

somehow strangely out of place here.

Part III, the last section of the book, then brings up the rear with fully seven essays on “Southeast Asia.” All of this literature concentrates on the island world of Southeast Asia, and there is almost nothing here on the long outstretched coasts of Burma, Siam, and Cambodia, for example, and also little on the Malay Peninsula. This is a lacuna which should have been filled, likely, so the book might have had better balance. While it’s true that there is less literature on these coasts, and that piracy may have been practiced less here, too, than in the Insular world of Southeast Asia, this lack of material gives the book a feeling of slightly skewed orientation. I should be clear that the essays that are indeed here are very good ones; these are the main authors in the field, and the work that they exhibit here is nuanced and complex. Adri Lapien talks about piracy in Indonesian waters generally in his piece, and then Gerrit Knaap, Esther Velthoen, and Carolin Liss all discuss variations of piracy across several time periods in Papua, Sulawesi, and Sabah respectively. All are accomplished essays, which provide a very good balance between hard data and conception on the how’s and why’s of piracy working in these far-flung locales. Three other essays then problematize these ideas even further, as James Warren, Stefan Eklof Amirell, and Ikuya Tokoro all examine different avatars of the subject in one place, the Sulu Basin at the southern end of the Philippines. These essays too are accomplished, each and every one, with much that is new on display, as the Sulu Sea is dissected vis-à-vis its maritime dynamics from colonial to post-colonial to “ethnographic” time, and across the centuries. It is very helpful to have these three essays together here, in fact, because one can see how various methodologies can be used to describe the same place, and how piracy looks different according to the tools being used in one’s own study.

Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia is a good book, and more than this it is a useful compendium which repays a serious reading and careful consideration of its contents. Many of the world’s academic experts on Asian piracy, both historical and contemporary, are on

view here, and these are all serious scholars who have thought about these issues for a long time (and in some cases, for a very long time, including pioneers of the field in Warren and Lapien’s cases). The book is however slightly uneven, as I have described above, with perhaps too much attention paid to Insular Southeast Asia, and too little paid to Japanese and Korean waters (where are the *wako*, for example?), and the long outstretched coasts of the Southeast Asian mainland. Presumably to fit into the book’s title, some attention should have been paid to Indian Ocean piracy as well, of which there was plenty, and which still (of course) exists even now, though on a smaller scale than in previous centuries. I would recommend this book to anyone who wants to see strong, solid scholarship on the notion of piracy in Asian waters, and a number of the essays really do fit very well together in sets (on Sulu; on the Outer Islands of Indonesia; and on the Sino-Vietnamese frontier, for example). The book — already useful — might have been still stronger, however, had it aimed a bit more for geographic inclusion in its contributions, so that more territory could have been covered. This would make an already-utilitarian volume, impressive in many ways in its own right, even more of a contribution to a field that only seems to be growing year after year.

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||| Duncan McCargo. *Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand*. Ithaca: |||
||| Cornell University Press, 2008, 264 p. |||

This well-written and researched book provides a much-needed detailed analysis of the violent conflicts in three Malay-Muslim provinces of southern Thailand — Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. The author, one of the most prolific scholars of Thai politics, challenges two commonly evoked explanations that attribute the conflicts to primordial ethno-religious differences and to region-wide or global terrorist “Jihad” networks. McCargo argues, instead, that the violence is fundamentally a

political problem that stems from the fact that the Malay-Muslim population has never accepted the legitimacy — the moral right to rule — of the Bangkok-based Buddhist-majority state.

Specifically, McCargo analyzes the illegitimacy of the Thai state from three angles: religion, politics, and security. First, he argues that the state has made conscious efforts to neutralize or fragment the authority of local Islamic leaders. These leaders, who are supposed to champion Malay-Muslims' interests, have been coopted into the state in return for material inducements. At the same time, traditional Islamic schools (*pondok*) have been placed under the control of the state in exchange for government subsidies. Consequently, ordinary Malay-Muslims have lost the "moral and spiritual center" in their communities (p. 52). Second, the Thai state has made similar moves to "coopt and control" the local Malay-Muslim political elites (p. 183). Several elites, such as Den Tohmeena and Wan Muhammad Nor Matha, have attained key cabinet positions since the 1980s, but this is, according to McCargo, a cosmetic measure taken by the state to appease the otherwise discontented Malay-Muslim population. Far from serving as vital links between the local and the center, those politicians have spent most of their time in Bangkok or have enriched themselves by collaborating with Bangkok-based political elites. As a result, the political (as well as religious) authority in Malay-Muslim communities has been weakened and divided by the state. Finally, Thai security forces have consistently displayed "a lamentable catalogue of criminal blunders, negligence, incompetence, lack of coordination, and sheer misdirection" (p. 133), as exemplified by the tragedies of Kru-Ze and Tak Bai. The post-Thaksin military-led government apologized for the past atrocities or repression, but failed to bring the security personnel involved to justice.

Under these circumstances that render the central state illegitimate, militant leaders, such as Ustadz Soh, have found ample room for maneuver in exploiting the Malay-Muslims' pent-up anti-state grievances for their political ends. Here McCargo provides an important

insight that Islam itself is not the cause of violent conflicts; rather, Islam constitutes a convenient rhetorical resource that a handful of hatemongering militant leaders have tapped or manipulated to mobilize local youths behind their violent cause. McCargo bases all these arguments on a wealth of previously untapped materials (e.g., militants' confessions, leaflets circulated by militants, numerous interviews). This book makes a valuable contribution to the existing literature that only scratches the surface of the violent conflict in southern Thailand.

With this contribution duly acknowledged, however, the book leaves several things to be desired. First, McCargo's explanation lacks sufficient historical depth, focusing preponderantly on the Thaksin era, especially on the period after January 2004. This temporal focus is puzzling, given McCargo's contention that the conflict has deep roots in "*historical* and political grievances" (p. 188, emphasis mine). He bases his whole argument on the assumption that the Thai state's rule over the Malay-Muslim provinces "has long lacked legitimacy" (p. 183), but this assumption is asserted, rather than well demonstrated through a longitudinal analysis of various events, state policies, and politicians (both national- and local-level) that have been involved in the region over the century. Characteristic of McCargo's ahistorical analysis is his cursory discussion of the Prem Tinsulanond's administration (1980–88). Prem, according to McCargo, only offered conciliatory policies without granting Malay-Muslims full participatory rule. The "carrot" helped contain the insurgency, but local discontent kept simmering underneath the surface, which erupted in violence after Thaksin attained power. The reader is not told how ordinary Muslims perceived Prem's various policies (e.g., the "New Hope" initiative taken in the 1980s to develop the Malay-Muslim provinces) or how their negative views of the state were stoked and sustained by local-level political or religious elites. Another important neglected issue is the Bangkok-based prostitution rings that thrived in border areas — notably in Sungai Kolok of Narathiwat — in the 1980s–90s and proved highly unpopular with Malay-

Muslims for undermining the morality of their communities. Short on a deeply historical analysis of these (and other) issues, the book may give the false impression that Thaksin's "regime" (as opposed to the "state" — McCargo tends to conflate the two concepts) is largely to blame for the upsurge in violence.

Contrary to its claims, the book also takes a rather simplistic view of state "legitimacy." Every state enjoys varying degrees of legitimacy in different policy areas and at different points in time. In McCargo's formulation, however, Malay-Muslims seem to have viewed the Thai state as illegitimate across board and across time. On issues of security, religious education, and political recruitment, the state may be illegitimate (as McCargo claims), but what about other schemes, such as social welfare, infrastructure development, and scholarships, from which a sizeable number of Malay-Muslims have benefited, albeit to varying degrees, over the years? These issues are not explored in the book.

The book, moreover, tends to make a jump from state illegitimacy to the occurrence and persistence of violent conflicts. According to McCargo, the militant movement has now found many active and passive sympathizers in the Malay-Muslim population. In some areas, they "constitute more than half or two-thirds of the population" (p.186). But it is unclear why these people support or condone the violent movement, given the fact that it has attacked innocent civilian Muslims in recent years. Seeing the state as illegitimate is one thing, but supporting the use of violence is another. If many Malay-Muslims view the state as illegitimate, they should view the violent movement as equally illegitimate. My educated guess (based on my brief stay in the three border provinces) is that most ordinary Malay-Muslims are willing, if not totally happy, to be part of the Thai nation-state. They remain neutral between the state and violent conflicts; they support neither side. They may oppose some types of "regimes" (e.g., Thaksin), but they do not necessarily shun the "state" altogether.

Finally, the book provides little theoretical and comparative analysis. What little theoretical discussion

it provides draws primarily on Mohammed Hafez's work without addressing the voluminous literature on insurgency and communal violence. How does the Thai case illuminate this literature? Similarly, McCargo unfortunately fails to cast the Thai case in comparative perspective. The existing literature, he laments, is "highly case specific" without offering "systematic comparative perspectives" (p.10). This critique can be turned against him, too. Is the Thai case similar to, or different from, other cases of insurgency movements or communal conflicts in countries like India, Indonesia, and the Philippines? It is a pity that he does not address these cases, for he presents an unparalleled amount of empirical materials.

These comments notwithstanding, McCargo has produced just another "must" book for anybody interested in Thai politics. The way he situates the violent conflicts in the nature of interaction between the center and periphery is particularly illuminating. This book sets the bar high for those currently working on the important topic of Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand.

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津田浩司, 『「華人性」の民族誌——体制転換期インドネシアの地方都市のフィールドから』世界思想社, 2011, 373p.

本書は、現代インドネシアにおいて華人が「華人である」ということ、すなわち一つのエスニシティとしての「華人性」が人々に意識され、社会的に立ち現れる諸局面について、スハルト体制の終焉（1998年）をはさむ約10年間に中部ジャワ北岸の町ルンバン周辺で起きた出来事の聞き取りと参与観察をもとに叙述・分析した研究である。著者津田氏が2002年から2年間ルンバンを拠点に行った現地調査を基礎とし、2008年東京大学大学院総合文化研究科に提出された博士論文がもとになっている。なお、本書にいう華人とは国籍の別などにかかわらず広く中国系住民を指す総称である。