *pravṛttivijñāna* as “waves” upon the “ocean” of the *alayavijñāna*: e.g. ebhir mahamate caturbhik karanair oghantarajalasthanryad alayavijnanat pravṛttivijñānatartaranga utpadaye, NANJO 44.8 etc. The only other place it appears before P is in Bodhiruci’s Daśabhāmika sutra śastra T1522:26.172b17, where it corresponds to Tib. ’jug pa’i *rnam par shes pa* (= *pravṛttivijñāna*), ŌTAKE (2005) 2, 488, 489 n. 10. Thereafter, the most important place where the term also appears is AF, where it is clearly derived from LAS in at least some instances (being associated, for instance, with 業識 karma[-laksana]-vijñāna, 分別事識 vastupratikalpa-vijñāna, 現識 khyati-vijñāna etc.; see T1666:32.577b06-12, HAKEDA ("evolving consciousness") 48; 579b20-23, HAKEDA 69; 581a26-29, HAKEDA 87.

As ŌTAKE Susumu has pointed out (personal communication), in P’s own texts, the more usual term for *pravṛttivijñāna* is by contrast *shengqishi* 生起識: see MSg T1593:31.115c17, 116a03, (119c22, not in Tib.), 121b29-c03 = ’jug pa’i *rnam par shes pa*, LAMOTTE (1973) 1, 12-13, 42; MAVBh to 3.22, T1599:31.457c16-17, = *pravṛttivijñāna*, NAGAO 48. (The term *shengqishi*, further, is not found before P, and only a few times in XZ after him in translation works, and so is a strong marker of his genuine style.)

Thus, while the evidence is only circumstantial, it seems a term derived from LAS, but never certainly found in P’s own corpus, has been applied as the title of this P text. The same term is further associated with AF, i.e. the most famous instance of the interpolation of non-P ideas into the P corpus, which is itself associated with LAS-derived ideas. Rather than reading the title in terms of the content of ZSL itself, and then reconstructing *Vijñānaparināma śastra* itself, it seems more consistent with this scenario to read the title in terms of the LAS provenance of the term *zhuan shi*, and to reconstruct *Pravṛttivijñāna śastra*. This reflects a presumed intent of whoever applied the title to align the text with ideas derived from LAS and possibly AF.

Note, finally, that Daoji, who quotes ZSL by name, must have seen the text in whatever modified form it assumed when this title was applied to it; conversely, we can conclude that the text must have acquired the title at least before his citations (in 633-637); see below p. 131.

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128 A full translation of ZSL is the centre of the only book-length study of P’s works in English, PAUL; see 153-167. For apt criticisms of Paul’s translation, see reviews by DE JONG and COX.

129 See LEVI (1925) and LEVI (1932), 61-123.

130 LEVI (1925), 36. Sth agrees with P that the first *vijñānam* refers specifically to *alayavijñāna*; and that various particular sense-consciousnesses are produced in the process of *parināma*
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the two commentaries differ in important respects. There is nothing in Sthiramati that sounds like the *amalavijnāna passage translated here.

*Amalavijnāna occurs twice in one passage, at the end of a long comment on Trisākā 18. That verse proclaims:

"[This] consciousness (i.e. alayavijñāna) is possessed of/identical to all seeds; due to the mutual influence of consciousnesses one upon the other, its phenomenal transformation (parinama) goes from one form to another, and thereby each figment of the imagination comes into being [in turn]."

(though P specifies a wider range of evolutes).

131 In particular, P's translation and interpretation of tathā tathā/ yaty anyonyavaśad is strange and difficult to account for. At this point, P's text also adds comments on the distinction between subject and object of discrimination, and equivalences between these categories and parikalpitavabhava and paratantrasvabhava, none of which are matched in Sth's text. P's emphasis on the disproof of external objects alone is not paralleled in Sth.

132 That is to say, no caveat that the kind of viñaptimatra here expounded is limited or provisional, no concern with a "pure" aspect of viñaptimatra system or practice, and no mention of any concept that might answer to *amalavijnāna itself. For a French translation of Sth's comments here, see LEVI (1932), 107-108.

133 The passage as a whole runs from T1587:31.62b25-c20. For a translation (not always accurate) see PAUL 159-160.

134 The root text has already adverted to this consciousness, i.e. alayavijñāna, in the preceding verse. Both P and Sth agree that it is alayavijñāna that is meant here. Sth is at pains to point out that it is specified by the epithet sarvabijam, which is necessary to distinguish alayavijñāna from other kinds of consciousness that are not comprised of seeds (i.e. the "operative" pravṛtti sense-consciousnesses etc.), and therefore that no fault accrues to Vasubandhu for omitting the qualifier alaya- in speaking of it here; LEVI (1925), 36. Yoxi has argued that because talk of *amalavijnāna arises here in the context of a discussion of alayavijñāna, it is unlikely that the reference in ZSL to the "Chapter on the Doctrine of 'Nine Consciousnesses'" is, as it has been taken by the tradition, reference to a freestanding text (like the rumoured Jiushi zhang) that expounded *amalavijnāna as a "ninth consciousness"; see p. 106 below.

135 So at least Sth understands this notion of mutual influence: anyonyavaśad iti/ tathā hi caksurādivijñānāṁ svasaktiparipose varītamanāṁ saktivisīśasyālayavijñānānāparīnamāsya nimittam so 'pi alayavijñānāpaariṇāmaḥ caksurādivijñānāsya nimittam bhavati/ evam anyonyavaśad yasmad ubhayām pravartate/ tasmad alayavijñānād anyenānadhīśitaad anekaparākāro vikalpaḥ sa sa ājaya, LEVI (1925), 36. P's gloss here is very peculiar and would simply lead us away from the issue at hand; see T1587:31.62c06-10.

136 sarvabijam hi vijñānam āparināmaḥ tatha tathā/ yaty anyonyavaśad yena vikalpaḥ sa sa ājaya.
This verse explains how apparent phenomenal experience originates from the mind as a product of the interactions of karmic forces (seeds,  bjña). The apparent objects of phenomenal experience are mere figments of false imagination (vikalpa), and the endlessly transforming stream of such experience is a series of transformations (parināma) of consciousness itself.

Paramārtha’s ZSL then comments in detail on this verse, foot by foot. These comments basically treat the verse as showing the falsehood, i.e. the non-existence in the ultimate perspective of truth, of external phenomenal objects only. On this reading, the verse disproves the independent status of external things, but not of consciousness itself.\textsuperscript{137} In a move clearly related, in content if not in name, to the doctrine of two perspectives on viññāpaimatå we saw above in SBKL <2>, the text characterises this aspect of viññāpaimatå as the “impure aspect” (不浄品) — a clear parallel to “representation only in the perspective of practice” (方便唯識).\textsuperscript{138} This leads the text directly to the notion of *amalavijñāna. It seems clear (though implicit) that this exposition is intended to present *amalavijñāna as the “pure aspect” of viññāpaimatå (both as practice and object of realisation), by contrast to the “impure aspect” just examined:

“Question: If we do away with the phenomenal object, but allow consciousness (viññāna) to remain 遠境在識, then we can call this principle ‘consciousness only’ (唯識, viññāpaimatå, ‘representation only’). But once both object and consciousness have been done away with, what ‘consciousness’ is there to be demonstrated/realised (或, /siddh) [in order that we can call the resulting state ‘consciousness only’]?"

“Answer: In establishing ‘consciousness only’, it is in the final analysis only for the purposes of argument (卒終為論)\textsuperscript{139} that one [proposes] merely doing away with the object and retaining the mind. In fact, the true purport [of ‘consciousness only’] is that one does away with the object because one wants to render mind empty (遺境為欲空心), and for this reason, the principle [of ‘consciousness only’] is only truly realised (是其義成) when both object and consciousness dis-

\textsuperscript{137} a ~gl'o* TAG • • • I li fiU * .PR,T1587:31.62b27-28.

\textsuperscript{138} RN+IJ'I`l - , T1587:31.62b28; ffillitAIMA. ravA7ta a iL ly o tSc i At, 62c14-15.

\textsuperscript{139} This phrase, which occurs twice in close succession, is a mysterious hapax (apart from its duplication here). Even the phrase 卒終 is only found here and in an isolated instance in Zhiyi (T1718:34.49c25) down to this period. As we shall see immediately below (n. 140), it is also, in its second occurrence, implicated in the textual problem that also besets the second instance of the term *amalavijñāna. My translation here is therefore tentative.
appear at once. This simultaneous disappearance of both object and consciousness is precisely
the perfected nature (parinispansasvabhava); and the perfected nature is precisely the
*amalavijñāna.”

As in SKB1<2> above, we here see *amalavijñāna related to a more perfect aspect
or version of vijnaptimatra/weishi doctrine. Again, this “higher weishi” is superior, and
ultimately true, because it not only disposes of external objects, but also of ordinary
consciousness. The most significant new aspect of the doctrine here is the identification
between the perfected nature (parinispansasvabhava) and *amalavijñāna; once more,
this is associated with a non-dualism that obviates the subject-object dichotomy.

2.5 San wuxing lun

The San wuxing lun (三無性論 T1617, *Nihsvabhavatratraya-sastra, “Treatise on the
Threefold Absence of Essential Nature”, hereafter SWXL) corresponds to the Cheng
wuxing Chapter (成無性品, “Proof of the Absence[s] of Essential Nature”) of the Xian-
yang shengjiao lun (顯揚聖教論, T1602, hereafter XYSJL). The term *amalavijñāna

140 遠境在識，乃可稱「唯識」義，既境識俱違，何識可成？答：立唯識，乃一往遠境留
心，卒終為論。遠境為欲空心，是其正意。是故境識俱泯，是其義成。此境識俱泯，即是實
The second instance of the term *amalavijñāna occurs in the phrase immediately following,
亦可卒終為論是摩羅識也. There are reasons to believe there is a textual problem here. (1)
*Amalavijñāna is uniquely here represented by 摩羅識 alone, whereas in all other instances
of the term it always has a preceding syllable for Skt. a- (阿摩羅識, 阿摩羅識, etc.); note, howev-
er, that Song, Yuan, Ming and Palace editions of the canon have a here. (2) As we noted in the
preceding fn. 139, the odd phrase 卒終為論 is unique, in the entire canon, to the present
passage. Its repetition at such close proximity may be a sign of a scribal error. (3) It is very
difficult to extract any sense from this sentence. (PAUL’s translation here, “Additionally, we can
say in the final analysis that this is Pure Consciousness,” is a guess at best, and does not
acknowledge the strangeness of the Chinese syntax.) In support of this conjecture, we might
note that the text seems also to be corrupt in other places; at the very beginning of the passage
discussed here, for example, we see an apparently meaningless repetition of the phrase 及所餘
七識種子 thus: 為諸法種子及所餘七識種子 及所餘七識種子, T1587:31.62b29-c02, where it
seems clear the copyist’s eye has been drawn back to the first instance of zhongzi and he has
redundantly reduplicated its sequence. These possibly corrupt passages are the same in all
editions of the text available to me (including the southern Qisha and two derivatives of the
Kaibao canon, namely the Koryō and Jin versions). UI silently corrects the latter passage, UI 6,
416. In any case, whether or not the sentence is indeed corrupt, it is difficult enough to make
sense of it that it adds nothing to our analysis of the overall meaning of the term
*amalavijñāna.

141 XZ’s translation of the text. The title of this text is variously reconstructed
appears in two passages in this text.142

2.5.1 SWXL <1>

*Amalavijñāna occurs three times in a passage expounding the third of the seven tattvas, i.e. "the reality of representation only" (vijñaptitattva, vijñaptitathata). As we saw above, *amalavijñāna is expounded in the same connection in SBKL <2>.143

“(3) The reality (Thusness) of representation only (識如如, *vijñapti [−matra]-tattva).144 By this is meant that all conditioned phenomena (一切諸行, *sarvasamskāra) are nothing more than representation/consciousness (識, *vijñāpti, *vijñāna). This ‘consciousness’ is called ‘reality’ (如如, tattva) in two senses: (i) it is a comprehension free from error (攝無倒, *aviparyasasangraha);145 (ii) it is immutable (無變異, *avikara).146

“(i) In saying it is ‘a comprehension free from error’, we mean that all dharmas, i.e. the twelve sense bases (入, ayatana) etc., are nothing more than representation/consciousness, and that beyond [this] deluded consciousness there are no other dharmas. Thus, all dharmas are comprised by consciousness and nothing more.148 The discernment of this principle is called

*Āryadesanāvikaḥ (Aryaśanaprakaraṇa, Śasanodbhavana) etc. The chapter in question begins at 557b04. Parts of XYSJL and therefore of SWXL also correspond in some measure to portions of YBh, and I will refer to relevant parallels below. On the Xianyang shengjiao lun, see SCHMITHAUSEN (1987) 2, 261-262 n. 99.

142 PAUL incorrectly asserts that it only appears in SWXL <2>; PAUL 142.

143 This passage is translated in its entirety in GIMELLO 317-319, and I have benefited greatly from consulting this translation and annotations in the process of making my own. A partial translation is also given in DEMIEVILLE (1929), 41-42. GIMELLO also comments extensively on this passage, 320 ff.

144 The reader is referred to comments introducing SBKL<2> above p. 76, for the meaning of this concept and its place within larger rubrics. Note that the translation terminology varies: for 如如 here SBKL has 唯識真實; see n. 118.

145 Following GIMELLO’s suggested Skt. and explanation, 318 n. 206.

146 See GIMELLO 318 n. 207, esp. the illuminating reference to MAV 3.11, NAGAO 41.

147 P uses 亂識 to translate both bhṛnti “error, delusion” and abhataparikalpa “imagination of that which does not really exist” in his MAV. See GIMELLO 318 n. 208. This term is a fingerprint of P’s style; see n. 337.

148 Note that here, in being associated with luanshi, weishi 唯識 takes on a stronger sense of “consciousness only” than would be suggested by Skt. vijñaptimatra “representation only”. This same dynamic is noticeable at other places in P’s expositions of weishi also.
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‘comprehension free from error’;\textsuperscript{149} and it is because it is free from error that it is ‘reality’\textsuperscript{150} (如意，‘Thusness’\textsuperscript{151}). However, this ‘reality free from error’ is not yet the [higher] Thusness free of characteristics (無相如实，*alaksanatattva).\textsuperscript{152}

“(ii) In saying ‘it is immutable’, we show that this deluded consciousness 乱識 is in fact 即 manifested in consciousness of the pseudo-objects 似塵\textsuperscript{153} proper to the imagined and interdependent [essential natures] (分別依他，*parikalpita[-svabhava], *paratantra[-svabhava]).\textsuperscript{154} Be-

\textsuperscript{149} I have differed from GIMELLO (who translates “comprises”, “comprised” etc.) in translating samgraha as “comprehension”. I am attempting to convey what I take to be a play on words. On the one hand, vijnaptimātra is said to “comprehend” what is free from error in the sense that it includes it or encompasses it. On the other hand, the discernment with which vijnaptimātra is realised is itself a “comprehension” in the sense that it consists in arriving at an understanding of or insight into this basic fact of the reality of existence. It is this “comprehension” (understanding), I believe, that is “freed from error” (aviparyasa). At least in Skt., the verbal root / grah admits of a similar polysemy to English “comprehend” in this regard, though it is a stretch to naturally interpret Chinese she in the cognitive sense.

\textsuperscript{150} GIMELLO 318 n. 209 refers us to the third of the ten tattvas in MAV Ch. 3. This third category is aviparyasatattva, “reality free of error”, which is the reality that is discerned when we understand that existence is characterised by impermanence, suffering, absence of self, and impurity. (It may help to recall that prabhedatattva, or “reality as it is differentiated”, is the ninth of this tenfold list; and is the master rubric under whose sevenfold head the present vijnaptitattva is discussed as the third item).

\textsuperscript{151} Recall that vijnaptitathata is a variant name for this third “reality”; see n. 118.

\textsuperscript{152} GIMELLO 318 n. 210 refers us to MAV 3.7.

\textsuperscript{153} The term 似塵 is also a unique hallmark of P’s style, never found in any other translator, and only in native Chinese scholiasts after him, beginning with Huisi, Jizang, Jingying Huiyuan and Tanyan 曼延 (516-588).

\textsuperscript{154} I take this to mean, in line with standard Yogācāra doctrine, that the apparently dualistic experience of objective phenomena by a perceiving subject is merely a manifestation of the underlying defiled consciousness (alayavijnāna = luanshi), which is in fact all that there is.

\textsuperscript{155} It is more accurate, though cumbersome, to translate the names of the three natures as “the essential nature of all things whereby they are figments of the imagination” (parikalpitasvabhava), “the essential nature of all things whereby they are products of mutual interdependence” (paratantrasvabhava), and “the essential nature of all things as they are when brought to perfection” (parinispannasvabhava). Note that the identification of this deluded experience with both parikalpitasvabhava and paratantrasvabhava is in line with P’s usual doctrine of the three natures, which holds that paratantra, also, is dispensed with, transcended or sublated in the liberated state, and all that remains is parinispannasvabhava. This understanding of the three natures differs from that found in XZ, from the apparent doctrine of MSg (and perhaps therefore the interpretation of this doctrine by Asanga), and from many modern characterisations of three natures doctrine in the secondary literature.

85
cause the imagined essential nature never exists, the interdependent essential nature also does not exist; and the inexistence of these two [essential natures] is *amalavijñāna (阿摩羅識). 156

Uniquely, this consciousness alone is 'immutable', and for this reason it is [fit to be] called 'reality' ('Thusness').

"[Now,] the former 'reality' [i.e. (i) 'Thusness/reality free from error'] only dispenses with the twelve sense bases (ayatana) [and] all [such] dharmas distinguished in the Lesser Vehicle. 157

[This discernment or comprehension] merely frees the [understanding of the] twelve sense bases [etc.] from [predicative?] error唯十二入非是顛倒. Here, however, the tenets of the Greater Vehicle demolish 被 the twelve sense bases [etc.], such that they are [seen to be] completely non-existent 並皆是無, and only the figments of deluded consciousness 顛倒. Thus, [in this perspective,] the twelve sense bases [etc.] themselves are in fact errors 非顛倒 with regard to the deluded consciousness that is in fact all that exists. Thus it is called 'reality' ('Thusness').

"However, the substance 體 of this [deluded] consciousness is still mutable 猶變異. Next, [therefore,] in consideration of [its inexistence in terms of] imagined and interdependent natures, we do away with 遏 this consciousness. [In this perspective,] only the *amalavijñāna is free of [the] error [even of positing bare existence per se, 唯阿摩羅識是無顛倒]; 159 [only

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156 This effectively identifies *amalavijñāna with parinispannasvabhava.
157 唯十二入小乘所辨一切諸法. My translation here differs from Gimello's.
158 I have tried to reflect in my translation of this paragraph and the next a distinction that the text may be making between two kinds of negation, and two corresponding kinds of "freedom from error". *Fei 非, which in classical Chinese is usually used to negate predication, and *wu 無, which negates existence, are perhaps deliberately used in a distinct manner throughout. In what the text calls the perspective of the Lesser Vehicle, one refutes or negates (fei) certain mistaken understandings of the Abhidharmic reals (dharmas) as represented by the synecdoche of the twelve ayatanas, but one accepts their fundamental existence. In the perspective of the Greater Vehicle, one comes to the more profound insight that dharmas themselves fundamentally do not exist, and therefore negates (wu) their very existence itself. The former perspective is a kind of freedom from predicative error 非顛倒, but not from the error of assuming sheer existence 無顛倒. We might alternatively express the two types of error as the error “that [a given] X is Y” and “that there is X”. Thus, P immediately trumps the ordinary perspective of the Greater Vehicle with one even more sublime, in which the deluded consciousness is perceived in a manner free not only of predicative error, but also of the error of positing its existence — i.e. the perspective he elsewhere calls "vijñaptimatra in the perspective of truth" (SKBL <2>), “the perfected nature” (ZSL) etc.
159 Reading 無顛倒 in the sense contrasting with “predicative error” 非顛倒 laid out in n. 158 above.
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*amalaviñana* is immutable, and is therefore the true ‘reality’ (Thusness) 真如.

“Even in [interpreting] the former theory of consciousness only, we should adopt this interpretation of ‘consciousness’. Thus, we first do away with external objects by means of [the posit that] there is only deluded consciousness; next, through disposing of the deluded consciousness by means of *amalaviñana 阿摩羅識, [we realise that] there is ultimately only pure consciousness 究竟唯一 淨識.”

As in ZSL above, *amalaviñana is here identified with parinispannasvabhava (“perfected nature”). As in both ZSL and SBKL<2>, it is also associated with the superior interpretation of vijñānaptimatra/weishi doctrine, which does away with ordinary consciousness as well as its objects, and so obviates the subject/object dualism. Once more, *amalaviñana is identified with a kind of reality or Thusness (tattva, tathata), as in SBKL above (especially SBKL<2>, where the link was direct). The text adds to our understanding of *amalaviñana by further specifying a further sense in which the “reality” with which it is identified is said to be real: it is free from change (avikāra; echoing JDZL<1>, “*amalaviñana is permanent”). The text also aligns the “lesser” understanding of vijñānaptimatra/weishi doctrine with “hinayana", and asserts that only the superior understanding that perceives *amalaviñana is worthy of the name “Mahayana”.

2.5.2 SWXL<2>

The last passage in which *amalaviñana is mentioned is also found in SWXL. The root text is discussing the relationship between two groups of “characteristics” or

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180 三、識如如者。謂一切諸行、但唯是識。此識二義故稱如如。一攝無倒、二無變異。「攝無倒」者：謂十二入等一切諸法、但唯是識、離亂識外、無別餘法、故一切諸法、皆為識攝。此義決定故、稱「攝無倒」、「無倒」故如如。無倒如如、未是無相如如也。矣。無變異」者：明此別識、即是別依他所虛識所顯。由分別性永無故、依他性亦不存。此二無所有、即是阿摩羅識。有此識、獨無變異、故稱「如如。」前此如如、但遣十二入、小乘所辨一切諸法、唯十二入是顛倒。今大乘義、破諸人並皆是無、唯是亂識所作故、十二入則為顛倒、唯一亂識則非顛倒、故稱「如如。」此識體離變異、次以別別、依他、離此亂識、唯阿摩羅識是無顛倒、是真如如也。前唯識義中、亦應作此識說。先以唯一亂識除於外境、次阿摩羅識除於亂識、故究竟唯一 淨識也。T1617:31.871c27-872a15. The corresponding passage in XYSJL is extremely brief. It explains that all dharmas are, in their true nature, only comprised of consciousnessrepresentation, but then goes on, in an interesting echo of P’s preoccupations here, to say that “sentient beings are defiled because the mind, which is all that exists, is defiled; when the mind that is all that exists is purified, [so] sentient beings [too] become purified.” 三、唯識如如作意、謂如前說、乃至於染淨法所依思惟、諸法唯識之性。既思惟已如實了知、唯心染故眾生染、唯心淨故眾生淨, T1602:31.493b17-20.
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“marks” (laksana):

(1) one group of five characteristics, namely
   (i) signifier (名言, *abhilapa);
   (ii) signified (所言, *abhilapya);
   (iii) meaning (義, *artha);
   (iv) attachment/hypostasisation (執著 *abhiniveśa);
   (v) non-attachment (非執著, *anabhiniveśa).

(2) “three characteristics” corresponding to the three essential natures of Yogacara, namely:
   (i) the characteristic of [all things as] imaginary constructs (parikalpitalaksana);
   (ii) the characteristic of [all things as products of] mutual interdependence (paratantralaksana);
   (iii) the characteristic of [all things as they appear when brought to] perfection (parinisanalaksana).

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161 These five characteristics are expounded elsewhere in XYSIL, at T1602:31.536c21-537a06, corresponding to YBh T1579:30.751a21-b07. They seem otherwise to be rare. For the five categories concerned, XZ YBh reads as follows: (1) “referents” (所詮, brjod bya ba, *abhilapya); (2) “speech” or “language” (能詮, brjod, *abhilapa); (3) “the conjunction of these two [referent and speech]”, i.e. reference (此二相應, tattvayasyayoga?); (4) “attachment”, i.e. hypostasisation of the construction of the world according to the categories of language (執著, mgon par zhen pa, *abhiniveśa, *abhiniveśa); (5) “detachment, non-attachment” (不執著, mgon par ma zhen pa, *anabhiniveśa, i.e. the undoing, deconstruction or transcendence of hypostasisation). This paragraph corresponds to nothing in the extant Tib. YBh (we would expect it to fall at Derge 50b1, following ... bsams pa las byung ba’i sar ji skad ston pa de bzhin du bsha bar bya’o). It is therefore impossible to provide precise Tib. equivalents for the terms used. However, we can tentatively reconstruct the equivalents given, in part on the basis of Tib. equivalents provided in YOKOYAMA for other instances of the same translation terms. The order in which the first two characteristics are given is reversed in P’s SWXL. Useful comments on a selection of these categories state: (1) The first of these categories refers in turn to a complex analysis of categories under which all reals can be understood, for which see T1602:31.507a17-b01, T1579:30.696a01-21. (2) “Speech/language”, upon which the texts comment in the most detail, is identified with other technical categories including parikalpitavabhava, hypostasisation or reification (samaropa), etc. (4) “Attachment” is explained rather technically as “the parikalpitasvabhava of the benighted (*bala), continuously operative from beginningless time, and its attendant tendencies (*anusaya)” 諸僧王言時來相續流轉遍計所執自性執及彼隠蔽.
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The text then considers whether the five encompass or comprise (相, *sam/grah) the three, or vice versa. It answers that of the fivefold rubric, categories (1) signifier and (2) signified are comprised in all three members of the threefold rubric; (3) “meaning” is comprised of the imagined characteristic (*parikalpitalaksana) alone; (4) “attachment/hypostasisation” is comprised of the interdependent characteristic (*paratanralaksana) alone; and (5) freedom from attachment is comprised of the perfected characteristic (*parinispannalaksana) alone.162

In SWXL alone, a comment follows, bringing *amalavijnana to bear:

“The reason the first two characteristics [of the fivefold rubric] are comprised of all three characteristics [in the threefold rubric] is as follows.

“(1) The characteristic [called] ‘the signifier’ is the names of all things (dharma) and language. This signifier is a product of consciousness. (i) Consciousness arises in the apparent guise of the signifier, and for this reason it is of the nature of what is imagined (*parikalpitavabhava). (ii) The subject [or ‘agent’] of [this] imagination, viz. consciousness, is of the nature of what is produced by interdependence (*paratantrasvabhava). (iii) Since the signifier constituting the imagined object does not exist, the consciousness constituting the agent of imagination also does not exist, and [the discernment of] this [very fact] is the nature of [things as they are when brought to] perfection (*parinispannasvabhava). For this reason, this first [category] is comprised of all three natures.

“(2) The second characteristic is also comprised of all three natures. The characteristic called ‘the signified’ is the meaning/referent (*artha) intentioned by the signifier, that is to say, all things which are also products of consciousness. (i) Where only consciousness

162 Recall that *artha, if it is what underlies yi, can also mean “object”, “referent”.
164 Note the way P’s comment here slips from talk of *parikalpita, *paratantra and *parinispanna as “characteristics” to talk of them as “natures”.
165 Is relatively unusual in a Buddhist translation context, but very common otherwise in Chinese philosophical discourse, to refer to all “things” as wu 物, translation texts, P’s included, would probably more often talk of dharmas, or sometimes of shi (事, *vastu). This seems to be the only instance of 一切 in P, though we do quite frequently find 一切: in JDZL T1584:30.1027b28; in MSGb T1595:31.250c27-251a01; especially numerously in Rushi lun 如實論, T1633:32.30c14, 31b04-12, 31b28-29, 32c18-19; *Laksanānusāra-sastra 隨相論 T1641:32.159b14; 佛說立世阿毘曇論, T1644:32.225b15-16; Ratnāvali T1656:32.500b27.
exists, it is of the nature of what is imagined (*parikalpitasvabhava*) that there arise the apparent characteristics of things 似物相起. (ii) The agent of imagination, viz. consciousness, is of the nature of what is produced by interdependence (*paratantrasvabhava*). (iii) That these two, as above, do not exist, is of the nature of [things as they appear when they have been brought to] perfection (*parinispasvabhava*).

“(3) The third characteristic ['meaning', i.e. reference] is only comprised of the nature of what is imagined (*parikalpitasvabhava*) for the following reason. This 'characteristic [of things] whereby word and meaning correspond to one another' 名義相應相 refers to [the fact that] a word is designated for a thing. We make [the word] correspond to the thing, [so that,] by means of the word, it is possible to represent the thing 因名得顯物. However, this meaning of the word in fact does not exist, and because of the fact that it is so characterised by inexistence 無相義故,"\textsuperscript{166} [we know that] it is only of the nature of what is imagined (*parikalpitasvabhava*).

“(4) The fourth characteristic ['attachment', i.e. hypostasisation] is only comprised of the nature of [what is produced by] interdependence (*paratantrasvabhava*) for the following reason. In this 'characteristic of attachment to both word and meaning', we distinguish the agent of this attachment, and thus [determine that] it is only of the nature of interdependence. Because [this category] does not explicitly [address] the object of attachment, it is not comprised of the nature of what is imagined. The preceding [category], however, only brings out the object of imagination, and not the agent of imagination; and thus it is not of the nature of interdependence.

“(5) The reason the fifth characteristic is comprised only of the nature of [things as they appear when they have been brought to] perfection is as follows. This state 'characterised by freedom of attachment to both word and meaning' is the "*amalavijñāna*, in which there is no distinction between object and wisdom/intuition 境智無差別阿摩羅識. The third and fourth [characteristics, i.e. the apparent object and subject of deluded knowing comprised by imagined and interdependent natures] are in fact no different from this perfected nature; [the] only [difference is that] each of them establishes [a category that] manifests precisely one partial aspect [of the truth]."\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{166} The phrase 無相義故 is obscure. It might also be read, at a stretch, "because there is nothing corresponding to the meaning".

\textsuperscript{167} 釋曰: 初二相所以通為三相所攝者、初名言相、即是諸法名字及說。此名言是識所作。識似名言相起、即是分別性、能分別識、即依他性。所分別名言既無所有、能分別識亦無所有、即是真實性。是故、初相即三相攝。第二相亦三性攝者、所言相、即是名言所法定、謂一切諸物、亦是識所作。但識有、似物相起、即是分別性。能分別識、即是依他性。亦二俱無所有、即是真實性。第三相但為分別性所攝者、此名義相應相、謂為物立名、令與物相應、因
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In this passage, as previously in ZSL and SWXL<1>, *amalavijñāna is once more identified with parinīṣpannasvabhava. This passage adds to our picture of *amalavijñāna a new dimension of non-dualism. Where previously the non-dualism was defined in negative terms, as the obviation of a false dualism between subject and object of delusory thinking, here, its content is defined positively as a relation of indistinction between perfected gnosis (wisdom, jñāna) and its object. In the emphasis in its exposition of the earlier members of the fivefold rubric, the passage also exposes a certain dimension of the relationship between *amalavijñāna and language. Previously, in SWXL<1>, we were already told that *amalavijñāna is identical with “reality” in part because it is beyond error (aviparyāsa); given the frequent connection between viparyāsa and language, we could perhaps have inferred that this meant it was free of ordinary language also. Here, however, this aspect of *amalavijñāna is made explicit. All aspects of the operation of language and its referential function are associated with the imperfect parikalpita- and paratantrasvabhava. *Amalavijñāna, by contrast, is associated exclusively with parinīṣpannasvabhava, in large part because it is “free of attachment to word and meaning”.

3. Summary and analysis: Two doctrines of *amalavijñāna

Let us now review the picture of *amalavijñāna that emerges from the primary texts taken in the aggregate. For the purposes of this summary analysis, it will be convenient to divide the primary texts (excluding Abhidharmakośabhāṣya) into two groups: (1) Jueding zang lun (JDZL); (2) other texts. There are several reasons for this division.

First, the JDZL passages in which *amalavijñāna appears have counterparts in parallel versions of the text in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Xuanzang’s Chinese. By contrast, in SBKL, ZSL and SWXL, there is uniformly little or nothing in parallel texts that corresponds to passages expounding *amalavijñāna. This suggests strongly that in SBKL, ZSL and SWXL, we are dealing with sub-commentarial or “lecture” passages (whether by Paramārtha and his team at the point of translation, or by some later hand).

Second, JDZL is traditionally supposed to have been translated (or composed) earli-
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est of all the texts under consideration here, during the Liang (before 557). The facts here are complex and tenuous,
but in the absence of firm evidence to the contrary, we

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168 JDZL is first mentioned in the catalogues in the Da Zhou kanding zhongjing mulu 大周刊定眾經目錄, composed by Mingquan 明淸 under Empress Wu (r. 690-705). Here, it is ascribed to P and the Liang in the Song, Ming and Yuan versions of the text, 梁天竺三藏真諦譯, T2153:55.407c15; in the Korean version, however, this line is missing, so that JDZL ends up appearing to be ascribed to Gautama Prajñāruci (active c. 516-543?), alongside his 達贊論 Vigrahavyavartito T1631. JDZL is not more precisely dated until the next catalogue of the canon, Zhisheng’s (智昇, 669-740) Kaiyuan lu 開元釋教錄 (which dates to 730). Even then, Zhisheng only dates the text on the basis of the fact that it contains an interlinear note glossing a transliteration term by saying “in Liang, this is said . . .” 梁言; T2154:55.538b05; relevant JDZL passage at T1584:30.1018c09. So it is not until 120-160 years after P’s death that JDZL turns up, under that title, in the catalogues, and then the dating is based upon one very slender piece of evidence. Note that this means that the first recorded references to the title Jueding zang lun are actually found outside catalogues; e.g. the reference in Wönch’uk (see below, p. 107-108, 145) predates Mingquan.

The situation is further complicated, however, by the fact that older catalogues, beginning with Fei Changfang’s (費長房, d.u.) somewhat unreliable Lidai sanbao ji 當代三寶紀 in 597 (T2034:49.99a04), list a lost Shiqi di lun 十七地論 among P’s works, which seems to have been a partial translation of YBh (see further also n. 283). It is possible that our present JDZL is a surviving remnant of that text; for example, we will see below that there is at least one clear instance in which T2807 refers to contents included in JDZL by the title Shiqi di lun (see n. 283). If JDZL is a remnant of the Shiqi di lun, it may be relevant that that text too is supposed to date to early in P’s translation career, dating from the fourth year of the Taiqing era 太清四年 (approx. 550).

Judging from its title, we might well expect that Shiqi di lun (“Treatise on the Seventeen Stages”) should have been a translation of the Maulūbhami portions alone of YBh. However, this seems not to have been the case. T2807 cites a portion of the text corresponding to the present JDZL, i.e. the Vinisaya-sangrahani (see once more n. 283). Bhikkhu Huimin has further pointed out that one of three Shiqi di lun passages referred to in P’s MSgBh is also from the Vinisaya-sangrahani: 十種法正行, 如『十七地論』説, T1595:31.224b18-19 (Huimin has a19, in error), corresponding to T1579:30.706c22 (in juan 74 of XZ); Huimin [1994], 6 (I am grateful to ŌTAKE Susumu for pointing out this reference to me). In unpublished work, ŌTAKE has also found passages quoted from the Shiqi di lun that correspond to sections of the Maulūbhami ranging from XZ juan 4 to juan 48. Therefore it seems that whether or not it was a full translation or, as seems more likely, merely a set of excerpts, Shiqi di lun covered passages corresponding to a very wide range in the present YBh, including parts outside the Maulūbhami. Thus, while it is possible that JDZL is a remnant of Shiqi di lun, Shiqi di lun cannot have been identical to our present extant JDZL. We should also note that when Huijun summarises the seventeen stages as laid out in the text (which he calls Shiqi jing 十七經), stages nine to fourteen comprise five sets of ten stages, totalling fifty stages, known to be unique to Chinese Buddhism, i.e. (1) ten “faiths” 十信, (2) ten “abodes” 十住, (3) ten
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should still follow the traditional bibliographers. If JDZL was thus the first text in which *amalavijnāna was mentioned, and followed only at a distance of perhaps a decade by the other texts under consideration, the concept may have undergone considerable development between JDZL and the other texts. For this reason, we should be alert to possible differences in *amalavijnāna doctrine as it is expounded in JDZL, against the doctrine of the other texts.

Third, close study of the style of these texts suggests that SWXL, SBKL and ZSL may be part of a reasonably close sub-group in Paramārtha's corpus, but differ in important respects from JDZL. These stylistic considerations reinforce the hints from the bibliographic tradition that the circumstances, and indeed collective authorship, of our texts may have differed in important respects.

I will address the complex issue of authorship and style in a study currently in preparation. To give only one example, JDZL calls alayavijnāna — 71 times! — but the term is previously entirely unknown (and is only attested three times in one text even thereafter). JDZL's frequent use of this term is thus unique in the P corpus in this regard.
Fourth, we find that there are important differences between the *amalavijnāna doctrine of JDZL and that of the other three texts, but the other three texts present a relatively uniform version of the doctrine.

3.1 *Amalavijnāna in JDZL

We can summarise the most important points of the rich doctrine of *amalavijnāna in JDZL as follows. *Amalavijnāna corresponds closely to āsraya-parāvṛtti. The term corresponds to āsraya-parāvṛtti in textual parallels; it is also spoken of as parāvṛtti in JDZL itself, where context shows clearly that āsraya-parāvṛtti is meant; and it is free of “badness” (dausthulya). The text (especially in Paramārtha) equivocates paradoxically over the exact status of this āsraya-parāvṛtti — in places it is said not itself to have, or be, a basis; but elsewhere it is said to be the basis for this or that (e.g. the path, lokottara-dharmas). The identity with āsraya-parāvṛtti is doubtless also connected to the interesting doctrine, propounded with special emphasis in JDZL<4>, that *amalavijnāna, identified with a purified viññānaskandha, stands in a radically transformed relationship to the other four skandhas. The other four skandhas, when the object of grasping or attachment, are clearly spoken of as the “basis” (āsraya) for further rebirth, because clinging to them leads to appropriation of a new body (incarnation) after the end of one lifespan.

There seems to be a number of respects in which JDZL's *amalavijnāna-cum-āsraya-parāvṛtti warrants the epithet “pure”. It is the counteragent, or the result of the operation of counteragents, to alayavijnāna and other features of the defiled state. It is associated with (a separate basis for) the “transcendent dharmas” (lokottaradharmas). It is also pure because it is diametrically opposed to the ordinary defiled state in many specific respects: most importantly, it is free of defilements (kleśa) and “outflows” (āsrava), and their causes; it is also free of all other qualities associated with the ordinary worldling (prthagjana). The purity of *amalavijnāna is also reflected in the fact that in it, the sensations (vedanā) are rendered pure. Its purity is also reflected in its association with Thusness. *Amalavijnāna is realised by intensive cultivation of the wisdom that knows Thusness (tathāta), and the very notion of “taintlessness” (amala, nir-mala) may well be intended to recall expositions of “purified Thusness” in RGV, other parts of YBh, etc.

*Amalavijnāna is also permanent (nitya), and this is emphasised by Paramārtha’s assertion, against parallel texts, that amalavijnāna-cum-āsraya-parāvṛtti does not cease of its own accord.

Apart from the naming of the liberated state (āsraya-parāvṛtti etc.) as
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*amalavijnāna, Paramārtha adds little to ideas already found in YBh. In effect, he has just given a clear name to an already-present configuration of ideas about the implications of liberation for consciousness. The name, moreover, is not inappropriate. The parallel passages also discuss liberation as a liberation of consciousness from defilements, in a manner that amply justifies the epithet “pure”; and the phrase “pure consciousness”, in some form, even appears in one place in parallel versions of the text.

It is impossible to miss, throughout these passages, the ring of the Yogācāra “Mahāyāna Abhidharma” — much of the talk is of seeds (bija), defilements (kleśa), “outflows” (āsrava), aggregates (skandha), gradualist models of paths of practice and realisation (including śaikṣa and aśaikṣa), etc.

Some of this doctrine echoes the AKBh amalavijnāna passage, not only in the general “Abhidharma” language, but in specifics. In both contexts, at issue is a consciousness purely specifically in that it is free of “outflows” (āsrava), and of defilements under other names. This purity matters so much because it enables us to attain freedom from eventual rebirth, or more precisely (especially in AKBh) freedom from the “latent tendencies” (anusaya) that constitute the most subtle level of grasping after the bases of future rebirth. If Paramārtha picked up the term amalavijnāna from AKBh 5.29 ff. and used it to name the doctrine of pure consciousness elaborated in these YBh passages, it was thus an artful move.

We see echoes here of an old doctrine of consciousness as the subject of transmigration and liberation. These echoes have not been noted by previous *amalavijnāna scholarship. In brief, this old doctrine is as follows.

In some texts, such as the Mahānidāna sutta (DN 15), viññāna is presented as the sine qua non for embryonic development; as “descending” into the mother’s womb, “leaving” in cases of miscarriage, etc. Viññāna is also presented as a “surviving” factor, called in the Majjhima nikāya the “consciousness that evolves [into the next life]” (samvattanikaviññāna). In both these connections, the understanding of viññāna is closely related to the place it assumed in the standard twelfefold chain of dependent

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171 See e.g. WIESEKERA (1945): 92, referring to D 2.63.
172 Ibid., 93; WIESEKERA (1964): 259; referring to Āneñjasappaya sutta (M 106), i.e. M 2.262 ff.
Another related idea is that consciousness arising from moment-to-moment sense experience is the “origin of the world” (lokkassa samudayam) with all its suffering, and that the suffering world ceases when consciousness ceases. Wijesekera has further shown that viññāna so understood is connected to the notion of the gandharva/gandhabba, as the “being that enters into the womb” on conception, a “being of the intermediate state” (antarabhavasattvam); this notion in turn is linked with manas, mind or “soul”, and, ultimately, with an ancient and sprawling network of various mythemes reaching back to the Vedas and apparently beyond. The resonances between these ideas and JDZL are strengthened by other key details. Even in the earliest texts, as in JDZL, viññāna is continually drawn back into rebirth precisely because it is still associated with anusaya (anusaya). Further, viññāna is spoken of in the Sampasadaniya sutta (DN 28) as a “stream” (viññānasotam), in a manner that clearly recalls the “continuum” or “flow” (sāntana) at issue in JDZL.

In the early texts, this same consciousness is sometimes understood as continuing

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173 In this formula, viññāna is pivotally placed as the key link in the process leading to rebirth. On the emergence of the twelvefold model, problems of internal consistency in it, and its possible basis in more than one earlier model, see the still seminal LA VALLEE POUSIN (1913).

174 This might make us think of P’s notion of “temporal consciousness” (more literally, “world consciousness”) in JDZL<4>, for which see n. 79.

175 SN. 44.4 “The World”, S 2.73-74, BODHI 581-582.; WALDRON 31-32.

176 WJJESEKERA (1945): 88-89; note especially the Assalayana sutta (M 93) passage discussed here: “We know how the descent of an embryo comes about. Here, there is the union of the mother and father, and the mother is in season, and the gandhabba is present . . . Then, sirs, do you know for sure whether that gandhabba is a noble, or a brahmin, or a merchant, or a worker?”.

177 Ibid., infra; note discussion of Avestan and possibly Greek parallels, 73-75.

178 On this dimension of the early doctrine of viññāna, see e.g. WALDRON 33 ff.

179 E.g. “the unbroken stream of consciousness that is established in this world and the next”, viññānasotam . . . ubhayaato abboccinam idha loke patiṣhitam ca paraloke patiṣhitam ca, D 3.105, WALSHE 420. This is part of the key distinction between the doctrine of transmigrating viññāna in these early texts and related, more outright ontological concepts current in Upaniṣadic and other contexts, as is shown particularly by the Buddha’s refutation of “Sati’s thesis” that “it is this same consciousness that runs and wanders through the round of rebirths, not another,” see M 1.258 ff., NĀNAMOLI and BODHI 349 ff., WALDRON 195 n. 44.
even into rarefied meditative states as far as nevasaññānaññāyatana, and there are indications that it, or perhaps "mind" construed more generally, was in some sources regarded as the quasi-"subject" of the process and state of liberation itself. Such a consciousness is said to be "unestablished" (apatițhita-vinnanā): a representative statement says that when lust (rāga) has been abandoned with regard to each of the five khandhas in turn, "there is no basis (arammanam) for the establishing of consciousness (patittha vinnanassā na hoti);" such a consciousness is liberated (vimuttam), steady (jhitam) and satisfied (santusitam), and has attained nirvāṇa (parinibbāyati). It seems clear that in such a state, consciousness is still undergoing experiences of some kind, which are free of suffering, and that it is such experience that comprises liberation. (However, we must also note other passages that depict liberation as a "cessation" of viññāna altogether.) It is also noteworthy that this state is already spoken of in terms of there being no "basis" (arammanam = Skt. alambanam) for consciousness (although the term is not agraya, JDZL clearly echoes these ideas). In "Volition", SN 40.10.3, the attainment of this "unestablished" state without a basis is further clearly linked to the absence of "latent tendencies" (anusaya = anuṣaya).

These and related ideas find resonances in the JDZL doctrine of the ordinary viññānaskandha, attached to the other four skandhas as "base" and therefore undergoing repeated rebirth and suffering; and of *amalavijnāna as a metamorphosed or purified transmutation of this viññāna, which is freed from suffering, the subject of a pure kind of experience, and eternal.

Modern scholars have often taken *amalavijnāna as a kind of bridgehead, intended to enable annexation of tathāgatagarbha doctrine into Yogācāra. Perhaps the doctrine

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181 WUJSEKERA (1945): 93, M 2.263-264.
182 As always in discussing Buddhist doctrines, any such term must be handled with caution and due provisos; but at the same time, if we are to discuss the problem, we must say something.
183 For aspects of this notion, see HARVEY; ALBAHARI; THANISSARO; LINDTNER. I am grateful to my student Benno BLASCHKE for bringing my attention to several of these studies.
184 E.g. S 3.58, BODHI 894; appatițhitat viññanam also features e.g. at S 3.53-54, BODHI 891; D 3.105, WALSH 420; as a description of the liberated state of one Godhika, S 1.122, BODHI 214; S 2.66, BODHI 577, where it is associated with the cessation of the whole mass of suffering; etc.
185 D3.103, S1.122, S2.66, 2.103, 3.61 etc.
186 Yato ca kho bhikkhave, no ceva ceteti, no ca pakappeti, no ca anuseti, arammanam etat paṭittagāni, viññānapassāhi, Arammanas asati paṭitti ahi viññānapassā hi, etc., S 2.67, BODHI 577-578; so too S 2.66, BODHI 577; S 2.103, BODHI 600-601.
did lend itself to that use, and perhaps Paramārtha was at pains, elsewhere in his work, to bring about such a rapprochement. However, very little in JDZL calls to mind tathāgatagarbha doctrine — only, faintly, that *amalavijñāna-cum-āsrayaparārvitī is associated with “pure Thusness”; that it is permanent (nitya); and that it somehow pre-exists the liberatory state (thus resembling tathāgatagarbha as a ground for potential realisation). Moreover, this is all also present in parallel texts, and therefore was presumably in Paramārtha’s source. The connection between tathāgatagarbha and *amalavijñāna in JDZL may thus be weaker than scholars have thought.

3.2 *Amalavijñāna in SWXL, ZSL and SBKL

In SXWL, ZSL and SBKL, *amalavijñāna is identified with a “higher” or complete understanding of vijñaptimātra/weishi (“consciousness/representation only”), in which the practitioner realises the unreality not only of objects, but also of ordinary defiled consciousness itself (of alayavijñāna). A state is thus attained that transcends the usual epistemological dualism of subject and object. Further, in explicit connection with this “higher weishi”, *amalavijñāna is identified with the parinispannasvabhava (“perfected nature”) (ZSL, SWXL). This status of *amalavijñāna as the “perfected nature” hinges on the obviation of the delusory dualism of subject and object that pertains in ordinary consciousness.187 It is also said to be also expressed in the non-dualism of perfected gnosis and its object in the liberated state (SWXL). *Amalavijñāna is further associated with (the pure aspect of) Thusness or reality, particularly in the context of the exposition of the seven kinds of tattva (SBKL, SWXL).

The concept of *amalavijñāna in these texts is thus relatively consistent and uniform. However, some claims are unique to a single text. Most importantly, only in SBKL is *amalavijñāna identified as “aboriginally luminous mind” (prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta), which is tainted by adventitious defilements (agantukakleśa). This aboriginally luminous mind is further identified with the fundamentally pure aspect of Thusness (tathātā), and also of the related domains of emptiness (śūnyata) and the dharmadhatu. SWXL<1> alone claims that the aspect of Thusness constituted by *amalavijñāna is real (or “thus”) because it is immutable, i.e. not subject to metamorphosis (avikara). SWXL<2> alone claims that it is real, also, because it is beyond ordinary language. On the whole, however, divergences between the texts are minor, and the coherence in their doctrine of

187 Note, in this connection, the way that the application of the notion of parinispannasvabhava in parts (1) and (2) of SWXL<2> also hinges on the obviation of a dualistic relation, in which it is vital that an apparent subject be involved.
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*amalavijnana* is more striking.

There is still relatively little, in this version of *amalavijnana* doctrine, that recalls tathāgatagarbha doctrine. The strongest echoes of tathāgatagarbha ideas are found in SBKL, where *amalavijnana* is identified with prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta as obscured by "adventitious dust (in Sanskrit)."

The relatively uniform *amalavijnana* doctrine of these three texts is strikingly different from that of JDZL. JDZL does not associate *amalavijnana* with vijñaptimatra/weishi doctrine in any form. It unsurprisingly, therefore, never breathes a word of transcendence of the subject-object dualism. Neither does it identify *amalavijnana* with the "perfected nature" (parinispannasvabhava). Despite its clear concern with the purity of consciousness and mind, it also does not link *amalavijnana* and prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta. Nor does it link *amalavijnana* to emptiness or the dharmadhatu; nor claim that it is beyond ordinary language.

By contrast, these three texts do not associate *amalavijnana* with āsraya-prarabdha as JDZL does. They do not treat *amalavijnana* as the vijñanaskandha, nor consider its relationship to other skandhas. They do not associate *amalavijnana* with the problematic of rebirth or its escape. There is, correspondingly, no discussion of defilements or "outflows" (āsrava). *Amalavijnana* is never said to be the "counteragent" (pratipakṣa) to anything. These texts never broach the question of the relationship between *amalavijnana* and the path, or various kinds of dharmas (e.g. lokottaradharmas, prthagjivanadharmas), or the stages of saikṣa or asaikṣa. They never speak of the purification of vedana. Nothing in these texts echoes the AKBh passage in which the term amalavijnana is attested in Sanskrit. There is also nothing, in these texts, of the echoes with the old doctrine of consciousness as the subject of transmigration and liberation.

More generally, in JDZL we observed a close entanglement of *amalavijnana* doctrine with the Yogācāra "Mahāyāna Abhidharma". Here we see, rather, attempts to connect *amalavijnana* more directly with core elements of innovative doctrines more particular to Yogācāra itself — that there is "only consciousness" (vijñaptimatra); three natures (trisvabhava); theory of language; the non-dualist nature of true gnosis; and the relationship between that gnosis and the reality or Thusness it knows. In fact, SWXL even seems to scorn an Abhidharmic understanding of reality (twelve āyatana etc.) as "hīnayāna".

In contrast to these stark differences, there are only minimal areas of overlap be-
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tween the presentation of *amalavijnāna in JDZL and the other three texts. In both sets of material, *amalavijnāna is associated in some regard with Thusness; and in both, the permanence of *amalavijnāna is stressed.188

What, then, are we to make of these differences? We cannot be sure what they mean, but some possibilities suggest themselves. The traditional bibliographies assert that JDZL is much earlier than other texts featuring *amalavijnāna. There also seems to be a closer fit between its *amalavijnāna and amalavijnāna in AKBh. These are also the only passages in which *amalavijnāna features in a “translation” rather than a “lecture” or “sub-commentarial” context. JDZL<1> is also the only passage that expounds *amalavijnāna at length, whereas it is elsewhere often merely mentioned. Finally, stylistic differences189 and other structural considerations190 make it possible that *amalavijnāna passages in the other texts may have been added by a later hand. JDZL is thus far more likely than the other texts to preserve for us the first known exposition of *amalavijnāna.

It is possible that the differences between the “Yogācāra Abhidharma” of JDZL and the “core Yogācāra” of the other three texts is merely a function of the different topics at issue. The two versions of *amalavijnāna doctrine, while different, do not directly contradict one another, and so may be mutually consistent developments, in different directions, of the same doctrine by the same hand. It is also possible that both sets of materials are equally the work of Paramārtha’s group, but that the doctrine was further developed between JDZL and the other texts, and that the composition of the authorial team shifted in the interim as well. SWXL, SBKL and ZSL may therefore show us a later version of *amalavijnāna. Alternatively, *amalavijnāna passages may have been interpolated later into SWXL, ZSL and SBKL, perhaps as subcommentary. Such a later hand might still be quite closely related to Paramārtha’s group.

Whatever the reasons, within Paramārtha’s corpus we thus find not one but two relatively distinct doctrines of *amalavijnāna. We now turn to the question of how accurately either of these versions of the doctrine was communicated to the later tradition.

188 JDZL<1>, <4>, “immutable” SWXL<1>.
189 See n. 169.
190 For example, the fact that ZSL seems clearly to contain different layers of commentary on the root text (Trimsīka), whereby the second layer may be the addition of a later hand (see further n. 243). In SBKL<1>, too, as we saw, mention of *amalavijnāna occurs in what is clearly labelled as an “additional comment”.

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4. *Amalavijñāna in later sources

There are relatively few sources for Paramārtha’s doctrine of *amalavijñāna. It is natural, then, to turn for further information to the testimony of later scholastics. Such scholastics report aspects of *amalavijñāna doctrine never found in Paramārtha’s extant corpus, and this may be because they had access to additional facts. Such authors may have seen texts since lost; sometimes they refer to such texts (or at least claim to). They were also closer in time and space to Paramārtha, and may have learnt things by hearsay that were never written down.

However, we cannot always be sure that later reports are accurate. These authors may have quoted from memory, or at second-hand. They may not have had access to Paramārtha’s texts, but could be relying upon hearsay. Ideas might have been ascribed to Paramārtha to lend them authority, even if actually elaborated by someone else — much as was the case with the entire Awakening of Faith. Some portrayals of Paramārtha’s ideas may have been coloured by sectarian polemics.

For these reasons, we must determine the extent to which later authors concur with or diverge from Paramārtha, as a way of judging their reliability. To this end, I will here summarise reports about *amalavijñāna to 800 C.E. under three heads: (1) what later authors report that we do not find in Paramārtha; (2) agreement between Paramārtha and later authorities; and (3) what we find in Paramārtha that is not reported by later authorities.

4.1 What later sources say that Paramārtha does not

In later reports of *amalavijñāna, we find much that is never found in Paramārtha’s extant corpus. First, later authors use various terms never found in Paramārtha; second, the specific content they attribute to the doctrine of *amalavijñāna is extremely various. In what follows, I consider this material in approximate chronological order.

4.1.1 A proliferation of various terms

Turning first to terms, we find that later sources frequently refer to *amalavijñāna by various names that Paramārtha’s texts do not use.

I have already mentioned above the fact that later sources sometimes use the term
wugoushi 無垢識 to refer to *amalavijñāna. Wugoushi is identified with “ninth consciousness”, and therefore with *amalavijñāna, already in Huijun (慧均, d.u., fl. 574-580s?) and in Daoji (道基, 577-637); by Kuji (窺基, 632-682); by Wŏnch’uk (圓測, 613-696); by Wŏnhyo (元曉, 617-686); Taehyon (大賢, 632-682, d.u., active c. 742-765); by Chengguan (澄觀, 738-839); and by Zongmi (宗密, 780-841). Tunnyun (透倫, d.u., Silla monk of the eighth century) also knows this term.

We also find *amalavijñāna called jingshi 淨識, e.g. by Zhiyi (慧葉, 538-597), Huijun and Daoji.

We also find that there are many variants of the transcription term that never appear in Paramārtha: (1) *Amalavijñāna is called anmoluoshi 燃摩羅識 by Zhiyi, by

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191 The term wugoushi is already mentioned in connection with Yogācāra doctrine by Jingyin Huiyuan 淨影慧遠 (523-592), but he thinks that it is a term for alayavijñāna (T1851:44.524c25-26). This is similar to the meaning the term has in the Cheng weishi lun, T1585:31.13c19-27; Huizhao (惠照, d. 714) understands the term in a similar manner, as one of the eighteen names of alayavijñāna mentioned in the Cheng weishi lun (成唯識論義疏 T1832:43.729c03).
192 X784:46.601c24; 603a13.
193 As quoted by Gyônen, DBZ 122, 364a-b. See also below, §4.1.3.7.
194 E.g. T1782:38.1001c28-1002a01, T1830:43.344c07-13.
195 X784:46.601c24; 603a13.
196 Three instances, T1828:42.318a17-22.
197 T1716:33.744b22, b29, c03; X356:20.48c21.
198 X784:46.599c21-2.
199 DBZ 12, 370b.
200 T1716:33.744b19, c07-08; T1783:39.4a12-13, 7c27; X907:55.465b18-19; X356:20.48c07, c12, c18, c20 (the byline of this text says it is the text of a lecture that was given by Zhiyi, recorded by Guanding, and shu 述 by Zhili of the Song; a very similar text at T1784 is only ascribed to Zhili; here I give it the benefit of the doubt). This is also the term under which *amalavijñāna appears in the apocryphal 大佛頂如來密因修證義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經, T945:19.123c14-16.
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Kuiji, by Zhanran (湛然, 711-782), perhaps following Kuiji, and once by Tunnyun, citing Kuiji. (2) In the Vajrasamādhi sūtra T273 alone (prior to the Song), *amalavijnana is referred to by the variant anmoluoshi 唵摩羅識. (3) It is called anmoluoshi 唵摩羅識 by Wŏnhyo, in Amoghavajra’s (不空金刚, 705-774) T1177A, by the anonymous (perhaps late eighth century) Shi moheyan lun T1668; by Amoghavajra’s disciple Huilin (慧琳, d. 820); and in a sub-commentary on T1668. (4) The transcription amoluoshi 阿末羅識 was used by Kuiji, by Wŏnh’uk (圆测, 613-696); by Tunnyun, citing Kuiji; by Taehyon citing Kuiji; and by Tankuang (善鑑, c. 700-788). (5) *Amalavijnana is called anmoluoshi 唵末羅識 by Kuiji, and, citing him, by Tunnyun. (6) The transcription amoluoshi 阿末羅識 is used by Li Shizheng (李師政, d.u., fl. 627-649); and by Tankuang.
Of course, orthography was sometimes a matter of some indifference. For example, when Wŏnhyo quotes the Vajrasamadhi sūtra in his Vajrasamadhi sūtra lun, he uses a variant orthography from the one we find in the extant text of the VSS itself. However, the majority of sources do still use the standard Paramārthaian transcription amoluo 阿摩羅. Where transcriptions in later authors depart from this standard, variant transcriptions are also retained by later authors who quote those authors in turn (e.g. Tunnyun or Taehyon's quoting Kuji). Thus, it seems authors did stick with a given transcription, and departures from the usual transcription may indicate, for example, that an author had heard the term but not read it; or that his knowledge of it came from a source other than the texts of Paramārtha himself.

4.1.2 “Ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses”

Perhaps the most significant variant term we encounter for *amalavijnāna is “ninth consciousness” (jiushi 九識). Numerous later sources frequently say that Paramārtha expounded *amalavijnāna as such a “ninth consciousness” over and above the “standard” eightfold model of consciousness of normative Yogācāra. However, Paramārtha’s extant texts never say that *amalavijnāna is a “ninth consciousness”.

4.1.2.1 Reference to *amalavijnāna as “ninth consciousness”

The claim that *amalavijnāna is a ninth consciousness is found as early as Zhiyi, Jingying Huìyuan (淨影慧遠, 523-592), Huijun, and Jizang (吉藏, 549-623); in the anonymous Dunhuang text She dasheng lun zhang T2807; in the She

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223 We must be careful to distinguish cases where P uses the phrase jiushi, but to refer to the ninth of the eleven vijñapti, e.g. T1595:31.181c14-15. See p. 106, and n. 245, 79.
225 T1716:33.742b01-10, 744b22; T1783:39.4a12-13; T1778:38.686a06-11; X356:20.42b08-09.
226 T1843:44.176a08-13, 179a20-29, 179c13-17.
227 See below n. 272.
228 T1824:42.104c08-09.
229 T2807:85.1016c10-11. The date of the group of Dunhuang texts including T2807 is uncertain, but the best estimates of modern scholars, including ODA Akihiro, KATSUMATA Shunkyo, Shengkai and Ching KENG, tend to place each sometime between 590-640. For a recent summary of research on this subject see Shengkai, Shelun xuepai yanjiu 1, 47-59; see also, especially on T2805, the forthcoming Harvard PhD dissertation of Ching KENG. I am grateful to KENG for pointing me to this information (personal communication, September 2008).
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dasheng yi zhang 摯大乘義章 T2809 (probably by Daoji);\textsuperscript{230} in other writings of Daoji;\textsuperscript{231} in Zhiyan (智巌, 602-668);\textsuperscript{232} in Li Tongxuan (李通玄, 635-730);\textsuperscript{233} in Kuji;\textsuperscript{234} in the Vajrasamadhi sutra;\textsuperscript{235} in Wonhyo (based on the VSS);\textsuperscript{236} in Zhizhou (智周, 668-723);\textsuperscript{237} in Tankuang;\textsuperscript{238} and in Zhanran.\textsuperscript{239}

4.1.2.2 A supposed special text on “ninth consciousness”

In addition to the reports of the authors just cited, there is a complicated body of further evidence that similar ideas may have been contained in a lost text attributed to Paramartha, apparently primarily on this subject.\textsuperscript{240} The text in question is given a wide variety of titles containing the phrase “nine consciousnesses/ninth consciousness” (jiushi 九識).\textsuperscript{241}

\textsuperscript{230} T2809:85.1036b28. On Daoji’s probable authorship of this text, see n. 382.
\textsuperscript{231} See below §4.1.3.7.
\textsuperscript{232} T1869:45.522c24-25; T1870:45.543a20.
\textsuperscript{233} T1739:36.722b15; 722c22; 723a06-07; 723b09-11; 736a20-b03; 741b29-c01. Li Tongxuan is notable because, in discussing *amalavijnana, he never uses any transcription term (he rather calls it adanavijnana); his understanding of the doctrine is also highly peculiar; see n. 482.
\textsuperscript{234} T1829:43.179a05; T1830:43.239a11-19; T1861:45.282c24-25.
\textsuperscript{235} T273:9.370b22-c01; 371b14-16.
\textsuperscript{236} T1730:34.961b03-04; 961b20-22; 978a07-08; 989b07-11; 989b23-26; 994c22-27; 995a17-19; 1003b20-26. Some of these loci include quotes from the root text VSS.
\textsuperscript{237} T1833:43.819b16-17.
\textsuperscript{238} T2810:85.1050b21. It is uncertain that this passage really means *amalavijnana by jiushi, since Tankuang refers rather to the Lamkavatara sutra, but the doctrine sounds compatible with what was thought about *amalavijnana by Tankuang’s time: 「楞伽經」等, 開阿賴耶染淨二位, 說有九識。
\textsuperscript{239} T1717:33.942c23-24 (implicitly); T1912:46.221c02-12.
\textsuperscript{240} On this problem, see also Yori 37-42.
\textsuperscript{241} In translating all the various versions of the title of this text in English, we necessarily confront the problem of whether it was supposed to be about a system of nine consciousnesses, or about a ninth consciousness specifically; in English, we cannot preserve the ambiguity of the Chinese. On the one hand, if we presume that the passages about *amalavijnana in the present JDZL were what was referred to as the “ninth consciousness section/chapter” of JDZL, then it is clear that those passages do not focus on expounding a ninefold system of consciousness, but rather, just on expounding *amalavijnana itself, so that we should translate “ninth consciousness”. On the other hand, if we suppose that an entirely separate text existed and was lost, it seems possible, from comments that are made about its supposed content by authors who refer to it, that it did expound a ninefold system of consciousnesses and not just the ninth consciousness alone, so that we should translate “nine consciousnesses”. In this paper, I have varied the translation as fits what seems the most likely interpretation of each.
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1) ZSL contains the phrase “as it says in chapter on the doctrine of ‘Nine Consciousnesses’ 如九識義品說”. However, this is not conclusive proof that Paramārtha himself knew of such a text, let alone that he wrote one. ZSL apparently contains a sub-commentarial layer, perhaps by a later hand, and this comment may belong to that layer. Further, Yuki Reimon has argued the possibility that this comment refers to a text like the Xianshi lun (XSL), which expounds not a ninefold system of “consciousnesses” (識, vijnāna) but the first nine out of eleven “categories” or “ideas” (識, vijnāpti) (the xianshi = khyativijnāna of XSL’s title). Further, the comment falls in the course of a discussion which is in fact on alayavijnāna, i.e. eighth consciousness. The ZSL comment may thus refer to a text entirely separate from the issue of *amalavijnāna as “ninth consciousness”.

2) The preface to Awakening of Faith (AF) claims that a Jiushi yi zhang 九識義章 was translated by Paramārtha, and gives quite specific circumstances and dates. However, this is a preface to a text whose own attribution to Paramārtha is generally regarded as spurious; and the preface is also considered inauthentic.

3) Bibliographic sources report that Paramārtha was the author of a text called the Jiushi yiji 九識義記. However, the first report of this text is in the often unreliable Lidai sanbao ji 歷代三寶紀, among a crop of texts dated to Paramārtha’s period of activity under the Liang dynasty, to which Fei Changfang 費長房, d.u., fl. under the Sui attaches passage; but I stress that all these translations are provisional.

242 T1587:31.62a04.
243 See FUKAURA 1, 315 ff.
244 T1666:32.575a28-b01.
245 Yuki, 41-42. See also n. 224 above. On the set of categories at issue here, see n. 79.
246 Yuki 42.
247 See DEMIEVILLE (1929) 11-15. CHEN Yince, however, has pointed out that some historical details in this preface could only have be known by someone very close to the original context in which P and his group worked, so that we cannot dismiss all of its contents out of hand. Prof. FUNAYAMA has rightly stressed that we must take this into consideration in weighing the testimony of the preface about the Jiushi yi zhang (personal communication, October 2008).
4) Gyonen says that Daoji’s Shelun zhang is a commentary on the Jiushi zhang. From context, it is clear that Gyonen probably understands the Jiushi zhang to be the source of doctrines Daoji has just attributed to Paramārtha in a passage Gyonen has quoted. Gyonen seems to have had Daoji’s Shelun zhang before him as he wrote (he quotes it extensively). If Gyonen has this information direct from Daoji, this is probably our strongest piece of evidence that a Jiushi zhang existed and was already attributed to Paramārtha in the Shelun school of Daoji’s time. However, Gyonen does not say that the Jiushi zhang was in fact by Paramārtha, and it is possible that Daoji was reading a Jiushi zhang by another author (for instance, his teacher Jingsong; see below) which described Paramārtha’s doctrines at second hand. It is also possible that Gyonen knows of a supposed erstwhile Jiushi zhang by Paramārtha, and has merely inferred that Daoji is commenting upon it.

5) Wŏnhyo also refers to what seems most likely to be a similar text (a zhang), but without specifying its title.

6) Wŏnch’uk cites a Jiushi zhang and even says specifically, in his commentary on the Samdhinirmocana sutra, that the text was quoting a “Ninth Conscious-
This is the first time we see the claim that JDZL contains such a special chapter, here found in tandem with the notion of a freestanding text on the same topic. The most impressive thing about Wŏnch'ûk's evidence is that he cites the *jiushi zhàng* as a source for ideas that are not directly connected to the doctrine of *amalavijñāna* or ninth consciousness. Here, it is difficult to imagine any motivation for Wŏnch'ûk (or any intermediate source, if the citation is indirect) to ascribe the passage to the *jiushi zhàng*, except that such a text indeed existed and contained it. This evidence cannot reassure us that the *jiushi zhàng* these scholars cite was correctly ascribed to Paramārtha, but it strongly suggests that some text of that name certainly did exist.

7) In a Vinaya text by Dajue 大覺 (712), we also see the claim that JDZL contains a “Ninth Consciousness Chapter” 九識品, referring to *amalavijñāna*.  

8) Tunnyun reports that according to Huijing 惠景, Paramārtha “established the doctrine of nine consciousnesses 九識義 on the basis of a citation from the ‘Ninth Consciousness Chapter’ 九識品 of JDZL.” Tunnyun is sceptical, and notes that there “never was” any such chapter in the corresponding part of *YBh*. Tunnyun notably tells us explicitly that he only has this information by hearsay.

9) Tankuang reports that the theory of ninth consciousness is found in “the ‘Treatise on Nine Consciousnesses’ (*jiushi lun* 九識論), translated by Paramārtha.”

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256 具如《九識論》引《決定藏論》《九識品》中說; once more at X369:21.240c06-07.
257 真諦三藏《九識論》云，《問：大本》云，《緣覺十住行到》，到何位，是何宗？答：此是客，宗意除三界果（感？），通心學大乘，入十信，信法如如。准知真諦亦說十信為所到處，X369:21.271b11-14.
258 Yuki does not believe Wŏnch'ûk ever saw the text; 39.
259 The same is true of a much later reference in Chinkai (珍海, 1092-1152). 真諦三藏《九識論》云，‘天親造論百非’云云，T299:70.228c, cited in Otake 2007(b).
260 On the date of this text, see n. 457.
261 『決定藏論』有『九識品』、第九名『阿摩羅識』, X736:42.876b19-20.
262 Tunnyun also goes on to express scepticism about the claim that the notion of *amalavijñāna* really derives from WXCL, on the grounds that corresponding parts of *YJSJL* do not feature the concept; T1828:42.318a11-15.
263 T2812:85.1075a19-23. Note that Tankuang may well, like Tunnyun, have been getting his information via Kuiji; he too was trained in the Faxiang school.
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10) In a statement either paraphrasing Dajue or quoting a third common source, Chéngguān 澄観 (738-839) also refers to a “Ninth Consciousness Chapter” of JDZL 決定藏論九識品.264

11) A *jiushi lun 九識論 in two juan is attributed to Paramārtha in a catalogue of manuscripts from Japan dating to 753.265 However, the entry in question is included in a list of manuscripts “yet to be copied” (*misha 未写), so there is no guarantee that the compiler of the catalogue actually sighted the text in question.

We should also note the ambiguous case of Huijun, who refers at one point to doctrines expounded in MSg and a "*jiushi yi 九識義". *Jiushi yi here could simply mean "[in expounding] the tenet of ninth consciousness", but given that later reports held that Paramārtha wrote a text entitled the *jiushi yiji 九識義章 etc. (AF preface, Fei Changfang), we must also recognise the possibility that this is an abbreviated reference to the title of a text.267

Against these sources, we must weigh another set of references, which sometimes purports to trace the idea of “ninth consciousness” or “nine consciousnesses” to similar source texts, but without referring to a special text or chapter with “ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses” in the title. Such authors are largely early.

1) Huijun (conceivably our earliest witness268) says:

264 T1736:36.323c10, 336b20.
265 『九識論』二巻, *Misha kyoritsuron sha mokuroku 未寫經律論集目錄 (Shōsōin bunsho 正倉院文書), *Dai Nippon komonjo jūni (tsuika roku) 大日本古文書十二(追加六), 553; cited in *Yoshimura (unpublished 2007b), 3, on the basis of *Otake 2007(b).
266 The context makes it clear here that the illegible character must be *shi 識.
267 However, elsewhere, Huijun also ascribes the doctrine of ninth consciousness rather to the *Shiqi jing (see p. 109 below). Huijun also immediately cites a verse that appears in MSg (see n. 335), so that either this verse should have appeared in the putative *jiushi yi as well, or the phrase merely means “in his [teachings on the] tenet of the ninth consciousness and the *Mahāyānasamgraha”. Matters are further complicated by the fact that in the series of three quotations that follow (the second and third introduced by 又云), there is material that is not found in the present MSg or MSgBh, including a phrase that *can, rather, be traced to FXL and SBLK, i.e. 非淨非不淨 X784:46.645c06; see n. 334. This may indeed indicate that material included in these apparent quotes not found in MSg and Bh was found in a separate text, available to Huijun, called the *jiushi yi.
268 See n. 330.
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“What is the practice in seventeen stages? It is as laid out in the Sutra of Seventeen [Stages] 十七經，269 which is cited by the Trepiṭaka Paramārtha to prove the tenet that there is a ninth consciousness 有九別. His treatise 彼論 270 says, “nine kinds of mind 九品心”, and thus there exists a ninth consciousness 有第九別. However, that sutra [i.e. Shiqi jing] has not been translated here [in China 此間 271], and [Paramārtha’s claim] is thus difficult to believe.272

It is key that Huijun does not say the “Shiqi jing” contained a chapter 品 specially on “ninth consciousness” (i.e. a Jiushi pin 九識品). Rather, he says that the text speaks of jiu pin xin 九品心, most naturally read “nine kinds/categories of mind”. This claim fits better with our extant JDZL (if we grant the identification between *amalavijnāna and “ninth consciousness”) than any claim that any partial YBh translation by Paramārtha contained an entire special section devoted to “ninth consciousness”. This is also the earliest reference in our extant record to the exposition of ninefold mind in JDZL. We might thus suspect that the idea of a “Ninth Consciousness Chapter” arose later by a reversal of Huijun’s word order (九品心 → 九心品), combined with the idea that Paramārtha wrote a special text on this topic.

2) The anonymous Shelun School Dunhuang text, She dasheng lun shu 收大乘論疏 T2805,273 mentions a passage in which JDZL “expounds ninth consciousness” 274...
This passage is of particular interest because T2805 is here not itself expounding *amalavijnana or "ninth consciousness", so this characterisation of the text is clearly not motivated by T2805's doctrinal agenda. The quote following this introduction is not a verbatim citation, but perhaps rather a paraphrase. However, the author clearly knew Paramārtha's text. The cited passage falls just before JDZL<1>. This passage, comments by Huijun, comments in T2807, and comments by Daoji (who cites parts of XWL) are the only instances where a later reference to "ninth consciousness" can clearly be shown to have in mind an extant Paramārtha text. T2805 is also the earliest text to say that "ninth consciousness" derives from JDZL, and the only text that actually recognisably cites JDZL in the process. T2805 also shows no special interest in "ninth consciousness" or *amalavijnana, but rather merely mentions it here, in passing. It is thus early, accurate, and has no special interest in presenting any version of "ninth consciousness" doctrine. If T2805 also does not say that JDZL contains a special "chapter" on "ninth consciousness", we may be glimpsing another intermediate stage in the elaboration of a legend of a special chapter on ninth consciousness in JDZL.

3) Another anonymous Shelun School Dunhuang text, the She dasheng lun zhang 摺大乘論章 T2807, says "it is said abroad" 外國傳云 that the "Bodhisattva Chapter' of the 'Treatise on Seventeen Stages" [Shiqi di lun 十七地論菩薩品] goes into detail to distin-

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275 T2805:85.985b19.
276 Referring to JDZL T1584:30.1019b16-19. Otake 2007(b) points out that there are places in which this version of the text of JDZL is closer to the text of YBh as reflected in XZ and Tib. than the extant JDZL. He suggests that this may indicate that the author of T2805 is citing from the so-called *shishi yi (which he takes to have been a separate text), in which P, rather than citing his own earlier translation of JDZL verbatim, retranslated from the original Sanskrit. One difficulty this inference must confront is the question of why T2805 calls this text "fuizing zang lun", if it was citing a different text to our extant JDZL.
277 Other than via P, we know of no other way that an author in China at the time of T2805 could know the content of this part of YBh.
278 JDZL<1> begins a full Taishó page later, T1584:30.1020b08. Note too that JDZL itself says, at the end of JDZL<1>, that the whole section has been about "the realisation of the *amalavijnana"; see n. 48. That the citation falls outside our JDZL passages suggests that the author of T2805 considered a larger portion of JDZL to be centrally engaged in "expounding ninth consciousness" than only the passages that actually mention *amalavijnana.
279 See §4.1.3.5 below.
280 See §4.1.3.7 below.
281 Does this statement in T2807 mean that the author had heard of some foreign text or authority
guish an *amalavijnāna, and counts it as a ninth consciousness. Now, Shiqi di lun is the title of a lost partial translation of YBh by Paramārtha, and the present JDZL may be a remnant of it. The present JDZL does not contain a "Bodhisattva Chapter"; but the passage that concentrates most on *amalavijnāna, JDZL<1>, does open with an indication that it is discussing the entry of the bodhisattvas into the "stage of non-regression" (不退地, avaivartikabhāmi). Thus, the title "Bodhisattva Chapter" may be no less appropriate than "Ninth Consciousness Chapter".

T2807 thus traces *amalavijnāna to the exposition in JDZL, but refers to it by another alternate chapter name, also unattested in our extant text. This suggests that: (1) reference to texts by title was loose; (2) the tradition that JDZL contained a "Ninth Consciousness Chapter" was either not yet established, or at least not yet universal.

4) The wording of Huijun's report ((1) above) is echoed by Daoji 道基. Daoji says that Paramārtha cited the “definitive exposition（決定論）of nine kinds of mind 九品心 in the Shiqi di lun” to prove a theory of ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses. However, Daoji does not seem to have very concrete information about his sources. He claims, for example, that Paramārtha quotes LAS in expounding his theory, which is not supported by any extant evidence. Further, Daoji shows himself wary of the Shiqi di

who said that Shiqi di lun corroborated the doctrine of *amalavijnāna found in JDZL? Or does it simply indicate that the author presumed it was a “foreign tradition” because the text is presented as a translation? Does the use of the title Shiqi di lun mean that the author had actually seen a text circulating under that title that expounded *amalavijnāna — and as a ninth consciousness, to boot — or that he was just attempting to put two and two together from various pieces of hearsay?

See n. 168.

The *amalavijnāna passages appear in a chapter entitled “The Stage/Ground of the Mind” 心地品.

T2807:85.1016c21-23.

T1584:30.1020b05

The wording of this quotation matches no Chinese translation of LAS, and suggests that this is because the quote genuinely dates back to P, who translated himself and directly from his knowledge of Skt. LAS; he regards this as supporting evidence for the likelihood that a special text on ninth consciousness by P really did exist (Otaka 2007d). However, given the confusion that Daoji seems to evince in this very same passage about his other source, the Shiqi di lun (in which case he is possibly referring to or “citing” a text he himself never even saw, and thus basing himself on hearsay), it does not seem that we have strong grounds for confi-
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*lun. He rejects it as a proof-text on the grounds that “has never circulated in this country [i.e. China] 此國未行”.

Daoji himself thus never saw the *Shiqi di lun, and any information he gives us about it is based on hearsay.

Once again, Daoji does not say that the *Shiqi di lun contained a special section whose title had anything to do with “ninth consciousness”. Daoji was a Shelun scholar in a direct line from Paramārtha himself. His teacher, Jingsong (one remove from Paramārtha), may have written a text entitled *Jiushi yi zhang (see below), which we would expect his disciple Daoji to have known. If even Daoji does not say that Paramārtha’s *Shiqi di lun (or JDZL) contained a special chapter on “ninth consciousness”, and if he nonetheless refers to *Shiqi di lun (and LAS!) for his textual support, rather than a dedicated text by Paramārtha on ninth consciousness, then it seems unlikely such a text existed by the 630s.

In addition, Daoxuan (道宣, 596-667) reports that two other texts with similar titles were written by important Shelun figures. (1) Tanqian 塔遷 (542-607) is supposed to have written a *Jiushi zhang 九識章. Tanqian was extremely influential in spreading Shelun School thought to the North, and a prominent figure under the Sui. (2) Jingsong (靖嵩, 537-614) is supposed to have written a *Jiushi xuan yi 九識玄義. Jingsong was a disciple of Fatai 法泰 and so a “dharma grandson” of Paramārtha himself; he was also, like Tanqian, an important figure in the transfer of the Shelun school to the North. Jingsong was also pivotal because he was the master of Daoji, an important Shelun-school witness to later *amalavijnana doctrine (see below). It is thus not impos-

dence that Daoji certainly quoted word-for-word from texts on paper, rather than roughly, from memory or hearsay. The slight difference in wording here might therefore only be evidence that Daoji’s “quotation” is actually simply a “near-enough” paraphrase.

This ignorance about the text is mirrored by the fact that details of Daoji’s reference to the text also seem confused; his mention of 決定説 is perhaps a vague echo of the title of *Jueding zang lun, and it is possible that he knows that these two titles have something to do with one another, but is not sure what.

**Xu gaoseng zhuàn 極高僧傳, T2060:50.574b04. It is important to remember, in assessing this report, that Daoxuan’s information is never repeated in any other source.**

See **Chen Jinhua.**

**Xu gaoseng zhuàn, T2060:50.502a02.**

See n. 366.
sible that one of these texts became associated in the tradition with Paramārtha, leading to the reports we have seen above of a similar text in Paramārtha’s name.294

Finally, we should also consider that the earliest mention of a ninth consciousness, or nine consciousnesses, is found not in Paramārtha or his successors, but in the *Lankāvatāra sūtra* (LAS), as early as the translation of Bodhiruci.295 The verse in question reads: “The various consciousnesses, eight or nine in kind/ Are like waves on water.”296 This passage, or its doctrine, was frequently referred to as later scholastics discussed the concept of *amalavijñāna* and ninth consciousness: for example, by Jingying Huiyuan,297 T2807,298 Li Tongxuan,299 Kuiji,300 Tunnyun,301 and Tankuang.302 This shows that later authors were interested in using LAS to furnish a scriptural warrant for *amalavijñāna*; or using the notion of *amalavijñāna* to interpret this cryptic passage in LAS; or using LAS to account for the errors perceived as inhering in the notion of *amalavijñāna*; etc. Whatever tack the various later scholars took, these passages suggest that LAS is one possible alternative source of the enumeration of *amalavijñāna* as a ninth consciousness.

Surveying this tangled body of evidence, we can discern several main points.

First, there seems to be considerable confusion about the title of the text(s) ascribed to Paramārtha (九識義品, 十七地論菩薩品, 九識義章, 九識品, 九識義記, 九識章, 九識品, 決定藏論有九識品, 九識論), which we find alongside a number of other locu-
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...tions which may or may not even refer to a freestanding text (九品心, 九識義, 释九識中). We also see much confusion about whether it this was a freestanding text or a chapter in a larger text (usually specified as in JDZL), or (perhaps) both. This confusion does not inspire confidence that many authors had actually seen such a text.

There is a clear association in some quarters between this supposed text and JDZL (or Shiqi di lun). If “ninth consciousness” refers to *amalavijnāna, this association is partly justified; however, extant JDZL *amalavijnāna doctrine does not call it a “ninth consciousness”. Further, as we will see, the actual ideas about *amalavijnāna that are expounded in JDZL almost never appear again in the record.

We can further sort the above materials into three main groups:

(1) the idea that JDZL or Shiqi di lun expounded the idea of ninth consciousness, without any claim about a section with a related title: Huijun, T2805 and T2807, and Daoji.

(2) the idea that there existed a separate text on the same topic: beginning (possibly) with ZSL, or Fei Changfang and the AF preface; the root-text of Daoji’s Shelun zhang (only as reported by the much later Gyōnen); the Da Tang neidian lu; the Faxiang authors Wŏnch’uk and Tankuang; possibly Wŏnhyo; and the Japanese catalogue of 735. In Wŏnch’uk we find the unusual hybrid assertion that such a freestanding text (Jiushi zhang) cited a special chapter of JDZL.

(3) The idea that JDZL contained a text with a title to do with ninth consciousness, expounding the same. This idea is first seen in Wŏnch’uk, then in Dajue, Tunnyun and Chengguan. In Wŏnch’uk, moreover, we find the unusual hybrid idea that this chapter was the source for a separate text called the Jiushi zhang.

Thus, the broad pattern seems to be as follows. Our earliest evidence contains two conflicting accounts. In the first century after Paramārtha, one line of evidence holds that the doctrine of ninth consciousness is grounded in JDZL (among other texts; WXL, MSgBh etc. are also cited). This line of evidence is found in our best informed, most scrupulous early sources: Huijun and texts closely associated with the Shelun school, which go into detail about doctrines and accurately cite Paramārtha’s real texts. Along-

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303 See also YOSHIMURA (2007a), 180-182.
side this, we have texts which, especially in the early period, only touch very fleetingly on the whole problem, and never show themselves to be well informed about the concrete contents of Paramārtha’s texts. These texts hold that the doctrine of ninth consciousness is found in a separate text by Paramārtha containing the term “ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses” in the title, but cannot agree on what that title is. At the same time, we also have accounts that inform us that two important Shelun School authors in the late sixth century, Tanqian and Jingsong, wrote texts with “ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses” in the title. There is thus a possibility that the freestanding text of that title ascribed to Paramārtha might, like AF, have been incorrectly attributed to him, and actually authored by someone else.304

When we arrive at the Faxiang authors, the characterisation of the textual basis for the theory of ninth consciousness changes. Wŏnch’uk seems to be pivotal. In him, we see an assertion, never repeated, that there exists a freestanding text, and that it cites a section of JDZL also named for the doctrine of ninth consciousness. Perhaps Wŏnch’uk was attempting to reconcile the two contradictory traditions that had preceded him, i.e. that there was a text with jiushi in the title, and that the doctrine was expounded primarily in JDZL.305 After Wŏnch’uk, all authors but one take to saying that ninth consciousness doctrine is expounded in a chapter of JDZL named for that doctrine. The idea that there existed a separate text only recurs in catalogues and in Tankuang.

While we cannot be sure, it thus seems likely that neither JDZL nor Shiqi di lun ever contained a section with the term “ninth consciousness” in the title. The idea that such a text existed seems rather to emerge over a century after Paramārtha’s death, as an attempt to reconcile conflicting traditions, and then to be repeated in a way that shows the extent of the authority of Wŏnch’uk (which he shared with Kuiji; see below).

It is even more difficult to know whether or not Paramārtha did indeed compose a freestanding text with jiushi in the title. On the one hand, the texts that do say Paramārtha wrote such a text are less clearly reliable. On the other hand, the portion of Fei Changfang’s Lidai sanbao ji about Paramārtha’s translations may have been based on a list drawn up by Cao Bi; CHEN Yinque has shown that the apocryphal AF preface still contains considerable accurate historical information; and Wŏnch’uk and Chinkai cite the Jiushi zhang on topics other than ninth consciousness. These facts and others

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304 YOSHIMURA argues this was the case; YOSHIMURA (2007a), 181.
305 YOKI suggests this possibility; 40.
discussed above seem to me to suggest that at least one text with a title like *Jiushi zhang* certainly existed, and that it was almost certainly ascribed to Paramārtha as early as 590. However, perhaps that attribution, and indeed the text itself, was not widely known for quite some time beyond that (otherwise why would Daoji not cite it?). Beyond this, however, it seems to me impossible to exclude either of two mutually contradictory possibilities: (a) the text was by Paramārtha, or (b) that it was by another author, and the attribution was apocryphal.

4.1.2.3 Did Paramārtha propound a ninth consciousness?

The idea that there are nine consciousnesses, and the identification of *amalavijñāna* with the ninth consciousness, was certainly current and well-known in the scholastic Buddhism of North China from the early Sui (by the late 580s or 590). All our most reliable witnesses for this early period relay to us this idea. We have no evidence that is closer to Paramārtha and his circle than these witnesses, that might give us grounds to doubt this testimony. We must recognise the possibility that these ideas were genuinely propounded by members of the group (including perhaps Paramārtha himself), but were lost from the extant record of their texts.

On the other hand, these ideas are absent from the extant Paramārtha corpus. Further, as we will see, even our earliest witnesses were not very well-informed about Paramārtha’s actual doctrines of *amalavijñāna*; many of the aspects of the doctrine we have seen above are entirely absent from their accounts, and each of them appears ignorant of the bare existence of at least some key texts, let alone their contents. We have also seen that the notion of nine kinds of consciousnesses could have been derived from LAS, and *amalavijñāna* labelled a ninth consciousness in order to make sense of the LAS passage and furnish the Shelun school theory of mind with more textual support. It is also possible, then, that a nine-consciousness model grew up in the early Shelun school, to reconcile earlier convictions that the ground of mind was pure Thusness with the idea that alayavijñāna was the repository of all defiled seeds. Given that our present evidence gives us no firm testimony of the existence of the idea of ninth con-

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206 Indeed, Yoshimura makes the valid point that if Jingying Huiyuan, who himself espoused an eight-consciousness theory, nonetheless felt obliged to make room for a ninth consciousness theory and *amalavijñāna* understood as such, it is a sign that this position was already strong in his time; Yoshimura (2002), 229.

207 Yuki in particular argues that P did not expound nine consciousnesses, but that the doctrine developed under the influence of the LAS; see esp. Yuki 21-44.

208 Something like this is the conclusion argued by Yoshimura (2002); see esp. 240, 241 n. 28.
sciousness until perhaps as late as 590, we cannot exclude the possibility that the doctrine of ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses was an early post-Paramārtha development, which was then ascribed to him as founder of the Shelun school.

It therefore seems impossible to determine for sure whether or not Paramārtha or his group expounded ninth consciousness, or nine consciousnesses.

4.1.3 Later reports of concrete contents of the doctrine of *amalavijñāna

In tracing the later development of *amalavijñāna doctrine, we must treat the reports of several individuals separately, since there is relatively little agreement between them. This lack of consensus alone suggests that there was a lot of creative interpretation mixed in with these reports.

4.1.3.1 Jingying Huiyuan

Jingying Huiyuan (淨影慧遠, 523-592) places *amalavijñāna under a broader rubric of “true” consciousness, which is twofold, including also dlayavijñāna. He says that amala means “taintless” in Chinese 虔淨無垢, and also “originally pure” 本浄. He says further that it is referred to as “taintless” in the sense that the substance 體 of what is true (or Thusness) is permanent and pure 真體常淨故日無垢. He equates it with the “Thusness aspect of mind” 心真如門, a term clearly derived from AF; he quotes AF as a proof-text in the next line, so connecting *amalavijñāna to tathāgatagarbha. Elsewhere, Huiyuan again associates “ninth consciousness” with the “Thusness aspect of mind” 心真如相, and dlayavijñāna with “the aspect of mind [that is subject to] arising, cessation and conditions” 心生滅因緣相. The ninth consciousness is the “substance of all dharmas” 諸法體. Both *amalavijñāna and dlayavijñāna are part of the same mind, but the difference is that ninth consciousness is the state in which language is cut off and conditionality is transcended, whereas eighth consciousness is the state in which [mind] conforms to the metamorphoses brought about by conditions.

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309 The most thorough discussions of later witnesses, to my knowledge, are YOKI and YOSHIMURA (2002) (2007a).

310 We have already seen that Jingying Huiyuan refers to *amalavijñāna as a “ninth consciousness”. To my knowledge, the only transcription of the term found in his works is the standard amoluoshi 阿摩羅識.

311 T1666:32.576a06.

312 T1851:44.530b06-11.

313 於一心中絕言離緣，為第九識，隨緣變轉，是第八識，T1843:44.179a20-29. See also T1843:44.179c13-17.
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Already, the concept of *amalavijnana is clearly being interpreted in part through the lens of AF. As a result, the relationship posited here between *amalavijnana and alayavijnana differs from that found in Paramārtha’s works. Paramārtha understood *amalavijnana to be the counteragent to alayavijnana, and the two to be in a temporal relationship to one another, whereby alayavijnana existed only until liberation, and was then succeeded by fully realised *amalavijnana.314 For Huiyuan’s post-AF analysis, by contrast, the two are different facets of the same “true” consciousness, *amalavijnana in its pure, eternal, self-contained and transcendent purity, and alayavijnana as it is engaged with and even immanent in samsara.315

Huiyuan also links *amalavijnana as “ninth consciousness” to the LAS passage mentioned above.316 Here again, he says that within the rubric of a ninefold analysis of consciousness, there are two possible analyses, depending upon whether one understands “true” and “false” 真妄 as (1) distinct 分别 or (2) as dialectically “analysed and then synthesised” 離合. (1) In the former perspective, the “true” aspect is twofold, and comprises *amalavijnana on the one hand and alayavijnana on the other. (2) On the latter analysis, only “the fundamentally pure *amalavijnana” 本淨阿摩羅識 is “true”, and alayavijnana is included among eight consciousnesses that are an “amalgam of true and false” 真妄和合.317 This approach is again redolent of AF. However, these are only two among a longer list of various modes of analysis consciousness admits of, which also include tenfold and elevenfold analyses.

It seems, then, that Huiyuan is wielding the concept of *amalavijnana and related concepts in the pursuit of his own hermeneutic projects,318 and is not simply concerned with giving us accurate doxographic reports of Paramārtha’s own doctrine. Huiyuan also shows little sign of direct acquaintance with Paramārtha’s own pertinent texts.319

314 As we saw, this relationship is complicated by the fact that P also, in some passages, considers that *amalavijnana pre-exists liberation in some form, e.g. as the basis for the path, etc.
315 阿梨耶識... 隨妄流轉、體無失壞... 與生滅合, T1851:44.530b09-11.
316 See n. 296.
317 T1851:44.530c08-16.
318 On this same point, see YOKI 29, YOSHIMURA (2002), 226-227.
319 See also YOSHIMURA (2007a), 179.
4.1.3.2 Zhiyi

The bulk of Zhiyi's (538-597) discussion of *amalavijñāna is found in his Fahua xuanyi, most likely dating to around 593. Zhiyi maps the different levels of consciousness, in which he includes *amalavijñāna, onto his unique doctrine of “three dharmas” 三法 or “three rules” 三軌: *amalavijñāna is the “rule of Thusness [itself]” 真性軌; alayavijñāna corresponds to the “rule of contemplation of Thusness” 観照軌; and adanavijñāna 阿陀那識 corresponds to “the rule of extending this understanding to the workings of Thusness” 資成軌. Zhiyi also says explicitly that the difference between *amalavijñāna and alayavijñāna is just that *amalavijñāna is alayavijñāna in which the seeds of wisdom exist and in which the “perfumation (vasana) of hearing” has grown, so that it undergoes a “revolutionary transformation of the basis” (asrayaparavrtti) and is transformed into “Thusness after the path” (道後真如). He identifies *amalavijñāna with something he rather idiosyncratically calls “the light of nirvikalpakajñāna” 無分別智光. Elsewhere, Zhiyi also says that *amalavijñāna is the “consciousness” of a Buddha, whereas alayavijñāna is the consciousness of the bodhisattva, and adanavijñāna, which he calls the “seventh” consciousness and identifies with *prativikalpavijñāna 分別識, is proper to the two lesser vehicles.

As this brief overview shows, much of what Zhiyi has to say about *amalavijñāna

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320 We have already seen above that Zhiyi uses the otherwise unusual transcription ṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭṭ्ण
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is unique to him, and looks like the result of creative attempts to coordinate what he
knows of *amalavijnana from other sources with other doctrines and his own original
system.328

4.1.3.3 Huijun/Hyegyun

Important evidence about the image of Paramartha’s doctrine in late sixth-century
China is preserved in Huijun’s (慧均, d.u., fl. 574-590s?)329 Si lun xuan yi 四論玄義 X784.
It is difficult to know exactly when Huijun was writing,330 but the Shelun school already
canon, but it is difficult to be sure of their authenticity and date. Even if these two texts are not
actually by Zhiyi, however, we should not automatically exclude their evidence. They may both
nonetheless contain information as early as the period immediately after Zhiyi’s death, and
thus still comprise some of our earliest evidence. (1) The 金光明經玄義拾遺記 X356 is a
collection of fragments made in 1023 by Zhili 知禮 (960-1028) of the Shanjia 山家 faction, in-
tended to disprove accusations from representatives of the Shanwai 山外 faction that parts of
the 般若金剛般若経 X784 were apocryphal. It may contain sub-commentarial layers, and these
are further of uncertain date; SATO 451. This text says *amalavijnana is an “unmoving
consciousness” (不動識), and says it is another name for prajña and awakening 覺了;
X356:20.42b08-09. It further identifies *amalavijnana with the attainment of a sophisticated in-
sight 観 into the nature of mind, which has both empty and non-empty aspects; this insight
does not hypostasise either the empty or the provisional, but understands their dialectical in-
terrelationship; 60b10-13. It also maps this schema onto the analogy to gold, earth and impuri-
ties from MSg; *amalavijnana equates with the gold, and is all that is left when full buddha-
hood is attained; 48c15-18. (2) The Chan men zhang 習門章 X907 is probably not actually by
Zhiyi, but is rather a commentary on Zhiyi’s 中華 Stt. SATO thinks it probably dates after
Zhiyi’s death (in 597), but otherwise is unable to speculate about its date; SATO 125, 276. This
text includes *amalavijnana in a string of different names which variously identify the abso-
lute, all of which have in common that they strike the happy medium (madhyamapratipad) be-
 tween the extremes of various false dualisms like conditioned/unconditioned, bondage/libera-
tion, worldly/transcendent, defiled/pure etc. In this context, *amalavijnana is identified with
ultimate truth (paramarthasatya), Buddha nature (foxing 性), Thusness, the “limit of what
exists” (bhatakoti), non-abiding, non-production etc; X907:55.645b17-22.

328 See YOSHIMURA (forthcoming), 2.
329 We have already seen above that Huijun says that P propounded a ninth consciousness, and
that he said he did so in a “treatise” that cited the so-called “Shiqi jing”; see above p. 48. The
only transcription he uses for *amala [vijñana] is 阿摩羅. He also calls it wugoushi 無垢識 and
jingshi 淨識. Huijun attributes the doctrine of “ninth consciousness” 菩提道第軌 to the “Shelun
masters”; X784:46.635b09.
330 Huijun/Hyegyun, also known as Junzheng 均正, was a Sanlun scholar-monk, and like Jizang
was a disciple of Falang 法朗 (507-581). This fact is known from several passages in the
recovered fragment of his Si lun xuan yi entitled “Chu zhang zhong jia yi” 初章中家義; in
particular: 興皇師 [i.e. Falang]、大建六年 [574 C.E.] 五月、房內亦開六章, which informs us
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had some identity that it presented to outsiders, and thus Huijun’s knowledge of the concepts that concern us was filtered through a Shelun lens. The only *amalavijñana text he mentions by name, he apparently misnames (Shiqi jing for Shiqi di lun), and he makes it clear that he has not seen the text himself. Huijun’s attitude to ideas he identifies as belonging to Paramártha is also probably coloured by his polemical hostility towards the Shelun school.

that he most likely heard Falang lecture in person in 574, thus providing our most precise clue as to the dates of his activity. Other clues seem to indicate that he was a student of Falang from relatively early; that he was close to Falang over an extended period; and that he was slightly senior to Jizang; see MITSUGIRI 223-225, KANNO (2002) 87. It was long thought that the partial version of the Si lun xuan yi collected in the canon was his only surviving work, but modern scholars have discovered other parts of that text in Japan; see e.g. OCHO, and works listed in KANNO (2008) n. 1. Further, Ito has argued that the Mile jing you yi 磔勒經意意 T1771, traditionally ascribed to Jizang, is also his (see Ito [1977] 847-848 for a summary of the reasons for this claim; also Ito 1973). It has also been proposed that the Dapin jing you yi 大品經意意 T1696, also ascribed to Jizang, is by Huijun (CH'OE 26). Recently, CH'OE (infra) has proposed that Huijun may have been from Paekche 百濟, and also that the Si lun xuan yi may even have been composed in Paekche. (I will nonetheless refer to him as “Huijun”, not “Hyegyun”, because CH'OE’s theory is still new and speculative, and because Huijun was active in China and wrote in Chinese.) In the current state of our knowledge, it is not possible to know definitively the chronological relations between Huijun and Jizang (or their works), nor the exact date of the Si lun xuan yi. The full text of the Si lun xuan yi is thought to date at least to after Falang’s death in 581 (MITSUGIRI 225); it mentions events of the Sui, and figures like Huichong 慧衝, which would seem to indicate that the text was completed after Huijun was active in Chang’an 長安 under the Sui (Foguang dacidian 6029). As we saw, Huijun is thought to have been senior to Jizang; on the other hand, he also refers to Jizang (藏公, X784:46.599b02; KANNO [2008] 6). Despite this uncertainty in their chronological relations, I have placed Huijun before Jizang because he is thought to have been slightly senior; because the only firm date I know for his activities is his reference to hearing Falang lecture in 574; and because, to my knowledge, there is no firm evidence for his activity much beyond the time shortly after the death of Falang, whereas Jizang lived for several more decades. It is also possible that Huijun is the earliest among our sources after P. Both Jingying Huiyuan and Zhiyi were active into the 590s, and Zhiyi’s texts, further, were in many cases revised and expanded by his disciple Guanding, who lived until 632. Given that Huijun was active before the 580s, this may mean that some information in his text(s) about P predates these other sources.

The Shelun masters represent one of four positions comprising Huijun’s main foils in Si lun xuan yi, the others being Dilun, Satyasiddhi and Abhidharma; KANNO (2008).

See above p. 109.

See, for example, his critiques of both Dilun and Shelun positions touched upon in n. 347 below.
Against this, however, we should also weigh the following factors. Huijun is potentially a particularly reliable witness not only because he is close in time to Paramārtha, but because he knows Paramārtha’s works better than many of our other witnesses. He quotes SBKL verbatim; he also accurately quotes MSg and unique parts of Paramārtha’s MSgBh. This puts Huijun among a very small number of later witnesses to *amalavijnāna/“ninth consciousness” doctrine who quote Paramārtha verbatim, or even cite texts and loci in which *amalavijnāna is in fact expounded. Huijun also knows at least one term that is found very rarely outside the writings of Paramārtha himself. In addition, Huijun is unlikely to himself be consciously applying AF concepts to the interpretation of Paramārtha’s ideas (though the ideas may have already passed through

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334 非淨非不淨 X784:46.599c18, 645c06; quoting SBKL 非淨非不淨 T1616:31.863a27-28, 非淨非不
淨 863b19; in the second passage, particularly, this phrase is associated immediately with *amalavijnāna and prakṛtiprabhasvaracittā, for which see SBKL<1> above. See also FXL T1610:31.795c02.

335 此師九□義井『撮論』云：『此界[?]無始時、一切此[for 法?]依止』X784:46.645b24, probably citing MSg: 此界無始時 / 一切法依止 T1593:31.114a01, cf. anādikāliko dhatuḥ sarvadharmaśamāśrayaḥ | tasmin sati gatiḥ sarva nirvāṇadhigama | pī ca, TrBh 37, 12-13.

336 彼『論』三種佛性中「自性住佛」X784:46.599c20-21, and again in greater length at 602a02-06, referring to MSgBh T1595:31.200c23.

337 The term in question is luanshi 亂識, for which see also n. 147. This term is only found twice, in one location, before P’s translations, in the “Second [?] Part of the?” Annotated Preface to the Dasabhumika satra” by Sengwei 僧衛 (fl. 410-420?) preserved in Sengyou’s Chu sanzang ji ji, T2145:55.61b02-06. (Sengwei may be approximately dated by the fact that he appears in the biography of Tanyi 瞿曇, a student of Lushan Huiyuan 處山慧遠 [334-416]; by the fact that he is said in Baochang’s [寶唱, d.u. active under the Liang] 名僧傳抄 to have been from Changsha 湘東 in Jiangling 江陵 under the [Eastern] Jin 晉 [317-342] [X1523:77.347b16]; and by this preface itself, which is to a text translated by Kumārajīva in 410.) Given that the preface is cited by Sengyou and therefore must date at the latest before approx. 515, when the Chu sanzang ji ji was completed, only two explanations are possible for the appearance of the term luanshi there, well before P; either it is coincidence; or P’s team took the term from Sengwei. Luanshi appears 52 times in P’s corpus; in MAV, Ālambaraparikṣa, Hastāvālaparipākarana, MSgBh (but not MSg), FXL and SWXL. Thereafter it appears occasionally (and interestingly enough) in a few translation works by XZ (part of a wider pattern where special P terms are peppered through XZ’s works, seemingly indicating either that some of XZ’s terminology was still influenced by hangovers from P, or perhaps that he even occasionally based translations of certain passages on P’s translations); and in the works of some Tang scholars. The only other places where it appears to my knowledge before XZ are in the Shelun texts 撮大乗論章卷第一 (T2807:85.104a09) and 撮大乘義章卷第四 (T2809:85.104a24, 104b26). Thus, the fact that Huijun cites this term, otherwise so rare, shows he must have had direct and exceptionally good knowledge of the concrete contents of (some of) P’s texts.
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some AF filter before they reached him). This is because Huijun knew AF, but was suspicious of it, believing it a Chinese apocryphon. On the whole, then, Huijun is a seemingly reliable witness - early, well-informed and scrupulous.

Huijun says, more than once, that *amalavijnāna/ninth consciousness is beyond language and conception or thought (想, possibly meaning *sanjīna[-skandha]), and even, quite specifically, that it cannot be known by consciousness itself. He further associates “pure consciousness” 淨識 with prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta 自性清淨心, citing in the process SBKL<1>, in which *amalavijnāna is indeed associated with that concept. He links these doctrines to tathāgatagarbha doctrine, but only indirectly, insofar as he ascribes to both the Dilun and Shelun schools the notion that an “aboriginal storehouse (or garbha) consciousness 本有藏識 is the substance of the essence of mind 心性之體”, which is prevented from being manifest by adventitious defilements; on this view, he says, the process of becoming a Buddha is identical with the removal of these defilements. This view is associated clearly with the idea that

“we do not speak of ‘Buddha nature’ only upon the attainment of buddhahood, but rather, it is precisely by means of the present manifestation of an original, hidden/latent mind that buddhahood is achieved; the original nature is neither changed nor lost, and thus we speak of ‘Buddha nature that always indwells’.

In the context of describing a varied set of views about what comprises the substance 體 of Buddha Nature, Huijun also alludes to “ninth taintless (wugou) consciousness” 第九無垢識 (ascribed to the Shelun school, not to Paramārtha himself). The ninth and tenth positions he discusses are those of the Dilun and Shelun

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338 He says (in a comment that survives only in a quoted fragment): 「起信是虗（呪？）鲁人作、 僧馬鳴菩薩名; quoted in Ch’oe 16.
339 「護論」師云：「第九識、名言所不及、故言語道斷。想所不及、故心行處絕。故第九識不可 識。」X784:46.635b9-10 (it is difficult to know where the quote ends here, and it may end after zai 誇); 「阿摩羅」者、正番[翻]「無垢」、無垢有二種 .... 二者、名言想識所不及, 635b14-16; this seems to be connected to the ascription of the same attribute of ineffability to Buddha nature.
340 X784:46.599c20-22; see n. 334.
341 X784:611b04-09.
342 不以成佛時方名「佛性」。 正以本有藏心今顯成佛。 其本性不改不失、故名「常住佛性」 也 X784:46.611b06-08; referring once more to MSeBh, for which see n. 336.
343 X784:46.601b01 ff.
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...schools. He says that the Dilun masters hold *alayavijnâna, counted as an eighth consciousness 第八無識, to be the substance *quâ ontological cause (正因, where 正因 is probably for karana hetu)†; the Shelun masters hold “ninth, taintless consciousness” to be the same.† Huijun is critical of both views. In the course of this

344 The term 無識 is very unusual. So far as I can determine, it never appears in a translation text, and the earliest texts in which it appears seem to be the present text by Huijun, and texts by Zhiyi (T1716:33.699c15, 744b22; T1777:38.552a10; T1783:39.4a13-14), Jingying Huiyuan (X753:45.107c14-15) and Jizang (T1824:42.119a23-24); the term also appears early in the Dunhuang Shelun text 摄大乘論章卷第一 (T2807:85.1013a27). Jingying Huiyuan also says that wumo is the “proper translation” of *alaya, e.g.,「阿梨耶」者，此方翻名為「無識」，T1851:44.524c18, also 530b09-10. This leaves open the mysterious question of where this term for *alayavijnâna comes from. I have been unable to find even the epithet wumo alone, clearly applied to any kind of consciousness, in any translation texts earlier than the texts cited here.

345 Shengyin 生因 (karana hetu) means a cause due to which something comes into existence, i.e. an ontological cause; liaoyin 了因 (jñâpakâhetu) means a cause due to which an act of perception or knowledge takes place, i.e. an epistemological cause; see OGIHARA s.v. *shoin, *ryoin. The distinction is explained in MPNS, T374:12.530a16-26 = T375:12.774c23-775a03, T374:12.593a11-19 = T375:12.841a01-10; and also in KUJI’s commentary on the Nyâyapravesa 因明入正理論疏 T1840:44.101b29-c28. Karana hetu is variously compared to the seed from which a plant grows, the clay from which a pot is made, etc., while *jñâpakâhetu is commonly compared to lamplight that illuminates objects. The terms were known to P: see FXL T1610:31.798a07-10 (explaining different phases of the realisation of Buddha-nature); *Rushi lun T1633:32.32c28-33a01 (the reason argued does not ontologically produce the inerentity of sound, but only brings about realisation of that inerentity, i.e. it is a *jñâpakâhetu for that inerentity, not a karana hetu). I am grateful to Prof. FUNAYAMA Toru for pointing out these references. For shengyin opposed to liaoyin, in roughly the same sense as shengyin = karana hetu, see MPNS: 有二種因：一者正因、二者了因。尼拘陀子以地水等作了因、故令徧得 thôi, T374:12.532b14-16.

346 「地論」師云、第八無識為正因體。第十、「攝論」師云、第九無垢識為正因體, etc.; X784.601c23-602a02.

347 Huijun’s criticisms are difficult to understand exactly, but he says, “[Whether] one takes the *alayavijnâna as the ground upon which liberation from delusion is possible, [or whether holds that] the taintless [consciousness] is manifest upon the extinction of vajracitta and *alayavijnâna, [one is] surely still beholden to a dualistic view” 彼義宗、無識為解或之本、至心無識盡無垢、豈非二見之徒, X784:64.602a20-22. He further seems to charge them with distinguishing in a dualistic manner between what is “mind” and what is not: 豈開心非心？乃至八識亦然, 602b01-02; and with failing to avoid the errors of nihilistic and eternalist thinking: 第九、十兩家、執正因、差前諸師、而不離新常, 603a06-07. He also applies Madhyamaka dialectic to prove the absurdity of the claim, which he attributes to both schools, that all kinds of mind lower that vajracitta on the path are conditioned (sanskrtta), whereas “taintless consciousness” (wugoushi) is unconditioned (asanskrtta) (though once more the finer details of his argument escape me): 彼地、攝兩論意、心心以下是有為、無垢識是無為、故虚實兩識故被破也 etc., X784.603a13-14 ff. The claim that taintless consciousness is asanskrtta

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exposition, Huijun mentions an understanding of “taintless consciousness” that seems accurate to what we have seen of it in Paramārtha, namely that it succeeds upon the cessation of alayavijñāna. 348

To summarise, then: Huijun calls *amalavijñāna a “ninth consciousness”, and uses the term wugoushi for the same; he seems indifferently to identify the views of Paramārtha and those of the Shelun school; he understands that *amalavijñāna/ninth consciousness is beyond language and conception, and even unknowable; he connects the doctrine of this consciousness to prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta; and he seems to report loose associations between this consciousness and Buddha nature/tathāgatagarbha (as part of a position indifferently ascribed to both Dilun and Shelun schools).

4.1.3.4 Jizang (writing c. 599-608)349

Jizang (吉藏，549-623) 350 lists *amalavijñāna among a set of terms that are identified by different schools or figures as what is “non-dual” (advaya, 不二). 351 Jizang also does seem to correspond to the understanding that it is asamāskāra, seen in Tib. and XZ parallels to JDZL<4> above.

345 X784:64.602a21; note, however, that this comment falls in the middle of a passage that is difficult of interpretation.

349 The Jizang works in which *amalavijñāna is discussed seem all to date between about 599 and 608. (1) Hirai considers 淨名玄論 T1780 to probably be the first thing Jizang wrote during his residence at Riyun si in Chang’an 長安, i.e. between his move to Chang’an in 599 and the end of the Kaihuang 開皇 era (581-600) (Hirai 374; citing Jizang’s own words in his 維摩經義疏 T1781:38.908c17-19); the text was thus written in 599-600. (2) Because the exposition of the category of 八不義 in 大乘玄論 T1853 is extremely close to that of Huijun, scholars have long been doubtful whether the text is actually by Jizang, or perhaps rather by Huijun; Hirai, however, concludes that whatever may be the provenance of passages concerning this category, the text as a whole is representative of Jizang’s thought, and cannot be excluded with certainty from the list of his authentic works; Hirai 256. Hirai seems to believe that this text was at least written after T1780; 595. (3) Tradition has held that 中觀論疏 T1824 was completed in 608; Hirai 375. However, Hirai notes that the group of texts to which it belongs were the work of several years, and other complications surround the dating of the text; 608 is only the date of completion; 375-377. The text could thus contain elements older by a few years. (4) 維摩經略疏 X343 was probably written in 604; Hirai 375.

350 We have already seen that Jizang speaks of *amalavijñāna as a ninth consciousness. To my knowledge, the only transcription of the term found in his works is the standard amoluoshi 阿摩羅世.

351 Others are: the principle of the [Four Noble] Truth(s) 真諦理; prajñā that carries the mark of reality 實相較若; alayavijñāna, identified with Nirvāṇa that is pure in its essence 性淨涅槃阿梨耶識. In T1853, these are identified as the positions respectively of the Satyasiddhi masters; the
refers to the notion of \textit{amalavijn\=ana} in another doxographic passage discussing views of various schools on the "real/true" 實, saying that "scholars of the \textit{Mah\=ay\=anrasamgraha} hold that the principle 理 of the twofold absence of self (\textit{nairatmyadvaya} 二無我), the principle of the threefold absence of essence (\textit{nihsvabhavatraya} 三無性), and the \textit{amalavijn\=ana} can rightly be called "true/real", but all else is false. In another passage, in his "Exposition of the Profundities of \{the\} \textit{Vimalak\=rti \{sutra\}" (腫名玄論, T1780), Jizang returns to this characterisation. According to him,

"Adherents of the \textit{Mah\=ay\=anrasamgraha} and the \textit{V\=ijn\=aptimatrata \{sutra\} [唯識論 i.e. the \textit{V\=in\=\textit{\=s\=a\=t\=i\=ka}]} take non-attachment to the three natures as the principle 理 of the threefold absence of essence; this principle of the threefold absence of essence is \textit{amalavijn\=ana}, which is also the principle of the twofold absence of self. The 'three natures' are the interdependent nature (\textit{paratantrasvabhava}), the imaginary nature (\textit{parikalpitasvabhava}), and the perfected nature (\textit{parinispannasvabhava})... The perfected nature is Nir\=vana."

Elsewhere, Jizang also recalls a similar classification to distinguish the ultimate, as it is characterised in all these schools, from the "Nir\=vana of the true doctrine" (正法涅槃, *saddharmar\=ianir\=vana) taught by his own position. In all these other cases, including that of \textit{amalavijn\=ana} as taught by the Shelun masters, he says that the instance in question is manifest upon the attainment of buddhahood, and this resultant state is called...
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dharmakaya because these schools maintain that certain dharma definitively exist. Finally, Jizang also briefly mentions a difference of opinion between the Dilun position, in which the “six consciousnesses” are eradicated to leave alayavijnāna, and that of a certain Trepitaka and certain “masters” who say that “the eighth consciousness is also eradicated, since it too is not pure; [only] the ninth, *amalavijnāna, is entirely pure”. Jizang again differs with these positions because they still posit a dualism of pure and impure.

Jizang’s explanation of the doctrine is rare in linking *amalavijnāna to three natures doctrine, and more specifically to the perfected nature. The general silence on this matter contrasts with the fact that it was so central to *amalavijnāna in Paramārtha. However, other members of the string of identifications Jizang ascribes to the doctrine are new: *amalavijnāna is also identified with the nondual in a new sense, with the two-fold absence of self, and with Nirvāṇa; the identification with dharmakaya in T1853 is also new. Jizang also ascribes the positions he describes either to the Shelun school and Paramārtha indiscriminately, or else only to the Shelun masters, on occasion not even mentioning Paramārtha. Even if Jizang reports everything with fidelity, we apparently see here a version of the doctrine already filtered through the early Shelun school.

On the whole, Jizang’s presentation of *amalavijnāna, like those of Zhiyi and Huiyuan, is also clearly bound up with his own intellectual agendas, and his attempts to fit the material into his own doctrinal system.

4.1.3.5 She dasheng lun zhang

The anonymous Dunhuang Shelun text She dasheng lun zhang argues that the same consciousness can either be called eighth or ninth, and cites LAS in support. Like Huiyuan, it adduces the AF categories of a “Thusness aspect” 真如門

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355 T1853:45.46c24-47a03. By contrast, in the position he expounds, it is in fact the “middle path” that is Buddha nature (madhyamapratiṣṭipad) 中道为佛性, and in this middle path, there can be no question of Buddha nature being either latent or manifest. The other positions are here characterised as the “essentially pure Nirvāṇa” 性凈涅槃 or alayavijnāna of the Dilun masters, and the original Nirvāṇa 本有涅槃 or attainment of Buddhahood of the Satyasiddhi masters.

356 又有三藏師云，亦除八識，此識亦不淨，第九阿摩羅識，番（for 翻）此乃凈，X343:19.166a24-b08. Jizang reports the dispute in very similar terms, and attempts to bring LAS and AF to bear to adjudicate it, at T1824:42.104c07-13.

357 On the dates of this text, see n. 230.

358 See 296.
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and "samsāric aspect" of mind to negotiate the apparent contradiction between eightfold and ninefold analyses, identifying “ninth consciousness” with the Thusness aspect. It then cites what it calls the “Chapter on Marklessness” (wuxiang pin) actually citing our extant SXWL) from the Wuxiang lun: “Because the imagined essential nature never exists, the interdependent essential nature also does not exist; and the inexistence of these two [essential natures] is *amalavijñāna (阿摩羅識)." It then says that this consciousness is “the ultimate, unique pure consciousness” 竟是唯一淨識. The text then says that a tradition from outside China reports that the Shiqi di lun contains a “Bodhisattva Chapter”, which gave an extensive exposition of *amalavijñāna as ninth consciousness.

This passage from T2807 probably conforms more closely to what we see in our extant Paramārtha corpus than any other later account of *amalavijñāna. Even here, however, we see a certain admixture of AF concepts.

4.1.3.6 Prabhākaramitra’s Mahāyānasūtraśāntaka (tr. 630-633)

Prabhākaramitra’s (波羅頗蜜多羅, 564-633) translation of the Mahāyānasūtraśāntaka T1604 famously mentions *amalavijñāna. The mention features as part of commentary on the verse corresponding to Skt. 13.19. This verse is part of a set dealing, in significant part, with “aboriginally luminous mind” (prakṛtirprabhāśvaracitta), which, we saw above, is connected with *amalavijñāna in Paramārtha’s SBKL. These verses assert that defilement (niḥsaṃklesa) and purification (viśuddhi) do not really exist, but are illusory, like a magic trick or “space” (akaśa) (3.16). This is likened to the way a flat picture, skilfully executed, appears to contain height and depth; similarly, there is in fact no dualism (dvaya) in the imagination of what is unreal (abhutakalpa), but it appears as if dual (3.17). Water is intrinsically clear, even when tainted by mud, and when the mud is removed, the water is not changed, but rather, its original true nature simply becomes manifest (3.18). 3.19 spells out the parallel to this conceit in the case of the mind:

359 This citation actually appears in SXWL T1617:31.872a05-06; see SWXL<1> above. There is a slight difference in wording, but the quote is nearly verbatim: SXWL: 由分別性永無故，依他性亦不有，此二無所有，即阿摩羅識；T2807: 分別性永無，依他性亦不有，此二無所有，即是阿摩羅識。
360 T2807:85.1016c08-23; already noted above, p. 111.
361 The word *amalavijñāna 阿摩羅識 itself occurs at T1604:31.623a09.
362 This passage occurs in Chapter 14 of Prabhākaramitra.
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"I have explained that the mind is pure in essence 心性淨
But is defiled by adventitious dirt 客塵;
There is no essential purity of mind
Apart from the Thusness\textsuperscript{363} of the mind 心真如.\textsuperscript{364}

In other words, like water, the mind is pure all along and by its very nature; it is not the case that, when it is purified, some new, pure mind is produced in the process.

In the \textit{Bhasya} to this verse, Chinese features an extra sentence that does not correspond to anything found in the Sanskrit. "It is this mind[, equated with Thusness,] that is expounded as aboriginally pure 自性清淨. This mind is *\textit{amalavijnāna} 此心即是阿摩羅識.\textsuperscript{365} This reinforces the association of *\textit{amalavijnāna} with \textit{prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta}. This association, made in SBKL, Huijun, and Daoji, appears again in Wŏnhyo and Chengguan.

4.1.3.7 Daoji (writing c. 633-637)

One of the most important moments in the history of *\textit{amalavijnāna} doctrine after Paramartha is found in Daoji’s (道基, 577-637)\textsuperscript{366} lost \textit{Shelun zhang 摄論章},\textsuperscript{367} which is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{363} Corresponding to \textit{dharmatā} in Skt; Bh gives “Thusness”, \textit{tasmāc cittatathataivām cittam veditavyam}, Lēvi (1907, 1911) 1, 88.
\item \textsuperscript{364} 已是心性淨 / 而為客塵染 / 不離心真如 / 別有心性淨, T1604:31.623a03-04. I translate Prabhakaramitra’s Ch., which agrees only in its gist with Skt. Skt. reads: “It is understood that while the mind is ever aboriginally pure, it is always poisoned by adventitious poisons; Apart from this aboriginal mind, there is no other essential mind characterised by purity (luminosity);” \textit{matam ca cittam prakṛtiprabhasvaram sada taddāgantukadosadusitam/ na dhammacittam rte ‘nyacetasaḥ prabhavaratvam prakrtau vidhiyate//} (3.19), Lēvi (1907, 1911) 1, 88; 2, 158; Jampsai et al., 171.
\item \textsuperscript{365} T1604:31.623a08-09.
\item \textsuperscript{366} Daoji was a disciple of Jingsong 靖嵩 (537-614). Jingsong was originally from the North, but fled the N. Zhou persecution of Buddhism in 577, and while in Jinling 金陵 (mod. Nanjing) met Fatai 法泰 (d. after 577), a prominent disciple of P Fatai introduced him to MSg, and Jingsong took the text back to the north when he moved to Pengcheng 彭城 in 590. See Chen Jinhua 31 n. 56, 32, 199-200 n. 60; Xu gaoseng zhuàn T2060:50.501b06-502a25. This means that Daoji was a “dharma great-grandson” of P, in a direct line. Daoji was in turn a teacher of XZ, and his testimony is thus particularly important because it is possible that Kuiji, Wŏnch’uk and their successors had their information about P’s supposed “ninth consciousness” via him, rather than directly from P’s texts. On Kuiji’s apparent relation to Daoji, see further below, n. 433.
\item \textsuperscript{367} Daoji cites the MSA, which enables us to date his comments quite closely between 630-633, when MSA was translated, and his death in 637.
\end{itemize}
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quoted by Gyōnen 玲然 (1240-1321) in the Kegon komokushō hatsugo ki 華厳孔目章發悟記 15. Daoji's368 most important comments about *amalavijnana/ninth consciousness are contained in a single extended passage.

"Question: Upon what sūtras and śāstras do Trepitaka Paramārtha and the Dharma Master Daoji base themselves, in proving the tenet of ninth consciousness?

"Answer: In the first [juan?] of [Daoji's] She lun zhang ["Treatise on the Mahayanasamgraha"], it says:369

There are Dharma Masters who expound nine consciousnesses. For example, Trepiṭaka Paramārtha cites [the line], "Various kinds of mind, eight- or ninefold" from the Lamkāvatāra sūtra;370 [he] also cites the definitive exposition of nine kinds of mind 九品心 from the Shiqi di lun ["Treatise on the Seventeen Stages"] as proof. From then, right down to the present, the controversy has not ceased, so that later generations have no way of deciding [what is correct].

‘Here, we will determine that it is correct to hold that: the sūtras expound six [kinds of consciousness]; some, however, say there are seven; the Lamkāvatāra expounds eight; and the Wuxiang lun has nine. Among these various theories, the Lamkāvatāra etc. expound only eight consciousnesses because they are expounding an abridged [version of the doctrine] (請略併説八識).

‘On the other hand, the doctrines of the Wuxiang [lun] lay out the nine in full (義具通陳其九). The “Chapter on *Pravṛtti-vijñāna [轉識品]” in the Wuxiang lun says, “The consciousness that is the subject of perception is of three kinds: (1) Consciousness [arising] as a result [of karma] (果報識, vipakaviññāna), that is, alavavijñāna 繭耶;372 (2) Con-

368 We have already seen above that Daoji refers to *amalavijnana as wugoushi. He also refers to it as jingshi 淨識. Like Huijun, Daoji says that P cited a discussion of “nine kinds of mind” 九品心 in Shiqi di lun to prove a theory of ninth consciousness.

369 These introductory passages are the words of Gyōnen.

370 See n. 296. Ōtake points out (2007d) that the precise wording of this quote does not match any transmitted Chinese translation of the text; see n. 287.

371 On this reconstruction for the term shuanshi in this context, see n. 127.

372 The transcription of alayavijñāna with the character 繍 is unusual, and is only ever found in the Xu zang jing, never in the Taishō. However, it is clearly a scribal variant of the transcription 阿黎耶, which is a distinguishing feature of P’s style (it is only found a few times in Bodhiruci
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sciousness that ‘grasps’ [or ‘is attached’] is consciousness, that is, adanavijnāna 阿陀那; (3) Sense consciousness [literally ‘consciousness of sense objects’] is consciousness, that is, the six consciousnesses [of eye, ear etc.]. When it has finished explaining thus, the text goes on to expound amalavijnāna 阿摩羅識. Thus, the [same Wuxiang] lun says, “The simultaneous disappearance of both object and consciousness is precisely the perfected nature (parinispannasvabhāva); and the perfected nature is precisely the amalavijnāna.” The [Wuxiang] lun also says, “Alayavijnāna 阿黎耶識 is of eight different kinds, as is explained in the ‘Chapter on Nine Consciousnesses’.” This treatise, having expounded eight consciousnesses, in addition expounds separately a pure consciousness called amala 阿摩羅, and further says “as is explained in the ‘Chapter on Nine Consciousnesses’”. It is clear that the principle of the nine consciousnesses we are expounding here is paramount in it [i.e. in that text].

‘In addition, the Mahāyānasatrālamkāra says, “By the transformation 轉 (paravṛtti) of eighth consciousness, ‘mirror-like wisdom’ 鏡智 (adarsajñāna) is obtained; by the transformation of seventh consciousness, ‘the wisdom [that recognises the] equality [of all things]’ 平等智 (samatajñāna) is obtained; by the transformation of the five [external sense] consciousnesses [sic], ‘wisdom of perfect cognition’ 眞智 (pratyaveksajñāna) is obtained; and by the transformation of the manovijnāna [sic], ‘wisdom that achieves its tasks’ 作事智 (anusthamanajñāna) is obtained.” This sentence [refers to] eight consciousnesses. However, the same treatise also says, “It is this mind, equated with Thusness, that is expounded as aboriginally pure 自性清淨. This mind is amalavijnāna 阿摩羅識.” When we add this mind to the previous eight, are there not nine [altogether]?

‘Trepitaka Paramarthama may cite [the line], “Various kinds of mind, eight- or ninefold” from the Lakāvatāra sūtra; and also the definitive exposition 決定說 of nine kinds of mind 九品心 from the Shiqi di lun. However, even though the Lakāvatāra does indeed say “eight-

before P; and also almost never after him in translation texts).

373 ZSL: 能緣有三種：一、果報識、即是阿黎耶識。二、執識、即阿陀那識。三、塵識、即是六識, T1587:31.61c08-09.
374 ZSL: 就此識中，具有八識名，謂依止處等。具如「九識義品」說, T1587:31.62a03-04.
375 M S A : 轉第八識得鏡智、轉第七識得平等智、轉第六識得觀智、轉前五識得作事智, T1604:31.606c29-607a02. This text appears in Bh to the verse correspond to Skt. 9.67, Lēvi (1907, 1911) 1, 46; 2, 88; however, nothing in the Sanskrit corresponds to this Chinese.
376 MSA: 心真如、名之為「心」，即說此心為自性清淨。此心即是阿摩羅識, T1604:31.623a08-09; see n. 365 above and corresponding text.
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or ninefold", it does not lay out the names [of the types of consciousnesses concerned]; and the *Shiqi di lun* was transmitted throughout (? photographs ?) India, but has never circulated in this country. Thus, these two modes of exposition can hardly constitute proof [of the doctrine]. Here, we have taken up passages from the *Wuxiang lun* and the *Mahayanasûtrâlanâmkâra* to explain that there are nine consciousnesses, taking them as reliable [proof-texts].

'Question: If nine consciousnesses are expounded, then why does the *Lamkâvatâra* only expound eight consciousnesses? Answer: In the *Lamkâvatâra*, only eight consciousnesses are expounded because [the text] only bases [itself on a view that] takes the objects (âlambana) as consciousness (?) 但據緣境為識. [However,] in the *Wuxiang lun* and the *Mahayanasûtrâlanâmkâra*, both mind and object are taken as consciousness, and so it explains in full [all] nine (?) 以心境俱識，通說九。 Or again, the *Lamkâvatâra* only bases itself on [the point of view of] samsara 生滅，[and so] expounds only eight consciousnesses; but in *Wuxiang lun* etc., the doctrine encompasses [both] true and deluded 真妄 [aspects].

Elsewhere, Daoji states that Paramârtha holds the substance of “pure consciousness” 勝識 to be Thussness and the wisdom that takes Thussness as its object 如如及如

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378 The contrast between 生滅 and 真妄 is obviously reminiscent of AF.
379 然：真諦三藏、井道基法師、依何經論、建九識義？答：『楞論章』第一云、『或有法師、具說九識、如真諦三藏、引『楞伽經』『八九種種心』、又引『十七地論』決定説九品心、以為證驗。自後説論今不息、遂另後代取決矣由。今者、正判諸經說六、或復云七、『楞伽』説八、『無相』具九。多説之中、『楞伽』等、據略但説八識。或復説云、『無相』義具通陳其九。『無相論』中『轉識品』云：『能緣有三。一、果報識、即業耶。二者、執識、即阿陀那。三者、應識、即是六識。』如是説已、復説阿摩羅識。故彼『論』云：『境識俱滅、即是實性、其實性者、即阿摩羅識也。』彼『論』復説：『阿摩耶識、有八種異、如『九識品』説。』論既説八識之外、別説淨識名『阿摩羅』、復説『如『九識品』中説』、明知、今者所說九識、其理勝焉。復次『大莊嚴論』云：『轉八識得鏡智、轉第七識得平等智、轉五識得觀智、轉意識得事智。』蓋八識文也。彼『論』復説：『心真如、名之為心、即說此心為自性清淨。此心即是阿摩羅識。』前八及此心、豈無九也？真諦三藏、井引『楞伽經』『八九種種心』、復説『十七地論』決定説九品心、其『楞伽經』雖云『八九』、不引列名、『十七地論』 摄論天竺、此國未行。故此二説亦難為證。今取『無相論』文井『大莊嚴論』說有九識、用為可依。問曰：若說九識、何故『楞伽』但説八識？答曰：『楞伽經』中、但據緣境為識、唯説八種。『無相論』中及『大莊嚴論』中、以心境俱識、通説九。又『楞伽』雖説生滅、但説八識。『無相論』等中、義含真妄、通説九。DBZ 22, 370a-371a; see also YOSHIMURA (2002), 237-239. In the case of this quote we are very fortunate that Gyônen (unlike many later authors) makes it clear precisely where the quote ends by saying 已上，and by adding 此一段文、道基先憲真諦三藏所立義門，次出自義。
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Daoji's citations, from texts like ZSL, MSA, SWXL, AF and the Mahayanabhisamaya, are exceptionally accurate, and show that he is a scrupulous scholar. Daoji's testimony is also particularly valuable because of his critical attitude towards Paramārtha (perhaps surprising, in a member of the Shelun school towards its ostensible founder). This shows him a cautious commentator, not ready to simply believe anything. For example, he says that Paramārtha lists six alternative names for the “pure consciousness” (阿摩羅, 無垢, 淨識). These names are found together in no

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381 It is sometimes mistakenly said to be a text from Dunhuang. I am grateful to IKEDA Masanori for allowing me to see unpublished work in which he traces some of the history of this manuscript.
382 On Daoji's probable authorship of this text, see KATSUMATA 795. I am grateful to both Ching KENG and IKEDA Masanori for pointing out KATSUMATA's arguments.
383 T2809:85.1036b28-c05. This passage is difficult to interpret. It apparently identifies *amalavijnāna with an ultimate (paramārtha) pure consciousness identical with the truth 第一淨識, whose substance is Thusness 體是如如 (which, as we have seen, Daoji consistently holds elsewhere). The true essence of this consciousness is supposed to exist aboriginally 真性本有, and is identified with a gnosis (jñāna) that has no inception and cannot be cultivated 非始修智.
384 The *Mahayanabhisamaya sutra (Tongxing jing, 大乘同性經, T673) was translated by Jñānayaśas (fl. 564-572). The passage that Daoji cites (DBZ 12, 372a) in support of ninth consciousness doctrine is an abridged version of T673:16.642c15-643a08 (the actual phrases cited are found at 642c15-19, 643a06-08). In this passage, the Tathāgata is discussing the process of rebirth with the King of Lampa 楞伽王, and asserts that the “spirit-consciousness of the sentient being” (that undergoes transmigration) is limitless in size, without visible form (arūpya), without characteristics (alaksana) etc.; it then states, in what is probably the key link to *amalavijnāna doctrine, that this consciousness is pure, and only obscured by adventitious defilements, just as the pure element of empty space (akṣaṇadhātu) is obscured by the “adventitious defilement” of the four elements. For links between Daoji’s use of *Mahayanabhisamaya (and WXL) and Kuiji’s testimony, see below n. 433. Note that this is the only echo in all the later literature of the connection (here very tangential) between *amalavijnāna and the old doctrine of consciousness as subject of transmigration and liberation (see above p. 95).
385 Daoji cites SWXL (calling it, like ZSL, “Wuxiang lun”) twice at 372a, citing T1617:31.872a05-07 and 872a11-12. Daoji also cites, in the course of this same long comment, AF and the Mahayanabhisamaya (for the latter, see n. 384 preceding).
extant Paramārtha text. Daoji repeats twice that Paramārtha cites the authority of no sutra or sastra for these names, and concludes, “My suspicions have not been allayed, and I cannot rely upon [this doctrine as Paramārtha expounds it]” 疑信未決、未可即依. This critical attitude towards Paramārtha is also evidenced in an explicit disagreement Gyōnen reports that Daoji expresses with Paramārtha’s understanding of what comprises the “substance” 體 of consciousness.

Here, then, we see a Shelun scholar and direct “dharma descendant” of Paramārtha himself, who is yet sceptical of the standard proof-texts used to support the doctrine of ninth consciousness and keen to find alternative, less vulnerable proofs. Nonetheless, Daoji apparently cannot find anything better than ZSL and the hot-off-the-press MSA. Moreover, he also does not seem to know any additional Paramārtha texts since lost, except the Shiqi di lun, which he knows only by hearsay and is sceptical of.

4.1.3.8 The *Vajrasamādhi sūtra and Wŏnhyo’s commentary (approx. 649-686)

The *Vajrasamādhi sūtra (VSS) T273 and Wŏnhyo’s (元曉, 617-686) commentary on it, the Kūmgang sammaeyong non (*Vajrasamādhi sūtra lun, T1730), contain extensive new developments in the doctrine of *amalavijnana. Here, *amalavijnana is given outright (apocryphal) warrant as buddavacana, and a creative synthesis is attempted between *amalavijnana and other concepts important to East Asian Buddhism.

386 These six alternate names of *amalavijnana are highly specific, however, and Ōtake has shown that at least some of them seem to have connections to P’s ideas; see Ōtake (2007d).

387 Daoji accepts, with P, that the “principle of Thusness” 如如, 如如理 is the “substance” of consciousness, but not that “wisdom of Thusness” 如如智 is also part of that substance: 三藏所說第一淨識如如為體、頗有此理。言如如智、理亦不然 etc., DBZ 22, 371b. For Daoji’s enumeration of consciousnesses from *amalavijnana as first, see Gyōnen’s interlinear note here, and also the Shelun zhang passage cited at Gyōnen 364a.

389 On evidence studied by Robert Buswell, we can surmise that VSS was composed sometime between 649, when XZ translated the Prajñāparamitāhṛdaya sūtra (Buswell [2007], 369-370 n. 284) and Wŏnhyo’s commentary, which can have been written no later than his death in 686. We saw that VSS uses the transcription 廪摩羅識, which would seem to place it in some connection with Zhiyi.
The VSS first mentions *amalavijnana twice each in the following two passages:

(VSS<1>): "At that time, the Bodhisattva Non-Abiding asked the Buddha: 'Lord! Through revolutionary transformation (轉 *parā/vṛt) by what inspiration do all the affective consciousnesses undergo a revolutionary transformation so that they enter into the *amalavijnana?" The Buddha replied: 'All the Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, constantly employ the one awakening to [effect a] revolutionary transformation in all consciousnesses, so that they will enter into the *amalavijnana. This is because the original awakening of all sentient beings [works,] by means of the one awakening, to awaken those sentient beings, and [thus] to make the sentient beings all regain their original awakening, viz. to awaken them to the fact that all affective consciousnesses are empty, tranquil and unproduced. That is because it is an established fact that the original essence is originally without motion."

(VSS<2>): "[The Buddha said:] 'One who is enlightened need not abide in nirvāṇa 不住涅槃. Why is this? One who awakens to original nonproduction 本無生 remains far removed from the maculations (mala, 垢) of sentient beings. One who awakens to the original lack of tranquility 本無寂 remains far removed from the activity of nirvāṇa 離涅槃動. For one who abides 住 at such a stage, the mind abides nowhere. Free from both egress and access 無有出入, it accesses the amala consciousness 嬻摩羅識. The Bodhisattva Non-Abiding 無住菩薩 asked: 'If the amala-consciousness 嬻摩羅識 has some place where it can be accessed, [does this mean it is] something that is attained (得, upalabdhi) — that is, an attained dharma (處有得是得法)?' The Buddha replied: 'No, it does not."

The VSS goes on to relate a parable of a prodigal son (VSS<3>), who carries gold coins in his hands, but does not know it. For fifty years he roams in poverty and destitu-

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390 I here follow BUSWELL's translation. To my knowledge, he does not explain how he arrived at it, but equally, I cannot fully understand the sense of the Chinese, and defer to his judgement.
391 I use the admittedly awkward translation "revolutionary transformation" because 轉 here recalls the doctrine of āśrayaparāvrtti, which, as we have seen, is absolutely central to P's original doctrine of *amalavijnana.
392 Translation modified.
394 The text here recalls the old prajñāparamita idea that the ultimate, the tathāgata etc. "does not come or go".
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The moral of the story is spelt out thus:

"It is just the same with the *amala-vijñana. It is not something from which you have departed out, and now, it is not ‘accessed’ 入. Just because you were deluded in the past, does not mean you did not have it; and just because you have realised now [that you have it], does not mean you have ‘gained access’ to it 入。"396

VSS also mentions “ninth consciousness” twice:

(VSS<4>): “The Buddha [said:] ‘Those who recite the Prātimokṣa precepts do so because of their unwholesome haughtiness, which is [like] waves and swells on the sea. If the sea, i.e. the ground of their mind in the eighth consciousness, is limpid, then the ‘[out]-flow’ (流, asrava/ogha)397 will be purified from the ninth consciousness. Where no wind moves, waves cannot arise. The precepts are by nature uniform and empty (sanyā) 等空; [those who] hold fast to them are deluded and confused.”398

(VSS<5>): “[The Buddha said:] Thusness is empty (sanyā) in its essence 真如空性. The fire of the gnosis [that knows] this emptiness of essence 性空智火 completely burns up all fetters (結, sanyojana). All is utterly uniform 平等平等, and the three stages of equivalent enlightenment 等覺三地399 and the three bodies of sublime awakening 妙覺三身 are radiant, clear and pure within the ninth consciousness 於九識中皎然明淨, [so that] there are no shadows.”400

396 T273:9.369a01-09; BUSWELL (2007), 157-159, translation modified. This parable is full of word-play key to conveying its lesson: on the notion of “attaining” (得, upalabdhi), which is the same word used for the son finally “getting” or “finding” the gold; on the notions of “coming to” and “going from” 入出, which BUSWELL translated “egress and access” above, which refer back to the old Prajñāpāramitā notion of “coming or going”, and which are used to refer to gold and good fortune apparently deserting and then returning to the son. BUSWELL’s translation obscures these word plays somewhat.

397 A play on words: 流 (often asrava) is also used for ogha, “flood”, “flow”, thus likening the asrava to the waves.


399 Like the following concept of “sublime awakening”, this concept derives from the Chinese apocryphon the Pusa yingluo benye jing; BUSWELL (2007), 12. BUSWELL translates “virtual enlightenment”, but I cannot understand what he intends by this translation. My alternative here is also tentative, but I hope, closer to the literal sense of the Chinese.

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There is much that is new here. Astonishingly, the VSS is the first time after Zhiyi in the later evidence that we see even the faintest allusion to *amalavijñāna, despite the centrality of it to Paramārtha’s doctrine of *amalavijñāna. We also see here a connection of *amalavijñāna to a kind of “other-power” doctrine, in which access to it is explained by the good works of the Tathāgatas (VSS<1>). This is also the first time we have seen *amalavijñāna associated with the doctrines of “non-abiding nirvāṇa” (無住涅槃, apratishtitamirvāna), “non-production” (anutpada), and “neither coming nor going” (Buswell’s “free from both egress and access”). It is also the first time we have seen *amalavijñāna associated with “non-abiding” (VSS<2>). The parable (VSS<3>) is clearly modelled on the basic conceit of some of the nine parables of the Tathagatagarbha sutra, even though it matches none of those parables exactly — by this means, the association between *amalavijñāna and tathagatagarbha is clearly further strengthened. The metaphor of the “waves and the sea” (VSS<4>) derives from LAS and is, of course, by this stage in Chinese Buddhist history, famously associated with AF. This is the first time we have seen it used in direct connection with *amalavijñāna. VSS<5> also draws an implicit connection between *amalavijñāna and the “taintless stage” (wugou di 無垢地 = *amalabhuma) of the path to buddhahood, as it was expounded in the Chinese apocryphon the Pusa yingluo benye jing (菩萨璎珞本業經, T1485).

Wŏnhyo develops these rich ideas even further in his commentary. As Buswell shows in his translation and study of Wŏnhyo’s commentary, Wŏnhyo picks up on these hints in the root text and elaborates them into a theory whereby *amalavijñāna be-

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401 Note that the transcriptions used for *amalavijñāna in VSS also seem to suggest a connection with Zhiyi.
402 Even later, this connection is only hinted at a few times, by Dingbin, Dajue and Chengguan (see below).
403 Several of the parables involved hidden gold (4, “gold in a cesspit”; 7, “dead traveller’s gold”; 9, “dirty gold statue”). In addition, Parable 5, of the poor family that, unbeknownst to themselves, lives on top of a treasure-trove for years, shares a basic similarity of plot conceit with this present parable. For these parables, see Rulaizang jing 如來藏經 (Tathagatagarbha sutra) T666, and for an exhaustive study, see Zimmerman.
404 E.g. T671:16.515a06-08, 523b25-c03, 523c12-19.
406 The “equivalent” 等覺 awakening alluded to here is said in that text to belong to a “taintless (or ‘immaculate’) stage” (wugoudi), while “sublime” awakening 妙覺 belongs to a stage called “sublime training” (miaoxuedi 妙學地). It is easy to see how the author of the VSS could have associated this amala stage of practice with *amalavijñāna.
comes the key to a scheme of practice, by means of which the practitioner can progress from the ordinary to the awakened state. The key innovation and doctrinal goal in Wŏnhyo’s commentary is the attempt to bring out an “active” dimension of *tathagatagarbha, using a framework derived from AF (“original enlightenment” *benjue 本覺, “acquired enlightenment” *shijue 始覺, etc.). The main way Wŏnhyo achieves this is to map *amalavijnana onto the path structure of the *Pusa yingluo benye jing. Thus, “as Wŏnhyo interprets [the VSS], the enlightenment that is immanent in the mundane world ... could actually be viewed as a practical catalyst to religious training.” Wŏnhyo constructs “a comprehensive system of meditative practice, focusing on the six divisions of contemplation practice that lead to the experience of ‘the contemplation practice that has but a single taste’,” which constitutes “a practical way of actually cultivating original enlightenment, rather than just passively acquiescing to it.” On this reading, “the *Vajrasamadhi-sutra provides a practical soteriology of original enlightenment by shifting the *Awakening of Faith’s accounts of mind and enlightenment from ontology into the realm of actual practice.”

The most important points in Wŏnhyo’s exposition of *amalavijnana are as follows. In his introduction, Wŏnhyo says that as the result of the six practices advocated by the *sutra, the “ninth consciousness” appears by a revolutionary transformation 轉 (parä/vrt). He calls this resulting ninth consciousness *wugoushi, and identifies it with the *dharmanadhātu. This is the first time we have seen *amalavijnana associated with the *dharmanadhātu since *SBKL1. The process of realisation continues with the revolutionary transformation (轉 once more) of the eight consciousnesses into the

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409 BUSWELL summarises the six divisions of this practice, which are the focus of Ch. 2-7 of Wŏnhyo’s text respectively, 14.
412 Remaining passages where Wŏnhyo treats *amalavijnana (excluding citations from the root text), not discussed individually in the following, are: T1730:34.995a17-19, BUSWELL (2007), 236-237; 1003b20-26, BUSWELL 284. See also n. 254 above.
413 See n. 409.
414 BUSWELL (2007) mistranslates this word as “in turn”, 49.
415 T1730:34.961b03-04; BUSWELL (2007), 48-49.
416 It is possible that this might be a clue indicating that Wŏnhyo had direct access to SBKL, since we know of no other earlier source from which he might have derived this idea. It is also possible, however, that he arrived at the identification independently.
four wisdoms (adarsajñāna, samatajñāna, pratyaveksajñāna, anusthānajñāna), and the attainment of the three bodies (trikyāya) of the Buddha. We have not seen the idea of the attainment of all three bodies connected to *amalavijñāna before; the only place we have previously seen *amalavijñāna connected with the four wisdoms is in Daoji’s use of MSA. Wonhyo further says that in this state, gnosis and its object are nondual. 

Later, Wonhyo states explicitly that “original enlightenment” is identical to *amalavijñāna 本覺正是摩羅識; he therefore glosses the notion of “accessing *amalavijñāna” seen in VSS<1> as “attaining benjue” 得本覺. The ground for this move was obviously prepared for Wonhyo by the author of VSS in passage <1> above; Wonhyo is merely spelling out what is already there implicit. In glossing VSS<2>, Wonhyo explains that “accessing *amalavijñāna” means “leaving behind the two extremes” 離二邊, and he identifies the attainment of *amalavijñāna with “returning to the fountainhead of the mind” 違此心源. These claims reinforce the ties between *amalavijñāna and the AF framework.

In commenting on the parable of the foolish son, Wonhyo comments that the gold has the four qualities of permanence, bliss, self-identity and purity. The use of these four well-known epithets of tathāgatagarbha strengthens still further the association between tathāgatagarbha and *amalavijñāna. He also assigns these epithets to benjue. He goes on to employ the LAS/AF figure of wind, waves and water, associating the underlying tranquil substratum (the sea) with prakṛtprabhasvaracitta 自性清淨心. Mention of this concept puts Wonhyo in a line that includes Huijun, MSA and Daoji before him, and Chengguan after.

Finally, in one other text, the Niepan zong yao 涅槃宗要, Wonhyo explicitly identi-
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ifies *amalavijñāna with Thusness, the substance of Buddha-nature 佛性體, and, most interestingly, jiexing 解性. This last notion derives from Paramārtha’s MSg, and seems itself to have been the centre of a process of reinterpretation in line with tathagatagarbha doctrine as mediated by AF ideas. This is the first time we have seen this idea associated with *amalavijñāna.

In sum, in the VSS and Wŏnhyo, *amalavijñāna is an important concept, and it undergoes a number of striking new developments. It is elaborated into a basis for practice; it is associated with the path structure from the Pusa yingluo benye jing; it is linked to the four wisdoms and the three bodies; it is tied much more closely to tathagatagarbha, Buddha nature, and their four epithets of permanence, bliss, self-identity and purity; and it is associated still more with AF rubrics and concepts. These texts also seem to revert to some old and, from what the extant texts show us, authentic dimensions of Paramārtha’s doctrines, including the link to aśrayaparavṛtti, and the identification with the dharmadhatu, and the nonduality of perfect gnosis and its object.

From this point in our analysis, as we venture into periods more distant from Paramartha himself, the testimony of authors who mention *amalavijñāna/ninth consciousness tends only to become more uniform, more removed from anything Paramartha himself said, and more derivate of intervening accounts. For these reasons, we will not treat individual the remaining authors to 800 so exhaustively, but rather, will

423 T1769:38.249b08.
425 This concept has traditionally been understood as meaning something like “inherent nature [disposing the sentient being] to liberation/gnosis”. However, Ching KENG argues persuasively that this is not an accurate reflection of the term as it was used by P and the early Shelun school. See KENG’s forthcoming Harvard PhD dissertation.
426 Remaining sources in the period down to the Faxiang authors, whose comments are too slight to treat in detail, are: (1) A brief comment in Fall’s (法論, 569-635) Sifen lú shu (四分論疏, composed between 618 and 626), which occurs in the context of a discussion of the Buddha’s bodies, speaks of the “ninth pure consciousness [that is] Thusness, the dharmadhatu” 真如法界第九淨識. Upon the attainment of buddhahood, this instance, “originally hidden, is made manifest” 本隱今顯 and “comprises the dharmakāya” 以為法身; X731:41.541b06-09. (2) Li Shizheng (李師政, d.u., fl. 626-649) mentions *amalavijñāna in his Famen ming yi ji 法門名義集 T2124. He uses the very unusual transcription 阿摩羅識. Li, unusually, echoes Huijun in discussing *amalavijñāna in terms of the distinction between ontological cause 生因 (karaṇakahetu) and epistemological cause 由因 (jñāpakahetu); T2124:54.195b11-23; see n. 345. (3) Zhiyan very briefly mentions *amalavijñāna twice, T1870:45.543a18-21; T1869:45.522c18-26.
only pick out the main trends in their accounts. There are two main groups of ideas we need to look at: those of the Faxiang school; and the beginning of a reaction against those ideas, as seen in the Vinaya authors Dingbin and Dajue, and in Chengguan.

4.1.3.9 Faxiang authors

We turn first to Xuanzang's Faxiang school. During roughly the same few decades when the VSS and Wŏnhyo's commentary were composed, Xuanzang and his team would have been busy on their massive translation projects, and his disciples would have been producing the first of their significant body of commentarial literature. In this literature, they occasionally commented on Paramārtha's doctrines, including *amalavijnāna. The three most important Faxiang authors to comment on *amalavijnāna and ninth consciousness are Kuiji, Wŏnch'uk and Tunnyun. We will here take them as representative, noting additional information supplied by other authors as necessary.427

The battle against the notion of the so-called "ninth consciousness" was a key part of the struggle of the Faxiang school to roll back the ongoing synthesis of Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha thought, which it saw as heterodox. This polemical setting exerts a significant distorting influence over their presentation of the doctrine. This bias notwithstanding, the massive historical influence of the Faxiang position in the interpretation of Yogācāra/Vijnaptimātra doctrine in East Asia has arguably exerted an excessive influence over our understanding of *amalavijnāna, right down to modern scholarship.

427 Zhizhou (智周, 668-723) comments very briefly in his 成唯識論演義, but merely echoes standard Faxiang opinion, T1833:43.819b16-17. The other pertinent Faxiang authors, both late, are Taehyŏn (太賢, 太賢, fl. c. 742-765) and Tankuang (善鏡, c. 700-788). Taehyŏn discusses the doctrine in his "Study Notes" 學記 on the Cheng weishi lun, discussing the same passage that occasions Kuiji's first comment. He is entirely reliant on his Faxiang predecessors for any information about the doctrine, and does not add any fresh information to our picture; X818:50.64c01-07. Tankuang's account is also entirely derivative. He uses only the transcriptions 阿末羅識, found only Faxiang writers, and 阿摩羅識, otherwise only in Li Shizheng. *Amalavijnāna is supposed to be a ninth consciousness, and derive from a jiushi lun 九識論 by P, and also LAS. His account is resonant of AF; T2810:85.1050b21, 1051b09-14; T2812:85.1075a19-23.
Kuiji\textsuperscript{429} discusses *amalavijnāna in the context of a larger discussion of various rubrics numbering consciousness various ways. He begins by citing the LAS passage saying consciousness can be eightfold or ninefold. He then says:

"On the basis of the Wuxiang lun and the Mahāyānaḥbhisamaya sūtra, this [verse, i.e. from LAS\textsuperscript{429}] is interpreted to [mis-]take Thusness for a ninth consciousness, because it expounds the combination of two aspects, one true [consciousness] and eight worldly [consciousnesses]. Thus, [this interpretation] [mis-]takes the eighth, fundamental consciousness 本識, when it is in a state of purity, for a ninth, expounding a distinction between the defiled and pure 墮淨 fundamental consciousness. The "Sūtra of the Adornment of the Tathāgata by Merits 如來功德莊嚴經 says:

\begin{quote}
\text{The taintless consciousness 無垢識 of the Tathāgata}
\text{Is the pure 淨 element/realm without 'outflows' (amasravādhatus 無漏界);}
\text{It is liberated from all obstructions (sarvāvartara 一切障);}
\text{It is conjoined with (*sanyukta 相應) the cognition that is like a perfect mirror (adarsajñā).}\textsuperscript{431}
\end{quote}

"Since, here, the text speaks of "taintless consciousness" 無垢識 and "cognition that is like a perfect mirror" together, and since, further, the ninth is called *amalavijnāna 阿末羅識, we [therefore] know that [the text] is expounding a distinction between the defiled and pure [aspects of

\textsuperscript{428} As we have already seen above, Kuiji (琉基, 632-682) uses a variety of transcriptions for *amalavijnāna: 阿末羅識, 阿末羅識, and 阿末羅識 (this last seen for the first time here and in Wŏnch'uk). He also calls it wugoushi 無垢識. Kuiji also refers to *amalavijnāna as a "ninth consciousness" — indeed, for him, the fact that it is counted as a ninth is a major bone of contention.

\textsuperscript{429} Kuiji cites the verse on "eight or nine consciousnesses" from LAS (see n. 296; Kuiji cites the Bodhiruci translation, T671:16.565b24) immediately before the passage Tunyun quotes here.

\textsuperscript{430} "Mistakes for" in the sense that it "apprehends" it as such, but this apprehension is a kind of ignorant clinging 取.

\textsuperscript{431} 如來無垢識 / 是淨無漏界 / 解脫一切障 / 圓鏡智相應. This verse is quoted (from "a sūtra") in the third juan of Cheng weishi lun T1585:31.13c23-24. The provenance of the verse is identified in Kuiji's commentary, T1830:43.344c21-22. The text seems only to have been known in the East Asian tradition for this one verse. In CWSL itself, this verse is only identified as from "a sūtra": commentators from Kuiji on seem to follow Kuiji here in identifying the source text, e.g. Huiyuan (慧苑, 673-743?): X221:3.833b21-23 ; Chengguan: T1735:35.878a17-18; Yanshou (延壽, Song dynasty): T2016:48.584c08-10; etc. LA VALLEE POUSSEN (1928-1929) 1, 167, reconstructs the title of the sūtra as Tathagatagundlāṃkara, but does not give any information about the text.
the] eighth consciousness, and taking [the latter] 以為 for the ninth.432

This passage was the key point of reference for later Faxiang writers discussing *amalavijnāna. We see here a number of hints that suggest Kuiji’s understanding is based quite closely on Daoji.433 Kuiji also adduces a new proof text for the concept, coming to him via none other than the (for his school) immensely authoritative Cheng weishi lun (the only source for the Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing verses).

In keeping with the Faxiang attempt to assert their orthodoxy over Paramārtha, we see here for the first time the outright assertion that there is something wrong with the concept of ninth consciousness: it is based upon (grasping) misapprehension 取. Kuiji was elsewhere even more forthright about criticising this notion: “A former master set up [wugoushi] as a ninth consciousness. This is an error 古師立為第九識者非也.”434 In his commentary on the Cheng weishi lun (the Shuji 述記), he again cites the LAS verse, and then explains the nature of the error:

“To say there is a ninth consciousness is superfluous 增數. It is manifest that the other-dependent consciousness (*paratantra-vijñāna, 依他識) includes three types [of consciousness], when considered in general 時, and only 唯 eight, when considered in detail 段. It is beyond increase and decrease 增減, and that is why we use the word ‘only’ 唯.435 The Lankāvatāra

432 大乘法苑義林章, T1861:45.261b16-23.
433 It is significant that both WXL and the Mahayanabhisamaya are used by Daoji as key proof-texts for the discussion of *amalavijnāna. For Daoji’s use of WXL, see §4.1.3.7 above; for his use of the Mahayanabhisamaya, see n. 384. The fact that Kuiji mentions these two texts in tandem, in addition to the fact that Daoji was a teacher of XZ, suggests that the Mahayanabhisamaya passage Kuiji is thinking of here is most likely the one quoted by Daoji. Further, Daoji’s citation of MSA passages about the transformation of various kinds of consciousness by paravṛtti (see p. 132) is also the main precedent to the link Kuiji makes (via the Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing citation) between *amalavijnāna and adarsajñāna. The fact that the present passage alludes to these source texts is a strong indication that the Faxiang school’s understanding of the doctrine was derived via Daoji’s Shelun zhang, or at any rate, from Daoji. In this connection, it is perhaps significant that Kuiji also mentions WXL and Mahayanabhisamaya once more, where he also ascribes to them certain ideas about “taintless consciousness” — namely that it is “consciousness or mind in its essence, viz. the principle of Thusness” 無垢識、是自性識心, 則真如理, T1831:43.634c08-09. (The only other places this phrase occurs are when later authors cite Kuiji.) This, too, is a clear echo of ideas from Daoji’s Shelun zhang, for which see n. 388.
434 T1830:43.344c09-13.
435 Note that this is the “only” of weishi, Chinese for vijñaptimatra, “consciousness only”, the
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doubles up in its exposition[,] saying] that if we take the eighth as defiled, and separate out its pure [aspect], we can speak of a ‘ninth consciousness’. This does not mean that there are nine [consciousnesses] in the substance 體 of the other-dependent consciousness 依他識, and it also does not mean that in terms of substantial kinds 體類, there is a separate ninth consciousness.436

Apart from these passages, Kuiji only comments briefly and inconsequentially on *amalavijñāna/ninth consciousness.437

In his famous commentary on the *Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra*, Wŏnch’uk438 also uses the term wugoushi in a manner that clearly attempts to recuperate the term as merely another name for alayavijñāna.

“The Trepitaka Paramārtha asserted a doctrine of nine consciousnesses on the basis of the *Jueding zang lun*. “Nine consciousnesses” refers to: six consciousnesses (of the eye, etc.) . . . the seventh adana . . . and the eighth, alayavijñāna, which is of three kinds . . . The ninth is *amalavijñāna 阿摩羅識, which here [in China] is called ‘taintless consciousness’ 無垢識. It takes Thusness for its substance 體, such that, in the same Thusness, there are two aspects 義: (1) the object [of gnosis] (‘noema’, *if*), which is termed Thusness, or the ‘limit of reality’ (bhūtakott); (2) the subject [of gnosis] (能緣, ‘noesis’), which is termed ‘taintless consciousness’ 無垢識, and is also termed ‘original awakening’ (benjue, 本覺). This is as is explained by the *jiushi zhang*, citing the “Ninth Consciousness Chapter” of the *Jueding zang lun* 具如九識章引定藏論九識品中說.”439

Later, Wŏnch’uk returns to the topic, arguing that wugoushi is correctly just another name for alayavijñāna:

subject of the eponymous *Cheng weishi lun*.

436 T1830:43.239a12-16.

437 In one brief passage, Kuiji says that *amalavijñāna is only found at the stage of “the fruition of buddhahood”* 唯在佛果; T1829:43.179a04-05. Other passages in which Kuiji comments are T1782:38.1001c26-29 and T1861:45.282c19-25.

438 We have seen that Wŏnch’uk (圓測, 613-696) (who is Kuiji’s senior in years, but as we shall see, depends upon him in the explication of *amalavijñāna*), uses the transcription 阿末羅識 (seen for the first time here and in Kuiji), as well as the standard 阿摩羅識. He also uses the term wugoushi to refer to *amalavijñāna. We also saw already that he refers to a specific text by P on the “nine consciousnesses”, which he calls “Essay on Nine Consciousnesses” (*jiushi zhang* 九識章), saying it quotes the “Ninth Consciousness Chapter” of JDZL.

"[Ālayavijnāna] is also called 'taintless consciousness' (wugoushi), because it is utterly pure, and the basis for all dharmas 'without outflow' (anasravadharmas). To explain: the Sanskrit word [for this term] is *amalavijnāna 阿末羅識, which here [in China] means 'taintless consciousness' (wugoushi). This is the state of [ālayavijnāna in?] sublime awakening. The substance of mind when it is conjoined with wisdom that is like a mirror (adarśajñāna) is called wugoushi. It is utterly pure; all the dharmas of the path that are without 'outflow' (*anasravamargadharma), such as wisdoms (jnana), states of absorption (samādhi) etc., take it as their basis. Thus the ‘Sūtra of the Adornment of the Tathāgata by Merits’ (Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing) says: The taintless consciousness of the Tathāgata is the pure element without 'outflows'; it is liberated from all obstructions; it is conjoined with the cognition that is like a perfect mirror." This is explained in detail in the third juan of the commentary on the [Chengweis]i lun 唯識疏.  

This explanation applies purely to the ālayavijnāna, even though it accepts (or speculates) that *amalavijnāna was the original term for wugoushi as cited in the Chengweis lun 經疏. Wŏnch’uk overtly addresses a doctrine he ascribes to Paramārtha:  

"Further, Trepīṭaka Paramārtha propounded a total of nine consciousnesses, adding *amalavijnāna 阿摩羅識, which has as its essence Thusness-cum-original awakening. While it is in [a state of] bondage, it is called tathagatagarbha; when it escapes bondage, it is called the dharma-kāya 在緣名如來見出縁名法身. Here [in China] we call it 'taintless consciousness' 九識. This is as [it is expounded] in the jiushi zhāng 九識章. The remaining eight consciousnesses are roughly the same as in all the masters.  

The distinction here adduced between "in bondage" and "free from bondage" derives from a new proof-text in the history of *amalavijnāna doctrine, the seminal tathagatagarbha scripture, the Śrīmalādevīsīhanāda sūtra, though the exact wording  

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440 This is one of the very few times we have seen *amalavijnāna associated with what is "without outflows" (anasrava) since P himself.  
441 This verse was already cited by Kuiji, above p. 143.  
442 X369:21.246c24-247a05. The reference at the end of this citation is to Kuiji; see n. 431.  
443 T1708:33.400b26-29.  
444 In Gūnabhadra: 若於無量煩悩藏所縛如來藏不疑惑者、出於無量煩悩藏法身亦無疑惑, T353:12.221b17-18; in Bodhiruci almost identical, T310(48):11.676c26-28; Skt. is known be-
used by Wŏnch'uk appears in no Chinese sūtras, but rather, first in the writings of this Faxiang generation and their successors. This is a new link between *amalavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha doctrine. Unfortunately, it does not seem there is any way of knowing whether Wŏnch'uk had it from some earlier text, and if so, what; or whether he perhaps added this flourish himself.

In his Yuqie lun ji 瑜伽論記, Tunnyun⁴⁴⁵ provides us more new information:

“Here, [Hui-]Jing 惠景⁴⁴⁶ follows Master Paramārtha in establishing the doctrine of nine consciousnesses 九識品 on the basis of a citation from the ‘Ninth Consciousness Chapter’ 九識品 of the Jueding zang lun. However, in the portion of the Jueding zang lun corresponding to the second part 三分 of the present sastra, there never was any ‘Ninth Consciousness Chapter’. Further, Master [Wen-]Bei 未巖⁴⁴⁷ says that an old tradition 舊傳 cites the [notion of] *amalavijñāna 阿摩羅訶 from the Wuxiang lun 無相論 to prove that there are nine consciousnesses.⁴⁴⁸ The Wuxiang lun corresponds to the ‘Chapter on Absence of Essence (nihsvabhavatā) 無性品’ from the Xianyang [shengjiao lun 仙陽] 無相論, but in that chapter, the term *amalavijñāna 阿摩羅訶 does not feature. Now, based upon the doctrine that there are nine consciousnesses from the Lankāvatāra sūtra etc., [we can say that] the ninth is called *amalavijñāna, which here [in China] would be said, ‘taintless’ 此云無垢. Master Ji 基 [i.e. Kuiji] says [of this]:

[Tunnyun here quotes in full the long Kuiji passage translated above, p. 143.]

“Divakara (地婆訶羅, fl. 676-688) says that there is also an interpretation 譯, in Western lands 西方, that holds that a separate aspect of the sixth consciousness 六識 [i.e. manovijñāna] is called *amala 阿摩羅, because it has the excellent function 勝用 of eradicating ignorance and realising

cause it is cited in RGV: yo bhagavan sarvakleśa-kośakoti-gādhe tathāgatagarbhe niskaṅkṣah sarvakleśa-kośa-vinirmuktes tathāgatagarbhakaye 'pi sa nisikaṅka iti, Johnston 79, 147; Wayman and Wayman 96.

⁴⁴⁵ We have already seen that Tunnyun (通倫, d.u., Silla monk of the eighth century) uses the transcriptions 莓摩羅祇, 阿末羅祇 (citing Kuiji), and 阿末羅祇 (citing Kuiji) as well as the ordinary 阿摩羅. We also saw that he reports that Huijing 惠景 traced the doctrine back to a “Ninth Consciousness Chapter” of JDZL.

⁴⁴⁶ Wenbei and Huijing were apparently late Shelun school figures; Yoshimura (2002), 234.

⁴⁴⁷ See n. 446.

⁴⁴⁸ Given that Wenbei was a Shelun school figure, we can speculate, on the basis of the evidence to hand, that this is most likely a reference to Daoji.
cessation 鄕惑證滅。449 Dharma Master [Wŏn-]Hyŏ of Silla says that *prakrītiprabhasvaracittā自性清净心 is called *amala 阿摩羅，450 and that it is of one substance with the eighth [consciousness], *alayavijnāna, but different in aspect 義別。Here, I follow 'retain', 存 this interpretation, which accords well 善順 with the sutra [quoted] above."

Tunnyun's comments451 here stand out for the scholarly care with which he reports and evaluates various positions and traditions. He has also clearly taken pains to gather all the relevant information he could; but he is still entirely reliant upon relatively late, second-hand information. It also seems he could only base his assessment on parallels to Paramārtha's texts in translations by Xuanzang; he apparently did not refer to Paramārtha's own works on the topic.

Perhaps the most significant thing about the treatment of *amalavijnāna and ninth consciousness/nine consciousnesses in these Faxiang authors is the overtly critical tone they adopt. Where early Sanlun authors (Jizang and Huijun) were also critical of Paramārtha, this was in a context in which they were critical of a number of schools, and for reasons somewhat tangential to Yogaçaṇāra concepts. Here, however, we encounter a head-on attack precisely on the concept of ninth consciousness itself, and the discussion is almost entirely governed by this polemic; such authors mention only those aspects of the doctrine that are necessary to refute it. In this polemical context, we should be alert for possible distortions of the doctrine, to make of it a straw man or a sitting duck.

Faxiang authors adduce a new proof text, the otherwise entirely unknown "Sūtra of Adornment of the Tathāgata by Merits". Moreover, Faxiang authors implicitly also use Cheng weishi lun as a proof text (since their comments are often occasioned by pertinent passages in that text); the conjunction of the Mahāyānābhisamaya and WXL as proof-

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449 It is difficult to know what to make of this tantalising comment. Divākara may have made some remark in connection with his translation of the Ghanavyūha sūtra, which Dingbin and Chengguan cite (see below) as a proof text for the notion that mind can be eightfold or ninefold, and that the pure *garbha of the Tathāgata is called *amalajñāna; see n. 459, 473. On *manovijnāna as the only consciousness to which the elimination of desire (corresponding here to huo, "confusion, ignorance") pertains, see AKBh 3.42a-c, vairāgya... *manovijnāna eva ita; VP 2, 131, Pradhan 155.19-20, P'T1559:29.213b07-08. My thanks to Ōtake Susumu for pointing this passage out to me.

450 Presumably referring to the passage cited above n. 422.

451 One other mention of *amalavijnāna in Tunnyun's corpus is also a simple quote from Kuiji, T1828:42.605b22-23.
texts imply they are probably reliant upon Daoji; and authors after Kuiji refer to Kuiji himself as an authority on the question. In addition, Faxiang authors refer to the following texts already referred to by their predecessors: LAS, WXL, and the Mahayanabhisamaya. The transcriptions they use seem to indicate that they have encountered the idea of *amalavijnana in part through the writings of Tiantai Zhiyi.

By contrast, Faxiang authors make very little reference to Paramärtha’s own works: they only refer to the supposed Jiushi zhang, and to JDZL (with no signs that they had actually read JDZL itself). Given the reasons for caution in believing the traditional ascription of a Jiushi zhang to Paramärtha, there is very little to give us confidence that the Faxiang authors were engaging with a textually grounded version of *amalavijnana, traceable to Paramärtha himself.

This paucity of firm information is reflected in the contents of the doctrine the Faxiang authors describe. They are more concerned to tell us what it is not, i.e. the “correct” understanding that in their view should be substituted for its mistakes; and what is wrong with it by contrast. They have very little to say about the actual content of Paramärtha’s doctrine: only that it counts *amalavijnana as a ninth consciousness; that it associates *amalavijnana with Thusness; (in Wönch’uk only) that it has two aspects, as object (Thusness etc.) and subject (benjue etc.); that it is the basis for anasravadharmas; and that it has two states, after the manner of tathāgatagarbha, i.e. in and out of bondage.

Now, it seems highly likely from his citation of WXL and the Mahayanabhisamaya, and perhaps the reference to adarsajñana, that Kuiji is deriving his information about *amalavijnana/ninth consciousness from Daoji. It is also apparent that Wönch’uk, already, is in part following Kuiji in his interpretation of the problem. We recall that Daoji was a teacher of Xuanzang, and also a student of Jingsong, to whom is ascribed a Jiushi xuan yi. These facts in combination make it possible that a Jingsong-Daoji version of the doctrine was the proximate source of Faxiang information about it, and the most immediate target of the Faxiang polemic.

452 See n. 433.
453 See n. 433.
454 See his reference to Kuiji at the end of the second passage translated above, p. 146, and n. 442.
455 See n. 366.
456 See p. 113.
Further, we have seen that an almost riotous variety of various ideas about *amalavijñāna/ninth consciousness was current in the century between Paramārtha and the Faxiang authors. By contrast, looking ahead towards the eighth century, we see that after Kuiji and Wonch'uk, the range of ideas we encounter is significantly impoverished, and very often dependent on the Faxiang authors themselves.

It thus seems that we encounter here a bottleneck in the transmission of “ninth consciousness” lore: ideas possibly acquired via Daoji’s Shelun-school lineage are recast in a form most suitable for their treatment as the targets of a polemic, and this then becomes the dominant guise in which the lore is known to later generations.

4.1.3.10 Two Dharmaguptaka Vinaya authors in the early eighth century

We turn next to Dingbin’s (定賓) *Sifen lü shu shi zong yiji 四分律疏飾宗義記 (c. 703-705) and Dajue’s 大覺 *Sifen lü xingshi chaopi 四分律行事抄 (712), both in the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya lineage. The main significance of these two authors is that they disagree with Faxiang authors and side with Paramārtha. In so doing, however, they show that even scholars after the Faxiang authors but outside that school were heavily influenced by them in their understanding of the doctrine.

Dingbin cites a new proof text, translated only after the time of Kuiji and Wonch’uk: the *Ghanavyūha-sūtra (Dasheng miyan jing 大乘密嚴經, T681), which held, in a manner reminiscent of LAS, that mind could either be of eight or nine kinds. He then cites an explanation of the ninefold system of consciousnesses, ostensibly from Paramārtha but most likely at best derived second-hand from the Wonch’uk passage above. This description begins with the six Abhidharmic consciousnesses, and then goes through sev-

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457 As FUNAYAMA Tōru points out, this text is ascribed to the later Kaiyuan period (713-741) in the *Song gao seng zhuàn, but passages in the text make reference to “the present third year of the Chang’an era of the great Zhou (dynasty) 大周長安三年 (703 C.E.)” (X733:42.36c15-21), on the one hand, and to the ascension to the throne of the Tang Emperor Zhongzong 中宗 in 705 C.E. In addition, the text is cited by Dajue writing in 712 (on the date of Dajue’s text, see n. 458 following). These facts allow us to date the present text more precisely. See FUNAYAMA (2000), 352 n. 11.

458 This text is dated from its colophon, which dates it to the first year of the Daji/Taiji era of the Tang 唐大極元年, i.e. 712 C.E., and says that it was written at Dazhuangyuan 大莊嚴院 in Xi-jing 西京 (mod. Hangzhou), X736:42.1063c07.

459 心有八種、或復有九, citing T681:16.734a24; *rnam brgyad rnam pa dgu yi sens etc., P. Cu 31b3, cited in OTAKE (2007b), 3. The *Ghanavyūha was translated by Divākara between 676 and 688.

460 See p. 145.
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enth adanavijn`ana and eighth alayavijn`ana. It then comes to the ninth:

"The ninth is called *amalavijñāna. The Tang Trepitaka says that here [in China], this is translated 'taintless' (wugou). This is also another name for the eighth consciousness. When one becomes a Buddha, the eighth consciousness undergoes a revolutionary transformation (轉, para/ vrt), and becomes taintless. There is [thus according to Xuanzang] no separate ninth consciousness. [This is explained] in detail in the *Vijñaptimatra (唯識, prob. Cheng weishi lun), the Mahayanasangraha etc."\(^461\)

Dingbin goes on elaborate further on how Xuanzang and his schoolmen disagreed with this doctrine. However, he then refers to the Ghanavyuha again, as proof that it is in fact the Faxiang understanding that is incorrect: "The ninth here is what is described in the last juan of the Ghanavyuha as follows: 'The pure garbha of the Tathāgata/ Is also called *ainalajnāna ,,t~tY .i462 Thus we can see that [Paramārtha's understanding] is not in error 不謬.\(^463\) He then goes on to describe the concrete contents of the doctrine of ninth consciousness thus:

"Trepitaka Paramārtha says that there are two kinds of *amalavijñāna: (1) as object of gnosis (noema, 所緣), meaning Thusness; (2) "original awakening" (如來, i.e. *tathatajñāna, 真如智. [This] subject of gnosis (noesis, 所緣) is identical with the "non-empty" (滿) [facet of the] matrix ([tathagata-] garbha); the object (noema) is identical with the "empty" (空) [facet of the] matrix ([tathagata-] garbha).\(^464\) According to the same (?4, ? for iA) treatise, both facets take Thusness as their substance .\(^465\)

This characterisation of *amalavijñāna as of two kinds is clearly derived from simi-

\(^461\) X733:42.44a18-21.
\(^462\) Citing T681:16.747a15. I am grateful to Ōtake Susumu for pointing out that where Divākara has 無垢智, Tib. Ghanavyuha has sprul pa'i ye shes, *nirmāṇajñāna; see Peking no. 778, Cu 62a8. By contrast, Divākara's Chinese would seem to correspond to an underlying *nirmāṇajñāna (personal communication, November 2008).
\(^463\) 丁賓 here may be responding directly to a comment by Wonch'uk, cited by Taehyon but to my knowledge unattested elsewhere: "This [interpretation found in the] Wuxiang lun is Paramārtha's error 不謬, X818:50.64c04 (my emphasis).
\(^464\) Referring to the Śrimaladevi sutra, T353:12.221c16-16; सन्यसं तथागतागर्भो विनिर्भगायिर muktañānai sarvakāśakai/ asANYO gaṅgānādi velākāyati vīrttair avinirbhagai amuktajñānair acintyai buddhadharmair iti, JOHNSTON 76, 144; TAKASAKI 301; WAYMAN and WAYMAN 99.
\(^465\) X733:42.44b03-06.
lar comments made by Wŏnch’uk, or from the same source Wŏnch’uk relied upon. However, it is not entirely derivative; it is the first time we have seen *amalavijnāna associated with the concept of what is “non-empty”, another epithet of the tathāgatagarbha. In implicitly adducing the Śrīmaladeva as a proof-text, however, Dingbin may also be taking his cue from Wŏnch’uk, who we saw above refers to other concepts from the same text.

Dajue explicitly says he gets his information from “the Tang Trepiṭaka” (唐三藏, i.e. Xuanzang). He links *amalavijnāna to adarśajñā (like Kuiji’s Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing, probably following Daoji’s use of MSA), and says that ninth consciousness is called *amalavijnāna 阿摩羅識 in the “Ninth Consciousness Chapter” of JDZL (thus following Wŏnch’uk). Echoing Dingbin and Wŏnch’uk, he then says,

“Paramārtha explains: This [*amalavijnāna] is of two kinds: (1) as object of gnosis (noema, 所緣), meaning Thusness; (2) what is termed ‘original awakening’ (benjue), which is the gnosis itself (jñāna) qua subject of gnosis (能緣, noesis). The manovijnāna 意識 and this [amala] consciousness unite noema and noesis, which thus, in their unity, comprise the substance of this consciousness 合為此識體.”

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466 See above p. 145.
467 See above p. 146. Dingbin also refers to *amalavijnāna in one other passage of marginal interest. “Trepiṭaka Paramārtha says that all sentient beings have an originally awakened nature (benjue xing 本覺性), which is the ninth [consciousness, viz.], *amalavijnāna, and practice is only an expedient. The Buddha Jewel functions to make this original awakening (benjue), which was originally hidden, become manifest. The Dharma Jewel is intended to provide guidelines allowing one to conform to this original awakening (即本覺上可執則義以為法寶). The Saṃgha Jewel is intended to prevent discord and strife 無違諍義為僧寶. The Tang Trepiṭaka said that the essence of the Three Jewels is nothing other than Thusness;” X733:42.191a14-18.
468 I cannot understand exactly what Dajue is saying here. It may be relevant that in places P seems to understand that at least at one stage in the process of the realisation of vijnāpātmakara/weishi, manovijnāna can be taken as the subject of something like fangbian weishi, but is understood to itself be obviated in zhengguan weishi; cf. FXL T1610:31.809b26-c06, SBKL T1616:31.864a24-28, and discussion in Ōtake (2007a), 390-394. Further, as we saw above, according to Tunnyun, Divākara associated manovijnāna with amalavijnāna in some capacity; Divākara’s doctrine may have been connected to the Abhidharma identification of manovijnāna as the consciousness that undergoes the elimination of defilement/ignorance/desire; see n. 449. There, too, we see possible parallels with this passage. I thank Ōtake Susumu for help with this difficult point (personal communication).
469 真諦所翻『決定識論』有『九識品』, 第九名『阿摩羅識』。真諦譯云：「此有二種。一者、所
The last (very cryptic) sentence here is new, but otherwise, Dingbin's comments are entirely derivative of either the Faxiang authors or Dingbin's use of Faxiang characterisations. Elsewhere, Dajue repeats verbatim a lengthy passage from Dingbin, showing that he was certainly aware of what Dingbin had to say about *amalavijnāna*. It is thus difficult to be sure to what extent Dajue worked directly from Wŏnch'ŏk and Kuiji, and to what extent he had even their ideas indirectly via Dingbin.

The most important of these two scholars is clearly Dingbin, whose comments are more detailed, and earlier. Although Dingbin disagrees with the Faxiang position, he clearly has much of his information from Faxiang scholars, and reads Paramārtha's doctrine through the lens of Faxiang views. It is also noteworthy that he has to fall back, for a proof text, on the Ghanavyuha, a new text translated even after Xuanzang's era. Neither Dingbin nor Dajue seem to have direct access to Paramārtha's texts.

4.1.3.11 Chengguan

Later comments by Chengguan (澄觀, 738-839) echo Dingbin and Dajue closely. Chengguan also sides quite openly with Paramārtha (as he perceives him) against Xuanzang.

In a first extended discussion, Chengguan says that Paramārtha called the pure aspect of eighth consciousness, which Chengguan refers to as "the pure consciousness of the Buddha" 佛淨識, a ninth consciousness, and named it *amalavijnāna*. Xuanzang said that this term should be translated wugou, and that it results from the revolutionary transformation (轉, para/vrt) of the eighth consciousness into a taintless consciousness (wugoushi) upon the attainment of buddhahood; but that it is not a ninth consciousness. Chengguan then gives the two Ghanavyuha-sutra citations first seen in Dingbin, saying they support Paramārtha in establishing a ninth consciousness. Chengguan then repeats verbatim Dingbin's assertion, which says that *amalavijnāna* is of two kinds, corresponding to the "non-empty" and "empty" aspects of
tathāgatagarbha. Chengguan relates this doctrine to the two aspects of mind from AF, i.e. the Thusness aspect and the samsaric aspect, quoting as a proof-text a section of AF saying that mind is only one, and is Thusness. He then says that whatever we call the mind in this liberated state, there are important differences between it and ordinary consciousness, namely that pure consciousness creates the four wisdoms and the three bodies (probably following Wŏnhyo).

Later in the same text, Chengguan returns to the topic, in the course of glossing the notion of rushi xin (如實心, "yathabhūta-citta, “mind that is adequate to reality”), apparently a close relative of yathabhūta-jñāna. He identifies this concept with prakṛti-prabhasvaracitta (自性清浄心, “aboriginally luminous mind”), for which he refers again to the Śrīmaddevasinhanada sutra and AF, and also cites a passage from MSA comparing prakṛti-prabhasvaracitta with pure water that has been tainted by mud and dirt, which returns to its original purity when the taints are removed. He then argues that there can be no essence of mind separate from the Thusness of mind, and therefore, that purity of mind is merely a matter of removing adventitious defilements. Thus, mind is identical with Thusness, and prakṛti-prabhasvaracitta is identical with tathāgatagarbha, and also with original pure consciousness. Having thus prepared the ground, he introduces Paramārtha’s notion of amalavijnāna, which he calls a ninth consciousness. The remainder of this passage repeats much of the argument he already laid out in the first passage cited above.

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474 See above p. 151.
475 T1666:32.576a06.
477 Cf. VSS and Wŏnhyo’s commentary, which are the only other places we have seen the four wisdoms and the three bodies linked with amalavijnāna (see p. 140).
479 如實心 is a rare enough concept, but found once in Śikṣānanda’s Avatamsaka sutra T279:10.105b01-02, which is certainly enough to account for Chengguan’s interest in it.
480 Chengguan is apparently citing from memory; his citation differs in details from MSA itself, but corresponds to scattered portions of Ch. 14 of the Chinese, T1604:31.622c14-623a04, i.e. immediately preceding 623a09, where Prabhākaramitra’s text uses the term amalavijnāna; corresponding to Skt. 13.17-13.19 and Bh, where the text is already discussing prakṛti-prabhasvaracitta; LEVI (1907, 1911) 1, 88; 2, 157-158; JAMPSAL et al. 171-172.
481 Specifically, he repeats that XZ says the term is translated as wugou, but it is not a separate ninth consciousness, rather what results from the revolutionary transformation of eighth consciousness on attainment of buddhahood; he then repeats the two citations from the Ghanavyuha; the assertion that amalavijnāna was expounded in a special chapter of JDZI;
There is much that is new in Chengguan’s discussion here. We have not seen *amalavijnāna related to “the pure consciousness of the Buddha”. We have seldom since Paramārtha seen such a close association between *amalavijnāna and prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta, though the link does appear in Huijun, MSA and Daoji, and again in Wŏnhyo. It is also, to my knowledge, the first time since Paramārtha that anyone has said so directly that *amalavijnāna is obscured by adventitious defilements. In some respects, then, it is as if Chengguan is returning to aspects of Paramārtha’s original doctrines; and yet, despite the meticulous way he specifies his sources, we have no indication that he has direct knowledge of Paramārtha’s works.

In Chengguan, then, it seems we see a strengthening of an initial reaction against the Faxiang rejection of Paramārtha’s ideas seen first in Dingbin and Dajue. However, Chengguan elaborates this understanding in a creative way that is most reminiscent, if anything, of the mode of doctrinal development that we see begun in VSS and built upon by Wŏnhyo in his commentary. The *amalavijnāna/ninth consciousness as articulated in these texts has little to do with Paramārtha’s own doctrine. If *amalavijnāna, now firmly identified with a ninth consciousness, is by the time of Chengguan on the verge of winning for itself a secure place in East Asian Buddhism, it is in a form that has declared almost complete independence from its original author.

The Faxiang authors articulated a very influential vision of *amalavijnāna doctrine, as we have seen. At the same time, they made the conflict with Paramārtha so sharp it was almost a matter of “you’re either with us or against us”. In the long run, this may ironically have hastened the demise of the doctrine they opposed to Paramārtha’s. Apparently scholastics began to decide that they were “against them” — the ideas ascribed to Paramārtha, even as Kuiji and Wŏnch’uk (inaccurately) described them, proved too attractive to reject entirely, and too well supported in a range of proof texts (none of them, by this stage, Paramārtha’s own!). Perhaps, then, we hear here one stroke of the death knell of Xuanzang’s “orthodox” Faxiang line against the “sinified” line represented by the Yogācāra-tathāgatagarbha-Buddha nature-AF synthesis that eventually won out in mainstream East Asian Buddhism.482

The passage shared with Dingbin on the two kinds of *amalavijnāna, relating to the non-empty and empty aspects of tathāgatagarbha; and the reference to AF’s two aspects of mind.

482 For the sake of completeness, we should note that this survey has omitted the following later evidence of relatively marginal importance: (1) The Da foding rulai miyin siuzheng liaoyi zhubu shouyan jing 大佛頂如來密因修證了義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經 T945, translated by Paramiti/Pramiti (? 般剌密帝), who arrived in Canton in 705 (DEMÉVILLE [1952], 43 n. 2),
4.1.4 Summary

Before we compare *amalavijnāna doctrine in later witnesses with that of Paramārtha himself, it will be helpful to identify some general trends in this later material.

First, the materials seem to fall into two main periods. A first period lasts from approximately the 580s, or the early Sui, to the formation of Xuanzang's Faxiang school. In this period, we see quite various impressions of *amalavijnāna doctrine, with little apparent centre of gravity. A second period lasts from approximately the middle of the seventh century, when Xuanzang's school became active, until around the end of the eighth century, when we ended our survey. Understanding of *amalavijnāna from this period is dominated by the Faxiang authors, and their preoccupation with proving that eight, not nine, is the correct count for kinds of consciousness. In this same period, however, we see a second strand of material, represented mainly by VSS, Wonhyo, Dingbin and Chengguan, in which the gathering tendencies are to accept *amalavijnāna, sometimes by overtly rejecting the Faxiang position; to associate *amalavijnāna more and more overtly with tathagatagarbha; and to creatively connect *amalavijnāna to a range of other ideas and texts.

contains one very brief reference to *amalavijnāna 唎摩羅識; T945:19.123c15. This is primarily of interest only because it is another instance of the term finding its way into a sutra (cf. VSS) or Indic text (cf. also MSA). (2) Li Tongxuan (李通玄, 635-730) apparently mentions *amalavijnāna in his Xin Huayan jing lun 新華嚴經論 T1739, but his comments are notable mostly for their outlandishness. Li mistakenly refers to this consciousness as adonavijnāna or "ninth consciousness". According to Li, this doctrine is taught in the Samdhinirmocana sutra! 解深密經 (T676:16.692c02-04, referring to XZ T676), but the actual content of this doctrine sounds more like a cross between LAS and rumours of P; T1739:36.722c22-23, 723a06-14, 723a23, 723b05-09, 723b12, 736a20-b02, 741b29-c01. (3) The Shi moheyan lun 釋摩訶衍論 (a commentary on AF, probably written sometime in the late seventh or eighth centuries; see YAMAMOTO Kazuhiko 山本和彦, “Shaku makaen ron”, s.v. Daizokyo zen kaisetsu daijiten) mentions *amalavijnāna 唎摩羅識 in discussing a ninth consciousness, and quotes part of the passage I called "VSS<1>" above; T1668:32.611c22-27. (4) The She Moheyan lun shu 釋摩訶衍論疏 (said to have been compiled by 法敏 Famin [579-647], but this seems a clear anachronism), a sub-commentary on T1668, quotes T1668 quoting the same VSS passage; X771:45.800c18-22. (5) We see brief mentions in Subhakarasiṃha (善無畏, 637-735, arrived in China 716), Amoghavajra (不空金剛, 705-774) and Amoghavajra’s disciple Huilin (慧琳, d. 820); T906:18.913c07, T1177a:20.757c14-18, T2128:54.604c20. (6) Zhanran (湛然, 711-782) discusses alayavijnāna as 論因 (jñāpatikacatu) and “*amala 唎摩羅” as direct cause 正因 (kāraṇakacatu?) (see n. 345), thus echoing Huijun and Li Shizheng (see n. 426).
Moreover, as we move further away from Paramārtha, the trail runs cold in the hunt for genuine new information. In the earliest references to Paramārtha, it is difficult to be sure whether we are seeing the result of accurate doxography, creative endeavour, or inaccurate hearsay. Later, however, we find authors clearly repeating their predecessor’s views. This suggests strongly that over time, *amalavijnāna lore became increasingly like a chamber of echoes or a game of “Chinese whispers”.

Throughout the period we have surveyed, our authors very seldom refer to any works from the extant Paramārtha corpus as evidence for their characterisation of *amalavijnāna/ninth consciousness: only Huijun, T2805 (whose direct knowledge of JDZL is established by its quote therefrom), T2807, Daoji, Kuiji (whose reference however seems possibly second-hand via Daoji), Wŏnch’uk as reported by Taehyŏn, and Wenbei as reported by Tunnyun. Verbatim citation of a known Paramārtha text in the discussion of this doctrine is even rarer, only occurring in Huijun, T2807 and Daoji.

Otherwise, where authors purport to refer to works by Paramārtha, they refer mostly to the mysterious special work on nine consciousnesses he is supposed to have composed. However, as we have seen, confusion seems to reign supreme over the exact title, location, nature and contents of this work, and there is little sign that any of the authors who refer to this work had themselves seen or read it. Apart from the supposed treatise or chapter on nine consciousnesses/ninth consciousness, the other main supposedly Paramārthian source authors refer to is the apocryphal AF.

Instead of making reference to Paramārtha’s works, extant or otherwise, authors reach for many other sources to piece together a picture of the doctrine, and *amalavijnāna gradually gets woven into a fabric of allusions to an ever-shifting range of new proof-texts. Thus, authors claim to find the origins of the doctrine in MSG, the Vimśatika, LAS, the Mahāyānābhisamaya, the elusive Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing, the Cheng weishi lun, the Pusa yingluo benye jing, the Tathagatagarbha sūtra, MSA, the Śrīmaladevī, the Ghanavyuha, and even, in the singular case of Li Tongxuan, the Samdhinirmocana sūtra. Of course, it is the usual task of exegetes to find or forge links like these between texts and doctrines they interpret and doctrines in other texts. At the same time, we are certainly justified in wondering why such diligent textual scholars would almost uniformly turn to such sources, and almost entirely overlook Paramārtha.

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483 See n. 276.
484 Taehyŏn has Wŏnch’uk refer to WXL; see n. 463.
himself, if they had the choice of consulting Paramārtha’s own works directly.\footnote{YOSHIMURA also observes the great fluctuation of proof texts adduced in support of the doctrine; (2007a), 180; so too YOKI 32-35.}

Parallel to this process of weaving *amalavijñāna into a larger intertextual fabric, the doctrine also progressively becomes associated with more and more concepts. These include: dharmakaya; the “Thusness aspect of mind” of AF; Buddha nature; “neither increase nor decrease”; “not coming or going”; “original awakening” (benjue); jiexing; “non-abiding Nirvāṇa” (apratishtitanirvāṇa); the LAS/AF figure of the wind, the waves and the water; the epithets of tathāgatagarbha “eternal, blissful, self-identical, pure”; the dharmadhatu; wugoushi 無始識; the “gnosis that is like a mirror” (adarsajñāna); the tathāgatagarbha idea of “in bondage” and “free from bondage”; the non-empty and empty aspects of tathāgatagarbha; “Buddha consciousness”; various technical doctrines of causation as it relates to liberation; the “pure Buddha consciousness”; the “pure garbha consciousness of the Tathāgata”; and, of course, tathāgatagarbha itself.

This lengthy survey (§4.1) has thus shown that there is very much about *amalavijñāna in later sources that is never found in Paramārtha’s extant works. On the other hand, then, how much overlap is there with Paramārtha’s documented doctrine of *amalavijñāna?

4.2 What later sources say that agrees with Paramārtha

We saw above (§3) that there seem to be two quite distinct doctrines of *amalavijñāna in Paramārtha’s corpus. Here, however, I will treat all these text as a single unit, for purposes of comparison with later texts.

We find that there really is very little overlap between *amalavijñāna in Paramartha and in later authors. This is in part a function of the wide variation of later authors among themselves. However, even if we take all the later sources as a unit for the purposes of comparison, it is remarkable how seldom they concur with our extant evidence about the doctrine they were ostensibly discussing. The only areas of frequent overlap are:

1) The term *amalavijñāna itself. However, some later sources only use the term “ninth consciousness”, or wugoushi, both terms that are not used in association with
The Doctrine of *Amalavijnana in Paramārtha (499-569), and Later Authors to Approximately 800 C.E.

*amalavijnana* doctrine in Paramārtha himself; and transcriptions widely diverge from Paramārtha.

2) Discussion is at least about some kind of “pure” consciousness, as the term would lead us to expect.

3) *Amalavijnana* is a state of consciousness that attends liberation, and is attained through some transformation or purification of *alayavijnana*.

4) The connection between *amalavijnana* and Thusness. However, Thusness also features prominently in AF, whose categories loom so large in the attempts of later authors to come to grips with *amalavijnana*. It is difficult to determine, therefore, whether this agreement is a function of accurate reporting of Paramārtha’s ideas from the later authors, or of the application of the AF lens.

5) The identification between *amalavijnana* and *prakṛtiprabhasvaracitta* is touched upon in Huijun (actually citing SBKL), MSA, Daoji, Wŏnhyo (also reported second-hand by Tunnyun) and Chengguan. This link is thus the specific component of Paramārtha’s actual doctrine that most frequently recurs in later authors. It suggests that to the extent that the later tradition did base itself upon accurate information, it was working not from (reports of) JDZL, but SBKL. It is interesting to note that no Faxiang author notices this aspect of the doctrine.

There is also some reference in the later tradition to the following dimensions of Paramārtha’s doctrine, but it is slender. In many cases, we find ourselves in a grey zone, where agreement could be a result of coincidence:

1) The idea that *amalavijnana* is related to *asrayaparāvrtti* is only mentioned explicitly by Zhiyi. It is also hinted at slightly in some authors.

2) The association between the attainment of *amalavijnana* and the realisation of a state “without ‘outflows’” (*anāsrava*), or the association between *amalavijnana* and *anāsravadharmas*, features briefly in the *Rulai gongde zhuangyan jing* verse cited by Kuiji, Wŏnch’uk and Tankuang.

3) The statement that *amalavijnana* is “permanent” appears only in Jingying Huiyuan, and does not then reappear in later sources until the loose association of

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486 *Amalavijnana* is associated implicitly with Thusness in SBKL<1>, and explicitly in SKBL<2>. This theme is found, in one form or another, in Zhiyi, Jingying Huiyuan, Daoji, T2807, VSS, Wŏnhyo, Kuiji (where the identification is criticised as a misapprehension), Dajue, Dingbin and Chengguan.

487 By the use of the word *zhuan* 轉 to refer to the transformation in consciousness that brings it about: VSS, Wŏnhyo, Dingbin, Chengguan.
*amalavijnāna with the four epithets of tathagatagarbha in Wŏnhyo. (The related Paramārthian notion that *amalavijnāna is “true” because free from change [SWXL<1>] is never found later.)

4) The association between the attainment of *amalavijnāna and the attainment of power over body and lifespan is only weakly echoed in the identification of *amalavijnāna and dharmakaya in Jizang, Fali, Li Shizheng and Wŏnch’uk; and in the association between the attainment of *amalavijnāna and the three bodies (trikaya) in VSS<5>, Wŏnhyo, and Chengguan.

5) The identification of *amalavijnāna and the “perfected nature” (parinispānasvabhava) is only weakly hinted at in Jizang.

6) The idea that *amalavijnāna is obscured by adventitious defilements is only found in Huijun; by association in MSA; and in Chengguan.

7) Very little is made of the notion that *amalavijnāna is characterised by a nondualism of subject and object. We find this notion reflected directly only in Wŏnhyo. In Jizang, Dajue and Dingbin, the nondual also seems to feature, but it has a curiously different emphasis.

8) The relationship between delusion and language, or the relationship between the attainment of *amalavijnāna and the escape from language, is only reflected in Huijun and Jingying Huiyuan. (We also do not find much emphasis on Paramārtha’s related assertion that *amalavijnāna is free from error.)

4.3 What Paramārtha says that later sources do not
Comparing Paramārtha’s extant corpus our later sources, we find that the following aspects of Paramārtha’s doctrine are never mentioned at all:

1) The association or identification of *amalavijnāna with the counteragents (pratipakṣa) of alayavijnāna.

2) The idea that attainment of the *amalavijnāna entails a transformation of the relationship to the skandhas.

3) The association between the problematic of the attainment of *amalavijnāna, and liberation specifically understood as a process of evading rebirth, and thereby escaping future suffering.

4) The related overtones, found in Paramārtha, of the old Nikāya/Āgama doctrine of consciousness as the subject of transmigration and liberation; and indeed, any sign of a relationship between *amalavijnāna and the vijnānaskandha.

5) The identification of *amalavijnāna with a “higher” stage of Vijñaptimātrata/weishi (weishi as the object of “perfect insight”, zhengguan weishi etc.), beyond the weishi “in practice” (fangbian weishi) that obviates only external objects but not the ordinary
perceiving consciousness.

6) The notion that *amalavijnāna is free of "badness" (*dausṭhulya), which, as we saw, is connected to its close association with *āsrayaparāvṛtti.

7) The idea that *amalavijnāna is a basis for transcendent (*lokaṭtara) dharmas.

8) Any association whatsoever between *amalavijnāna and the idea of the "continuum" (*samtāna), either the ordinary continuum of the *prthagjana before liberation, or the "continuum produced by *lokaṭtara dharmas" of JDZL<3>.

9) The idea that *amalavijnāna is without a basis (*āsraya), or even the very question of its relationship to a basis.

10) The "Mahayāna Abhidharma" framework that is so key to the exposition of *amalavijnāna in JDZL.

11) The identification of *amalavijnāna with emptiness (SBKL).

I argued (§3) that there are two separable *amalavijnāna doctrines in Paramārtha, and that JDZL probably preserves the version closest to the original. We see here that some details of the version of the doctrine reflected in the other group of texts (SWXL, SBKL, ZSL) are reflected, if weakly, in later texts. However, the JDZL doctrine sinks almost without a trace.

This almost total silence on the actual content of JDZL forms a striking contrast to the fact that so many of the later sources claim to trace the notion of *amalavijnāna back to a putative "Ninth Consciousness Chapter" found precisely in JDZL.

5. Conclusions

There are very few areas of real overlap between *amalavijnāna doctrine in extant Paramārtha texts and in later sources. Of course, traditional bibliographies report that Paramārtha wrote many more texts than we have received. At least on the evidence of the extant texts, however, it seems that the tradition inherited from Paramārtha only a very basic idea of a pure, post-liberatory consciousness, in some relationship of contrast to *aḷaṇavijnāna, which had a close relationship or identity with Thusness.

Recognising the virtual certainty that some of Paramārtha’s texts and ideas have indeed been lost to our record, the possibility cannot be ruled out that some of what the tradition reports was in fact part of the doctrine of Paramārtha or his group. In particular:

1) We saw (§4.1.2.2, §4.1.2.3) that we cannot be sure that Paramārtha did not author a text especially on "ninth consciousness" (*jiushi zhang etc.), or that he did not teach a
ninth consciousness or a system of ninefold consciousness.

2) We cannot be sure that he never associated *amalavijñāna with tathagatagarbha, and may indeed therefore have been attempting thereby to effect some kind of rap-prochement between Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha thought. 488

Testimony that Paramārtha’s teaching had these features is early and widespread. We have no contradictory evidence intervening between the earliest witnesses and Paramārtha’s group, which might allow us to cast doubt on this testimony. Thus, it is entirely possible, if not certain, that Paramārtha taught that *amalavijñāna was a separate, ninth kind of consciousness, associated with tathagatagarbha. If such important aspects of Paramārtha’s original doctrine may indeed have been lost, it reminds us that we must also be aware of the possibility that we have an incomplete picture when we attempt to study and characterise Paramārtha’s thought more generally.

However, the fact remains that later authors only received a very vague and pared-down version of Paramārtha’s doctrine. Subsequent authors then often took the concept as raw material for their own constructive projects, or, in the interests of attacking or defending the notion, wove it into complex new networks of proof texts and various concepts. The result, as we have seen, is that the bulk of what was said about *amalavijñāna by later authors was new. We have little grounds for confidence that these authors were well acquainted with any works by Paramārtha, upon which they based their comments.

Despite some excellent studies, modern scholarship has still tended to accept too readily the image of *amalavijñāna found in the later tradition, rather than to examine closely what Paramārtha’s texts had to say about it. I hope that this study has shown that those sources reveals a surprising profile of Paramārtha’s genuine attested doctrine of *amalavijñāna.

To summarise, the major findings of this study were:

1) It is reasonable to think that Paramārtha coined the term amoluoshi at least in

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488 We see *amalavijñāna or “ninth consciousness” associated with tathagatagarbha (or Buddha nature) in witnesses as early and apparently reliable as Huijun and Jingying Huiyuan. This association then recurs in Zhiyan, VSS, Wonhyo, Wŏnh'uk, Dingbin and Chengguan. Notably, however, no Shelun school witnesses are found in this list (Dunhuang texts, Daoji).
2) Paramārtha’s extant works contain not one but two separable doctrines of *amalavijnāna: one in JDZL, and the other in ZSL, SWXL and SBKL. The JDZL doctrine is most likely earlier, and more likely to be authentic (though the other version of the doctrine may also be authentic).

3) The rich details of these original doctrines have been insufficiently known in modern scholarship. They were also almost unknown to later authors in the tradition.

4) Later authors propose a riot of extremely varied ideas about *amalavijnāna and ninth consciousness, little of it traceable with any confidence to Paramārtha or his group.

6. Directions for future research

If we have tended to overlook the original content of Paramārtha’s own *amalavijnāna doctrine, that implies at least three agendas for further research.

First, it is important to look for the sources of Paramārtha’s attested *amalavijnāna doctrine.489

Second, what has proven true for *amalavijnāna may prove true of Paramārtha’s thought more generally. Paramārtha’s actual ideas may have been buried under what was made of them by his successors — enthusiasts as much as enemies. Those ideas may therefore constitute a missed chapter the development of East Asian Buddhism. We may need to bracket out what we think we “know”, from the image of Paramārtha constructed by the later tradition, and study Paramārtha’s own texts more carefully.

Finally, Paramārtha’s ideas are significant in part because of the place they hold in our usual narratives of the so-called “sinification” of Buddhist concepts. If the general image of *amalavijnāna has been inaccurate to date, then part of the general understanding of the process of sinification may have been built on sand. It will also be important, therefore, to reassess the place of *amalavijnāna in relation to the problem of sini-
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Fication, in light of a more accurate picture of *amalavijnana and its actual sources.490

Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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490 With reference to Buddhism, the term “sinification” may broadly be taken in two senses, “weak” and “strong”: “weak” sinification is any change that results in a Buddhism unique to China, regardless of the cause of that change (thus including changes resulting from chance vicissitudes of the translation process, translation errors, and a host of other factors); “strong” sinification refers to change resulting in aspects of Buddhism unique to China, caused by factors themselves already unique to China or characteristically Chinese (most typically, Chinese culture, thought or a Chinese “worldview”). To simplify, Paramārtha’s *amalavijnana has often been regarded as a part of an increasing emphasis on tathagatagarbha/Buddha nature, culminating in its eventual ascent to centrality and orthodoxy, supposed to be typical of East Asian Buddhism. This process is regarded as sinification in the specific sense that it is thought, in a quasi-Weberian mode, to have been the product of “this-worldly” and “optimistic” tendencies fundamental to the Chinese tradition. I disagree with this interpretation of *amalavijnana. I am currently preparing a study of these problems entitled “Paramārtha’s *Amalavijnana as a Case Study in the So-called ‘Sinification’ of Buddhist Concepts”, in which I hope to demonstrate the relationship of important received interpretations of *amalavijnana and Paramārtha’s thought with “sinification” so understood, and argue that, for the case of *amalavijnana, it is a misinterpretation.
“The Doctrine of *Amalavijñāna in Paramārtha (499-569), and Later Authors to Approximately 800 C.E.”

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Note: In this bibliography, I have followed Chicago History style. However, at Zinbun's request, in the footnotes I have adopted name-date citation to save space. To ease cross-reference, I therefore list multiple items by a single author in chronological order. Where I am not using the first edition of an item, I have tried to give the original date of publication in square brackets, followed by the date of the edition or printing I used, thus: [1984] 1998. Citations in footnotes refer to the date of the version I used.


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491 IWATA Taijō/Ryōzō is a single author who has published under two names. I list his publications here in two groups, according to the name under which each was published.

492 See n. 491.
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[See also WOIHARA.]


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