During my time as a teacher, I would regularly teach the differences between similes, metaphors and metonyms. Though this paper will touch on my experience of teaching these things that is not ‘exactly’ its principal concern. Instead, I want to discuss the more general ways in which two philosophers (Derrida and Deleuze) privilege metonymic ways of viewing language. In a sense, I will be providing a metadiscourse ‘of sorts’ on metonymy and metonym. Metaphors, as they ordinarily appear, involve both division and suitability of fit. So, for example, if a poet refers to the sun as ‘the eye of heaven’ then we have a division between the sun (the real ‘original’ thing) and its metaphorical realisation as ‘the eye of heaven’. Moreover, the implication is that we can logically determine what is being described because the sun is eye-shaped and it is up in the sky. Of course, to say the sun is eye-shaped is, in a sense, wrong—the sun is round. The fact that the wrongness here does not immediately strike us reveals a deeper metonymic quality to language. In this paper I look at contrasting philosophical approaches to metonymy as they feature in the work of Derrida and Deleuze. From there, I consider various issues pertaining to education and translation.

During my time as a school-teacher I frequently had to teach the difference between metaphor and metonymy: Metaphors, I explained, must replace other ways of putting things. So, for example, ‘the sun’ might be replaced with the ‘eye of heaven’. This is based on the idea of there being some kind of resemblance between the metaphor and the thing it stands for. Metonyms, by contrast, were best explained by giving examples of what metonyms are: the crown stands for the king; in these cases a part of the thing in question is taken to stand for the whole.

Why does this matter? It matters to me because I want to introduce the idea that some kinds of philosophy—in fact, some ways of thinking more generally—are metonymic. Let’s approach this by asking, first, how some kinds of philosophy (and thinking) may depend on metaphor. This brings us to philosophies that depend upon some kind of a gap between, for example, the actual and the ideal, perhaps between language and logic. Where there is such a gap, one element in the binary is privileged. A clear case of this is Plato’s theory of the Forms (see, for example, Plato, 1999). The ideal forms, that for Plato are the most real things, contrast with the changing objects of our experience. Obviously this is crucial for what we think of as Western forms of thought. This makes us believe that the actualities of our experience are somehow second-rate: they are inferior to the ultimate reality, the realm of the Forms. A version of this way of thinking is inherited by Christianity. We can see here the connection between this way of thinking and a certain kind of metaphysics: metaphor connects with metaphysics!

These concerns may seem remote from life in the 21st century, but they are not. Think for a moment of Takashimaya, the department store, where everything is
arranged beautifully. We are presented with a kind of ideal world where everything is in perfect condition. When we go to the store and purchase something, we feel we are brought closer to this ideal world—almost perhaps as if this were like a religious experience. Just think for a moment of the compulsion that people feel to go shopping—as if they were spiritually drawn. On the negative side this can make us feel that our actual lives—our homes, our clothes, our kitchens—are second-rate, not how things should be. In fact, a similar process is at work through television. Advertisements work on us in this way, constantly presenting the world that we should aspire to live in. So also do series such as *Friends*, which glamorise a way of life, making us feel that this is really how people should be. All this is relevant to ordinary everyday unhappiness. Phillip Larkin’s poem ‘Essential Beauty’ catches something of this:

In frames as large as rooms that face all ways  
And block the ends of streets with giant loaves,  
Screen graves with custard, cover slums with praise  
Of motor-oil and cuts of salmon, shine  
Perpetually these sharply-pictured groves  
Of how life should be. High above the gutter  
A silver knife sinks into golden butter (Larkin, 1964, p. 45).

Larkin’s depiction of advertising hoardings captures the lurid quality of images of perfection that are gathered above us. They look down at us as we languish in the gutter, cowed by the discrepancy between the mundanity of our ordinary lives and the golden promise that hovers in the night sky. We can also relate these images of an idealised world to the way the classroom has become. Instead of the dynamic and sometimes heated space that this used to be, it is now characterised more by the cool air of a climate-control system. The atmosphere has become antiseptic through an overreliance on ICT. Everywhere you look there are laminated cards with lists of learning objectives. Teachers will be smartly dressed and smiling, as if they were young executives efficiently managing the business at hand. Activities will be ‘well targeted’. Lesson plans, and the discourse of the teacher during the lesson, must remain ‘on message’.

Derrida takes issue with the attitude toward ‘perfectibility’ described above. For him it is not the case that there are truths to the world that are already there waiting to find words. Rather, language generates a metaphysics through its own workings, through the repetition of words in connection with other words. Meaning is only possible through interdependence, and there is no final stability. This is metonymic because meaning is generated through contiguity (where one thing touches another) and not through representation (where one thing stands for or replaces something else). A crown (‘crown’ is a metonym that denotes the monarch) touches the head of a king or queen, and part of what you see when you see a king is the crown on that person’s head.
ANOTHER TAKE ON METONYMY

There is another kind of philosophy that is also metonymic. If Derrida’s ideas about language derive especially from a Heideggerian and Levinassian background, the philosophy I now want to consider is more Nietzschean in character. It is developed especially by Deleuze and Guattari—by a philosopher collaborating with a psychoanalyst. The most famous of their works in which this is elaborated is *A Thousand Plateaus*. The first image of thought that they discuss is the image of the tree.

Describing tree-like thought is fairly straightforward. Here we have (1) the image of roots, often invisible to the naked eye—think of God or Hegel’s conception of spirit, and (2) the firm insular trunk from which branches spread. A tree (as image) is a self-enclosed entity, an arborescent ‘structure’. Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the law of the tree-like structure always follows the logic of the one that becomes two. Here we might think of Genesis, and the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib. In this sense ‘the tree is already the image of the world, or the root the image of the world-tree’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 5). The law of the ‘One that becomes two’ is effectively also the law of reflection. The book is projected as the reflection of the world. There is therefore a matching of thought and world in representation. Within this model, thought is not conceived as an active element in the world.

The contrasting image employed by Deleuze and Guattari is that of the rhizome. Whereas trees grow in accordance with an arborescent ‘structure’, rhizomes do not behave in this way; they grow round the edges and between gaps and are always on the outside. Grass is a rhizome—here we might note the peculiar resistance to destruction displayed by grass. It may be obliterated in one place but simply grows up again elsewhere. We tend not to think of grass in terms of its individual blades; by the same token, ants are not generally thought about in this way. Rhizomes are multiplicities. We cannot even speak coherently about ‘a rhizome’—we must simply refer to ‘some’ of a rhizome (p. 9) as we might speak of a patch of grass, which is already multiple. Rhizomes are therefore ‘always in the middle’.

What is particularly relevant for present purposes is that Deleuze and Guattari speak of the tree in this explanation as a metaphor, whereas the rhizome is said to be a metonym—it is a metonym that resonates with the intensities of the world. But what exactly is an ‘intensity’? According to Deleuze and Guattari, an intensity is an experience that is allowed to move across a flat plane. But what then does that mean? Intensities do not happen all the time. They are a matter rather of what happens in the middle, when things are allowed to flow. Thus, in the teaching of a class one can find that there are different phases. The class starts slowly, the planned activity is set out and the children begin to work. But then, somewhere in the middle, a question is asked, a discussion takes place and something happens that breaks with the lines of the lesson-plan or that opens it to new possibilities. And then in the midst of this activity, teacher and children become absorbed in what they are doing: things become intense.

The point here is to see that this is not something to be frightened of. It is not something that makes us unhappy. On the contrary it may be associated with some of the more memorable aspects of our teaching and learning, or indeed of our lives more generally. It is the kind of thing that it is hard to capture in a formal account. Something like this is suggested in these lines from ‘Corsons Inlet’ by A. R. Ammons. The exploratory nature of the words here, which seem almost to be feeling their way, suggests something of the kind of thought, the way of being and living that is needed:
I went for a walk over the dunes again this morning
to the sea,
then turned right along
the surf
rounded a naked headland
and returned
along the inlet shore:
it was muggy sunny, the wind from the sea steady and high,
crisp in the running sand,
some breakthroughs of sun
but after a bit
continuous overcast:
the walk liberating, I was released from forms,
from the perpendiculars,
straight lines, blocks, boxes, binds
of thought
into the hues, shadings, rises, flowing bends and blends
of sight:
I allow myself eddies of meaning:
yield to a direction of significance
running
like a stream through the geography of my work:
you can find
in my sayings
swerves of action
like the inlet’s cutting edge:
there are dunes of motion,
organizations of grass, white sandy paths of remembrance
in the overall wandering of mirroring mind:

but Overall is beyond me: is the sum of these events
I cannot draw, the ledger I cannot keep, the accounting
beyond the account:

I have reached no conclusions, have erected no boundaries,
shutting out and shutting in, separating inside
from outside: I have
drawn no lines:
as
manifold events of sand
change the dune’s shape that will not be the same shape
tomorrow,
so I am willing to go along, to accept
the becoming
thought, to stake off no beginnings or ends establish
no walls:

by transitions the land falls from grassy dunes to creek
to undercreek: but there are no lines though
change in that transition is clear
as any sharpness: but 'sharpness' spread out,
allowed to occur over a wider range
than mental lines can keep (Ammons, 1972, pp. 147-149).

Here Ammons captures the experience of being caught up in the midst of things
where transition though 'clear' is 'spread out'. The distinction between 'inside and
outside' no longer holds. Why is this metonymic? The point is that thought is not
confronted with a gap between one thing and something else it resembles; it is not a
matter of representation—say, of the way that the tree relates to the world. Rather
there is a contiguity (things touch!), and thought is allowed to flow as it touches this
thing and another and another. Whereas the tree generates an 'arborescent' structure:
it frustrates touch, being preoccupied with the gaze that seeks representation.

It is interesting to note, moreover, that the tree-rhizome distinction is not a
straightforward binary opposition. This is partly because of what we saw earlier about
the fact that tree is a metaphor and the rhizome a metonym. The rhizome does not
represent but it is continuous with those aspects of the world to which it relates. It
may seem ironic then that a forest is a rhizome: trees make up a forest, but a forest
goes where it can go, like the moss that gathers around the stones in the temple garden
or the water that flows across the river valley.

METONYMY AND TRANSLATION

Perhaps on the strength of these thoughts, and in the light of a theme of this
conference, it is worth making connections here with the idea of translation. But two
possibilities emerge here. On one understanding translation involves a conversion of
thought from one language to another, where the languages in question are understood
to have a more or less pure form: the function of translation then takes on a coldly
communicative quality. Problems in converting the words of a sentence from the
home language to the target language are understood as technical difficulties, ideally
to be overcome.

The other conception is based on the thought that there is something wrong with
the above picture. Languages do not come in such pure forms. Bakhtin draws
attention to the way that translation is already at work within language. Derrida’s and
Deleuze’s viewpoints, as outlined above, extend this thought, and they do this in
different ways. For Derrida, translation is in a sense impossible. And it is impossible
because language generates a metaphysics, rather than seeking to represent the way
things are. What is germane in one language—what germinates—must be different
from what occurs in another. Nevertheless, translation does take place. The
impossible, translation, becomes possible, but never in any full sense—never in any
pure or exact or mimetic way. The impossible, as so often in Derrida, must be what
orients us.

A Deleuzian approach here requires us to think in terms of contiguity. A word
touches another. It functions, as is well established, not so much through its
correlation with the thing it represents as with its connections with other words. These
contiguities are not exclusive to a home or target language but exist in endless chains
that extend from one language to another. Deleuze and Guattari often use linguistics
as a model for demonstrating the distinction between rhizomes and trees. Put simply, tree-like approaches to linguistics champion models of grammatical correctness, which conjure the figure of an ideal speaker or listener. In contrast rhizomatic thinking on language turns away from such ‘power markers’ and approaches language in a different way:

A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts sciences and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural and cognitive: there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs and specialised languages. There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogenous linguistic community (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 7).

There are several important things to note here. A rhizome, characterised by the line as opposed to the point establishes connections between linguistic zones, which are kept separate by tree-like thought. By the same token, rhizomatic thinking brings certain aspects of language ‘the perceptive, mimetic, gestural and cognitive’, which are ignored by traditional linguistic models, to the forefront. We are therefore encouraged to think of language in terms of intensities as well as ‘meaning’. The linguistic universals formulated in traditional grammar are replaced by an understanding of language which celebrates its multiplicity of ‘dialects, patois, slangs and specialised languages’. Perhaps more than this, we might say that the ‘standard’ forms of language enact a kind of tree-like violence against the forest of languages. Multiple languages are ‘forced’ outside to continue their rhizomatic behaviours around the roots of the dominant ‘standard language’. This is why Deleuze and Guattari argue that conventional linguistic models do not represent ‘a method for the people’ whereas, ‘a method of the rhizome type’, on the contrary, can analyse language only by decentring it onto other dimensions and other registers. A language is ‘never closed in on itself, except as a function of impotence’ (p. 8).

What does this have to do with translation? Any act of translation must involve ‘decentring’ one language onto other dimensions and registers. Consequently, if one adopts this approach to translation it becomes a never-ending journey through dimensions and registers. This will appear hopeless if we crave transparency but thrilling if we embrace intensity.

CONCLUDING REMARK

Both Derrida’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s metonymic visions of language point to the unhappiness of linguistic theories that are based on a false and debilitating metaphysics. Though Deleuze and Guattari undoubtedly present a more expansive all-embracing vision of language than what Derrida provides, I do not want to choose between them. Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari draw our thought away from the kind of idealisation that is home to so much human misery. All three have something
important to say about translation that takes us away from the debilitating search for pure and transparent communication across borders.

REFERENCES
