Historical Formation of Pan-Islamism:
Modern Islamic Reformists Project for
Intra-Umma Alliance and Inter-Madhāhib Rapprochement

Junichi Hirano

Kyoto Working Papers on Area Studies No.12
(G-COE Series 10)
December 2008
The papers in the G-COE Working Paper Series are also available on the G-COE website:
(Japanese webpage)
http://www.humanosphere.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/staticpages/index.php/working_papers
(English webpage)

©2008
Center for Southeast Asian Studies
Kyoto University
46 Shimoadachi-cho,
Yoshida, Sakyo-ku,
Kyoto 606-8501, JAPAN

All rights reserved
ISBN978-4-901668-43-9

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies.

The publication of this working paper is supported by the JSPS Global COE Program (E-04):
In Search of Sustainable Humanosphere in Asia and Africa.
Historical Formation of Pan-Islamism: Modern Islamic Reformists Project for Intra-Umma Alliance and Inter-Madhāhib Rapprochement

Junichi Hirano

Kyoto Working Papers on Area Studies No.12
JSPS Global COE Program Series 10
In Search of Sustainable Humanosphere in Asia and Africa
December 2008
Historical Formation of Pan-Islamism: Modern Islamic Reformists Project for Intra-Umma Alliance and Inter-Madhāhib Rapprochement

HIRANO Junichi

0. Introduction

This paper aims to rethink pan-Islamism from the latter half of the 19th century to the former half of the 20th century in the Islamic world.

It has been pointed out that Pan-Islamism has its origin in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the period of imperialism. Islamic countries were subordinated by the West one by one, although they tried to resist it and through the process, Islamic intellectuals began to show the idea of Pan-Islamism. Therefore, mention of the name tends to
immediately call to mind anti-colonial struggles against the West imperialism. However, Pan-Islamism has another aspect, which aims to transcend the political divisions and religious disputes within Islamic Umma. For the latter purpose to reconstruct the unity of Umma, what did Islamic reformists living in the modern age see as critical issues?

To bring light into the issues, it focuses on Arabic countries and prominent Islamic reformers in those countries, especially Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838/9-1897), Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905), Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935), and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (1854-1902). They are considered to be distinguished Islamic proponents who advocated pan-Islamic alliance through Islamic countries, and transcendence of narrow religious schools of thought in Islam. They proposed those ideas through modern printing media including newspapers, magazines, books and so on and those materials which conveyed their Pan-Islamic visions have been read through the Islamic world so that those who read the articles obtained strong Muslim identity as consisting of the Islamic Umma. To focus on modern pan-Islamic ideologies and movements, it is useful to utilize those newspapers and magazines for looking into their visions towards the Islamic alliance and the relationship between Islamic schools of thought. To achieve this task, it will take some examples of modern Islamic printing media as “al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqā” (1884-1885), “al-Manār” (1898-1935), “Umm al-Qurā” (1902), scrutinize the contents and reveal diversity of Pan-Islamism.

I. Pan-Islamism: An Imagined Term in the West

It is said that the term “pan-Islamism” was coined in the 19th century in Western Europe. Originally, the term captured the Europeans’ fearful perception of the Islamic world; it had an invasive ring to it. Accordingly, the transnational vision of pan-Islamic solidarity, as a geopolitical

---

1 Lockman says that “pan-Islamism” is the shadow of a widespread European anxiety about Muslim solidarity, the term (literally meaning “encompassing all Muslims,” on the model of “pan-German” or “pan-American”) that European colonial officials and experts on Islam used to denote the persistent feelings of solidarity among Muslims and across national boundaries—feelings which, they feared, might be mobilized against colonial rule. At the very zenith of European global hegemony, Europeans conjured up vague but threatening notions of secretive cabals of cruel and fanatical Muslims plotting to overthrow colonial rule everywhere across the Muslim world (Lockman 2004: 91).
concept, belongs to the 1880s (Özcan 1997: 45–46). The thesis of Islamic solidarity surged after the Ottoman loss of large territories in the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia in 1878, suggesting that the Ottomans could compensate for the loss of the Christian-majority areas in the Balkans by attracting Muslim-majority lands in southern Asia into its sphere of international influence. The occupation of Tunisia by France in 1881 and of Egypt by Britain in 1882 further stimulated the emotional and intellectual attitudes of educated Muslims toward the Eurocentric world order.

Indeed, there were some struggles for resistance against the West in the Islamic world. In 1882, the Egyptian general ʿArābī encouraged his fellow countrymen to free themselves from British colonial rule, under the slogan of “Egypt for the Egyptians.” In Egypt’s neighbor, Sudan, Muḥammad Aḥmad declared himself the Mahdī and began a resistance movement against Britain in 1882, during which the British General Charles Gordon died fighting for what seems, in retrospect, a lost cause. In Iran, the Tobacco Boycott Movement of 1891 brought about the withdrawal of British economic suppression. Thus, Western countries in general—and Britain in particular—began to hold a fearful perception of the Islamic world as a whole. Hence, neither an intellectual or religious bent, nor the actual steps to exploit them, should be separated from their proper context—which is to say, the Oriental-Occidental cultural and political conflict.

Indeed, it was during this period of rising Muslim protest against increasing threats from the West that the great powers began to worry about a pan-Islamic solidarity: European newspapers began to refer to the idea of a pan-Islamic reaction to Western expansion and discuss this issue. One of the first uses of the term “pan-Islam” can be attributed to Gabriel Charmes, a prolific French journalist, in his description of the Muslim response to the French domination of Tunisia (Landau 1990: 2). From that point forward, numerous visions of pan-Islamism cropped up all over the Muslim world, either in the form of diplomatic cooperation among independent Muslim countries like Ottoman Turkey, Persia, and Afghan, or in the sense of cultural awakening, economic development, and political solidarity.
One of the prominent German Orientalists, Carl Becker, defines “pan-Islamism” as “the realization of the Islamic concept of Islamic world integration, by uniting under the sole leader of the community (Imām)”; he maintains that the term “pan-Islamism” originated after the Berlin conference in 1884 (Becker 1924: 231–51).

Other Orientalists claim that the expression was created in the 1870s, and that it was compared to “pan-Slavism,” which was then in full bloom in Eastern Europe (Lee 1942: 281). A prominent Iranologist, Edward Browne, reports that he cannot find any words equivalent to “pan-Islamism” in the Arabic, Turkish, or Persian languages, and says that when he asked his Muslim friend about the term, he replied that “pan-Islamism” had been coined with a dark connotation by his Western colleague in Vienna (Browne 1903: 306–07). Moreover, the Orientalist David Margoliouth says that pan-Islamism was “a ghost,” according to some Arabic resources (Margoliouth 1912: 3–4, 16–17). Lee says that it was one aspect of the reaction of Muslims to the impact of the Christian West (Lee 1942: 281). As secondary material sources in Western European languages offer confusing and contradictory views, we can only surmise that the term “pan-Islamism” was produced by the West in the modern imperial era.

Judging from these Orientalists’ insistences, pan-Islamism did come about through the Muslims’ natural and traditional sense of unity, but it was only a way of thinking that was formed through their common experience, under the threat of Western imperialism and colonialism as a whole. That is to say, pan-Islamism was a shadow cast over global integration under Western imperialism, and it ultimately highlighted the negative aspects of imperialism itself (Kurita 2002: 4).

In this sense, the term “pan-Islamism,” which al-Afghānī uses frequently in his many articles and books to resist European—and especially British—imperialism, required the very existence of the West to begin with. Indeed, as seen below, his famous pan-Islamic journal al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqā (‘UW hereafter) was published from Paris and

---

2 The Indian Muslim scholar Seyyed Amir ‘Ali also defines the word as “the imaginary product aiming to break the freedom of Muslims” (Ali 1938: 19–20).
delivered throughout the world using modern technology. In addition, a contemporary Iranian Islamic writer, Hādī Khosrō Shāhī, describes his journey to Paris as pilgrimage (Hijra) (Shāhī 2000: 23). “Hijra” is a key concept in Islamic history, as it marks the beginning of the Islamic Umma in the Arab Peninsula in the seventh century. From here, we can judge how important the existence of the West was for the Islamic world in starting the modern revival of its Umma.

As will be shown in the following chapter, the Islamic world was contending with advancing Western imperialism and colonialism at that time. The West felt threatened by the Islamic world—although they had invaded it—and had coined the term “pan-Islamism,” along with its connotations of fear and dread. On the other side of the coin, al-Afghānī employed the Arabic term “al-Wahda al-Islāmiya,” which corresponds directly with “pan-Islamism.” There is the possibility that after he saw the term “pan-Islamism” circulating in Europe, he began using the same term in Arabic. If this were so, it could be said that he borrowed the term “pan-Islamism” from the West.

However, we must first and foremost pay attention to the fact that he used the term “al-Wahda al-Islāmiya” to unite Muslims and liberate Islamic countries from Western encroachment. Therefore, his term does not contain any connotation of a threat, regardless of context. Indeed, the

---

3 There is an indication that pan-Islamic propaganda was made possible—and was perhaps actually engendered—by mechanical progress in communications, the introduction of the printing press, and the increase of commercial transactions between the Islamic world and the West (Becker 1924: 239–42; Hurgronje 1915: 23–25; Ritter 1924: 329–50; Wirth 1915: 432–33).

4 According to Keddie, al-Afghānī was the first in his time to use the Qur’ānic term “al-‘urwa al-wuthqā” to express Muslim solidarity and advertise pan-Islamism, with his sincere praise for the Ottoman Khalīfa in the latter half of the 1870s (Keddie 1972a: 184). As mentioned, it was in 1884 that Afghānī and ‘Abdūh published the pan-Islamic journal ‘UW in Paris. In the very same year, the Berlin Conference—the symbol of colonial partition by the West, of Asian and African countries—was held in Germany. There is the great possibility that ‘UW, as an expression of his pan-Islamism, was a reflection of Western imperialism itself. Moreover, al-Afghānī took Czarist Russia as a model to follow in realizing pan-Islamism, because of its absolute unity and unbending self-assertion (al-Afghānī 2002a: 161); he also took the unification of the German Empire in 1871, incidentally, as the model for an agreement that could lead to solidarity. Indeed, he praised Bismarck and Cavour for realizing their national unity (al-Afghānī 2002a: 207, 333, 356, 413, 428, 429, 447, 452, 453). ‘Imāra also points out that he expressed his positive evaluation of Italian political leaders for creating the Italian language, integrating many prefectures, kingdoms, and republic states, and acquiring a noble freedom and perfect unity (tawhīd) (‘Imāra 1984: 175).
West and al-Afghānī used the same term, but their intended meanings were quite different; the latter modified and re-appropriated the term for his own purpose. In this sense, pan-Islamism was the concept of a man who had deeply internalized the West and then strongly resisted its influence, for the sake of Islamic salvation. In the end, he had a deep fear of the West—especially of his main opponent, Britain. Regarding the term “pan-Islamism,” both sides appear to have influenced each other in its introduction.

II. Al-Afghānī's Political Vision: Toward Constructing an Alliance among Islamic Countries

When al-Afghānī’s political thought became widely known, Muslim intellectuals loved to use the term “pan-Islamic,” on the grounds that it was the very expression of true Islamic belief that enhanced the Muslim sense of solidarity. It is now customary, both in the West and in Islamic countries, to regard him as a pioneer of pan-Islamism.

It is well-known—and quite commonsense—that Islam strengthens the spirit of Muslim solidarity; in reality, however, it is not quite so simple. In al-Afghānī’s time, Islamic countries maintained rather hostile relationships, and deep disagreements among religious schools were erupting. When the Islamic Empire was the superior world power, such disagreements did not cause any problems; however, when the

---

5 Hans Cohn says that the term “pan-Islamism” was first used in Britain in 1882 (Cohn 1920: 44), when Britain subdued the ‘Arabī revolution and occupied Egypt. In the very same year, al-Afghānī visited Britain and had a discussion with British high officials about the ‘Arabī revolution and the Mahdī movement in Sudan (Keddie 1972a: 229; Lotf Allāh Khān 1926: 38; ‘Imāra 1984: 67–68; Blunt 1983: 409–10). So, pan-Islamism was a concept that reflected the correlation and interrelation between al-Afghānī (or the Islamic world) and the West.

relationship between Europe and the Islamic world was reversed in the 19th century—so that Western, imperialistic countries began invading Islamic territories—they became crucial.

By the beginning of the 20th century, there were only three Muslim countries that had retained their independence, albeit only formally: Ottoman Turkey, Qājār Persia, and Durrānī Afghan. For the Islamic world, the 19th century was one of disassembly (Nakata 2001: 41–42), experienced as an integration into the modern world system (Wallerstein 1974) politically, economically, and militarily, even though it was neither single-lined nor inevitable. These political changes signaled what seemed to be an irrevocable extension of Europe’s political and economic hegemony and, consequently, a rethinking of the reason for the Muslim world’s decline.

Al-Afghānī detected the essence of these serious crises; in response, he started the so-called first Islamic revival movement, in the 19th century (Kosugi 2006: 188–89).

When surveying his entire life, it can be seen that the impact of the invasions of Tunisia by France and Egypt by Britain played a critical part in the emergence of his global pan-Islamic vision. These events caused him to have ideas about the necessity for Muslim solidarity against the larger expansion of Western hegemony. Indeed, it was immediately after the formal British occupation of Egypt that al-Afghānī began to publish his pan-Islamic ideas in Paris, in the journal he edited together with his Egyptian disciple, Muḥammad ‘Abduh 7, ‘UW—a highly influential publication that was distributed throughout the Islamic world8. Hādī Khosrō Shāhī, who compiled a complete works of al-Afghānī in 2002,

---

7 Both stayed in Europe at this time involuntarily—and, ironically enough, due to European colonialism in the Middle East. Al-Afghānī had been expelled from Egypt by the Khedive Tawfīq and reached Paris via India. ‘Abduh joined him there after being expelled from Cairo in the wake of the ‘Arābī Revolt and the British occupation in 1882.

8 While one cannot be absolutely certain whether al-Afghānī himself wrote it, or whether ‘Abduh did (if so, probably under his mentor’s inspiration), the style seems to point to the former’s authorship. Moreover, no less an Islamic scholar than Muṣṭafā ‘Ābd al-Rāziq republished this article in 1938, with an introduction of his own, maintaining that he recognized it as a product of al-Afghānī’s thought (al-Afghānī 1938). This is also the opinion of Muḥammad ‘Imāra, who compiled his complete collection and reprinted this article (‘Imāra 1968: 339–46).
explains the significance of the journal thus: first, it was an expression of resistance against European colonialism in general and that of the British in particular; second, it was an expression of Islamic solidarity and the abolition of narrow religious factionalism; third, it was a discussion of the Islamic Empire’s decline that brought the cause to light (Shahi 2000: 519). Indeed, this periodical expressed his views on pan-Islamism in general, at that time, especially in an article entitled “al-Wahda al-Islamiya,” and designed Muslim solidarity to expel foreign intruders and establish their own independence and freedom. His was the Islamic voice that blamed Western imperialism for the Muslim Empire’s decline; he succeeded in raising the alarm across the Islamic world with these words: Islamic sovereignty used to extend to Maghrib (Andalsia) in the West, Tonkin at the border of China in the East, Fazan in the North, and Sarandib at the equator in the South, and there were so many Muslims who lived within its borders. They had one Khalifa, and when he raised his voice, Chinese emperors surrendered and European kings became very frightened. They had never invaded the Islamic Umma until recently. Once, Muslims rejected being put under a non-Muslim ruler, and when some Muslims were under the control of foreigners, every other Muslim mourned wholeheartedly throughout the entire Islamic brotherhood (al-Afghani 2002a: 157).

Al-Afghani goes on to say that Muslims east and west, north and south, would unite and work together against the dangers facing them. The only ones opposing this union were those local rulers who were steeped in their own daily pleasure and vanity. These individuals, he says, were like chains around the necks of Muslims. The heirs of the notables should not let themselves despair, for there was an unbroken sequence of Muslim lands, from Edirne to Peshawar, inhabited by no fewer than 50 million Muslims who were long distinguished by their courage. If these Muslims could agree among themselves, says Al-Afghani, and show regard for the needs of fellow Muslims, they could unite and dam the floods imperiling them from all sides. Melancholy and despair help no cause, but hope and action do; by uniting in the name of the Qur’an, says al-Afghani, Islam would be guaranteed success (al-Afghani 2002a: 160–62).

In another article (“al-Ta‘aşṣub”), al-Afghani points out that Arabs,
Turks, Persians, Indians, Egyptians, and Maghribis had originally held onto their religious reins so tightly and kept so deep a kinship, that when one of their companions was troubled by misfortune or their country was being loosened and divided, they would all feel great sorrow (al-Afghānī 2002a: 139). However, the reality he faced in his time was quite the reverse. He complains bitterly: When the Indian Revolt occurred (in 1857), Afghan and Baluchi Muslims failed to help Indian Muslims, and when the Afghan-British War broke out (in 1878–81), they also did not participate in the political struggle against British encroachment. The key point in opposing the British occupation of Egypt lies in solidarity among the Indians, Afghans, and Persians, and that is the very expression of Muslim brotherhood and a clue to the revival of the Islamic Umma in the future (al-Afghānī 2002a: 123).

According to al-Afghānī, no Muslim ought to rely on national or ethnic ties, but should instead depend on only religious ties (al-Afghānī 2002a: 103–06). Muslims must oppose racism wherever they live, and throw off any kinds of kinship (‘aṣabiya) which would undermine Islamic solidarity. Because the people who believe in the Islamic principles, once they have accepted this belief, reject their own race and nationality when they turn from personal ties to universal relationships, that is, religious ones. Muslims, who are on the truth of Allāh’s sacred law (Sharī‘a), do not perceive any differences among nationalities, for if there are differences among Muslims, these depend on their degree of enthusiasm for keeping and embodying the religious law.

Then, he proclaims that racial and national solidarity are the very things Allāh denounces strictly, taking as a proof a Qur’ān verse: Allāh rebukes all solidarities, besides the one made through Islamic law. Whoever relies on such a solidarity cannot afford to repel the rebuke or whoever approves of such a tie deserves criticism….there is nobody among us who can call for a racial tie (‘aṣabiya), and struggle and die for it. “O you men! Surely we have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and families, that you may know each other” (al-Hujrāt: 13) (al-Afghānī 2002a: 104–105).

Al-Afghānī sincerely respected the Qur’ān and Sunna of the prophet Muḥammad, referring to those religious books and quoting their sentences
or passages in many places in this political periodical. To begin with, the
title of his periodical, “al-‘Urwā al-Wuthqā,” is a direct derivation from
the Qur’an: “There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has
become clearly distinct from error; therefore, whoever disbelieves in the
false deities (Tāghūt) and believes in Allah he indeed has laid hold on the
firmest handle (al-‘Urwā al-Wuthqā), which shall not break off, and Allah
is All-Hearing, All-Knowing” (al-Baqara: 256). At the same time, he
maintains in an article: “The Qur’an is alive, not dead. …The Book is not
invalidated. Return to it” (al-Afghānī 2002a: 162). The articles in his
periodical contain so many political, economic, and religious messages;
each message is accompanied by Qur’nic or Ḥadīth passages and thus
reminds the readers of the significance of religion. The periodical is a
resonant appeal for Muslim solidarity, based on communal memory.

At the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that he preached
Islamic solidarity, not only for the Muslim masses but for Muslim rulers
in general. Notice should be paid, however, to the fact that he believed
that the reform of monarchism and absolutism in Muslim
countries—which would lead the revival of Islam—precedes
independence and autonomy from Western domination. The periodical
contains some articles which, in the name of Islam, spoke out readers to
work against those local rulers who stood in the way of the achievement

According to Landau, at some unknown point in his career,
al-Afghānī must have reached the conclusion that he would have to
convert the Muslim rulers, or at least one of them, to his pan-Islamic
views, if he were to carry out his plans (Landau 1990: 18) ⁹. Indeed, the
concept of a united Muslim community with a spiritual and political
leader at its head was essential to the pan-Islamism of late 19th century

— ⁹ During his short stay in London, he contributed the articles “British Policy in East
Countries” (“al-Siyāsah al-Injilīyā fi Mamārik al-Sharqīyā”) and “The Reason for War
in Egypt” (“Asbāb al-Ḥarb bi-Mīṣr”) to a newspaper compiled by Lūīs Sābunji, The
Bee (al-Nahlā). The former is a strong criticism of British foreign policy in India and
Egypt, and the latter points out that the true reason for the British invasion was the
Britons’ concern over the project of the Ottoman Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamīd II, to gather all
the Muslims under the Islamic Khalīfa—that is, pan-Islamism—and that the British
Army dispatch was to break up this rising sign of Islamic solidarity (‘aṣābiyya), for
fear of its deep influence in Eastern countries, especially in India (Keddie 1972a:
184).
Al-Afghānī adopted this concept and markedly toned down his attacks on the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II, whom he selected as the most likely personality to lead a successful pan-Islamic campaign (al-Bashîr 1975: 18–19). Thus he supported the Ottoman caliphate, though not willingly, in ‘UW.

Relating to the failure to grasp his political thought, according to Kramer, it must be said that there is no critical evidence that al-Afghānī ever advanced an articulate proposal for a Muslim congress (Kramer 1986: 19). However, according to al-Afghānī’s nephew, Mîrzâ Lotf Allâh Khân Asadâbâdî, there was a concrete plan devised by al-Afghānī for an Islamic congress in Istanbul: The Sayyid determined that, from each of the major Islamic lands, one person would be selected by the state as an official representative, and one person from the first ranks of the ‘ulamâ’ of (each) people (millet) would be selected by the people as a true people’s representative, to assemble and meet in Istanbul. In Istanbul, a great congress would be founded and organized, and important problems anywhere, at any time, would be given over to the arbitration of this congress. All states and peoples of the Muslim faith would recognize the obligation to respect and follow the decisions and verdicts of the Islamic congress... The purpose of the Sayyid in organizing this Islamic congress was to amass the means for progress and fulfillment of the Muslim peoples collectively, and to restore the glory and might of early Islam.10

Moreover, the idea of having an Islamic congress can be found in the pages of ‘UW, where Makka was cited as “the most favorable city for the exchange of their ideas and dissemination in all parts” (al-Afghānī 2002a: 122–27). This identical idea was repeated once again in another article, “Waḥda al-Siyāda” (al-Afghānī 2002a: 163–68). Hardly more explicit were his remarks on Muslim solidarity, which stressed the role of the ‘ulamâ’ in this regard: The ‘ulamâ’, the religious leaders everywhere should join together and establish centers in various lands, to advance their solidarity, and take the hands of the masses, so that the Revelation (Qur’ān) and true tradition (Ḥadīth) will guide them. They should gather these threads into one knot, with its center in the Holy Lands, the most

10 The account went on to relate that the plan fell through when Abdülhamid II attempted to assert his prerogative as caliph by demanding that he serve as president of the congress, a move resisted by al-Afghānī (Lotf Allâh Khân 1926: 56).
noble of which is the House of Allāh (al-Afghānī 2002a: 126).

Now we can grasp the grand design in al-Afghānī’s pan-Islamic politics: the establishment of an important Muslim bloc, comprising the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and Afghan under the guide of Ottoman caliphate(Maḥmūd 1979: 318)—the only independent Muslim states at that time—as a milestone in attracting Muslims to a pan-Islamic union\(^\text{11}\). Moreover, he had the beginning of a plan for an Islamic congress led by the religious leader in Istanbul or Makka. Western colonial aggression had awakened Muslim solidarity from its slumber, and al-Afghānī gave expression to that solidarity running through the Islamic world, with “al-Wahda al-Islāmiya.” He aimed to construct a unified common front that united Islamic independent states against imperialism. Hence, he diverted the traditional religious mentality among the Muslims toward a modern ideology for political solidarity among Islamic countries (Kosugi 2006: 215). In this sense, he chose Islam as a political ideology by which Muslims could achieve liberation and independence from Western imperialism.

### III. Al-Afghānī’s Religious Attempt Towards Transcending the Sunnī-Shīʿī Dichotomy

However, at the same time, we must also pay attention to al-Afghānī’s advocacy, beyond the Sunnī-Shīʿī dichotomy (Enayat 1982: 41–42; Landau 1990: 15). In his paradigm for pan-Islamism, al-Afghānī advocated the solidarity of the Islamic religious schools of thought (i.e., Sunnī and Shīʿī). One of al-Afghānī’s ambitions was to bridge their differences. Well acquainted with the writings of both groups, he argued, again and again, that their differences were a matter of past relevance and that a *modus vivendi* between them could—indeed, *should*—be found. Thus, in his confidential discussions with his disciple and friend, Muḥammad al-Makhzūmī, he repeatedly stresses the modern irrelevance of these differences (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 112–14).

\(^{11}\) Al-Afghānī himself, when referring to the concrete project of the political alliance between the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and Afghanistan, used the Arabic term “al-Jāmi‘a al-Islāmiya.” See the article “Awakening from Sleep” (al-Afghānī 2002a: 405–06).
Not surprisingly, al-Afghānī referred to the Sunnī-Shī‘ī differences in his periodical articles (Key 1951: 545). After having been exiled from Egypt, he not only contributed to various European newspapers\textsuperscript{12}, but also set up several Arabic periodicals, the best-known of which was ‘UW. ‘UW repeated al-Afghānī’s wish to reconcile Sunnīs and Shī‘īs. In an article entitled “Call for the Persians to Reach an Agreement with the Afghans,” for example, he says that: Both nations are like two branches of one tree and they have one root. That is an ancient Persian origin. When Islam came, both became so powerful through the deep unification that true religion brought. Actually, there are few differences between these nations, and those differences do not require branches to be split or clothes to be cut. I am very sorry that these slight differences have become so serious, although both parties have wise ways of thinking (al-Afghānī 2002a: 193)\textsuperscript{13}.

According to him, Afghans and Persians had become overly particular about tiny and frivolous differences between them. Originally, the two nations had been one and had been so mighty by virtue of the true Islamic faith they shared. Islam has two religious schools in general, Sunnī and Shī‘ī; the Afghans belong to the former, while the Persians belonged to the latter. Sunnīs and Shī‘īs originally followed one Islam, and the disparity and disunity between them emerged only with the passage of time. “Now we must go back to the pure Islamic principle and revive its true meaning,” he advocated\textsuperscript{14}.

So what, then, was his motivation for advocating the necessity of

\textsuperscript{12} For example, A. Abdullāh refers to an article by al-Afghānī in Figaro (Paris) of November 8, 1883, in which he warns that, should the Mahdi be victorious in Sudan, Muslims would rise everywhere (Abdullāh 1981: 42–43).

\textsuperscript{13} He goes on to say, “Oh, Persians, remember that you have contributed your knowledge to Islam and turn your eyes to your inheritance in Islam. As you made a great effort in spreading Islam all over the world, you should become a pillar of the religion, Islam. You are the best people to restore Islam’s past glory and to build a firm foundation for bringing about Islamic solidarity in the Umma. This deed is not impossible, on account of your great nationality and firm will” (al-Afghānī 2002a: 195).

\textsuperscript{14} On the other hand, Brunner points out that the call for al-Wahda al-Islāmiya and the struggle against European predominance is a leitmotif that runs through the entire journal. Nowhere, however, is there explicit mention of rapproching the Sunnī and Shī‘ī. Particularly with respect to Egypt and Sudan, the fight against British colonialism formed the main emphasis in the news reports carried in ‘UW, and so he considers the journal a “classic example of an anti-imperialist argument couched in religious terms” (Brunner 2004: 35–36).
transcending the narrow dichotomy between Sunnî and Shî‘î? We can see the background of the pan-Islamic nature of his thinking, in the following points.

Firstly, it could be subscribed to a fundamental change in the worldwide historical system in general. By the early 20th century, the Islamic world had been absorbed into the worldwide political and economical system, and these differences made little critical sense. The integration of the world economy, together with the advance of secularization and Westernization, caused Islamic historical and religious differences to be put aside; Islamic intellectuals were less concerned with internal disunity, than with taking care of the crisis caused by their confrontation with Western imperialism (Kosugi 2006: 706).

Secondly, the pan-Islamic nature of his thinking can be seen in his description of the Afghan nation in his notable book History of Afghan (Tatimma al-Bayān fi Ta’rîkh al-Afghān)\(^\text{15}\). In this book, he mentions the unreasonably narrow religious factionalism that existed among the Afghans in his time. For example, he points out that: The Afghan ‘ulamā’ avoid eating food slaughtered by Shī‘as. On the other hand, they do not hesitate to eat meals slaughtered by Jews or Christians, because they believe that Shī‘as have already disavowed their faith, and do not take any food slaughtered by those who have lost their own creed. This is their point of difference with ahl al-Kitāb (the people of the Sacred Book) (al-Afghānī 2002d: 179).

Furthermore, he points out the meaningless and ugly struggles between Sunnis and Shi‘is, as follows: There was a political struggle in Qandahar that was derived from Islamic sectarian factionalism. It went as follows. One of the greatest (Sunnī) ‘ulamā’ declared the Shi‘as to be unbelievers. Then the Afghan people revolted against them and so much blood flowed. Houses were broken and shops were invaded. The same situation happened in Kabul. The ‘ulamā’s declaration that the Shi‘as were unbelievers led to an appalling war between Sunnīs and Shi‘is that

\(^{15}\) According to Rashtī, a prominent al-Afghānī researcher in contemporary Afghanistan, al-Afghānī’s pan-Islamism was guaranteed by his experience of engagement in Afghan policy in the 1860s. The fruit of his experience is expressed in his book (Rashtī 1977: 5).
continued for a few months (al-Afghānī 2002d: 177–78).

Thus, the experience of al-Afghānī during his stay in Afghan in his youth contributed greatly to his later concept of pan-Islamism, because he had grown intolerant of the miserable conditions resulting from the repeated factional struggles that occurred between the two religious schools, despite the fact they were both Muslim\(^{16}\). He looked to offer a solution to break through the useless conflicts, by advocating tolerance and the solidarity of Muslims\(^{17}\).

In this respect, he offered a typical argument *vis-à-vis* the Islamic schools of thought, in his later years in Istanbul. First of all, he thought of the Shi’a as people who “follow the school of thought of Imam Ja’far

\(^{16}\) On the other hand, he praised an aspect of co-existence among Sunnī and Shi’ī in *History of Afgān*. Al-Afghānī points out that “Afghans have a strong attachment toward their religion, law school, and race (*jins*). They never discriminate rights among foreigners, and they have little concern about whether Shi’as or non-Muslims follow the Islamic principles or not, so they do not forbid them from taking a high rank in Afghan government. Actually, you can see al-Qizil Bāsh transporting landlords in Afghan.” Then al-Afghānī says that all Afghans, though they are poor, are proud of their “Afghaness” and are convinced that they are from the noblest nation in this world. He also insists that there are none more pure in faith and complete in Islam than the Afghans and the ‘Arabs (al-Afghānī 2002d: 175). In this respect, it is very interesting to point out that he insists that the Afghans and Persians are the same nation in origin (*aṣl Ḥānī*) and that the Afghan language derives from the old Persian language (*ma’khūd min lisān Zendōst*) (al-Afghānī 2002d: 114). For him, there are no peculiar distinctions between Afghan and Persia from national or linguistic viewpoints.

Sadıq, who is a great law scholar of Bayt Allāh. These people, who are Muslim, obey Imām Ja'far, (and) are distinguished by their enthusiastic love for Imām ‘Ali and respect for his family” (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 152). However, according to him, this does not necessitate banishing them from Islam (category), and making a big deal of these trivial differences. Likewise, the Sunnīs should not make these differences determining factors in disparity, struggle, and murder. These things are derived from the ignorance of the Umma, and the stupidity of greedy rulers hoping to expand their own land (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 152). In reality, however, he points out that Sunnī rulers exaggerated Shī‘a-ness to horrify and mislead the people with novel fantasies; they tried to convert the Shī‘īs into Sunnīs, prompting disparity, mobilizing armies, and killing them one by one, even though they all followed the Qur‘ān and the guidance of Muḥammad (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 152). Thus, al-Afghānī criticized the unreasonable Sunnī attitude toward the Shi‘a. On the other hand, he also denounced the Shī‘īs for their own attitude. For example, he mentions that “as to the problem of respect for Imām ‘Ali, hoping for his advent...we see remnants of this pride and adherence to this problem nowadays, and this does nothing other than bring damage and disunity to Islamic solidarity. Abū Bakr and ‘Ali would not have approved of such a struggle and such disparity under their own names” (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 152–53). This does not mean that al-Afghānī aimed to abolish the two religious schools of thought, but he insisted on the necessity of recalling the principle of Islam as Abū Bakr and ‘Alī had proposed: Islam is one. Indeed, he had many disciples and companions, Sunnī or Shī‘ī alike. He warned both schools not to adopt extreme, opposing positions.

At this point, it is very interesting to consider al-Afghānī’s remark that the German people saw religious differences in Christianity, just as Persians and Afghans saw differences in Islamic religious schools of thought. These frivolous differences influenced Germany’s political unity, weakness emerged within the German community, and the neighboring enemy flooded into it. When they had reflected on their condition, taken hold of their essential roots (uşūl al-jawhariya), taken account of the public interest (maslaha), and achieved the integration of their nation, Allāh would give them the power and strength to become the master of Europe and the political balance would tilt for them (‘Imāra 1968: 318–19). Thus, he compared differences between religious schools of
thought in Christianity and Islam.

It is known that there has been confrontation and somewhat nervous relations between Sunnīs and Shīʿīs in Islamic history. The differences between these religious schools derive from their respective viewpoints toward the early Islamic period, and in their ways of thinking about jurisprudent and theological affairs. In this respect, it is interesting to note that al-Afghānī even says that as to veneration (tafdīl), if it had occurred some centuries later, it would have revealed skepticism to say; that the feeblest among the orthodox caliphs was ʿUmar, hence he carried the caliphate before them. Had ʿAlī b. Abī ʿṬālib succeeded to the caliphate after the prophet Muḥammad, Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, and ʿUthmān would have died without being able to make contributions to Islam (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 153). From this statement, we can understand that his principal purpose was to reinterpret early Islamic history and re-construct a historical consensus between the Sunnīs and the Shīʿīs (Enayat 1982: 185).

In this respect, it should be pointed out that he stressed the fact that there had been a historical co-existence among several religions and religious schools of thought in the Islamic world; nonetheless, he showed that Islam is the teaching of Allāh which recommends humans to co-exist and co-habit each other. Indeed, al-Makhzūmī points out in his retrospect book about al-Afghānī (Khāṭirāt al-Afghānī: Ārāʾ wa Afkār) that al-Afghānī during his late stay in Istanbul, preached to the people around him—including Judaists and Christians—that the principle (mabdaʿ) and the purpose (ghāya) of the three religions (i.e., Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) is the same: creating oneness (tawḥīd) and human happiness in this

---

18 At the same time, there is no evidence more clear in proving his independence from solid religious sectionalism than his testimony. When al-Afghānī was asked about his own belief (ʿaqīda) by some Sunnī ʿulamāʾ in Turkey, he replied “I am a Muslim.” When they asked him about his religious sect (madhhab), he answered “I do not know of any madhhab leaders who are greater than me.” When the question was repeated, he said, “My madhhab corresponds to them in part, but is mostly different” (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 112–13; al-Murʿashlī 1983: 39). ʿAbduh and al-Makhzūmī, and other later researchers, rank him as a “complete Muslim” or a pure monotheist (Hanīfī) (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 73; ʿAbduh 1972: 27; Rīḍā 1931: 41; ʿImāra 1984: 61, 1997: 53; Yūsuf 1999: 57–62; Hānafī 1998: 31) and as a man belonging to the Ashʿarī or Mātrakī schools of theology (kalām), not to any schools in ʿaqīda, to the four law schools in ʿibāda, or to any of the schools in muʿāmalāt to which each land ruler belonged (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 73; ʿAbduh 1972: 27; Rīḍā 1931: 47; ʿImāra 1984: 68; Hānafī 1998: 31).
world (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 313–18). It is very interesting to observe that when told by a Judaist that the principle of Christianity is the trinity and not *tawḥīd*, al-Afghānī replied that the principle of Christianity is not contradictory to that of the Judaism *Ṭūrā*, because when it can be seen to contradict by its external appearances, he says, it must be re-interpreted (*taʾwil*) in an inner sense (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 220). When explaining this, he assumed a *taṣawwuf* point of view and said “ahl al-Kitāb is ahl al-taṣawwuf” (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 219). For al-Afghānī, solidarity beyond Islam is not regarded as being contradictory to Islamic principles. Rather, it was the very essence of the teaching of the Qurʿān.

In this sense, al-Afghānī had already transcended the narrow Sunni-Shīʿi dichotomy, even in the 19th century Islamic world; even more, he transcended the persistently rigid Islam/non-Islam dichotomy that persisted in depending on Islamic principles.\(^{19}\)

**IV. Rashid Riḍā: Pragmatic Approach for Intra-Madhāhib Cooperation**

The Syrian disciple of ‘Abduh, Rashīd Riḍā advocated the solidarity(*tawḥīq*) between the Sunnī and the Shiʿīte. The schools of

\(^{19}\) There is some insistence, therefore, that the term “pan-Islamism” is not suitable for designating the whole of his project. For example, Kurita points out that in the preface of the journal ‘*UW*’, he says that the purpose of the journal is to benefit Orientals in general and Muslims in particular (al-Afghānī 2002a: 102). Actually, the journal contained articles that treat not only political events in the Middle East and sub-Indian continent, but also the relationship between China and France and the struggle for independence in Ireland. Thus, the call for solidarity, as advocated by al-Afghānī, was designed not only for Muslims but also for all Orientals and exploited people around the world. In this sense, Kurita concludes that the term “pan-Islamism” is not preferred to understanding al-Afghānī’s thought more comprehensively (Kurita 2000: 5–6).

There is another reason to reconsider the suitability of the focus. In the periodical ‘*UW*’, he treats Islam as a civilization (Hourani 1962: 115), hence his understanding of the connection between Islamic civilization and others is flexible. Through this attitude, it is clear to see that he stresses that the Islamic civilization is the legitimate heir of the ancient Greek and Persian civilizations. For instance, he says that Muslims have imported the medical science of Hippocrates and Galenus, the geometry of Euclid, the astronomy of Ptolemy, and the philosophy of Socrates and Aristotle; he exaggerates when he says that Muslims succeeded in those studies and thus created an important heritage (al-Afghānī 2002a: 115). Also, he points out that the men who mastered rational studies like theosophy (*Ḥikma*), medicine (*Ṭibb*), geography (*Ḥawā*), and engineering (*Handasa*)—such as Ibn Sinā, al-Fārābī, al-Rāzī, Ibn Bājja, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn al-Ṭufayl—brought the golden age to Islamic civilization (al-Afghānī 2002a: 157). As seen above, then, his term “Islam” includes the intellectual heritage of old civilizations, like those of Greece and Persia.
thought which Riḍā advocated recognition and rapprochement with the Sunni contained 12 Imam Shi’ite in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Hind, Jawa and Zaydi in Yemen. His project was continuation of the Pan-Islamic project started by al-Afghānī (al-Shawābika 1989: 48).

It is said that he had two basic strategy for the project; 1) to cooperate the issues over which both schools can make solidarity, to be tolerate to situation in which each individuals show their differences, and to demand all people of religious schools of thought to resist novel (bid‘a) and its spreading. 2) concerned with persons who bring division and hostility to another religious schools, it is duty for ‘ulamā’ who belong to his school to oppose him (S.S. vol.2.: 208-209). And Riḍā thought that it is enough to realize the common interest (al-maṣāliḥ al-mustarika) and actual welfare (al-manāfi‘ al-‘amaliya) in political, military, and economical domain rather than to seek the perfect unity between both schools. The common actual interest between both schools would transcend the historical difference and division of religious definition, he imagined.

As a milestone for religious solidarity, he abstained from sticking to oppose bid‘a and superstition which the Shi’ite had been performed. He knew the bid‘a which the Shi’ite brought in its religious ceremony called Āshūrā. However, he made silent to it and accepted the call for the ceremony performed by the Shi’ite at Egypt in each year. He seeks to deepen knowledge for them and strengthen trust thorough real mixing (M vol.13, no.4.: 312).

At another place, he praised the Shi’ite as follows; when British governor imposed the Shi’ite for their religious special stipulations, they answered that there were not any division which lead such a typical stipulation between Shi’ite and Sunni. To the contrary, what is exist between both schools would never oppose to what is exist between those who obey the other law schools (S.S. vol.1.: 129).

Riḍā decided his place to stand, called on the Shi’ite ‘ulamā’ in Iraq and sought to strengthen the brotherhood among them, looking for the good method for rapprochement. When ‘ulamā’ in Najaf heard that the Riḍā decided to visit them, started letter exchange with him and showed
approval on his visiting, his critical role to realize the general Muslim interest and his open attitude towards their religious School, Shi’ite(al-Shawābika 1989: 50).

When he got decree which ordered the Shi’ite ‘ulamā’ to spread Shi’ism in Arab Iraqs, he accepted it as useful from religious viewpoint which is conditioned to teach religious duty and border of ḥalāl/ḥarām(M vol.13, no.4.: 312).

He had an opportunity to hold the Islamic Conference(al-Mu’tamar al-Islāmī) at Jerusalem in 1931, and he demand one of the prominent Shi’ite Mujtahid in Iraq, Shaykh Mohammed Āl Kāshef Al-Ghiṭā’ to commit the conference(S.S. vol.2.: 216-18). Ḥājj Āmin Husaynī also showed approval for his attendance to the conference(M vol.33, no. 5.: 394)\textsuperscript{20}. Thus, He realized the actual recognition and solidarity among ‘ulamā’ of religious schools of thought.

At the Islamic conference, Riddā proposed the establishment of college which produces both religious schools member. At the university, all muslims can learn Islamic studies including theology, law, languages along with modern science and technology under the guide of ‘ulamā’ of both schools, then graduate without knowing differences between both schools except difference of interpretation to the past historical experiences, and spread Islamic light thorough the world. Thus, the university aims to stabilize the base of solidarity among muslim individuals in Islamic Umma and to finish differences within the society actually(M vol.32, no.4.: 317). To underweight the teaching and guide for means to correspond individuals and societies to certain aim and road is more closer to what ‘Abduh taught than that of al-Afghānī(al-Shawābika 1989: 52)\textsuperscript{21}.

Besides the level of International conference, Riddā argues individual and concrete cases of religious antagonism between the Sunni and the

\textsuperscript{20} Kāshef al-Ghiṭā’ sent a letter to Riddā in 15 Ramaḍān 1350 which stressed the importance of solidarity among Islamic schools and governments, estimated his positive role in this point(al-Shawābika 1989: 53).

\textsuperscript{21} After his death, the committee for realization of recognition and rapprochement began to be held, at which the Sunni ‘ulamā’ of al-Azhar and the Shi’ite ‘ulamā’ can meet each other(al-Shawābika 1989: 55).
Shi’ite in al-Manār. When the struggle between the Sunni and the Shi’ite in Jawa, leaders of the both schools demand Riḍā to put forward the judgment towards the struggle. He wrote an article which rebuked the leaders of both schools and ordered to stop the struggle immediately. The article continues to present an idea to consist common committee to control the problems which lied between the Sunni and the Shi’ite and bring peace by both schools members who are equal to attend the committee, then, spread decisions at the committee towards all muslims thorough preaching in Mosque or printing media including newspapers and magazines(M vol.33, no.1.: 66-78, 617-19).

His reply on religious issues was not limited to the case of Southeast Asia. There are some cases of South Asia in al-Manār. For example, when he travelled in India, he preached in front of both religious schools members. He call for recognition of both schools, forgetfulness of things which remember differences, conformity to economical interest, establishment of common schools, resistance against risks suffering both schools inside or outside India(S.S. vol.2.: 110).

He understood that most of the Shi’ite was opposed to the Sunni and their ‘ulamā’. He brings into light novels and superstitions in religious creeds and deeds which the Shi’ite had embraced and performed. Riḍā added his refutable comments on those superstitious novels and criticism including what the Shi’ite said as “call for worship of idols by Quraysh family”, which Riḍā counted as disrespect towards the Prophet company(Ṣahāba) (S.S. vol.2.: 29, 253).

In spite of those matters which the Shi’ite sticks to, he sought

---

22 Along with this line to preach his idea on religious school issues with modern printing media, it should be attended that Riḍā helped to launch the Shi’ite Persian newspaper “Teaching(Tarbiyat)” in his house and his viewpoint was widespread among another Islamic reformists who read and write Persian. He specified the role of the newspaper as a tool for rapprochement of elements of Islamic Umma. The newspapers were edited towards increase of actual benefit transcendence over the political and historical differences, whistle a warning to political leader of Persia and Ottoman Turks to discard the various difference between both countries, to deal with foreign crises over them correspondently(S.S. vol.1.: 16).

23 A Syrian Shaykh Muḥsin Amin ʿĀmiri wrote the book titled “Fort of Refutation against what al-Manār editor mentioned to Shi’ism. Then Sunni ʿulamā’ in Iraq Maḥmūd Suqūrī Ārūsī wrote the book titled “Refutation against the Fort” and criticized the viewpoints of ʿĀmiri towards Riḍā.
methods to make bridge and consist cooperative relationship with them. Then he define what the recognition and rapprochement mean as follows; making the principle of the Sunni adjusted to the principle of the Shi’ite, correspondent to what the Shi’ite principles or both schools principles make coincide(S.S. vol.2.: 5, 157)\(^ {24}\).

On the other hand, it should be noted that there are many religious schools which Riḍā regarded as out of Islam. Among them, he especially took two sects and made comments; the Bābī and the Qādiyyānī. The reason why he took was wide of spread of both side and his recognition of relationship with the emergence of the sects and the benefit of colonial state(al-Shawābika 1989: 56).

He thought the Bābī as one of the latest sects of the Bāṭīnī. its followers worshiped Bahā’, they called their leader Abbās Effendi as iaqab “‘Abd al-Bahā’”, venerate his revelation. They borrowed various principles from other religions, had special religious law, two noble books “al-Kitāb al-Aqdas”, “al-Bayān”. Riḍā also believed that the principle of the Bābī is far from Islam than that of Judaism, because Judaism puts Tawḥīd on its bases on the other hand, the Bābī puts materialistic worship of idols on its bases(M 3, vol. 23.: 548). He acknowledged that the preaching of the Bābī (and Bahā’i) embraced the denial of division which was brought by religious, racial, national fanaticism, the open attitude towards other religions, schools of thought and the teaching with which all humankind would satisfied(T.U. vol.1.: 931).

After the revolution lead by the Young Turks, the Bahā’i recover its influence, and starts rigorous activity in Egypt too(M vol.13, no.10: 789). “The Explanation of Egypt(al-Bayān al-Miṣrī)” was the newspapers which carried articles about the Bahā’i and its leader Abbās Effendi. Riḍā also mentioned about the newspaper(M.vol.17 no.3.: 178) and quoted

\(^ {24}\) At another article in al-Manār, he showed his wonder why the struggle between the Sunni and the Shi’ite in Bukharā has happened? The struggle would not make any sense and profit for both schools. It is Russia which hope mutual collapse. … Why the Zaydi and the Shāfi’i kill each other? It leads each ruin” (M. vol.13 no.7.: 541). He thought that the narrow religious struggles and oppositions lead the foreign powers to fish in troubled waters and carry their imperial and colonial subdue in Islamic world. That’s why he advocated the solidarity among Islamic religious schools of thought.
article of Arabic newspaper “the Helped(al-Mu’ayyad)” which made comment on Abbās in al-Manār(M.vol.17 no.3.: 178). he even reported that a student of al-Azhar published a book, which insisted that the teaching of the Bahā’ī was “beautiful parl(durar al-bahiya)” and showed his tafsīr of Qur’ān along with the Bahā’ī preaching(T.U. vol.1.: 937).

The fact that they were assigned to some British government post let him to think that they served for British colonial rule and her interest. He reminded two Bahā’ī; Ḥusayn Ruḥī Effendi Bahā’ī and Aḥmad Effendi Ṣaḥwat. The former was assigned to Amin of Ḥijāz and the latter was to the reformatory program of law in Palestine by British government(M.vol.27 no.5.: 399).

Another case which Riḍā took and made comments on, is the Qādiyānī. The Qādiyānī has its nisba to Ghulām Aḥmad Qādiyānī. That the revelation was descended to Qādiyānī and he was regarded as Christ so that the prophethood and revelation were not closed is the core of its teaching(M.vol.23 no.10.: 799). Riḍā bring into light general circumstances of the emergence of this sect, pointed that Britain helped its emergence and development, and that the sect divided the muslim solidarity, praised British men and served for British colonial rule(M.vol.24 no.5.: 580, M.vol.31 no.7.: 560).

Riḍā thought that the Qādiyānī tried to call Indian muslim to abandon the duty of Jihād, to yield to sovereignty of British rule and power and to discard all kind of weapon for resistance(M.vol.5: 790). He quoted the voice of Aḥmad about British rule from the book called “The Locus of Aḥmad”. He--Aḥmad—insisted that the God would not prefer infidels who commit evil toward people who treat them kindly, and that it was the biggest sin to perform Jihād against British government which treats Indian Muslim well(M.vol.31 no.7.: 560). During his stay in India, some follower of Ghulām Aḥmad visited him and requested him to call on Qādiyān. However, he abandoned the visit with fear of his visiting being used for spread of their preaching(M.vol.23 no.1.: 35).

Along with the solidarity of the Sunni and the Shi’ite, he also advocated the solidarity of law schools(tawḥīd al-madhāhib al-fiṣḥīya). According to Riḍā, differences between schools of thought mean
differences between each individual for understanding and ability, and also mean freedom of thought. It is the very thing which Islam respects and approves (W.I.: 137). The emergence of jurisprudences is based on fact of freedom of ijtihād in general on Islamic law (W.I.: 137). Ijtihād depends on surrounding circumstance and accept positive or negative influences through it. When this aspect is disregarded, movement of society turns to stiffening, movement of ijtihād is halted, changing into individual attempt which sees only partial and secondary matters (M.vol.13 no.9: 672; vol.25 no.8: 626-27, W.I.: vii).

Thus, the intellectual effort turns to be restricted to refer to what the preceding generations wrote, backing to the teaching and only making comment or explanation. ‘Ulamā’ turn around the preceding schools of thought, respect what they preach, disregarding other studies. At last, they think much of views of preceding jurisprudences than original Islamic texts as Qurʾān and Ḥadīth (W.I.: 99).

According to him, it is not better to think that Islam performed by preceding generation of these schools was correct than to think that the correctness of their Islam precedes their establish of law schools. They themselves exaggerated that their ijtihād was so specific, individual that it is not necessary to persons who can understand fundamental basis of Shariʿa and embrace creative ability. The conditions they performed their individual ijtihād were limited to what is not contradict with Qurʾānic verses, Prophet Sunna, and Companion’s Ijmāʿ (M.vol.25 no.8: 626-27; W.I.: 88-90).

According to his understanding, reason of the division of Islamic law schools should be ascribed not only to religious intellectuals but also political rulers. He insists that some rulers have used the differences between schools of thought and hidden their political differences or individual interests. Every states have its own schools of thought and propagate the value to obey. Ottoman Turk is Sunni, Yemen is Zaydi, Oman is Ibadi, and Iran is Shiʿite. People who obey to schools which their state does not adopt as official has been regarded as treason to the state. In fact, Islamic states have witnessed so many struggles derived from the problem of schools. He admitted that the Zaydi has been prohibited to attend the pray on Friday in Sultanate state (M.vol.13 no.9: 679).
Riḍā proposed that each state adopting its own schools of thought should protect intellectual and jurisprudential treasure of other schools of thought, which would bring solutions for problems the state has suffered (M.vol.16: 4, 271). He reports struggles between Shi’ite Persia and Sunni Ottoman, dispute between Zaydi Yemen and Salafi Sa‘udi25.

Riḍā advocated the necessity for generalization of religious teaching, awakening each individual to his/her own religious affairs. Then he demand ‘ulamā’ to battle with stifling of thought and blind emulation, to proceed the road of ijtihād and push aside the notorious theme “gate was closed” (M.vol.13 no.9.: 672).

In this sense, Riḍā did not only call for open the gate of ijtihād but took a first step to construct open relationship between law schools (al-Shawābīka 1989: 65). Riḍā proposed the establishment of academic committee which represents all Islamic law schools and discusses stipulations of creed affairs, religious ceremonies and social rituals. At the same time, the committee guarantees everything with which ‘ulamā’ of each law schools can correspond and aims to erase individual differences brought by individual ijtihād, to start ijtihād in general at Sharī‘a and to seek solutions for problems in Muslim life (M. vol.25 no.2: 126).

In fact, what he said about solidarity (al-tawfīq) means to acknowledge the prestige of all law schools (talfiq) and to get out from old system of law schools, making a new school. He did not think to

---

25 For instance, he proposed Muslims in general and the Shi’ite in particular not to make pilgrimage as a divine duty on account of not affirming the peace from the Hijāz kingdom and the Wahhabist. He also stated them infidel if not changing their attitude towards other Muslims (S.S vol.2.: 5). Riḍā sought a way to recognition between both Iran as Shi’ite state and Sa‘udi kingdom as Salafi state. He require the Sa‘udi kingdom family to decrease their insult toward Iran and their disturbance towards Shi’ite people in making pilgrimage to Makka, to forgive certain part of their activities unless breaking peace and sacred law. He continued to insist that making alliance with Iran is correspond with Sa‘udi national interest and that when the exchange of recognition between both countries is accomplished, it would be the complete circle which links chain of Pan-Islam (M. vol.31 no.2.: 142-44). In this context, it deserves to note that Riḍā approve Shā Mozaffar al-Din for his intelligence on “constitution (dustūr)” and for opening the national parliament, adjusting the parliamentary system in Iran from 1905. He even exaggerated that the government of Iran is the most attractive in Islamic government (S.S. vol.2. 16).
realize total accordance between all law schools (M. vol. 28 no. 6: 432). To gather under common affairs among all law schools, to open the gate of various schools. It did not mean to necessitate only one school (al-Shawābika 1989: 66). 

V. Al-Kawākibī in the Makka Congress: Towards an Arab Caliphate

At last it will examine another prominent Islamic reformist ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibī and his books, “Umm al-Qurā”. First of all, as to its form, this is a book of the minutes of a hypothetical conference consisting of twelve sessions which was supposed to be held in Makka during two weeks of November 1899 which heralded the season of Islamic pilgrimage. Actually, this conference was held in his imagination. However, his idea that Islamic intellectuals around the world should gather at a place to discuss the current reality of the Islamic world is so original and its content is so stimulating that the prominent Orientalist at that time, Margoliouth mistakenly judged the conference to have actually been held in Makka (Kramer 1986: 34). Plenty of Islamic intellectuals participated in this imaginary conference. The writer of the minutes was Sayyid— al-Kawākibī—who was elected to the register. He called himself by his penname “Furāṭī”, for he was borne in Aleppo, an old city in northern Syria. Table 1 shows the whole list of participants at the conference.

26 Actually, Riḍā showed possibility to open the law schools one by one or to gather the followers of law schools. Actually, with his influence and plea from Iraqi Sulaymani and Yemeni people, Ottoman Sultan Abdūlhamid II put forward the Sultaniya decree which forgives to obey law schools except Hanafi school (T.U. vol.1: 617; M. vol.16, no.4: 264-67). And he also comments on what the jurisprudences should do for legislation. See (M. vol.26 no.6: 453, W.1: 118).

In this context it is interesting to see that a Turkish Ḥanafi ‘ulamā’ accused Riḍā as if he attacks Islam and destructs Islamic law schools, called him “non-schools of thought (al-lāmadhhabiya)” or “non-religion (al-lādiniya)” (Bayram 1977: 107). He responded the rebuke as follows; he would not aim to abolish the old law schools or launch his new school. He identified himself as Shāfī’ī in Islamic law school at the same time he also acknowledge to belong to Salafi muslim. He did not obey specific ‘ālim or stick to special mujtahid in jurisprudent problems (M. vol.25 no.8: 629).

Shaykh Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Marāghi left his biography on Riḍā. He stressed in it that Riḍā was a man of Salafi Sunni, disgust taqlid and call for ijtiḥād as duty to people like him or who has ability to perform (M. vol.35 no.3: 188). At the same time, Marāghi points out that Riḍā has new principles towards Islam on the one hand, which is better to be attributed to himself, his principles were accord with the basis of ‘ulamā’ of ancestors (salaf).
Table 1: The participants in the imaginary conference in Makka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pen Name</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Euphrates sayyid (Al-Sayyid al-Furāṭī)</td>
<td>Aleppo (Halab)</td>
<td>Aleppo (Halab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Syrian notable (Al-Fādil al-Shāmī)</td>
<td>Damascus (Dimashq)</td>
<td>Syria (al-Sham)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jerusalemite eloquent (Al-Baligh al-Qudsī)</td>
<td>Jerusalem (Al-Quds)</td>
<td>Palestine (Filastin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alexandrian person of character (Al-Kāmil al-Iskandari)</td>
<td>Alexandria (Al-Iskandariya)</td>
<td>Egypt (Miṣr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Egyptian great scholar (Al-Allāma al-Miṣrī)</td>
<td>Cairo (Al-Qahira)</td>
<td>Egypt (Miṣr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Yemeni scholar of Hadith (Al-Muḥaddith al-Yamanī)</td>
<td>Sanaa (San‘ā’)</td>
<td>Yemen (Al-Yaman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Basri reciter (Al-Hāfiz al-Baṣrī)</td>
<td>Basra (al-Basra)</td>
<td>Iraq (al-‘Irāq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Najdi scholar (Al-‘Alim al-Najdī)</td>
<td>Hail (Hā‘il)</td>
<td>Najd (Najd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Meccan professor (Al-Uṣūdī al-Makki)</td>
<td>Mecca (Makka)</td>
<td>Mecca (Makka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tunisian Doctor (Al-Ḥakīm al-Tūnī)</td>
<td>Tunis (Ṭūnīs)</td>
<td>Tunis (Ṭūnīs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fezian guider (Al-Murshid al-Fāṣī)</td>
<td>Fez (Fāṣ)</td>
<td>Marrakech (Marākiṣ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The British optimist (Al-Sa‘īd al-Inkīlīzī)</td>
<td>Liverpool (al-Lifārbūl)</td>
<td>England (Injilturā)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Greek guardian (Al-Mawlamā al-Rūmī)</td>
<td>Constantinople (Al-Qustantīniya)</td>
<td>Turkey (Turkiya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kurdish mathematician (Al-Riyādī al-Kurdi)</td>
<td>Kurdistan (Kūrdistān)</td>
<td>Kurdistan (Kūrdistān)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tabrizi jurist (Al-Mujṭahid al-Ṭabarzī)</td>
<td>Tabriz (Ṭabarz)</td>
<td>Persia (Fās)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tatari wise man (Al-‘Ārif al-Tāṭārī)</td>
<td>Bohgja Sarai (Bughja Saray)</td>
<td>North Tatarstan (Bilād al-Tāṭār al-Shamāliyya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kazak preacher (Al-Khaṭīb al-Qazānī)</td>
<td>Kazan (Qāzān)</td>
<td>Kazakhstan (Kaʿızākstān)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Turkish inspector (Al-Muḍaqqiq al-Ṭurkī)</td>
<td>Kashgar (Kashghar)</td>
<td>Central Asia (Al-Mawtīn al-Aṣlī li-l-Ṭurāk bi-Wasat Ṭāsiyyā)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Afghan jurist) Al-Faqīḥ al-Afghānī</td>
<td>Kabul (Kābūl)</td>
<td>Afghanistan (Afghanistān)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Indian possessor (Al-Ṣāḥīb al-Hindī)</td>
<td>Delhi (Dihlī)</td>
<td>India (Al-Hind)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sindi elder (Al-Shaykh al-Sindī)</td>
<td>Calcutta (Kalkattā)</td>
<td>India (Al-Hind)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chinese guider (Al-Imām al-Ṣinī)</td>
<td>Beijing (Bikīn)</td>
<td>China (Al-Ṣin)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Al-Kawākibi’s argument is typical in that he perceives the reason for the decline of the Umma to be not only due to the superstitious deeds of the Muslims but also to the role of the Ottoman Turks. According to al-Kawākibi, the Ottomans did not at first want their subjects to be Turkized or Arabized but later they showed an affirmative attitude towards being Franchised or Germanized. Their opinion should be understood from their deep disgust for the Arabs, and the Ottoman Turks deserve to be criticized severely for their blind imitation of western countries. Then al-Kawākibi lists the Turkish terms by which they insult the Arabs and expresses his rebuke to them and mentions that the Turks have not contributed much to Islam except for building a few mosques (‘Imāra 1975: 324-25).

Being disillusioned with the Ottoman government which was unable to resist western imperialism and colonialism, al-Kawākibi seeks a new political leadership that will lead the Islamic world as a whole, replacing with Ottoman Turks. He thought the new leader should be chosen from amongst the Arabs. He stresses that the Arabs are qualified to lead the revival of the Islamic Umma for two reasons; firstly, the Arab peninsula is the center of the world and the birthplace of Islam, contains the Bayt Allāh and Prophet’s mosque, is the most protected from ethnical, religious and sectarian mixture, and the most remote place for Muslims to live to avoid foreign influence. Secondly, the Arabs living in the Arab peninsula have established the noble foundations of the Islamic community and they follow religious ethics and the law, are the most pious for religious solidarity, and the most ardent in preserving and promoting their own religious customs.

According to al-Kawākibi, they the Arabs are the holders of civilization, the most able to endure any difficulties and persevere in achieving their goals, heeding their freedom and independence, hating oppression, and preserving their own nationality and customs. They are

---

27 On the other hand, al-Kawākibi lists the following dynasties that have Arabized their subjects: Umayya, Abbas, Muwahhid, Buwayh, Seljuk, Ayyub, Ghol, Cherkes Amirs and Muhhamad ‘Ali dynasty(‘Imāra 1975: 324). They became Arabs ethically, equipped with Arabic virtues. By the way, this theme “to Arabize” was a reaction to Western colonial rule at that time, adopting the motto that the ruled should become one with the rulers in their languages, ethnicity and race. Thus, he rebukes the Turks for not making their subjects Turkized, as well as not Arabizing themselves(‘Imāra 1975: 324).
associated with many nations but not mixed with them in lineage and customs (‘Imāra 1975: 356-57). He specifies that from the standpoint of geography, ethnicity, and nationalism, the most suitable nation for the Islamic revival of the Umma is the Arabs.²⁸

In short, whether they are Muslims or not, the Arabs share a common language and way of thinking and it is they that have embodied the qualities which modern western civilization has praised—the principles of equal rights, democracy, shared wealth, security of life, conforming to international pacts and so on. He stresses that the ideal of the Arabs coincides with that of modern West and is embodied in their sacred book, al-Qur’ān(Rahme 1999: 174).²⁹

²⁸ Strictly speaking, al-Kawākibī lists up 25 items which assure the qualifications of the Arabs to lead the Islamic revival. 1). The Arab peninsula is the source of the light of Islam, 2). It contains the Ka’ba, 3). It contains the Prophet’s mosque, 4). It is an ideal political and religious center located between the far east of Asia and far west of Africa, 5). It is an area which is free from the intermixture of races, religions, religious schools, 6). It is an area remote from foreigner influence, 7). It is a free area and the most respected place, 8). The Arabs in the peninsula are capable of being the advocates of pan-Islamism (al-jāmi’a al-islāmiya) for it is the the birthplace of Islam. 9). They hold a tendency towards religion, 10). They are the most accustomed to religious principles among Muslims, 11). It is most ardent to preserve religion among the Muslims, 12). Their religion has been pure monotheism (hanif salafi), 13). They hold the strongest ‘aṣabiya and pride of all Muslims, 14). Their ruler is Muslim 15). Their Umma is the oldest, 16). They are the most efficient of Muslims 17). They are the most preserving of their racial identity and the customs of the Muslims, 18). They are the most interested in the freedom and independence of the Islamic Umma, 19). Among the Arabs in general, their language is the most graceful of the languages spoken by Muslims, 20). The Arabic language is universal in that more than 300 billion Muslims speak it, 21). The Arabic language is the specific language of more than 100 billion Muslims and non-Muslims, 22). It is the oldest Umma complying to the principle of equal rights, 23). It is the Umma most deep-rooted in democracy (shūrā), 24). It is the most right-guided Ummas in the principle of shared property (al-ma’isha al-istihlākiya), 25). It is the most concerned Ummas with regard to making contracts(‘Imāra 1975: 356-57).

²⁹ By the way, some have commented that al-Kawākibī regards socialism as having borrowed the motto of ‘an equal standard of living for all, as ownership of the land or immovable property has always been regulated in Islam(Atiyeh 1988: 49-50). In fact, he articulates that socialism is contained in Christian and Islamic principles. However, according to him, socialism under Christianity has not realized its full potential, while socialism was fully realized during the classical Islamic era. The right-guided caliphatres succeeded in establishing a just government which considered themselves to be on the same social level as the poorest of their subjects, which prompted something which is understood in a socialistic society as brotherhood and solidarity among the Muslims. In addition, Islam imposed a law (qānūn) whose principle is based on property being the result of labor (qayyima al-a’māl) and great wealth could not be gathered except by robbery and plunder. Then he stresses that land, immovable property, and machines used in giant industries are the common property of the people of the Umma and that the profits and benefits should be distributed among the society justly within the stipulations of the law which the government emulates in order to share even the most trivial things fairly among them, with reference to socialist
VI. Al-Kawākibī’s Prospect for Inter-Madhāhib Rapprochement

As confirmed at the beginning of this chapter, there is no doubt that this imaginary conference is held with the aim of realizing pan-Islamic solidarity. He proposed to invoke the unity of the Umma using the symbol of a caliphate. However, when aiming at Islamic inner solidarity, he considered that religious sectionalism would be a tough roadblock. The Islamic world in the latter half of the 19th century kept experiencing religious struggles and disputes related to the Sunni/Shi’ite religious split (Kosugi 2006: 215).

According to al-Kawākibī, the differences among the leaders, if they are utilized for the good are in fact a blessing (raḥīma). On the other hand, if they result in religious disparity between Salafs in the Arab peninsula and Egyptian, Maghribi, Syrian and Turkish Muslims or among Iraqis or Persians in ‘Ajam and the notables of the Shi’ites in India, or among Zanzibarians and Ibādians, these differences will be a reason for antipathy (niqma). Then he points out that “In spite of this big disparity, all of them believe that they themselves are the people of the Sunna and Jamā‘a and think that everyone except for themselves is contaminated with heresies. He reminds reasonable people that this disparity and disunity come from antipathy and from not seeking to utilize the differences for good (‘Imāra 1975: 313-14)”, and then he rebukes the latter’s narrow, fanatical sectionalism which exaggerates the very issue of disparity.

Al-Kawākibī was born at Aleppo in northern Syria and belongs to the Sunni madhhab. It would be an acute and urgent issue for arguing the solidarity of the Islamic world and its internationalism to confirm his views on other Islamic schools of thought.

First of all, by listing up the groups he mentions in the congress societies in the West (‘Imāra 1975: 171).

30 In his article “Pan-Islamism (al-Jāmi‘a al-Islāmiya)” contributed to the political magazine “al-muqattam”, he criticizes Muslims who believe that the misfortunes the Islamic world is experiencing as a whole today will never stop without the extinction of all the Christians and it is this attitude that presents the West with a pretext to intervene and for the Cristians to call on European nations for help (Atiyeh 1988: 51). He rebukes the Muslim’s fanatical attitude towards the Christians which has led to Western imperialistic interference in the affairs of the entire Islamic world.
under the name of “branches (fīraq) , schools (madhāhib), associations (jam’īyāt), parties (aḥzāb)”, we can create Table 2 below.

Table 2: Schools of thought, Associations, Parties with which the congress deals Source: (‘Imāra 1975: 409-10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunnī Schools</th>
<th>Shi‘a schools</th>
<th>Theology, Law schools</th>
<th>Tariqa</th>
<th>Other Islamic schools</th>
<th>Christian schools</th>
<th>Other schools</th>
<th>The West schools/parties/secret sosieties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahl al-Suwna</td>
<td>Al-Shī‘a</td>
<td>Al-Mu‘tazila</td>
<td>Al-Qādirīya</td>
<td>Al-Kha wärīj (al-Ḥākimīya)</td>
<td>Al-Burūtī stāntiya</td>
<td>Al-Ṣā‘iba</td>
<td>Hīzb al-‘Ummāl al-Imjilīzī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahl al-Hadith</td>
<td>Al-Imāmīya</td>
<td>Al-Asḥā‘irā</td>
<td>Al-Sanūsīya</td>
<td>Al-Ibādīya</td>
<td>Juzwīya</td>
<td>Al-Fīthāg hūrāsiyā</td>
<td>Al-Ṭābī‘iyīn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Zaydīya</td>
<td>Al-Māt uridiyya</td>
<td>Al-Naqshbandiyya</td>
<td>Al-Has hwiyya</td>
<td>Al-Kāthul ikiyya</td>
<td>Al-Hashsh hāshiyyīn</td>
<td>Al-Dahrīyīn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Ja‘fariyya</td>
<td>Al-Hanafīyya</td>
<td>Al-Rifā‘iyya</td>
<td>Al-Jah miyya</td>
<td>Al-Mawārīn (al-Jamā‘iyya / al-Shuyū‘iyya)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Ismā‘iliyya (Al-Bā‘ṭiniyya)</td>
<td>Al-Māli kiyya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Al-Jabraiyya</td>
<td>Al-Arthūdhaksiyya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Süsiyālist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Qarāmiyya</td>
<td>Al-Shāfī‘iyya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Al-Qadariyya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Al-Nihlist (al-‘adamiyyūn / al-fawḍawiyūn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Durūz</td>
<td>Al-Hanābīla</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>al-mushabbīha</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Al-Fībyānīyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Rāﬁda</td>
<td>Al-Wahhābiyya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Al-Fīnūnīyā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the table 2, he gives an overview of various groups in his discussion. Concerning pan-Islamism, it is necessary to focus on his perception of the Shi‘īts, because it is the largest group among Islamic schools of thought after the Sunnis.

Al-Kawākibī selects the mujtahid of Ja‘far school from Tabrız to attend the congress as a representative of the Shi‘īte schools of thought. The mujtahid mourns the reality of the Islamic world at that time in which there were so many disparities in religious thought and he calls for the overcoming of blind imitation of the authorities which leads to the
disunity through the application of the spirit of ijtihād. According to the mujtahid, Islam as religion commands Muslims not to obey their leaders (Imāms) but to submit to Allāh as the Lawgiver on every issue and as for issues which need innovative interpretation of law, he commands them to perform ijtihād for themselves, even if the ijtihād of others is superior to there own (‘Imāra 1975: 315).

The most interesting point is his description of the Wahhābīs and Zaydis in Yemen area. He demonstrates both schools of thought through their speeches at the congress; the Turks are concerned about the Salafi movement, which includes Wahhābism in Hijāz and Zaidism in Yemen. According to their insistence, both conflict with the schools of the Sunna, the latter being Shi’ite and the former denouncing as bid‘a things which the Ottomans would call Sunna. However, al-Kawākibi stresses that this insistence does not have any intellectual grounds for Zaidism is closest in relationship to the tenets of the Sunna or the Mu‘tazilite among Shi‘ite schools and Wahhābism is a kind of Salafi movement in origin and merely imitates the vigorous attitude of early Islam. Most Yemenis are in conflict with the Salaf in applying the principle of ijtihād which Imām Zayn al-Ābidīn performed, or the principle of istinbāṭ which Imām Ibn Ḥambal executed (‘Imāra 1975: 296).

What makes al-Kawākibi’s argument original is his perception of combining Zaydism with the Shi‘ite school, clarifying Wahhābism as one of the Salafi movements and unifying both schools within the same area—the Arab peninsula. This confirms that he regards the Shi‘ites as closer to the Sunna than we imagined possible at that time and views them along with Wahhābis as Salafi. It also confirms that he defines the border between Sunni and Shi‘ite schools very flexibly31.

His flexibility on the typological border between religious schools

31 In addition, his bundling the Wahhābis and the Zaydis into Salafism can be seen (‘Imāra 1975: 241, 296). Al-Kawākibi points out in (‘Imāra 1975: 241) that the Arabs living in the Arab peninsula are Salafi Muslims and most of them belong to the Hanball or Zaydi schools of thought. In addition to the Zaydi school of thought, he introduces Shi‘ite Twelver Imamism affirmatively in the book. For example, see (‘Imāra 1975: 314). He emphasizes that it imitates the school of thought of Imām Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq and he focuses on its accent on using reasoning (‘aql) when interpreting Islamic law (ijtihād). His praise for this school seems to be mainly due to this point. Indeed, he calls the ‘ulamā‘ of the school “mujtahid”.
of thought is confirmed as not only between the Sunnis and the Shi’ites but also among the different groups of Sunnis, especially in his interpretation of their law schools.

The evidence as to his flexible perception of the relationships between Islamic schools of thought derives from his reference to “talfīq” and his praise of it. According to Kosugi, talfīq is to mix the stipulations of different law schools when interpreting a law case, and talfīq in classical jurisprudence means to mix the stipulations of other schools simultaneously or at different times in same case (Kosugi 2002: 622).

For example, al-Kawākibī proposes through the remarks of the Tabrīzi mujtahid that he would propose the concept of talfīq as jurisprudents of all law schools have admitted it in principle (‘Imāra 1975: 314-15), then insists as follows; Abū Ḥanīfa and his companions were so superior that they believed themselves more superior than Abū Bakr or ‘Umar. Due to this, they are different from the latter schools in their interpretation of law using ijtihād. Jurisprudents of all law schools have permitted taking the advice of an Imām or his followers. According to al-Kawākibī, this is the very reason for talfīq. From this perspective, he expresses his doubt that the Ḥanafī law school does not permit talfīq taking as an example the remarks between Abū Ḥanīfa and Shāfī‘ī, though there is nobody to say that an Imām’s followers were superior to Shāfī‘ī, Mālik, or Ibn Abbās (‘Imāra 1975: 315).

He, being afraid that the dispute derived from differences in interpretation of the law by mujtahids from all schools of law would lead to disunity between the Mālikī, Ḥanafi, and Shāfī‘ī schools again, quotes profoundly a Qur’ānic verse “He has enjoined on you the same way of religion that He enjoined upon Noah and that which We have revealed to you and that which We enjoined upon Abraham and Moses and Jesus, saying: “Establish the Religion and do not be divided in it.” Dreadful for the unbelievers is that which you call them to. Allah chooses for Himself whom He pleases, and guides to His way only him who turns to Him in repentance” (42: 13) (‘Imāra 1975: 315), insisting on the necessity of interpreting Islam with reason and concludes “it is obvious that we need
the interpretation of Islamic law by ijtihād” (‘Imāra 1975: 316).32

Thus, al-Kawākibī urges the utilization of talfīq as permitted by many jurisprudents and the performance of ijtihād towards understanding Islam correctly. For him the disunity among Muslims and their fanatic attitude towards their religion is a treason to the absolute order of Allāh, and it was indeed the narrow fanatical religious sectionalism that he tried to overcome at that time33 and dealing with it in the international conference at Makka is the most symbolic indication of his pan-Islamism.

The intellectual catalyst coming from the West can be seen in a discussion which compares Christian Protestantism with Islam as understood by an Orientalist (mustashriq). An Orientalist who attends the conference defines the protestant believers as follows; when Protestantism appeared, it aimed to revive the original rigorous power, to proclaim any privileges not stipulated clearly in the sacred book as false, to widen the domain of the intelligence and science throughout the realm Christianity, and to resist the activities of the clergymen. They are “the People of the Gospels (al-al-tāʾifa al-injiliya)”. Then the Catholics and the Arthūdhaksi34 disappeared from the elite completely - which was welcomed among the people for their brand of Christianity and rational thought could never be combined. On the other hand, Islam was confounded by false scientists (al-mutafanninīn) who led reason in a false

32 Al-Kawākibī also highlights taqlīd as the counter-concept of ijtihād. According to him, the early Muslims performed ijtihād till the 8th or 9th century. However, from 9th century, they began to practise blind imitation (taqlīd a’mā) among others. It is the very blind imitation which he believes to be the source of intellectual stagnation and ignorance and that the re-introduction of ijtihād is necessary to overcome this bad habit. For him, Allāh originally commanded Muslims to make choices (khiyār) within permitted limits to coincide with the needs of each situation (‘Imāra 1975: 310).
33 Al-Kawākibī maintains that there are two struggles which caused disunity among the Umma in Islamic history; a political one and a religious one. The former was concerned with relationship between the caliph and kings; the latter was concerned with the relationship between Islamic schools of thought. He considers the latter in some detail and focuses on the dispute between the Hanafi school and the Shāfī‘i school in particular, and then points out that no Islamic schools of thought could remain except for the Zaydi school and Ahmād school in the Arab peninsula, the Mālik and Khazar schools in the Maghrib, and the Ja’fari school in Persia (‘Imāra 1975: 312).

Thus, the indication by Brunner that his existence was crucial to developing the idea of a Muslim congress but had no effect on the rapprochement movement within Islamic schools of thought in 20th century (Brunner 2004: 38) needs certain modifications. His subjective argument on the differences among schools of thought could be regarded as an early sign for the movement along with Muslim congress.
34 It means a sect of the Eastern Orthodox Church (al-Munjid 2001: 16).
direction and bewitched healthy thought(‘Imāra 1975: 310).

It is necessary to do as Protestantism has done in the history of Christianity by returning to its origin, referring to its sacred book directly, regaining its rigorous power, spreading intelligence and science throughout the Umma in order to rescue an Islam compounded by scientific forgeries and false beliefs\textsuperscript{35}.

Al-Kawākibi sees Christianity and Islam comparatively, even comparing Catholicism with an Islam polluted by blind imitation and corruption, and Protestantism with an Islam rigorous in returning to its sacred source and performing innovative interpretation of Islamic law. From another angle, it means that emphasizing the necessity to return to true Islam and its rational interpretation is brought about reflexively by referring to the Orientalist who reminds us about the Protestant sect of Christianity.

\textbf{VII. Conclusion}

Above chapters, this paper reveals inner Pan-Islamism which aims to transcend the political divisions and the religious struggles and the logic of modern Islamic reformers towards it. Now arranging the content, it should be focused on two points. 1) solidarity among Islamic countries under the symbol of Caliphate against political divisions--Intra-Umma Alliance, 2) recognition and correspondent between the Sunni and the Shi‘ite against religious struggle--Inter-Madhāhib Rapprochement. With this two pillars, they sought to confirm the unity of Umma.

\textsuperscript{35} For another case which explains Protestantism, see(‘Imāra 1975: 292). Al-Kawākibi stresses the characteristics of the sect in it as; 1. Attaching importance to the original sentences of the sacred book, 2. Respecting the truth which was introduced and founded on reason, 3. Criticism of the intervention of religious leaders or priests and their atonement, 4. Rejecting the religious infallibility of the pope or the sacred ranks of the priests without any conviction in the Gospels.

It is impressive that the British optimist defines Catholicism as an imitation sect (tā‘īfa taqllīdi) and Protestantism as the Gospel sect (tā‘īfa Injīlī) and reports the increase of conversion from the latter sect to Islam in the fifth conference(‘Imāra 1975: 291). At the same time, he also mentions that Muslims are guided only by the sacred book and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad and that they were never imitators of Hanafi and Shafi‘i, Hanbali and Malikī, even though they regarded them as trustworthy transmitters of the Prophetic Sunna (nāqilīn). Thus, Al-Kawākibi compares Protestantism and Islam correlativey and points the relationship between them both. In this context, he criticizes the traditional institution of Islamic law schools of thought while emphasizing the importance of the original religious texts.
On the other hand, it should be attended to their individual differences. For instance, al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh recognized the Ottoman Sultan as caliphate in “al-'Urwa al-Wuthqā”, al-Kawākibī in “Umm al-Qurā” and Riḍā in “al-Manār” aimed to substitute the Turk caliphate to the Arab caliphate. These individual differences among Islamic reformists can be seen in how to transcend the religious sectarianism. Al-Afghānī proposed the religious solidarity among three monotheisms, namely Judaism, Christianity and Islam along with the recognition among the Sunni and the Shi‘ite and ‘Abduh followed his master. On the other hand, al-Kawākibī advocated the solidarity among Islamic law schools in addition to religious recognition. Riḍā also stepped the same way.

Confirming these individual differences among them, it is possible to sketch roughly that the inter-madhāhib rapprochement proposed by the Islamic reformers consists of three layers, 1) divine revelation religions, 2) Islamic religious schools especially the Sunni and the Shi‘ite, 3) Islamic law schools like Ḥanafī, Ḥanbalī, Mālikī, Shāfi‘ī and Ja‘fari, and they tried to reconstruct relationships of each layer.
References:

<Japanese>

<Western Languages >


Saab, H. 1958. The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire. Amsterdam; s.n..

<Middle East Languages>


Mo’assase-ye Farhangi-Tarbiyat-e Tawhid.


شایخ آمل الشاوا


Enteshārāt-e Mo’assase.

