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Race as Praxis in the Philippines at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

John D. BLANCO*

Abstract

This article takes as its point of departure the disparity between the empirical poverty of race and its survival, even growth, as a way of understanding history and politics — or more specifically, history as politics and politics as history in the Philippines during the nineteenth century. What interested me primarily was how race as a form of praxis is too often and easily ascribed to a discredited science that came into vogue during the nineteenth century. While race rhetoric certainly drew its authority from scientific positivism, its spokespeople also invoked the fields of law, philosophy, and religion. Yet for most people, race was not a question to be resolved by scientific investigation, but a weapon in a war or conflict between unequal opponents. Not surprisingly, questions around the existence or impossibility of a Filipino race were most fully debated and developed in a time of war — the 1896 Philippine Revolution, and the 1899 Philippine-American War, which began just after the outbreak of war between the U.S. and Spain in 1898. My article charts the genealogy of these debates, and the relationship of race to the narration of anti-imperial movements and alternative cosmopolitanism.

Keywords: Philippine-American War, Philippine revolution, colonialism, U.S. imperialism, race, racism, religion, counter-history

When we speak of the “Unfinished Revolution”... we should ask, which one?... What do we mean when we speak of memory? Is it the memory of Presidents and Judges or that of Warriors and Revolutionaries? Is it the memory of winners or of losers? Of rich or poor? Of the academic or the shaman in her mountain vastness recalling a noble race of brown people before the coming of the white?

Charlson Ong 1)

What is a Filipino race? The question today seems absurd, if we understand race as a social construct: a fabrication of biological origins and human predispositions that have no scientific basis. Most scholars would agree with this basic premise: that every claim to racial identity and difference lays claim to a myth of scientific “truth” that has been either discredited or identified as particularly susceptible to ideological manipulation. Even the social science most closely

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associated with the idea of race has felt it necessary to publicly distance itself from its original object of inquiry, and to subject it to a rigorous historical reading. Thus in the American Anthropological Association’s Statement on Race, passed by the executive board in 1998, we read:

“Race” thus evolved as a worldview, a body of prejudgments that distorts our ideas about human differences and group behavior. Racial beliefs constitute myths about the diversity in the human species and about the abilities and behavior of people homogenized into “racial” categories. The myths fused behavior and physical features together in the public mind, impeding our comprehension of both biological variations and cultural behavior, implying that both are genetically determined. Racial myths bear no relationship to the reality of human capabilities or behavior. Scientists today find that reliance on such folk beliefs about human differences in research has led to countless errors.

“Statement on Race” [American Anthropological Association 1998]

This clarification, along with a significant bibliography on the role of anthropology and the study of race in furthering colonial undertakings and imperialist endeavors, allows us to correct the aforementioned “errors” of fact and judgment inherent in the concept of race, by returning such errors to the historical specificity from which they emerged — the genocide and depopulation of native Americans, the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the depredations of commercial war in Asia and the Americas, the rise of colonial states in Asia, the scramble for Africa, and the First World War, to name only the most familiar ones. And yet, historical revision and cultural critique can neither resurrect the past nor change the “truth” for which people have killed and died. This observation, however banal, leads us to consider the stark differences between the ways we narrate the histories of race as a social construct today, and the way race rhetoric narrates and stakes its claim to truth on its own counter-history, which is the subject of this article.

In recent years, scholars in American and U.S. Ethnic Studies, as well as Philippine and postcolonial studies, have shown us the central role of racism and race prejudice in the making of U.S. Empire, particularly in the 1898 U.S. War with Spain and the Philippine-American War (1899–1902). While Philippine historians have long been attentive to the institutional and cultural racism of U.S. officials and magistrates throughout the early decades of U.S. colonial rule, later debates on U.S. participation in colonial genocide, along with the unfavorable comparison of the Philippine-American War with colonial wars in Africa and U.S. wars in Southeast Asia (particularly Vietnam), brought to task both the “benevolent” aims of U.S. institutions and the “positive” effects of the U.S. colonial legacy [see Francisco 1973; Miller 1984; Blanco 2005; 109–115; Rodriguez 2009: 98–149]. This has allowed a new generation of scholars to explore the complex ramifications of racial discourse in the Philippines as well as the Philippine diaspora, whether it concerns the postcolonial displacement of racism onto Philippine indigenous and

2) For a contrary opinion, see May [1991] and Linn [2000: 322–328].
ethnic minorities in elite nationalism [Salman 2001; Aguilar 2005; Kramer 2006]; the racialized and gendered character of the globalizing service sector, composed of workers without the protection or rights of citizenship [Parreñas 2003; Tadiar 2009]; or the race and gender formations of Filipina/o-Americans in the U.S. [Bonus 2000; Campomanes 1995: 145–200; Le Espiritu 1993; Manalansan 2003; Rodriguez 2009; See 2009]. While my study draws on these and other works, my primary interest lies in the hidden histories that racial conflict and partisanship seek to tell, and the deep affinities these histories share in a time of war. Posed in the form of a question, that question would be: in our haste to expose the hidden histories of economic exploitation, imperialist ideology, and colonial depredation, all of which employ categories of race for their ideological justification, is it possible that we miss or disregard the stakes of the rank and file who take up the banner of race as a way to understand the present?

This article takes as its point of departure this disparity between the empirical poverty of race and its survival, even growth, as a way of understanding history and politics — or more specifically, history as politics and politics as history. What interests me primarily is how race as a form of praxis is too often and easily ascribed to a discredited science that came into vogue during the nineteenth century: a science that adopted and vulgarized one or more theories of scientific positivism, evolutionism, or orthogenesis, and that served the cynical imperialist doctrines of Europe and the United States on the eve of World War I. While race rhetoric certainly drew its authority from scientific positivism, its spokespeople also invoked the fields of law, philosophy, and religion. For most people, race was not a question to be resolved by scientific investigation, but a weapon in a war or conflict between unequal opponents. Not surprisingly, questions around the existence or impossibility of a Filipino race were most fully debated and developed in a time of war — the 1896 Philippine Revolution, and the 1899 Philippine-American War, which began just after the outbreak of war between the U.S. and Spain in 1898.

Three paradoxes frame this understanding of race formation in the late Spanish colonial period and the two phases of the Philippine Revolution, which ended with the fall of the First Philippine Republic and 40 years of U.S. colonial rule. The first is the contradiction between the relative liberalization of various economic and social reforms promoted by the Spanish colonial state in the 1880s and the emergence of the most vicious racism expressed by Spanish officials and writers in the same period. The second is the contradiction between the understanding among most ethnologists at the end of the nineteenth century, Philippine-born as well as European, that there was no such thing as a Filipino race, and the predominance of race rhetoric in revolutionary and messianic movements. The third is the radical disjunction between the stated aims and strategies of U.S. benevolent assimilation as it was formulated by U.S. leaders at the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, and the pursuit of the same war by the military rank and file as a genocidal campaign against the native population. Not coincidentally, these

3) For recent studies on the discourse and rhetoric of race in this period, see Salman [2001], Rafael [2000], Aguilar [2005] and Kramer [2006].
genocidal campaigns were also framed by the rhetoric of race and racism, but in a very different way from the race rhetoric of the Philippine Commission that governed the archipelago during the first five years of U.S. rule. The full-blown expression of Spanish colonial racism, expressed in cultural terms, the appearance and persistence of the idea of a Filipino race, and the hidden signification of “benevolent assimilation” as genocide frame this study of race rhetoric at the turn of the century and its role in fashioning a historical memory for political purposes, as well as creating or enforcing certain forms of historical amnesia. To borrow a phrase from Lisa Lowe, each race formation propels an “economy of affirmation and forgetting,” both in the intersection and divergence of each from the establishment and exercise of imperial U.S. hegemony [2006: 206].

From Implicit to Explicit Colonial Racism

In John Schumacher’s synthetic history of the Propaganda Movement for colonial reforms by the Filipino expatriate students and editors living in Spain during the 1880s, the author observes that the coalescence of anti-Spanish sentiment and the outbreak of the 1896 Philippine Revolution did not occur in a vacuum. The 1868 opening of the Suez Canal, the 1872 Cavite rebellion (which led to the exile of prominent Philippine-born creoles and mestizos (mixed-blood) to Europe), the 1887 publication of Jose Rizal’s Noli me Tangere, and the representation of the indigenous tribes of the Philippines during the 1887 Philippine Exposition in Madrid, all served as the primary catalysts for the spread of popular discontent, and its convergence with the rancor of the native-born educated classes for their unjust persecution [Schumacher [1972]1997: 40-104]. All of these events also contributed to attuning these educated classes to the larger contradiction emerging in the Philippines, in which the impetus for economic liberalization and industrial development foundered on the continuity of colonial society — based as it was on a caste-like hierarchy of peninsular Spaniards, creoles, mestizos, Indios, and Chinese (each assigned different privileges and duties); and a system of political expediency that gave colonial officials and religious missionaries wide latitude in their interpretation and exercise of the law [see Blanco 2009: 64-94]. In this historical context, individual acts and independent events took on the added symbolic meaning of pointing toward the future direction of colonial policy as a whole in the archipelago. As national martyr Jose Rizal so succinctly put it in his famous 1889 essay “The Philippines a Century Hence”: “The batteries are being charged little by little, and if the prudence of the government does not give vent to the grievances that are accumulating, the fatal spark may one day fly” [cited in La Solidaridad I 1996: 434].

Schumacher’s account, based as it is on a close reading of works by members of the so-called “enlightened” or ilustrado generation of Philippine expatriates studying in Europe after 1872, rightly stresses the influence of Spanish republicanism, German enlightenment, and economic liberalism on these writers, all of which drew them into the contentious debates waged in the public press regarding the relationship of Spain to their native land. It is in the context of these debates that the early ilustrado interest in the history of Filipinos as either a
race or collection of races inhabiting the archipelago takes shape. At the same time, however, these influences themselves must be examined against the explicit racist character of the modern colonial state, because it is only this racist character that explains the outbreak of peninsular Spanish cultural racism that propelled ilustrado scholarship from the very beginning.

Religious missionaries from the colonial period never ceased to remark on the relatively “peaceful” conquest and colonization of the archipelago: the Spanish king Philip II went so far as to mandate that the conquest be referred to as a “pacification,” owing to the exemplary prudence of certain conquistadores and the strategic deployment of religious missionaries. With rare exceptions [e.g., see Constantino 1975; Corpuz 1989], modern scholars concur that no genocide or wholesale slaughter of indigenous inhabitants took place as they did in the Americas and Caribbean, and that religious missionaries from within the first 30 years of the conquest began to provide legal sanctions against (many forms of) institutionalized slavery and for limiting Spanish contact with the natives (a situation that almost always resulted in the abuse of power and enslavement).

Such considerations have led many to wonder what accounts for the specificity of Spanish colonial racism in the nineteenth century. Should one begin, as Aníbal Quijano does, with the time of the Spanish conquest of the Americas, from which the colonial system justified and managed from top to bottom a division and hierarchy between the conquerors and the conquered? 4) Following this view, any presumed benevolence or cultural sensitivity the early conquistadores and missionaries may have shown neither contradicts nor qualifies the coerced incorporation of indigenous communities into colonial society, which took place along the lines of a fundamental, racial disparity between the privileges of the conquerors and the duties and obligations of the conquered. 5)

4) The division of manual slave and intellectual management labor, Quijano would argue, inheres in the colonization of the Americas from the fifteenth century, a model that was repeated throughout the world until after World War II [Quijano 2000: 534-535]. One may go further, adding that the imposition and enforcement of this order by conquest and “just war” on the Indians of the Americas and the indigenous peoples of the Philippines acquired the expression of legal sanction by the Salamancan Dominican priest and jurist Francisco de Vitoria (widely considered one of the founding fathers of international law). “Indeed,” writes legal scholar Anthony Anghie, “in the final analysis, the most unequivocal proposition Vitoria advances as to the character of the sovereign is that the sovereign, the entity empowered to wage a just war, cannot, by definition, be an Indian. Since the Indians are by definition incapable of waging a just war, they exist within the Vitorian framework only as violators of the law” [1996: 330].

5) While one may debate whether it is proper or anachronistic to call this division and hierarchy of labor and privilege “racist,” by the end of the seventeenth century the use of the word and concept of race to distinguish aristocratic lineage and training (“breeding”) from the heritage and customs of the vulgar populace was also used to distinguish between people inhabiting different territories and environments. For a distinction between “race-thinking” prior to the nineteenth century and scientific racism, see Arendt [1994]. These distinctions were already common to debates in Spain’s overseas territories over the ordination of priests and bishops who were identified as creoles (castas) or natives, under the criterion of a candidate’s limpia de sangre [see Poole 1999: 360-370]. In France, François Bernier wrote his Nouvelle division de la terre par les différentes espèces ou races qui
demands that we study race according to the historical moment in which race as a reification of human diversity — race as an idea — first takes place: “the idea,” she argues, “that a human social group is a natural formation grew up in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” [Guillaumin [1980]1995:67]. Following Guillaumin’s assertion, race and racism are thoroughly modern ideas of recent invention, which one can only apply to past centuries anachronistically.

This divergence of opinion, however, becomes secondary, perhaps “academic,” when we try to approach the question of race as a form of praxis — that is, participation and agency in a field of laws, decrees, discourses, institutions, and contingencies (both natural and human) that create or unmake colonial hegemony. However ancient or modern race may have been considered as a form of administration in the seventeenth century or a science in the nineteenth century, we must bear in mind that in both cases, race attempts to lay claim to a knowledge or science of history. It not only attempts an account of human difference, but it does so in and through a narrative whose function it was to inform the prudence of colonial practices — decrees, policies, and their enforcement or disregard. Foucault links the two approaches to “race-thinking” and racism “proper” by emphasizing how both enact a practice of politicizing history under the guise of historicizing political relationships, which go under the name of counter-histories:

Although this [counter-historical] discourse speaks of races, and although the term “race” appears at a very early stage, it is quite obvious that the word “race” itself is not pinned to a stable biological meaning. And yet the word is not completely free-floating.... One might say — and this [seventeenth-century] discourse does say — that two races exist whenever one writes the history of two groups that do not, at least to begin with, have the same language, or, in many cases, the same religion. The two groups form a unity and a single polity only as a result of wars, invasions, victories, and defeats, or, in other words, acts of violence. The only link between them is the link established by the violence of war. [2003:77]

When we turn our eyes to the theater of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines, two observations regarding the idea of race in colonial practice present themselves. The first is that the sheer diversity of ethno-linguistic and social groups that came under the administration of

\[l’habitent, in 1684, in which the “new division of the Earth extend[ed] the concept [of breeding] to mankind in general, but also focuses, as modern racial distinctions do, on fixed physical features...” [cited in Boulle 2003: 15]. Bernier, writes the historian Pierre Boulle, also insisted: “the transmission of characteristics by inheritance predominates over environmental or cultural determinants” [ibid.]. The same year as Bernier’s article was published King Louis XIV passed the French Black Code (Code Noir), one of the most comprehensive forms of legislation on black slavery and anti-Semitism of the modern period [ibid.: 26 [n. 44]].

6) Guillaumin’s argument follows Hannah Arendt’s earlier distinction between “race-thinking” and nineteenth-century “racism” proper. See Arendt [1994: 38-64].
Spain's claim to the islands — from the many indigenous tribes that refused or resisted Christianization by the religious missionaries, to the Chinese traders that maintained the internal domestic economy, to the regional differences of the pacified populations universally labeled *Indios*, not to mention all the human combinations produced among these groups and Spaniards — precluded any easy, unqualified statements about racial difference. In fact, this very heterogeneity was invoked as the primary reason that the islands were prohibited from electing representatives to the Spanish parliament (Cortes) in the nineteenth century. The second observation is that, in the aftermath of the Seven Years War between Britain and France (1756–63), during which the British temporarily occupied Spain's colonial cities Havana and Manila, the colonial government launched a project of administrative and economic reform that lasted all the way to the end of Spanish rule, and the reforms initiated by the colonial state *could not but* reorganize colonial society along explicitly racial lines.

Even though Great Britain returned Havana and Manila to Spain, the Seven Years War made plain the fact that Spain lacked the necessary force to repel an invasion by Britain in the Caribbean or the Pacific and that the wealth produced by Spain's right of conquest from the sixteenth century was not sufficient to allow Spain to compete with other European powers in the expansion of world trade of the eighteenth. This recognition served as the basis of Bourbon colonial reform, whose task it would be to create a modern colonial state in the overseas vicerealties. Yet while we tend to characterize this reform in broad strokes as the corollary of economic liberalization, religious secularization, and flirtation with admitting political representatives into the Spanish legislature (Cortes) after 1812, the reality was more complicated. On the one hand, the government had to reform the colonial Treasury (Hacienda); stimulate the production of export commodities; open Manila and other port cities to world trade; circulate information and communication through media (which would lead to the opening of new markets); and generally find more effective ways of drafting or soliciting and profiting from native or (in the case of Cuba) slave labor. On the other hand, the colonial state had to centralize economic and political authority in fewer hands, the better to harness and manage the consequences of social transformation [Elizalde Pérez-Grueso 2002: 123–142; Fradera 2004: 307–320].

The colonial dilemma in turn engendered at least two possible attitudes toward the racial separation and hierarchy of Spanish and native subjects. To follow the structural parallel, on the one hand, Spanish advisors and administrators imagined native subjects playing a more assertive role in providing for the economic, military, and even “spiritual” welfare of the colony. This would involve the mastery of skills that could only be learned through an educational system; the creation of new needs that would provide the incentive (or coercion) to labor; the monetarization of all forms of tribute payment; the fomentation of public opinion; the Christianization of non-tribute paying populations; and the enlistment of native and mestizo priests in the administration of parishes. On the other hand, the colonial state had to ensure against future attacks by both rival European powers and the threat of internal anti-colonial revolt. This latter threat became all the more pressing after the 1793 Haitian revolution, which
was led and propelled by African slaves, as well as the Latin American wars of independence between 1810–21. For colonial military officers and Spanish missionaries, these dangers warranted an even more pronounced segregation of colonial subjects from access to any and all institutional forms of authority.

One might say that the contradiction of these two tendencies constituted the “late colonial dialectic” of the nineteenth century, in which racial consciousness for both Spaniards and colonial subjects arose in the ever-pervasive urgency of preserving Spanish “prestige” (*prestigio*) in the islands over and against Spain’s increasing dependence on the colonial population for its welfare and security. The loyalty of native and Chinese populations to Spanish rule becomes tied to the questioned (in)capacity of native and Chinese mestizo priests to administer parishes over Spanish religious missionaries; or native and mestizo military officers to wield authority; or the capacity of a vernacular language like Tagalog to effectively communicate the Gospel to the common folk. Then in 1840, Spanish authorities realized that the same racial exclusion that the colonial administration had applied to native priests was being applied to Spaniards in the by-laws of a religious confraternity dedicated to the devotion of St. Joseph in the southern Tagalog region of Luzon [Ileto 1989: 29–73; Sweet 1970: 94–119]. The suppression of this confraternity, under the leadership of Apolinario de la Cruz, would lead to the massacre of up to a thousand devotees [Ileto 1989: 62].

Sinibaldo de Mas’s 1841 secret report to the king perhaps best expresses the perceived urgency of the colonial state to pursue an explicit racial policy in conformity with the permanence of colonial rule in the archipelago. His three recommendations were: 1) the reduction to the point of elimination of the Spanish Creole population; 2) the “voluntary” obedience of all colored people (*gente de color*) to all whites; and 3) the overhaul of the colonial administration, which included the prohibition of colored people from positions of authority [Mas 1963: 50]. Decades before the *indio Filipino* became a subject of anthropology, the racialization of colonial subjects as “colored people” allowed colonial administrators to homogenize its target of reform under a common identity. In asking what measures, short of enslavement (which was forbidden by the Spanish monarch from the time of the conquest and colonization of the archipelago), would lead colonial subjects to accept their subservience and inferiority, Mas was already engaged in the process of naturalizing the relations of Spanish superiority/native inferiority, years before Charles Darwin and the Comte de Gobineau would provide their theses on natural selection and racial pedigree.

In the case of the Philippines, then, we see how the *implicit* racial character of colonial hierarchy between conquerors and conquered no longer sufficed to maintain order while coping

7) For an extended version of this argument, see Blanco [2009: 64–94].

8) Regarding the native clergy, Mas writes: “It is of the greatest important to break their pride completely, and that in all places and occasions they consider the Spaniard as their superior, not their equal” (Es preciso quebrantar enteramente su orgullo, y que en todos lugares y ocasiones consideren al español como señor, no como igual) [Mas 1963: 50].
with the social and economic transformations taking place in Southeast Asia. The project of reform would have to render explicit racial division and hierarchy in colonial policies and institutions, even as the colonial state introduced liberal reforms in the economy and society. The reversal of colonial policy to secularize religious missions into parishes, the Spanish military expeditions to “pacify” Muslim Jolo and Mindanao, the “reconquest” of the mountain tribes of Luzon for the purpose of subjecting these groups to Spain’s financial monopolies, the return of the Jesuits for the purpose of evangelizing the unincorporated mountain tribes and Muslim populations, the vacillating policies regarding Chinese immigration (from exclusion to assimilation) in the nineteenth century, and the stimulation of agriculture through the land tenancy of Chinese mestizos (who proceeded to sub-contract their lands to native labor), may not individually exhibit a fully formed “racist ideology.” Yet they brought Spaniards into ever-closer contact with the subject populations, forcing the former to measure these populations against their presumed capacity to increase economic productivity and political security. Even as reform initiatives became internally differentiated, the overall attempt to move from “theoretical” to “actual” centralization entailed the penetration and ramification of racial division and hierarchy into all spheres of society.9)

The transition from the implicitly racial character of colonial rule to the explicit racism of the colonial state adds a dimension of desperation to the otherwise smug sense of racial superiority expressed by peninsular Spanish writers in the Philippines during the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1887, during the Philippine Exposition that was at that moment transpiring in Madrid, the Spanish journalist Pablo Feced, otherwise known as Quiquiap, published what would become the exemplary artifact of Spanish racism, “Them and Us” (“Ellos y nosotros”).10) At first sight, the author seems merely content to parrot the same stupidities developed by the social Darwinism of his more illustrious European counterparts over the course of the last century. Additionally, he draws on the well-known longstanding antagonism between Spanish peninsular missionaries and the native-born secular clergy in the Philippines, as well as more recent attempts by officials to bring Spanish traditionalism to bear on the formation of colonial policy. Yet while more recent critics have struggled to give us a more nuanced portrait of both Feced and his time, it remains to this day for many readers the almost incontrovertible proof of the backwardness, ignorance, and malice of Spanish authoritarianism and traditionalism, even as a new century of imperial powers came to obliterate any memory of Spain in most of the extra-European world.

At the same time, however, a closer look at Quiquiap’s sketch illustrates how truly off-center this dichotomy between colonizer and colonial subject would have appeared to readers of the late nineteenth century. The disjunction between the expression of anti-native racism in the colonial and peninsular Spanish press, on the one hand, and the changing social conditions of the

9) The transition from theoretical to actual centralization has been analyzed by Eliodoro Robles [1969].
colony in the latter half of the nineteenth century, on the other hand becomes clear when we
highlight some of these major changes. To begin with, the 1840s saw the full-blown entrance of
foreign commerce into Manila Bay. The 1863 education decree mandated the opening of public
schools and the training of teachers. The abolition of the state tobacco monopoly and the
subsequent entrance of private entrepreneurship in the tobacco industry occurred in 1880.
Finally, we must mention the formal abolition of caste-distinction through the abolition of tribute
in 1884. When we string these events together, we can imagine how the central feature that had
characterized colonial society from its inception — the division and segregation of the
colonizers from their colonial subject populations — had reached a threshold of collapse. As
Edgar Wickberg has pointed out in his pioneering study, the Chinese-native mestizo
emblematized this breakdown of social hierarchy on multiple levels: s/he served at once as
tenant and rentier, pupil and teacher (particularly in the arts), acolyte and parish priest, equally
“Hispanized” and “Filipinized” without clearly belonging to either class status.11) Strangely, yet
not coincidentally, this figure of great significance in the changing relationship between
Spaniards and native-born colonial subjects is not even mentioned in Feced’s essay, even as he
goes to great lengths to denounce the mountain tribes as incapable and unfit for the arts of
civilization, comparable only to Chinese “coolies,” “blacks,” and “gypsies” [Feced [1887] 1998].
The naturalization of these groups as “people of color” was anticipated by Mas: Quiquiap
merely adds the findings of physical anthropology to the polemic.

The reaffirmation of a sovereign division between Spaniard and native subject thus appears
at a moment when the institutional bases of such a division were perceived to be in crisis, and
the implicit racial foundations of colonial rule had to manifest themselves in explicit racist
policies and practices.12) It is at such a moment that Quiquiap invokes the sign of race in order
to narrate a counter-history.

What does this mean? First, race introduces or reintroduces the theme of unfinished war
or conflict to the analysis of civil society: in this case, the prestige (prestigio) and privileges of the
conquerors over the subjection of the conquered. “Spain,” Quiquiap writes, “implanted its
dominion here from almost the first day: it organized its administration as best as it could, it gave
to the subjected race, after many years of contact, a certain social domesticity, it rescued
[Philippine natives] for the most part from primitive backwardness and the darkness of the

11) See also Fast and Richardson [1979], Corpuz [1989], B. Anderson [1988: 4-8], and Aguilar [1998:
156-188].
12) As María Dolores Elizalde reminds us, debates regarding the capacity of indigenous colonized groups
to learn the arts of “civilization” need to be placed in the context of the late nineteenth century
emergence of imperialist appropriation of lands and their sanction in international law. The 1885
Berlin Conference provided the international legal framework for imperial conquest and colonization,
which coincided with the penetration of European military powers in Africa and Asia. In this context,
Spanish anxiety over native “capacity” for civilization merely distorts and masks anxiety over
Spain’s “capacity” to maintain the remnants of its empire when faced with the military and industrial
supremacy of other European nations. See Elizalde Pérez-Grueso [1992: 133-222], and Blanco [2004:
31-32].
jungle, liberating them from piracy and the Muslim scourge...”[cited in Sánchez-Gómez 1998: 317, italics added].

The invocation of the original rights of conquest mixes freely with the more familiar references to both the emancipatory rhetoric of the liberal revolutions as well as social Darwinism. In fact, at a certain point the historical violence of one becomes completely conflated with the “natural” violence of the other: “The law insofar as it is a conventional and manufactured thing, may attempt to erase the differences (between us and them); but Nature, insurmountable in its power, casts down every bureaucratic edifice ... and always, in the end, portrays the Spaniard standing proud and straight, and the Malayan submissive and on his knees” [ibid.].

Second, the theme of racial division as inseparably tied to the sense of an unfinished war, in addition to serving as a critical history, also serves as a partisan history, a call to arms in the present, to enjoin or conscript that history’s audience to an unresolved event. This involves the performance of certain sacrifices to that side in order reap the spoils of the future victor, as well as the division within a given population between one’s friends and enemies with the question of life at stake. The repeated instance of qualifiers in Quióquiap’s editorial gestures toward the incomplete state of conquest and colonization: a “certain social domesticity,” the gift of civilization “for the most part,” endowed to a subjected [sumisa] race. On a larger level, the unresolved and partisan aspect of this history feeds directly into Quióquiap’s call for the necessity of Special Laws for the archipelago, which would formalize the colonial nature of Spain’s relationship to the Philippines: “No one [in Spain] knows the primitive and markedly infantile character of these herds, [determined] ... by inescapable physiological factors, which hence demand ... a special policy [política especial], adapted to their special nature [especial naturaleza] [Feced 1888: 361, italics added]. As we know, no “special policy” or legislation, which Spain promised to grant its remaining colonies after the Latin American wars of Independence, was ever produced. Even if Spain had managed to enact such legislation, the very differentiation of the law in Spain from that of the colonies could not but take on an explicitly

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13) España implantó aquí su dominio casi desde el primer día, organizó como pudo su administración, dio a esta raza sumisa, tras largos años de contacto, cierta domesticidad social, la sacó en gran parte del atraso primitivo y de la oscuridad de las selvas, la libertó de la piratería y la morisma.

14) “La ley convencional y artificiosa podrá pretender borrar esas diferencias; pero la Naturaleza, inconostable en su poder, echa por tierra todo el edificio oficioso, y ... siempre, allá en el fondo del cuadro, se destaca altivo y de pie el castilla, sumiso y de rodillas el malayo.” Quióquiap employs this argument to criticize the policy that the governor generals of his time had adopted, which was to invite and entertain guests at the governor general’s Malacañang Palace, regardless of their class or geographical origin. As Governor General Carlos María de la Torre (1869-1871) was known to say to his guests: “Aquí no hay mas que españoles,” here there are only Spaniards. See Feced [[1887]1998].

15) Elsewhere, Josep Fradera has underlined the inseparability of economic liberalization in the Philippines and the “reconquest” of the archipelago’s hinterlands as well as southern regions, which had remained economically marginalized by the Spanish tobacco monopoly until 1880 [see 2004: 314].

16) No se conoce el carácter primitivo y acentuadamente infantil de estas muchedumbres ... [determinado] por factores fisiológicos ineludibles, que demandan por tanto una política especial, adaptada a su especial naturaleza.
racist character. In Cuba and Puerto Rico, the main obstacle to the enactment of a special legislation was the emerging population of “free” blacks and mulattoes who claimed the same rights and privileges as the white landowning Creoles. In the Philippines, the “savage” and “un-Christianized” state of the archipelago rendered most native subjects unfit for public office, even on a reduced colonial scale [Fradera 1999: 71–93; Celdrán Ruano 1994: 95–126].

The politicization of colonial history, in and through the racial abjection of colonial subjects and Feced’s recourse to identifying Spaniards as the emissaries of “the divine law of progress” [Feced 1888: 226], thus corresponds to an impasse in the contradictions of the colonial state. On the one hand, the liberalization of the economy was forcing Spain to allow natives a greater place and participation in certain aspects of colonial society. “The Filipino is a Spaniard,” Feced would say with all the sarcasm he could muster, “he is our compatriot” [Feced [1887] 1998: 317]. Yet in doing so, the colonial government threatened to cut itself adrift from the anchor of Spanish authority from the time of the conquest — the right of conquest, both temporal and spiritual. Beyond mere claims about the survival of the fittest and random musings on the difference between primitive and civilized people thus lies another claim about sovereign right and its implications. As Quioquiap says elsewhere: “Ay! The laws of history are as ineluctable as those of nature, and it is through these harsh laws that all cultured peoples have passed. Everywhere in the world the scepter has served as the first instrument of progress, and the scepter signifies a club” [Feced 1888: 114].

Race, Colonialism, and the Concept of the Political

While native-born Philippine propagandists like Graciano López Jaena saw it necessary to respond to the calumnies of Feced and others with a point-for-point rebuttal of their claims, Jose Rizal’s response was more complex. As Rizal wrote to his German friend and fellow ethnologist Ferdinand Blumentritt in 1888: “I do not fight seriously with such persons, for I need my nerves and my intelligence for better causes. From the fight only filth could be gathered and perhaps something worse. I shall not use my time and my life to attack the prejudices of Quioquiap and his kind, for that is useless labor” [Rizal 1992: vol. 2, 246]. And yet, it would be disingenuous to believe that Rizal ignored it. When publicists like Wenceslao Retana began accusing Rizal’s writings of fomenting racial division, Rizal wrote to Blumentritt: “Let [Retana] say what he wants, but let us see. Who among the Filipinos and Spaniards wrote the first insulting books? Who started slandering? Who was the first to compare people to animals? Who tried first to humiliate an obedient people? … If he believes that my book is an emanation of racial hatred, how then should I describe the books of Cañamaque, San Agustin, and Sinibaldo de Mas, and the writings of Quioquiap, Barrantes, and the rest?” [ibid.: 203–204]. Rizal’s private correspondence

17) ¡Ay! Las leyes de la historia son tan ineludibles como las de la naturaleza, y por estas asperezas han pasado todos los pueblos cultos. El cetro ha sido en todas partes el primer instrumento de progreso, y cetro significa palo.
here anticipates and illuminates the peculiar appearance of a Filipino race in his famous essay “The Philippines a Century Hence.”

What constitutes a Filipino race in Rizal’s essay? A century of commentary on this essay by scholars and politicians alike does not make the answer an easy one. One of the more recent compelling arguments appears in an article by Filomeno Aguilar tracing the ilustrado origins of race-thinking. In it, the author highlights the influential role of Ferdinand Blumentritt, the German ethnologist, in advancing the (now discredited) theory of ethnic “migration waves” to the archipelago. Rizal and his fellow ilustrados presumably used this theory to distinguish the growth of a pre-Hispanic, lowland Tagalog civilization from the nomadic and semi-nomadic Negritos and mountain tribes of the hinterlands—a necessary distinction, Aguilar maintains, in that it allowed Rizal and his fellow ilustrados to read history against the grain of the narrative of Western progress and civilization. The ancient Tagalogs, so the argument would run, had contributed and participated in Asian maritime commerce and society centuries before the arrival of the Spaniards. As Rizal’s essay, “The Philippines a Century Hence,” as well as his annotations to the publication of Antonio de Morga’s 1609 history of the Philippines both emphasize, the Tagalogs had their own laws, writing system, religion, and settlements. In conclusion, such a vindication of a lowland Tagalog civilization would serve not only to refute the common Spanish presumption that Philippine history began with the arrival of the conquistadores, but also to suggest that an indigenous or in any case ancient racial identity had possessed (and might one day reclaim) a prior, competing claim to the future welfare of the islands, which diverged from Spain’s.

Reading Rizal’s essay as a by-product of Blumentritt’s theory of migration waves (an assumption that will be questioned later), Aguilar derives two main implications for the production of race rhetoric among the ilustrados and the colonial elites under the American regime that followed. The first was that the allegations of the Philippine native incapacity for civilization spewed by Quioquiap and others neglected the possibility that native industry, commerce, and creativity had suffered, not benefited, from Spanish “civilization.” The second was that the alleged savagery and ungovernability of the Luzon highland and southern Muslim populations could be explained away by the simple fact that they did not necessarily belong to the same ethnic or racial stock as the Tagalogs. These two implications would determine the two main lines of development of race-thinking and racism among nationalists in the early twentieth century. The first resulted in the narration of a “counter-history” that sought to resurrect pre-Hispanic past glories while decrying the pernicious legacy of Spanish repression and obscurantism. The second was the displacement of Spanish racism against the native colonial subject as Indios, onto the Negritos, Igorot, Ifugao, and Tinguian mountain tribes of northern Luzon as well as the sultanates of the Muslim South.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{18}\) This second argument appears in an earlier work by Michael Salman, in which the author demonstrates how Filipino elites reproduced U.S. discourses of benevolence and racism, while reorienting the object of uplift from Filipinos as colonial subjects to the racialized minorities of the region.
Yet Aguilar’s claim concerning the derivativeness of ilustrado thought in the nineteenth century flies in the face of what is most original in Rizal’s essay, something that Rizal’s contemporary readers (including Quiouquiap) would not have failed to grasp. This is especially surprising, given that Aguilar himself expresses an intuition of this insight: “given his political project,” Aguilar writes, “Rizal posed a question different from that of Blumentritt, who was concerned with classifying and ordering ‘the races’ found in the Philippine islands. From the ethnologist’s tacit question of ‘What races are found in the Philippines?’ Rizal drew and transposed the information to answer the question with which he grappled: ‘Who are we?’” [2005: 608, italics added]. Strangely, instead of following this insight, Aguilar devotes the rest of his analysis to interpolating the gaps and ambiguities of Rizal’s writing as evidence that his thought did, in fact, unquestioningly follow Blumentritt’s categorization of racial types in the archipelago. Such an aspersion implies that Rizal’s silences make him complicit in the compromised nationalism of the educated elite during and after the Philippine revolution. Rizal’s complicity, if we are to believe Aguilar, makes of him a pioneer of what historian Paul Kramer would call “nationalist colonialism,” an argument for independence among elite nationalists during the first two decades of U.S. rule in the Philippines, based on the presumed knowledge and capacity of Philippine elites to govern and subject their “own” minorities.

By contrast, a close reading of Rizal’s essay shows that for Rizal, the concept of race depended less on an acknowledgment and study of what he calls the scientific or quasi-scientific “physical forces” that are responsible for the fashioning of races than on the “moral forces” that set these physical forces into motion. Here is the key passage:

If the population is not assimilated to the Spanish nation, if the dominators do not enter into the spirit of their inhabitants, if equitable laws and free and liberal reforms do not make each forget that they belong to different races, or if both peoples are not amalgamated to constitute one mass, socially and politically, homogeneous ... some day the Philippines will fatally and infallibly declare themselves independent.... Necessity is the most powerful divinity the world knows, and necessity is the result of physical forces set in operation by moral ones. [La Solidaridad I 1996: 32]

mountain tribes [2001: 259–270]. The development of Salman and Aguilar’s arguments find their full force in a recent work by Paul Kramer, who documents the shift from a U.S. promoted “imperial indigenism” to a Philippine “nationalist colonialism.” For a parallel argument made in the context of postcolonial India, see Guha [1997: 100–151] and Chatterjee [1993: 131–166].

19) “Ultimately, nationalist colonialism ‘internalized’ empire by arguing that those who were civilized among the colonized — in this case, the Hispanicized Filipino descendants of a ‘third wave’ of invaders — had the capacity, right, and duty to rule over those who were not civilized. The justification for, and means toward, national self-fulfillment would be founding internal empire” [Kramer 2006: 73].

20) Si no se asimila su población á la patria española, si los dominadores no se apropián el espíritu de sus habitantes, si leyes equitativas y reformas francas y liberales no les hacen olvidar á los unos y á los otros de que son de razas diferentes, ó si ambos pueblos no se funden para constituir una masa social y politicamente homogénea que no esté trabajada por opuestas tendencias y antagónicos.
The ethnological coordinates of a Filipino race throughout Rizal’s essay remain fuzzy and ambiguous: in one passage, he identifies Filipinos as “Malays”; in another, he speaks of “Filipino races” in the plural. Yet even as the putative scientific coordinates of a Filipino race remain slippery and imprecise, the historico-political ones acquire a notable consistency and force as the essay progresses. However one wants to theorize the existence of a Filipino race, Rizal argues, the fact is that racial division, the identification of two races in conflict, has become the basis of public opinion and colonial policy:

With the native inhabitants having arrived at this state of moral debasement, disenchanted and filled with self-loathing, an attempt was made to give the ultimate coup de grâce ... to reduce these individuals to a species of brawn, of brutes, beasts of burden, a form of humanity without intelligence and heart.... It was then made public, what was attempted was openly admitted, an insult to the entire race was made.... [cited in ibid.: 378, italics added]

However one wants to theorize the existence of a Filipino race, the fact is that it has already become the basis for an emergent collective consciousness:

[But] at this point what [Spaniards] believed would be [the native Indio’s] death was precisely his salvation.... So many hardships were crowned with insults, and the lethargic spirit returned to life. The Indio’s sensitivity, his characteristic par excellence, was wounded, and if he once had the patience to suffer and die at the foot of a foreign flag, he had no such patience when those [Spaniards] for whom he died, repaid the sacrifice with insults and rubbish. At that point he began to examine himself little by little, and became conscious of his misfortune. [ibid., italics added] 21)

“Ancient enmities among different provinces have become erased by one and the same sore, a general affront addressed to an entire race,” he says at one point; “One and the same misfortune and the same abjection has united all the inhabitants of these islands,” he says later.

21) Llegado á este estado el rebajamiento moral de los habitantes, el desaliento, el disgusto de sí mismo, se quiso dar entonces el último golpe de gracia... para hacer de los individuos una especie de brazos, de brutos, de bestias de carga, así como una humanidad sin cerebro y sin corazón. Entonces dijose, dióse por admitido lo que se pretendía, se insultó á la raza.... Entonces esto que creyeron que iba á ser la muerte fué precisamente su salvación.... Tantos sufrimientos se colmaron con los insultos, y el aletargado espíritu volvió á la vida. La sensibilidad, la cualidad por excelencia del Indio, fué herida, y si paciencia tuvo para sufrir y morir al pie de una bandera extranjera, no la tuvo cuando aquel, por quien moría, le pagaba su sacrificio con insultos y sandeces. Entonces examinóse poco á poco, y conoció su desgracia.
The point of these assertions, for Rizal, is not the questioned orthodoxy of an academically generated racial science of migration waves, but rather the genealogy of racial consciousness — or, to be more specific, race as consciousness, race as a praxis of political historicism. To reiterate Rizal's words, "Necessity is the most powerful divinity the world knows, and necessity is the result of physical forces set in operation by moral ones." Like Quioquiap, Rizal's gesture towards another nineteenth century philosophy — this time, positivism — masks the voluntarism of "moral forces" to allow the presumed authority of Nature to dictate necessity and scientific fate (i.e., not Nature itself). To put it another way, colonialism does not simply reproduce an already existing difference or set of differences anchored in science and awaiting future discovery. Rather, colonial rule creates and ramifies differences that do not preexist the historical event of conquest and domination, and sets in motion identities that become tied to the historical themes of fall and redemption.

How does Rizal's political historicism compare and contrast with Quioquiap's? Like Quioquiap, Rizal imagines an irreducible and centuries-long conflict between colonial occupier and colonized subject, which inheres in the institutional racism of every colonial order. And like Quioquiap, Rizal's prose duplicitously pretends to address one audience when he is in fact addressing another [see Blanco 2004: 32-41]. The provocative character of Rizal's partisan history becomes clear in the concluding statement of the essay: "Spain! Will we have to tell the Philippines one day that you have no ears for their ills, and that if the Philippines wants to save itself it must redeem itself alone? [La Solidaridad II 1996: 32]. While Rizal's histrionic gesture here appears to be leveled at Spain, it also anticipates a future addressee, the Philippines, who awaits the bad news that Spain is not listening. As we know, the writings of Katipunan leader Andres Bonifacio and Philippine revolutionary prime minister Apolinario Mabini reflect the degree to which they understood themselves as the true addressees of Rizal's message.

Another feature that both Quioquiap and Rizal's works share is the erasure of both the Chinese and the mestizo in the anticipation of the irreducible dichotomy between the rulers and the ruled. This disavowal makes no sense if we try to understand it merely as Rizal's attempt to square some knowledge of his ethnic origins with the available categories of social classification of the time. Rather, Rizal was in fact trying to be systematic about his political historicism — a historicism that entailed the partisan division between rulers and ruled, in which the historical movement of consciousness substantiates the integrity of a race irrespective of its supposed biological moorings.

On a larger level, race as a form of colonialist and anti-colonial praxis recalls Carl Schmitt's classic study on the concept of the political, which he distinguished from other spheres of society.

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22) ¡España!, ¿le habremos de decir un día a Filipinas que no tienes oídos para sus males, y que si desea salvarse que se redima ella sola?

while at the same time providing their ultimate foundation (religion, economics, science, and culture). For Schmitt [2007], the concept of the political accounts for that threshold upon which all normative ideas that determine the terms of hegemony within (and between) these spheres cede to the “existential meaning” in which partisans face “a real combat situation with a real enemy” [ibid: 49]. For both Quiñoquiap and Rizal, science serves as a pretext for “existential questions” around the right of conquest or the right of revolution. It is these concerns, and the mythic past or messianic future that they engender, that determine the concept of race on the eve of the Philippine revolution.

“To Reiterate, There Is No Such Thing as a Filipino Race…”

In 1913, secretary of the Philippine Bureau of the Interior Dean Worcester sought to silence all future talk of a Filipino race through his exhaustive classification of native groups in the islands. Against Philippine assembly speaker Sergio Osmeña and the Nacionalista Party advocating independence from U.S. rule, Worcester argued that the Philippines was essentially unfit for self-government and that this essential unfitness derived from racial difference: “The Filipinos are not a nation, but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and peoples, and their loyalty is still of the tribal type” [cited in Kramer 2006: 123]. Worcester’s claim was revised several years later, when the eminent scholar and pro-U.S. advocate Dr. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera declared that the very concept of race and racial origins was itself “primitive,” and that its ideological manipulation far outweighed its contribution to scientific veracity.

We Filipinos should not continue our former error of speaking of our race, because there is no such

24) The relation of Schmitt’s concept of the political and the theory of partisanship to the question of race has been a frequent subject of debate. Political theorists like Slavoj Žižek and Chantal Mouffe, for example, speculate on the possibility of using Schmitt’s theory of partisanship against him, i.e., as a potentially progressive structuring principle of domestic and international relations [see Žižek 1999: 18–37; Mouffe 1999: 38–53]. For a sobering counter-assessment of this tendency, see Wolin [1990: 389–416]. Wolin rightly points out the inseparability of charismatic authority, the total state, and racial identity in Schmitt’s affiliation with the Nationalist-Socialist party (1933). As Schmitt himself writes: “We not only feel but also know from the most rigorous scientific insight that all justice is the law of a certain people. It is an epistemological truth that only whoever is capable of seeing the facts accurately … and of weighing impressions about people and things properly joins in the law-creating community of kith and kin in his own modest way and belongs to it existentially. Down, inside, to the deepest and most instinctive stirrings of his emotions … man stands in the reality of this belongingness of people and race” [Schmitt [1933] 2001: 51]. Or again: “We seek a commitment which is deeper, more reliable and more imbued with life than the deceptive attachment to the distorted letter of thousands of paragraphs of the law. Where else can it rest but in ourselves, and in our kin … all the questions and answers flow into the exigency of an ethnic identity without which a total leader-State could not stand its ground a single day” [ibid: 52]. These statements suggest that to propose the concept of the political cleansed of its racial moorings is pure mystification, whether one disavows the necessity of the conquest of the Americas for the foundation of a *jus publicum Europaeum* or one theorizes a racially neutral form of partisanship.
Filipino race. We are the result of the union and fusion of very different races.... We should not recall our origin, because it will be of no avail in strengthening our union, which should be our objective. The idea of race has always been invoked among us in order to brand some men with inferiority and to attribute superiority to others. Our origin should not engage our attention, but rather our orderly movement, our future. [Pardo de Tavera 1928: 341]

Pardo de Tavera's statement no doubt received inspiration from the rise of cultural anthropology, which had begun to dispute the kinds of claims associated with racial genealogies and physical anthropology's theories of orthogenesis, monogenesis, and polygenesis, as exercises in pure theoretical speculation. As early as 1911, the founder of cultural anthropology in the U. S. Franz Boas had declared: “The old idea of absolute stability of human types must ... evidently be given up, and with it the belief of the hereditary superiority of certain types over others” [1912: 103]. And yet, even as ilustrados like Pardo de Tavera debated theories of “migration waves” to the Philippines, Rizal's deployment of race as political historicism would pervade the 1896 Philippine revolution and its aftermath.

As we know, the first phase of the Philippine Revolution began in 1896, and led to the execution of Jose Rizal by firing squad for sedition. After a brief hiatus, the second phase of the Philippine Revolution coincided with the 1898 U. S. war with Spain, in which Spain agreed to sell the archipelago to the United States for the sum of $20 million before its colonial government in Manila collapsed against the combined U. S. and Philippine revolutionary forces. The U. S. takeover of the Philippines quickly succeeded the fall of the colonial government, with first president of the short-lived Philippine republic (1899–1900) and military general Emilio Aguinaldo, along with many of the leading officers of the revolution, being captured by the end of 1901. For most inhabitants, these years were characterized by chaos and catastrophe, with the U. S. would-be liberators launching military campaigns of genocidal proportions. It is in such a context that the political historicism of race war takes on increasingly spiritual and messianic proportions.

In Andres Bonifacio’s well known 1896 text, “Ang Dapat Mabatid ng mga Tagalog” (“What All Tagalogs Should Know”), the revolutionary leader begins with a retelling of the history of a Tagalog people (Katagalugan), reminiscent of Rizal’s own condensed history of the Philippines but with a focus on this people’s confrontation and deception by the “Spanish race,” “ang lahi ni Legaspi” [in Lumbera B. and Lumbera C. L. 1982: 93–94]. In this context the word lahi is used to represent a Filipino people bound by primordial ties as well as the desire for inde-

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25) Compare this statement to the one found in pro-imperialist Katherine Mayo’s 1924 sensationalist popular study of the Philippines, The Isles of Fear, which cites the speech which served as the occasion for Pardo de Tavera’s words: “What do you mean when you speak of the people of the Philippine Islands? Do you think of them as a political body? A social body? A distinct race.... If you do, you start wrong. The pre-eminent native scholar of the Islands, Dr. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, lecturing on February 26, 1924, in the University of the Philippines, said: ‘Let us not indulge in idle dreams. Let us admit that there is no such thing as a Filipino race’” [1924: 9].
Ancient rites like the blood compact (Sandugo), which the painter Juan Luna famously depicted (in 1886) as taking place between sixteenth-century Spanish conquistador Miguel López de Legazpi and Bohol native leader Rajah Sikatuna, are revived as a way of imagining and inventing kinship [see Blanco 2004]. This “fictive ethnicity” was certainly what prime minister of the revolutionary government Apolinario Mabini projected in his “Decalogue” when he wrote: “Love thy Country next to God and thy honor and more than thyself, for it is the only patrimony of thy race, the only inheritance from thy ancestors, and the only future of thy descendants: through it, thou hast life, love and interests, happiness, honor, and God” [cited in Aglipay y Labayan 1926: 26].

The most popular play written and performed in the U.S.-pacified area of Manila at the time was Severino Reyes’ Walang Sugat [1898], which featured the tried and tested but true and enduring love between two cousins threatened by the lustful desires of a foreign American official.

With the passage of the 1902 Sedition Act by the U.S. colonial government, in which the U.S. no longer recognizes a state of war as existing between U.S. forces and a Philippine “insurrection,” race rhetoric morphs in at least two directions, adapting to the changing nature of resistance without relinquishing that common identification of race with partisanship in the state of war or emergency. The first direction appears in revolutionary leader (now identified as an outlaw) Macario Sakay’s constitution of the Tagalog Republic (Republika ng Katagalugan), pronounced in 1902 when virtually the entire central leadership of the revolution had been captured or killed. In this text, he redefines the very definition of Tagalog, which began as an ethnolinguistic category designating the population in and around central and southern Luzon, particularly Manila. In Sakay’s rhetoric, the Tagalog people becomes synonymous with a pan-Filipino one. “Sino mang tagalog tungkol [sic] anak dito sa Kapuluang Katagalugan,” he writes, ay walang itatangi sino man tungkol sa dugo gayon din sa kulay nang balat nga isna’t isa; maputi,

26) The word lahi refers simply to a male in Chamorro and Malagasy, both of which belong to the family of Austronesian languages from which Tagalog, Ilocano, and Cebuano developed (and which use the word lañahi to refer to the same). The Austronesian morpheme is lañahi, “husband” [Kempler-Cohen 1999: 213]. It is interesting that lañahi appears as the translation to the Spanish word for race (raza) in the appendix to Juan de Noceda and Pedro de Sanlúcar’s Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala (originally published in 1753), yet the official entry for the word lañahi in the main text has nothing to do with the concept of race: it signifies “to provoke, to enjoy oneself with someone at a festival” (incitar a mal, holgarse con otro en alguna fiesta) [ibid.: 166]. Even Jose Rizal had difficulty explaining the Spanish word for race (raza), as can be gleaned from his correspondence with Ferdinand Blumentritt [ibid.: 33]. In both cases, his advice seems appropriate: “One must be very careful in reading Tagalog words written by Spaniards. At home we give no value, absolutely none, to the Tagalog of the Spaniards” [ibid.: 59].

27) See also Emilio Jacinto’s “Teachings of the Katipunan,” where the latter writes: “Maitim man o maputi ang kulay ng balat, lañahi ng tao’y magkakapantay; manghayaring ang isa’y hihigtan sa dunong, sa yaman, sa ganda …; ngunit di mahihigtan sa pagkatao” [Whether the color of one’s skin is black or white, all people are equal; it may turn out that one may possess greater intelligence, wealth, [or] beauty [than others] …; but that does not make [him or her] any more human].
maitim, mayaman, dukha, marunong, at mangmang lahat ay magkapantay na walang higit at kulang, dapat magkaisang loób, maaring humigat sa dunong, sa yaman, sa ganda, dapwa’t hindi mahihigitan sa pagkatao ng sino man, at sa paglilingkod nang kahit alin.

No Tagalog, born in this Tagalog archipelago, shall exalt anyone else on account of his or her blood, or the color of one’s skin; white, black, rich, poor, educated and illiterate are all completely equal, and must be one in spirit/will (loób). Whatever differences exist in one’s education, wealth, beauty, these do not surpass the humanity of each and every one, and one’s capacity to serve whatever cause. [quoted in Ileto 1989: 177]

In a radical sense, Sakay takes an understanding of race and the state of emergency to its ultimate implication, stripping race of any constituent features (blood, skin color, as well as education, wealth, beauty) other than the concept of political partisanship in the existential condition of war. 28) Readers of Jose Rizal’s second novel *El Filibusterismo* [1891] will recognize the same logic at work in the anti-hero Simoun’s plan to “renew the race!” by destroying the concentration of colonial elites at a wedding banquet:

...“Cabesang Tales and I will join one another in the city and take possession of it, while you in the suburbs will seize the bridges and throw up barricades, and then be ready to come to our aid to butcher not only those opposing the revolution but also every man who refuses to take up arms and join us.”

“All?” stammered Basilio in a choking voice.

“All!” repeated Simoun in a sinister tone. “All — Indians, mestizos, Chinese, Spaniards, all who are found to be without courage, without energy. The race must be renewed! Cowardly fathers will only breed slavish sons, and it wouldn’t be worth while to destroy and then try to rebuild with rotten materials....” [Rizal [1891]1912: 316] 29)
The key word that supplements all those determining characteristics that colonial science had sought to fill is *loób*, which I translated as “spirit” or “will” (in the sense of consent or initiative) but which literally designates the “inner” or “inside” in purely conventional terms to the “outside” (*labas*). The ambiguity of the word — which was used by Christian missionaries to speak of the soul but whose normal application is purely relational and possesses no signified or content — helps to explain the facility with which Sakay exploits the word’s polysemy: one soul, one spirit, one will, but also one “inside,” opposed to the “outside” invader who encroaches upon it. The convergence of an almost universalist transcendence of race by one’s humanity (pagkatao) is brought right back to the scene of battle, where the Tagalog Republic exists first and foremost to witness the defeat of the American Empire.

The spiritualization of *loób* anticipates the second, related articulation of the Filipino race, which appears in the transculturation of Christianity by nationalism in folk religious movements and the birth of the nationalist Protestant sect Aglipayanism. It is in these groups that theodicies of the founding of a Filipino race continue to be produced and practiced, even today. While the individual doctrines and practices vary, a common theme to emerge with Aglipayanism (later developed in folk religious sects) was the transformation of Christian spiritual fraternity (*kapatiran*) into a national(ist) fraternity organized around the incarnation of the Mother Country (Inang Bayan) as the Virgin Mary and her children as “children of the country” (*anak ng bayan*). In Aglipay’s self-benediction of a civic-religious cult dedicated to the “Mother of Balintawak” (Balintawak being the site where the Philippine Revolution was first declared), he writes:

> In this Image of the Motherland, we symbolize all our natural drive for national independence. The Virgin-Mother is the country, for the Country is the only mother that can truly be called virgin, virgin as it is of all lust. The *Katipunero* child represents the People, eager for their liberty and their spokesmen, prophets and evangelists are the great Filipino teachers Rizal, Mabini, and Bonifacio and our other countrymen whose modern sapient teachings will form the best national Gospel. [Aglipay y Lahayan 1926: 32](31)

The transposition of the Virgin Mother to the native country and the identification of the young revolutionary as a synecdoche of a nation’s people, together reintroduce the theme of divine kinship and a promised land that the virgin birth of Christ and his fulfillment of Jewish law were meant to transcend or suppress.

From this incarnation, folk religious groups were able to articulate the link to race in various ways. “Oh mga kalahi!” a popular song from the period of the Philippine revolution goes.

31) *Katipunero* refers to the name of the first revolutionary organization formed by Andres Bonifacio, the Katipunan.
“Lakad, pagpilitang/tunguhin ang bundok, kalawakang parang/gamitin ang gulok at sibat sa kamay,/ating ipagtanggol lupang tinubuan” (“Oh racial brethren! Walk on, strive/to reach the mountain and the forest/use the bolos and spears in your hands/let us defend the land of our birth”) (quoted in Ileto 1989: 107). In the proliferation of religious cults developing alongside or in the wake of Aglipayanism, Jose Rizal appears as a messianic Christ; other sects have written their own biblical Testaments, in which the idea of a Jewish elect reappears in the form of the Brown Race (Lahing Kayumanggi). The “Decalogue” of this Rizal sect lists as its second commandment that one put her or his fate in the hands of the brown race: “sa inyo oh LAHING KAYUMANGGI [mapalad]. Sapagka’t ang abang ninyong kapatid, ay TUNAY ninyong KALAHI” (“Trust) in yourselves, oh Brown Race. Because your disgraced brothers and sisters, are your true racial brethren”) [Alaras 1988: 152]. “Lahing kayumanggi” leaves no doubt as to the manner by which racial difference is associated with political partisanship. Through a retelling of the Judaeo-Christian texts, a racial genealogy transposes the miracle of Christ (the Divinity made flesh) into the miracle of Mary — the Divinity made mother, giving birth to those most deserving of her infinite mercy. As late as 1940, the emergence of a later Rizalist cult Watawat ng Lahi (Flag of the Race) conveys the immediate political meaning of race: race as a flag, a color whose primary signification becomes clear in a time of war or conflict.

With the forced economic diaspora of Filipinos from the archipelago under U.S. rule to places like Hawai‘i and California, the constantly deferred promise of Philippine independence in the homeland began to merge with other experiences of racial discrimination and racial redemption. Steffi San Buenaventura’s invaluable work on nativism and ethnicity in the context of early U.S. Filipino immigration demonstrates how these experiences continued to be expressed in religious terms. The formation of mutual aid societies such as the Filipino Federation of America (FFA) in California and Hawai‘i allowed diasporic Filipinos to make sense of their displacement in theosophical terms, while also inviting them to participate in both the independence movement in the Philippines and civic life in the U.S. Under the leadership of former agricultural worker, self-styled mystic, and political maverick Hilario Moncado, the FFA

32) The anthropological work of Prospero Covar and Consolacion Alaras has explored the lines of transculturation in these groups, focusing on the religious sects of Mt. Banahaw that exist to this day. See also the locus classicus of peasant based religious revolution in the Philippines, David Sturtevant’s Popular Uprisings in the Philippines; and Nick Joaquin’s popular account of the Guardia de Honor religious movement in Pangasinan and Ilocos [1988: 263–311].

33) The adoption of race rhetoric among the southern Tagalog lowland regions can hardly be said to represent the Philippine population as a whole, even on the main island of Luzon. For an alternative perspective on the shifting racial frontier between the peoples of the Cordillera region and lowland colonial society, see the two essays by William Henry Scott, in Scott [1993]. Among the main points highlighted in these essays, Scott dispenses with the myth that “Igorots and lowlanders were enemies from time immemorial,” an idea disproven by the flourishing of contraband in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries [ibid.: 11, 29–36]. He also emphasizes the 350-year continuity of Igorot resistance to Spanish resettlement mandates [ibid.: 39, 49] and the racialization of the term by Spaniards to mean “infidel” and by the Americans to mean “uncivilized” [ibid.: 52–60].
provided a framework that allowed Filipinos in the diaspora to overcome their regional divisions, which were often cast in religious as well as ethnic and linguistic terms. Indeed, one may go so far as to say that the cultural project of identifying oneself as Filipino took place not only within the boundaries of elite nationalism in the Philippines, but also through the collective experience of displacement and self-redefinition in the United States. As one writer for the FFA periodical Filipino Nation wrote:

> Every native of the Philippine Islands should ask himself the question: “Am I a Filipino or am I a tribesman?” If his answer is that he is a Filipino, he will ... forget tribal and sectional jealousies and remember the words of our martyred hero, Rizal, “unity of purpose is certainty of success.” [cited in San Buenaventura 1990: 225]

Yet this consciousness of being (or becoming) Filipino could not but take on a racial character, with this unity of purpose expressed in terms of a “brown” or “Malayan” race who is destined to inhabit a “New Jerusalem” that would emerge from Lake Lanao in the Philippine southern island of Mindanao [ibid: 274-276]. This racial identity was channeled through both the official and popular cultural memory of Jose Rizal, as well as the charismatic leadership of Hilario Moncado. For the latter, the future of Philippine independence was inseparable from the racial redemption of Filipinos in the diaspora, as in the following statement: “it is our born right to govern our own land, the land of our fathers and the land of the brown race” [Moncado, in San Buenaventura 1990: 290]. In the words of one member: “aking namamasdan nga na tayong mga kayomangui, ay pag hahandogan ng poong may kapal sa ikaluluwalhati sa ating buhay at ikaluluwalhati ng ating Inang Bayang Filipinas” [ibid: 291] (I observe that we brown people have been granted by the Lord Almighty gloriousness in our lives and that of our “Inang Bayan”/Mother Country the Philippines). A more recent member of the Federation would render this dichotomy even more explicit:

> The next God after Christ is a brown God. The white people killed their God, Christ. They rejected him. They had their chance. Moncado is God. The Filipinos will rule the world.... Those who are not Filipinos, like the white people, can also be saved if their heart is like a Filipino. [Arcadio Amper, cited in San Buenaventura 1990: 288]

In Ileto’s Pasyon and Revolution, the author writes: “independence was regarded by many people from the lower classes of Tagalog society as an imminent event to which their loób

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34) Translation slightly modified. Following the lead of Luciano Santiago, the word *luwalhati* also conveys a meaning closer to the word “redemption”: it is a compound word composed of the root *hati* (division, partition) and its prefix *luwal* (outside, “extruded”). The word can be contrasted with other words that possess the same root, such as *pighati* (grief) and *dalamhati* (suffering, with the prefix *dala-* meaning either “carried,” or a contraction of the word for two, *dalawa*). See Santiago [1993: 277-283].
must be directed. Having experienced the turmoil and dislocation of five years of war, they expected such chaos to lead its inevitable conclusion, when society would be turned on its head, when all men would be brothers, leaders would be Christ-like, all form of oppression would end and property would be shared” [1989: 209]. For these groups, the state of emergency that defined the war against the Americans becomes indistinguishable from life in general, life as the ceaseless process of distinguishing the inside from the outside, the friend from the enemy, where the question of life and death was at stake. For these groups, to paraphrase a well-known thesis of Walter Benjamin, the state of emergency was not an exception but the rule.

Counter-history under/against U. S. Imperial Hegemony

The political historicism of a Filipino race, which flourished in a time of war and became spiritualized in messianic movements and the proliferation of a New Jerusalem in Pangasinan, Hawai‘i and California, contrasts sharply with the racialization of Filipinos as blacks in the U.S. press and the rank and file of the U.S. military in the Philippines. And yet, they are intimately related. For the U.S. soldiers as well as for Filipinos, the colonial war could not but be expressed in racial terms, just as it had been expressed in the previous era. In the last part of this article, I want to turn our attention to this parallel movement of racialization that came out of the Philippine-American War at the turn of the century, to show how the political historicism of race war from the perspective of U.S. soldiers reflected the unfinished war legacy of the U.S. Civil War (1862–65) and the failure of Reconstruction by the turn of the twentieth century.

When we examine the race formations in a time of war, we find that what is taking place in the Philippines in 1896 also takes place in the U.S. in 1898. That year, the subject of war filled newspaper headlines and sparked heated debates on the floor of the U.S. Congress. But an inattentive listener might have missed the fact that publishers, editors, and congressional representatives were not talking about one war, but two. There was the Spanish-American War, which began in February with the sinking of the U.S. battleship Maine in the Havana harbor and the U.S. declaration of war. And there were also the public pronouncements of a race war between blacks and whites, with allegations ranging from a black campaign to “colonize and control North Carolina” in October, to public hysteria around the imagined rape of

35) “The brutal exigencies of war,” David Joel Steinberg writes, “force an articulation of values which otherwise can remain inchoate. It is a catalyst that requires stark decisions of life or death, sacrifice or self-interest, allegiance or treason. It is an acid test for nationalism, since fissiparous divisions of language, geography, social class, religion, ethnicity and culture must be subordinated to the mass demands of national allegiance” [1972: 165].

36) See Benjamin [[1974]2005: thesis 8] (web): “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.”

37) I owe this insight to Nerissa Balce’s important study on the conflation of Filipino and black bodies during and after the Philippine-American War in the U.S. [see 2006: 44–58].
white women by black men. According to the Cleveland Gazette, between 1882 and 1903 there were 3,233 lynchings, in one form or another, in the country. The Tuskegee Institute chronicled over 4,000 lynchings during a similar period. The year 1901, which marked the height of U.S. atrocities and what might legitimately be identified as genocidal campaigns in the Philippines, also coincided with the escalation of black lynchings to 105 reported cases. On the floor of the 56th U.S. Congress, Senator Ben “Pitchfork” Tillman of South Carolina summarized his war against “black domination”: “We have done our level best; we have scratched our heads to find out how we could eliminate the last one of them. We stuffed ballot boxes. We shot them. We are not ashamed of it” [cited in Dray 2008: 302].

While seemingly unrelated, the two wars became conflated among the white soldiers of the rank and file fighting in the United States’ first overseas colonial war. In one early (1899) editorial of the black press opposing U.S. involvement in the war, the editors write: “whenever the soldiers send letters home to their relatives and parents they all breathe an utter contempt ‘for the niggers which they are engaged in slaying’.... In view of these facts, no negro possessing any race pride can enter heartily into the prosecution of the war against the Filipinos” [cited in Marks 1971: 126]. According to the Stuart Creighton Miller, from the beginning of the war, “the most common assertion of the volunteers in the months preceding the war was that they were ‘just itching to get at the niggers’” [Miller 1984: 176]. One private writes: “With an enemy like this to fight, it is not surprising that the boys should soon adopt ‘no quarter’ as a motto, and fill the blacks full of lead before finding out whether they are friends or enemies” [ibid.: 189].

Some members of the black press sought to rationalize the explicit racism with which the atrocities in the Philippines were committed on a regular basis. Others used the war to attempt to reorient the discussion in U.S. politics toward the failure of Reconstruction by the end of the nineteenth century. “Why use a telescope to sweep the horizon for wrongdoing,” wrote the anonymous author of an editorial titled “Afro-American Reflections on ‘Killing Niggers’ in the Philippines,” “when the cries of lynched Negroes can almost be heard at the White House and the odors from the funeral pyre fall scarcely short of the Capitol, where Congress is engaged in solving the problem of government?” [cited in Literary Digest 24, 1902]. Still other editors challenged white soldiers to take responsibility for the fires of race war that were being stoked: “Every soldier in the Philippines who uses the term ‘nigger,’” writes one editorial from the Progress in Omaha, “does so with hell-born contempt for the negro of the United States, and it is our one desire that he be cured of his fiendish malady by a Filipino bullet buried in the heart of such a wretch” [cited in Marks 1971: 128].

38) In 2002, the community organizers in Oakland Abe Ignacio and Helen Toribio teamed up with the environmental engineer and activist Dr. Jorge Emmanuel to publish a collection of political cartoons, many of which were exhibited throughout California and the Philippines just before and during the U.S.-Iraq war. The book is called The Forbidden Book, named after a political cartoon in which President William McKinley prevents Uncle Sam from opening a “forbidden book” that would reveal to him all the atrocities committed by the U.S. in the Philippines in the name of liberty and freedom (see Fig. 1). These images like no other demonstrate the efficacy of stereotypes as a technology of
Above the clash of public opinion, however, Southern senators like Ben Tillman (SC), John McLaurin (SC) and John Morgan (AL), were taking advantage of the popular racism of the rank and file in order to establish a more direct correspondence between blacks and Filipinos in the larger context of an unfinished U.S. civil war and the permanence of race war and racial conflict. In 1899 McLaurin proposed an amendment to the constitution, “placing all the inferior races in this country and the inhabitants of the Philippines beneath the plane of the white men, and that it is the divine right of the Caucasian or the whites to govern the negro races. That by pursuing such a course the negro or the race problem will be forever settled in this country” [cited in ibid.: 111].

In 1900, Tillman paradoxically used the permanence of race war to argue against the U.S. imperial project in the Philippines. “The mysterious influence of race antagonism and caste feeling,” he writes,

has always existed; it is ineradicable; and it will continue as a governing factor wherever the races come into contact.... The Anglo-Saxon is pretty much the same wherever you find him, and he walks on the necks of every colored race he comes into contact with. Resistance to his will or interests means destruction to the weaker race. Confronted, as we are, within our own borders with this perplexing problem, why do we seek to incorporate nine millions more of brown men under the flag? [1900: 443-444]

In 1902, Alabama Senator John Tyler Morgan of the 56th Congress went so far as to draw up a plan for the U.S. government to deport blacks to the Philippines after it had been subdued [see Lemus 1903; Baylen and Moore 1968]39) Thornton sincerely believed that, in addition to identification and interpellation, particularly in a time of war, for both the aggressors and the aggrieved. The *Boston Sunday Globe* depicts the Filipino’s progress under Uncle Sam by parodying the socialization of Afro-Americans; a cover page of *Judge* portrays democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryant as a hypocrite who is “For One Negro and Against the Other”; and an anti-imperialist critique of U.S. expansion reveals the necessity of measuring black lynching and overseas expansion by the same scales of justice (see Figs. 2, 3, and 4).

39) While President Theodore Roosevelt publicly acknowledged that the plan deserved “serious consideration,” it was never brought to the House of Representatives for a vote, in part due to the
resolving the state of siege on blacks throughout many parts of the United States, blacks would also create the basis of new commercial trade opportunities across the hemispheres but south of the equator — from Africa to Latin America to the Philippines.

Summing up, these and other examples demonstrate how the state of exception unleashed in the Philippines contributed not only to the racialization of Filipinos as Afro-Americans in the U.S.; it actually sought to turn Afro-Americans into Filipinos. In this project, a constant slippage occurs between the understanding of race as a product of biological or theoretical racism, and race as the sign of war, the state of war as constitutive of race relations. Thus, while one may attempt to underline the “newness, immediacy, and localism of U.S. soldiers’ racial formation,” as Paul Kramer does in his otherwise comprehensive history of racial discourse in the U.S. during the Philippine-American War [2006: 128], the praxis of race as the articulation of counter-histories moves in the opposite direction. In other words, the counter-history of white redemption draws from the popular memories of the Confederacy’s wars against the emancipation of slavery, as well as the self-identified Anglo-Saxon wars against the indigenous populations on the westward frontier.\(^{40}\) These are the counter-histories that find their way to

\(^{40}\) categorical rejection of the idea in editorials by the black press. See Baylen and Moore [1968: 69-75].
the Philippines, and narrate the new episode of imperial conquest as the concluding chapter to the unfinished racial conquest of whites over blacks and native Americans.

At the same time, however, we can agree with Kramer’s insight regarding the internal contradictions of race formation in this period, where one can distinguish between the racism that spurred the scorched earth and genocidal policies pursued by U.S. military leaders in the Philippines like Generals Arthur MacArthur and J. Franklin Bell, and the project of racial hegemony, “an inclusionary racial formation that both invited and delimited Filipino political agency in colonial state-building” [ibid.: 5]. It is against the latter that Dylan Rodriguez’s critique of race formation is addressed. Rodriguez decries the efficacy of imperial hegemony, which leads to what he calls “arrested raciality” among Filipinos and Filipino-Americans: “a

Fig. 3 “For One Negro and against the Other. Dr. Jekyll ‘Bryan’ and Mr. Hyde ‘Bryan.’” The political Dr. Jekyll professes to love and would give enfranchisement and liberty to the Filipino negro, while Mr. Hyde would destroy and disfranchise our southern Negro. Source: Judge (November 3, 1900). Reprinted in Ignacio et al. [2005: 85].

Fig. 4 “Civilization Begins at Home” Source: The Literary Digest 27: 22 (November 26, 1898). Reprinted in Ignacio et al. [2005: 86].

40 It is no coincidence that a number of U.S. military leaders in the Philippine campaign, including General Adna Chaffee and Lieutenant Jacob “Howling Jake” Smith were products of the Civil War and the extermination campaigns against the native Americans. See Schott [1964: 60–63] and Miller [1984: 31–56].
structurally disrupted articulation of racial and protoracial history ... constituted by the grammatical presence of racial signification in Filipino discourses and the simultaneous sanitation of that signification by a labor of critical illiteracy” [2009: 98]. What we are dealing with here, then, are two distinct racial formations, each of which incorporates and mimics the language and rhetoric of the other without being collapsed into one and the same trajectory.

This labor of sanitizing the violence of colonial conquest was certainly evident in the early years of the war [see Ileto 1995: 51–82; Warwick Anderson 2006: 83–112]. While the U.S. press and public reacted with horror to the atrocities visited upon Filipinos by the U.S. military, U.S. officials and the members of the second Philippine Commission (headed by future president William H. Taft) attempted to frame the violence of war in domestic metaphors and the discourses of civil society. Countless political cartoons of the period attest to the domestication of violence in paternalistic metaphors of discipline, education, and hygiene (see Figs. 5–7 “Because I love you,” “School,” and “The Filipino’s First Bath”). These metaphors interfaced with the continuation of the war through military as well as civil institutions. Yet the trajectory of this rhetoric led not to the political historicism of race war we saw earlier, but rather the suppression of war in both the U.S. and Philippines, through metaphors and the discourses of civil institutions. With the 1902 “Sedition Act” classifying any and all signs of revolutionary activity as a civil crime, the criminalization of war

Fig. 5 “Popular Song Illustrated—Because I Love You”
Source: Chicago Record (November 28, 1899). Reprinted in Ignacio et al. [2005: 103].

41) Ileto [1995] illustrates how the discourse of biopolitics that was wedded to the civilizational rhetoric frequently used by military leaders and civil officials, masks a dark underside. The genocidal campaign of J. Franklin Bell in 1900, for example, deserves special attention for the remarkable way in which he describes the military offensive: “I expect first to clean out the Looboo Peninsula.... I shall then move command to the vicinity of Lake Taal, and sweep the country westward to the ocean.... I shall scour and clean up the Lipa mountains. Swinging northward, the country ... will be scoured.... Swinging back to the right, the same treatment will be given all the country” [ibid.: 59, italics added].
served to internalize the violence through civil institutions like the Bureau of Health under Victor Heiser, the Bureau of the Interior under Dean Worcester, and the Bureau of public security under Cameron Forbes. Victor Heiser’s memoirs render stark the contradictions brought about in the name of civilization: “The Bureau of Health,” he writes, “was like the tree of life... Necessarily we had to invade the rights of homes, commerce, and parliaments. We had to guard against the entrance of dangerous communicable diseases by strict measures, even when they conflicted with convenience or personal necessity...” [Heiser 1936: 151, italics added]. Charles B. Elliott, the chief of police was even more explicit: “[Sanitary] work, to be effective, required the arbitrary disregard of ordinary personal rights... Sanitary rules are useless unless backed by the power and will to compel their enforcement, and punish their breach, which means infringement on the assumed rights of men to do as they please on their own premises. A health officer is necessarily ... a tyrant. He sometimes abuses the power with which it is necessary to invest him. The temptation to do so is peculiarly strong when white men are dealing with an inferior and less informed race of people” [Elliott 1916: 215, italics added].

The undercurrent of brute domination in these paternal metaphors is evident. Yet the impersonality of the terms by which Heiser and Elliott justify the regular violation of civil order performs an effacing operation on the racial dichotomy that finds its fullest expression in a time

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**Fig. 6 “School”**

UNCLE SAM to his new class in Civilization: “Now children, you’ve got to learn these lessons whether you want to or not! But just take a look at the class ahead of you, and remember that, in a little while, you will be as glad to be here as they are!”

Source: *Puck* (January 25, 1899). Reprinted in Ignacio et al. [2005: 64].

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of war: what Heiser and Elliott give us instead is a pervasive, invisible threat whose face can only be glimpsed in microscopes, hospitals, and laboratories. What we see instead is an increasingly sanitized, clinical, and systematic rhetoric wielded by the officers of civil institutions, who meticulously document the improvement of the infant mortality rate in the first year after the formal declaration of the war’s end, or that distribute vaccines to the furthest reaches of the archipelago, or that organize a leper colony, create a national library and national laboratory, teach children in new American schools how to go home and recite their lessons on sanitation to their parents [Heiser 1907:861]. In place of race as a form of praxis, we find the humanitarianism of colonial rule as the new norm under which concepts of racial conflict and cooperation will have to be subordinated.

When the discourses of public health, world trade, domestic security, and industry (however limited) become the primary referents under which the legality of colonial rule is to be divided, weighed, and measured, the existential immediacy of both race and war — race as the cultural expression of war, or the concept of the political — loses its exceptional character, and becomes one factor among others by which social scientists gauge the reproduction and management of systemic inequalities. U. S. imperial hegemony thus found itself able to institute two forms of historical amnesia that would secure the legitimacy of its overseas possessions: the forgetfulness of the rancor that left open the unresolved contradictions at the close of the Civil War, and the forgetfulness of the colonial subject that she or he was, in fact, still living under colonial rule.42)

42) Indeed, if one were to seek the ideal appropriation and sterilization of race war rhetoric in the fashioning of U. S. imperial hegemony at the end of the nineteenth century, one need look no further than Frederick Jackson Turner’s theory of the American frontier. The “frontier thesis” was first propounded by Turner at the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition held in Chicago: it appears as the
Coda: War, Race, and Religion in America’s Trans-Pacific Possession

In the epilogue to Resil Mojares’s work on Cebu’s experience of the Philippine-American War, the author writes: “A war never really ends. When the causes for resistance remain, then a war never really ends. It assumes other forms, becomes an illusion of itself, a subversion of what it intends; it is submerged and yet can rise again, find oneself once more in the tenacious imagining of a better order of things” [1999: 205]. Mojares’s reflection captures well the praxis of race as the production of counter-histories, and the messianic implications of race consciousness among Spaniards, Filipinos, and Americans in the Philippines at the turn of the century. As long as the perception persists that we live in a state of war, the racialization of self and other will continue to express the immediate, urgent task that the past is charged to convey to the present. Where the historian sees original causes or influences, the counter-historian sees original conflict. Where the rabbi or theologian speaks of the First Day, the counter-historian speaks of the eon preceding it: of wars between God and the Devil, and the secret names of angels and nature. 43)

The marginalization of race as a form of political historicism — banished to the obscure first essay of his collection of essays on the role of the frontier as the foundational theme of U.S. history. Turner’s discussions of settler solidarity, for instance, or the transculturation between “civilized” and “savage” customs for taming the wilderness, seem to imply an autochthonous American egalitarianism that transcends racial divisions [1920: 1-38]. One might argue that these were radical claims, given that the formative years of Turner’s education take place during the collapse of the Reconstruction of the South, the presumed certainty of social Darwinism and its manifestations in theories of Teutonism and Anglo-Saxonism as America’s cultural and racial heritage. At the same time, however, Turner’s discussion of America’s “composite nationality” scrupulously avoids any mention of specific racial groups that might serve as the primary components. While this ambiguity has led certain scholars to criticize Turner for being ignorant of the role race played in the nineteenth century, reading Turner’s western frontier thesis alongside both the historiography of Anglo-Saxonism and Du Bois’s indictment of modern racism seems to suggest the opposite. That is, Turner’s frontier thesis, with its assertions of a composite nationality that resulted from the frontier, fully intended to displace the centrality of racial division and conflict in the late nineteenth century. Turner implies as much in his repeated insistence that the civil war, and the “slavery struggle” or “slavery question” remain incidental rather than central to U.S. history. Far from ignorance, Turner reveals in his repeated disavowal of the importance of racial conflict his close attention to the matter. In a sense, the frontier thesis solves an unsolvable problem by reducing its importance. For Turner, the only way to transcend the social divisions brought about by the civil war and the failure of Reconstruction in the writing of U.S. history would be to permanently displace the centrality of that conflict. This is in effect what the frontier thesis does, regardless of the veracity or inaccuracy of its many flawed corollaries. As Richard Slotkin has observed: “One can legitimately argue that Turner actually obscures the historical role of violence, which weakens his analysis. By rejecting the idea that racial violence is the principle around which both individual character and social organization develop, Turner devalues violence as a political symbol”[1998: 55].

43) For an exemplary text demonstrating the influence of Masonry and Kabbalism on folk Christianity, see Sabino[1955], and Covar [1977].
folk religious cults in the Philippines and the United States, except for the occasional populist
gesture by Philippine congressmen and celebrities—can be ascribed to factors that are both
global and specific to the Philippines. In Arendt and Foucault’s analyses of racial discourse in the
West, the obscuration of counter-histories (or “race-thinking”) derives from their appropriation
and sublation (Arendt would say rationalization and bureaucratization) by the biological racism
embedded in all modern historical discourses of “the human race” [see also Balibar 1991: 57].
Despite their significant differences, both Darwinism and Marxism achieved this sublation
through their respective theories of natural selection (the “natural” war of all against all) and
the class struggle. By simultaneously generalizing and abstracting counter-histories from their
immediate field of application, these discourses render the specific memories of war, conquest,
and planned retribution the subject of economic individualism and ideology, along with new
forms of humanism and its respective teleologies (progress, emancipation, and so forth).

Yet, while Arendt (and to a lesser degree, Foucault) tends to see the rationalization of racial
discourse into scientific racism along the lines of a unilinear development, both Spanish and U.S.
racism at the turn of the century demonstrate how counter-histories continue to speak in and
through the very discourses of social Darwinism and Manifest Destiny, even after these had, in
effect, colonized and sterilized the “existential” question of partisanship in a state of emergency
on which the praxis of race is based. Seen from afar, the rationalities of biological racism appear
to supersede or neutralize the concrete stakes and historical contingencies that shaped colonial
conflict in the Philippines under Spain and later the U.S. On closer inspection, however, the
rationalization of race praxis is inseparable from the racialization of rationality. It is the latter
that constituted the “fringe” of political discourse at the turn of the century. Just as Quiquiap’s
exacerbated racism and Rizal’s Filipino race helped to catalyze revolutionary sentiments among
the Philippine native-born educated elite, so too did America’s race war against Philippine
“nig—rs” threaten to derail the larger project of U.S. imperial hegemony. Both Southern white
supremacy and Filipino racial redemption, however different or opposed, were thus strangely
allied. For both, the question of war was inseparable from the question of racial difference, in
which the right of conquest and its history—or conversely, the immanence of resistance to a
fundamentally illegitimate form of foreign rule—was stamped on the faces that distinguished
nations and peoples. In both instances, it is the concept of the political, not ethnicity or science,
which provides the basis of race as a form of praxis.

The reciprocal relationship between race and religious formation, too, can be seen at once
through global and local lenses. The nineteenth-century policies of the modern Spanish colonial
state in the Philippines intended to transform the relationship of metropolis to colony as a
response to and engagement with the economic and military penetration of the Western powers
to all parts of the globe. Yet the full incorporation of the religious orders and Christianity into
the colonial project—from the dismantling and rationalization of the respublica Christiana as
it had existed on the frontiers of Spanish empire from the seventeenth century, to the vacillating
policies on the secularization of religious missions into parishes (to be administered by native
and mestizo secular priests)—had unforeseen consequences [see Blanco 2009]. The preaching
of the Gospel and the administration of parishes had become a racial issue; conversely, the vernacular translation of the Gospel in texts like the *Pasyon Henesis* paved the way for new interpretations of Christian texts and religious experiences outside the control of the religious orders [Ileto 1989].

From a broad perspective, one may argue that there is little to say about the “originality” of these interpretations: myths of a chosen Elect, a New Jerusalem or Promised Land, speaking in ciphers, and the anticipation of trials and temptations that would test the faithful, are themes that reappear with some regularity among folk Christian sects, not to mention Jewish messianism. Yet beginning with Rizal’s ruminations on the inseparability of race, political historicism, and historical redemption, what is original is the “interface” Rizal establishes between scientific and religious understandings of enlightenment, which allowed folk Christianity to absorb and reinterpret the colonial legacy. Against the colonial state’s incorporation of religious Christian discourse and institutions in order to make racial claims about Spanish “prestige” (a euphemistic shorthand term for the longer expression *prestigio de la raza*), there corresponded a new articulation between Christianity and revolution in and through the adoption and reevaluation or even “transvaluation” of racial discourse. While Philippine elite nationalists under U.S. colonial rule attempted in various ways to appropriate and manipulate race rhetoric for their own variants of culturalism — the Filipino as “Oriental,” the Filipino as “Latin” — they clearly neither understood nor identified with the existential question behind which the racial signifier arises.

For the latter, war and revolution only represented one among many ways to envision the Philippines “a century hence.” For the witnesses to the historical appearance of the Brown Race, however, there would be no “orderly movement [towards] the future,” as Pardo de Tavera so anxiously urged, without the simultaneous and full redemption of the past.

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44) For an introduction to comparative millenarian movements, see Cohn [1970].

45) For examples, see the edited volume by Vicente Hilario. One may even go so far as to argue that such incomprehension corresponds to the “necessary forgetting” among many Philippine elites of their ancestral ties to China. For the ethnic ambiguity of ilustrado or educated elites, see Cullinane [2003: 26-35], and Hau [2011].


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