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Beyond the Sunni-Shiite Dichotomy:
Rethinking al-Afghani and His Pan-Islamism

Junichi Hirano

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Beyond the Sunni-Shiite Dichotomy:
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Junichi Hirano
Beyond the Sunni-Shi'i Dichotomy: Rethinking al-Afghānī and His Pan-Islamism*

HIRANO Junichi**

Summary
Religious sectionalism is one of the major problems in the contemporary Islamic world, and there have been various movements that have attempted to overcome it. Pan-Islamism is one of the strongest approaches among these movements and is often attributed to al-Afghānī himself.

This paper begins by dealing with al-Afghānī’s pan-Islamism and suggests that the term “pan-Islamism” was at first coined in the West, after which he adopted it for his own cause, anti-imperialism. Secondly, it reveals his religious pan-Islamism project in the context of his home background. Finally, it brings to light the fact that his pan-Islamic heritage still remains as a reapproachement movement between Islamic schools of thought in the contemporary Islamic revival we are witnessing today.

0. Introduction
I. Pan-Islamism: An Imagined Term in the West
II. Al-Afghānī’s Pan-Islamism I: Toward Constructing an Alliance among Islamic Countries
III. Al-Afghānī’s Pan-Islamism II: Toward Transcending the Sunni-Shi'i Dichotomy
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0. Introduction

Recently, as underscored by the event which occurred in the United States on Sep. 11th, 2001, the political struggle between the West and Islam has been highlighted and the dichotomy of the West vs. Islam has been exaggerated. Moreover, as represented by the situation in contemporary Iraqi since the war in 2003, the religious dispute between

* This paper includes additional correction to the presentation in International Workshop on “Islamic System, Modernity and Institutional Transformation”, G-COE Program on Sustainable Humanosphere, Kyoto University, 2008/02/02.
** Ph.D. candidate, Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University. E-mail: hirano@asafas.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Sunnīs and Shi‘īs within the Islamic world has also caused worldwide concern, and the dichotomy based on the different schools of religious thought has been focused on. It is urgently necessary to reconsider this struggle thoroughly if we are to reach mutual international understanding and establish peace in the 21st century.

To this day, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838/39–97; al-Afghānī hereafter)\(^2\) has been considered one of the greatest pioneers of Islamic revivalism; he is regarded as an important advocate of pan-Islamism. His uniqueness derives not only from the knowledge he acquired through traditional Sunnī-Shi‘ī scholarship, but also in maintaining unity and solidarity in the face of narrow religious factionalism in dealing with the common crisis facing the Islamic world. No other advocate of Islamic revivalism, standing between Sunnī-Shi‘ī, can be seen in the 19th century, and it is said that the thought of al-Afghānī is a rich and ecumenical heritage, even within the context of today’s contemporary Islamic revivalism. Although it is inconceivable that one particular individual could be responsible for all the world-wide and ongoing Islamic resurgence movements, and we do not mean to say that all these movements have been induced by him, his influence cannot be underestimated.

This paper has three purposes. First, it points out that, historically, the term “pan-Islamism” was first imagined and coined in Western countries, bearing the

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\(^2\) There is continuing controversy on his origin and therefore his name. Orientalists like Kedourie and Keddie state that his origin was Asadābād, near Hamadān in Iran (Haim 1962; Lewis 1966; Kedourie 1966; Pakdaman 1969; Keddie 1968a, 1972a). Almost all Iranian scholars agree on this point and call him “Asadābādī” (Lotf Allāh Khān 1926: 14; Taqīzāde 1956: 181; Asadābādī 1971: 85–90, 156; Asadābādī 1971; Ṭabātabā’ī 1972: v; Khorūsh 1979: 308–09; Modarres 1982: 148, 272; Zāhed 2003: 100; Kāshānī 1972; Farhādiyān 1997: 7–9; Jamʿī az Nevisandegān-e Majalle-ye Houze 1997: 274–76; Movāsseqī 2002: 17; Karamī 2004: 33; Kermānī 2006: 53). However, many scholars in the Arab world and Afghanistan maintain that he comes from As‘ūdābād, near Qunār in Afghanistan, hence they call him “Afghānī” (ʿAbdūh 1972; al-Makhzūmī 1931; Ṭabībī 1977: ii; Ṭabībī 1977: i; Ghānī 1977; Sīdīq 1977: 8; ʿAbd al-Quyūm 2000). In this paper, I will employ the Area Studies approach, which concerns the area and its historical process, and choose to call him “Afghānī,” from the viewpoint that he had already so identified himself. I will further discuss this point at a later opportunity.

As to al-Afghānī, there were plenty of studies in both the West and the Islamic world. However, studies on him in the West have been quite malicious, depending upon the historical approach taken. On the other hand, studies on him in the Islamic world have lacked historical procedure, though they take account of the preciousness of his thought. Both sides have experienced a serious lack of a concurrent grasp of historical reality and ideological thought, and neither has constructed a whole and integrated image. Moreover, there is another problem in reflecting on contemporary al-Afghānī studies. On the one hand, by proving that he disguised Sunnī-Afghan as being contrary to his Šī‘ī-Persian origin, Orientalists throw doubt on his thought and attack him, denouncing him as a religious unbeliever. On the other hand, by defying his pro-Western attitude, contemporary Arab Salafists criticize him as a person who helped create a close relationship between the Islamic world and the West. Al-Afghānī is now attacked by both the West and the East. In this paper, I will not take positions for or against al-Afghānī. I wish instead to say, objectively, that it is impossible to imagine contemporary Islamic revival movements without him, and therefore impossible to ignore his contributions and his contemporary interpretations as they are understood in the Islamic world.
negative connotation of fear of the Islamic world. Second, it brings to light the fact that al-Afghānī himself applied the same term in Arabic in a positive way, to acquire liberation and independence from the West, and that there were two aspects to his pan-Islamism, both a political and a religious one. Third, this paper confirms that the heritage of al-Afghānī’s pan-Islamic religious thought remains today within the so-called “second Islamic revival” within the Islamic world, in the latter half of the 20th century. As a typical example, I will focus on the “reapproaching movement” led by the organization called “Dār al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmiya” (“the organization for reapproaching Islamic schools of thought”) in Cairo in the 1960s.

I. Pan-Islamism: An Imagined Term in the West

It is said that the term “pan-Islamism” was coined in the 19th century in Western Europe. Originally, the term captured the Europeans’ fearful perception of the Islamic world; it had an invasive ring to it. Accordingly, the transnational vision of pan-Islamic solidarity, as a geopolitical concept, belongs to the 1880s (Özcan 1997: 45–46). The thesis of Islamic solidarity surged after the Ottoman loss of large territories in the Balkans and Eastern Anatolia in 1878, suggesting that the Ottomans could compensate for the loss of the Christian-majority areas in the Balkans by attracting Muslim-majority lands in southern Asia into its sphere of international influence. The occupation of Tunisia by France in 1881 and of Egypt by Britain in 1882 further stimulated the emotional and intellectual attitudes of educated Muslims toward the Eurocentric world order.

Indeed, there were some struggles for resistance against the West in the Islamic world. In 1882, the Egyptian general ‘Arābī encouraged his fellow countrymen to free themselves from British colonial rule, under the slogan of “Egypt for the Egyptians.” In Egypt’s neighbor, Sudan, Muḥammad Aḥmad declared himself the Mahdī and began a resistance movement against Britain in 1882, during which the British General Charles Gordon died fighting for what seems, in retrospect, a lost cause. In Iran, the Tobacco Boycott Movement of 1891 brought about the withdrawal of British economic suppression. Thus, Western countries in general—and Britain in particular—began to hold a fearful perception of the Islamic world as a whole. Hence, neither an intellectual or religious bent, nor the actual steps to exploit them, should be separated from their

3 Lockman says that “pan-Islamism” is the shadow of a widespread European anxiety about Muslim solidarity, the term (literally meaning “encompassing all Muslims,” on the model of “pan-German” or “pan-American”) that European colonial officials and experts on Islam used to denote the persistent feelings of solidarity among Muslims and across national boundaries—feelings which, they feared, might be mobilized against colonial rule. At the very zenith of European global hegemony, Europeans conjured up vague but threatening notions of secretive cabals of cruel and fanatical Muslims plotting to overthrow colonial rule everywhere across the Muslim world (Lockman 2004: 91).
proper context—which is to say, the Oriental-Occidental cultural and political conflict.

Indeed, it was during this period of rising Muslim protest against increasing threats from the West that the great powers began to worry about a pan-Islamic solidarity: European newspapers began to refer to the idea of a pan-Islamic reaction to Western expansion and discuss this issue. One of the first uses of the term “pan-Islam” can be attributed to Gabriel Charmes, a prolific French journalist, in his description of the Muslim response to the French domination of Tunisia (Landau 1990: 2). From that point forward, numerous visions of pan-Islamism cropped up all over the Muslim world, either in the form of diplomatic cooperation among independent Muslim countries like Ottoman Turkey, Persia, and Afghan, or in the sense of cultural awakening, economic development, and political solidarity.

One of the prominent German Orientalists, Carl Becker, defines “pan-Islamism” as “the realization of the Islamic concept of Islamic world integration, by uniting under the sole leader of the community (Imām)”; he maintains that the term “pan-Islamism” originated after the Berlin conference in 1884 (Becker 1924: 231–51).

Other Orientalists claim that the expression was created in the 1870s, and that it was compared to “pan-Slavism,” which was then in full bloom in Eastern Europe (Lee 1942: 281). A prominent Iranologist, Edward Browne, reports that he cannot find any words equivalent to “pan-Islamism” in the Arabic, Turkish, or Persian languages, and says that when he asked his Muslim friend about the term, he replied that “pan-Islamism” had been coined with a dark connotation by his Western colleague in Vienna (Browne 1903: 306–07). Moreover, the Orientalist David Margoliouth says that pan-Islamism was “a ghost,” according to some Arabic resources (Margoliouth 1912: 3–4, 16–17). Lee says that it was one aspect of the reaction of Muslims to the impact of the Christian West (Lee 1942: 281). As secondary material sources in Western European languages offer confusing and contradictory views, we can only surmise that the term “pan-Islamism” was produced by the West in the modern imperial era.

Judging from these Orientalists’ insistences, pan-Islamism did come about through the Muslims’ natural and traditional sense of unity, but it was only a way of thinking that was formed through their common experience, under the threat of Western imperialism and colonialism as a whole. That is to say, pan-Islamism was a shadow cast over global integration under Western imperialism, and it ultimately highlighted the negative aspects of imperialism itself (Kurita 2002: 4).

In this sense, the term “pan-Islamism,” which al-Afghānī uses frequently in his many articles and books to resist European—and especially British—imperialism, required the very existence of the West to begin with. Indeed, as seen below, his famous

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4 The Indian Muslim scholar Seyyed Amir ‘Ali also defines the word as “the imaginary product aiming to break the freedom of Muslims” (Ali 1938: 19–20).
pan-Islamic journal *al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqā* (*UW* hereafter) was published from Paris and delivered throughout the world using modern technology. In addition, a contemporary Iranian Islamic writer, Ḥādi Khosrō Shāhī, describes his journey to Paris as pilgrimage (*Hijra*) (Shāhī 2000: 23). “Hijra” is a key concept in Islamic history, as it marks the beginning of the Islamic Umma in the Arab Peninsula in the seventh century. From here, we can judge how important the existence of the West was for the Islamic world in starting the modern revival of its Umma.

As will be shown in the following chapter, the Islamic world was contending with advancing Western imperialism and colonialism at that time. The West felt threatened by the Islamic world—although they had invaded it—and had coined the term “pan-Islamism,” along with its connotations of fear and dread. On the other side of the coin, al-Afghānī employed the Arabic term “al-Waḍa al-Islāmiya,” which corresponds directly with “pan-Islamism.” There is the possibility that after he saw the term “pan-Islamism” circulating in Europe, he began using the same term in Arabic. If this were so, it could be said that he borrowed the term “pan-Islamism” from the West. However, we must first and foremost pay attention to the fact that he used the term “al-Waḍa al-Islāmiya” to unite Muslims and liberate Islamic countries from Western encroachment. Therefore, his term does not contain any connotation of a threat, regardless of context. Indeed, the West and al-Afghānī used the same term, but their intended meanings were quite different; the latter modified and re-appropriated the term for his own purpose. In this sense, pan-Islamism was the concept of a man who had deeply internalized the West and then strongly resisted its influence, for the sake of Islamic salvation. In the end, he had a deep fear of the West—especially of his main opponent, Britain. Regarding the term “pan-Islamism,” both sides appear to have

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5 There is an indication that pan-Islamic propaganda was made possible—and was perhaps actually engendered—by mechanical progress in communications, the introduction of the printing press, and the increase of commercial transactions between the Islamic world and the West (Becker 1924: 239–42; Hurgronje 1915: 23–25; Ritter 1924: 329–50; Wirth 1915: 432–33).

6 According to Keddie, al-Afghānī was the first in his time to use the Qurʾānic term “al-ʿurwa al-wuthqā” to express Muslim solidarity and advertise pan-Islamism, with his sincere praise for the Ottoman Khalīfa in the latter half of the 1870s (Keddie 1972a: 184). As mentioned, it was in 1884 that Afghānī and ʿAbduh published the pan-Islamic journal *ʿUW* in Paris. In the very same year, the Berlin Conference—the symbol of colonial partition by the West, of Asian and African countries—was held in Germany. There is the great possibility that *ʿUW*, as an expression of his pan-Islamism, was a reflection of Western imperialism itself. Moreover, al-Afghānī took Czarist Russia as a model to follow in realizing pan-Islamism, because of its absolute unity and unbending self-assertion (al-Afghānī 2002a: 161); he also took the unification of the German Empire in 1871, incidentally, as the model for an agreement that could lead to solidarity. Indeed, he praised Bismarck and Cavour for realizing their national unity (al-Afghānī 2002a: 207, 333, 356, 413, 428, 429, 447, 452, 453). ʿImāra also points out that he expressed his positive evaluation of Italian political leaders for creating the Italian language, integrating many prefectures, kingdoms, and republic states, and acquiring a noble freedom and perfect unity (*tawḥīd*) (ʿImāra 1984: 175).

7 Hans Cohn says that the term “pan-Islamism” was first used in Britain in 1882 (Cohn 1920: 44), when Britain subdued the ʿArābī revolution and occupied Egypt. In the very same year, al-Afghānī visited
influenced each other in its introduction.

II. Al-Afghānī’s Pan-Islamism I: Toward Constructing an Alliance among Islamic Countries

When al-Afghānī’s political thought became widely known, Muslim intellectuals loved to use the term “pan-Islamic,” on the grounds that it was the very expression of true Islamic belief that enhanced the Muslim sense of solidarity. It is now customary, both in the West and in Islamic countries, to regard him as a pioneer of pan-Islamism.

It is well-known—and quite commonsense—that Islam strengthens the spirit of Muslim solidarity; in reality, however, it is not quite so simple. In al-Afghānī’s time, Islamic countries maintained rather hostile relationships, and deep disagreements among religious schools were erupting. When the Islamic Empire was the superior world power, such disagreements did not cause any problems; however, when the relationship between Europe and the Islamic world was reversed in the 19th century—so that Western, imperialistic countries began invading Islamic territories—they became crucial.

Britain defeated France at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and expanded its territory in the Bengal area. Then, through the three Maratha Wars in India (1775–1818) and the Sikh Wars (1845–1849), Britain conquered the Punjab area. Finally, Britain abolished the rank of the Mughal Emperor in 1857. In this way, Britain had thoroughly colonized India and began to govern her directly in the name of Queen Victoria (Kimura 1995: 386–90).

Qājār Iran was defeated by Russia in two wars (1805–13, 1827–28), created the Turkmanchāi treaty, lost Armenia, and admitted extraterritoriality for Russians in its own territory. This was the beginning of Iran’s unequivocal treaties with the major world powers. Russia, since its subordination of the Kazan Khān kingdom in 1552 by Ivan the Terrible, the Emperor of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, continued to conquer
the Khân states in central Asia, one after another; it took steps toward conquering Caucasus, and finished colonizing Dagestan by 1877 (Yamauchi 1996: 340).

On the other hand, the beginning of the colonization of northern Africa goes back to the march of Napoleon on Egypt in 1798. After the withdrawal of Bonaparte, the Muhammad ‘Ali Dynasty was placed under the influence of France and Britain; the latter colonized Egypt in 1882, without missing the opportunity of the ‘Arâbî revolution. The former occupied Algeria in 1830 and separately colonized Tunisia and Morocco. Italy began its occupation of Libya in 1911. The colonization of northern Africa was followed by the division of Africa by the West, and African Muslim countries were also subordinated (Komatsu 1998: 15).

Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century, there were only three Muslim countries that had retained their independence, albeit only formally: Ottoman Turkey, Qâjâr Persia, and Durrânî Afghan. For the Islamic world, the 19th century was one of disassembly (Nakata 2001: 41–42), experienced as an integration into the modern world system (Wallerstein 1974) politically, economically, and militarily, even though it was neither single-lined nor inevitable. These political changes signaled what seemed to be an irrevocable extension of Europe’s political and economic hegemony and, consequently, a rethinking of the reason for the Muslim world’s decline.

Al-Afghânî detected the essence of these serious crises; in response, he started the so-called first Islamic revival movement, in the 19th century (Kosugi 2006: 188–89).

When surveying his entire life, it can be seen that the impact of the invasions of Tunisia by France and Egypt by Britain played a critical part in the emergence of his global pan-Islamic vision. These events caused him to have ideas about the necessity for Muslim solidarity against the larger expansion of Western hegemony. Indeed, it was immediately after the formal British occupation of Egypt that al-Afghânî began to publish his pan-Islamic ideas in Paris, in the journal he edited together with his Egyptian disciple, Muhammad ‘Abduh9, ‘UW—a highly influential publication that was distributed throughout the Islamic world10. Shâhî explains the significance of the journal thus: first, it was an expression of resistance against European colonialism in general and that of the British in particular; second, it was an expression of Islamic solidarity and the abolition of narrow religious factionalism; third, it was a discussion of the

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9 Both stayed in Europe at this time involuntarily—and, ironically enough, due to European colonialism in the Middle East. Al-Afghânî had been expelled from Egypt by the Khedive Tawfiq and reached Paris via India. ‘Abduh joined him there after being expelled from Cairo in the wake of the ‘Arâbî Revolt and the British occupation in 1882.
10 While one cannot be absolutely certain whether al-Afghânî himself wrote it, or whether ‘Abduh did (if so, probably under his mentor’s inspiration), the style seems to point to the former’s authorship. Moreover, no less an Islamic scholar than Muṣṭâfâ ‘Abd al-Râziq republished this article in 1938, with an introduction of his own, maintaining that he recognized it as a product of al-Afghânî’s thought (al-Afghânî 1938). This is also the opinion of Muhammad ‘Imâra, who compiled his complete collection and reprinted this article (‘Imâra 1968: 339–46).
Islamic Empire’s decline that brought the cause to light (Shâhî 2000: 519). Indeed, this periodical expressed his views on pan-Islamism in general, at that time, especially in an article entitled “al-Wahda al-Islâmiyya,” and designed Muslim unity to expel foreign intruders and establish their own independence and freedom. His was the Islamic voice that blamed Western imperialism for the Muslim Empire’s decline; he succeeded in raising the alarm across the Islamic world with these words:

Islamic sovereignty used to extend to Maghrib (Andalsia) in the West, Tonkin at the border of China in the East, Fazan in the North, and Sarandib at the equator in the South, and there were so many Muslims who lived within its borders. They had one Khalîfa, and when he raised his voice, Chinese emperors surrendered and European kings became very frightened. They had never invaded the Islamic Umma until recently. Once, Muslims rejected being put under a non-Muslim ruler, and when some Muslims were under the control of foreigners, every other Muslim mourned wholeheartedly throughout the entire Islamic brotherhood (al-Afghānī 2002a: 157).

Al-Afghānī goes on to say that Muslims east and west, north and south, would unite and work together against the dangers facing them. The only ones opposing this union were those local rulers who were steeped in their own daily pleasure and vanity. These individuals, he says, were like chains around the necks of Muslims. The heirs of the notables should not let themselves despair, for there was an unbroken sequence of Muslim lands, from Edirne to Peshawar, inhabited by no fewer than 50 million Muslims who were long distinguished by their courage. If these Muslims could agree among themselves, says Al-Afghānī, and show regard for the needs of fellow Muslims, they could unite and dam the floods imperiling them from all sides. Melancholy and despair help no cause, but hope and action do; by uniting in the name of the Qur’ān, says Al-Afghānī, Islam would be guaranteed success (al-Afghānī 2002a: 160–62).

In another article (“al-Ta‘aṣṣub”), al-Afghānī points out that Arabs, Turks, Persians, Indians, Egyptians, and Maghrabis had originally held onto their religious reins so tightly and kept so deep a kinship, that when one of their companions was troubled by misfortune or their country was being loosened and divided, they would all feel great sorrow (al-Afghānī 2002a: 139). However, the reality he faced in his time was quite the reverse. He complains bitterly:

When the Indian Revolt occurred [in 1857], Afghan and Baluchi Muslims failed to help Indian Muslims, and when the Afghan-British War broke out [in 1878–81], they also did not participate in the political struggle against British encroachment. The key point in opposing the British occupation of Egypt lies in unity among the
Indians, Afghans, and Persians, and that is the very expression of Muslim brotherhood and a clue to the revival of the Islamic Umma in the future (al-Afghānī 2002a: 123).

According to al-Afghānī, no Muslim ought to rely on national or ethnic ties, but should instead depend on only religious ties (al-Afghānī 2002a: 103–06). Muslims must oppose racism wherever they live, and throw off any kinds of kinship (‘aṣabiya) which would undermine Islamic solidarity. Because the people who believe in the Islamic principles, once they have accepted this belief, reject their own race and nationality when they turn from personal ties to universal relationships, that is, religious ones. Muslims, who are on the truth of Allah’s sacred law (Sharī‘a), do not perceive any differences among nationalities, for if there are differences among Muslims, these depend on their degree of enthusiasm for keeping and embodying the religious law.

Then, he proclaims that racial and national solidarity are the very things Allāh denounces strictly, taking as a proof a Qur’ān verse:

Allāh rebukes all solidarities, besides the one made through Islamic law. Whoever relies on such a solidarity cannot afford to repel the rebuke or whoever approves of such a tie deserves criticism….there is nobody among us who can call for a racial tie (‘aṣabiya), and struggle and die for it. “O you men! Surely we have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and families, that you may know each other” (al-Hujrā: 13) (al-Afghānī 2002a: 104–105).

Al-Afghānī sincerely respected the Qur’ān and Sunna of the prophet Muḥammad, referring to those religious books and quoting their sentences or passages in many places in this political periodical. To begin with, the title of his periodical, “al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqā,” is a direct derivation from the Qur’ān: “There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has become clearly distinct from error; therefore, whoever disbelieves in the false deities (Tāghūt) and believes in Allah he indeed has laid hold on the firmest handle (al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqā), which shall not break off, and Allah is All-Hearing, All-Knowing” (al-Baqara: 256). At the same time, he maintains in an article: “The Qur’ān is alive, not dead. …The Book is not invalidated. Return to it” (al-Afghānī 2002a: 162). The articles in his periodical contain so many political, economic, and religious messages; each message is accompanied by Qur’ānic or Hadith passages and thus reminds the readers of the significance of religion. The periodical is a resonant appeal for Muslim unity and union, based on communal memory.

At the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that he preached Islamic unity, not only for the Muslim masses but for Muslim rulers in general. Notice should be paid, however, to the fact that he believed that the reform of monarchism and absolutism in
Muslim countries—which would lead the revival of Islam—precedes independence and autonomy from Western domination. The periodical contains some articles which, in the name of Islam, spoke out readers to work against those local rulers who stood in the way of the achievement of unity (al-Afghānī 2002a: 191–92).

According to Landau, at some unknown point in his career, al-Afghānī must have reached the conclusion that he would have to convert the Muslim rulers, or at least one of them, to his pan-Islamic views, if he were to carry out his plans (Landau 1990: 18). Indeed, the concept of a united Muslim community with a spiritual and political leader at its head was essential to the pan-Islamism of late 19th century (Fakhry 1954: 451). Al-Afghānī adopted this concept and markedly toned down his attacks on the Ottoman Sultan Abdūlhamid II, whom he selected as the most likely personality to lead a successful pan-Islamic campaign (al-Bashīr 1975: 18–19). However, he kept preaching the benefits of constitutionalism to the Ottoman Sultan and suggested to him that consultative governance (shūrā) is the order of Allāh, referring to the Qur’ān (al-Shūrā: 38) (al-Makhzāmī 1931: 59); in this way, he aimed to perform inner political reformism to the despotism existing in Turkey. He concentrated his efforts to demanding a constitution and a consultative council, drawing on the slogans of the French Revolution and the Islamic principle of shūrā.

He was convinced, likewise, that internal reform of the government system should be done in other Islamic countries. According to Khūrī, the life of al-Afghānī was connected to three movements in the Islamic world: 1) the Turkish Constitutional Movement, 2) the Egyptian Parliamentary Movement during and after the reign of Khedive Tawfīq, and 3) The Iranian Parliamentary Movement during the reign of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh (Khūrī 1983: 30). Actually, as to this second movement, he made this statement directed towards the Egyptian ruler of the time:

Allow me, Your Highness, to say with freedom and sincerity that the Egyptian nation, like all other nations, has among its members the lazy and the ignorant, but it is not totally destitute of the learned and the wise. As you consider the Egyptian nation and individuals, so do they consider Your Highness. If you accept the advice of a sincere man like me and hasten to let the nation partake in ruling the country on the basis of consultation (shūrā) by arranging for the

11 During his short stay in London, he contributed the articles “British Policy in East Countries” (“al-Siyāsa al-Injiliyya fi Mamārik al-Sharqiyya”) and “The Reason for War in Egypt” (“Asbāb al-Harb bi-Miṣr”) to a newspaper compiled by Lūís Sābūnji, The Bee (al-Nahlā). The former is a strong criticism of British foreign policy in India and Egypt, and the latter points out that the true reason for the British invasion was the Britons’ concern over the project of the Ottoman Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamīd II, to gather all the Muslims under the Islamic Khalīfa—that is, pan-Islamism—and that the British Army dispatch was to break up this rising sign of Islamic unity (‘aṣabiyya), for fear of its deep influence in Eastern countries, especially in India (Keddie 1972a: 184).
election of national representatives who enact laws and implement them in your name and by your will, this procedure will add more stability to your throne and more years to your sovereignty (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 83–84).

Moreover, as to the third movement, there remains this anecdote. The Shāh asked al-Afghānī whether it was right that the king of kings of Persia should be regarded like one of his peasants or not. Al-Afghānī replied:

Let it be known to you, O Shāh, that your crown, the glory of your sovereignty and the foundation of your throne will be, through constitutional (dustūrī) rule, greater, more effective, and more stable than they are now. The peasant, the laborer, and the craftsman in your kingdom, O Shāh, are more useful than your glory and your princes. Pardon my sincerity, which I should express frankly before it is too late. No doubt Your Majesty has seen and read about a nation that could live without a king at its head; but have you ever seen a king without a nation or subject? (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 55)

Al-Afghānī worked with all his zeal and drew up a basic constitutional law for Qājār Persia, which would make it a consultative monarchy. When the Shāh read the main articles of the constitution, he felt it was too much for him to accept because his rule would be restricted and the Persian people would have more power through their assembly.¹²

Thus, al-Afghānī emphasized inner political reformism by the introduction of a modern constitution or a consultative parliament, and thought that these reforms should be achieved within each Islamic country before they could all be united. It would not be until after their internal political reformation that independent Muslim countries could, and should, be combined with each other against the invading West. There is some indication that al-Afghānī believed that independence and autonomy from Western colonial rule was a precondition for Muslim revival and, for Muslims, to gain their rightful position on the international scene as equal and respected members (Aydin 2007: 49). However, this viewpoint indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the facts as demonstrated above.

¹² There remains his anecdote of the Russian Czar, as follows. The Czar asked al-Afghānī the reason behind his conflict with the Shāh. Al-Afghānī mentioned to him his opinion about representative government and the necessity for establishing it, and told the Czar that the Shāh abhorred such an opinion and did not like to admit to its soundness. The Czar said, “I think that the Shāh is right. How can a king agree to be ruled by the peasants of his kingdom?” Al-Afghānī replied, boldly and eloquently, “I believe, Your Majesty, that if the millions of subjects are friends of the throne, it is far better for it than having them as enemies waiting for opportunities and hiding in their breast the venom of hatred and the flames of vengeance” (Maghribi 1948: 103–04).
Relating to the failure to grasp his political thought, according to Kramer, it must be said that there is no critical evidence that al-Afghānī ever advanced an articulate proposal for a Muslim congress (Kramer 1986: 19). However, according to al-Afghānī’s nephew, Mirzā Loṭf Allāh Khān Asādābādī, there was a concrete plan devised by al-Afghānī for an Islamic congress in Istanbul:

The Sayyid determined that, from each of the major Islamic lands, one person would be selected by the state as an official representative, and one person from the first ranks of the ‘ulamā’ of [each] people (millet) would be selected by the people as a true people’s representative, to assemble and meet in Istanbul. In Istanbul, a great congress would be founded and organized, and important problems anywhere, at any time, would be given over to the arbitration of this congress. All states and peoples of the Muslim faith would recognize the obligation to respect and follow the decisions and verdicts of the Islamic congress.... The purpose of the Sayyid in organizing this Islamic congress was to amass the means for progress and fulfillment of the Muslim peoples collectively, and to restore the glory and might of early Islam.  

Moreover, the idea of having an Islamic congress can be found in the pages of ‘UW, where Makka was cited as “the most favorable city for the exchange of their ideas and dissemination in all parts” (al-Afghānī 2002a: 122–27). This identical idea was repeated once again in another article, “Waḥda al-Siyāda” (al-Afghānī 2002a: 163–68). Hardly more explicit were his remarks on Muslim unity, which stressed the role of the ‘ulamā’ in this regard:

The ‘ulamā’, the religious leaders everywhere should join together and establish centers in various lands, to advance their unity, and take the hands of the masses, so that the Revelation (Qur’ān) and true tradition (Hadith) will guide them. They should gather these threads into one knot, with its center in the Holy Lands, the most noble of which is the House of Allāh (al-Afghānī 2002a: 126).

Now we can grasp the grand design in al-Afghānī’s pan-Islamic politics: the establishment of an important Muslim bloc, comprising the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and Afghan (Maḥmūd 1979: 318)—the only independent Muslim states at that time—as a milestone in attracting Muslims to a pan-Islamic union. Moreover, he had the

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13 The account went on to relate that the plan fell through when Abdūllāh II attempted to assert his prerogative as caliph by demanding that he serve as president of the congress, a move resisted by al-Afghānī (Loṭf Allāh Khān 1926: 56).

14 Al-Afghānī himself, when referring to the concrete project of the political alliance between the
beginning of a plan for an Islamic congress led by the religious leader in Istanbul or Makka. Western colonial aggression had awakened Muslim unity from its slumber, and al-Afghānī gave expression to that solidarity running through the Islamic world, with “al-Waḥda al-Islāmiya.” He aimed to construct a unified common front that united Islamic independent states against imperialism. Hence, he diverted the traditional religious mentality among the Muslims toward a modern ideology for political unity among Islamic countries (Kosugi 2006: 215). In this sense, he chose Islam as a political ideology by which Muslims could achieve liberation and independence from Western imperialism.

III. Al-Afghānī’s Pan-Islamism II: Toward Transcending the Sunnī-Shī‘ī Dichotomy

However, at the same time, we must also pay attention to al-Afghānī’s advocacy, beyond the Sunnī-Shī‘ī dichotomy (Enayat 1982: 41–42; Landau 1990: 15). In his paradigm for pan-Islamism, al-Afghānī advocated the unity of the Islamic religious schools of thought (i.e., Sunnī and Shi‘ī). One of al-Afghānī’s ambitions was to bridge their differences. Well acquainted with the writings of both groups, he argued, again and again, that their differences were a matter of past relevance and that a *modus vivendi* between them could—indeed, should—be found. Thus, in his confidential discussions with his disciple and friend, Muḥammad al-Makhzūmī, he repeatedly stresses the modern irrelevance of these differences (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 112–14).

Not surprisingly, al-Afghānī referred to the Sunnī-Shī‘ī differences in his periodical articles (Key 1951: 545). After having been exiled from Egypt, he not only contributed to various European newspapers15, but also set up several Arabic periodicals, the best-known of which was *UW*. *UW* repeated al-Afghānī’s wish to reconcile Sunnīs and Shī‘īs. In an article entitled “Call for the Persians to Reach an Agreement with the Afghans,” for example, he says that:

Both nations are like two branches of one tree and they have one root. That is an ancient Persian origin. When Islam came, both became so powerful through the deep unification that true religion brought. Actually, there are few differences between these nations, and those differences do not require branches to be split or clothes to be cut. I am very sorry that these slight differences have become so

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15 For example, A. Abdullāh refers to an article by al-Afghānī in *Figaro* (Paris) of November 8, 1883, in which he warns that, should the Mahdi be victorious in Sudan, Muslims would rise everywhere (Abdullāh 1981: 42–43).
serious, although both parties have wise ways of thinking (al-Afghānī 2002a: 193)\(^{16}\).

According to him, Afghans and Persians had become overly particular about tiny and frivolous differences between them. Originally, the two nations had been one and had been so mighty by virtue of the true Islamic faith they shared. Islam has two religious schools in general, Sunnī and Shi‘ī; the Afghans belong to the former, while the Persians belonged to the latter. Sunnis and Shi‘īs originally followed one Islam, and the disparity and disunity between them emerged only with the passage of time. “Now we must go back to the pure Islamic principle and revive its true meaning,” he advocated\(^{17}\).

So what, then, was his motivation for advocating the necessity of transcending the narrow dichotomy between Sunnī and Shi‘ī? We can see the background of the pan-Islamic nature of his thinking, in the following points.

Firstly, it could be subscribed to a fundamental change in the worldwide historical system in general. By the early 20th century, the Islamic world had been absorbed into the worldwide political and economical system, and these differences made little critical sense. The integration of the world economy, together with the advance of secularization and Westernization, caused Islamic historical and religious differences to be put aside; Islamic intellectuals were less concerned with internal disunity, than with taking care of the crisis caused by their confrontation with Western imperialism (Kosugi 2006: 706).

Secondly, the pan-Islamic nature of his thinking can be seen in his description of the Afghan nation in his notable book *History of Afghan* (*Tatimma al-Bayān fī Ta‘rikh al-Afghān*)\(^{18}\). In this book, he mentions the unreasonably narrow religious factionalism that existed among the Afghans in his time. For example, he points out that:

The Afghan ‘ulamā‘ avoid eating food slaughtered by Shi‘ās. On the other hand, they do not hesitate to eat meals slaughtered by Jews or Christians, because they

\(^{16}\) He goes on to say, “Oh, Persians, remember that you have contributed your knowledge to Islam and turn your eyes to your inheritance in Islam. As you made a great effort in spreading Islam all over the world, you should become a pillar of the religion, Islam. You are the best people to restore Islam’s past glory and to build a firm foundation for bringing about Islamic unity in the Umma. This deed is not impossible, on account of your great nationality and firm will” (al-Afghānī 2002a: 195).

\(^{17}\) On the other hand, Brunner points out that the call for al-Wāḥda al-Islāmiyya and the struggle against European predominance is a leitmotif that runs through the entire journal. Nowhere, however, is there explicit mention of reapproaching the Suunī and Shi‘ī. Particularly with respect to Egypt and Sudan, the fight against British colonialism formed the main emphasis in the news reports carried in *UW*, and so he considers the journal a “classic example of an anti-imperialist argument couched in religious terms” (Brunner 2004: 35–36).

\(^{18}\) According to Rashtī, a prominent al-Afghānī researcher in contemporary Afghanistan, al-Afghānī’s pan-Islamism was guaranteed by his experience of engagement in Afghan policy in the 1860s. The fruit of his experience is expressed in his book (Rashtī 1977: 5).
believe that Shi‘i as have already disavowed their faith, and do not take any food slaughtered by those who have lost their own creed. This is their point of difference with ahl al-Kitāb (the people of the Sacred Book) (al-Afghānī 2002d: 179).

Furthermore, he points out the meaningless and ugly struggles between Sunnis and Shi‘is, as follows:

There was a political struggle in Qandahar that was derived from Islamic sectarian factionalism. It went as follows. One of the greatest (Sunnī) ‘ulamā’ declared the Shi‘is to be unbelievers. Then the Afghan people revolted against them and so much blood flowed. Houses were broken and shops were invaded. The same situation happened in Kabul. The ‘ulamā’’s declaration that the Shi‘is were unbelievers led to an appalling war between Sunnis and Shi‘is that continued for a few months (al-Afghānī 2002d: 177–78).

Thus, the experience of al-Afghānī during his stay in Afghan in his youth contributed greatly to his later concept of pan-Islamism, because he had grown intolerant of the miserable conditions resulting from the repeated factional struggles that occurred between the two religious schools, despite the fact they were both Muslim19. He looked to offer a solution to break through the useless conflicts, by advocating tolerance and the unity of Muslims20.

19 On the other hand, he praised an aspect of co-existence among Sunnī and Shi‘i in History of Afghān. Al-Afghānī points out that “Afghans have a strong attachment toward their religion, law school, and race (jins). They never discriminate rights among foreigners, and they have little concern about whether Shi‘as or non-Muslims follow the Islamic principles or not, so they do not forbid them from taking a high rank in Afghan government. Actually, you can see al-Qizil Bāsh transporting landlords in Afghan.” Then al-Afghānī says that all Afghans, though they are poor, are proud of their “Afghanness” and are convinced that they are from the noblest nation in this world. He also insists that there are none more pure in faith and complete in Islam than the Afghans and the ‘Arabs (al-Afghānī 2002d: 175). In this respect, it is very interesting to point out that he insists that the Afghans and Persians are the same nation in origin (asl Īrānī) and that the Afghan language derives from the old Persian language (ma‘khūdh min lisān Zendōstā) (al-Afghānī 2002d: 114). For him, there are no peculiar distinctions between Afghan and Persia from national or linguistic viewpoints.

20 Kosugi points out that during his stay in many countries, he became able to transcend the narrow religious factionalism by which the thoughts of most people at that time had been arrested. On that basis, he was accustomed to both Sunni and Shi‘i scholarship traditions. Judging from the traditional Islamic knowledge system, his was a very rare case (Kosugi 2006: 216). For the background of his education, see (‘Abduh 1972: 17; Ridd 1931: 28; al-Makhzūmī 1931: 111; ‘Imārah 1984: 45; Lotf Allāh Khān 1926: 17; Shāhī 2000: 17; Moqaddem 2007: 402–03) and especially (‘Abduh 1972: 12; al-Makhzūmī 1931: 76; Ridd 1931: 28; Amin 1955: 24, 66–67; ‘Imāra 1984: 53; Halabi 2005: 7). He took his education at Tehran and Shi‘i sacred places like Najaf or Qazvin in his teenage [Ridd 1931: 28; ‘Imārah 1984: 47; Lotf Allāh Khān 1926: 20-21; Shāhī 2000: 17]. According to al-Makhzūmī, he had profound knowledge in rational scholarship, especially in old philosophy, Islamic historical philosophy, Islamic civilization, and so on. He also mastered Afghan (Dari/Pashhto), Persian, Arabic, Turkish, French, and understood English and
In this respect, he offered a typical argument *vis-à-vis* the Islamic schools of thought, in his later years in Istanbul. First of all, he thought of the Shi’a as people who “follow the school of thought of Imam Ja’far Sādiq, who is a great law scholar of Bayt Allāh. These people, who are Muslim, obey Imām Ja’far, [and] are distinguished by their enthusiastic love for Imām ‘Alī and respect for his family” (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 152). However, according to him, this does not necessitate banishing them from Islam [category], and making a big deal of these trivial differences. Likewise, the Sunnis should not make these differences determining factors in disparity, struggle, and murder. These things are derived from the ignorance of the Ummah, and the stupidity of greedy rulers hoping to expand their own land (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 152). In reality, however, he points out that Sunnī rulers exaggerated Shi’a-ness to horrify and mislead the people with novel fantasies; they tried to convert the Shi’īs into Sunnīs, prompting disparity, mobilizing armies, and killing them one by one, even though they all followed the Qur’ān and the guidance of Muḥammad (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 152). Thus, Al-Afghānī criticized the unreasonable Sunnī attitude toward the Shi’a. On the other hand, he also denounced the Shi’īs for their own attitude. For example, he mentions that “as to the problem of respect for Imām ‘Alī, hoping for his advent...we see remnants of this pride and adherence to this problem nowadays, and this does nothing other than bring damage and disunity to Islamic solidarity. Abū Bakr and ‘Alī would not have approved of such a struggle and such disparity under their own names” (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 152–53). This does not mean that al-Afghānī aimed to abolish the two religious schools of thought, but he insisted on the necessity of recalling the principle of Islam as Abū Bakr and ‘Alī had proposed: Islam is one. Indeed, he had many disciples and companions, Sunnī or Shi’ī alike. He warned both schools not to adopt extreme, opposing positions.

At this point, it is very interesting to consider al-Afghānī’s remark that the German people saw religious differences in Christianity, just as Persians and Afghans saw differences in Islamic religious schools of thought. These frivolous differences influenced Germany’s political unity, weakness emerged within the German community, and the neighboring enemy flooded into it. When they had reflected on their condition, taken hold of their essential roots (*uṣūl al-jawhariyya*), taken account of the public interest (*maslahah*), and achieved the integration of their nation, Allāh would give them the power and strength to become the master of Europe and the political balance would

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21 As to his disciples and companions, regardless of whether they are Sunni or Shi’ī, see table 1.
tilt for them (‘Imāra 1968: 318–19). Thus, he compared differences between religious schools of thought in Christianity and Islam.

It is known that there has been confrontation and somewhat nervous relations between Sunnis and Shi’is in Islamic history. The differences between these religious schools derive from their respective viewpoints toward the early Islamic period, and in their ways of thinking about jurisprudent and theological affairs. In this respect, it is interesting to note that al-Afghānī even says that as to veneration (tafḍīl), if it had occurred some centuries later, it would have revealed skepticism to say; that the feeblest among the orthodox caliphs was ‘Umar, hence he carried the caliphate before them. Had ‘Ali b. Abī Ṭālib succeeded to the caliphate after the prophet Muhammad, Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthmān would have died without being able to make contributions to Islam (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 153). From this statement, we can understand that his principal purpose was to reinterpret early Islamic history and re-construct a historical consensus between the Sunnīs and the Shi’īs (Enayat 1982: 185).

At the same time, there is no evidence more clear in proving his independence from solid religious sectionalism than his testimony. When al-Afghānī was asked about his own belief (‘aqīda) by some Sunnī ‘ulamā’ in Turkey, he replied “I am a Muslim.” When they asked him about his religious sect (madhhab), he answered “I do not know of any madhhab leaders who are greater than me.” When the question was repeated, he said, “My madhhab corresponds to them in part, but is mostly different” (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 112–13; al-Mur‘ashlā 1983: 39). ‘Abduh and al-Makhzūmī, and other later researchers, rank him as a “complete Muslim” or a pure monotheist (Hanīfī) (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 73; ‘Abduh 1972: 27; Riḍā 1931: 41; ‘Imāra 1984: 61, 1997: 53; Yūsuf 1999: 57–62; Hanafi 1998: 31) and as a man belonging to the Ash’ārī or Mātridī schools of theology (kalām), not to any schools in ‘aqīda, to the four law schools in ‘ibāda, or to any of the schools in muṣūlāt to which each land ruler belonged (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 73; ‘Abduh 1972: 27; Riḍā 1931: 47; ‘Imāra 1984: 68; Hanafi 1998: 31).

In this respect, it should be pointed out that he stressed the fact that there had been a historical co-existence among several religions and religious schools of thought in the Islamic world; nonetheless, he showed that Islam is the teaching of Allāh which recommends humans to co-exist and co-habit each other. Indeed, al-Makhzūmī points out that al-Afghānī during his late stay in Istanbul, preached to the people around him—including Jews and Christians—that the principle (mabda’) and the purpose (ghāya) of the three religions (i.e., Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) is the same: creating oneness (tawhīd) and human happiness in this world (al-Makhzūmī 1931: 313–18). It is very interesting to observe that when told by a Jew that the principle of Christianity is the trinity and not tawḥīd, al-Afghānī replied that the principle of Christianity is not contradictory to that of the Jewish Tōrā, because when it can be seen
to contradict by its external appearances, he says, it must be re-interpreted (\ita w\il) in an inner sense (al-Makhirji 1931: 220). When explaining this, he assumed a ta\awwuf point of view and said “ahl al-Kitâb is ahl al-ta\awwuf” (al-Makhirji 1931: 219). For al-Afghani, solidarity beyond Islam is not regarded as being contradictory to Islamic principles. Rather, it was the very essence of the teaching of the Qur’an.

In this sense, al-Afghani had already transcended the narrow Sunni-Shi’i dichotomy, even in the 19th century Islamic world; even more, he transcended the persistently rigid Islam/non-Islam dichotomy that persisted in depending on Islamic principles.

IV. Pan-Islamism: A New Phase in Late 20th Century

His pan-Islamic intellectual heritage was inherited wholesale by Islamic intellectuals in the 20th century: Kawâkibi and Riḍâ, Sunni Muslim thinkers who lived from the late 19th century to the early 20th century; the Makka Conference advocated by Kawâkibi, which had Shi’i jurisprudence; and Riḍâ, who praised the Shi’i ‘ulamâ’ in his Islamic state theory. In fact, Shi’i ‘ulamâ’ from ‘Irâq took part in the Islamic International Conference held in Jerusalem in 1931, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) does not regard Sunni-Shi’i differences to be a terribly crucial problem (Kosugi 2006: 706). Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood has much more closely followed the tradition of pan-Islam as drawn up by al-Afghani in the 19th century, with whom Hasan al-Banna is frequently compared (Mitchell 1969: 216, 321).

In the latter half of the 20th century, especially after the 1970s, the Islamic world

There is some insistence, therefore, that the term “pan-Islamism” is not suitable for designating the whole of his project. For example, Kurita points out that in the preface of the journal ‘UW, he says that the purpose of the journal is to benefit Orientals in general and Muslims in particular (al-Afghani 2002a: 102). Actually, the journal contained articles that treat not only political events in the Middle East and sub-Indian continent, but also the relationship between China and France and the struggle for independence in Ireland. Thus, the call for unity, as advocated by al-Afghani, was designed not only for Muslims but also for all Orientals and exploited people around the world. In this sense, Kurita concludes that the term “pan-Islamism” is not preferred to understanding al-Afghani’s thought more comprehensively (Kurita 2000: 5–6).

There is another reason to reconsider the suitability of the focus. In the periodical ‘UW, he treats Islam as a civilization (Hourani 1962: 115), hence his understanding of the connection between Islamic civilization and others is flexible. Through this attitude, it is clear to see that he stresses that the Islamic civilization is the legitimate heir of the ancient Greek and Persian civilizations. For instance, he says that Muslims have imported the medical science of Hippocrates and Galenus, the geometry of Euclid, the astronomy of Ptolemy, and the philosophy of Socrates and Aristotle; he exaggerates when he says that Muslims succeeded in those studies and thus created an important heritage (al-Afghani 2002a: 157). As seen above, then, his term “Islam” includes the intellectual heritage of old civilizations, like those of Greece and Persia.

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experienced a second Islamic revival. Some political events were considered evidence of the rising tide of this revival. In 1967, Egypt was completely defeated by Israel in the Third Middle East War, and Arab nationalism started to fade away in the Arab world. In Iran, the Iranian Revolution occurred in 1979, halting the advance of the secular modernization policy that had been progressing up to that time. In the same year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the Mujahidin gathered from all over the world to defend Islamic lands. The Islamic world responded to these political situations and took action toward a comprehensive religious revival (Kosugi 2006: 474–83).

Al-Afghānī’s dream of establishing a political line of resistance to Western imperialism by combining the independent Islamic states—that is, Ottoman Turkey, Qājār Persia, and Durrānī Afghan—in the 19th century came true, in a sense, through the establishment of the OIC in 1971. This was an expression of the political aspect of his pan-Islamism. So how, then, is the religious aspect of his pan-Islamism expressed in the contemporary Islamic world?

Being linked by these outer political conditions, the Islamic world produced a movement to promote mutual understanding between Islamic schools of thought, known as “Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmiyya,” during the 1960s. This movement was regarded among those involved as a sort of inner-religious reformism (islāh) (DTMI 1966: 19).

The organization called “Dār al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmiyya” (“Organization for the reapproaching the Islamic schools of thought”) was established by Iranians and headed by Moḥammad Taqī Qommi in Cairo in January 1947 (Brunner 2004: 129–132). This organization worked especially hard through the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s and published an official journal called Risāla al-Islām (RI hereafter), which was distributed all over the Islamic world, but stopped its activities in the 1970s. After

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23 For details of the OIC’s political structure and the background of the Islamic concept in international laws and relationships, see (Moinuddin 1987). On the other hand, there is the opinion that the OIC is the very testimony of the internalization of the Western colonial paradigm in the political domain—that is, the nation-state system. According to Nakata, this system is irrelevant to the traditional Islamic world-view. So, while the OIC bases itself on that system and considers itself an Islamic union, Nakata says it will never be truly “Islamic” (Nakata 2001: 44, 52–55).

24 In January 1949, exactly two years after the foundation of the organization, the first issue of RI was released; within a brief period, it became by far the Jamā’ā al-Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib al-Islāmiyya (JT)’s most important mainstay in making the taqrīb concept known (Brunner 2004: 143–44). See al-Madani’s editorial to RI 1/1949/106–10, on 109f. During the 23 years of its existence, 17 volumes of the RI were published. The first 1½ these (including vol. 12/2 of April 1960) appeared on a precise, quarterly schedule, with each issue containing 112 pages. With an annual output of 448 pages, however, the RI lagged far behind other Islamic journals like the Majalla al-‘Azhar and Irfān; it was retracted for no given reason (Brunner 2004: 144–45). See RI 1/1949/4 and 2/1950/7. Editorial responsibility for the RI was in the hands of two Azhar scholars. The inspector (mufattish) and the later dean of the Department of Shari‘a, Moḥammad Muḥammad al-Madani, became editor-in-chief (ra’is al-tahrir); ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Muhammad ʿIsa, who taught in the same department, took over the post of editorial staff director (mudīr al-majalla). For details of the men who supported the journal or supported the reapproaching movement, see table 2.
the Iranian Islamic Revolution, a similar organization called “Markaz al-Taqrîb bayna al-Madhâhib al-Islâmiyya” was established in Tehran in the 1990s for the purpose of furthering the heritage of the previous organization (Brunner 2004: 382).

There are some points that show that this reapproaching movement was a remnant of al-Afghânî’s religious pan-Islamism. Firstly, it can be seen that al-Afghânî’s trans-religious thinking was adopted by his most prominent disciple, ‘Abduh. In 1884, with Mirzâ Mohammad Bâqer Bavânâtî, who was a Shi’a, and other supporters, ‘Abduh set up a secret society in Beirut that sought to bring about tolerance among religions. This society is remarkable because the very term “reapproaching” (taqrîb) emerged explicitly for the very first time from its activities (Brunner 2004: 38–39).

Second, right from the beginning, Muhammad Muhammad Madani articulated his hope that RI might become the ‘UW of our times (RI 1949/1: 110). ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Mughniya says that there is no doubt that the reapproaching movement owes its inspiration to al-Afghânî and ‘Abduh. Both prominent Islamic revivalists from the first Islamic revival era were the precursors in this matter, for publishing the pan-Islamic political journal ‘UW (DTMI 1966: 7). Regarding this point, Brunner points out that RI had been the first periodical since ‘UW to be established with the express goal of realizing a pan-Islamic unity among Muslims; ‘UW had been the model that the latter sought to emulate (Brunner 2004: 143–44, 208–09).

Thus, in terms of its name and publication, the organization was a remnant of al-Afghânî’s pan-Islamism. What, then, was the concrete purpose of this organization, and what kind of results did it aim to achieve?

Mughniya points out the five purposes of the organization (DTMI 1966: 6). First, it aimed to make Muslims one (tawhîd al-muslimîn) and to gather them under the Islamic and Qur’ânic flags, because “we can accomplish liberation from the miserable situation we are in today only through unity (al-ittihâd), effort (jihâd), and self-sacrifice (al-tadhîyât)”. Second, it aimed to understand the true meaning of Islam and what Islamic religious schools represent: to confirm basic Islamic ideas—such as the Profession of Faith (Shahâda), the Last Day (al-yawm al-Âkhir), Worship or Prayer (Ṣalâ), Fasting (Ṣawm), Pilgrimage (Hajj), and the Book of Allâh (al-Qur’ân)—and to banish the ignorance that was circulating about the Islamic world. Third, it aimed to call for a reapproaching (da‘wa al-taqrîb) of the Islamic religious schools, to avoid struggles, and to establish deep relationships among them. Fourth, it aimed to negate the religious schools’ fanaticism (ta‘âṣsub), because fanaticism makes both the reason and the mind so blind that people cannot discern anything; the Qur’ân and the Sunna teach that Muslims must avoid fanaticism, be tolerant of other religious beliefs, and reconfirm

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25 He also adds that calling for reapproaching is a call for unity (da‘wa al-tawhîd wa al-wâḥda) and for subordination and peace (da‘wa al-islâm wa al-salâm) (DTMI 1966: 14).
the brother and sisterhood of all human beings. Fifth, it aimed to prevent Muslims from declaring another Muslim an unbeliever (takfīr) on the grounds that he or she does not belong to their own religious school 26.

Mughniya also points out that their intention was not to demand that the Sunnī renounce their sect or Shi‘a abandon their schools, but to call for unity with one another under a common cause (yattahid al-jami‘ ḥawla al-uṣūl al-muttaqī ‘alayhā), and for tolerating others unless they denied the principle of Islam, the conditions of faith, or the requirements of religion (DTMI 1966: 12) 27.

By virtue of the ardent activities of this organization, Mahmūd Shaltūt, the head of al-Azhār at that time, pronounced a fatwā in 1959 permitting Muslims to select their own school, as long as it led to a faithful path on firm ground and rational reasoning, and legitimizing the Shi‘a, who followed the doctrine of the Ja‘farī school (DTMI 1966: 15). Thus, the Sunnī authorities admitted the Shi‘a formally for the first time in Islamic history. Brunner says that “before Shaltūt, no Sunnī legal scholar of rank, let alone a Shaykh al-Azhār, had gone as far to recognize Shi‘ism as a completely equal denomination” (Brunner 2004: 290). Actually, the religious leaders of al-Azhār respected this fatwā, which prompted various religious leaders to cooperate in starting Islamic law studies regardless of Sunnī-Shi‘a affiliations, relying instead on rational demonstrations and persuasive proofs that were free of any dogmatism. Together they embarked on holistic Islamic studies (DTMI 1966: 16) 28.

We must keep in mind that the fatwā given by Shaltūt was a jurisprudential view and that so many real and concrete gaps still remain between Sunnī and Shi‘i; however, we can also see in it a very important first step toward mutual understanding among Muslims as a part of the second Islamic revival, because “the idea of taqrib is the very point of transformation in the history of Islamic reformism past and present” (DTMI

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26 The reapproaching group adopts mottos (al-qānūn al-asāṣi‘), as such—first, to collect the voices of Islamic religious school leaders; second, to spread Islamic principles with various languages and to explain the necessity to adopt those principles in society; third, to end the struggle and apathy between two the Muslim nations (sha‘b) and sects (tawā‘if) and unite them (tawfīq) (RI 1991: 8).

27 According to Brunner, this kind of remark goes back to those of Abū al-Hasan Mīrzā, Shaykh al-Ra‘is, who had been through theological training. In a treatise entitled Ettehād-e Eslām, published in Bombay in 1894, he discusses in detail the relationship between Sunnī and Shi‘i. He did this, however, not so much on a doctrinal-theological level, but on a diplomatic-political one. His main motivation was to bring about some type of equilibrium between the governments of the Ottoman Empire and Qājār Persia. He also supported the recognition of both the mundane and the spiritual sovereignty of the Ottoman sultan, a fact that necessarily rendered his initiative unacceptable to the Shi‘i ‘ulamā‘. Remarkably enough, though, he assured the reader that he neither wanted to convert Sunnī to Shi‘a, nor vice versa (Brunner 2004: 36–37).

28 Āyatollāh Montazeri recalls in his memoirs that Shaltūt’s fatwā was the result of Borūjerdi’s activity (Brunner 2004: 290). It is said that Borūjerdī received a deep impression from al-Afgānī’s pan-Islamic thought (Lotf Allah Khan 1926: 123). It is therefore possible to think that there is some relationship between Shaltūt and al-Afgānī, by way of Borūjerdī.
We should also remember that this reapproaching movement was a product of the
time to which it belonged. Indeed, the *taqrīb* theory has an aspect of its response to
Western colonialism that has been preserved in the contemporary Islamic world. In
particular, there is one sentence in the book: “We need to accord to resist against the
vicious attacks and the coarse Crusaders of the present Zionism and American
imperialism” (*DTMI* 1966: 5). Like the pan-Islamism advocated by al-Afghānī within
the tide of the first Islamic revival in the latter half of the 19th century, the
reapproaching theory within the context of the second Islamic revival in the latter half
of the 20th century reflects the Western imperialism, that is, American-Israeli
colonialism, and the very means of resisting it.

V. Conclusion

There was a slogan, “al-Waḥda al-Islāmiya,” from the first Islamic revival in the latter
half of the 19th century. Today, there is the slogan, “Taqrīb bayna al-Madhāhib
al-Islāmiya,” from the second Islamic revival. These slogans have been seen as
representing the very same pan-Islamism.

The term “pan-Islamism” was created in the West in the latter half of the 19th
century, bearing with it a dreadful connotation. Al-Afghānī accepted and reappropriated
this term, and changed its meaning from a negative one to a positive one; he then used it
to call upon Muslims to liberate themselves from Western colonialism, especially that of
Britain. Within this meaning, the term “pan-Islamism” is a term both coined by the West
and used against the West.

Within the context of pan-Islamism, al-Afghānī advocates a unified common
political front among independent Islamic countries against imperialism, and he also
insists on the transcendence of the religious dichotomy between Sunnī and Shi‘ī. This
paper has focused on the latter.

The call for a mutual reapproaching of the two main Islamic schools of thought in
the latter half of the 20th century is obviously the fruit of al-Afghānī’s pan-Islamism.
Indeed, the reapproaching theory reaffirms the significance of al-Afghānī’s religious

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29 Fazr Rahmān points out that it was in the 1960s and 1970s that a wholesale modernization of the Azhar
was embarked upon. In 1961, a law was enacted to institute as part of the Azhar University a school of
medicine, a school of agriculture, and a school of engineering; in 1962, a women’s college was also set up
within the Azhar complex (Rahman 1982: 68, 101–02). It would even be possible to say that the fatwā
enacted from Shaltūt can be regarded as a kind of modernization reform movement in the Azhar.
30 It also points out that contemporary Islam is confronting American imperialism and Israeli Zionism,
and “they know that Islam is the most suitable religion for freeing human beings, the belief for promoting
justice and progress through the Prophet Muhammad, and the faith for fighting with enemies to acquire its
independence and rights” (*DTMI* 1966: 5).
pan-Islamism. It was also taken as a slogan against imperialism, especially that of America and Israel. Thus, “al-Waḥda al-Islāmiyya” and calling for “taqrib” was, and still is, an Islamic bridgehead in overcoming the continuing colonialism in the Islamic world, past and present.\(^{31}\)

Thus, the process of dynamically evaluating the present Islamic movement within its inner contexts, and estimating its future prospects accurately, is deeply linked to a thorough examination of the heritage of al-Afghānī’s ongoing living political and religious thought, and to viewing Islamic movements in the context of their relationship with Western imperialism.

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\(^{31}\) Brunner explains that since the days of al-Afghānī, there has rarely been a call for Islamic unity without reference to the machinations and conspiracies of the “enemies of Islam,” under which one is free to include Freemasons, imperialists, colonialists, Communists, Orientalists, Zionists, or any unpopular grouping within Islam. Justification for Islamic ecumenism did not always derive from theological motives, so much as from a political-ideological front against an opponent (Brunner 2004: 209, 395–96). As seen above (f. 24), \(RI\) was published from the 1940s to the 1970s. At that time, secular nationalism was spreading in the Middle East as a whole. We should confirm here that Islamic revivalism existed even in an era of nationalism, contrary to what one would expect. This is evidence of the anti-imperialistic aspect of pan-Islamism.
Appendix:

- **Table 1:** The members he was associated with in Istanbul:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shī‘ī/Persia</th>
<th>Sunnī/Arab</th>
<th>Hindi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fāyżī Efendi Tabrizī, Iranian leader</td>
<td>‘Abd al-Qādir al-Maghribi</td>
<td>Nowwāb Ḥosayn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥosayn Reżā Pāshā, the Iranian leader of immigrants from Iran to Turkey</td>
<td>Ibrāhīm Muwayliḥī</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seyyed Borhān al-Dīn Balkhī, Iranian friend</td>
<td>‘Abd Allāh al-Naḍīm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abū al-Ḥasan Mirzā, Shaykh al-Ra’īs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaykh Aḥmad Rūḥī Kermānī, Iranian disciple</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirzā Āqā Khān Kermānī</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirzā Ḥasan Khān Khabīr al-Molk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Abd al-Karīm Bīk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamdī Bīk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaykh Māhmūd Afzār al-Molk Rūḥī</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [Loṭf Allāh Khān 1926: 58; Keddie 1972]

- **Table 2:** The members who supported the publishing of the “Risāla al-Islām”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>the Shī‘ī ‘ulamā’īs, the great Marjī‘īs in Najaf or Qom</th>
<th>the Azhar Shaykhs in Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh Moḥammad Ḥosayn Kāshef al-Ghiṭā’</td>
<td>al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-Majīd al-Taqrīb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Seyyed Hebe al-Dīn al-Shahrastānī</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Seyyed ‘Abd al-Ḥosayn Sharaf al-Dīn al-‘Āmeli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh Mohammad Sāleḥ al-Mūzdardānī (al-Sammānī)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh Moḥammad Javvād Muḥniyya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥosayn al-Raṣḥī</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥosayn ibn al-Dīn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh Mohammad Taqī al-Qommī (the secretary general of Dār al-Taqrīb; al-ʿĀmm li-Dār al-Taqrīb)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āya Allāh al-Seyyed Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Ṣadr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āya Allāh al-Seyyed Moḥammad Taqī al-Khavansārī</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Maṭrī’ al-Kabīr Āya Allāh al-‘Uẓmā al-Borūjerdī</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh ‘Abd al-Majīd al-Taqrīb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Names</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh Mâhmûd Shaltût</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh Muhammâd Abû Zahra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Shaykh Muhammâd Muhammâd al-Madânî (the head of the journal editor; Raʾis Tahrîr al-Majalla)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the professors in Islamic universities</td>
<td>al-Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz ʿIṣâ (the office leader; Mudîr İdâra al-Majalla)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the famous Islamic writers</td>
<td>Aḥmad Amîn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ʿAbbâs Mâhmûd al-ʿAqqâd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muḥammad Farîd Wâjdî</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [RI 1991: iii]

Cf. Dâr al-Taqrîb was established and supported by Islamic leaders in Islamic countries as below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad Taqî Qommi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad Madânî</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad Ḥosayn Al Kâsîf al-Gîtâ’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mâhmûd Shaltût</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿAbd al-Majîd Salîm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿAbd al-Ḥosayn Sharaf al-Dîn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad Jawwîd Mughîyâ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad ʿAlî ʿAlawîya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥammad ʿAbd Allâh Dârez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mâhmûd Fayyâd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [OTMI 1966: 7]
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