Re-examination of 'Non-Western' International Relations Theories

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Preface

It is our pleasure to present you with this Working Paper, which details the research outcomes of our project “Re-examination of Non-Western IR from Asian and African Perspectives” completed in March 2011. This research project was enabled by the Junior Researchers Support Program under Kyoto University’s Global COE Program “In Search for Sustainable Humanosphere in Asia and Africa,” to which we owe much appreciation.

The underlying theme throughout the papers is a question of why (not) we need international theory with the standpoint outside the West. This Working Paper joins in an increasingly important epistemological debate in the discipline of International Relations (IR) on how academics and practitioners alike may overcome the hegemony of both Western and non-Western IR theories in order to tell the world about the world. Rather than speaking with one voice, you will find substantial disagreements among the contributors who are nevertheless united by their concerns about IR knowledge production in a “no-so-international” discipline.

The arguments presented here had been repeatedly debated and refined in various gatherings, including one research meeting at Kwanseikakuin University (30 July 2010) and four international seminars at the Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University (27 November 2010), the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University (29 November 2010), the Leiden Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University, the Netherlands (23 February 2011), and Kyung Hee University, Korea (25 March 2011). We would like to express our gratitude to Lindsay Black, Kazue Demachi, Tomoya Kamino, Florian Schneider, and Kosuke Shimizu for their helpful comments and suggestions, without which this project would not have taken its current shape.

While we are certain that in our attempt to move the emerging great debate forward we have not done sufficient justice to those marginalized voices and experiences in the study of IR, this should not be considered in any way as intentional disrespect. It is our hope that, with your constructive criticisms, this Working Paper’s shortcomings can be compensated to some extent in our future book The Politics of “Non-Western” International Relations in Asia.

Shiro Sato, Josuke Ikeda, Ching Chang Chen, and, Young Chul Cho
The IR discipline would discipline Asian Studies*

Shiro Sato**

1. Introduction

In 2007, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan posed a stimulating question (Acharya and Buzan 2007a; 2007b; and 2007c): Why is there no non-Western International Relations Theory (IRT)? Advocates of constructing non-Western IRT share an assumption that *Western IRT stands at a hegemonic position over the non-West.* Dr. Ching-Chang Chen re-examines the absence of non-Western IRT in Asia in the *Journal of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* in 2011 (Chen 2011). He concludes that the *discourse of non-Western IRT would also be hegemonic logic.*

This essay criticises the critical discourse on theories of ‘non-Western’ IR. First, we examine the discourse of non-Western IRT through Acharya and Buzan’s works. Second, we survey the discourse of anti-‘non-Western’ IRT with a focus on Dr. Chen’s paper. Third, we furnish an argument against Dr. Chen’s. We conclude that the *discourse of anti-‘non-Western’ IRT would not only strengthen the hegemonic status of Western IRT but also discipline Asian Studies.*

2. Discourse of ‘Non-Western’ IRT

In the 1960s, Martin Wight asked scholars and students of IR the reason for the absence of international theory (Wight 1966). This absorbing question was one of the key factors in organising what we call the ‘English School’ in the discipline of IR.¹

In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in theories of IR. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan co-edited a special issue on non-Western IR in the *Journal of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* in 2007. They put forward a provocative question about the reason for the absence of non-Western IRT. ‘The ultimate purpose of the special issue is’,

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according to them, ‘to stimulate non-Western voices to bring their [the Asian audience’s] historical and cultural, as well as their intellectual, resources into the theoretical debates about IR’ (Acharya and Buzan 2007a: 286). This special issue was worked out later under the title _Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia_ (Acharya and Buzan 2010).

The theories of non-Western IR projects are conducted not because they are opposed to the West but because Western IR ‘is both too narrow in its sources and too dominant in its influence to be good for the health of the wider project to understand the social world in which we live’ (Acharya and Buzan 2007b: 289). They attempted to ‘introduce the non-Western IR traditions’ in IR, and ‘pose the challenge of why the Western theory is so dominant, and what could and should be done about this’ (Acharya and Buzan 2007b: 289). It should be noted that they do not think non-Western IR should replace Western IR. Western IR ‘needs more voices and a wider rooting not just in world history but also in informed representations of both core and periphery perspectives within the ever-evolving world political economy’ (Acharya and Buzan 2007c: 437).

Of course, this is not the first attempt to build theories of non-Western IR in the IR discipline. For example, Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw edited _Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory_ (Dunn and Shaw 2001). In addition, Stephen Chan, Peter Mandaville, and Roland Bleiker published a book entitled _The Zen of International Relations: IR Theory from East to West_ (Chan, Mandaville and Bleiker 2001). Yet, Acharya and Buzan’s text (2010) was the first to examine methodology as well as epistemology of Western IRT comprehensively.

The question posed by Acharya and Buzan deserves more than a passing glance by scholars and students of IR. The reason for this can be found in the famous phrase by Robert W. Cox: ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purposes’ (Cox 1986: 207 [Emphasis original]). To borrow this acute phrase, IR would always be for the West and for Western purposes if non-Western IR did not exist.

Since Acharya and Buzan’s text, IR scholars in Asia have attempted to propound their national schools of IR with an eye to the English School (Chen 2011: 4). The English School opened the door for constructing various national IR in the world. In the last few years, several articles and books have been devoted to the study of ‘indigenous’ IR, such as Chinese IR (Qin 2007) and Japanese IR (Inoguchi 2007; Shimizu, Ikeda, Kamino and Sato 2008).
3. Discourse of Anti-‘Non-Western’ IRT

Dr. Ching-Chang Chen examines the theories of non-Western IR projects from a slightly different angle. He gives a warning to non-Western IR scholars: the discourse of non-Western IRT would also be hegemonic logic.

Dr. Chen does not deny that ‘traditional sources of knowledge in the non-Western sites have no positive agency in IR’ (Chen 2011: 5). What he would like to say is that innocent theoretical non-Western IR projects would reproduce ‘the logic of colonial modernity rather than disrupting it’ (Chen 2011: 4) owing to the ‘Hegelian trap’. He explains it with reference to the writing of Hiroyuki Tosa:

The problem is that, with a competitive mood to become another English School or a superior alternative to Western IRT, Asian aspirations for their national schools of IR still treat East and West as oppositional entities, hence unable to escape from the ‘Hegelian trap’ which had led to the downfall of the Japanese Empire as well as its future to overcome modernity (Chen 2011: 4).

The ‘binary opposition of “us/them”’ (Chen 2011: 8) and the master/oppressor relationship prompt IR scholars to craft theories of non-Western IR in Asia. Under this ‘Hegelian trap’, the project of non-Western IRT as an ‘oppressor’ would be hegemonic, and in theory, the new ‘master’ in Asia.

According to Dr. Chen, the reason non-Western IR scholars fall into the ‘Hegelian trap’ is that the non-Western IRT project just adopts ‘a sort of historicist framework that differentiates between several stages of human development, with the Western model as the “end of history”’ (Chen 2011: 10). To put it another way, ‘The prospects of non-Western IRT in Asia have likewise been under the shadow of the modernization and development enterprise, with each state at different stages of “catching up” to Western powers’ (Chen 2011: 11). For Chen, the serious problem in such a ‘catch up’ historical viewpoint is that ‘it assumes the existence of a singular, universalizing narrative of modernity that denies alternative modes of temporality’ (Chen 2011: 10).

Dr. Chen carefully examines the risk of non-Western IRT hegemony in Asia. For example, he refers to the paper written by William Callahan (Callahan 2008) and points out that the emergence of Chinese IR implied a new type of hegemony (here, Tianxia) through the eyes of empire in the twenty-first century. He also conducted a case study in Japanese IR and emphasised:
Confronted with the Hegelian challenge that relegates Asia to the land of Oriental despotism that symbolizes the beginning of history, with Europe/the West at the end of history waiting to absorb the non-West into itself, Japanese intellectuals and national leaders alike came up with the notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere/Pan-Asianism, which purportedly possessed a greater universality than the West (Chen 2011: 14).

In short, ‘the simple reversal of East and West only ensured the continuation of the unwanted master-slave relationship’ (Chen 2011: 14) in theories of non-Western IR. From this reason, he contends that the uncritical project towards theories of non-Western IR runs the risk of standing at a hegemonic position in Asia. In addition, Dr. Chen mentions that we need to re-orient ‘the discipline toward a post-Western era whose epistemological foundation is not hegemonic in nature’ (Chen 2011: 5 [Emphasis original]).

Interestingly, Dr. Chen points out the absence of non-Western IRT in Taiwan and argues as follows:

The total acceptance of American/Western IRT in Taiwan, then, reflects a self-empowering identity strategy through which Taiwanese associate themselves with the United States/West, which in turn allows them (and, indeed, the emerging Taiwanese state) to look at China from a presumably universalist, superior position (Chen 2011: 12).

What is immediately apparent in this extract is that Western hegemonic IRT does not always ‘politically’ (not ‘theoretically’) exercise a unilateral dominion over all the non-West. Taiwan would be able to politically gain a ‘superior position’ to China under the protection of American IR, which stands at a politically as well as theoretically ‘superior position’ to the non-West. Viewed in this light, the emerging Chinese IR, as a national school of non-Western IR theories, would be hegemonic logic not only for Taiwan but also for the United States.

4. Two Mistakes that Dr. Chen Makes

To the conjecture that the discourse of non-Western IRT would be hegemonic logic, I reply that the discourse of anti-‘non-Western’ IRT would not only strengthen the hegemonic status of Western IRT but also discipline Asian Studies.

Dr. Chen successfully argues that the project of nation-based non-Western IRT would
establish a new hegemony within the non-West. The objection is well founded, but the following two points should be taken into account when we narrate the discourse of anti-‘non-Western’ IRT.

The first mistake Dr. Chen makes is to regard only ‘indigenous’ theories of IR as non-Western IRT. In other words, to group many national schools of IR together merely as theories of non-Western IR is to oversimplify the purpose of creating non-Western IRT. For the moment, let us focus on two historians: Kaoru Sugihara and Takeshi Hamashita. Masayuki Tadokoro named Sugihara and Hamashita as prominent contributors to the field of International Political Economy (Tadokoro 2009: 167-168). Both Asian Studies scholars have offered invaluable resources, which have the possibility to destroy our common sense in the Western Westphalian IR. What is important is that they have attempted to re-examine East Asian history on its own terms and re-write Western-centric views of world history.

Kaoru Sugihara re-examines the East Asian path of economic development and explains the dynamism of the ‘Great Divergence’ (Pomeranz 2000) between East Asia and Europe in the nineteenth century (Sugihara 2003). Western-centric views of history tell us that ‘industrialization’ was brought out from Western Europe and expanded to Asia and other parts of the world. Against this one-way Western viewpoint, Sugihara introduces two concepts: a labour-intensive ‘industrious revolution’ path (the East Asian trajectory) and a capital- and natural-resource-intensive ‘industrial revolution’ path (the European trajectory). Although he agrees that ‘East Asia would not have industrialized without the West’s impact’, Sugihara contends that ‘it was the East Asian path of economic development that made it possible for the majority of the world’s population to benefit from global industrialization’ (Sugihara 2003: 81). In short, Sugihara successfully propounds a ‘diversity’ of economic development paths. Now he attempts to consider international relations and world history with a paradigm shift from ‘temperate zones’ to the ‘tropics’ (Sugihara, Kawai, Kono and Tanabe, 2010).

Takeshi Hamashita propounds a ‘diversity’ of regional orders in international relations and world history from the sea-based perspective and not from land-based and state-centric perspectives, which are typical views of IR (Hamashita 2003). In the standard IR text, the sovereign state system in Western Europe expanded to the rest of the world; East Asia entered modern times and introduced the sovereign state system due to the ‘Western impact’ in the nineteenth century. However, Hamashita emphasises that ‘East Asia entered modern times not because of the coming of European powers but because of the dynamism inherent in the traditional, Sinocentric tributary system’ (Hamashita 1997: 113). Western impact, according to him, ‘did not destroy this maritime
Asia or the Sinocentric tributary system embedded in it’ (Hamashita 1997: 117). From the Chinese perspective, ‘the tributary system was still very much alive, and in the case of Korea, China sent military assistance and political advisers to post-treaty Korea after the mutual confirmation of their master-vassal relationship’ (Hamashita 1997: 117). In short, East Asia had its own order under the Sino-centric tributary system before the Western impact and had gradually introduced the sovereign state system over the Sino-centric tributary system after the Western impact (Shiraishi 2000: 32).

The second mistake that Dr. Chen makes is assuming all advocates of creating nation-based non-Western IRT have made frantic efforts to hold priority to the West. Dr. Chen assumed that the creation of nationalistic non-Western IRT was an effort to get the predominant position over theories of Western IR. This view is quite unsatisfactory. It does not follow that all advocates attempt to have superiority over the West within theories of IR just because national schools of non-Western IRT are created.

Takashi Inoguchi provided a good example of this. Inoguchi attempted to show a ‘diversity’ (not ‘superiority’) of the First Great Debate. The First Great Debate in Western IR (here, ‘American’ IR) concerned idealism/utopianism and realism. In the 1950s, Japan witnessed the idealism-realism debate over whether Tokyo should conclude the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the Western powers or all the Allied powers. Inoguchi labelled this debate the First Great Debate in Japan\(^2\) and contended that the debate ‘resembles to the first great idealism-realism debate in the Unites States’, but that ‘realism’s victory over idealism was somewhat incomplete’, unlike in the United States (Inoguchi 2007: 376).

Shiro Sato also attempted to find a ‘diversity’ of the First Great Debate with the example of Japanese IR (Sato 2008). The idealism-realism debate occurred between Yoshikazu Sakamoto and Masataka Kosaka over the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty during the 1960s. Sato contended that this debate did not resemble the debate in the United States. It was the debate over ‘means’ and ‘ends’ within the paradigm of realism, more specifically, ‘utopian realism’ (of course, this debate was not the same as that between ‘classical realism’ and ‘structural realism’ in the United States).

\(^2\) Another example is the perception gap between China and the British Empire over Hong Kong. Hong Kong became a colony of the British Empire after the First Opium War; yet, it was just a ‘local’ incident for China at the time. Rather, China adopted a policy of winning over the British by providing them isolated lands named Honk Kong.

\(^3\) Inoguchi provides the following definitions of idealism and realism: ‘By idealism, I mean the tendency to place pacifism at the helm according to Article 9 of the Constitution and to play down the role assigned to Japan by the Japan-US Security Treaty. By realism, I mean the tendency to place alliance with the United States the highest priority and to play down the role envisioned by the Constitution at the time of its drafting process’ (Inoguchi 2007: 378).
In his recent research on realism in Japanese IR, Matake Kamiya takes some important steps on this point. Kamiya re-considers Japanese realists like Yonosuke Nagai, Fuji Kamiya and Masataka Kosaka. He successfully argues that Japanese realists are not realist in American IR terms but rather ‘realistic liberal’ scholars (Kamiya 2010).

We are now able to see that all discourses of non-Western IR are not hegemonic. A part of non-Western IR projects attempts to show ‘diversity’ in the study of IR and to listen to ‘local voices’ in Asia. The creation of ‘non-Western’ or ‘post-Western’ IR does not have the same meaning as ‘anti-Western’ IR. We need sunglasses for a much better understanding of our world, with a ‘Western’ lens on one side and a ‘non-Western’ lens on the other (Sato 2010: 69). However, Dr. Chen does not allow Asian people to speak the discourse of ‘non-Western’ IR with the discourse of anti-‘non-Western’ IR. In this sense, we might say that the discourse of anti-‘non-Western’ IRT would strengthen not only the hegemonic status of Western IRT but also the discipline Asian Studies. 4

Now, IR scholars need to put valuable knowledge of Asian Studies into ‘theories’ of Western IR. At the same time, they need to put indigenous knowledge of Area Studies into ‘practice’ in international relations. Peace building is a good example. Peace building is often regarded as the ‘Western’ conflict resolution, or ‘neo-colonialism’ from a ‘non-Western’ perspective. However, ‘The point is not to abandon conflict resolution because it is western, but to find ways to enrich western and non-western traditions through their mutual encounter’ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2005: 8). The discipline of IR in collaboration with Area Studies is expected to enrich the methods of conflict resolution without hegemony.

5. Conclusion: Beyond Double-edged Hegemony in IR

This essay aims to re-examine the critical discourses on theories of non-Western IR. The crafts of non-Western IRT have attempted to show diversity of IR on the grounds that Western IRT stands at a hegemonic position over the non-West. As Dr. Chen argued, however, we run the risk that the discourse of non-Western IRT would also be hegemonic logic. I agree with Dr. Chen’s analysis. We need to remind ourselves of the risk that ‘national’ schools of IR would be hegemonic if they just aim to be another English School or to show superiority over Western IRT. Dr. Chen summarised the hegemonic discourse of non-Western IRT as follows: ‘Western powers have Western IRT that

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4 This is not the first critique of ‘re-strengthening the Western hegemony’ in the study of IR. For example, Immanuel Wallerstein propounded a theory of ‘world-system’ (Wallerstein 1974; 1980). His works definitely contributed to Marxist theories of IR, but he was criticised because he re-strengthened the West-centric view of world history. Hamashita was one of figures to criticise Wallerstein.
speaks for them and their interests, so we should have our own!’ (Chen 2011: 7).

However, it does not follow that all theories of non-Western IR are hegemonic logics. As we have seen, some non-Western IR attempts to find diversity in IR and listen to indigenous voices in Asia. We run the risk, therefore, that the discourse of anti-‘non-Western’ IRT would not only strengthen the hegemonic status of Western IRT but also discipline Asian Studies. To paraphrase Dr. Chen, non-Western powers attempt to have non-Western IRT that speaks for them and their interests, so we should drown out their brisk voices!

However, what I wish to say the most is not that Dr. Chen missed the hegemonic aspect of anti-‘non-Western’ IR discourses. I wish to convey that Dr. Chen and I are in the same camp when examining how we can overcome hegemonies of both Western and non-Western IR theories to see and understand our planet more deeply. Dr. Chen and I assume that Western IRT stands at a hegemonic position over the non-West. He did not criticise the core question of why we need to foster non-Western IRT. He just criticised the procedure of how we create theories of non-Western IR. He is just an anti-‘non-Western’ IR scholar in the sphere of non-Western IRT, not an anti-‘non-Western’ IR figure in the sphere of Western IRT. Actually, he stresses the importance of ‘democratization of IR’: that ‘all voices are heard and treated with equal respect, which, for our purpose here, does not assume the cultural superiority of the West, consciously or otherwise’ (Chen 2011: 3, n.4 [Emphasis original]). He suggests the following:

the IR discipline will remain undemocratic if decolonization only takes place in non-Western IR. Western IR needs to acknowledge its direct involvement in the lives of those whom it studies and to jointly create non-hegemonic spaces where different perspectives of IR can co-exist and learn from each other (Chen 2011: 17).

Dr. Chen successfully provided a starting-point to examine hegemony within both Western and non-Western IR theories: a double-edged hegemony in IR. His fantastic paper paves the way for non-hegemonic/democratic theories of IR. Now IR scholars should give back valuable resources of Asian Studies to the theories and practices of IR. This ‘diversification of IR’ would be one approach towards the ‘democratization of IR’. Then, scholars and students of IR should not miss the hegemony within as well as outside the IR discipline. Otherwise, scholars and students of Asian Studies might say that the IR discipline would discipline Asian Studies.
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The “Westfailure” Problem in International Relations Theory*

Josuke Ikeda**

1. Introduction

In 1999, late Susan Strange published a paper on *Review of International Studies*, with the title “The Westfailure System” (Strange 1999). Her original argument was that the Westphalian world was a “failed” system because it eventually allowed excessive capitalist political economy, thereby created grave global disparity as well as some transnational problems. Yet in one sense her assessment can be re-interpreted that the Westphalian world had had a successful time as the global spread of capitalism represents how it has been influential, going beyond the Western hemisphere. One then may ask here whether there was anything else wrong with the Westphalian system, apart from Strange’s evaluation. Historically speaking, there seems to be sufficient (and even more) reasons to make the case positively, as it developed the dual structure of “international order” and “imperial order” (Keene 2002; Sakai 2007), whereby expanding international society (Bull and Watson 1984) and setting the “standard of ‘civilization’” (Gong 1984).

What the paper contends is, however, slightly different from this line of argument. More focus will be on the side of intellectual development, emphasising the role of Western traditions for the discipline of International Relations. This means that there has been another kind of “Westfailure” in IR theory. It includes both the development of Western intellectual framework of international relations and the underdevelopment of non-Western scheme in the discipline. Or to rephrase, IR has regarded non-Western world as the “Other” to itself, seeing merely as the object for applying concepts and theories, and not as the subject providing any intellectual resources to enrich the discipline. Needless to say, such claim is not new, but what current prevalent theories show is, despite acute criticisms for the discipline’s west-centricity, there would seem no radical tide change, at least for foreseeable future. Nevertheless, recent explorations for “non-Western” or “post-Western” IR theory still deserve serious considerations, as they

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are attempts to move forward from mere criticism. Thus the problem of “Westfailure” in IR theory now contains not only the critical assessment of Western IR, but also more positive investigations if there are any frameworks which draw the world in a quite different way.

This paper aims to offer a series of answer to the questions abovementioned. Its crux is that there needs “post-Western” turn rather “non-Western”, or more precisely, the latter should be a step to move towards the former. In order to proceed this statement, the paper will make a historical case focusing on the “Japanese School” of IR theory, which appeared in interwar and wartime period. A short review will show that the “Japanese School” was one of the earliest attempts based on the non-Western turn, but more important is such “revolt” ended with failure. After all, many of non-Western theorisation seem to face the same pitfall of prioritising own traditions over Western, which provides no solutions to the “Westfailure” problem. Here it is contended that post-Western turn can instead be seen as a better path to take, as it may avoid the reverse prioritisation. Yet simultaneously, the paper holds one reservation with it. That is, post-Western IR is still based on the Western intellectual ethos of continuous criticism, a view that it is desirable to keep questioning and criticising. Whether, and if positive to what extent, one can allow such procedural justice to human fallibility already constitutes a big question, but having recognised so, the paper propounds that it is possible to hold the critical attitude without relying on the procedure of continuous criticism, by tracking how certain ideas have been developed, transferred, interpreted and reinterpreted, accepted, changed and discarded. Such historical account can be called as “cosmopolitan history of ideas”, which becomes the paper’s proposal to address the “Westfailure” question.

A brief overview on the “Westfailure” problem is given in the next section two, while the section three touches the rise and fall of the “Japanese School”, as an example of the failure of “non-Western” approach. Section four will proceed the argument by shifting from “non-Western” to “post-Western” IR, with introducing “Cosmopolitan History of Ideas” particularly focusing on the works of Nakamura Hajime, a Japanese thinker on Indian Philosophy.

2. The “Westfailure” Problem in International Relations Theory

Since its born in 1919, the discipline of IR has sometimes been suffered from criticisms that the subject had ‘failed’ as an academic project. Often the meaning of failure is diverse, and there can be classified at least three. One is the failure regarding to the malfunction of the discipline. Here the “malfunction” means unsatisfactory performance for engaging actual world affairs, mostly war and peace. While E.H.Carr’s classic
castigation is understood as a criticism toward Idealism for providing unrealistic visions for post WWI world peace (Carr 1946/2001), more recent claims that IR cannot predict the End of the Cold War can be understood as self-blaming reflection not to offer any intellectual accounts for late 1980’s transition (Gaddis 1992/1993). Another is the failure of the object of IR itself, international system of society, as typically represented in Strange’s article. Finally, there is third type of failure which can be ascribed to the very character of the discipline. Barry Buzan and Richard Little’s argument that IR has never been to be ‘independent’ and required to import expertises from neighbouring disciplines goes to this disciplinary defect (Buzan and Little 2000).

The “Westfailure” problem dealt in this paper belongs to the third category. It is understood as the failure that existing IR has not taken non-Western world as a source of intellectual tradition, thereby regarded merely as the target of applying concepts and theories. Interestingly, this has not long been recognised as a problem, because it was precisely these ideas about sovereign states and their relationships which non-Western world has required, in particular immediately after decolonisation period. But it does not straightforward mean the Western tradition \textit{per se} has always had universal intellectual validity. The point is that there still have remained some gaps between the Self of IR and its Other.

The first is the civility gap, which entails the difference between Western and non-Western cultures. Here the term ‘civility’ may mean the education and sophistication of particular culture, and as long as culture includes intentional activities of a particular group of people in a given society, it asks to what extent such people’s activities can be seen as educated and sophisticated. The problem in the civility gap is the criteria for evaluation have often set along with Western standard, especially based on language. Typically expressed as the word \textit{barbaroi}, which meant the people who cannot speak Greek, the inability for intercultural communication often goes to the “Other’s” defect, thus historically the language gap has often constituted the civility gap between the civilised and uncivilised. Another point to note is such civility gap creates the progress gap. It includes the claim that the uncivilised may have a room for improvement, and frequently connected with the thoughts of paternalism or trusteeship, the progress gap established asymmetrical relationship between the civilised and uncivilised. All these processes can be rephrased an West-civilization nexus (Ikeda 2011: 83-86).

The second is the conceptual gap, more specifically seen in IR. It entails that existing IR theories have been necessarily presupposing the notion of Greco-Roman polity, if not always Westphalian sovereign states, as an essential ingredient, and therefore do not fully cover any other type of political communities. A typical example can be found in the
writings of Martin Wight, who distinguished sovereign states system from suzerain system and thereby rejected the latter (Wight 1977). Also, in their collaborated study on the expansion of international society, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson argued that western state system had been a prototype which later had spread across the globe (Bull and Watson 1984: 6). What is common to these expertises is the tendency of regarding Greco-Roman style of polity as the standard of reference. Of course, in a sense, the first claim is retrospective in nature, and one may counter that we do not have to consider the point anymore as contemporary world is witnessing rather the ‘retreat’ from states (Strange 1996). Yet even such view still rests on a linear perspective of history from the age of pre-sovereign states to post-Westphalian world, which the idea of states remains as a vital element. The problem here is that mainstream IR theory has usually put less significance on other types of political communities than the one of states.

Finally, there is a functional gap, which means conventional IR has not adequately mentioned non-western world theoretically. Of course the discipline has indeed focused non-western regions, but most of the time theory application to non-Western world is limited to the extent of existing vocabularies of Western IR, typically represented either international system or international society. The result is insufficient treatment of what is uniquely happening in a given country or a region. One of few exceptions may be the theory of underdevelopment, sophisticated in the dependency school and the World System Analysis (Wallerstein 1974). Here it merit is they focus on the vertical relationship between the core and the colony and thus not the horizontal linkage of among states, thus presented another “Other” of the “West”, as “south” or “periphery”. More deeply, existing IR can only offer one-sided perspective for explaining colonial experience. It can be clearly contrasted, in that point, to postcolonialism which gives richer and more non-clear-cut pictures about the colonialism in world politics.

These three gaps constitute a defect of current IR theory, the “Westfailure” problem. Most straightforward, it means that IR theory fails to give clearer account to the phenomena occurring outside the West, but in a deeper level, the problem entails both the limitation of methodology and even the basic attitude to see the non-Western world. What this paper deals with is, however, and unlike postcolonial IR theory, not to provide a fundamental critical treatment to existing international theories. Rather its aim and scope is more limited, in order to offer a path to somewhat different approaches of world politics.

Having mentioned these backgrounds, then, the next inquiry is what we may expect for overcoming the “Westfailure” problem. This paper argues that it is necessary to have some “turns” from Western IR. Namely one can be called as “non-Western” while the other as “post-Western”, and the paper advocates the latter rather than the former. The
obvious question is why not “non-Western”. For what is occurring in current IR academia is almost exactly the opposite, exploring non-Western traditions for the feedback to the existing IR (Acharya and Buzan 2007; 2009). A typical answer to this question is made on the basis that non-Western approach may easily fall into a pitfall or prioritising own traditions against the other (i.e. the Western)\(^1\). What will be presented in the next section is a story of re-prioritisation of Japanese culture and therefore of one of the earliest attempt, and indeed its failure, of “non-Western” IR. More fundamental is a criticism that “non-Western” approach can only address the West-rest difference, but not always ‘intersectional’ disparities.

What can be proposed instead has to be the one to overcome these dual difficulties, which is the “post-Western” turn. Its meaning comes from Giorgio Shani’s article (Shani 2008), with the phrase of “provintializing” (Shani 2007: 417). Its core activity may include (a) giving critical scrutiny to dominant theoretical discourses; and (b) putting Western discourses into wider context of the “post-western” IR. Here, the “post-western” IR itself is vague and difficult to grasp. Yet its main character can be ascribed to the claim against the totalising project by singular, modern, Western, and masculine “Theory”, and the proposition instead to show the plurality of theorising the world. So in one sense, the “post-Western” IR does share the same interest of post-positivist IR. But in another sense, it distances itself from mere post-positivism, as it critically approaches to the dominance of theorisation in IR from geographical point of view. Thus it can be the case that the “post-Western” IR is closer to postcolonial IR, and less to poststructuralism or Critical Theory. Finally, however, such “post-Western” turn is not free from different problems. The most pressing are the questions how we should think the nature of being critical, whether criticism is Western property or intellectual \textit{ethos}, and if so, how we to deal with it. These questions may create further path for taking even different approach within the “post-Western” IR, which will be mentioned in section four. Yet before we need to think why “non-Western” turn is not sufficient.

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\(^1\) The case against recent emergence of non-Western IRT is made in Chen (2011), while more specific historical analysis based on the ‘Kyoto School’ in modern Japan is taken in Shimizu (2011).

\(^2\) The term ‘intersectionality’ comes from American feminist sociologist Kimberle Crenshaw. She uses the term to indicate that actual discrimination occurs not at single but at multi-level, such as gender and colour-based. What can be indicated from her analyses on battering, rape, and domestic violence is that the real minority therefore is the people who stand at the intersection of two discriminations (thus in this case black women or black sexual minorities). Her argument is important \textit{per se}, yet may have much broader implications for indicating that social exclusion may take place on much more complex level. For detailed argument, see Crenshaw (1989).
3. Non-Western IR and the Japanese School

Here the paper attempts to clarify the limit of “non-Western” turn through historical analyses of modern Japanese IR scholarship. Particular focus is on the one during the interwar and wartime period, or between 1920 to 1945. This is the time when the foundation of international politics was born, developed, and distorted for war purposes. By analysing its structure, agenda and function and its afterwards, the section three aims at showing the limit of “non-Western” IR.

3.1. Its structure

The overall character of IR itself differs country by country. In the United States, it is recognised as a branch of Political Science (Schmidt 1998). In Britain, international politics was also firstly developed as a standing subject (Porter 1972; Dunne 1998). In Japanese case, however, IR was firstly developed as a complex of different subjects or a patchwork by five different subjects: International Law, Diplomatic/International History, Modern Politics, Sociology, and Philosophy.

(1) International Law

When we see the historical development of IR, the first point to know is that, in Japanese case, it was international law that was the leading discipline contributing to form IR. This makes a contrast to the case of the States and Britain, both of which Modern Politics was a primary source.

In history, international law was firstly translated as Bankoku Kouhou (萬国公法), which means “Universal Public Law”. Unlike its name, its introduction was highly political on the one hand, as well as for domestic reasons rather international on the other (Yoshino 1931). According to YOSHINO Sakuzo (吉野作造, 1878-1933), the Meiji government had originally had a hostile attitude to western powers, which was a major motor for the political change from Edo Shogunate. However, after achieving the regime change, Meiji government decided to turn its overseas policy for cooperative direction, for the reason not to be invaded like other Asian neighbours. Here a problem emerged how to make such radical change accountable to the original supporters who remained hostile to foreign states. Bankoku Kouhou was then introduced as a device representing the government’s new direction, showing the universal rule to follow even Japan, a state having hostile attitude to the world, had to do so and to some extent there needs to cooperate for existence. In much familiar words, Meiji government showed Bankoku Kouhou as the minimal rule to coexistence (Friedmann 1964; Bull 1977/1995), but its audience was not primary diplomats from western powers but the country’s citizens themselves. Another point of interest is that the term was not coined by Japanese, but an
American Christian who spend more than 20 years in China: thus *Bankoku Kouhou* was neither coined by Japanese, nor in Japan, yet still had a great impact to Meiji modernization.

Since its introduction, it is argued that international law was one of the most intensively studied subjects in Japan’s social science. YOKOTA Kisaburo (横田喜三郎, 1896-1993) classifies four stages of its development until 1942 (Yokota 1942/1976). He argues that while most expertises during the first and second stage (the Meiji Era) was descriptive, closely related to the wars against China (-1894) and Russia (-1904), the ones during the next stage (the Taisho Era) there was a number of results with deeper observations. Theoretical studies introduced Hans Kelsens’ pure theory of law and applied to international law. From practical aspect, a number of analyses focused on “International Peace Organizations”, mainly the League of Nations (Yokota, 1942/1976: 258). It was more or less the same time when the IR was born in Aberystwyth, UK, and it was this second aspect which had provided firm foundation to Japanese pre-war IR, which coincided Japan’s development to be a member of the League Council. However, this had been eroded gradually as the country starts imperial extension.

**(2) Diplomatic/International History**

Diplomatic / International History had also been one major pillar constituting the Japanese School of IR theory. Probably the most notable figures are SHINOBU Junpei (信夫淳平, 1871-1962) and TACHI Sakutaro (立作太郎, 1874-1943), both of which were prolific writers both International Law and History. Another figure to note is KAMIKAWA Hikomatsu (神川彦松, 1889-1988). As typically shown by Shinobu and Tachi, what was unique with modern Japan’s diplomatic/international history is that it had been another name of international law: most of historians were international lawyers as well. Other scholars may include TAMURA Kosaku (田村幸策, 1887-1985), HANABUSA Nagamichi (英修道, 1902-1994), and IRIE Keishiro (入江啓四郎, 1903-1978). One possible reason why can be derived from highly practical orientation among international lawyers at the formative period of the Meiji Era. Diplomacy and international law had developed hand in hand, as the latter was introduced as a vital tool for open-door policy and the state rapid modernisation. Indeed, the official periodical of the *Kokusai Hou Gakkai*, or Japan Society of International Law, has long been as *Kokusai Hou Gaiou Zasshi*, the Journal of International Law and Diplomacy, except first 10 volumes (1902-1911). True were there some exclusive international historians, such as ASHIDA Hitoshi (芦田均, 1887-1959) and KAJIMA Morinosuke (鹿島守之助, 1903-1978).

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3 For example, Osawa (1931) was a seminal work of its sort.
4 Shinobu’s four volume book on international politics, international conflicts, the League of Nations and diplomatic institutions were the leading expertises. Shinobu (1925-1926).
Yet again those historians were at the same time diplomatic practitioners as well: while Ashida was a diplomat who witnessed Russian Revolution and later became a Prime Minister, Kajima worked in both Germany and Italy as a diplomat, later became a head of research section at *Taisei Yokusan Kai*, or the Imperial Aid Association.

(3) Modern Politics

Modern Politics had been third constitutive “pillar” for the Japanese IR. The term “modern politics” had a particular meaning, contrast to contemporary Political Science, which was a combination of pre-behaviourist positivism and German *Staatslehre*. So according to ROYAMA Masamichi (蝋山政道, 1895-1980), there were two streams that constituted the interwar/wartime Japanese Politics, the “Statist” School and the “Positivist” School (Royama 1949/1968: 65). The former is characterised as the study of the state for the state, while the latter situates itself as a counter discourse by focusing not on the structure of the state but what is actually happening in a society in the name of politics. Thus, as its name suggests, most efforts of Modern Politics had been poured to the domestic politics, and not international. Both Royama and Kamikawa belong to such exception, yet more important figure here can be OYAMA Ikuo (大山郁夫, 1880-1955), who applied “positivist” school’s view to international context, in his early book of *Seiji no Shakaiteki Kiso* (Societal Foundation of Politics) in 1923.

Yet there was one critical deficiency with Modern Politics at that time: unlike United States, few efforts had been made for seeking own standing methodology. Of course the 1920s was the formative period for not only modern politics but also IR itself, and the theoretical development had just started. Nevertheless, two “schools” had been in debate for a long time⁵, and it is thus undeniable that there modern politics was not finally able to bear a method for domestic and international political phenomena. This is a part of the reason why later MARUYAMA Masao (丸山真男, 1914-1996) severely criticised as “(…) the political science in this country (…) really has no tradition worth reviving” (Maruyama 1947; 1969: 226). One possible exception to this criticism may be a functionalist theory of the state and international politics, which belongs to the “Positivist” School on Royama’s classification. Yet the problem with this school is it could explain the structure of an idealist international society, but not the basic dynamics of international relations, or simply power politics. In Japanese case, the analysis was made by a sociologist, TAKADA Yasuma.

(4) Sociology

Japanese IR scholar KAWATA Tadashi once suggested that Japanese IR had been

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⁵ Detailed history about the debate between “Statist” and “Positivist” schools can be reached at Otsuka (2001).
developed as a complex of three different subjects: international law, modern politics, and diplomatic history (Kawata 1963). This is what this paper basically relies on, but it was insufficient as it ignored the role of Sociology. There is a good reason to do so, because Japanese Sociology during pre-WWII era was full of methodological debates and not much serious analysis on state and society. One notable exception is TAKADA Yasuma (高田保馬, 1883-1972), who had long been a professor at the Kyoto Imperial University, then moved to Osaka.

Takada’s contribution to the pre-WWII IR was twofold, and they were critical: the argument of society and of power. Regarding to the former, he saw states as one type of society, but not the one and the only. In addition, he argued for the world society, as a possible result of Zentai Shakai (Total or Grand Society, which is the one including not only states, but also any types of societies). The more important was the latter, his argument of power. In his book of Kaikyu oyobi Daisan Shikan (Class and the Third View of the History), published in 1925, he made an intensive analysis on the conception of power or Seiryoku. He also made the clarification and classification of power concept, then presented how power can be distributed among social actors (Takada 1925). Though not directly mentioned, those accounts of power were closely linked to his theory of society, explaining how power works for the development of a society (Takada 1922/78). The point to note with his works is that his theory of society was based on modern individualism. In addition, he had a firm presumption that any action made by an individual was from his/her desire to “power” and to “co-existence”. Thus the person that Takada had supposed was thus both rational and egoistic, on which his argument of society had been built.

(5) Philosophy
Another point which Kawata had missed in the development of modern Japanese IR is the impact of Philosophy. Indeed, Philosophy had provided the worldviews and methodology on which social scientific visions of the world became possible. Here one point to note is modern Japanese humanity, like other subjects, had also been heavily influenced by German expertises, such as Neo-Kantianism, Phenomenology, the Philosophy of Life, and so on. Some of them were actively involved, such as seen in ODAKA Tomo-o (尾高朝雄, 1899-1956)’s analyses of modern states based on Phenomenology (Odaka 1936), and OSAWA Akira (大澤章, 1889-1967)’s account of international legal order (Osawa 1931) with Neo-Kantianism. It is also important that NANBARA Shigeru (南原繁, 1889-1974) also drew his picture of international idealism relied on Kant’s perpetual peace, which Kamikawa, or TOMONAGA Sanjiuro (朝永三十郎, 1871-1951) took the same path.
Apart from such indirect influence, there was a direct relevancy made by Philosophy. Importantly, this was closely tied by the emergence of “Japanese” ways of Philosophy, typically represented by the “Kyoto School”, headed by NISHIDA Kitaro (1870-1945). Its original aim was to bridge between Western and Eastern Philosophies, and the School enjoyed a good mixture of philosophers trained in Japan and in overseas (namely Germany). As well known, however, the direction of the Kyoto School gradually changes, facing the deadlock to reconcile two traditions, eventually became supportive to military (in particular navy’s) policy. But one should not miss the point that the problem tackled by the Kyoto School was exactly what both non and “post-Western” IR also square.

Finally, further different attempt of Japanese Philosophers’ project can be identified: the “Tokyo School”. The Tokyo School here refers to a group of people gathered at the Department of Letters, Imperial University of Tokyo. Its head was UI Hakuju (1882-1963), and their original interest was ancient Indian Philosophy. Obviously therefore no linkage could be recognized with international politics, and in fact there were no people in early stage of the School who tried to cover political issues. The point is, however, later the Tokyo School started to introduce cross-civilizational method for comparing ideas, both religious and secular, under the initiative of NAKAMURA Hajime (1912-1999), connecting with the idea of world community and peace. And it is this method which will later be proposed as a competent candidate for the “post-Western” IR.

Now it can be argued that these four subjects worked together and constitute a discipline of IR. While International Law provided the basic principles of co-existence among states, Diplomatic History offered historical account how the Westphalian system had worked. Modern Politics gave possible direction from mere co-existence to cooperation, and Sociology presented some analysis of some of the most basic concepts of the world. And finally Philosophy gave a overall ground of worldview on which four other subjects can establish their own arguments. It is true that the first course of IR was established in the Politics department, yet this does not impair the argument presented here: the introduction of international law reflected from government’s acute need for diplomatic rule and language, and there was a close connection between law in general and Staatslehre on the one hand, and between critical account of the state and Sociology on the other. And now the argument presented above can be summarised as following figure.
3.2 Its Agendas

Next inquiry is what kind of agendas are to be investigated. The author has elsewhere argued that despite there were some variations on the country’s academic grasp of international society, modern Japanese IR had centred three main questions: the aspect of order, of society, and of autonomy (Ikeda 2008: 20-21). Along with this line of argument, it can further be extended as there can be five types of inquiries which are regarded as agendas for the Japanese School.

The first is about the relationship between sovereign states and society, asking which is more fundamental. It was an older and less sophisticated version of the ‘agent-structure’ problem, and two answers were proposed there, claiming the absoluteness of states or the superiority of society. A debate sparked in Modern Politics, as Seiji Gainen Ronsou (the Debate on the concept of Politics) (Otsuka 2001). In Royama’s classification, the “State School” claimed the supremacy of sovereign states, while the “Positivist School” did emphasise its relative position in a society. Behind the debate was the conflict of two thoughts about politics, Staatslehre and the pluralist theory of the state. What happened in IR was, unlike original Modern Politics, almost total negation of the former. Typical examples were found in Oyama’s work mentioned earlier (Oyama 1923), yet more influential was the book of Royama himself (Royama 1928). The difference between Oyama and Royama is the latter used functionalism as the base for his theory of international politics and administration. Royama, in that book, acknowledges the impact of Leonard Woolf for his study (Royama 1928: 3).

The second inquiry asks to which states may belong, either “order” or “society”. This is a
question which overlaps the first in many extent, but one difference from the first is the second inquiry involved international lawyers and sociologists. On the one hand, many of international lawyers supported the former argument, thereby formed strong camp advocating the “order” approach. Obvious influence by Hans Kelsen can be identified here, and in the country’s context it was both Yokota and Osawa (1931) most sophisticatedly presented theoretical arguments that states belongs to a hierarchical *Kokusai Hou Chitsujo* (international legal order). On the other hand, scholars in Modern Politics and Sociology supported the “society” approach. Besides Oyama and Royama, there were other scholarly works such as TANAKA Kotaro’s (田中耕太郎, 1890-1974), theory of *Sekai Hou* (World Law), which was based on Ferdinand Tönnies’ argument from *Gesellschaft* to *Gemeinschaft* (Tanaka 1931).

Whereas the second asked for broader framework which states may belong, the third concerned more specifically, what kind of actual political arrangement state would / should belong. One possible answer was the League of Nations. This is what most scholars had pursued during the interwar period, regardless their academic standing either the Kelsenite (Osawa), the pluralist (Oyama), the Kantian (Kamikawa), or the functionalist (Royama). However, the attitude gradually changed, thereby emerged another answer that was different from the League system: the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (hereafter, Co-Prosperity Sphere). It was theoretically analysed by YASUI Kaoru (安井郁, 1907-1980) (Yasui 1942) and MATSUSHITA Masatoshi (松下正寿, 1901-1986) (Matsushita 1942), through the comparison of Schmidtian *Grossraum* or the Monroe Doctrine. Osawa later converted his ideas, and approached the issue by referring the idea of *lebensraum* (Osawa 1941). In addition, the development of the Co-prosperity Sphere was historically described as the “Collapse of the Versailles System” (Irie 1943-1944). A different study was made from the point of trusteeship system, by an international lawyer TAOKA Ryoichi (田岡良一, 1898-1985), with his conclusion justifying the Imperial Japan’s rule over foreign territories (Taoka 1941).

The fourth inquiry was qualitatively different from the former three, and it asked what the epistemological basis of our worldview was / should be like. As all international arrangements were western in essence, the basic answer to this question was obviously it was “Western philosophy”, or more precisely, the Lockeian account of constitutionalism tied with Grotian conception of international law. Apart from them, as mentioned, the Kantian tradition had been still strong, typically expressed in Kamikawa (1927) However, there was another pole seeking if there is any possibility apart from these Western mainstreams. The Kyoto School’s philosophy was the challenge, proposing qualitatively different sets of thinking of Eastern or even Japanese philosophy. In addition, there were some via media approach attempted, such as Nakamura’s works on comparative study of
Ways of Thinking which finally published late 1940s (Nakamura, 1948-49).

Finally, there was an even deeper inquiry asking what IR was / should be like as an academic discipline. This asked the overall character and the desirable direction of the subject, and again two possible answers were set. One is the position to become “Politics in international realm” with “scientific” methodology and value-neutral attitude. The same trend can be seen in the realm of Law, through the introduction of Kelsenite theory. Another is the position of “international policy science”, with highly practical orientation to actual world affairs. It is interesting that the Modern Politics in Japan had had strong policy orientation since its emergence. In international context, it had sometimes been called as Kokusai Gyousei (International Administration), and theorists had been expected not only theoretical but also highly practical commitment. Again a representative figure here was Royama, who developed a thorough account of international administration (Royama, 1928). What is important is, which answer one may choose, there had been almost no influence from the United States yet, such as Charles Merriam or Harold Lasswell, and one has to wait the growth of Americal social science until post-war period (in particular the 1960s).

Now these five agendas can be drawn as following image (See Figure 2 and Table 1). These five agendas are not conclusive, nor are they exclusive with each other. They are significantly overlapped and the same person can be found in different agendas. But one point to note is that there seem to be a clear demarcation between the first two and the last three, based on the question of autonomy. Here the word ‘autonomy’ asks not to what extent a state is autonomous from international society; this belongs to questions about authority and autonomy. Rather it questions whether Japan (and perhaps non-Western world) is free from other actor’s (therefore Western in this context) control (Ikeda 2008: 24). While the agenda four tackled the autonomy question more fundamental level, the agenda three considered it at more practical and political level. Yet what was common with them is there occurred a shift departing from Western-dominated thinking. Philosophers dealt with the question if there might be different, or non-Western worldview, and practical thinkers attempted to answer not relying on the League system. And their answer eventually formed a discourse, supporting the Imperial Japan’s colonialist policies.
## Figure 2. Five “Agendas” of Japanese IR during the Interwar/Wartime Period

### Table 1. Major works of Japanese IR during the Interwar/Wartime Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Field</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Birth-death</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Major works</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MODERN POLITICS</td>
<td>OYAMA, Ruu</td>
<td>1880-1955</td>
<td>Waseda</td>
<td>Sei no Shakai-ieki Ken (1933)</td>
<td>became political asylum to the United States in 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KAMIYAMA, Hikosaburo</td>
<td>1889-1988</td>
<td>Tokyo Imperial</td>
<td>Kokusai Rinrei Sensaku-ron (1927)</td>
<td>purged by GHQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROYAMA, Masamichi</td>
<td>1895-1980</td>
<td>Tokyo Imperial</td>
<td>Sei no Nikko to Taicho (1923); Kokusai Sei no Kokusai Gyosai (1937); Sensaku no Nikkyoku to Sekai Sensaku no Sekai Gakushu (1938); Taikai no Sekai (1941)</td>
<td>purged by GHQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OSAWA, Akira</td>
<td>1889-1967</td>
<td>Kyoto Imperial</td>
<td>Kokussho-sho (1933); Kokussho ni okeru Kyoka to Sekai-kuraberi (1941, article)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHIMIZU, Junpei</td>
<td>1871-1962</td>
<td>Waseda</td>
<td>Kokusai Sei no Rinrei (4 volumes, 1920-26); Shanghai-ren to Kokussho (1932); International Law in the Shanghai Conflict (1933, in English); Sensaku kokussho kouji (4 volumes, 1941-42); Sensaku kokussho tokyo (5 volumes, 1943-1944)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAKA, Ryoichi</td>
<td>1898-1985</td>
<td>Tokyo Imperial</td>
<td>Kotoku to Kokussho (1937); Hei kou no Honshitsu (1941); Sensaku no kouki kyokai (1944)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TACHI, Saburo</td>
<td>1874-1943</td>
<td>Tokyo Imperial</td>
<td>Hei kou no Rinrei-ron (1930/last revised 1942); Sensaku kouki-ron (1931/last revised 1944); Kokusai Rinrei Kyoka-ron (1932); Kyokai Kokussho-ron (1934); Shinjinen Kokussho-ron (1936)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TABATA, Shigejiro</td>
<td>1911-2001</td>
<td>Kyoto Imperial</td>
<td>Kokussho Chitai no Togen-teki-Kaigai (1942, article); Kokussho Henshin no Tekken (1943)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YAMA, Katsuo</td>
<td>1907-1990</td>
<td>Tokyo Imperial</td>
<td>Oshika Assi Kokussho no Kyo Sekai (1944)</td>
<td>purged by KMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNATIONAL LAW</td>
<td>OSABA, Akira</td>
<td>1896-1993</td>
<td>Tokyo Imperial</td>
<td>Kokussho no Houteki Senshiki (1944)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIPLOMATIC HISTORY</td>
<td>ASHIDA, Hitoshi</td>
<td>1887-1959</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Kyokai to Osuha Gakushu (1923); Dai Ni Sekai Toyou Zenri (1942)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IRE, Kenshiro</td>
<td>1903-1978</td>
<td>Daigaku Tsukibara</td>
<td>Bunka/Gaku no Houkai (3 Volumes, 1943-44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KAJIMA, Masaokuse</td>
<td>1896-1975</td>
<td>Kaigai Seisaku Gakusya no Kyo Sei no (1934); Tairaku Gakushu no Kihan Sensaku (1942)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KAMIYAMA, Hikosaburo</td>
<td>1889-1988</td>
<td>Tokyo Imperial</td>
<td>Sekai Tsai-mumron (1940)</td>
<td>purged by GHQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SHIMIZU, Junpei</td>
<td>1871-1942</td>
<td>Waseda</td>
<td>Kokussho Sen sei renri (1927); Kindai Gakusha Shoten (1927)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIOLOGY</td>
<td>TAKADA, Yasuma</td>
<td>1883-1972</td>
<td>Kyoto Imperial</td>
<td>Shokagyo Gakushu (1922); Sekai no Kikou (1922); Kyoiku-yokai Gakushu Shakai (1925); Taikai no Minkou-ron (1935); Sensaku no Shokai (1941)</td>
<td>purged by GHQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILOSOPHY</td>
<td>THE KYOTO SCHOOL</td>
<td>Kyoto Imperial</td>
<td>Kongen renri (Shokai no sei to) (1940, by NIHONSHI Kenji); Seiko-ken to Seiko-kai (1940, by KYAMA Issou); Shiryo-sei Kikou no Rokkai (1941, by KOYAMA Tada); Kyoikyuu Kikou no Rinsen (1941, edited by KAMAKAMI Tatsuya)</td>
<td>purged - Nishimura and Suzuki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The TÓKYO SCHOOL</td>
<td>Tokyo Imperial</td>
<td>Taikai no Shin no Shin Chouhou (1942-43, by NAKAMURA Hajime)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3. Its Aftermath: How It Went Wrong

It is well known that many scholars in the “Japanese School” during the interwar/wartime period had played an important role for supporting the state’s policy of colonial rule, in particular by providing an intellectual foundation to legitimise the Co-Prosperity Sphere. A typical figure was Royama, who resigned his job of professor at the Imperial University then be elected as a MP backed by Taisei Yokusan Kai. The turn for supporting imperial policy was seen not only in IR and relevant subjects, but also other disciplines in social science and humanity, and one critical point to note here is that such turn was closely intertwined with serious reconsideration of western culture and west-centrism. As mentioned, the Kyoto School of Philosophy had been a leading group for this task, though its leader Nishida is still recognised its importance for Japanese IR (Inoguchi 2007); (Shimizu 2011).

Generally speaking, there were mainly two streams for supporting government’s policy intellectually. One can be called “Japan-centrism”, arguing the superiority of the Emperor and Japan itself often with referring Shintoistic culture and tradition. In the realm of IR, one possible figure was TAMURA Tokuji (田村徳治, 1886-1958), yet the first type of scholars remained minority. Another is the “conversion”, defined as “the change of belief by coercion of the power [in this case, Japanese government - author] (Tsurumi 1959)”. It involved a number of leading IR scholars, most of whom were later purged by the GHQ. This second type was problematic because, for many scholars, the conversion was not clear-cut change of their academic stance from, say, A to B, rather a sort of extension of A, in order to overcome the deficiencies of A itself. Here it can be classified as three. First is the conversion from Kelsenite/Verdrossian theory of the world state. The second is the one from Marxist revolution. While Osawa belongs to the former, Yasui was a person of the latter group. Third is the one from liberalism or idealism, and this is the path that even powerful liberals went through. Both Royama and Kamikawa, who had once been strong supporter for the League based on political functionalism and Kantian cosmopolitanism, belongs to this third camp. Takada also took the same route. Despite that those three have different starting points, the destination was the same: Schimidttian theory of international law or Grossraum, which justifies the Co-Prosperity Sphere. What is common among all three is that their conversion is a result of dialectic development from west-centric view of the world.

Maruyama later castigated Japanese Politics as “sterile” in his article of “Kagaku to shite no Seiji-gaku (Politics as a Science in Japan)” (Maruyama 1947/1957; Maruyama 1969). He mentioned the conversion as:
During the national crisis that developed after the China Incident, several political scientists were unable to endure the excessive gap between reality and their own scholarly work. They left their ivory towers and plunged directly into the vortex of raw politics. Eventually they established personal ties with specific politicians and military men. These scholars were excessively anxious to use such private relations to move political events in the direction they thought desirable.

Such was the tragic fate of the political science in Japan.

(Maruyama 1947/57: 388; 1969: 232)

His criticism can also be applied not only to modern politics, but also other relevant “pillars” constituting Japanese IR. Indeed, what he called “several political scientists” can be interpreted as those who had close relationship with Imperial government and military. Besides Royama, there are a number of scholars related to IR who had “left their ivory towers and plunged directly into the vortex of raw politics”, and later purged by the GHQ: Kamikawa, Kajima, Irie, Takada, Tamura, Osawa, and Yasui. Having stated, there are two points to note. Firstly, some of abovementioned figures did come back from purge, and then played critical role for the development of post-war Japanese IR. Royama and Kamikawa, in particular, were the two of founding members of the Japan Association of International Relations as well as Japan Association of Politics, both of which were established after WWII. Takada moved to Osaka University and became the first Dean of newly established the Institute of Social and Economic Research, one of the top institute of its sort in the country. Kajima had a very unique career both elected as MP at the same time the President of Kajima Construction Company. In addition he edited and published a number of books on Diplomatic History, including 30 volumes of *Nihon Gaikoushi* (The History of Japanese Diplomacy).

Second, it should be recalled that there were some scholars who refused to convert their ideas. Such people can be categorised as (1) the resistant; (2) the scientist; and (3) the exiled. The first type of people includes both Nanbara and Tanaka, who expressed their concern to imperial expansion. Yokota and Odaka belongs to the second group, who did not clearly support the government by putting themselves as legal scientists distant from political issues, focusing on Kelsenite theory. The final group is indeed a minority, Oyama. He was almosty only one person who sought political refuge to the United States, where he continued his study at Northwestern University until 1947.

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6 For instance, Nanbara criticised Japanese style of fascism in his book *Kokka to Shukyo* (States and Religion) (Nanbara 1943).
4. From “Non-Western” to “Post-Western” IR: A Proposal

What the story presented in the previous section shows us is the limit of the “non-Western” approach to IR theory. However, it is not a wise way to regard merely as a failure. The point is not to regard the “non-Western” turn as the final goal, but to put it into wider context of another, but related, project. This may be called as the “post-Western” IR, and the final section will devote to explain a rationale for such second turn. Moreover, it is also explored any possible means to advance the project, namely the “Cosmopolitan History of Ideas”.

4.1. A Rationale for a Proposal

It is obvious that the “Japanese School” during the interwar/wartime period had a serious deficiency both in its orientation and its argument. However, the attempts made by those scholars in that period were the projects facing squarely the question of West-centricity for the first time, at least in Japan, from non-Western standpoint. As mentioned in the second section, the “post-Western turn” in IR is to de-essentialise the western way of thinking about international / world politics. The essentialisation of some types of knowledge about the elements, the structure, and the dynamics of the world necessitates the exclusion of the “Other’s” knowledge. Here, the essentialisation creates a kind of asymmetrical relationship between things happening in the world. In front of the “essence”, the “Other” is at best what complements the “essence”, and at worst, what does not exist in the world. The problem with such operation is we may not acknowledge what we should do. Here, the “post-western turn” contributes to prevent us from missing the important “Other”, by problematising the essentialisation. The IR scholars in the interwar/wartime period in Japan did have a similar purpose, but they distorted their intension by themselves, or by the atmosphere of Jikyoku, the wartime mood.

Thus, if the initial intension has been good enough even for contemporary “post-Western turn”, is it sufficient to revive the past movement with significant modification? It is the case, as some scholars has begun to re-assess the pros and cons of the Kyoto School of Philosophy, and sought the possibility to apply to IR (Tosa 2008; Shimizu 2011). These are important works, and it would be reasonable to say some intellectual heritages in modern Japan can bring any implications for overcoming west- / modern- / masculine-centric IR theory. But this paper will take a different route. Its first reason is related to the attitude to the “post-Western turn” itself. At the earlier part, the paper has characterised the core of the “turn” as de-essentialisation, but the real question remains how we can achieve it. There have been some notable methods which are similar both its ways and purposes, such as “immanent criticisms” for Critical Theory, or “deconstruction (or destruktion in Martin Heidegger’s sense)” for poststructuralism. Though their
methods are quite different, at least two common points may be identified. One is the presumption of that there is no such a thing as the “Truth”: what there exists is a process of making / legitimising a view the “Truth”. This first point leads to the second, that there is nobody who embodies such “Truth” and we thus have to be sceptical for it. It is the view that it would be the best way to keep questioning, as long as we are the human neither to reach the “Truth” nor to be the holder of it. What Socrates did was to keep questioning, through which revealed the fact that the person being asked had always failed to acquire the truth. More modern context, Jürgen Habermas says that the whole enterprise of critical social theory is an unfinished project to human emancipation, where the act of immanent criticism plays vital role. Or Jacque Derrida argues in a quite different way as continuous deconstruction belongs to “justice” (Derrida 1992). In any cases, continuous criticism is recognised as a crucial way as intellectual ethos. In the realm of de-essentialisation, therefore, how we keep being critical to critical approaches seems to be a critical matter, and scepticism has been the way to meet that requirement.

The paper does not intend to deny the role and value of continuing criticism, but asking one point: how should we evaluate such “keep asking” culture itself? On the one hand, scepticism is a vital way for preventing absolutism. On the other hand, it also means that what can ensure the non-arbitrary-ness, is not the substance of a view but the procedure of iteration. Emphasising the role of procedure can be categorised as intellectual ethos or, by using Arthur O. Lovejoy’s word, an intellectual “habits” (Lovejoy 1936/1960: 10), and in fact has been a very important element of Western idea. Again this paper does not reject the value of continuing criticism. Thus it may still be able to make a case that we should be critical for de-essentialising IR. Having acknowledged, nevertheless, these still seems to remain one difficulty in the context of “post-Western” turn: that is, we cannot really de-essentialise the procedure / iteration-centric attitude by applying existing method. If this would be the case, then we would need another way.

3.2. Its Blueprint (1) Introducing “History of Ideas”

Now we have seen that there would be a reason for seeking a different way of de-essentialisation for the “post-Western turn” in IR theory. Thus the next question is what a new proposal would be like. This is a difficult to answer, yet one point to clear is the blueprint presented hereafter will not replace the whole picture of Western IR theory nor “post-Western” IR theory, and remains merely one way for de-essentialising the former.

The new proposal may have following tenets as general character. First of all, it is inter-civilizational in its level. Here, what the first point does NOT mean are twofold: in the first place, this does not exclude the view that contemporary world is the one made by
sovereign states. Despite the widespread of globalization, states still remains the primary actor in the world. What the new proposal, however, argues is that even though sovereign states have been the principal actors, there exists a long story which certain ideas of political communities were born, developed, supported and rejected, and we see the history of ideas on political community itself, not just the material existence of states. Thus, to some extent, this new proposal shares interests with Charles Tilly’s or Hendrick Spruyt historical analysis of developing sovereign states (Tilly 1992; Spruyt 1994). Yet the proposal diverts itself from Spruyt in as it focuses on much wider, and even vague, concept of polity itself, and from Tilly’s argument as it aims to present the history of ideas about the polity. Having stated, it is necessary to analyse the historical development of political communities apart from the context of the world of sovereign states, as they are answers to an inquiry of how people have thought about possible / desirable type of human collectivity.

In the second place, neither does this take civilization as an analogy of states, or ultimately, individual. Civilization is not an independent “actor”, but a venue where different people create different / similar ideas about common issues of concern. One possible reason why Samuel Huntington’s argument has been influential, and therefore criticised is because he implicitly introduce the analogy of states / individuals to the story among civilizations. The same line of argument can be applied to Arnold Toynbee’s world history. There would be more difficulties for applying the “domestic analogy” at the inter-civilizational revel, since civilizations are structured neither as states nor individuals. Civilizations simply do not fight with each other, nor even conflict: it is always people living within them, then create and develop ideas that construct civilizations.

What can be derived from the first tenet is: although the level of analysis is inter-civilizational, what we will see actually is rather different from civilization itself. Instead, the point of focus is the idea. Here the paper has a big presupposition that it is the idea which constructs the reality, or the world (Berger and Luckmann 1966). It has been fashionable for recent IR literatures to argue the role of ideas (Goldstein and Keohane 1993), but the reason why the proposal pays attention to ideas is not simply because it makes reality. Rather, ideas are at the same time the product of human mentality. “Human mentality” here does not limit itself to philosophical aspect; it includes a wide range of activities that are rational, irrational, and emotional. However, material conditions often do play significant roles for the formation of human mentality as well, and this paper does not reject the roles that they would play for forming certain ideas.

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7 A detailed review and criticism to Toynbee are given in Ikeda (2011), pp. 88-92.
8 See Dodds (1962) as an example.
Therefore, the whole character of this proposal can belong to the “History of Ideas.” According to Lovejoy, it is the subject which is “more specific and less restricted than the history of philosophy” (Lovejoy, 1936/1960: 3). More specific because the subject pays attention not to the general idea of Philosophy, but to “the prior idea” which is more fundamental and variously operative (Ibid., 5). This includes: (1) unconscious mental habits; (2) intellectual habits; (3) metaphysical pathos, which is epitomised by a feeling like “the loveliness of the incomprehensible” (Ibid., 11); (4) meanings of sacred words and phrases; and (5) principle, which is an answer to the philosophical questions that human beings naturally have. Principle is the most important in his argument, so Lovejoy’s study can be rephrased as the history of principles that goes prior to philosophy. In addition, it is less restricted because the subject does not limit its range of analysis to philosophy only. He identifies the “History of Ideas” as inter-disciplinary, as well as multi-national and multi-lingual. In fact, his approach is not in fact inter-civilizational, but multi-national / lingual character remain important, since there have been small number of similar attempts which takes them seriously. One possible example is Martin Wight, who classifies four concepts, international society, the maintanence of order, intervention, and international morality, as “certain coherent pattern of ideas that may be detected from time to time (Wight 1966: 90)”. He takes inter-civilizational view by comparing major systems of polities among different cultures. One problem with it is he strictly limits his analysis in western, state-centred context. In his inquiry, suzerain state system was not the subject of central consideration, nor did he make clear the relationship between these two.

Another example may be found in the works by ONUMA Yasuaki (大沼保昭), Japanese International Lawyer. His recent arguments entail both critical comments to west-centricity of International Law (Onuma 1987/1995), as well as his proposals to add “inter-civilizational” (later “trans-civilizational”) perspective (Onuma 1998). His argument is sensitive both non-western and post-western aspects, and successful for de-essentialising the idea of human rights in the study of international law. Yet his analysis seems to overemphasise the difference between western and non / post -western conception of human rights, rather than the commonality of these two. Moreover, his analysis lacks to draw how certain ideas (human rights, in this context) had been developed, interpreted, supported and rejected. His contention of “inter-civilizational” perspective may be of great help to draw such process, but his view of inter-civilizationality remains the one complementary level of analysis for de-centralising western, inter-national conceptions of international law. As his initial interest has been problematising west-centred understanding of international law, it may be harsh to criticise the argument simply because his argument like this. However, the deficiencies with his study give a clue how we can fix it and make a proposal better.
3.3. Its Blueprint (2) Transforming into “Cosmopolitan History of Ideas”

What Lovejoy, Wight, and Onuma tell us is that there have already been some attempts similar to the paper’s proposal, but they were not perfect. The deficiencies with those studies are either: (1) the lack of non/post-western perspective for problematising particular conceptions in international/world politics (Lovejoy and Wight); (2) the lack of inter-civilizational perspective (Lovejoy); or (3) the lack of the analysis more than problematising the West-centricity of them (Onuma). Thus the remaining task for presenting a new proposal is to show how one may overcome them. Here, the paper argues that it would be useful to introduce the argument of Nakamura Hajime.

Nakamura was a professor of Indian Philosophy at the University of Tokyo, but he extended his interest to what he called “Hikaku Shisou Ron (Comparative Study of Ideas)” His academic manifest was systematically appeared in his book Hikaku Shisou Ron (Nakamura 1960) for the first time, which later led to seven volume books on “Fuhen-teki Shisou-Shi (Universal History of Ideas)” titled as Sekai Shisou shi (World History of Ideas) (Nakamura 1974; 1975-1976; 1976; 1977). Besides historical analysis, he made different attempts to establish “Fuhen-teki Ronri-gaku (Universal Logics)”, which resulted his posthumous publication of Ronri no Kouzou (The Structure of Logics) (Nakamura 2000).

For developing his study of “Fuhen-teki Shisou-shi”, Nakamura puts three theses as its core. First, he argues that ideas are becoming more sophisticated as human culture develops. Second, he presumes that there appear similar ways of thinking among different cultures, if they are more or less at similar stage of development. Finally, he says that most of philosophical questions are universal. His project of “Fuhen-teki Shisou-shi” is the one which aims to draw out historically how human being has had common philosophical agendas as well as corresponding ways of thinking throughout the time and place. For achieving this purpose, he takes comparative approach between three areas, China, Europe, and India, picking out both similar patterns and differences. What is unique with him is his primary focus on India and China. In addition, he points out that human mentality and the actual world are mutually constitutive (Nakamura 1960: 239-240; 1974: 28), which fits the paper’s previous presumption that ideas (re)construct the social reality.

On the one hand, Nakamura’s project of “Fuhen-teki Shisou-shi” is very close to the studies by Lovejoy, Wight, and Onuma. First of all, Nakamura’s focus on Philosophical agendas and corresponding patterns of thinking is almost the same with Lovejoy’s attention to “principles” or “intellectual habits”. In the second place, Nakamura
recognises the question of order and political community as two of key inquiries in his books, which overlaps Wight’s interest of state and state-system. Finally, unlike Lovejoy and Wight, Nakamura’s approach is at least non-western, putting western ways of thinking and philosophical ideas in much wider context of universal history of ideas. Here Onuma’s project of Inter-civilizational law shares some interest.

On the other hand, these points do not enable Nakamura’s argument to be applicable to the study of IR straightforward. His argument definitely lacks post-modern / post-masculine standpoint. Also, although he says he only concentrates on certain philosophical inquiries which are common to the similar stages of development in any cultures, his scope of analysis still remains very wide to include major questions about man and the world. Moreover, Nakamura seems to put more weight on philosophical aspect of human mentality than others, which should be complemented by Lovejoy’s focus on pathos. In short, his project of “Fuhen-teki Shisou-shi” is too wide to include principle issues of philosophy, and at the same time, too narrow to focus on the philosophical issue only.

If one makes an attempt to introduce Nakamura’s project in IR, therefore, there will need two tasks for modifying his framework. One is to limit the issue from general philosophical inquiries to the ones which are especially related to international / world politics. This operation may take two steps: firstly, one narrows the issue from philosophy in general to political philosophy; and secondly, one then expands the issue from political philosophy to international / global political theory. Another task to be required is to bring non-philosophical elements back into the historical analysis of ideas. It is gradually recognised that pathos or emotions have played equally important roles for the development of human mentality (Nussbaum 2003), and IR theory is not an exception (Linklater 2004; 2009). This is particularly the case when the construction of certain polity or related institutions is closely connected to the development, (re)interpretation of certain non-secular ideas.

Having made such modification, one can transform Nakamura’s framework of “Fuhen-teki Shisou-shi”, into “Cosmopolitan History of Ideas”, for clarifying the development, transfer, (re)interpretation, acceptance and rejection of following thoughts:

(1) On human groups or collectivity; particularly (but not limited to) political community

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9 For expanding political theory into international realm, see Williams (1996).
10 For instance, one of the earliest form of diplomacy is based on oaths, which often had religious character. See Nussbaum (1954) for ancient examples.
(2) On general environment surrounding human being; particularly (but not limited to) political one.

(3) On the “life-cycle” of certain human groups (i.e. their “birth”, development, and “death”)

(4) On the dynamics of those human groups, including conflict and cooperation, dissolution and integration, exclusion and inclusion

(5) On the change of the general environment

They are a part of possible long list, so there will be other important ideas to be analysed.

Before moving to the conclusion, there can be three possible points to note for introducing Nakamura’s framework as an approach of the “post-western IR theory”. The first is about the relationship between the ideas listed here and more familiar concepts to IR students, such as sovereignty, states, power, war, peace and so on. The author does not think these two categories will clash straightforward. Yet some concepts, like sovereignty, will be de-essentialised, which means that they will once lose given and absolute status in IR and be put into a wider context of the “life-cycle” or the dynamics of particular human groups. For instance, sovereignty will remain one crucial concept for forming a political community, but simultaneously relativised as modern, European product. The “History of Idea” approach focuses on the process how the idea of sovereignty had been created or followed from its forerunning concepts, transferred and interpreted outside Europe, and going to change, if it is the case, in foreseeing future. Since many of concepts in international / world politics are modern and European, there will expect similar operations like sovereignty for others. The key here is the process of de-essentialisation of a concept and its relocation into inter-civilizational context.

The second is about the relationship between Nakamura’s modified framework and the “Japanese School” of IR theory. In one aspect Nakamura’s framework of “Fuhen-teki Shisou-shi” seems to be based on Japan’s unique experience: situating itself into the Western and non-Western world simultaneously. Such experience has sometimes understood as the “hybridity” in postcolonialist sense, and there have been a number of Japanese scholars who have emphasised it. However, it is also negative because the “Japanese School” merely indicates where it comes from. Despite their origins, ways of thinking or theories spread all over the world. It allows the globalization of certain theory, as well as various interpretations and diversification at the same time. Thus an “American social science” or the “English School” are accepted, modified or rejected in other

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11 The classic instance is the conviction of the Kyoto School of Philosophy, which later turned to the claim of Japan’s superiority because of its hybridity. Similar trends can be found in recent expertises on the Comparative Studies of Civilizations. See Ito (1985).
countries. The “Japanese School” is not an exception. If there are any points which are original to American, English, or Japanese Schools of IR theory, it would not be the national affiliation of particular practice of theorisation and their fruits, but their uniqueness. The national adjective of “American” “English” “Japanese” or any others are the ones to show where such theorisation, theories and their background experiences came from. This is a point worth emphasising, since it is not always correct to say that the original theory is the genuine one. It is especially the case for IR, a subject analysing globalised and multicultural world.

Finally, supposing that the introduction of Nakamura’s framework would make any influence to IR theory, what kind of contributions it is expected to make. Again it should be recalled that the “Fuheng-teki Shisou-shi” approach will not replace all major IR theories and become a kind of “grand theory”. However, in the “post-western turn”, it would provide a different type of historical account. It is different in two senses: firstly the approach exclusively focuses on ideas, and secondly it attempts to clarify the development, (re)interpretation, acceptance and rejection of ideas from inter-civilizational perspective. It will not fill the methodological cleavage between positivists and post-positivists, nor will it give any practical answers for those who wish to utilise IR for governing the world from policy-making field, or resisting it at grassroots level. Yet it is expected that the proposal would be of a help to know how a given concept related to international / world politics has a story of formation, development, transfer, (re) interpretation, acceptance, modification, and rejection, from civilization to civilization.

5. Conclusion

The question whether one can really recognise anything like the “post-Western turn” in IR theory, and whether the “Fuheng-teki Shisou-shi” approach, and its successor of “Cosmopolitan History of Ideas” would be a good candidate for that turn still remain big questions. Indeed, there have been a number of studies which may share the concern about the west-centricity of IR theory, approaching from different angles, levels and methodology. However, what the paper has attempted is to provide a positive answer to them, and the argument developed in this paper, even it remains sketchy, is reflected from certain intellectual mood that it is high time to consider the issue of the “Other” in the discipline. It may well be in a sense “dangerous” to develop a proposal based on particular “mood” or Zeitguist, but what should not be ignored is that there are questions left how we should explain and understand contemporary globalised and diversified world, and its politics, and whether it is appropriate enough to see them through western-tailored lens. The proposal presented here is one view to approach these inquiries.
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Is Japanese IR the Next English School?*

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1. Introduction

It may look strange to begin an analysis of Japanese International Relations (IR) with a seemingly unrelated work on the relationship between constructivism and critical international theory. Contrary to the concerns held by some critical theorists involved in the “Third Debate,” Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit argue that the rise of constructivism as a new perspective on international relations should be perceived as a welcome intervention, for constructivism does not just have its roots in critical social theory but also add to the “sociology of moral community” in world politics (Price & Reus-Smit 1998). One may thus expect that this author too would call for a closer collaboration between the English School and a distinctive Japanese approach to international relations.

Moreover, despite the oft-seen criticisms and even its proponents’ own recognition that the English School is essentially a Eurocentric theory, there has been no shortage of admiration for the School as an established alternative to mainstream IR theories (neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in particular) which are very much American in origin and perspective. Indeed, it has been widely cast as a role model by various academic IR communities in East Asia which are trying to build up their own indigenous theoretical approaches.1

But the apparent attractiveness of the English School as a “strategic partner” for aspiring Asian schools does not stop here. In his survey of the state of the IR theory field as of 1969, Hedley Bull, a founding father of the English School,2 already alerted us that IR

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2 While it is important to inquire “where are the women in international society?” as True (2005) does, it should also be stressed that all canons of this gender-blinded theory are men.
theory has been “overwhelmingly Western, predominately Anglo-American” (Bull 1995: 208),\(^3\) which may have increasing difficulty in offering an adequate understanding of world politics that is becoming more and more non-Western.

More recently, Barry Buzan, a second-generation English School scholar who reconvened the once dormant School at the annual meeting of the British International Studies Association (BISA), went further to encourage the development of non-Western IR theory in Asia.\(^4\) Buzan’s initiative has been well received thus far. A Chinese scholar involved in the would-be Chinese School proudly announced that he has been included in Buzan’s English School group, and that “China can probably learn more from the English School than from American IR theory” because the former is “more open to the idea of variations between different international systems that can accommodate non-Westphalian politics” (Wang 2009: 117).

Unlike Price and Reus-Smit’s attempt to “bridge” (or, for that matter, optimism registered by the Chinese scholar mentioned above),\(^5\) I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of the development of homegrown, non-Western IR theories along the trajectory of the English School, consciously or otherwise. The problem of its Eurocentrism is not simply a matter of selection bias which can be easily corrected once we “broaden our horizon,” i.e. moving from European to world history.\(^6\) Rather, we must ask how such a bias on the part of English School writings becomes possible in the first place.

Turan Kayaoglu has demonstrated that the intellectual narrative employed by English School scholars about the Peace of Westphalia (1648) works to reproduce a framework of normative hierarchy within which Western states are producers of rules, norms, and institutions of international society, whereas non-Western states are at the receiving end of those rules, norms, and institutions (Kayaoglu 2010). Although IR scholarship has gradually come to realize that the conventional story associated with the Peace is more like a myth than reality (e.g. exclusive state sovereignty, state monopoly of the means of violence, the separation of church and state, etc.),\(^7\) English School writers continue to treat Westphalia as the emergence of an international society that removed the problem of religious conflict and affirmed a commitment to peaceful coexistence among sovereign

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\(^3\) This recognition came before Hoffmann (1995).

\(^4\) See the special issue in *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, vol. 7, No. 3 (2007), which was later published as Acharya and Buzan (2010).

\(^5\) With the rise of Wendtian constructivism in the past decade that is mostly concerned with how social norms or identities shape international and foreign-policy outcomes rather than how particular norms or identities came about, it can be argued that Third Debate critical theorists’ (including postmodernists, post-Marxists, feminists, and so on) concerns are not entirely misplaced.

\(^6\) See, for example, Buzan and Little (2000).

\(^7\) Krasner (1999), a staunch realist, is among the critics of this Westphalian narrative.
states. The Westphalian narrative thus naturalizes the Eurocentric conception of international society while equating other forms of arrangement outside of Europe with political disorder and religious intolerance.

This, in turn, establishes non-Western states’ inherent inferiority vis-à-vis Western ones and allows the latter to apply different norms and principles toward the former based on the Western-oriented “standard of civilization.” The end result of such a normative hierarchy in the “real world” includes, to name but a few, the legitimization of colonialism (Keene 2002: chap. 4), the deprivation of the rights of indigenous people (Keal 2003), and the demise of an East Asian international society in the late nineteenth century which until then had prevented military conflicts between China and Japan for nearly three hundred years (Suzuki 2009). Rather than inspiring the development of indigenous theory-building or facilitating a global dialogue among equals (Acharya & Buzan 2007; Ikeda 2011), I submit, the very presence of the English School, among other mainstream theories, entails the absence of non-Western IR theory in Asia and other parts of the Third World in the eyes of Western academics; after all, for people without Westphalia their regional systems must lack some crucial qualities of international society, hence unable to produce any English School-comparable theory that can meet the Western standard.

Drawing upon Kayaoglu’s critique of Westphalian Eurocentrism in IR theory, I develop my argument regarding the pernicious consequences of the “narrative-laden” English School on Asian IR theorizing and possible ways to address them in the following three sections. According to Kayaoglu, the problem of “narrative-laden” refers to situations in which researchers tend to focus on cases that confirm rather than disconfirm the narrative and, so to speak, they are insensitive to the limitations and biases of the historical narratives they employ (Kayaoglu 2010: 196). When Westphalia-disconfirming practices occur (e.g. lack of political and religious tolerance), European and non-European states are perceived differently. European deviation is attributed to exogenous conditions that are beyond European states’ control, or treated as instances of reinterpretation and contestation of the Westphalian order; non-Western deviation, on the other hand, is attributed to non-Western states’ endogenous inferiority and seen as their violation of the “status quo.” In short, such a double standard comes from a normative hierarchy in which “the non-Western tortoise will never catch the European hare” (Kayaoglu 2010: 196).

Following this introductory section, the second section will examine how the recent drive to develop a distinctive Japanese IR continues to inherit, rather than poses a fundamental

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8 See also Kang (2007: chap. 2).
challenge to, the Eurocentrism endemic to the Westphalian narrative in Western IR scholarship. The Japanese case is illustrative for our purpose here, not least because Japan hosts the largest number of IR academics in Asia. Two caveats should be added here. First, I do not intend to offer an extensive survey of the state of the IR field in Japan but concentrate on a limited (albeit growing) body of local literature that is concerned with the aforementioned Western bias in mainstream IR theory.9 Second, as this paper deals with the ideas proffered in such a literature rather than the individuals who put forward them, my observation does not necessarily capture the latest positions of those individuals.

Being a “derivative discourse” of Western IR does not imply that Japanese theorizing as a discursive practice is without any positive agency, though (Chatterjee 1986). As Foucault indicates, such practice emerges out of “the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it” (Foucault 1984: 88). The third section will illustrate how Japanese intellectuals’ appropriation of the logic of the English School, especially the notion of international society, reminds us of the intimate relationship between national identity and international theory, which is not simply about preserving modern states’ mutual independence and peaceful coexistence as the (pluralist wing of) English School scholars anticipate.

To address the Eurocentric orientation of its epistemological foundation, however, it is imperative for Japanese IR to stop taking Western theories and concepts as its sole reference point. The fourth section will discuss how to do so by pointing to some steps forward.

2. “We are not monkeys!” The search for indigenous IR theory in Japan

In the 2007 special issue of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (the flagship journal of the Japan Association of International Relations, JAIR), Acharya and Buzan provocatively ask: “Why is there no non-Western IR theory in Asia?” (Acharya & Buzan 2007). Understandably, their question has aroused a growing interest within and outside Japan in examining whether there is any approach to international relations which can be said distinctively Japanese (Inoguchi 2007a; Pettman 2010). But this kind of question is in fact not novel to IR scholars in Japan. Prompted by Adolf Hitler’s categorization of the Japanese race as a mere bearer of Euro-American cultures but not a creator of their own, Kamikawa Hikomatsu, the first JAIR president, in 1966 already questioned: “Are Japanese IR scholars only monkeys to import European and American IR theories?”

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9 This type of comprehensive survey can be found in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai [Japan Association of International Relations] (2009).
As a contemporary authority of Japanese IR and its representative in the Archarya-Buzan project, Inoguchi Takashi responds to this renewed challenge by pointing to some Japanese contributions to academic IR which, he believes, should have been considered original and widely acknowledged in the discipline (Inoguchi 2007a). He argues that, if theories of IR are not narrowly defined in terms of positivist methodology as often seen in the United States, it is possible to identify at least three fledging theories in pre-World War Two Japan associated with prominent intellectuals such as Nishida Kitaro, Tabata Shigejiro, and Hirano Yoshitaro.

It is not my purpose here to dispute the credentials of these pre-war figures as under-explored sources of non-Western IR knowledge. Nor do I deny the importance of making these sources accessible to a much wider audience outside Japan. What is striking about Inoguchi’s response is that the aforementioned scholars and their ideas are presented in a particular way that is not “clearly comprehensible by readers of all persuasions” (Inoguchi 2007a: 379) but is especially congenial to academics fluent in Western/American IR language. Rather than striving to find words to articulate Nishida’s philosophy of nothingness, he chooses to depict Nishida as an “innate constructivist” with sophisticated understanding about identity (a concept which, even until today, can only be expressed in katakana by the Japanese) and Japan’s place in the world. Similarly, Tabata is portrayed as a liberal international lawyer defending the natural freedom of individuals and Hirano as a progenitor of functionalism calling for Asian regional integration.

The distinctiveness and merit of Japanese IR is thus demonstrated through an indirect comparison with American IR (“We have got everything you have for long – save realism!”) but not through self-refinement. This strategy inevitably backfires, however, when Inoguchi goes on to assert that the study of IR in Japan bears more differences than similarities with its counterparts in Korea and Taiwan on the grounds that the former is “less penetrated” by American IR (Inoguchi 2009). Rather than telling us how pre-war Japanese intellectuals had sought to overcome Western modernity but failed, how contemporary Asian IR scholars could learn from that experience and how they might join forces to address the “Hegelian trap,” the need to perform Japanese IR’s

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11 See also Inoguchi (2007b: chap. 6).
12 See also Inoguchi (2007b: chap. 7).
13 Tosa (2009) indicates that Japan’s non-Western alternative to modernity (i.e. Pan-Asianism and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere) inevitably fails, for the simple reversal of East and West only ensured the continuation of the unwanted master-slave relationship, in which the slave triumphs over the master by oppressing his oppressor and thereby himself becoming the new master/oppressor.
“non-Western” uniqueness becomes more urgent than to articulate what its contents actually are.

Such identity politics of IR theorizing remains discernible, albeit less apparent, in various recent rejoinders to Inoguchi’s response. Largely confirming Inoguchi’s approach, Ikeda Josuke comes up with an impressive (and longer) name list of pre-war thinkers under his four categories: “the Idealists,” “the Kelsenians,” “the Cosmopolitans,” and “the Greater-Asians” (Ikeda 2008). He argues that, if there is anything unique about Japanese IR, writings of the Greater-Asians provide the most relevant insights on Japan’s peculiar position between the world of the colonizers and the world of the colonized. While categorization of this kind tends to invite quarrels as to who should be included and who should be excluded (e.g. how to deal with those intellectuals’ about-face during the wartime? Was Tabata a staunch liberal or a collaborator of the militarist regime? Likewise, to what extent Royama Masamichi should be considered an idealist?) and thus obscure rather than clarify their ideas, the portrait that “Japanese IR does something different but is comprehensible through Euro-American normative theory” must be quite comforting to those who insist that Western theories can be universally applicable.

Other young academics similarly fail to avoid Inoguchi’s misstep. Shimizu Kosuke provides a useful yet ultimately constructivist appraisal about the central role of culture and identity in his description of Japanese IR (Shimizu 2008). In Sato Shiro’s account, too, the policy debate between two academic heavyweights (Sakamoto Yoshikazu vs. Kosaka Masataka) over the revision of the Japan-U.S. security treaty during the 1960s is framed as a “great debate” between “utopianism and realism,” comparable but not similar to the “First Debate” in the United States (Sato 2008). To be sure, Sato is not the first person to do so and his analysis actually concludes that Sakamoto was no less realistic than Kosaka. Nevertheless, instead of pondering over the extent to which they may be called “utopian realists,” it is perhaps more pertinent to acknowledge that the nuance in these two scholars’ thinking cannot be readily captured by common (read: Western) categories such as realism, utopianism, or their synthesis.

This is not to underestimate the enormous difficulty of articulating indigenous thought without making reference to external sources. Yet it does not follow that these sources can or should only be Western ones. Again, Inoguchi’s response is illustrative here. In order to resolve the normative hierarchy between Western civilization and Japan, Inoguchi notes that Nishida adopted a creative method of dialectic in which a thesis and an anti-thesis may coexist without forming a synthesis. This is so because contradictions do not

14 See also Inoguchi (2007a: 376).
necessarily move in the direction of a new synthesis without an innate self-contradiction. Nishida was thus able to advance a non-Western account of “identity/difference” which does not resort to conversion or discipline; accordingly, Japan’s identity is produced through a coexistence of opposites, Eastern and Western civilizations.

Rather than showing how Japanese IR may benefit from this insightful formulation and its engagements with some like-minded philosophies such as Taoism, Inoguchi abruptly reduces Nishida’s dialectic to something “more Hegelian [than Hegelian]” (Inoguchi 2007a: 379), hence reinforcing the West’s assumed cultural superiority which he seeks to problematize. It cannot be more ironic for a non-Western IR project to look for investiture from a questionable Western authority while ignoring other potentially valuable non-Western voices. Such omission does not just reveal that IR knowledge production even by the culturally sensitive scholarship in Japan remains ultimately Western-oriented; it also confirms Kayaoglu’s observation that the Westphalian narrative has not only permeated in the writings of German historians and international jurists of the nineteenth century (as a reaction to the Napoleonic War that sought to unify Europe) but also those of IR theorists of the twenty-first, Western and non-Western alike.

Apart from the language “barrier,” the reason why Japanese academics have not engaged with any recent non-Western IR work produced outside Japan is precisely because they have internalized this powerful narrative that non-European political spaces lack the crucial dimension of international society (namely, Westphalia and all of it positive attributes such as order and tolerance) and thus are not appropriate objects of mutual learning. Of course, this “theory of lack” is not only rooted in today’s Japan. Royama, for instance, explained in his “Toa Kyodotai no Riron” (“The Theory of East Asian Community”) that the sense of a common East Asian destiny must be consciously constructed through political movements because, unlike Europe which has common regional ethos and fate due to its Greco-Latin tradition and Christianity, East Asia lacks such regional ethos and fate (Royama 1941). In this regard, one can identify a fairly consistent pattern in Japanese intelligentsia before and after 1945.

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15 I do not intend to idealize Nishida as a “solution” for the unfinished project of overcoming modernity, however. For a useful reflection, see Shimizu (2010).
16 To the best of my knowledge, as of early 2011 there has not been any systematic communication between Asian IR communities that attempt to construct alternative, locally relevant theories. This lack of interaction is so profound that there has not been even a single publication by Japan’s IR circle that seeks to follow the latest development of the “Chinese School” or “Korean School,” or to explore relevant traditional Chinese or Indian sources for indigenous theory-building.
17 Such disinterest and Western IR communities’ growing interest in the development of a Chinese School can be considered two sides of the same coin, for the latter is very much preoccupied with confirming the impossibility/undesirability of indigenous theory-building in China. See, for example, Snyder (2008).
18 This term is borrowed from Nader (2005).
The question remains as to how we, as students of IR, should respond to the century-old Hegelian challenge (and, for that matter, to Hitler’s categorization of Japanese as a bearer of cultures but not an inventor) which equates Asia with the land of Oriental despotism to be absorbed by the law-based, civilized West/Europe embedded in the Westphalian narrative, if not to concede that non-Western theorizing and practices have no meaningful agency in human history. While this will be a main issue to be addressed in the remaining part of the paper, it is helpful to briefly examine how some IR scholars outside Japan have handled it.

In his attempt to demonstrate that there exists a distinctive Japanese approach to conflict resolution that can offer a viable alternative to the Western mainstream, Ralph Pettman, a renowned IR postmodernist, argues that this alternative emerges out of Japan’s extraordinary experience of finding ways to live first with imperial China then with Western colonial powers without losing its autonomy. This becomes possible because Japan has evolved into modernist, traditionalist and “both at the same time.” For him, this hybrid and unique Japan – capable of combining modernist science with other cultural perspectives, i.e. *yosai tokon* (“Western knowledge/Eastern spirit”) – represents a “fresh source” for understanding conflict and conflict resolution that may even *prevail* over Western approaches in a globalizing world (Pettman 2010: 4, 13). Despite all its subtlety, Pettman’s understanding of hybridity (“Japanese culture is unique but nonetheless accessible to those from outside the society”) brings us back to Inoguchi’s familiar portrait of IR studies in Japan (“not similar but comparable to American IR”) (Pettman 2010: 6).

Quoting Shmuel Eisenstadt, Pettman asserts that “actual developments in modernizing societies have refuted the homogenizing and hegemonic assumptions of … [the] Western program of modernity … giving rise to multiple institutional and ideological patterns, that is, to multiple modernities.” The problem with his otherwise encouraging statement is that, not unlike the concept of hybridity which implies the pre-existence of two “pure,” “untainted” cultures, the notion of “multiple modernities” does not tackle the logic of colonial modernity but instead works to buttress and reproduce it. It is therefore no coincidence that one finds striking similarities between Pettman’s and Kenneth Pyle’s Orientalist treatment of Japan’s (fixed) identity as a highly rational, master modernizer which can always manage to adjust itself in the often unfavorable international

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20 For the failed project of overcoming modernity backed by some of Japan’s most prominent intellectuals such as Nishida, see Calichman (2008).
22 Moreover, it is misleading to assume that those in the world of the colonized all share the same degree of hybridization or possess the same conditions to subvert the colonizer. For a useful critique of hybridity as a resistance strategy, see Young (1990).
environment, although the former is more explicit in thinking past Western IR in search for non-Western/Japanese insights understood as uniqueness/differences. So long as East and West are treated as oppositional entities, the competitive mood to become another English School or a superior alternative to Western theories will persist in Japanese IR, as a “derivative discourse” of Western IR.

3. Appropriating the English School, demarcating Japanese IR

It should be stressed, however, that the fallacy of multiple modernities or the omnipresence of the Westphalian narrative does not render non-Western IR entirely “agency-less,” recalling Foucault’s remark on the weak’s strategic appropriation of concepts created by the strong. To illustrate this, this section will show how Japanese theorizing, as discursive practice, emerges and works to achieve specific purposes unfamiliar to the mainstream anticipations. It will do so by focusing on Japanese scholars’ preoccupation with “international society,” a concept that is central to English School writings. As will be seen, while their formulations about this concept may not be particularly “fresh” for English School writers and critics, such practices perform a largely unnoticed function, i.e. drawing the boundaries of a Japanese IR community by excluding alleged differences. After all, the construction of an identity requires the presence of difference; they mutually constitute each other (Connolly 1991).

To what extent Japanese conceptions of international society overlap with those of the English School or break new ground? Recall a classical definition by Bull and Watson. For them, international society refers to:

> a group of states . . . which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements (Bull & Watson 1984: 1).

Japanese academics are well aware of this. While arguing that there exists four visions of international society in pre-war Japan (developed by “the Idealists,” “the Kelsenians,” “the Cosmopolitans,” and “the Greater-Asians”), Ikeda is clear that these discussions on the questions about solidarity and authority are not new to the outsiders (Ikeda 2008: 20-21). For Ikeda, what is special about Japanese contribution lies in their concern over

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23 Kenneth Pyle is arguably today’s most prominent realist expert on Japanese foreign policy in the United States. See Pyle (2007).
24 Another recent example can be found in Brigg and Bleiker (2011).
the question of autonomy, that is, how to position Japan in a peculiar and at times
dangerous juncture between East (the world of the colonized) and West (the world of the
colonizer).

To be sure, this “in-between-ness” may sound familiar in countries such as Turkey and
Russia (Zarakol 2010; 2011), and English School scholars would argue that the
undesirable Western paternalism can be readily handled in a “pluralist” international
society in which principles of international legal sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
non-intervention shall be equally applied to all states (Jackson 2000: 16-25).25 But this
should not divert our attention away from a more crucial aspect of Japanese conceptions
of international society.

While Bull and other early English School members were concerned with how to sustain
an international order originally created by the spread of European empires in the
aftermath of decolonization (hence rather quiet about the colonization part of their
historical record),26 Sakai Tetsuya argues that Japanese intellectuals and policymakers
have been keenly aware of the “order to whom/for what” questions since Japan’s entry of
(European) international society at the turn of the twentieth century. Because of Japan’s
exceptional position between East and West, Japanese elites considered “order” in two
folds: on the one hand, “international order” exists among equal sovereign states which
have been admitted to the European club; on the other hand, “imperial order” applies to
those which are outside the boundaries of international society, mostly colonies (Sakai
2007: chap. 5).27 Accordingly, Sakai goes on, Japanese internalized two different,
sometimes conflicting, identities – internationalism and imperialism – and switched
between them when facing Western and non-Western societies.

Compared with past English School writings, Sakai’s analysis is indeed a step in the right
direction, but it does not amount to an alternative conception of international society.
Contrary to his belief, the same (European) international society aimed to promote these
two types of order simultaneously. As Edward Keene (2002: 7) observes,

In the family of civilized nations… its ultimate purpose, simply put, was to promote
the toleration of cultural and political differences between civilized peoples so as to

25 The problem with Jackson’s theory of pluralism is that he recognizes its Eurocentric roots (i.e.
Westphalia) but does not accept that Eurocentrism invalidates his theory. As Kayaoglu (2010) indicates,
demands for civilizational recognition, accommodation, and representation cannot be resolved by privileging
a “global” covenant invented by the West alone.
26 See the part three of Bull (2002).
27 Another recent work, Oga and Sugita (2008), is more explicit about its dissatisfaction with the notion of
international society as developed by the English School; nevertheless, with the exception of its chapter on
East Asian history, the volume’s epistemological foundation remains remarkably Eurocentric.
allow them to live together in peace, Outside the family of civilized nations, however... the central purpose of international order was to promote the civilization of decadent, backward, savage or barbaric peoples.

Moreover, these two orders (one was defined by tolerance for difference in the society of states, the other was characterized by a “civilizing mission” toward the barbaric natives outside the society) were not separate parallel; they were mutually constitutive (Callahan 2004: 311; Keal 2003). The European self intimately depended on the colonial Other. Said has explained this relationship succinctly:

Both [imperialism and colonialism] are supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination (Said 1993: 9, emphasis in the original).

Sakai thus repeats the familiar error that treats modern Japan as a pre-given, rational actor that learned to pursue two “incompatible” orders and at times struggled to reconcile them in a hostile international environment. He fails to recognize that, after being socialized into European international society, the Japanese self also intimately depended on the colonial/Asian Other, being they Chinese, Koreans, or Taiwanese. Seen in this light, laws governing homeland were not mechanistically applied to colonial territories not because some “progressive” Japanese elites respected the latter’s socio-cultural diversity or sought to increase the legitimacy of Japan’s colonial administration in the eyes of local people (Contra Sakai 2007: 210-213), but because imperial Japan’s “civilized” identity needed the presence of its “backward” Asian neighbors.28

Apart from their unsuccessful attempts to articulate an alternative, non-ethnocentric vision of international society, as have seen above, the ways Japanese scholars try to (re)invent indigenous theories and concepts bear a visible resemblance to the English School’s cultural practices. William Callahan (2004) has pointed out that, like European international society itself, the English School is very much an exclusive, old boys club (recall the formation of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics in 1959 and how E.H. Carr was excluded from the Committee for not being “convivial for the conversation”) (Dunne 1998: 93). It is common for English School writings to “tell and retell its history in terms of genealogy and biography,” and such genealogy “focuses on men rather than ideas, concepts or themes” (Callahan 2004: 317). The English School also has strict and consistent citational standards that define who needs to be quoted, if a

28 The 1874 expedition to Taiwan represented an illustrative example to punish “savages” in the name of civilization. See Suzuki (2009: 146-154).
scholarly work is to be counted as an English School inquiry. It involves examinations and punishments to control and enforce these standards and the objectives that “club members” seek to measure (Bleiker 2005: 184). Finally, the identity of the “reflectivist” English School has been defined in opposition to “social scientific” American theory since its establishment. In many ways, then, the emerging Japanese IR examined here has exhibited these familiar worrying patterns (producing “gentlemen’s knowledge” by, and for, a limited number of politico-academic elites mostly based in Tokyo and Kyoto) and the need for order (by excluding the Other from its theorizing, whether they are “unintelligent” Asian sources that “lack” Westphalia or “social scientific” American methods that are purportedly neither normative nor historical).

Ultimately, if we hope to reorient IR toward a less hegemonic direction in terms of disrupting the structural hierarchies between Western and non-Western perspectives, the need to draw boundaries through building national IRs must give way to deterritorializing and decentering our understanding of world politics and modernity. Japanese IR cannot be exceptional, if it is to avoid becoming another ethnocentric project of constructing an alternative theory (English School) in an alternative site (Britain) (Wæver 1998).

4. How not to become another English School: the possibility of constructing a post-Western IR Studies in and beyond Japan

As far as the “how” question is concerned, a feasible first step may be to compare indigenous theory-building endeavors in various IR communities in Asia and other parts of the Third World. To be sure, such suggestion is not new and some cross-national research have been conducted, but the existing literature has either ended up with reinforcing the cultural hegemony of Western IR (Acharya & Buzan 2010), or merely described what kind of scholarly activities have taken place outside the West (Tickner & Wæver 2009). There has not been any systematic comparative study in Japan on, say, the ways in which the “Korean School” and the “Chinese School” have been developed and the common problems they have encountered, and, most importantly, what can be learned from jointly tackling those problems. For instance, Cho Young Chul’s contribution in this volume shows that South Korean IR academia’s persistent call for Juchejeok (self-reliant) goes hand in hand with its obsession with Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) as the foremost standard for determining the quality of academic publications. This Korean-centric ontology (there exists a distinctive Korean approach to international relations) combined with Western-oriented epistemology (only knowledge productions that are congenial for American/Western IR scholarship can be counted as valid) does not

29 Portions of my analysis in this section are based on Chen (2011).
just reveal that Japan’s and South Korea’s IR studies have much in common at the meta-physical level; it also points to the potential for the two to learn from each other and join forces to push forward the process of decolonizing Asian IR.

Similarly, Japanese IR community would find recent efforts to construct a Chinese IR theory around the traditional *Tianxia* concept (“all-under-heaven”) as advocated by Zhao Tingyang (2005), a well-connected philosopher and public intellectual, somewhat familiar. Zhao argues that that the world governed by the Westphalian states system is a “non-world,” since inter-state institutions cannot solve trans-state and global problems. A “worldly world order” must be provided by genuine world institutions, e.g. those embodied in the Confucian *Tianxia* world view. The problem is that Zhao himself does not rise above state-centrism, for his analysis is still motivated by how China can become a “true world power” via being a “knowledge power” of its own (Zhao 2005: 1). Moreover, like his counterparts in Japan and South Korea, he continues to take the West as his reference point. As a product of postcolonial learning that synthesizes Confucian China’s parental care and leadership with Westphalia’s emphasis on the self-interested state, then, Zhao’s *Tianxia* system is not unlike a contemporary version of the Greater East Asia Co-Prospereity Sphere.

Recognizing that the origins and constitutional structures of international society should not be reduced to the Peace of Westphalia is another step conducive for less Eurocentric, more “international” IR theorizing. Indeed, it becomes possible to re-imagine the notion of international society that has thus far been too narrowly defined by the English School to accommodate diverse needs and voices in a globalizing world. Other forms of the society of states that had existed outside Europe before the spread of the “standard of civilization” are therefore no less legitimate as topics of intellectual inquiry in IR.

This is not to imply that pre-twentieth century non-European international societies were more superior to the Western one. Power relations still existed, for instance, in East Asian international society in which China’s smaller neighbors often had little choice but to accept and internalize its norms – willingly or otherwise – if they wished to maintain their trade and cultural exchanges with the Middle Kingdom for their own prosperity. The point is that the merits and shortcomings of these political associations should, and can, be judged *in their own right* rather than be measured against the criteria set up by European international society. To be more specific, Asian countries’ diplomatic problems with Western powers and between themselves in the second half of the nineteenth century were inherently problems of knowledge and representations. Since these countries

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30 For a penetrating critique of the Liberal and Confucian world orders, see Ling (2011).
31 This point is not missed by historians. See, in particular, Howland (1996).
were informed by a worldview different from that of the West as well as what counts as valid representations of their world, their respective difficulty in defining their borders by the physical (and exclusive) maintenance of territorial integrity enshrined in international legal treaties (instead of the Confucian influence of ritual protocol) should have told us more about the extent to which these polities had been socialized into East Asian international society over centuries than how “misguided” or “incompetent” (or, in the case of Meiji Japan, “successful”) their leaders were for modernizing the country.

Inquiring into East Asian international society’s constitutional structures (hierarchy among member states that affirms social and cosmic harmony through observing ritual justice) and fundamental institutions (tribute system) not just helps to enrich the impoverished imagination about international society in mainstream IR monopolized by the Westphalian narrative (Zhang 2001: 56), it also has policy relevance for understanding peace and security issues in contemporary East Asia. With a few exceptions (Suzuki 2009; Kang 2010), IR literature on the organizing principles of early modern East Asian regional system and the associated practices looks pale besides research done in other social sciences and humanities. While the Qing’s defeats first in the Opium War and eventually the Sino-Japanese War are typically seen as the end of the Sinocentric world order (indicating the decline of China’s hard power), Hamashita Takeshi, a distinguished historian of the tribute system, disagrees:

Considering the fact that the history of East Asian international relations was founded upon the principle of a tributary relationship sustainable for over a thousand years, it is difficult to assume that its demise could be brought about by a single event, such as the Opium War… Rather, it is conceivably more acceptable to view it as a demise that was caused by internal change in the tribute system itself (Hamashita 1997: 8-9).

If Hamashita is right that the arrival of Western powers added the Westphalian states system onto the tribute system rather than replacing it altogether, it is instructive to examine whether (and, if so, under which conditions) contemporary East Asian states’ behavior may also be shaped by the residual rules and norms of the millennium-old tribute system. David Kang suggests that the apparent absence of region-wide balancing behavior against China’s rise may have to do with the old “logic of Asian systemic hierarchy” wherein member states had learned to live with a powerful China under a hierarchical and stable regional order (Kang 2007: chap. 2). A recent illustration can be found in the conclusion of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between Beijing and Taipei in June 2010. Widely considered a sign of the warming ties between these two former foes with significant economic and geostrategic implications
for the East Asian region and beyond (Rosen & Wang 2010; Romberg 2010), the reason why this FTA-like agreement was unprecedented and very much loaded in favor of Taiwan cannot be adequately analyzed by IR theories derived from Euro-American history alone.32

For realists, ECFA represents Beijing’s latest exercise of economic statecraft to deepen Taiwan’s dependence on the mainland, hence giving it more economic leverage to achieve political reunification. From a liberal perspective, the agreement reaffirms China’s commitment to peaceful development and the “trade-promotes-peace” proposition. For constructivists, Taiwan’s special treatment can be best accounted for by the shared cultural heritage across the Strait. While each of these perspectives merits attention, they are all vulnerable to obvious counter-arguments (e.g. Taiwan has been able to conduct FTA talks with its major trading partners such as Singapore after signing the ECFA, China’s missile deployments along its coastal provinces have not slowed down, the same cultural affinity already existed before the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang government gained power in 2008) and together do not make the whole picture complete. It would have been less puzzling, though, had one recognized Taiwan’s increasing incorporation into Sinocentric cosmology. Hierarchical relations were confirmed when Taiwan (“vassal state”) presented “tribute” (upheld the so-called “1992 consensus,” a veiled One China Principle) to the paternal Chinese state (“suzerain”); in turn, the Taiwanese were granted generous trade privileges as gifts from Beijing (“son-of-heaven”). As secondary political units historically enjoyed immense latitude within the tributary order regarding their economic, cultural, and even military affairs (Hamashita 1997; Kang 2010), this perspective helps to understand why Chinese leaders formulated the “one country, two systems” proposal in dealing with Taiwan in the way they did (which precludes Beijing from exerting domestic control over the island), and why they have been willing to entertain issues pertaining to Taiwan’s “international space” so long as Taipei adheres to the 1992 consensus.

Much more insights can be learned from other social sciences and humanities as to how their scholars have striven to develop non-ethnocentric epistemological foundations for studying the subject matter.33 For instance, after Japan’s defeat in 1945, the success of the Chinese revolution became a new source of inspiration for Japanese China experts.

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32 In the ECFA’s “early harvest” list of goods and services for which there will be immediate tariff reductions or exemptions, Taiwanese-made products enjoyed tariff cut covering 539 items, and Beijing, on its own initiative, added a further 18 types of agricultural and fishery products. By contrast, the list of Chinese products that saw import duties cut covered 267 items, mostly raw materials or unfinished products. Finished products included on the list are those that Taiwan does not make or produce in volume. The early harvest list agreed between China and ASEAN is relatively more balanced, with 593 concessions agreed by China as against 400 by ASEAN. See Tung (2010).

33 See, for example, Alatas (2006) and Wang (2011).
Unlike their pre-war predecessors who pointed to China’s backwardness through European lenses, many of them began calling for the construction of a “non-European” style of China Studies in Japan. This included Takeuchi Yoshimi, a highly original thinker who considered China’s lack of “Europeanness” or European-style modernity as its strength. Takeuchi specifically called on the East to change the West “in order to realize the latter’s outstanding cultural values on a greater scale,” which, he believed, would lead to universality (Takeuchi 2005: 165).

As Mizoguchi Yuzo indicates, however, such substitution of West/Europe for East/Asia can hardly challenge the civilized-backward presumption (and, indeed, the Hegelian trap), for China or Asia continues to be defined in light of Europe. Mizoguchi thus proposes China as a method by which Japan learns how to understand a different nation based on the latter’s own historical subjectivity, without taking any specific standpoint. From his perspective, studying China itself is no longer the purpose; rather, it is to reconsider the structural questions of human history through studying China (Mizoguchi 1989; Chen et al. 2010). In so doing, Japan would belong to a truly universal world, rising above any national or civilizational conditions.34 Perhaps constructing a post-Western IR studies in Japan entails pursuing a post-Japanese IR?

5. Conclusion: whose international society?

Since the 1990s, there have been increasing criticisms of IR as a “not-so-international,” Eurocentric discipline in that its knowledge production and policy recommendation remain dominated by the West and for the West. The role of the English School – an IR theory originated in the West – is therefore intriguing as its leading figures explicitly encourage the inclusion of more non-Western voices (from Asia in particular) into IR theorizing. Against this backdrop, my paper has examined recent efforts by some “young turks” in Japan to ascertain the possibility of a distinctive Japanese approach to world politics. Without denying the relevance of their focus on the notion of international society or its importance in achieving international peace and development, I have argued that uncritical engagement with the English School runs the risk of reinforcing the Westphalian narrative, hence exacerbating the problem of ethnocentrism in IR rather than mitigating it. Specifically, it is essential for Asian and other Third World peoples to reclaim their shared ownership of international society. As Kayaoglu points out, such a “shift in narratives can bolster the legitimacy and efficiency of international society” (Kayaoglu 2010: 197).

34 My reading of *Hoho to shite no Chugoku* here follows that of Shih (2010).
To help recover IR’s “global heritage” (Acharya 2011), three claims have been advanced here: First, promoting “non-Western” or “Japanese” elements in IR studies on the grounds of “multiple modernities” does not address the consequences of colonial modernity, let alone making the discipline more global or universal. Second, recent endeavors to develop a “unique” Japanese IR along the trajectory of the English School are nevertheless meaningful as they illustrate how local intellectuals have learned and re-appropriated Western notions for purposes unfamiliar to Western IR theorizing. Last but not least, to construct a Japanese IR that does not assume the superiority of Western ideas and values, the way forward is to communicate with, and learn from, IR as well as other social sciences and humanities communities across Asia and beyond, even though those calls for alternative discourses are not necessarily without their own problems.

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Recent Discourses on Constructing a Korean National School of IR: A Reality Check*

Young Chul Cho**

1. Introduction

There has recently been a growing interest in producing non-Western, indigenous International Relations (IR)\(^1\) theory in many parts of Asia (Alagappa 2011; Acharya and Buzan 2010; Kim and Cho 2009; Mallavarapu 2009; Qin 2011; Tickner and Waever 2009; Xiao 2010; Yamamoto 2011), in proportion to Asia’s elevating international standing in world politics in the post-Cold War era of globalization. South Korea is no exception. Although South Korean scholars’ aspiration for having its own brand IR theory has existed since the 1950s, the South Korean IR community has vigorously engaged itself in discussing ways of building a distinctively Korean IR theory, like the English school, in the 2000s. Against this scholastic backdrop, this paper aims to provide a critical, meta-theoretical check on recent South Korean discourses on constructing its national school of IR in the global academia, by examining materials (such as journal articles, book chapters, single-authored books) written most after 2000 by established South Korean IR scholars who are members of the Korean Association of International Studies (see http://kaisnet.or.kr).

This paper will argue that the South Korean IR academia’s recent quest for its independent, self-reliant national school of IR with universal applicability still seems to be operating in a colonial circuit which tends to confirm and consolidate the Gramscian hegemonic status of mainstream American IR based on rationalist epistemology while possibly end up treating Korea as a mere test-bed of rationalist IR approaches. In addition, perhaps it also project an ethnocentric, imperialistic undertone toward non-Western IR communities while becoming self-serving in the way of promoting South Korea’s interest and influence there. This paper is not to say that the South Korean IR community stops theorizing or becomes nativistic, but needs to continue to critically be alert to its (mistakenly) taken-for-granted meta-theoretical/normative underpinnings in the process of theorization.

* As a working paper, this paper is still in progress.
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\(^1\) In this paper, capital letters refer to the academic field, lower case the practice of world politics.
As for this paper’s structure, the following section briefly provides a brief historical sketch of IR in South Korea, showing that there has been a persistent call for building a Korean school of IR since the 1950s. The third section discusses the South Korean rationale behind the quest for its own brand IR theory by looking at how IR in South Korea has been perceived by local scholars. In examining two major different approaches to how to build Korean national school of IR, the fourth section points to universalism/universality as a core element in the process of theorizing Korean and East Asian international relations. The fifth section, in a critical, reflective perspective, explores two potential pitfalls – colonialism and imperialism – of seeking the universality of future Korean-style IR theory. Related to the two pitfalls, the last section recaps the paper’s key arguments while stressing the importance of practicing reflective self-criticism in theorization.

2. The Ongoing Call for ‘Our’ Own Brand IR Theory in Contemporary South Korea

In their reflective essay of reviewing IR studies in South Korea while emphatically calling for building a distinctively Korean IR theory (Korean-style IR theory; Korean School of IR), Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009: 406-410) provide a historical trajectory of IR in South Korea in the Cold War era by dividing the period into three stages. The first stage is called the “Founding Era” (late-1940s ~ 1960s). Due to the legacy of Japanese colonialism, IR as a subfield of political science in South Korea was initially shaped by Korean scholars with Japanese academic orientation. Yet, American influence had become predominant after the Korean War (1950-3), since Korean scholars felt the necessity of counting on American materials for information on international politics and did want to have higher education in US universities. In this period the South Korean IR community started to actively import American IR programs for their own good. The second stage is called the “Formative Era” (1970s) which is characterized by “the rigorous application/reapplication of American IR studies into Korean issues” (Kim and Cho 2009: 408). Some US-educated Korean scholars had come back to South Korea and joined their home IR community with what they learnt in America such as functionalism and conflict resolution models which were applied to

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2 The essay appears to be a translated and updated version of Hyung Kook Kim’s article (2007) published in the special edition of The Korean Journal of International Relations (top IR journal in South Korea) initiated by The Korean Association of International Studies under the theme of “50 Years of the Korean Association of International Studies: Introspection and Prospect.” By adding few more chapters, the special edition was republished as an edited book in the same year entitled, Contemporary International Relations Studies and Korea (Kim and Cho eds. 2007).

3 As for similar accounts of development of IR and political science in South Korea, see Chun (2010); Hahn (2008); C. Park (2005); S. Park (2008).
Korean issues by them. Plus, influenced by American behavioralist academic culture since the 1950s, there was a growing interest in scientific methods in South Korea in the second period (S. Park 2008: 13-7). The third stage is the period of “Competing Alternative Views” (1980s) which is characterized by the tension between American mainstream IR perspectives and Marxist traditions. During this period, hegemonic stability theory and complex interdependence theory which became popular in America in the late-1970s were imported to explain some Korean issues while gaining a high popularity in the local IR academia. Against these mainstream approaches, progressive junior South Korean scholars adopted – and imported – various Marxist perspectives, such as dependency theory, bureaucratic authoritarianism, state corporation, and capitalist world system, to analyze Korean situations in the 1980s. Therefore, by importing and using two conflicting (mainstream and Marxist) foreign theories, traditional and progressive South Korean IR scholars disputed with each other over how to “correctly” understand and address the Korean case of the time. In a sense, this was a Korean replica of the debate in international political economy between realists/liberals and neo-Marxists in the 1970s (see Jackson and Sorensen 2010: 49-51; 199-214).

Since the end of the Cold War, it is said that the South Korean IR academic field has entered the stage of “Paradigmatic Pluralism” or “Maturity” (Kim and Cho 2009: 410-9; C. Park 2005: 68-9; S. Park 2008: 19-20). At this stage corresponding to the present era of globalization, IR in South Korea has become plural in terms of theories and research topics. Mainstream rationalist IR approaches remain firm in their dominant status, whereas reflectivist IR approaches have imported and vibrantly discussed rather than marginalized in the South Korean IR. In spite of the meta-theoretical tension between rationalists and reflectivists in IR, neither has rejected with their mutual recognition in South Korea, and at the same time both quantitative and qualitative methodologies have widely used on an equal footing. South Korean IR scholars have also expanded their scope of research from Korea-related issues to global ones such as human rights, global governance, and non-East Asian international politics. It would appear in the period of maturity that there is no serious time-lag in scholarly trends between the West and South Korea.

It is somehow clear that IR in South Korea still lacks in its independent intellectual basis and has been shaped by changing landscape of IR in the West. In fact, considering contemporary (South) Korean history, South Korean IR’s Western-dependency (particularly American-dependency) is an understandable phenomenon. Related to South Korea’s domestic and international politics, the influence of America cannot be missed.

4 Regarding a distinction between rationalism and reflectivism, see Keohane (1988).
Since and even before its national birth in 1948, America has been one of the most important factors shaping South Korea as it is today (Cumings 2005; Im 2006). South Korean academia would appear to be no exception. To modernize the country against North Korea after the Korean War, South Korea's educational system is voluntarily modeled after that of America, not to mention curricula for teaching academic subjects; in fact, national education has been an essential part of statecraft and modernization in South Korea. Arguably and crudely speaking, social sciences in South Korea mean American social sciences. Likewise, IR in South Korea to a great extent resembles American IR in educational system, teaching contents, theory, methodology, and research theme (Chung 2007; Hong ed., 2008; Y Kim 2010). Indeed, the South Korean IR profession has appeared to be a staunch disciple of the mainstream American IR. The whole academia – particularly, political science and IR – in South Korea still tends to prefer American doctoral degree to domestic or non-American one, so PhDs from America can be in a better position in the South Korean academic job market (Hong ed., 2008: 417-456; C. Park 2005: 74; Yu and Park 2008: 64-5). It is thus not surprising that, in conducting their own research, South Korean IR scholars have heavily relied on major American IR approaches such as balance of power, deterrence, power transition, democratic peace, and so on. South Korean scholars have well digested and appropriated American IR knowledge by rigorously applying it to Korean cases in their empirical work (Chun 2010; Kim and Cho 2009; C. Park 2005). Indeed, the American IR as a reference point of explaining South Korea’s security policy and foreign behavior has substantially contributed to developing IR in South Korea and to offering some policy guidelines for Seoul (see W. Kim, 2007). Needless to say, American IR has its own merits in explaining and handling security issues of South Korea, and in establishing and lifting up the academic standing of IR in the South Korean academia of social sciences (Chun, 2010).

However, by pointing out the adverse effects of American-centrism (broadly speaking, Western-centrism) on its local IR community which will be discussed in the following section, in South Korea there has been a persistent call for “the Koreanization or Indigenization of IR” since the 1950s (Lee and Lee 2006), even at a time when South Korean IR scholars vied for more rigorously applying various Western IR theories to Korean realities. Despite its heavy reliance on Western IR theories, ‘self-referential IR’, ‘Juchejeok [self-reliant] IR’, ‘the Korean School’, ‘Korean IR’, ‘IR with self-identity’, ‘a distinctively Korean IR theory’, ‘IR with Korean characteristics’, ‘IR in the Korean context’, and the like are buzzwords in the South Korean IR community. Moreover, there have recently been more louder voices for producing a distinctively Korean IR theory, like the English

5 Influenced by the positivist academic culture in America, the terms ‘social science’ and ‘political science’ are preferred to ‘social or political studies’ in South Korea.
School, in South Korea, in proportion to its elevating international and economic standing in the post-Cold War era of globalization (see Chul-Koo Woo and Kun Young Park’s edited volume in 2004; Young-sun Ha, Young-ho Kim, and Myongsob Kim’s edited volume in 2005; The special edition of The Korean Journal of International Relations in 2007; Yong-Chool Ha’s edited volume in 2008; The Inauguration Speech of President (S. Kim 2011) of The Korean Association of International Studies in 2011). In a similar vein, although globalization/globalism is today’s societal norm in its country, the following affective statement of stressing nationalization resonates with many South Korean IR scholars: “Currently, the Korean IR scholarships no longer rely on just importing foreign thoughts and ideas. Now is the time to facilitate the process of appropriating the study of IR to the standards of Koreanization” (Kim and Cho 2009: 402). In brief, building the ‘Korean School’ of IR is largely seen as an academic and historical mission to be finally completed in the globalizing 21st century in the field of international relations in South Korea.

3. The “Korean School” as a Way of Normalizing Colonized IR in South Korea

It has been almost six decades that the call for building a Korean School of IR was initially emerged in South Korea in the 1950s. This phenomenon is ongoing today, as mentioned, and reveals that IR in South Korea still relies heavily on Western theories and ideas in looking at non-Western but important issues related to it, such as Korea’s incomplete nation- and state-ness, South Korean developmental modernization, fluctuating inter-Korean relations, Korea’s place in Northeast Asia, and so on. Here, the key issue vexing the South Korean IR community is the conscious or unconscious intellectual dependency of South Korean IR on the West; more to the point, entrenched Western-centrism in South Korean IR, perhaps in entire South Korean academia in general (see K. Kim et al. eds. 2006; H Lee 2005; KPAC ed. 2003). According to Jung In Kang (2006: 120; 123; 126), a famous politics professor and vehement critic of Western-centric thinking in Korean mind-sets, excessive Western-dependency based on Western-centrism in the South Korean academia of political science has produced three negative impacts on developing its own scholarship, as follows:

As they digest “advanced” Western theories, non-Western scholars internalize the Western mode of thinking as both universal and preferential while failing to craft the critical tools to theorize their own unique political experience. … There is a tendency to explain Korean reality by assimilating it into Western theory. Non-Western scholars, immersed in advanced Western theory, sometimes distort the realities of their own societies when they are not able to locate the relevance of Western theory. … With the prevalence of Westernized critical thinking and assimilationist interpretative frameworks, the reality or
facts of non-Western societies continue to be marginalized. In their uncritical application of Western theories, and allow for diverse interpretations of the Western experience, whereas non-Western experiences are used merely for the sake of applying Western theories (italics: my emphasis).

Analogously, in his article entitled ‘The Academic Dependence on the US in International Political Economy Studies in Korea’, Haknoh Kim (2008: 15-26) also points out three problems of American-centric IR in South Korea. First, South Korean IR scholars are predisposed to focus on what their counterparts in America are interested in rather than important issues of relevance to Korea. Second, they tend to understand Korean unique realities in line with American IR theories while subscribing to normative presumptions of the imported theories. Third, they are inclined to universalize American IR theories and at the same time leave out local phenomena which are not properly addressed by the foreign theories, calling them outliers. Taken together, all three speak for America and in the interest of sustaining its power, prosperity, and influence in the global IR scholarship as well as in real world politics. In the same vein, Jinseog Yu and Kun Young Park (2008: 62-4) claim that the heavy dependence of South Korean IR on American IR has effectively served as a handmaiden to American value and interests, by wielding the power of America toward Korean theory-consumers in the way of equating American concerns with Korean ones in international politics. If this situation goes unnoticed, (South) Koreans become incapable of thinking of their own concerns and thus deny themselves in reality. What is more, (South) Koreans’ uncritical consumption of American IR theories would reproduce the existing international reality disadvantageous to Korea and disable their intellectual capacity for transforming world politics. Summarizing the ideas of critics of Western-centered IR in South Korea, Chul-Koo Woo (2004: 13) mentions that South Korean IR has been accused of a抄写物 of American IR, its ahistorical research attitude due to its indiscriminate importation/application of American IR theories, and lack of maintaining a balanced view of the world in going after American perspectives. Ho-Jae Lee et al. (2005: 23-4) argue that, if simply focusing on importing and disseminating Western IR theories without putting constant efforts into developing indigenous theories and methodologies, IR in South Korea get in deep trouble in two ways. Academically, even advanced Western IR theories have considerable limitations of describing, explaining, and predicting Korean cases, since they have been developed on the basis of a narrow and particular historical, geographical, cultural, and sociological experience of the West. Practically, it is skeptical of the question of how much Western IR theories devoid of the Korean critical mind and perspective can contribute to solving Korean problems and securing Korean interests. Indeed, there are much more work deploring excessive Western-dependency/Western-centrism in the South Korean academia while calling for its own brand IR theory even in the 2000s (see Chun and Park
For a majority of South Korea IR scholars, Western IR theories (particularly, mainstream rationalist approaches in the US) have acquired a Gramscian hegemony over the meta-theoretical foundations of IR in South Korea, while shaping the way Koreans comprehend the world and contemplate values. It is assumed in this way that Korea’s due concerns are often invisible to the gaze of the existing Western-centered IR discipline in South Korea. Rather than dealing with their own issues and concerns, the South Korea IR scholarship is believed to be culpable in serving Western interests, explaining Western concerns, and treating Western practices as superior and universal. This has thus driven them to “self-marginalization, self-abasement, and self-negation. … they have not been able to form independent worldviews, a fact that eventually rendered them as self-alienated” (Kang 2006: 119). In this sense, eventually, IR in South Korea is a post-colonial Western scholarship which reproduces the West’s frameworks in non-Western Korea. The effect of this Gramscian hegemony is to marginalize possibilities for Korean school of IR. To put it differently, as Sung-Hack Kang (2010: 12) laments, “most Korean IR scholars are practically doing what American scholars have been doing” under the “epistemological hegemony of American social science.”

At this point, the absence of its own brand IR theory has casted a psychological – or self-esteem – problem to the IR community in South Korea, regarding its academic identity as a distinctive, independent Korean IR. Over last six decades after the Korean War, South Korean IR scholars have made little if any progress in producing theories and concepts which can be called the stuff of Korean IR in the global scholarship, while the country’s rapid political, economic, and social development become a classic tale of rags to riches in today’s world. The call for an IR theory with Korean self-identity becomes stronger at a time of growing wealth and power of South Korea in the post-Cold War age of globalization. Even when South Korea’s East Asian neighbor – China – is likely to project core China-style IR concepts representing their academic identity (for example, China’s Confucian Tianxia worldview which is put forward to be seen as comparable to the realist concept of ‘system’ and English school’s concept of ‘society’), there has been no such grandiose global-level IR concept made in South Korea or by Korean scholars. Hence, there has been little if any indigenous development of IR theory in South Korea, and this sheer reality hurts South Korean IR scholars’ self-esteem. The following comments by Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009: 416) vividly reveal the commonly-shared frustration in the South Korean IR community as to theoretical underdevelopments of Korean IR and Asian IR, in general:
There is no denying that Korean IR scholarship has less influence in the world compared to what the dependencia school from Latin America initiated as a sensational model of underdevelopment to the global audience. Why can’t Korea follow what Latin America succeeds in? Japan also shared similar sentiments to this regard. The Japanese association, which has a similar background with that of Korea, demanded its own theory formation pretty much in a similar way. Perhaps most IR scholars in Asia have gotten away from what has been called an *intellectual colony in relation to the US dominance of academic areas* (italics: my emphasis).

Hence, the making of Korean school of IR is a way of securing scholarly independence, which is to escape from foreign dependency and overcome intellectual colonialism toward America. Since their country is about to join (or has already joined) the club of advanced, rich countries (such as the OECD or the G20) in the era of globalization, it is high time for South Korean IR scholars to work as inventors of their own approaches, rather than disciples of Western schools of thought: “Indigenization [of Korean IR] could be interpreted not just as a field of study but also as a matter of dignity for Korean IR scholars” (Kim and Cho, 2009: 403; also see Hong ed. 2008; M. Kim 2007; U. Kim 2002; 2009; Lee and Lee 2006). Furthermore, the absence of Korean-style IR theories contributes to the marginalization not just of South Korean IR scholars in the global scholarship, but also of their country in world politics. Related to this, in calling for Korean and more broadly non-Western IR theories, Chaesung Chun (2010: 87) argues that:

> If the future theory reflects only the newest phenomena happening mainly in the US and advanced Western countries, limited in a spatial and temporal sense, the non-Western world would remain unnoticed and relatively powerless not just in real international relations, but also in the field of theorizing, losing value as an important object of theoretical studies. *Untheorized territory of the non-Western world would not be grasped by policy makers, either.* What is theorized has an opportunity to be problematized in academic and practical worlds (italics: my emphasis).

After all things considered, what is meant by the indigenization of IR in South Korea? The ‘Korean School’ of IR must be established for academically improving South Korean IR knowledge production for the global scholarship, lifting up the dignity of IR scholars in South Korea while avoiding their intellectual Western-dependency (colonialism), and protecting the national interests in regional and global politics. In short, the idea of
building a “Korean School” of IR is based on the premise that the current South Korean IR academia is still colonized by the West, more to the point, by the hegemony of the mainstream American IR. To overcome this colonial situation, that is, to normalize IR in South Korea, distinctively Korean IR theories should be made to speak for South Korean scholars and the whole Korean nation. This might also allow (South) Korea to seek equality in status vis-à-vis the West, academically and practically.

4. Universality Is a Must in Theorization of a Korean-style IR Theory

As for the issues concerning the use of Western theory and the Koreanization of IR, it is said in South Korea that there has been a tension between two emulating approaches: One is universality-focused approach, and the other is particularity-focused approach (Choi 2008: 204-209; Kim and Cho 2009: 415-6; Y. Kim 2010: 129-136). The tension between them is also commonly described as ‘Universalism versus Particularism (or Exceptionalism)’, ‘Theoretical/Scientific Universalism versus Contextual Exceptionalism’, ‘General IR Theorizing versus Particularistic IR Theorizing’, ‘Social Science-based Approach versus History-centered (or Area Studies-based) Approach’, ‘Exogenous Approach versus Indigenous Approach’, ‘Pragmatic (looking outside-in) Approach versus Fundamental (looking inside-out) Approach, ‘Yu Gil-jun – as an importer Western thought – Paradigm versus Shin Chae-ho – as a leading thinker of Korean nationalism – Paradigm’, and the like.6 In the process of theorizing on Korean international relations from the perspective common to general IR, the universality-focused approach aims to produce so-called scientific knowledge which should be applicable in global scope and be empirically testable. Here, the key question is “How can we [South Korean IR scholars] make a distinctively Korean IR theory while trying to be as generalizable as possible?” (Choi 2009: 209). Accordingly, this approach often seeks to generalize from the Korean experience and history for a wider audience outside Korea, but on its own terms, and at the same time tends to revise and develop existing rationalist IR theories through the Korean and East Asian contexts (J. Lee 1999: 567; Min 2007). And, Korean particularistic IR theory without universality, which is consumed only inside Korea, is nothing more than an empty talk, such theory is undesirable and not achievable (W. Kim 2007: 283; 302). The point of this approach is that, in seeing IR as one of modernist social sciences, a future Korean IR theory should be universally applicable and globally useful while incorporating its unique experiences and history which show Korea’s

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6 This section will not detail who’s who in the two camps and plural scholars’ specific claims for their respective positions. As for this, see Jong Kun Choi’s (2008) well-researched article and YoungMyung Kim’s (2010) recent volume on the quest for a Korean school of political science. Rather, this section intends to indicate basic features of each approach and to consider their tacit meta-theoretical or teleological underpinning.
distinctive ontology. Despite trying not to ignore indigenous factors, universality\(^7\) rather than particularity comes first in the theorization.

On the other hand, the particularity-focused approach stresses “the importance identifying Korea’s unique historical experience from its own historical perspectives. This school of inquiry has consciously perceived Korea’s distinctive historical experience and its continuity into the post-cold war era as an ontological platform to formulate its own distinctively Korean IR theories” (Choi 2008: 205). A dialogue with Korean diplomatic history is thus crucial to building its own national IR school, often seeking certain prototypes of Korean security practices in history (Ha, Kim, and Kim eds. 2005; K. Kim 2008; Ku 2008; W. Lee 2007). In a similar vein, Yong-Chool Ha (2008: xi) maintains in the Preface to *New Perspectives on International Studies in Korea* (2008) that the Koreanization of IR springs from an in-depth understanding of Korea’s historical experience and modernization process (also see Kim and Cho 2009: 420). Chaesung Chun and Kun Young Park (2002: 26) argue that a future Korean IR theory “should be firmly based on its own historical experiences and impending policy concerns.” In addition, while there is a good deal of pre-theoretical resources in Korea, these have not been fully exploited by its IR scholars. South Korean scholars have been cut off from their own classical intellectual resources and need to rediscover them and reconnect for theorization. In doing so, Korean identity can be extracted from traditional Korean politics thought, breaking from the ongoing intellectual colonization (Bae 2003: 98; 103). Overall, this particularity-focused approach makes much importance of Korea’s indigenous perspectives, historical experiences and contextual exceptionalism in the formative process of theorizing on Korean and East Asian international relations.

Yet, it should be noted that the particularity-focused approach argues for making important contribution to the study of global phenomena from a Korean vantage point without being unduly jingoistic, nationalistic, and parochial. The approach should not be limited within the Korean peninsula, since political phenomena found in Korea share a universal nature with those in the other countries\(^8\) (Chun 2007: 235; Y. Kim 2010: 10; 121-3; M. Kim 2007: 122). Seeking and/or discovering universality is desirable and necessary in the theorization of an IR theory with distinctive Korean self-identity. Against this backdrop, Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009: 417) state that “To a large extent, IR theory

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\(^7\) A similar term of this, which is widely used in South Korea, is ‘generality’.

\(^8\) Related to this, since Korean particularity contains a universal element (or meaning), it is said in the particularity-focused approach that a Korean-style IR theory can be peculiar to Korea and at the same time universally applicable to the world outside Korea. Yet, it is curious that, if non-Korean (e.g. Chinese, American, and so on) particularity equally and essentially has the universal element which can be extracted from Korean particularity, on what basis can that universal element be claimed as exclusively belonging to Korean particularity? Perhaps the element can also be called Chinese, Japanese, Indian, American, and so on, for everyone has the same one. In this context, particularity-based Korean-style IR theory with a universalist orientation is difficult to be as distinctively Korean as it wishes.
can be categorized into nomothetic theory and ideographic theory. In the case of Korea, it needs a nexus for particularism in Korea with a larger knowledge of the world in an era of global communication.” Similarly, Chaesung Chun (2007: 249) suggests that “To find “Korean” way of studying international relations, it is crucial to … find a possibility for universalism.” Chul-Koo Woo (2004: 15) also argues that “To seek a Korean identity of IR studies, the Korean IR community needs to construct an objective, universal theoretical framework which can explain Korea’s various historical events.” Taik-young Hahm (2006: 1-2) further asserts that “The search for Korean international relations theory is only possible through the convergence of both universalism and historicism-particularism.” A key challenge for the particularity-focused approach is to explore how Korean unique experience can be turned into definitive frameworks for analyzing phenomena outside Korea. The point of this approach is that the theorization should be primarily based on Korea’s unique ontology which is required to be globally acceptable beyond its national boundaries; here, the quest for universality is seemingly taken for granted.

As a result, although discussing the tension between universality-focused and particularity-focused approaches is somewhat useful to figure out the formation of IR scholarship in South Korea for analytical and pedagogical purposes, the demarcation between them are not clear-cut – they are thus not polar opposite - in the sense that both regard universality as an essential core of their theorization, explicitly or implicitly. Both have the same mission: that is, a future Korean-style IR theory should be welcomed, recognized, and consumed in the local scholarship and, more importantly, the global scholarship dominated by the West. In short, the universality, roughly interpreted as making the “Korean School” of IR marketable globally, is a must in the theorization of a Korean school of IR.

5. Potential Pitfalls of Seeking the “Universality” of Future Korean-style IR Theory

In recent discourses on building its own national school of IR in South Korea, broadly speaking, two attempts appear to be suggested to achieve the universality of a Korean-style IR theory. One is to get a general recognition as an equal IR enterprise from the West, more to the point, the American IR scholarship largely based on rationalist (positivist) epistemology; and, the other one is to export made-in-Korea or made-by-Koreans IR theories to both Western and non-Western IR societies – particularly, the scholarships in developing countries often called the Third World. This section critically explores the hidden assumptions of these two moves, revealing potential pitfalls of implementing them in practice.
In overcoming its intellectual colonialism toward the West, as mentioned in the previous section, the IR scholarship in South Korea aims to produce a distinctively Korean IR theory which should be universal in scope. At this juncture, one critical question should be raised: what is the apparent, central reference point of the universality eagerly sought by the IR community in South Korea? In other words, when understanding IR as a “structured field permeated by relations of power” or “institution” (Waever 2010: 298), who has the institutional (if not, hegemonic) power to call something universal or not in the existing global IR scholarship? Apparently, American IR as a modernist social science still works as “the epicenter for a worldwide IR community engaged in a set of research programmes and theoretical debates” (Ikenberry 2009: 203), a widely-accepted belief that even reflectivists cannot deny American rationalist IR’s dominant position in “legitimate” knowledge production and disciplinary gate-keeping in the scholarship (Smith 2000; 2002; 2004; Weaver 1998; 2010). The same is true of a majority of South Korean IR scholars who often look to American IR as the global standard of evaluating their academic work while competing with it (Min 2007). The point is here that, to (appear to) be universally applicable in IR, in practice future Korean-style IR theories should receive a general recognition as an equal scientific IR enterprise from the mainstream American IR scholarship. If theoretical products of South Korea are simply ignored in the global scholarship, how can its IR community claim and prove that Korean IR theories are universal or truly global? Put simply, considering the ongoing asymmetric relations of power between America and South Korea in the global IR scholarship, Korean IR cannot be universal by itself; it needs American IR’s endorsement to successfully build its brand of a “universal” IR theory.

Then, what is the key rule of engagement for intellectual contestation with and/or recognition from the American IR scholarship based largely on rationalism? To answer this, it is useful to briefly discuss rationalism’s response to reflectivism in the third great IR debate and the meta-theoretical position of Alexander Wendt’s constructivism (1999) in relation to rationalism and reflectivism. In response to the reflectivist meta-theoretical critiques of rationalism (see George 1994), Robert Keohane (1988: 392), on the side of the rationalistic inclinations, claims that “the greatest weakness of the reflective school lies not in

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9 Here, the third great debate in IR means the intense meta-theoretical debate between the rationalists (positivists, mainstream IR theorists) and the reflectivists (post-positivists, critical IR theorists), which originated in the late 1980s and seems to continue so far. This debate has yielded the issue of incommensurability. Due to this, there has been the middle ground between rationalism and reflectivism, where some constructivists have sought to occupy. See Keohane (1988); the exchange on the “Third Debate” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1989); Goldstein and Keohane (1993); George (1994); Adler (1997); Checkel (1998); Smith and Owens (2005); Smith, (2007).
deficiencies in their critical arguments but in the lack of a clear reflective research program that could be employed by student of world politics.” In this sense, Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 6) further argue that, without offering the reflectivist concrete research methods, “the reflectivist critique remains … an expression of understandable frustration.” In addition, Keohane (1988: 382) argues that “It will not be fruitful … indeﬁnitely to conduct a debate at the purely theoretical level, much less simply argue about epistemological and ontological issues in the abstract.” Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (quouted in Sterling-Folker 2006: 8) also accuse the reﬂectivist methodology of mere “interpretivism” that lacks any standard of judgment, which could result in “a form of epistemological anarchy” in the IR discipline. The rationalists thus urge the reflectivists to suggest appropriate ‘scientiﬁc methods’ for the issues relating to “our subject matter, world politics” (Keohane 1988: 382), rather than nothing but denounce rationalism at the abstract level. It thus appears clear that the adoption of positivist epistemology based on the idea of IR as modernist social science is the minimum, essential requirement of being accepted by mainstream rationalists as an ‘equal’ enterprise in IR (Smith 2002; 2004).

In addition, there is another case to vindicate this point. By introducing his version of constructivism in IR, which is often called conventional or modernist or sociological constructivism, Alexander Wendt (1999: 394) locates his theoretical position within the framework of the third great debate between rationalism/positivism and reﬂectivism/post-positivism: “My objective … is to build a bridge between these two traditions … on behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can transform state identities and interests.” Towards this end, Wendt (1995: 72; 1999: 1) argues that “constructivists are structuralists” who are more concerned with idealism than materialism in international politics – “structural idealism.” Viewed in this way, the world we want to know is social and not static, which shows an idealist ontology. Wendt (1999: 75) adds that “Constructivists … are modernists who fully endorse the scientiﬁc project of falsifying theories against evidence,” which reveals a positivist epistemology. The above meta-theoretical positioning gives birth to the signiﬁcant facet of Wendt’s constructivism vis-à-vis other theoretical paradigms. In his Social Theory of International Politics, drawing on scientiﬁc realism, Wendt (1999: 38-40) states that ontologically he is post-positivist, while epistemologically he is positivist. Based on this meta-theoretical position, Wendt (1999: 40) believes that his constructivism can provide the ‘via media’ (the middle path) between rationalism and reﬂectivism, in the context of the third great debate in IR. Although reﬂectivists disagree with Wendt’s claim of the via media due to his meta-theoretical inconsistency, rationalists treat Wendt’s constructivism subscribing to the positivist epistemology as a legitimate IR approach along with realism and

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liberalism while thoroughly rejecting radical reflectivist approaches (Smith 2002: 74-6). The positivist epistemology and allied scientific methods still “define “proper” social science and thereby serve as the gatekeepers for what counts as legitimate scholarship” in the mainstream IR (Smith 2002: 72).

These two contemporary theoretical debates reveal that, to get a favorable recognition from the mainstream rationalist IR in America, IR in South Korea should theorize on Korean international relations or conceptualize unique Korean ontological entities, on the basis of empiricist, positivist epistemology defining IR as the social science. In fact, growing South Korean voices, explicitly or implicitly, follow this basic meta-theoretical rule of engagement with IR in America, in calling for a universal IR theory with distinctive Korean self-identity.11 On the side of the particularity-focused approach, Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009: 403) say that ‘International politics as a social science’ must be based on its own history and roots. YoungMyung Kim (2010: 10) also mentions that, using ‘Western social science’ in an appropriate way, it is needed to take notice of Korean particularity and search for its universal meaning. Based on the concepts of generalizability, preciseness and simplicity, for which a good theory should strive, in Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), Seokwoo Kim (2007: 116) points out that in South Korea the universality-focused approach stress generalizability, whereas the particularity-focused approach is concerned with preciseness, and then argues that IR in South Korea should adopt an eclectic approach combining generalizability with preciseness to its national IR theorization. In this sense, both universality-focused and particularity approaches appear to be operating within the rationalist framework of theorization. Chae-sung Chun (2007: 245) asks South Korean IR scholars to actively take part in the process of making ‘universal explanatory’ theories in the global scholarship while making much of Korean particularities and normative foundation. Jinseog Yu an Kun Young Park (2008: 66) claim that future Korean-style IR theories should best ‘explain’ Korean situations, and provide an action-plan for Korea by ‘predicting’ the future. In addition, Byoung Won Min (2007: 43; 50) argues that, by starting from the revision of existing Western theories for Korean realities, the South Korea IR community should produce Korean IR theories which are ‘communicable’ and ‘compatible’ with the criterion of international standard in the existing global IR scholarship. Woosang Kim (2007: 285)

11 To be fair, it should be noted that there are few voices which are critical of scientific universality and American positivistic international studies in South Korea (see Kang 2010; U. Kim 2002; Hong 2008a). In so doing, the voices tend to pay great attention to Korean exceptionalism against Western scientific universalism while shedding light on politics of knowledge production/consumption between Korean and American academia. In criticizing the universalism, they are also interested in the globalization of IR in South Korea. Plus, seemingly there have been no clear Korean epistemologies and methodologies which are distinct from Western ones.
also argues that South Korean IR scholars should produce a new type of ‘positivistic, universal’ IR theories and try to revise and improve the existing rationalist IR theories along with their counterparts in the West, both of which should be regarded as efforts of developing Korean IR studies. Against the backdrop of empiricist social science, the most explicit guideline of how to develop a Korean school of IR like the English School, is suggested in Jong Kun Choi’s (2008: 215) article entitled, Theorizing East Asian International Relations in Korea, as follows:

Any theorizing based on Korea’s unique historical experiences must be tested under the principle of generality. Only through this can the Korean IR community be said to contribute to social science as a whole. Although Korean IR should strive to explain the country’s unique historical experience, it will be judged by strict measurements of scientific universalism, which will contribute to globalization of Korean IR in return.

In sum, the success or failure of Korean theorists in developing a “Korean School” will depend on their ability to inspire and support a vibrant program of empirical research not only in the Korean and East Asian contexts, but also in world politics as a whole (italics: my emphasis).

To make a Korean-style IR theory marketable and acceptable to the American IR scholarship seen as the global reference point (and thus becoming seemingly universal), the South Korean strategy of adopting the mainstream rationalist epistemology in theorization is to the point and is likely to be successful. However, this move seems to cast one paradox to IR in South Korea. That is, although the South Korean IR community has long argued for overcoming excessive Western-dependency (de facto colonial) situation in their IR studies by constructing an independent, self-reliant Korean school of IR by Korean themselves, the local scholarship adopting the positivist epistemology for achieving universality is unable to become ‘self-reliant’ and ‘independent’ and thus almost impossible to normalize its so-called colonized IR on their own. Rather, the sheer reality is that its independent self-reliance against the intellectual colonialism relies on not South Korean IR’s efforts and will, but the long-term academic colonizer’s – American IR’s – benign decision. The call for building a universally applicable Korean IR theory with its distinctive self-identity is still operating in a colonial circuit sustained by the Gramscian hegemony of American IR, after all: ‘our indigenous voice should be heard by the great power’. The more IR in South Korea is obsessed with the universality suited for the mainstream rationalist IR in their theorization, the greater its dependency toward American IR. This implies that, in constructing a universal Korean school of IR, its IR community will, in practice, reinforce the Gramscian hegemony of American IR’s meta-theory in South Korea and make them appear to be more universal. This may also relegate Korean knowledge as little more than provider of “unique regional independent variables” (Choi 2008: 193) to American
rationalist IR theories. In so doing, future Korean-style IR theories, albeit successfully produced, would at best occupy a small, compartmentalized space within the mainstream rationalist IR in America. At this juncture, just as it is claimed that “it is the right time to deepen the process of Koreanization of the IR discipline” (Kim and Cho 2009: 420) in the post-Cold War era of globalization, it is high time to question the taken-for-granted value in South Korean theorization, that is, the universality which has the implicit hierarchical character: the rule-setting (dominant and colonial) America and the rule-following (dominated and colonized) Korea. Otherwise, it would seem that self-declared independent Korean school of IR remains in the colonial circuit of IR as American social science.

A New Ethnocentric Hegemony?

As discussed, a distinctively Korean IR theory can possibly be called one of “universal” IR approaches through American IR’s recognition in the global scholarship. Yet, only this recognition is not good enough to decisively prove that Korean-style IR theory is universally applicable as well as globally useful. The Western-recognized universality should be accepted in not only Western but also non-Western societies (particularly, less developed countries) to confirm its validity and usefulness worldwide. Related to this, although any substantive Korean-style IR theory has yet to be created, the South Korean IR community seems to have one apparently self-evident goal to be achieved with its own brand IR theory in the near future: “It seems that Korean political scientists are about to stand shoulder to shoulder with political scientists of any advanced Western country. Political science in Korea faces new challenging task of exporting theoretical and substantive knowledge created domestically” (C. Park 2005: 69). According to Jong Kun Choi (2008: 204-5), “for the last twenty years, the IR community in Korea has laboriously pondered, questioned, and debated how their understanding of Korea’s unique historical experiences and worldviews should be utilized to theorize about International Relations in East Asia on their own terms but still be communicable and “marketable” to the IR community worldwide.” Despite his critiques of South Korean mimicry of American positivist international studies, Sung-Hack Kang (2010: 36) reveals the idea of knowledge as commodity to be sold globally by saying that “Scholarship is the product of civilization. The level and uniqueness of any civilization and its globalization beyond the national borders have been dependent on the international recognition of power and status of each country. The time has come for Korean IR scholars to take it seriously to globalize their academic products in the academic field of international relations.” Similarly, Taik-young Hahm (2008: 67) mentions that, as a matter of fact, it is likely to have a Korean identity when Koreans design, put, and sell their brand theoretical products out in the domestic and international markets of IR theory. In the field of International Political Economy, Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009: 419; 420) maintain that “It could be a good
opportunity to extend the Korean way of development to Africa and the Asia-Pacific region in the global context. … This will showcase Korea’s contribution to other developing countries.” In his edited book chapter entitled, Knowledge and International Politics: Democratization of Korea and Task of Scholarship, Seongmin Hong (2008b: 51) also pronounces that “(South) Korea should be a theory-export country.” He goes on to state that South Korea should actively provide students from Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and South America with scholarships and invite them to Korean universities and research centers. Exporting knowledge should be recognized as crucial part of diplomacy, and Korean academia and government prepare serious measures for it.

Here, it is worth considering some normative questions relating to consumers of made-in-Korea or made-by-Korean IR theories abroad. If the Korean-style IR theory should be exported, what kind of theory is it? For whom and for what ends? To put it differently, what does the South Korean IR community mean by the Korean-style IR theory? What sort of elements will be incorporated in it? How should it look like? Whose interests are reflected in it? As for these, it is necessary to look at how South Korean scholars wish future Korean-style IR theories to be. The followings are some descriptions of what the Korean-style IR is and ought to be, pronounced by established South Korea IR scholars:

• Chaesung Chun and Kun Young Park (2002: 7): Korean-style IR theory is the knowledge which serves as guidelines for action by best explaining and predicting Korea’s situations, and is a political means of reflecting Korean voices in the global scholarship of IR theory and setting up the status of Korean theorists in the global IR community.

• In his article entitled, Why Is There No No-Western International Relations Theory? Reflections on and from Korea, Chaesung Chun (2010: 74) observes that South Korean scholars have recently “tried to formulate and develop theory based on South Korean interests and perspectives.”

• Young-sun Ha and Young-ho Kim (2005: 24): If a Korean-style IR theory is found through Korean diplomatic history, our Korean diplomatic history will be truly lifted up to the status of world diplomatic history rather than ‘humiliated’ diplomatic history.

• Taik-young Hahm (2008: 38; 68): The Korean School of IR should be IR of/in Korea, by Koreans and for Korea. By devising a theory and methods which are useful to issues of Korea, the South Korean IR community can contribute to the development of international relations theory.

• Hyung Kook Kim and Yun Young Cho (2009: 420): “In order to facilitate the process of the Koreanization of IR studies, or the Korean identity of IR studies, we have to look at out diplomatic history in the period of Korea’s transition toward modernity. … Second,
we need to examine the role of Korea in a global context. … Third, Korean IR scholarship needs to devote itself to finding ways to have peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. … Korean scholars of IR studies face a historical mission to devise grand strategies for external policies for the nation and the East Asian region.” (Kim and Cho 2009: 420).

• Tae-hyun Kim (2008: 318; 319): Korea’s international politics is the object of Korean-style IR theory. The accumulation of empirical research on Korean diplomacy is the foundation of IR in South Korea. The object and starting point of a Korean-style IR theory are roots of Korean thoughts, historical experiences, today’s reality, and Korean diplomacy which are brought by the all.

• Ho-Jae Lee et al. (2005: 25): Indigenization of IR means the development of an IR theory and research methods which are based on Korean cases and historical experiences. This should accord largely with pursuing Korea’s interests.

• Chul-Koo Woo (2004: 15): To seek a Korean identity of IR studies, the Korean IR community needs to construct an objective, universal theoretical framework which can explain Korea’s various historical events.

• Jinseog Yu and Kun Young Park (2008: 66): The long-term goal of Korean-style international relations is to produce a theory (and international relations studies) which serves as guidelines for action by best explaining and predicting Korea’s situations, and at the same time the world comes to accept the fact that the image of the world captured by the perspective based on Korean reality is universal.

Considering all this, it is very likely that, despite its frequent pretentious calls for being universally applicable and global useful, potential Korean-style IR theories are rooted in Korean history, traditions, thoughts, ideologies, and practices. Indeed, it can be seen as the particular and Korean-centric, pretending to be universal in order to enhance and secure its own claims and national interests. It is very difficult to answer the question of on what basis Korea’s national perspective/interests can be equated with the world’s universal perspective/interests: Are Korea’s interests every nation’s interests? Given the above comments by South Korean IR scholars, the development of a distinctively Korean IR theory with universal applicability, if it is to happen at all, cannot be disconnected from a certain (presumably high) degree of Korean-centrism. Roughly speaking, South Korean IR scholars may well respond to Western theoretical claims of universality dressed up in the garb of ethnocentrism by putting forth an ethnocentric paradigm, disguised with universalism or globalism, of their own making. In this case, future Korean-style IR theory with universalist orientation can be regarded as a would-be hegemony aimed to replace the Western hegemony in IR theory or to want to be one of dominant voices on a
par with the West, rather than becoming post-hegemonic.  

Moreover, given this possible hegemonic nature after nationalizing IR theory in the Korean context, if South Korea tries to aggressively export its Korean-centric theoretical products under the banner of universalism to non-Western (particularly the so-called Third World) societies, this move may be strikingly similar to the West’s White Man’s Burden toward the East including Korea. It is very probable that, in commodifying and exporting a Korean-style IR theory, the possible central elements of the theory all come out of Korean thinking and practice, yet are presented as universal knowledge that are applicable to, and whose application would be good for, non-Western societies. To put simply, South Korea who has its own brand theory enlightens other under-theorized non-Western societies for their own modernization: ‘they should follow the Korean path to developmental success for the sake of themselves’. In this logic of thinking, perhaps there is no enough room for considering the ways in which non-Western others perceive the Korean-style IR theory and South Korea’s unquestioned drive for the export of its own brand theory. If this concern is not properly addressed during the theorization, future Korean-style IR theory may fall into the danger of projecting an ethnocentric undertone of imperialism to non-Western societies while becoming controversial and self-serving. In spite of the long-term outcry over its American-centric intellectual dependency/colonialism within its IR academia, South Korea would appear to search for colonies which vindicate the universal fit of its national school of IR.

On the whole, while critically arguing that “The post-war international relations theory is the hegemonic project of the United States for the management of world order” (S. Park 2006: 1), South Korea’s unquestioned move (if not, drive) to export possible Korean-centric IR theories reflecting its own national interests under the banner of universalism would be actually an ethical oxymoron. It could be the Korean projection of its power and interests in the IR theory market and in world politics, on the basis of capitalist modernity. What is needed in the South Korean IR community while theorizing is to reflectively rethink the broadly shared – implicitly or explicitly – idea of exporting Korean-style IR theory to abroad (particularly non-Western communities) in the name of universality which is believed to be resided in Korean particularity.

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12 This is seemingly not a unique phenomenon in South Korea. As for the Chinese case, see Callahan’s (2008) penetrating critique of the concept of “Tianxia All-under-Haven” seen as Chinese visions of world order. Chen (2010: 4) also points to the danger of “reproduce[ing] the very hegemonic logic of dominance” by potential indigenous IR theories in Asia which speaks for them and their interest.
6. In Lieu of Conclusion

Related to universality/universalism as a must in building a distinctively Korean IR theory, from a critical, reflective standpoint, it is necessary to remind us of Robert Cox’s (1986: 27) famous phrase: “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specially social and political time and space.” In this sense, “International relations theory is not only about politics, it also is itself political” (Hutchings 1999: 69). IR theory thus offers not just a way of seeing, but also a viewpoint of what our world does look like, or ought to be look like. In addition, as Smiths (2004: 504) aptly points out, “scholarship is based in a set of social forces toward which it is supportive (either explicitly or implicitly) or opposed. In essence, then, scholarship cannot be neutral; it is unavoidably partial, is unavoidably political, and unavoidably has ethical consequences.” Given this value-laden knowledge-power dynamic, it is impossible to make a universal IR theory simply dealing with how the world really is in a neutral way, to which everyone should subscribe without questioning its universality. Despite using the term ‘science’ seen as a foundation of universality, social sciences are not value-free, immaculately objective academic enterprises (see Nugent 2010). If there is a certain theory called being universal across time and space, the theory is often a mere disguise for the secular interests of those promoting it. In practice, using the concept of universalism could be easily associated with violence against actors and things which appear to be unfit for it. In order to be universal, the universality must eliminate, exclude, and marginalize what are seen as not universal. Universalism as knowledge is thus a byproduct of power politics.

Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, it would seem that the pursuit of universality based on modernist social science has been taken for granted in building a Korean national school of IR. In so doing, plural IR scholars in South Korea still inadvertently consider IR in America as the reference point of measuring their level of imagined “universality.” Under this circumstance, in spite of arguing for normalizing its colonized IR by producing self-reliant Korean-style IR theories, the success relies on not South Korean IR’s products but the long-term academic colonizer’s—American IR’s—benign decision. It is argued in this context that the recent call for building universally applicable Korean IR theory with its distinctive self-identity is still operating in a colonial circuit sustained by the Gramscian hegemony of American IR’s positivist meta-theory. This might turn South Korea into a mere test-bed of American IR’s so-called ‘scientific’ models while showing South Korea’s ongoing, ingrained Westoxification13 in theorization: ‘serving the most powerful Other’s hegemony and relegating the Self’.14

13 The term is adopted from Hwa Yol Jung (2010: 96).
14 In a similar vein, Ching-Chang Chen (2010: 4) keenly points out that possible emerging non-Western IR theories in Asia – whose theories attempt to show contributions by non-Western
It should be here noted that American IR itself is geographically, linguistically, methodologically, and politically parochial (Biersteker 1999). It is not the anointed guardian of universal truths. It is just one of them in the global IR academia. It is the dominant one, though. Plus, due to its growing recognition in the global IR scholarship, the English School has been seen as a role model of the South Korean IR community while hardly heeding the English School’s conservative, imperialistic traits laced with being universal (Callahan 2004). What is required for South Korea is not to universalize the Self in relation to the West, but to provincialize the hegemony who tries to convert others into its own definition of universalism. This is not to say that the existing hierarchical relations between West and non-West must be reversed for the non-Western. Rather, everyone’s locus is center and at the same time periphery, and/or IR’s center is everywhere and its fringe nowhere. Regarding this, for the South Korean IR community, the question of how to “work towards fashioning a post-western IR” (Behera 2007: 342) which goes beyond any hierarchical binary (e.g. Orientalism and Occidentalism) should be taken seriously in their everyday research and teaching. In addition, South Korea needs to urge the hegemony to critically rethink its claim for universality while trying to decolonize South Korea in a self-reflective manner. Indeed, “Democratization of IR requires its decolonization (meaning permanent resistance to structural dominance in power relations of all kinds), which must take place not only in the periphery but also in the core” (Chen 2010: 5).

As for the theory-export mentality associated with the universalization of Korean national school of IR, the following critical questions are worth being considered. As argued above, even dominant American IR and the English School are not universal per se. Then, is it possible that distinctively Korean IR theories can be universal? If so, in what ways? Why does the South Korean IR community tend to simply treat universalism as the goal to be achieved in building its own brand IR theory? Why is there no serious discussion on denotation and connotation of their taken-for-granted universalism itself? In fact, the absence of these questions in the theorization is thoroughly political as well as normatively problematic, for possible future Korean-style IR theory with universalist orientation can be regarded as a would-be hegemony aimed to replace the Western hegemony in IR theory or to want to be one of dominant voices on a par with the West, rather than becoming post-hegemonic. Given this possible hegemonic nature after nationalizing IR theory in the Korean context, if South Korea tries to aggressively export its Korean-centric theoretical products under the banner of universalism to non-Western (particularly the so-called Third World) societies, this move may be strikingly similar to the West’s White Man’s Burden, projecting an ethnocentric undertone of imperialism toward non-Western theory consumers while being self-serving for South Korea. It is thus necessary to reflect on whether the hidden scholars from local ‘vantage points’ in the global IR scholarship dominated by the West – could end up becoming ‘derivative discourses’ of the modern West, “reproducing the logic of colonial modernity rather than disrupting it.”
rationale of exporting the Korean-style IR theory is the same as what exactly South Korean scholars criticize the hegemonic nature of their counterparts in the West. A self-reflective critique of the idea of universalizing Korean-style IR theory is essential in its theorization.

After all things considered, it is wonder whether the concept of universalism can be a proper ethical basis of engaging with others. As have been shown, due to its unconditional quest for universalism, South Korea is unable to decolonize itself in relation to the West, and at the same time is likely to search for non-Western colonies of its Korean-centric IR theory. Note that this paper’s suggestion of problematizing universality as a must in building a Korean school of IR does not mean that South Korea has to be distinctively particularistic all the way down and exceptionally essentialist against other IR communities. Nor is Korean-style IR theory only for Korea(ns). Far from it: IR theorization in South Korea should not be based on inward-looking, nationalistic, and defensive nativism. Rather, this paper strongly supports meaningful dialogues between Korean and non-Korean IR communities at various levels in many different channels, taking into account a plurality of cultures or a world of multiculturalism. The normative point of this paper is that Korea-style IR theory, if any, cannot be self-evidently universal, but should be freely shareable with others. It is a matter of attitude of engaging with others: universalism or share-ness. A perpetual critical appraisal of the meta-theoretical, normative foundations of a theory in the making is the indispensable job to be done by all IR theorists. Theorizing should go hand in hand with practicing self-criticism.

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