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REFUGEES, RESETTLEMENT, AND LAND AND RESOURCE CONFLICTS: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AMONG !XUN AND KHWE SAN IN NORTHEASTERN NAMIBIA

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ABSTRACT  This study examines land use, natural resource, and development conflicts, and the effects of government policies in a remote area in northeastern Namibia, known formerly as West Bushmanland, now Tsumkwe West. !Xun and Khwe San who had been soldiers of the South African Defense Force in the Angolan and Namibian wars of independence in the 1970s and 1980s were resettled in this area along with their families. Namibian government resettlement and development projects were planned and implemented in the Tsumkwe West in the early 1990s. In part because of the ways in which !Xun and Khwe San identities were constructed over time by settlers, academics, policy-makers, the South African Defense Force, the colonial and post-colonial state, and San themselves, the people of Tsumkwe West, later, the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy, have had to struggle against other groups and the state for the stake in their land and resources. Drawing on anthropological research, work of non-government organizations, and interviews of people in the area over a period of two and a half decades, this study assesses some of the ways in which resettlement and land and resource policies have mutually affected the Namibian government, the military, private companies, donor agencies, non-government and community-based organizations, and a diverse set of peoples in northeastern Namibia.

Key Words: Refugees; Resettlement; Identity; Land use; Communal land tenure; Resource rights; !Xun; Khwe; Ju/'hoansi San; Namibia.

INTRODUCTION

In 2006, the government of Namibia announced that small-scale agricultural resettlement farms would be established in a remote area in the northeastern part of the country. This decision came as a surprise to resident San and other peoples who had worked hard over many years to have the region declared a conservancy, an area of communal land in which local people have rights over wildlife. The new plan to establish small farms in the area came on the heels of another plan, subsequently suspended, to relocate some 21,000 refugees from a refugee camp in central Namibia to the same area.

Many of the people residing in the proposed resettlement area were !Xun and Khwe San refugees, ex-soldiers, and their families who themselves had been resettled in the region by the South African Defense Force (SADF) in the 1970s and 1980s and by the government of South West Africa, now Namibia, in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Botelle & Rohde, 1995; Suzman, 2001a; 2001b; Harring & Odendaal, 2006a: 22–27, 29–32). Also found in the area were Omatako !Kung, who were indigenous to that region (Suzman, 2001b: 12, 35). The major-
ity of the people in the Tsumkwe West region in the early part of the new millenium were !Xun and Khwe San, most of whom had been resettled there by the South African Defense Force and the governments of South West Africa and later, after 1990 Namibia. A portion of the resident population of the area was made up of Ju/'hoansi San, who had lived in the region for generations (L. Marshall, 1960; 1976; J. Marshall & Ritchie, 1984; Ritchie, 1987; Harring & Odendaal, 2006a: 27–29). Local people in the region had engaged in efforts to form community-based organizations and representative leadership structures with the aims of (1) gaining political recognition, (2) securing their land and resource rights, and (3) enhancing their livelihoods (J. Marshall, 1989; Wyckoff-Baird, 1996; 2000; Thoma & Piek, 1997; Bieseke & Hitchcock, 2011). They had sought and gained the assistance of non-government organizations and both national and international donors to support their activities.

The Khwe had already been involved in legal action against the government of Namibia over land and resources (Rousset, 2003; Daniels 2004). In the mid-1990s, the government of Namibia decided to establish a prison farm on land claimed by the Khwe along the Okavango River in the Caprivi region of northern Namibia. The traditional leader of the Khwe, Kipi George, approached the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities on Southern Africa (WIMSA), a San advocacy group, to help them arrange a meeting with the government about the prison farm issue. The meeting was held, but it did not go as the Khwe hoped. The chairperson of the meeting decided that the Khwe community campsite, N//goavaca, close to the picturesque Popa Falls on the Okavango River, had to move so that the prison farm project could go ahead as planned (Daniels, 2004: 58). The Khwe then approached the Legal Assistance Center (LAC) in Windhoek for legal help in appealing the government’s decision. The Legal Assistance Center filed a motion in the Namibian High Court in December, 1997 to stop the prison farm plan, to have the government recognize the Khwe traditional authority, and to have government recognize Khwe land rights in Caprivi. As Harring & Odendaal noted:

> All parties clearly understood the legal significance of this case: it was the first legal action in Namibia alleging that the San held legal title to their lands based on ancestral occupation—a full-blown claim of aboriginal title, which, if successful, would easily apply to other peoples in Namibia, too. (Harring & Odendaal, 2006a: 10)

As it turned out, in January 1998, the Attorney General’s office wrote to the Khwe and told them that the prison farm plan had been suspended. No final ruling, however, has yet been issued on the land claim by the Attorney General’s office or the High Court of Namibia.

A number of San in southern Africa have resorted to direct action—strikes and demonstrations—in an effort to bring attention to the issue of San land and resource rights, some of which have resulted in confrontations with the state. Such a demonstration occurred in January 1997, for example, when a group of Hai//om San blocked an entrance into the Etosha National Park in north-central
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Namibia. Seventy-three Hai//om were arrested and detained, but the charges of unlawful assembly and trespassing eventually were dropped (Widlok, 1999: 34; Dieckmann, 2003: 77–78). The demonstration and events surrounding it served to bring worldwide attention to the Hai//om claims for recognition of their land and resource rights (Dieckmann, 2003; 2007; Suzman, 2004: 221–222; Lawry & Hitchcock, 2011). G//ui and G//ana San in Botswana also demonstrated for land and resource rights in the Central Kalahari region in September 2005; 28 people were arrested and charged with unlawful assembly by the Botswana government (Hitchcock & Babchuk, 2011). At the time, they were in the midst of a court case in which 243 San and Bakgalagadi from the Central Kalahari had sued the Attorney General of the Botswana government in the High Court of Botswana (Sapignoli, 2012). In this instance, too, the charges against the demonstrators were eventually dropped.

The San have employed a variety of strategies in an effort to gain recognition for their land and resource rights (Hitchcock, 2006). These strategies range from seeking help from local traditional authorities (chiefs and headmen) to writing letters to government officials and requesting outside help and support, for example, from indigenous peoples’ advocacy organizations to the United Nations. Seeking assistance from lawyers to help them file legal cases in the courts is a strategy that the San employed primarily in the 1990s and into the early 2000s (Sapignoli, 2012). It is interesting to note that one of the ways that the San have been able to elicit support from outside groups has been to characterize themselves in essentialized ways, as “hunter-gatherers” or as “conservationists par excellence.”

THE DISPOSESSION AND TREATMENT OF THE SAN

The history of Namibia reveals that the dispossession of San and other groups came about in part through deliberate government policy. A large portion of the country was set aside as freehold land for white commercial farmers by the South West African Administration and, before that, by the Germans beginning in the 1880s (Werner, 1993; 2001; 2004; Odendaal, 2006a; 2006c; Wallace, 2011). Germans and later South Africans in Namibia obtained access to land in ways similar to EuroAmericans in North America, by signing treaties with local group leaders. They also acquired land through direct colonization on the land of other people, or through barter. Large numbers of Africans either remained on the land as laborers or were dispossessed. Local people who lost access to land moved in search of places with less competition from other groups or were more productive. The result was that conflicting claims arose among the various ethnic groups and sub-groups in Namibia and among individual households.

The “Land Question” is perhaps the most serious issue facing Namibia (Republic of Namibia, 1991; 1998; 2001; Hunter, 2004). Namibia has one of the most unequal distributions of land of any country in the world, and this inequality in access and control over land is seen by many in Namibia as a major cause of rural poverty, socioeconomic inequalities, and social dissatisfaction. In the 1950s and 1960s, over half of the land in Namibia was in the hands of some 4,500
white farmers, while well over 1,000,000 Africans were living in communal zones that were often overcrowded and were less productive agriculturally than the commercial farming zones. Thus, the pressure for land reform was considerable. As Harring (2004: 45–46) noted, however, “The call for ‘land reform’ is meaningless without a clear understanding of who benefits from the acquisition and redistribution of those lands.”

While many groups were dispossessed of their land in Namibia by colonization and the transformations in land tenure rules, one set of groups, known collectively as the San (Bushmen) were impacted heavily by changes in the ways in which land was handled (Gordon & Douglas, 2000; Daniels, 2003; 2004; Orth, 2003; Harring, 2004; Harring & Odendaal, 2006a; Hitchcock et al., 2006). The San of Namibia have been the subject of intensive study and investigation by anthropologists for over half a century (L.Marshall, 1960; 1976; Barnard, 1992; Suzman, 2001), and analyses of Namibian San languages, cultures, and stories had been carried out by Lucy Lloyd and others as early as the late 1870s (Deacon, 1996; Lionnet, 2011).

Today, the San are found in six countries in southern Africa (Fig. 1). San in Namibia represent the second largest San population in the region after Botswana (Suzman, 2001a: 5, Table 1.1; Lee, 2003: 10, Table 2–1). Numbering over 100,000, the San today are actively involved in efforts to shape their identities, promote empowerment, and seek land and resource rights in countries that in the past had denied them those rights (Saugestad, 2001; Sylvain, 2002; Lee, forthcoming). As noted by Sapignoli (2012), the San movement is part of a larger social movement of African and other indigenous peoples.

The San have had to struggle not only for civil and political rights in southern African states, e.g. for the right of representation and suffrage, but also for recognition of their social, economic, and cultural rights (Republic of Namibia, 1992; Hitchcock & Vinding, 2004; Hitchcock et al., 2006; Sapignoli, 2012). They have also had to cope with the various ways in which they were represented (Sharp & Douglas, 1996; Gordon & Douglas, 2000; Taylor, 2008; 2009; Battistoni & Taylor, 2009; Francis & Francis, 2010). The issue of San representation has a long and complex history. San in what was then German South West Africa were sometimes treated harshly by settlers, so much so that some of them were shot on sight. When South Africa took control of South West Africa in 1915, one of the new government’s first orders of business was “to ban Bushman hunting” (Gordon, 2009: 31). As the Secretary for South West Africa put it, “The farmers must be told that shooting of Bushmen will no longer be permitted and will be prosecuted with all the rigor of the law. The Bushmen must be informed in like manner” (National Archives of Namibia [NAN] file ADM 13/35). Bushmen were frequently characterized as “bandits,” “vagrants,” and “outlaws,” by settlers and by the German and South African states. Attacks on settlers and mine workers of the Ovambo and others resulted in statements in the press decrying what was described as a “Bushman Plague” or a “Bushman Danger,” fueling resentment against them (Gordon & Douglas, 2000: 54, 57–59, 97). By 1911, arguments were being made in the South West African press that the police and military should be strengthened and used to undertake patrols against Bushmen.
Bushmen were deprived of land and livestock, and they were pressed into service as laborers in the mines and on the farms of South West Africa. There were four different strategies recommended for handling “the Bushman Problem”: (1) outright extermination, (2) “cleansing” of areas, removing Bushmen to the coast of Namibia or driving them into the vast sandy waterless areas in the northeastern part of the country, (3) “civilizing” the Bushmen through habituating them to work, and (4) creation of special “reserves” for Bushmen (Gordon, 2009: 42–45). In the last case, there were those in Namibia who felt that a de facto “Bushman reserve” already existed in the area known as the Kaukauveld north and east of Grootfontein, stretching toward the Okavango River (Gordon, 2009: 43). Many settlers were opposed to the idea of a Bushman reserve, arguing that it would serve as a place where “vagabonds,” “stock thieves,” and runaway servants could congregate. There was also a concern that the area would be damaged by overhunting and bush fires set by Bushman inhabitants, and thus a reserve would pose a security threat to all settlers in the region. Missionaries, academics, and humanitarians, on the other hand, felt that a Bushman reserve...
would be a good idea, since it would allow them to “live in peace” and maintain their lifestyles which were seen as important for “scientific study” (Gordon, 2009: 43–45).

Overall, Gordon saw what happened to Bushmen in the 1912–1915 period as a clear case of genocide. As he put it, “What was a small war for Germany was genocide for Bushmen” (Gordon, 2009: 47), and that, “This was a case of genocide by long-term stealth” (Gordon, 2009: 48). It should be noted that 1912–1915 in Namibia was an especially complex period. The rains had failed in northern Namibia in 1911–1912, and as a result, the region was experiencing one of its worst famines in history. As Gewald (2003: 217) noted, “As people desperately sought food, levels of violence increased and communities came to be broken up.” Large numbers of Ovambo and others moved south in a desperate effort to find food and employment. In addition, the beginning of the First World War in 1914 resulted in serious economic problems in Namibia, followed by the South African intervention, which led to the end of German rule in 1915.

The period of South African administration of South West Africa (1915–1989) had a number of implications for San peoples. Most important was a shift in state policy towards the San, particularly following the Second World War. As Taylor (2009: 426) noted, the South West African administration initiated a scheme to bring San under greater “protection” in 1947. Realizing that their attempts to address the “Bushman problem” through violence and coercion had failed, new measures were proposed, aimed at “befriending the Bushmen,” through the government’s Native Commissioners’ provisions of tobacco, salt, and maize meal (Dieckmann, 2003: 59; Taylor, 2009: 426). “Bushman guards” were established at various settlements in the Kavango region to maintain law and order, conserve wildlife, protect Bushmen from other groups, and to encourage Bushmen to become sedentary, adopt agriculture, and practice livestock husbandry (Taylor, 2009: 426). There was a two-fold purpose in sedentarizing Bushmen: (1) encouraging them to alter their lifestyles and in so doing, make them more “law-abiding,” and (2) to draft Bushmen into the regional labor market, especially for the mines or the commercial farms.

In 1949, the South West African administration appointed a two-person Commission for the Preservation of the Bushmen. It was chaired by a former Stellenbosch University professor, Peter J. Schoeman, who was one of the individuals seen as an architect of apartheid, of “separate development,” in South Africa (Dieckmann, 2007: 59; Gordon, 2007). Schoeman was subsequently to become the chief Game Warden in Etosha Game Reserve, South West Africa’s most significant protected area. As Taylor (2009: 426) noted, this commission “had far-reaching effects on all Namibian San groups in terms of identity politics and land appropriation,” a point also echoed by Dieckmann (2007: 186). Schoeman helped popularize stereotypes of the Bushmen as pristine hunter-gatherers and as people capable of surviving in marginal environments through his writings on Bushmen, for example, Jagters van die Woestylnland (Hunters of the Desert Land) (Schoeman, 1951).

The Bushman Preservation Commission produced an interim report in September, 1951 in which two Bushmen reserves were recommended: one for Khaung (!Kung) and another for the “Heikom” (Hai//om). When the final report came out
in 1953, however, there was only one Bushman reserve recommended, that of “Bushmanland,” which was where the Ju/'hoansi and !Kung lived (Schoeman, 1953). The Hai//om, the largest San population in South West Africa, were not provided a reserve (Dieckmann, 2003: 59–60; 2007: 186, 189–191; LeRoux & White, 2004: 112–116). One reason for this decision was that the Hai//om were seen by Schoeman as not being “real Bushmen.” They spoke Khoekhoegowab, similar to the Nama and Damara languages, and many wore Western clothing, engaged in some agriculture, and kept dogs and livestock (LeRoux & White, 2004: 112–114). It is likely that the opinions of white farmers may also have played an important role in the final recommendations of the Commission, since they wanted “Bushman labor” (Dieckmann, 2007: 190). In addition, there was the fear that the Hai//om might hunt the wildlife in the Etosha Game Reserve to extinction, a common assertion by wildlife personnel and states for why indigenous peoples should have to leave protected areas.

In 1954, all but 12 Hai//om families who worked for Nature Conservation were forced to move out of Etosha. The rest either had to resettle in Owamboland or on white commercial farms east and south of the reserve (Widlok, 1999: 25–27; Gordon & Douglas, 2000: 165; Dieckmann, 2003: 60, 2007: 186ff.). According to Dieckmann (2007: 192), the Native Commissioner of Owamboland told the Hai//om that they “had to leave the reserve for the sake of the game,” and would be allowed to return only if they possessed a permit. The similarities between this discourse and that used by the government of Botswana in the case of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in the period between 1986 and 2002 could not be more striking (Sapignoli, 2012).

In the mid-1950s, the Bushmen and other peoples in Namibia were under the administrative oversight of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (L. Marshall, 1976: 13; Thomas, 2006: 279). Prior to 1953, as Lorna Marshall (1976: 13) pointed out, Bushmanland was considered “Crown Land” which meant that it was “closed to white settlers and Bantu.” In 1954, the issuing of the South West African Native Affairs Administration Act laid out the bureaucratic structure under which Bushmen and other “native peoples” fell. In this system, the Bushmen had no right to self-representation, no leader recognized by the South West African Administration, and no say about what could be done to the land (Biesele & Hitchcock, 2011: 9).

In the 1950s, the practice of “black-birding” (abducting workers by means of deception and kidnapping), was relatively common, extending into remote parts of Namibia (L. Marshall, 1976: 60; Gordon & Douglas 2000: 169–171). Some of the people pressed into service as workers in the mines were Bushmen, who were represented by the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association as having particular qualities of use in the diamond industry, notably their “sharp eyesight” and “keen sense of detail” (Employment Bureau of Africa representative, personal communication, September 2005).

In 1959–1960 the government of South West Africa established an administrative center at Tsumkwe in the area that was designated as a Bushman Reserve by the Schoeman Commission (L. Marshall, 1976: 60–61; Gordon & Douglas, 2000: 160–167). This was the only area in the country in which San were granted
“customary rights” to land under existing South West African law. Many of the people in the area moved to Tsumkwe to take advantage of the food and jobs that were promised. The first borehole was drilled in Tsumkwe in 1961. By 1964, there were at least 4 gardens maintained by Ju/'hoansi in Tsumkwe. Goats were introduced by the South West African administration in 1965 in Tsumkwe, and 9 people obtained them on the understanding that they would give the progeny back to Claude McIntyre, the Bushman Affairs Commissioner, who would then redistribute them to other people (John Marshall, personal communication, 1987).

In 1962, the government of South Africa appointed a Commission of Enquiry into South West African Affairs, sometimes referred to as the Odendaal Commission. In the plan that was developed by the Odendaal Commission, the “native reserves” in Namibia were consolidated into ethnic homelands. These homelands were organized along tribal lines (e.g. Hereroland for the Herero, Owamboland for the Ovambo, Damaland for the Damara), but they were all ultimately under South African government control. Fig. 2 shows the Odendaal Plan for South West Africa. One area, known as Bushmanland (“Boesmanland”) was set aside for the Bushmen. Bushmanland, however, was considered different from the other ethnic homelands, in that the people living there did not have any right to oversee their own affairs. The Odendaal Commission “created a situation where, according to census figures, only 7.62 percent of the people classified as ‘Bushmen’ were living in Bushmanland” (Widlok, 1999: 23).

The government of South West Africa declared Bushmanland as an official homeland for the Bushmen in 1970. The idea behind this declaration was that this area would be not just for the original inhabitants, the Ju/'hoansi and !Kung, but for all of the Bushmen in the country. At the time, the Ju/'hoansi and the !Kung together represented less than 3 percent of the total population of Bushmen in the country (John Marshall, personal communication, 1987; Suzman, 2001b: 5). The Ju/'hoansi were located in the eastern part of Bushmanland, in the area described by Lorna Marshall (1960: 325–327; 1976: 12, 18–22) as Nyae Nyae, while the !Kung were found primarily in western Bushmanland. The two San groups both speak the Ju language. The Ju/'hoansi and !Kung are part of a large ethno-linguistic group of San (Barnard, 1992: 39–47), who speak what Bleek (1929) described as “northern” Bushman languages. According to interviews of !Kung and Ju/'hoansi, there are differences between them that are both linguistic and cultural. They do, however, have much in common, and both groups had lived for generations in the area that became Bushmanland.\(^3\)

The !Kung consist of three main ethno-linguistic groups: the Central !Kung or Ju/'hoansi of northwestern Botswana and eastern Namibia, the Northern !Kung or !Xun of Angola and northern Namibia, and the Southern !Kung or //Au//eisi (Kao/'aesi) of the northern Ghanzi area of Botswana (Barnard, 1992: 39, 45–47). The main San groups occupying the Bushmanland area in the 1950s and 1960s were the Ju/'hoansi and the !Kung. As will be discussed below, the !Xun and Khwe were to come to the area later, in the 1970s, through the efforts of the South African Defense Force and the South West African Administration. It should also be noted that there were other peoples who were residing in or utilizing the land and resources of Bushmanland, some of whom were there because of the
administrative center at Tsumkwe, which was established in 1959–1960. Over the past decade, there has been a sizable increase in the numbers of other peoples in the region, including Herero, Damara, Kavango and Ovambo. Some of them have sought land from the Traditional Authorities in the area, and others have simply established themselves in places where they sometimes, but not always, asked permission from local community members.
The Bushmen of southern Africa have been the subjects of much myth-making and speculation, and their identities have been shaped both by themselves and by others, including academics, policy-makers, non-government organizations, filmmakers, and the military (Gordon & Douglas, 2000; J. Marshall, 2003; Taylor, 2007; 2008; 2009; Battistoni & Taylor, 2009; Francis & Francis, 2010). As Widlok (1999: 42) points out, San in southern Africa continue to be subjected to ethnic stereotyping. He goes on to say, “More fundamentally, their own ways of defining and managing their identity are restricted by the ethnic ascriptions of the dominant groups in Namibia” (Widlok, 1999: 42). While some San in Namibia self-identify as members of specific groups (e.g. !Xun, Hai//om, Khwe, Ju’/hoansi), for others identities are flexible and depend on who they interact with, or what their objectives are in defining themselves in certain ways.

Research on San populations has shown the tremendous diversity that exists in their social systems, subsistence, land use patterns, language, religion, and cosmology (Barnard, 1992; Guenther, 2000; Suzman, 2001a; 2001b; Hohmann, 2003a; 2003c; Hitchcock et al., 2006). There is also significant variation in the circumstances under which various San groups live in Namibia, with over half of the San in the country residing on commercial farms, others living in towns or urban areas, and still others in the communal areas of the country where they tend to be minorities (Suzman 2001b; Harring & Odendaal, 2006a). In addition, there are San residing in protected areas, notably Etosha National Park in Kunene Region and Bwabwata National Park in Caprivi Region (Suzman, 2001b: 53–59; Boden, 2003; Orth, 2003; Lawry & Hitchcock, 2011).

Historically, San who lived on the alienated land (turned over to private use or given to the state) were required either to become laborers on the farms of other groups, or move to the towns or the crowded communal areas (Harring, 2004: 44–46; Harring & Odendaal, 2006a). The communal areas, which in the past were called native areas, cover 298,200 sq km, or about 36.07 percent of Namibia (Table 1). Approximately two fifths of the country was designated as

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<th>Land tenure category</th>
<th>Size (km²)</th>
<th>Percentage of the country</th>
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<tr>
<td>Communal land</td>
<td>298,200</td>
<td>36.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commercial land (freehold)</td>
<td>356,700</td>
<td>43.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation area (parks and game reserves, etc.)</td>
<td>116,000</td>
<td>14.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other government and parastatal uses</td>
<td>32,400</td>
<td>3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban usage</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other uses</td>
<td>16,180</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>826,680</td>
<td>100</td>
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Data obtained from Mendelsohn et al. (2009) and the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Government of the Republic of Namibia.
commercial land which comprises some 356,700 sq km, or about 43.15 percent of the total surface area of the country. Some 116,000 sq km, or 14.03 percent of the land in Namibia was taken by the state for conservation purposes. The total area of the country is 826,680 sq km. According to the 1991 Namibia census, there were 12,921 San on commercial farms (47.5%), 14,024 in communal areas (51.5%), and 284 in urban areas (1%) in the distribution breakdown (Suzman, 2001b: 6).

Two important factors affecting the distribution, identities, and well-being of San peoples in Namibia were the state and the military. In the Namibian and Angolan wars of independence, San groups were subjected to enormous pressure, resulting in some San seeking refuge in other countries, joining one or the other militaries that were operating in areas where they were living, or seeking to sublimate their identities by moving into non-San communities where they engaged in various kinds of labor, intermarrying, and creating other kinds of alliances. The !Xun and Khwe of southern Angola are cases in point. When the civil war in Angola expanded into the southeastern part of the country in the early 1970s, many !Xun and Khwe moved into towns. Some of them were kidnapped and pressed into service as laborers or security guards for the guerilla forces, the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) and UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola). Others were incorporated into the Portuguese military forces, in part because they were seen as possessing extensive knowledge of “bushcraft,” that is, how to survive in the bush. !Xun and Khwe who I interviewed in Caprivi and West Bushmanland in 1995 and 2001 told me that they joined the guerillas and the Portuguese military, because (1) they felt that they had little choice, (2) they were able to get a certain measure of protection as well as food and other goods, and (3) in some cases they were also able to get support and protection for their wives and children. The disadvantage of joining the guerillas or the Portuguese, they said, revolved around the fact that taking sides put them in complex positions, exposed them to danger, and gave the impression to other groups that they could not be trusted.

The !Xun and Khwe were well aware of the ways in which their identities were being constructed by the MPLA, UNITA, and the Portuguese. Some of them said that they were worried about the fact that some of the skills that were attributed to them, such as their tracking abilities and knowledge of how to find their way around in the bush, were overstated. As Battistoni & Taylor (2009: 120) pointed out, however, “The social benefits of increased status and authority deriving from San being designated as locally knowledgeable and valuable trackers were probably also compelling motives for joining the Portuguese army.” They were also deeply concerned that they were being seen by Angolan liberation forces as “collaborators,” “terrorists,” or “traitors.”

In the 1970s, sizable numbers of !Xun and Khwe were killed or forced out of southern Angola, some of them crossing into Zambia, Namibia, and Botswana as refugees (Robins et al., 2001: 8; Brinkman, 2005; Taylor, 2009: 432). For the purposes of this paper, the author defines a refugee as a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, (a) is outside the
country of his or her nationality and is unable, or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country, or (b) not having a country of nationality, is outside their country of his or her former habitation and is unable or by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country. Refugees are, by definition, those people who have crossed an international border (United Nations 1951: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). The numbers of !Xun and Khwe who crossed into Namibia in 1974 are unknown, but informants in Namibia estimated that there were “several thousand.”

Some !Xun and Khwe, already in the military, were relocated to military bases in Caprivi, one of which was Omega. When asked whether they moved to Omega voluntarily, several people said that they did so because, “The army told us that we had to go.” As an elderly !Xun woman said in a discussion with Julie Taylor on 21 August 2006, “In Angola we were suffering; there was [armed conflict]. P.W. Botha brought us [here] from Angola … the Boers told us we’d die [there] if we didn’t leave” (Taylor 2009: 432; Battistoni & Taylor, 2009: 121). According to people to whom the author spoke in Caprivi in 1995, as many as 1,000–2,000 !Xun, also called Vasekela by local people, were brought by the SADF to Omega and other bases in Caprivi between 1974 and 1978. There were also Khwe from Angola, who the South Africans referred to as Barakwena, who were moved to the bases in Caprivi, notably Omega. Some of the Khwe were later moved to the West Bushmanland (Tsumkwe West) area.

The SADF had enormous impacts both on the well being and the imagery surrounding the San of Angola and Namibia. Recruiting !Xun, Khwe, and other San into the SADF began in the early 1970s, although some individuals who had family members in the military told me that the SADF may have been engaging the services of San in Angola in the late 1960s. The skills of the San as trackers, fighters, and as “first-rate soldiers” were extolled by South African military personnel (Breytenbach, 1997). San were romanticized and essentialized by the SADF, who saw them as “hunter-gatherers” who lived “an innocent and idyllic life” that was “in harmony with nature” (e.g. Breytenbach, 1997: 83; cf. Lee, 1986; Sharp & Douglas, 1996). For their part, the !Xun and Khwe who were part of the SADF had various views of themselves, ranging from “people who needed to eat” to “indigenous peoples” exploited by all of the institutions and peoples that they interacted with (interview data, Caprivi, 1995; Tsumkwe, 2001). The !Xun and Khwe saw “the Bushman soldier myth” (Taylor, 2009: 433) that was developed by the SADF, journalists, film-makers, and politicians as dangerous, fearing that it could lead to retribution by other groups and the state once Namibia achieved independence.

In 1974, Bushman Battalion 31 (later the 201 Battalion) was established by the SADF in Caprivi. It is unclear whether both !Xun and Khwe were in this unit. Some sources argue that both groups were in the same unit (Sharp & Douglas, 1996; Taylor, 2009: 433), while others (e.g. some former SADF officers with whom the author communicated in 2011) said that the two groups were in different units. Battistoni & Taylor (2009: 122) pointed out that the SADF, seeking to keep the image alive of the SADF’s “crack ethnic unit” kept the !Xun and Khwe together. Robbins (2007: 29–30) cited information from Scholtz van Wyk,
the commander of Battalion 203 (former Battalion 36), a former lieutenant-colonel in the SADF, who said that Battalion 31 contained !Xun from Angola and Khwe from Caprivi and elsewhere, and had its headquarters at Omega in West Caprivi. There was no Khwe soldier, van Wyk said, in Battalion 36 based in Bushmanland (Robbins, 2007: 29–30, 40). In interviews I conducted with !Xun and Khwe in Caprivi in 1995, and Tsumkwe, M’Kata, Mangetti Dune, and Omatako in 2001, I was told that !Xun and Khwe soldiers were in different units, although I did hear a variety of opinions on this issue.

In 1978, the SADF established military bases in Bushmanland, where another Bushman Battalion (32, later the 203 Battalion) was posted. As Robins, Madzudzo, & Brenzinger (2001: 66) noted, most of the 4,000 !Xun sent to West Bushmanland by the SADF were Mpungu !Xun, although there were some Vasekela !Xun there, as well. The SADF had different views of the !Xun and the Khwe (Sharp & Douglas, 1996: 325). The !Xun, in the eyes of the SADF, did not demonstrate the military prowess exhibited by the Khwe. The SADF mostly used the !Xun as counter-insurgency forces or as “home guards,” whereas the Khwe were used in their cross-border raids into Angola and their conventional military operations. When the SADF began recruiting San in Bushmanland, !Xun were sent from Caprivi to serve as the core of the second Bushman battalion (Sharp & Douglas, 1996: 325). !Xun ex-soldiers in Bushmanland told me in 1992 that one of the reasons that the SADF sent them there was because the SADF felt that they would get along better with the resident Ju’hoansi and !Kung since “They spoke the same language.” Ironically, as Sharp & Douglas (1996: 325–326) noted, the San group that was most dependent on the SADF was the !Xun, but the SADF tended to provide greater assistance to the Khwe because of their perceived military value, even though the SADF did not regard the Khwe as “proper Bushmen.” Some Khwe were also sent by the SADF to Bushmanland to assist in the training of new recruits. A chronology of events relating to the !Xun and Khwe and what happened to them over time, from the 1840s to the present, is presented in Appendix 1.

According to Lee & Hurlich (1982: 335), SADF personnel were posted to Bushmanland in the late 1970s and began work on military training and economic development activities, including assisting the !Xun and Khwe in livestock keeping. The military built roads and drilled boreholes in the area. The SADF’s goal was to settle family groups with livestock around each borehole in order to facilitate their becoming economically self sufficient.

John Marshall and Claire Ritchie arrived in Tsumkwe in July 1980. Social, economic, and health problems were apparent to them immediately. Some of the most common reasons that people went to the Tsumkwe clinic were for treatment for gunshot and stab wounds (John Marshall, Claire Ritchie, personal communications, 1987). Alcohol-related conflicts were common, adults and children suffered from nutritional and psychological stress, and many of the residents of Tsumkwe were despondent (J. Marshall & Ritchie, 1984; Ritchie, 1987). There were also some inter-group tensions between the !Xun, Khwe and the Ju’hoansi, where the latter viewed the former as invaders taking their land (John Marshall, personal communication, 1987; Claire Ritchie, personal communication, 1992;

As the Namibian civil war wound down in the late 1980s, the SADF discussed the available options for !Xun and Khwe soldiers. The !Xun and Khwe were told by the SADF that they may: (1) stay in Namibia, either in the Caprivi or Bushmanland, (2) resettle in South Africa, or (3) return to Angola. Given that fighting continued in Angola, most !Xun and Khwe did not want to return there. Intense discussions ensued among the !Xun and Khwe in both Caprivi and Bushmanland. Individuals and families weighed their options: move to South Africa where they could hopefully continue to be supported by the SADF and the South African state, stay in Namibia, where they might face retribution, or leave the military bases and the support system they represented and move elsewhere to Botswana, Zambia, or elsewhere in Namibia.

One of the questions that arises about this process was whether the !Xun and Khwe were made fully aware of the implications of their decisions. By leaving the military and residing in Namibia, they were “leaving the fold” as it were, with no more salary, clothing, food, housing, health care, and education for their families from the SADF. If they opted to stay in Namibia, they could only hope that the transition to majority rule would not bring with it retribution for their collaboration with the SADF and the South West Africa Territorial Force established in 1980. The !Xun, coming mainly from Angola, had few kinship links with local people in Caprivi. The Khwe, on the other hand, had a fairly sizable number of relatives residing in Caprivi.

The South African military planned what was called “Operation Mattras,” the relocation of those !Xun and Khwe who opted to go to South Africa, for March 1990. Some 4,000 !Xun and Khwe soldiers and their families took advantage of the SADF’s relocation plan. Sharp & Douglas (1996: 323) pointed out that, “The motive for this relocation was highly ambiguous, as was the question of whether the people involved came to South Africa voluntarily or not.” The SADF maintained that the San were given “a totally free choice.” On the other hand, SADF personnel did say to the San that they might face difficulties in Namibia, if they opted to stay there. As it turned out, over half of the people in the two “Bushman battalions” decided to stay in Namibia and to take their chances. Those who went to South Africa were settled in Schmidtsdrift, a farm in the Northern Cape near Kimberley. Most of the !Xun who opted to stay in Namibia, stayed in Bushmanland, according to van Wyk as noted in Robbins (2007: 32). The Khwe, once they were demobilized, who opted to stay in Namibia mainly resided in the Caprivi, many in Omega.

The two San groups that the SADF worked with most closely were the !Xun, often referred to as Vasekela and Mpungu, and the Khwe, called Barakwena. There were members of other San groups in the SADF as well, including !Kung, Hai//om, Ju/'hoansi, and //Au//eisi. Scholtz van Wyk, appointed Officer in Charge of 203 Battalion in Bushmanland in 1988, worked with !Xun, Khwe, and Ju/'hoansi. He and a colleague, Callie Sanders (Officer in Charge, 201 Battalion, formerly 31 Battalion), based in Omega, spent over a year in negotiations and planning with the !Xun and Khwe for the resettlement of 1988–1989 (Omega Veterans Association website www.omega-vets.com, accessed June 25, 2011: 31/201 Bush-
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men Battalion). Relatively little was known publically of these units because of their clandestine nature, although more information is now available, some of it on the worldwide web, for example, SAMagte Klub-SAForces Club website (www.samagte.co.za, accessed June 26, 2011). In March, 1990, van Wyk was named Officer in Charge of the newly founded 31 South African Infantry Battalion at Schmidtsdrift, until its disbandment 3 years later. He worked closely with the people in the 31 Battalion and their families, and sought to obtain state, civil society, and private sector support for the !Xun and Khwe.

One of the issues that the SADF struggled with was whether the decision to resettle on the part of the !Xun and Khwe was based on “free, prior, and informed consent,” in line with the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which Namibia voted in favor of in the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 2007. !Xun and Khwe who moved to South Africa and who stayed in Namibia told me that they felt they were given a choice, but that choice was complicated by the fact that they did not know what would happen to them if they decided to stay; some of them said that they wondered whether the SADF would remain committed to them as the political landscape changed in South Africa.

NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND LAND AND RESOURCE ISSUES

Namibia achieved its independence on 21 March 1990. Some of the activities in which the new SWAPO (South-West Africa People’s Organization)-led government of Namibia engaged, once it was established, included work on rehabilitation of the economy, the demobilization of soldiers, the transformation of the roles of traditional authorities, land tenure reform, and the re-organization of the various administrative units in the country (Wallace, 2011). Land reform was a major concern, given the inequality in land access and distribution in the country (Werner, 1993; 2001; Daniels, 2003; 2004; Harring, 2004; Harring & Odendaal, 2006b; Odendaal, 2006b). One of the first efforts of the new government was to begin planning for a major conference on land reform and the land question.

In order to abolish the token “homeland” local government legacy of the colonial South West Africa administration, the new government of Namibia began seeking to establish a new system of local governments and regional administrations. In line with a plan developed by a Delimitation Commission, the former tribal and ethnic homelands structure was eliminated and replaced with new regions that were defined on the basis of a number of factors including population, infrastructure, presence of municipalities, and economic viability.

The former racially divided municipal governments merged into single municipal councils, and 13 new regions replaced the communal administrations and former regions (Fig. 3). Each region had a Regional Commissioner, who served as an officer of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, a Chief Administrative Officer, and an elected council. The regions had advisory and planning authorities, and limited taxing capacities. The regional governments were not intended to fulfill service provision or production functions, which remained the responsibility of the central government ministries.
Between Namibian independence in March 1990 and the 1991 National Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question, the unclear status of communal lands in Namibia was in the forefront of the minds of nearly everyone in the country. Rumors flew of plans for pre-emptive government land allocations that would not take seriously either community organizations or longevity of tenure. It was a time of great insecurity for the San, who had little faith, given these rumors, that they would be treated any differently from other marginalized, already dispossessed Namibians. San were often reluctant to put forth their views about government decisions on land and resources for fear that they would not be taken seriously, or that they would be dismissed as “collaborators with the old regime.”

At the time of independence, the only area where San had at least de facto rights to land in Namibia was Bushmanland (Suzman, 2001b: xviii; Harring, 2004: 45; Harring & Odendaal, 2006a: 34). Bushmanland itself was smaller than the areas occupied originally by the indigenous peoples of the region, the !Kung and
the Ju/'hoansi. The Ju/'hoan territory, for example, was some 25,900 sq km (10,000 sq mi), stretching east from the Nyae Nyae Pans to Kauri near the Okavango Delta in Botswana, north to what is now the Kaudum National Park, south to /Gam, and west to the area around Mangetti Dune (L. Marshall 1960: 325–330; 1976: 18–22).(9)

After independence in Namibia, new administrative regions were formed, one of which was called Otjozondjupa (Fig. 4). This region incorporated areas of former Bushmanland, re-designated as Tsumkwe District, portions of what used to be Hereroland, commercial farms of Grootfontein, just to the west of Tsumkwe District, extending south and east to the town of Otjiwarongo, outside of which a large government of Namibia–United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) refugee camp, Osire, was located (Hitchcock, 2001).

Bushmanland, or Tsumkwe District, consists of two different areas, the eastern portion, known in the past as Nyae Nyae, now Tsumkwe District East (L. Marshall, 1976: 18–22), and the western part, which came to be called West Bushmanland, now Tsumkwe District West (Botelle & Rohde, 1995; Hitchcock, 2001; Hohmann, 2003b: 206, 214–215, 224–232; Bieselee & Hitchcock, 2011: 40–41, 43, 48). Fig. 5 shows Tsumkwe District and the various villages found in the area, along with the administrative center of the district, Tsumkwe, where the former Bushman Affairs Commissioner, Claude McIntyre, resided, beginning in 1959. Tsumkwe became the focus of Ju/'hoan settlement in the 1960s and 1970s (L. Marshall, 1976: 60–61; J. Marshall & Ritchie, 1984; Gordon & Douglas, 2000: 75–76). In 1978, as noted previously, the SADF chose Tsumkwe as another place to establish military bases as part of its campaign against SWAPO.
While the boundary between eastern and western Bushmanland (Tsumkwe) was unmarked, there were some geographic differences between the eastern and western portions of the area that had considerable significance to the people on the ground. The eastern part of Tsumkwe, which the Ju/'hoansi called N//oaq!'a or “area of broken rocks” had a feature that was unusual in the Kalahari Desert region: pans, low, clay-lined depressions that contained water which in some cases lasted throughout the year. Lorna Marshall (1976: 64) called them, “water holes … in which underground water wells up to the surface in outcroppings of the underlying rock.” Elizabeth Marshall Thomas, Lorna Marshall’s daughter, said in her book The Old Way (Thomas, 2006: 27) that, “In the 6,000 square miles known as Nyae Nyae, there were only seven waterholes that the Ju/'hoansi considered to be permanent.” She went on to say that these waterholes had not failed in living memory, even during serious droughts.

Tsumkwe West, on the other hand, while similar in some ways to areas further east, did not have permanent surface water sources. Wild resource densities tended to be lower in the area, and it had patches of a plant (Dichapetalum cym-soum) very poisonous to cattle, known in Afrikaans as gifblaar, in Setswana as mogau, and in Ju/'hoan as maqen. The area supported far fewer people than did Nyae Nyae to the east.

In the 1970s, prior to the establishment of military bases and resettlement of other groups there, Tsumkwe West was occupied by small groups of !Kung in the Omatako Valley or scattered elsewhere across the region, some Ju/'hoansi in the east, and a few Hai//om families who had moved there from the Grootfontein commercial farms. The area was used periodically by Ju/'hoansi from further
east for hunting and gathering purposes, and for the exploitation of some of the high value timber there.

In January 1991 the new government made surprise land allocations around the former military bases in Western Bushmanland that caused an outcry among the Ju/'hoansi of Eastern Bushmanland. Ju/'hoansi were justifiably afraid that a model of 5-hectare allocations to heads of families, all to be male, would quickly destroy their communal, egalitarian, extensive land use system based on traditional n!oresi territories. An information meeting was called in late January at Aasvoëlnes, a former SADF base on the border between the eastern and western portions of Bushmanland. Nyae Nyae Farmers Cooperative (NNFC) and !Kung, !Xun, and Khwe leaders stood in the heat, among straw blown from the disintegrating grass huts of former San soldiers, and asked why they had not been informed about the allocations.

“But they WERE informed about the allocations: it was on TV!” This comment was made by an Afrikaaner who was then schoolmaster of the tin-roofed Aasvoëlnes school. As Megan Biesele (personal communication, 2010) put it, “At the time the comment was made, approximately 2 of the 2000 Ju/'hoansi of Nyae Nyae had ever seen a TV, and then only rarely on trips to Windhoek with John Marshall.” The Ju/'hoansi also learned, much to their chagrin, that certain land “allocations,” prior to articulation of policy or legislation, had indeed been made quietly to inhabitants of Western Bushmanland by the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MLRR), now Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (MLR).

It should be noted that at this point, in 1990–1991, the ex-soldiers and their families in Bushmanland were facing what they felt was severe social and economic deprivation. With the departure of the SADF and loss of many of their relatives who had gone to South Africa, they were despondent. Some of them were literally starving after the departure of the SADF, and, like the Ju/'hoansi, they had very few televisions.

The government of Namibia, realizing that the departure of the SADF would cause difficulties for some of the people in various parts of the country, including West Caprivi and Bushmanland, established a resettlement and development program, implemented by the then MLRR, the Lutheran World Federation, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia (ELCIN). This program, which lasted from 1990 to 1995 in Caprivi and Bushmanland, had as its objectives: (1) resettlement of ex-soldiers and their families, (2) rehabilitation (that is, restoration of the livelihoods and well being of people), (3) provision of training in agriculture and livestock production, and (4) capacity-building (training of local people). The total expenditure on the Western Bushmanland resettlement program was US$1,167,000 (Kasita & Nujoma, 1995). One of the major problems with this resettlement project, according to some of the original settlers, was that it was heavily centralized. Coordination among the various organizations, according to information from informants interviewed in 1992, 1995, 2001, and 2009 was relatively weak. There was no emphasis placed, for example, on the establishment and enhancement of local governance systems or leadership.

The land use planning for the project was based in individual plot ownership
and on-the-plot residence along the lines of Ovambo and Kavango farmers (Jansen et al., 1994: 7). It came as a surprise to the resettlers when they saw the long and narrow plots that had been laid out by the project authorities. They worried about the shape of the plots, which they felt were inefficient. In addition, 600 hectares of grazing land were set aside for livestock raising, which some livestock-owners felt was too small an area for their cattle, goats, and other animals.

Farmers were able to get token certificates drafted by the resettlement organization, ELCIN, but it was unclear to people whether the government of Namibia would recognize these certificates. Questions were raised as to whether local people had de jure (legal) rights over the land or whether the rights were based on usufructuary (customary) principles and therefore open to question under Namibian land law. As a result, there was a fairly high level of insecurity felt by some people in the region with regard to land tenure.

Allocations in fact started in the form of 5-hectare plots to male heads of households. Many of the Western Bushmanland people went along with the allocations, thinking they were being given garden plots to use in addition to “the bush” in general, never dreaming that these plots might be both their first and final chance to gain access to communal land in Namibia. The distress that the !Xun and Khwe felt over this issue led to their eventual participation, along with the NNFC, the Ju’hoansi’s community-based organization founded originally in 1986, in the National Land Conference in mid-1991.

For the moment, it remained unclear whether the allocation model used in Western Bushmanland would apply to other communal lands in Namibia. The uncertainty gave added impetus to the NNFC’s preparation for the National Land Conference. Later, during the Land Conference and its aftermath, this allocation model was called into question by local groups and by non-government organizations. They argued that local, time-tested traditional land use patterns and extended-family distribution of resources were much more likely than this model to produce a living on Kalahari sand. They pointed out that the new MLR may have been generalizing from a Namibian model, but one which presupposed a riverine environment such as the Okavango far to the north. They asked for long-used subsistence activities, such as hunting and gathering, to be given status as recognized forms of land use. They also pointed out the social and gender implications of the 5-hectare policy, and asked for attention to be paid in land allocation to varying types of family arrangements, including female-headed households and extended families.

In the Western Bushmanland case, as in many other cases for potential land allocation in Namibia, this model was inappropriate for several reasons. First, San were concerned that dividing the land along these lines would disrupt their traditional, communally based system of territories, known as n’oresi to the Ju’hoansi (for a discussion of the Ju’hoan system of resource management, see Biesele & Hitchcock, 2011: 54–59). Second, they were concerned that the policy had a gender bias, giving males rights over land and not females. The Ju’hoansi, described in anthropological literature as some of the “least sexist” societies known (Draper, 1975), were incensed that the policy might exacerbate tensions between
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men and women and privilege one gender over another. Third, the Ju/'hoansi did not use fences to divide the land, seeing fences as resulting in exclusivity, which could lead to conflicts with people’s neighbors. As a Ju/'hoan man from Nyae Nyae asked, “How could we find our food if our neighbors fenced it off from us?” He went on to say, “We have to know the land well and be able to look for our food when it ripens, if necessary in all directions.” Finally, the Ju/'hoansi were worried that two different systems of land tenure and land use in Western and Eastern Bushmanland would potentially cause conflicts between the largely immigrant and heterogeneous population in the west and the more homogeneous Ju/'hoansi population in the east.

Awareness of the threat the land policy posed to their society spread quickly just before the 1991 Land Conference. Because of the protests that arose at that time, the first wave of allocations was not allowed to proceed further east towards Nyae Nyae. In the Land Conference, which was held in late June and early July 1991, various groups put forth their positions on land and resource issues (Republic of Namibia, 1991). At the end of the communal lands alphabet was Vasekela, one of the San groups living in Western Bushmanland. A Vasekela leader, Alvita Victor, originally from Angola, invited by the NNFC to take one of their allocated spots at the Land Conference, stood up and said that his people supported all that the spokespersons for the Ju/'hoansi, Tsamkxao /Oma and Kiewiet (/Angn!ao) had said about the shared territory and resource system of the Ju/'hoansi. He went on to say that he and his people were unhappy about the division of land that had already taken place in their area, because the 5-hectare plots were too small.

On the last day of the Land Conference, after a video on land rights was shown, ending with an impassioned speech by Tsamkxao /Oma about the traditional Ju/'hoan n!oresi system and the need for communication among Namibians, Tsamkxao was given a final three minutes to speak. Tsamkxao said that he spoke not only for his own people but for others in the country who as yet had no voice. He said the Ju/'hoansi had a co-operative to protect their land, a constitution which provided against overgrazing, and plans to resettle suffering ex-farm workers back from Gobabis. As Land Conference Chairman Geingob raised his hand to announce the end of his three minutes, Tsamkxao delivered through the microphone his final word—a Ju/'hoan word containing a resounding click—a flourish that brought him great applause. The applause was repeated when his speech was translated into English. Shortly thereafter, Alvita Victor stood up again, and said that he now saw that the land allocation already in place in Western Bushmanland was illegal in the understanding of this Conference. Then he said “Ek is ontevrede!” (“I am dissatisfied!”), which he repeated loudly three times. This speech was aired on national TV in Namibia that evening. As Megan Biesele (personal communication, 1992) put it, “Victor went from a silent, church-attending military refugee to an international firebrand overnight.”
THE CHALLENGE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

Some of the people residing in Tsumkwe District were refugees; others were internally displaced peoples, some from inside Namibia, from such areas as Kavango, Caprivi, and the “4-O region” of Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshana, and Oshikoto. Still others were immigrants who moved into the area to take advantage of the boreholes that had been drilled by the SADF and later by the government of Namibia and the grazing nearby, e.g. Herero from further south and Kavango from the north. Because of the various in-migrations and settlement of individuals and families, the Tsumkwe West population was far more heterogeneous than that of Tsumkwe East.

An important difference between the two areas was that while the majority of the people in Tsumkwe East (76%) had been born there, this was only true for 4 percent of the population of Tsumkwe West (Botelle & Rohde, 1995: 110; Suzman 2001b: 40). A breakdown of the birthplaces of people in Tsumkwe West in the mid-1990s revealed that 4 percent were born in the area, 4 percent in Tsumkwe East, 54 percent elsewhere in Namibia, and 38 percent in Angola (Suzman 2001b: 40, Table 4.1). According to interview data collected in 2001, the predominant language spoken in Tsumkwe West was !Xun (80%). Ju/'hoan was spoken by approximately 10 percent of the population, and the other 10 percent spoke Khwe, Hai//om, Otjiherero, Kwangali, or Oshiwambo. As of November 2011, there were an estimated 6,000 people in Tsumkwe West, approximately half of whom were members of groups other than San, e.g. Kavango, Damara, Herero, and Ovambo (Lara Diez, personal communication, 2011).

Some of the people in Tsumkwe West were Ju/'hoansi who relocated there after they were required to leave the Kaudum Game Park when it was proclaimed a nature reserve in 1989, and later a national park in February, 2007. According to some people who had to leave Kaudum, they were forced out of the reserve with little consultation and without any compensation for their losses. This can be seen as an example of “conservation-forced displacement and resettlement” (for discussions of the displacement, see West et al., 2006; Cernea & Schmidt-Soltan, 2006; Oliver-Smith, 2009a: 9). As was the case with Etosha Game Reserve, now Etosha National Park, from which the Hai//om were expelled in 1954 (Dieckmann, 2003: 60–73; 2007: 186–204; Suzman, 2004), the Ju/'hoansi of Kaudum felt that their rights to land and resources had been forsaken by the government in the interests of tourism, conservation, and “national development.”

One of the issues that arose in the case of the resettlement of refugees and other people in Tsumkwe by the SADF was whether this can be seen as a case of voluntary resettlement or what has come to be known as “development-forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR)” (Oliver-Smith, 2009a; 2009b). DFDR is the process whereby people are forced to leave an area because of development. It is almost always permanent and it has wide-ranging effects, many of them negative, on the population(s) involved. Oliver-Smith (2009a: 12) pointed out that, “People facing DFDR must often cope with great uncertainty and a lack of information concerning their future, resulting in situations of considerable stress, disorientation and trauma. It is important to keep in mind that displacement is not
only a physical transfer to a new location, but it is also a process that sets in motion a series of events and transformations that fundamentally affect the ways of life of individuals, families and communities.” To paraphrase Gordon (2009: 41), (re)settlement involves not only physical movement but also a psychic domain: angst and other anxieties must be allayed for (re)settlers to be settled. It is well understood that people involuntarily displaced by development projects often suffer from severe alteration of their physical and social landscapes (Clark, 2009: 181). It is necessary, therefore, to take a human rights-based approach to the issue of resettlement, something that is not always done.\(^{(10)}\)

In discussing the issue of resettlement with people in Tsumkwe West, the author found that, perhaps not surprisingly, there was a variety of opinions on the subject. Some people felt that they had not had the opportunity to choose whether or not to resettle. They said that they were told that they were being moved by the SADF and they complied. In this sense, they said, the move was involuntary. Others said that they had been given a choice by the SADF, and that they exercised that choice to move when and where they did. Some of them opted not to resettle a second time, as was the case with those who opted not to go to South Africa in March 1990. Still others maintained that they had moved to Western Bushmanland, because they wanted get away from what they felt to be unfair working conditions on farms elsewhere in Namibia. Finally, there were those who said that they opted to resettle, because it “provided them with new opportunities.”

There are two major theoretical frameworks that deal with the involuntary resettlement and relocation process. The first is that of Thayer Scudder & Elizabeth Colson (1982; Scudder, 2005; 2009). In essence, Scudder & Colson saw four general stages relating to projects involving resettlement:

Stage 1. Planning for resettlement (and mitigation) before removal.
Stage 2. Coping with the initial drop in living standards that tends to follow removal.
Stage 3. Initiating economic development and community-formation activities.
Stage 4. Handing over a sustainable resettlement process to the second generation of resettlers and to non-project authority institutions.

Scudder (2009: 3) points out that in the early stages of resettlement, living standards of the majority can be expected to decline. For this reason, Scudder (2009: 3) argued that a combined compensation and development approach was necessary to restore or improve living standards.

International experience with large-scale infrastructure involving resettlement has shown that compensation alone is insufficient (World Commission on Dams, 2000; Scudder, 2005; Cernea & Mathur, 2008). One must provide local people with development support and opportunities. At the same time, the development work that takes place must be (1) sustainable over the long-term, (2) multi-faceted, and (3) socially and culturally relevant.

The second major theoretical model dealing with resettlement is that of Cernea (1997; 2009) who developed the “impoverishment, risks, and reconstruction (IRR)” framework. The eight risks of the model are as follows: (1) landlessness, (2) joblessness, (3) homelessness, (4) marginalization, (5) food insecurity, (6) increased morbidity (sickness) and mortality, (7) loss of access to common property assets,
In order to offset these risks and to prevent impoverishment from occurring among the people who are resettled, efforts must be made to ensure that project-affected peoples are direct beneficiaries. Some of the ways to do this include: (1) benefit-sharing programs, (2) setting up and running development funds, (3) the use of windfall economic rent generated by the exploitation of natural resources, and (4) allowing for the use of a portion of the project’s normal stream of benefits to reconstruct project-affected people’s livelihoods at higher-than-displacement levels (Cernea, 2009: 55).

If we examine the cases of resettlement that have been carried out in Namibia since the early 1970s, we can identify several trends which these two theoretical models are relevant to. First, some of the resettlement that occurred was involuntary. The !Xun and Khwe who were affected by the conflicts in southern Angola in the early 1970s felt that they had little choice but to leave the area given the conditions that prevailed at the time. Some of my informants in Caprivi and Tsumkwe said in 1995 and 2001 that what they faced in Angola in the early 1970s was genocide. They said that they were the targets of both the liberation forces and the Portuguese, who were out to destroy them for “who they were.” They made the decision to move to other countries, including Zambia, Namibia, and, to a lesser extent, Botswana, because they feared for their lives. Second, the fact that some of them joined the SADF meant that they were required to go along with the commands of the senior military personnel. If those senior military personnel ordered them to move to military bases in Caprivi or Bushmanland, they felt that they had to do so; otherwise they would be seen as disobeying orders.

Many of my informants said that they were not involved in the decisions about their resettlement, but they were told what they might expect once they were resettled. In terms of the resettlement models, some of the !Xun and Khwe did see their living standards decline after they were resettled. At first, however, they continued to receive their salaries and were provided with food, clothing, and shelter. It was only after a period of time, notably when the SADF decided to pull out of Namibia, that their living standards dropped precipitously.

In order to offset the decline in living standards, some of the ex-soldiers and their dependents opted to take part in the government of Namibia-ELCIN resettlement and rehabilitation program that was implemented between 1990 and 1995. Since the most comprehensive component of the MLRR-ELCIN project related to agriculture, people attempted to take advantage of the information, tools, and seeds made available to them. There were a number of problems with the agricultural activities, ranging from lack of agricultural input provision, such as seeds, fertilizers, and tools including hoes, to the centralized system for plowing using tractors, which meant that people were dependent on outside agencies and non-local technology.

In Tsumkwe District West in the mid-1990s, there were some 700 fields, 423 of them resettlement plots and 277 self-allocated fields. In 1994, some 525 hectares of land were under cultivation. Most of the land that was not cleared was due, at least in part, according to local people, because of labor and technologi-
cal constraints (Ruud Jansen, personal communication, 1995). The families that were involved in agriculture had cleared trees and brush from approximately one hectare of land on average, and they were raising crops on 0.75 hectares (Jansen et al., 1994: 10). Given expected yields of between 120 and 400 kilograms of grain per hectare (according to estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Forestry), most people in Tsumkwe West were not self-sufficient. According to the various organizations operating in Tsumkwe West, residents of the area were meeting only a third of their food needs in 1994–1995 (Ruud Jansen, personal communication, 1995; Botelle and Rohde, 1995; information from ELCIN and the MLRR, 1995).

The government of Namibia, through its MLRR-ELCIN resettlement and rehabilitation program of 1990–1995, attempted to mitigate some of the effects of the loss of employment, incomes, and health and educational benefits that the !Xun and Khwe received from the SADF. The program was only marginally successful, according to project evaluations and to informants in Tsumkwe West. Among the problems with the project were that (1) it was top-down in nature, (2) it was largely non-participatory, with San resettlers having only a few of the 55 jobs in the program, all of them low-level, (3) the San had no say in decision-making about program implementation, and (4) the agricultural component of the project, ostensibly its centerpiece, saw only a portion of the resettled population taking part, not so much, people said, because of their lack of desire to try agriculture, but rather because of the way the program was designed (Jansen et al., 1994; Botelle & Rohde, 1995; Hitchcock field data, 1995). Finally and perhaps most importantly, as Botelle & Rohde (1995: 126) pointed out, “The limited success of the program was a direct consequence of its almost complete disregard for existing community institutions, structures and desires.” The lack of adequate inputs, combined with lack of participation of resettlers, inappropriate management structures, limited pre-project research and needs assessments, and the overall complexity of the program contributed to the resettlement and rehabilitation project’s failure to meet most of its objectives.

In the period between 1995, when the MLRR-ELCIN program ceased, and 1998, a number of !Xun and, to a lesser extent, Khwe families and individuals opted to move from Caprivi to West Bushmanland. They did this in part because some of them had relatives there, but also because of the feelings that they had of insecurity in Caprivi. In October 1998 the tensions in Caprivi increased with the discovery of what were said to be armed activists of the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) meeting in secret in Mudumu National Park. The Namibian Defense Force carried out security sweeps throughout Caprivi, targeting people suspected of having sympathies for the secessionist movement and with UNITA forces who had been coming across the border from Angola into Caprivi to exchange wild game meat for maize meal and other goods. House to house searches were conducted, and reportedly people in West Caprivi villages were harassed and beaten.

Eventually, some 3,000 people, many of them Khwe, and a few !Xun, crossed the border into Botswana as refugees. Some of the refugees, including Khwe Chief Kipi George, were housed in the Dukwe refugee camp in northeastern Botswana (Boden, 2003). There were some 600 Khwe in Dukwe in March 1999.
(Alice Mogwe, Ditshwanelo, personal communication, 1999). Many of them were repatriated to Namibia between March and July 1999. The repatriation process stopped, when, on 2 August 1999, CLA personnel attacked strategic sites in Katima Mulilo. Subsequently, Khwe and other San crossed into Botswana again beginning in January 2000, after a series of attacks by UNITA soldiers in Caprivi. These events contributed significantly to the ways in which Khwe and other San were characterized by the Namibian security forces and the Namibian state, that they were “secessionist sympathizers.” In fact, very few Khwe were in support of the secessionist movement.

In 2001, the author was asked to conduct an assessment of the potential impacts of the proposed relocation of Namibia’s main refugee camp, Osire, to the M’Kata area of Tsumkwe West (Hitchcock, 2001). In the course of this research, I was able to obtain information on the incomes, subsistence, and employment activities of a sample of households in Tsumkwe West. Combining this information with data from previous work in the region in 1987, 1992, and 1995, along with published and unpublished literature, a rough picture of the socioeconomic situation in Tsumkwe West emerged (Hohmann, 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2003b; Pakleppa, 2001; 2002; 2004; Botelle & Rohde, 1995; Suzman, 2001a; 2001b; and minutes of the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy Management Committee). In general, incomes of households in Tsumkwe West were very low, averaging less than N$1,000 and many of them under N$200. A sizable number of people said that they were poor and struggling to get enough food to eat and cash to buy necessities.

Most Tsumkwe West households had diversified livelihoods, combining cash generated from short-term work and craft sales with agriculture and livestock production. The degree to which people in Tsumkwe West depend on foraging is unknown, but it is likely that the amounts of wild plants and animals obtained for subsistence purposes is much less than is the case for Nyae Nyae (Wiessner, 2003). Approximately half of the interviewed individuals (N=140) said that they regularly gathered wild plant foods, and 10 percent of them said that they had engaged in hunting, scavenging, or collecting wild fauna in the previous two years.

About 25 percent of the Tsumkwe District West households had small herds of cattle, goats, and donkeys. Livestock production is affected by water availability, grazing, and browse conditions, which vary considerably by season and location. Livestock owners must also contend with predators, including lions, leopards, cheetahs, hyenas, and wild dogs. Another constraint that the livestock-owners and managers face is livestock disease, including tick-borne diseases. Although there was an outbreak of lungsickness, contagious bovine pleuropleumonia, that occurred just across the border in Botswana in 1995, it did not spread to the Tsumkwe District in Namibia. Cattle and other livestock have, however, died from consuming poisonous plants and possibly from eating bones that contained botulism (Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Rural Development, 2001).

People in Tsumkwe are not able to sell livestock to commercial buyers in Windhoek or other large towns in central Namibia, because they are located above what is known as the Red Line, the veterinary cordon fence that cuts across the southern part of Tsumkwe District. This fence follows the western boundary of
the district and the Grootfontein Farms, and then cuts west, separating the northern communal areas from the commercial farming area to the south. This fence, erected for control of foot-and-mouth disease and other livestock diseases, has significant political symbolism, and has been the subject of much debate in Namibia in recent years.

Some government officials interviewed during the course of this study blamed the plight of the people of Tsumkwe West on their inability to learn to farm. This perception is belied by the evidence of farming activities among the !Xun, Khwe, Ju/'hoansi and other groups, who not only have extensive knowledge of farming techniques and crops but who also employ innovative farming practices. People interviewed about agriculture in Tsumkwe District West revealed that they selected the places for planting carefully, based on an assessment of soil types, drainage, slope, and exposure to wind. They chose crops to plant on the basis of past experience, knowledge of crop productivity, drought susceptibility and tolerance. They often planted a mix of crops, anticipating some to fall victim to drought, disease, or predation by pests. They staggered their planting, putting in crops at various times. They also planted crops in several different places, thus employing a kind of spatial diversification strategy as a means of buffering against risk.

In line with some aspects of the impoverishment, risks, and reconstruction (IRR) model (Cernea, 1997), some of the people in Tsumkwe West said that they were worse off after the resettlement than they were before. A sizable number of them lived below the poverty line. Many felt that they were impoverished, and they complained of joblessness, food insecurity, and landlessness. Some people received land, they said, but were uncertain of the tenure status, not having been given Namibian government Permission to Occupy (PTO) forms or other certificates. Some of them were sick, and said that their health worsened after they moved to Tsumkwe. Some spoke of the loss of relatives, especially children, to disease, e.g. malaria. A sizable number of people said that they felt marginalized, and that the Namibian government was not as concerned about their needs and problems as it could be.

It should be noted that some households in Tsumkwe District were given food relief from the Namibian government. Some elderly received pensions (N$450 per month, roughly US$60 in 2011). There are also people in Tsumkwe West who receive remittances as funds sent to people in the area from relatives or friends working outside of the area, such as in the mines. Some households received packets of seeds and fertilizer from the Namibian Red Cross Society, or, in some cases, the Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Forestry: 4 kilograms of maize seed, 20 kilograms of fertilizer, and 20 grams of various kinds of vegetable seeds were provided, theoretically enough to feed 50 people. Approximately a third of the income of the people in the region came from a combination of wage employment and food relief. Some residents generated income through the production and sale of ostrich eggshell bead necklaces, leather items, and other crafts, which they sold directly to the few tourists who visited the area or at the Grashoek Living Museum and Campsite, a Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy cultural tourism enterprise that was established in 2004. A substantial proportion of these crafts were manufactured from natural resources obtained in the area. Natural
resources are also utilized for purposes of energy (wood for fuel), thatching of huts (grass), building (wood, termite earth and dung used for making mud for house construction), medicines, and food (approximately half of the households collected wild plant foods).

There have been conflicts over the individual uses to which natural resources should be put. Some people chose to cut down *kiaat* (*Pterocarpus angolensis*, African Teak), *mangetti* (also known as *mongongo*, *Ricinodendron rautanenii*), and *marula* (*Sclerocarya birrea*) trees in order to make stools, pestles, and other items, whereas others preferred to keep these trees in tact so they would continue to bear fruits and nuts. The treatment of wood resources was an issue discussed at length in the communities, in part because some of the species that were considered valuable were seen as declining in number. Some people proposed to make certain trees off-limits, something that people said had worked to preserve *baobab* trees (*Adansonia digitata*) in the past. A locally observed rule was that people who were going out from the villages to collect plants had to seek permission of the appropriate local land manager, called the *n!ore kxao* by the Ju/'hoansi, before foraging in that person’s area.

**RESETTLEMENT MODELS AND PRACTICES**

In line with the Scudder-Colson (1982) model, resettled individuals in Tsumkwe District initiated various kinds of income generation and food production activities in an effort to sustain themselves. They also took advantage of government policies in an effort to gain greater control over land and resources.\(^{(13)}\)

An important piece of legislation, passed in 1996 in Namibia, was the *Nature Conservation Amendment Act*, which allowed for the establishment of community-based natural resource management projects in communal areas of the country (Weaver et al., 2010). Under this legislation, communities in communal areas could apply to the government, specifically, to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), for the rights to wildlife resources in their areas. In order to gain these rights, communities had to form what was known as a “conservancy,” a local institution that had a defined membership, a defined area of land, a representative management committee, a land use plan, and a governing constitution (Jones, 2010; Directorate Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), Namibia website www.dea.met.gov.na/programmes/cbnrm.htm, accessed June 25, 2011; Namibian Association of Community-Based Support Organizations (NACSO), 2006; NACSO website www.nacso.org.na, accessed June 25, 2011).

Beginning in the late 1990s, the people of Tsumkwe West initiated efforts to form a conservancy in their area, which they called the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy. Consultations with local communities were carried out in conjunction with personnel from the MET and non-government organizations, notably the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA). These consultations revealed that local people in Tsumkwe West (1) did not want to see wildlife disappear, rather, they wanted to see more animals; (2) at the same time, they wanted to see an end to wildlife-human conflicts and receive compensation for losses of live-
stock and gardens to wild animals; and (3) they wanted to increase incomes and employment in their areas, which they realized might be possible through leasing out the rights to the wildlife in their areas to private companies which would engage in tourism or safari hunting or both.

One of the reasons that the people of Tsumkwe West took part in the CBNRM program of the Namibian government was that they thought it could lead to greater control over their land and resources. In Namibia, communal land is held in the name of the state (Namibian Constitution, Article 100; Republic of Namibia 2002a: *Communal Land Reform Act, 2002*, Section 17). The people could, however, under the legislation, have some degree of control over wildlife resources. They had to apply to the MET for a wildlife quota set by MET. A management plan needed to be approved by government.

The people of Tsumkwe West worked on the establishment of the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy for over 5 years (Hohmann, 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2003b; Hitchcock, 2001; Pakleppa, 2001; 2002; 2004; Bollig & Berzborn, 2004; Cameron Welch, personal communication, 2006). In the process, surveys were undertaken of their area, and individuals were asked whether or not they wished to be members of the conservancy. Some people opted not to seek membership, while others, notably the young, were excluded because one had to be 18 years of age or older to become a conservancy member.

In Tsumkwe West the population at the time of the surveys (2000–2001) was around 2,500, residing in an area of approximately 9,000 square kilometers. Tsumkwe West had 24 settlements, many of them relatively small (Table 2). In addition to the resident population, there was a temporary population of approximately 450–500 people who worked at the hospital, clinic, schools, government offices, and administrative headquarters in the district, or were short-term livestock caretakers. One problem noted in the surveys was the number of outsiders who come to the area mainly to take advantage of local natural resources, including soils, grazing, water, wild animals, and wild plants. Many of these people came from Kavango to the north and Otjozondjupa and Omaheke to the south, and were seen by the resettlers and other long-term residents of the region as interlopers.

A major issue that arose during the course of the conservancy formation exercise was who was to be considered a legitimate member of the “community.” The reason that the question was important was that community members would be able to receive direct benefits from the conservancy once it was established, including (1) jobs, (2) royalties, (3) meat obtained by safari hunters, and (4) other resources, including medicine and other goods provided by the private company or companies that were successful with permit to operate in the conservancy. Hohmann (2003b: 221) noted that the MET made the definition of a social group with more-or-less clear and stable boundaries a necessary condition for groups of people wanting to realize certain goals, in this case, forming a conservancy.

One of the advantages of forming a conservancy, acknowledged by some residents of Tsumkwe West, was that it would allow them not only to have decision-making power over wildlife resources, but also, if they wished, to lease out those resources to private entrepreneurs in exchange for cash and other benefits.
The Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy sought bidders for rights to bring tourists and trophy hunters to Tsumkwe West, and they came to an agreement with a safari company, Eden Trophy Hunting, which established a luxurious tented camp on the Omatako Omuramba, the fossil river valley overlooking a water hole which attracted sizable numbers of wild animals. Eden hired some local people and gave funds to the conservancy in exchange for the rights to use the area for trophy hunting purposes. In some cases, people in the Omatako area also received meat from some of the animals obtained by Eden’s safari hunters.

There were a number of issues that arose with respect to the operations of the

Table 2. Population of communities in Tsumkwe District West, Namibia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Population (2001)</th>
<th>No. of members*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aasvoëlness</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bubi’s Post (Bubipos)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain’s Post</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etameko</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/G/ando</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grashoek</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamelwoud (Kameelwout)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kankundi</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanovlei</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kukurushe</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kundu</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhebu</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangetti Dune</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M’Kata</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mparara</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nankudu</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhoma</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliphant’s Water</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omatako</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omatako Valley Rest Camp</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpseka</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooidaggate (Rooidaghek)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swartak</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viksrus</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS: 24 communities</td>
<td>2,673 (N=24)</td>
<td>1,302 (N=18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Members of the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy. Not all populations in various communities could be counted at the time of the 2001 fieldwork. For comparative information, see Thoma and Piek (1997) and Hohmann (2003b: 217, Table 1). Some people did not register as members either because they were absent at the time of the formation of the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy or they did not agree with its objectives. A total of 170 people did not register. In 2011, there were 25 communities, but there are fluctuations over time in the numbers as villages form and then disband. The latest membership list indicates approximately 1,500 members, and one can assume that another 1,500 San in the conservancy are under 18 years of age.
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conservancy and the Traditional Authority in Tsumkwe West. First, there were complaints that Eden did not always honor its agreements; payments to the conservancy were sometimes late and occasionally they were skipped altogether. Second, the conservancy Management Committee had an agreement with Eden that the company would facilitate the translocation of game animals to the conservancy, reportedly as many as 250 animals a year for 5 years, but only a small number of the promised animals have been delivered. Third, some !Xun and Khwe members of the conservancy said that they were upset with what they believed were illegal fences constructed by mostly non-San who had been allocated land for grazing and agriculture by the !Kung Traditional Authority, but without clearing these decisions with the conservancy management committee.

One of the problems people in Tsumkwe West faced was that the population in the area was in flux, making it difficult to know who was living there. Some people moved inside the conservancy, and a number of them went outside to seek employment, visit friends or relatives, or take trips to Grootfontein, Tsumeb, Otjiwarango and other places for shopping, socializing, or seeking medical attention. Given the history of the liberation struggle in Namibia, the people of Tsumkwe West were well aware that they could not base their decisions about conservancy membership on ethnic grounds. Some in Tsumkwe West felt that they were in a double bind; on the one hand, they had been brought there as resettlers, and therefore were not “indigenous” to the area although they certainly were indigenous to other areas, while at the same time they were associated, accurately or not, in the minds of some government officials, party members, and some newcomers to Tsumkwe West, with the apartheid regime which had attempted to prevent Namibia from gaining independence.

The resettled population in Tsumkwe West discussed at length the ways in which they were seen by other people in Namibia and in the area. Some said that they had worked with the SADF and later the South West Africa Territorial Force, because they had little choice. Two people said that the Bushmen had been the victims of genocide in 1912–1915 and then again in the early 1970s in Angola. Evoking the genocide perpetrated against Herero and Nama in 1904–1907 by the Germans, these men said that they, too, were the victims of what they called “a forgotten genocide” (Gordon, 2009). They said that they, like many other Bushmen, had sought to resist the colonial state, not collaborate. In fact, they said they had worked for the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s military wing, during the liberation struggle. Why, they asked, should they be seen as “collaborators” when in fact they had fought hard to bring democracy to Namibia?

In Namibia, the 1904–1907 genocide has been memorialized and discussed for a variety of reasons: to honor those who died, to ensure that “nobody forgets,” to further political aims and objectives, to seek apologies and reparations, and to promote identity. Many !Xun, Khwe, and other Bushmen in Namibia realize that the image that has been created of them as “fierce fighters,” “collaborators,” and “opponents to liberation” is to their disadvantage. Some prefer to be identified as “harmless people” or “peaceful people.” Others, dissatisfied with any of the ways that they have been characterized, say that they are “just people,” who are
trying to get along, like other people. Some people in Tsumkwe West argue that efforts should be made to educate the Namibian public about their contributions to Namibian society and the losses that they have suffered.

The politics of identity for Bushmen in Namibia, however, loom large. Bushmen in Tsumkwe West feel that they are saddled with a negative political identity, and as a result, they say, they have to contend with what they feel is poor treatment by government officials and others. This was one of the reasons given by a number of people the author interviewed in 2001 as part of an assessment of the implications of the Namibian government’s October 2000 decision to relocate the large Osire refugee camp with about 21,000 refugees, to the Tsumkwe West area, specifically, to M’Kata (Fig. 6) (see Hitchcock, 2001). When this decision was announced, the Tsumkwe West residents sought to consult with the government in an effort to convince them to abandon the plan. Calling on their Traditional Authority, John Arnold, recognized as the !Kung Traditional Authority in 1998 under the Traditional Authorities Act (Thoma & Piek, 1997), the people of Tsumkwe asked Arnold to meet with the government and with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Liaison office in Namibia to express their concern about the refugee camp resettlement plan. Arnold and other members of the !Kung Traditional Authority did meet with the government and the UNHCR representative several times, and conveyed the message that the people of Tsumkwe were deeply wor-

![Map of Namibia showing the locations of the Osire refugee camp and Tsumkwe District.](image-url)
ried about the establishment of a large refugee camp in their area, which they said would have negative impacts on the people and environment of Tsumkwe District (Hitchcock, 2001; Pakleppa, 2001; 2002; 2004). They also said that there could be tensions between the refugees, many of whom were not Angolans, and the local people.

The government continued to plan for the refugee camp resettlement, but events overtook it. With the end of the war in Angola and the signing of peace accords in 2002, the government and UNHCR began focusing more attention on repatriating refugees from Osire to Angola.

It is interesting to note that one of the reasons given by people in M’kata for not wanting the refugee camp there was because it would, in their view, disrupt the lives of local people. Some who said this were themselves refugees who had been brought to the area relatively recently. It is also interesting to point out that at least some of the people in the Osire refugee camp were members of the same Mpungu and Vasekela !Xun ethnic groups as those in Tsumkwe West.

The !Kung Traditional Authority, allying itself with non-government organizations such as WIMSA, the Legal Assistance Center, and the Namibian Society for Human Rights, was able to raise serious questions about the government’s plan, and may have helped delay the plan if not help convince the government to abandon it altogether. In interviews of people in Tsumkwe carried out in 2009 and communications with Namibian NGOs and individuals by phone and email, I was told that the N≠a Jaqna Traditional Authority, WIMSA, the Legal Assistance Center, and other NGOs should be given some credit for the government opting not to relocate the refugee camp in Tsumkwe. There were also those in Tsumkwe who said that they thought that the government’s plan to relocate the refugee camp in their area was because “some influential people” did not respect the rights of the people of Tsumkwe as they believed the residents to be “all from Angola.” Ironically, so were most of the people in the Osire Refugee Camp at the time the relocation was planned.

In July 2003, MET informed the people of Tsumkwe West that the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy had been established formally. The N≠a Jaqna Conservancy is the largest communal conservancy in Namibia (9,120 sq km) and is adjacent to the earliest communal conservancy in Namibia, Nyae Nyae (8,992 sq km), established in February 1998. Together, the two conservancies cover a total of 18,212 sq km, and represent two of less than half a dozen conservancies in the country in which the majority of the members are San (Table 3). The communal conservancies in Namibia have been credited with being some of the most effective organizations of their kind in southern Africa (Jones, 2010: 107). It must be emphasized, however, that the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy, like other communal conservancies in Namibia, has had its share of problems, not least among them conflicts over issues relating to the composition of the members of the conservancy committee (Hohmann, 2003b: 223–224; Bollig & Berzborn, 2004: 314–315). Some of these issues include (1) gender balance in the committee, (2) age and educational balance in the committee, and (3) representation of San vs non-San members of the committee. The latter issue arose because of debate over the principles of the N≠a Jaqna Constitution, which included a reference to members being defined on
Table 3. Conservancies in Namibia’s communal areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Size (km²)</th>
<th>No. of members</th>
<th>Date registered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Wild Dog</td>
<td>Otjozondjupa</td>
<td>3,824</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>Sept 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anabeb</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doro !Nawas</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>4,073</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>Dec 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehi-Rovipuka</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Jan 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>//Gamaseb</td>
<td>Karas</td>
<td>1,748</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>//Haub</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>1,817</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#Khoadi //Hoas</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>3,366</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>June 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!Khob-!Naub</td>
<td>Hardap</td>
<td>2,747</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwandu</td>
<td>Caprivi</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>Dec 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marienfluss</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>3,034</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Jan 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashi</td>
<td>Caprivi</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>Mar 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayuni</td>
<td>Caprivi</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Dec 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N≠a Jaqna</td>
<td>Otjozondjupa*</td>
<td>9,120</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyae Nyae</td>
<td>Otjozondjupa*</td>
<td>8,992</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>Feb 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okamatapatu</td>
<td>Otjozondjupa</td>
<td>3,096</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Sept 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okongundumba</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>1,131</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omatendeka</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>1,619</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>Mar 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orupembe</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>3,565</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oskop</td>
<td>Hardap</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Feb 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjimboyo</td>
<td>Erongo</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>Mar 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otjituo</td>
<td>Otjozondjupa*</td>
<td>6,133</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Sept 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozonahi</td>
<td>Otjozondjupa</td>
<td>3,204</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>Sept 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ozondundu</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purros</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>3,568</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>May 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salambala</td>
<td>Caprivi</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>June 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitatas</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seisfontein</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>2,591</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soris Sorris</td>
<td>Erongo</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>Oct 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torra</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>3,522</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>June 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsiseb</td>
<td>Erongo</td>
<td>8,083</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>Jan 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twyfelfontein-Uibasen</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Dec 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uukwaluudhi</td>
<td>Omushati</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Mar 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wapuro</td>
<td>Caprivi</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>Dec 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 regions</strong></td>
<td><strong>88,056</strong></td>
<td><strong>67,785</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data obtained from the Directorate of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), Namibia.

* stands for conservancies with majority San membership. See also Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organizations (2006; 2011) and the association’s website (www.nacso.org.na). There were 66 conservancies as of November 2011 (World Wildlife Fund-Namibia, personal communication, 2011).
the basis of (1) whether they can demonstrate an ancestral claim to the area, i.e. having relatives currently or in the past living permanently on one of the traditional *n'oresi*, or (2) had been granted permission to use land and resources by the traditional authority and the conservancy committee (*Nǂa Jaqna 2003 Constitution*, paragraph 10[1]). As some government officials noted off the record, and as some of the residents of Tsumkwe claimed directly, the constitutional provision was a means of clarifying which people were able to become members and which were not. Hohmann (2003b: 223) noted that, “In practice, the conservancy is frankly seen by most of its San members as a means to secure themselves resource ownership and land rights not only in reaction to former disempowering Apartheid policy, but also in resource and land claims by members of other ethnic groups.”

**LAND AND RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN TSUMKWE**

Over the past decade, a number of land and resource conflicts have occurred in Tsumkwe, some of them the result of deliberate government policy, and some arising from local conditions. One of these conflicts was over land, and related to the drawing of boundaries between conservancies. In the process of planning the conservancies in Tsumkwe District, areas were surveyed and maps were drawn. The Nyae Nyae Conservancy was the first conservancy established in Namibia with the support of a large donor-funded project and non-government organizations working with it. This was the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) Project, which supported the Nyae Nyae Conservancy from 1995 to 2002 (Berger et al., 2003). Local people in the border area between Tsumkwe East and Tsumkwe West told the author that they were consulted during the course of the mapping of the Nyae Nyae Conservancy. However, when the application for the Nyae Nyae Conservancy was filed in 1998, people in Tsumkwe West, including the !Kung Traditional Authority, said that the Nyae Nyae Conservancy had claimed a portion of what they felt to be “their land.” When the Tsumkwe West people applied for the *Nǂa Jaqna* Conservancy, they apparently did so with relatively little consultation with the Nyae Nyae Conservancy committee and its members. The *Nǂa Jaqna* Conservancy plan incorporated some of the land that came to be known as “the disputed area” (Fig. 7). Disagreements broke out over the land that was to be included in each of the conservancies. An anthropologist, Thekla Hohmann, was engaged as a consultant by WIMSA to investigate the issues and to facilitate discussions between the two conservancies and government officials from MET and the Ministry of Local and Regional Government and Housing (Hohmann, 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2003b: 226–232). Negotiations that took place were between two large institutions: the memberships of the two conservancies, at the time roughly 700 people in the case of Nyae Nyae, and 1,200 people in the case of *Nǂa Jaqna*. As Hohmann (2003b: 230) noted, these two groups had to make decisions as corporate, cohesive interest groups. The dispute also involved the two traditional authorities, the !Kung Traditional Authority, John Arnold, and the Ju/'hoan Traditional Authority, Txamkxao /Oma, on opposite sides. Eventually, after extensive discussions, the *Nǂa Jaqna* Conservancy Committee and the
Kung Traditional Authority agreed with the original Nyae Nyae Conservancy boundaries, with the provision that the area would serve as a co-management zone in which both conservancies would play a role (Hohmann, 2003b: 231–232). The discussions leading to the resolution of the boundary dispute covered a variety of subjects, from claims about hunting and gathering territories to places where people had lived or utilized regularly, and from issues related to who was considered a “long-term resident” (and therefore had rights to the area) to how to go about defining boundaries. An issue that had an impact on the discussions and affected the relations between the two sets of communities was the fact that the people in Nyae Nyae had the right to engage in subsistence hunting with traditional weapons, whereas the people of Tsumkwe West did not have the same rights. This difference between west and east Tsumkwe District has had some effects on the attitudes of local people, who felt that they were not being treated the same in all cases. As one man from Omatako put it, “Why is it that I can get arrested for hunting a springbok while a Ju/'hoan man from Gautscha in Tsumkwe District East will not?” There was a sense among some people in Tsumkwe West that the anti-poaching efforts of MET were concentrated more on them than on people in Tsumkwe District East. When the author asked MET officials whether or not they thought this was the case, they said that they did not think it was. They said that the efforts to oversee wildlife were carried out without regard to the area where people lived or what their group membership was. A comparison of the situations in Tsumkwe West and Tsumkwe East underscores the degree to which the two areas differ, particularly in terms of the right to hunt. (Table 4) While people in Tsumkwe East (Nyae Nyae) can hunt as long as they use traditional weapons such as bows, arrows, and spears, this is not the
### Table 4. Comparison of natural resource management and utilization strategies in two Tsumkwe District Conservancies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tsumkwe District West</th>
<th>Tsumkwe District East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy (1,302 members)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nyae Nyae Conservancy (1,180 members)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,120 km², 24 villages, 6,000 people</td>
<td>8,992 km², 36 villages, 2,400 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of establishment: July 2003</td>
<td>Date of Establishment: February 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!Kung, !Xun, Khwe, Hai//om, and Ju/'hoansi San, Kavango, Herero</td>
<td>Ju/'hoansi San</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not allowed to hunt</td>
<td>Subsistence hunting allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No use of traditional or modern weapons allowed</td>
<td>Use of traditional weapons, including bows and arrows with poison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No snare or trap allowed</td>
<td>Can use traditional snares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot use dogs to assist in hunting</td>
<td>Cannot use dogs to assist in hunting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No mounted hunting allowed (horses, donkeys)</td>
<td>No mounted hunting allowed (horses, donkeys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush hunting is not allowed</td>
<td>Ambush hunting is allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits on all animals – no hunting</td>
<td>Limits on types of animals to be hunted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota set by Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET)</td>
<td>Quota set for “own-use” subsistence hunting, and for safari hunting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some safari hunting with a concession-holder (Eden Trophy Hunting)</td>
<td>Some safari hunting with a concession-holder (SMJ Safaris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem animal (predator) control by MET</td>
<td>No shooting of predators by local people; problem animal control by MET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource management by Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy Committee members at the village level and traditional leaders and managers</td>
<td>Resource management by Nyae Nyae Conservancy and local n!ore kxaosi (Ju/'hoan territorial overseers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism encouraged; Omatako Rest Camp run by the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy; Grashoek Living Museum and Campsite established and run by the Grashoek community with some support from the Living Culture Foundation, Namibia</td>
<td>Two community campsites in addition to Living Hunting Museum and Campsite at //Xa/hoba established with support from the Living Culture Foundation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data obtained from the Nǂa Jaqna and Nyae Nyae Conservancy management committees, the Nyae Nyae Development Foundation of Namibia, the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA), the Conservancy Development Support Service (CDSS), and fieldwork. It should be noted that efforts were being made to determine the number of members of the conservancies for purposes of benefit distribution in 2011.
case for people in Tsumkwe West. This difference caused tensions between the two districts, especially when hunters from Tsumkwe East would cross into Tsumkwe West, and when people from Tsumkwe West were found hunting in Tsumkwe East. These situations argue for adjustments to be made in resource conservation and utilization policies with careful consideration of equity and fairness. They also point to the need for greater efforts to be made in devising local-level development plans that take into consideration the realities of each of the areas. In addition, thought needs to be given to reworking some of the policies pursued in the two regions, with an eye toward attempting to level the playing field in which all community members in the region operate under a similar set of rules.

Resource conflict is a fundamental issue in natural resource management (Berry, 2004; Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008). There are certainly resource conflicts in Tsumkwe District, one example being the struggle between those who favored the presence of pastoralists and their herds, and those who did not. Some of the people of the N≠a Jaqna conservancy looked the other way when the !Kung Traditional Authority allegedly allocated land to Herero, Kavango, and other groups without consulting his councilors or members of the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy. At the same time, there were members of the conservancy who complained bitterly about what they felt to be inequitable land allocation practices on the part of the Traditional Authority.

There were also concerns expressed about mining companies coming in to the area. A number of local residents favored this, because they thought that such activities would lead to greater numbers of wage-paying jobs and potential development. There were others who felt that the presence of mining companies (e.g. Mount Burgess, an Australian mining firm operating in the area in the early 2000s) was damaging to the environment, and that the costs of the exploration and mining activities would outweigh the benefits. While my interview data on the reactions to the mining companies prospecting in the Tsumkwe are not extensive, it seemed that there were more people who were favorably inclined towards the mining companies than there were those who opposed them.

It is interesting to note that the efforts to establish a conservancy and to obtain the quota from MET helped bring some of the conflicts to the surface so that they could be dealt with directly. Now that the communities in Nyae Nyae and N≠a Jaqna are officially registered conservancies and have each been given a wildlife quota, they can “get on with the business of managing natural and human resources,” as one government official put it. One of the members of the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy committee told me that conflict-solving sessions were an important part of the deliberations of the organization. Another man said that the traditional !Xun, Khwe, Ju’/hoan means of solving conflicts, through subtle or sometimes not-so-subtle public criticism, was an effective strategy of preventing conflicts from worsening.
RESETTLEMENT: A NEW THREAT

In October 2001, the government of Namibia issued a white paper on a *National Resettlement Policy* that outlined ways in which historically disadvantaged populations such as the San could be granted access to land (Harring, 2004; Harring & Odendaal, 2006a; 2006b; Odendaal, 2006b; 2006c; Werner & Odendaal, 2010). Unfortunately, relatively few San have been able to gain secure access to resettlement land and the resources necessary to carry out developments on it (Suzman, 2001b: xix, 83–94). Interviews of people in Tsumkwe West in 2001 indicated their support for the government’s objectives in addressing the skewed distribution of land through programs involving resettlement. Daniels (2003: 60) noted, as of 2003, some 7,000 San had been resettled in 11 resettlement projects. In many of those cases, San had to compete with other, more powerful groups for resources. A crucial problem was there were too many people and too little land in the resettlement areas. The result was that relatively few people were able to become economically self-sufficient as farmers (Daniels, 2003: 60).

An assessment of the experiences of the various resettlement projects in communal and commercial areas of Namibia that have had San as the major target groups (Table 5) indicates that in order to make them successful, substantial investment of capital and human resources is necessary. This does not mean that San are unprepared to be involved in resettlement and development activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resettlement site</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of settlers</th>
<th>Type of settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsintsabis</td>
<td>Oshikoto</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bravo</td>
<td>Oshikoto</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshivelo</td>
<td>Oshikoto</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangetti Dune*</td>
<td>Otjozondjupa</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M’Kata*</td>
<td>Otjozondjupa</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onamatadiva</td>
<td>Ohangwena</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eendobe</td>
<td>Ohangwena</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekoka</td>
<td>Ohangwena</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagani</td>
<td>Kavango</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seringkop</td>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omega</td>
<td>Caprivi</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chetto</td>
<td>Caprivi</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Diversified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skoonheld</td>
<td>Omaheke</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>Co-operative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drimiopsis</td>
<td>Omaheke</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Co-operative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 settlements</td>
<td>7 regions</td>
<td>8,335</td>
<td>12 diversified and 2 co-operatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data obtained from Suzman (2001b: 93, Table 7.1), the MLR, WIMSA, the Legal Assistance Center, the Nyae Nyae Development Foundation of Namibia, the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy, the Nyae Nyae Conservancy, non-government organizations, and Namibia regional administrations. The term, “diversified,” means a multi-pronged system based on arable agriculture, livestock production, and small-scale rural enterprises, including natural resource utilization and craft-making. * indicates those official resettlement sites that are in Tsumkwe West.
centered on farming and agriculture. Many if not most San in Namibia have had experience with farming and herding, and both women and men have engaged in raising crops, livestock, and small stock of sheep and goats.

A substantial number of San have worked for other people in both the communal and commercial areas, raising crops and livestock in exchange for cash or in kind payments. For example, a portion of the crop produced, or a calf a year is paid in exchange for herding services. There are also San who have worked as seasonal or migrant laborers on farms and have offered their services as field hands, herders, and domestic workers assisting in gardening and poultry raising. A sizable number of San are or were so-called “generational” farm workers, who work full-time on commercial farms, do not have outside residences or businesses, and thus were largely dependent on the returns from the farm employment. Many of these generational farm workers were displaced as farm owners opted to hire members of other groups as farm workers, ostensibly because they had “more experience” than San at herding cattle and other kinds of work on commercial farms. In line with Namibia’s land and resettlement policies (Republic of Namibia, 1998; 2001; 2002a; 2002b) Suzman (2001b: 93) noted, “Resettlement (where available) represents one of the few residential and economic strategies available to many San.”

The problem with the plans for the resettlement of farmers from other areas in Namibia in Tsumkwe District West was that the resettlement planners were not thinking of resettling San in N≠a Jaqna, but rather members of other groups, particularly Herero, Kavango, Ovambo, and Damara. This is in line with Namibian government policy, which does not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity in land allocations.

Since independence in March 1990, the government of Namibia stepped up its assistance to communal farmers and has resettled farmers from the northern communal areas to commercial farms. Extension services were expanded, as were subsidies for communal farmers. It is in this context that the resettlement farming program in Tsumkwe West can be viewed. The idea behind it is that some of the land in Tsumkwe District West, approximately a third of the conservancy area, will be divided into 50-hectare, fenced-in “farms.” Each farm will have a water point, a small house or two, fields, and grazing areas. Rights over the farms will be allocated to individuals or households willing and able to invest in them. Given that most San have relatively low incomes and generally cannot afford to purchase the seeds, breeding stock, and other inputs that would be necessary to develop farms and maximize their economic potential, it is likely that the farms will be allocated to other people from outside the area who have more resources.

Tsumkwe West communities demonstrated that they were willing to deal with threats from the outside by writing to various authorities about their concerns, filing formal requests for land and resources with regional level authorities, e.g. the Otjozondjupa Communal Land Board, and making their views known at local, regional, and national meetings. Over the past few years, the people of Tsumkwe District have spent a considerable amount of time and energy discussing natural resource management and development issues, an indication of their concern about these topics. Admittedly, some individuals have raised questions about the degree
Refugees, Resettlement, and Land and Resource Conflicts

to which the community-based organizations in Tsumkwe District and the !Kung Traditional Authority represent and negotiate their constituents’ interests, for example, in pushing for rights to land at the regional and national levels.

The efforts to have their voices heard at meetings with government officials did not, however, always achieve the objectives they sought. This can be seen in case of the proposed resettlement of farmers from other areas on land in the Nʼa Jaqna Conservancy in spite of the fact that it had been gazetted officially by the Namibian government in July 2003 as a communal conservancy. The resettlement plan, which was announced by the Deputy Minister of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation, Jerry Ekandjo, at a meeting held in Tsumkwe in June 2006, got an immediate reaction from the !Xun, Khwe, and other people in Tsumkwe West. Local people argued in meetings and in the Namibian media that the resettlement plan would affect their already existing land use plans, including ones involving the establishment of a communal forest in the same area where the resettlement was being proposed (Fig. 8). Nʼa Jaqna had already established a Forestry Management Committee and was involved in working out arrangements to create a communal forest in line with Namibia’s Forest Act (No. 12 of 2001) and Forest Amendment Act (No. 13 of 2005) (Feuerriegel, 2005). In addition, the conservancy was hoping to arrange for private companies to exploit some 230 tons of wood a year in the MʼKata area, the goal being that some of the cash generated by timber sales would be distributed to conservancy members and some would go to support the conservancy.

One of the activities in Tsumkwe District that generated substantial income for a sizable number of people was the collection of devil’s claw (grapple plant, *Harpagophytum procumbens*), used for medical purposes, especially in Europe and the United States (Berger et al., 2003; Wiessner, 2003: 154, Table 4; Biesele & Hitchcock, 2011: 44, 201, 223). In 2008, there were 377 permit holders in

![Map of the Nʼa Jaqna Conservancy showing land use and the proposed farming resettlement area.](image)

Fig. 8. Map of the Nʼa Jaqna Conservancy showing land use and the proposed farming resettlement area.
Nyae Nyae for the exploitation of devil’s claw, and was estimated that the Nyae Nyae Conservancy made N$418,000 from devil’s claw that year. There were also several hundred people in Tsumkwe West who had permits to exploit devil’s claw. In 2010, the exploitation of devil’s claw generated N$385,000 for individuals, and the conservancy gained some benefits from the sales, as well. One problem facing the people of Tsumkwe District in 2010–2011 was the number of outsiders coming in to the area to exploit high-value plants such as devil’s claw, resulting in competition among users and some ill-feeling.

As some of the members of the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy told the conservancy management committee, non-government organizations working with them, for example, WIMSA, the Legal Assistance Center, and World Wildlife Fund-Namibia, were concerned that the establishment of the farming program for resettlers would result in their plans for natural resource exploitation and utilization to be shelved. They wanted, if possible, for the conservancy and its members to have exclusive rights to resources in the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy, including wood for making craft items (Fig. 9), devil’s claw, Hoodia (e.g. *Hoodia pelifera*, and *Hoodia gordonii*) and Kalahari truffle (*Terfezia pfeili*). They also expressed the fear that some of them would likely become farm workers on the new resettlement farms established in Tsumkwe West, and face the same problems as farm workers in other parts of Namibia such as low wages and high work loads (Werner, 2004). More important than that, they said, was the fact that the MLR’s proposed resettlement program represented a serious threat to the efforts of the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy to manage its own resources.

From the perspective of many of the members of the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy, the government of Namibia was pursuing a contradictory set of policies, on the one hand promoting community-based conservation, tourism development, and

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**Fig. 9.** 'Xun San man in Aasvoëlnes in Tsumkwe West, preparing a piece of wood for purposes of making wooden beads.
small-scale farming, while on the other planning a resettlement and development program involving the relocation of farmers and herders from other areas in what they saw as their land. The members of the conservancy said that the decisions of the government underscored the fact that, in spite of government guarantees about land and resources noted in the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002, they clearly had no control over their land, water, and other natural resources. If government was to go ahead with its plans, they said, it would set a precedent for people in communal areas throughout the country.

Some San informants said that they were already in a precarious position in terms of access to land and resources. A sizable number of local people believed that land was already at a premium, and that there was insufficient agricultural and grazing land in Tsumkwe West. There were also fears that people who were brought into the area would be disruptive and that conflicts might occur between groups. As one man put it, “We have worked hard to bring peace among the various San groups living in Mangetti Dune—what will happen now if we bring members of other groups and their livestock into the N≠a Jaqna area?”

When government officials were asked what the motivation was for planning a resettlement program aimed at small-scale farmers in the N≠a Jaqna area, they said that the plan was a good one and that it was in line with government policy aimed at giving historically disadvantaged people access to land in line with government land and resettlement policies. As several people in Tsumkwe said at the time, “but WE are disadvantaged.” They also asked why the government would allow other people to take their land. From the government perspective, Tsumkwe West and other communal areas were not their land, as under Namibian law, all land in the communal areas was held in the name of the state.

In a speech to people in Tsumkwe in July 2003, then President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, had made it clear that the government of Namibia would not tolerate the idea of specific ethnic groups having rights to blocks of land. In so many words, Nujoma said that people and their livestock could not be kept out of an area on the basis of their ethnic background or place of origin. What this meant for the San of Tsumkwe District was that it will be difficult, if not impossible, in the future to prevent people from migrating in to their areas and establishing residences, farms, livestock operations, and businesses. It is likely, therefore, that competition for resources will increase in Tsumkwe District, even if the proposed farming program is not implemented as the numbers of people coming in to the area have increased substantially over the past decade.

The land reform and resettlement process in Namibia is not going as well as had been hoped at the time it was formulated (Werner, 2001; 2004; Odendaal, 2006b; 2006c; Werner & Odendaal, 2010). According to Odendaal (2006b: 26), as of 2006, 1,526 families (9,156 people, calculated at 6 persons per family) resettled on 142 farms which totaled 843,789 hectares in size. The cost for this resettlement was SN127,836,132. This works out to at an average cost of NS14,000 per person for resettlement, a very high cost. This amount does not include food rations provided to the resettlers or the funds required for services and supplies provided by MLRR, other government ministries, and non-government organizations. The government of Namibia has resettled 610 persons per year since inde-
pendence in March of 1990. Odendaal (2006b: 50) noted, not a single resettlement project had become sustainable after 5 years.

In terms of the on-the-ground situation in the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy at the end of the first decade of the new millennium, the conservancy had a joint venture agreement with a safari company, Eden Trophy Hunting, which has a lodge, Camp Eden, on the Omatako Omuramba in West Tsumkwe. There was no hunting quota for 2012, as the conservancy was trying to save some of the animals for live auction sales in order to generate higher returns. The Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy also runs a community campsite at Omatako which was having some problems. Some of the activities of the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy include managing natural resources (wildlife, grazing, timber, devil’s claw). Some of the activities of the conservancy include managing a community forest which is approximately 75,000 hectares in extent. There were challenges regarding the community forest, as some government officials were considering putting farms in the area set aside for the forest.

The Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy has a management committee, a board, and has links with a number of Namibian non-government organizations, including the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa, the Legal Assistance Center World Wildlife Fund–Namibia, the Living Culture Foundation Namibia (LCFN), the Namibia Nature Foundation, and the Conservancy Development Support Service, a Millennium Challenge Account funded project as well as with various government departments, including the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Forestry. Like many conservancies in Namibia, it was facing funding and management difficulties.

In the conservancy the Grashoek Living Museum and Campsite was operated by Grashoek Village, one of the communities in the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy with support provided by LCFN. The Living Museum and Campsite had a business manager, a crafts manager, and 6 groups of performers, which together numbered approximately 80 people who did traditional dances and other performances on a rotational basis. The performers and craft producers got 90 percent of the proceeds, with 10 percent going to the conservancy. Data from the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy and the Living Culture Foundation indicate that individuals involved in the tourism program were making approximately N$4,290 per annum. The village was thus one of the largest employers and providers of funds to people in the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy and one of the more successful community-based projects in Namibia.

In 2010–2011, there were some internal conflicts present in the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy between the manager of the conservancy and the Nǂa Jaqna Management Committee over alleged mishandling of conservancy funds by the manager. As it turned out, these problems took an enormously long period of time to resolve. Some members of the Management Committee wanted the manager to stay on even after it was determined that he had been engaged for a considerable period in fraudulent activities and in keeping crucial information from the Management Committee and donors. The manager was eventually fired in August 2011 for theft and failure to provide adequate support to the conservancy.

Efforts were being made to strengthen the Management Committee in 2011–2012, which consisted of 8 members. There were also 12 staff members of Nǂa
Jaqna, including an advisor, a driver, 2 cleaners, a Devil’s Claw Coordinator, and 7 game guards. It is anticipated that the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy will have a new constitution, membership list, and a reworked development plan by mid-2012.

CONCLUSIONS

The construction of identities of San peoples by themselves and by others have had significant impacts not only on the ways that San are perceived, but also on their rights to land, resources, and political participation. San have been romanticized and stigmatized. They have had to cope with the ways that others have represented them, and they have attempted to shape their own identities.

Many San realize all too well that the perceptions that others have of them can affect their everyday lives and their social and economic well being. They can see this in the way that decisions are made about land and resource allocations, government support (or lack of it) of San land management and leadership systems, and in the opportunities that are presented to them (or denied). Many San feel that they are disadvantaged enormously, because of the images that others have of them.

The construction of San identities by German and South African colonial settlers, by academics, colonial government officials, by the SADF and various liberation groups, and by the Namibian state has had significant impacts on the ways that they have been perceived, but also on policies that affect San peoples. As Battistoni & Taylor (2009: 125) pointed out, the Khwe of Angola and Namibia “understood that accusations of political ‘subversiveness’ was a means of excluding them from ‘the nation’ and from ‘development’.” Discourses about San being “dangerous,” “unreliable,” “untrustworthy,” or “fierce fighters,” have contributed to their being targeted for mistreatment and to their social political, and economic exclusion.

Romantic discourses about San have also had their effects. Decisions to exclude them from protected areas, for example, came about because of the charge that some San were “inauthentic,” that is, they did not hunt and gather, move about the landscape in small groups, or wear clothing made of wild animals skins. It is interesting to note that one of the individuals who contributed substantially to the shaping of images of the San, P. J. Schoeman, took a group of “Kaudum Bushmen” to the Van Riebeeck Festival in Cape Town in 1951, because he felt they were “real Bushmen,” but only four years later he was party to the dispossession of Hai//om San from Etosha Game Reserve (Dieckmann, 2007: 173).

The resettlement of !Xun, Khwe, and other San by the SADF in what was then Bushmanland in the 1970s and 1980s was done for various reasons, some of them military, some of them ostensibly for “humanitarian” reasons, and some simply to relocate people to “get them out of the way,” as one former military officer in the SADF told the author. Why people opted to go along with SADF plans is an issue that has yet to be clarified, but some say that they did it primarily because they “wished to survive” and the SADF provided them with employment, food, and support for them and their families.

From the standpoint of resettlement theory, the military-driven resettlement of
the !Xun, Khwe, and other San groups represents an intriguing case. While aspects of both the Scudder-Colson (1982) 4 stage model and the Cernea (1997) IRR framework for understanding and mitigating the risks of involuntary resettlement seem to be applicable, there are some differences, as well. In the case of the !Xun and Khwe resettlement efforts in Namibia, the population that was resettled did not experience, at least at first, a substantial drop in living standards. Many of the people resettled did, however, experience what Scudder (personal communication, 2007) referred to as "multidimensional stress." In the case of the 1990 SADF resettlement of the !Xun and Khwe in Schmidtsdrift, South Africa, some of the resettled people also experienced considerable stress and uncertainty, leaving relatives and friends behind and going to a new place where they did not have land rights guaranteed.

Dalton-Greyling & Greyling (2007: 2), using Cernea's IRR model, pointed out that after Battalion 31 was disbanded in 1994 in South Africa, all financial support to the !Xun and Khwe San ex-soldiers and their families was stopped immediately, and they found themselves unemployed. They did not receive any pensions and "only a few were given a meager severance payment." As a result, they were worse off four years after they had come than when they arrived. It would be useful to know what the income levels of San soldiers and their families were before they were resettled. As far as the issue of landlessness is concerned, it was 13 years before the San were able to obtain land of their own at Plaatfontein; in the meantime, they experienced considerable uncertainty (Robbins, 2006; 2007).

One of the problems with top-down resettlement programs that are so common in cases where militaries and governments are involved is that the project-affected people have little, if any, say in how they are planned, implemented, and managed. This is also true, unfortunately, of many large-scale resettlement projects around the world (Colson, 1971; Scudder & Colson, 1982; Scudder, 2005; 2009; De Wet, 2006; Oliver-Smith, 2009b). Project-affected people often received little, if any compensation for the losses of common property resources, and attention was paid to losses of culturally and socially significant heritage such as sacred sites or family graves in less than half of the resettlement projects (World Commission on Dams, 2000; Ted Scudder, Barbara Johnston, personal communications, 2007; 2009). The post-resettlement development initiatives that were attempted generally failed to restore incomes and living standards that prevailed prior to resettlement.

Some of the people in Tsumkwe West suspect that the politics of identity played important roles in some of the situations they faced, notably (1) the long time it took for the government of Namibia to approve the establishment of the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy (over 5 years), (2) the decision to relocate the Osire Refugee camp to the Tsumkwe West area in 2000, and (3) the decision to resettle historically disadvantaged farmers in the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy in 2006. Some of the people in Tsumkwe West suspect that the reasons for these decisions were based at least partly on the views of a number of individual Namibian government officials that at least some of the people in Tsumkwe were "non-Namibians" who had "collaborated with the enemy" and therefore they felt that they should not receive the same kinds of benefits as Namibian citizens.

Some of the San of Tsumkwe West would agree with the opinion of Harring &
Odendaal (2006a: 58) that, “The San are marginal and powerless people.” Others would disagree vehemently, saying that they do have power, especially since they have been re-defining their identities and building alliances with other groups, NGOs, and the Namibian state. They point to the fact that the Namibian government established a “San Development Office” in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in 2005. They also note the government’s support of the Ju/'hoansi in the case of the movement of Herero herders with their livestock into Nyae Nyae in 2009, having cut the Red-Line Fence and entered Nyae Nyae without permission (Hays, 2009; Karahari Peoples Network website www.kalaharipeoples.net, accessed June 25, 2011).(17)

In 2008, John Arnold, the !Kung Traditional Authority, attended the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in New York with the support of the Namibian government. As one of his constituents in the village of Omatako said of this event, “This is evidence that we !Kung are shaping new identities for ourselves as indigenous peoples.” Clearly, as Battistoni & Taylor (2009: 125) pointed out, San identity-building has proved to be both multi-authored and dynamic. The San, like other peoples in Namibia and around the world, are aware of the importance of the politics of identity. The question facing the people residing in northeastern Namibia is whether or not their multiple identities will serve them positively or negatively. As one Tsumkwe West resident said, “Like all peoples, we want respect, social justice, and fair treatment.”

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NOTES

(1) Substantial ethnographic, ethnohistoric, demographic, and linguistic work has been conducted among a number of different San groups. For work on the Ju/'hoansi, see the work of the Marshall family (e.g. L. Marshall, 1960; 1976; J. Marshall; 1989; 2003; Thomas, 2006) and the Harvard Kalahari Research Group (Lee, 1979; 1986; 2003). For other work on the Ju/'hoansi, see Wilmsen (1989); Wyckoff-Baird (1996; 2000); Wiesner (2002; 2003; 2005); Berger et al. (2003); Biesele & Hitchcock (2011).

(2) For discussions of this case, see Orth (2003: 122–124); Suzman (2001b: 110); Daniels (2004: 57–59); Harring & Odendaal (2006a: 9–10).

(3) Most of the work among the !Kung has been conducted among the northern !Kung or !Xun, whereas the Ju/'hoansi are Central !Kung (Barnard, 1992: 39–61). See for example, Heikkinen (1987); Takada (2000; 2002; 2005; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2010); König & Heine (2001; 2008); Robins et al. (2001: 55–61); Pakleppa & Kwononoka (2003); and Heine & Honken (2010). Brenzinger noted 1,000 or fewer !Xun in Angola in 2000, and that only a few Khwe were in Angola, most having fled to Zambia by 2000 (Robins et al., 2001: 55–57, Tables 2.1 and 2.2). 2011 estimates from WIMSA and from sources in Angola and Namibia, e.g. the San Development Office, indicated 4,000 San in Angola, many of them !Xun from a variety of different named groups, and 6,000 !Xun in Namibia, for a total of 10,000 in the two countries.


(5) For information on the Khwe (Khoe), see the work of Siegfried Passarge (Wilmsen, 1997) who passed through the Okavango region in the 1890s, Guenther (2005) who discusses observations of settlers, military officers, missionaries, and others in South West Africa; the work of linguist Oswin Köhler who focused substantial attention on the Khwe (Barnard, 1992: 121); for ethnographic discussions, see Barnard (1992: 117–133); Suzman (2001b: xvii–six, 53–69); Robins et al. (2001: 8–10, 13–32, 43, Harring & Odendaal (2006a: 5–14); Boden (2003); Orth (2003); Rousset (2003) Taylor (2007; 2008; 2009); Battistoni & Taylor (2009). The number of Khwe in Namibia is uncertain, but estimated to be around 7,000. There are sizable numbers of Khwe in northern Botswana as well.

(6) The main military base with a sizable air field was at Mangetti Dune. Other satellite bases were established at Grashoek, Omatako, Kanovlei, Lehubu, M’Kata, Perspeka, and Aaesvolnes. John Marshall’s film A Kalahari Family (J. Marshall, 2003) shows recruitment of soldiers at Tsumkwe in 1978 and some of the effects of the presence of the military in the region in graphic detail. In 1989, prior to the withdrawal of SADF, it was estimated that the numbers of Bushman soldiers and their dependents in West Bushmanland was as high as 4,000 (John Marshall, personal communication, 2001). About half of the people in West Bushmanland opted to go to South Africa in March 1990, while the rest opted to stay (Botelle & Rohde, 1995: 46).

(7) Mathias Brenzinger distinguishes three !Xun groups on the basis of dialectal variation: (1) West !Xun, (2) Mpungu !Xun, and (3) Vasekela !Xun. He pointed out that West !Xun and Mpungu !Xun are not terms used by !Xun themselves. He also suggested that communication was nevertheless relatively easy among speakers of all three northern !Xun dialects (Robins et al., 2001: 58–61).

(8) There are different figures given for the numbers of !Xun and Khwe relocated to South Africa. Sharp & Douglas (1996: 326) wrote that there were 500 veterans of the two “Bushman” battalions and 3,500 dependents, three quarters of whom were !Xun and a
quarter of whom were Khwe. Harring & Odendaal (2006a: 22) said the number was 2,000. Suzman (2001b: 4) estimated the number to be “several thousand.” David Robbins (2006: 2; 2007: 29–30, 40) said the number was 3,720. Robins et al. (2001: 56) said that most of the Bushmen who went to South Africa were !Xun (N=3,000), and 1,000 were Khwe (Robins et al., 2001: 62) for a total of 4,000. An important point made by Robins et al. (2001: 9) is this: “Although the terms ‘!Xu’ and ‘Khwe’ did not refer to distinct groups in Angola, these labels (and their various synonyms such as Vasekela and Barakwena) have taken on considerable significance at Schmidtsdrift.”

(9) John Marshall (personal communications, 1987; 1992) indicated that the area he thought the Ju/'hoansi of Nyae Nyae claimed as theirs in the past was 70,000 sq km in extent.

(10) For useful discussions of development-related resettlement, see Colson (1971); Cernea (1997; 2009); De Wet (2006); Clark (2009); Scudder (2005; 2009); Scudder & Colson (1982); Oliver-Smith (2009a; 2009b; 2009c).

(11) The Botswana government opted to kill some 320,000 cattle in northwestern Botswana (Ngamiland) in an effort to control the spread of lungsickness.

(12) The Grashoek Living Museum and Campsite was operated by Grashoek Village with support provided by the Living Culture Foundation of Namibia (LCFN). The Living Museum and Campsite had a business manager, a crafts manager, and 6 groups of performers, who together numbered approximately 80 and performed on a rotational basis. The performers and craft producers received 90 percent of the proceeds, with the rest going to the conservancy. Data from the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy and the LFCN indicate that individuals involved in the tourism program were making approximately N$4,290 per annum. The village was thus one of the largest employers and providers of funds to people in the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy.

(13) One could argue that they did this because they wanted to increase their chances of access to land and “common pool resources” in line with the arguments of Cernea (1997; 2009) and Scudder (2005; 2009).

(14) Some Bushmen in Namibia have read Elizabeth Marshall Thomas’ *The Harmless People* (1959) and say that they like the way they are portrayed. A few individuals told me that they have also read Marshall Thomas’ *The Old Way: A Story of the First People* (2006), and point out that they like the term “First People,” since it ties them to other ‘First Peoples” and “First Nations” in the indigenous peoples’ movement worldwide.

(15) It should be noted that internal conflicts present in the Nǂa Jaqna Conservancy between the manager of the conservancy and the Nǂa Jaqna Management Committee over alleged mishandling of conservancy funds by the manager took an enormously long period of time to resolve, and some members of the Management Committee wanted the manager to stay on, even after it was determined that he had long engaged in fraudulent activities and kept the crucial information from the Management Committee and donors. The manager was eventually fired in August 2011 for theft and failure to provide adequate support to the conservancy. Efforts were made to strengthen the Management Committee in 2011–2012, which consisted of 8 members. There were also 12 staff members of Nǂa Jaqna, including an advisor, a driver, 2 cleaners, a Devil’s Claw Coordinator, and 7 game guards.

(16) Ted Scudder (personal communication, 2011) pointed out one problem in using Scudder-Colson and Cernea resettlement frameworks in my analysis: I deal mainly with individuals and their families, whereas they studied community resettlement. Obviously, with individual families one would expect much more variation, which makes it difficult to know whether their community-based frameworks are directly applicable.

(17) It should be noted here that the government of Namibia has found itself to be in a complex position with respect to the Herero who entered Nyae Nyae in April, 2009. The
Namibian government, while it voted in favor of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in September 2007, takes the position that all Namibians are indigenous. It holds that the Herero, the Ju/'hoansi, !Xun, Khwe, and other San in the country are “previously disadvantaged, dispossessed and displaced Namibians” who should have priority in terms of government policies.

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### Appendix 1. Chronological milestones relating to the Nǂa Jaqna (West Bushmanland, Tsumkwe District West) Area, Namibia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Milestones</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1840-1850s</td>
<td>First recorded encounters of !Xun, Khwe, and Ju/'hoansi with Europeans</td>
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<tr>
<td>1879-1884</td>
<td>Four !Xun boys stayed with Lucy Lloyd in Cape Town, providing substantial ethnographic and linguistic information</td>
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<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Establishment of Namibia as a German Protectorate (called Deutsch Sudwestafrika)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1896-97</td>
<td>Rinderpest epidemic affects wildlife and livestock in the northern Kalahari and Namibia generally; establishment of a veterinary cordon fence across northern Namibia (just south of Tsumkwe) known as the Red Line</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904-1907</td>
<td>German-Herero-Nama Wars, the first genocide in the twentieth century, resulting in substantial lives lost, and at least 6,000 Herero moving into Botswana, some of them dying on the way</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911-1915</td>
<td>Police zone established in northern Namibia; the Bushman Problem or Bushman Plague in northern Namibia included attacks by German troops, police and settlers on San communities and forcing of San men into labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Germany surrenders territory of South West Africa to South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Denver African Expedition visits South West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Herero evicted from Nyae Nyae Pans area</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>First motor road build in the region by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Commission for the Preservation of the Bushmen (the Schoeman Commission) appointed in October</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Commission interim report produced in September calling for two Bushman Reserves, one for !Kung and the other for Hai//om</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1959</td>
<td>Marshall family expeditions to the Nyae Nyae region</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Bushman Commission final report produced, with only one Bushman reserve recommended, that of Bushmanland</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Removals of Hai//om San from Etosha Game Reserve; issuing of the <em>South West African Native Affairs Administration Act</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Establishment of a SWA government administrative centre at Tsumkwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Odendaal Commission report on South West Africa, creation of a non-self-governing Bushmanland</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Border fence erected between Namibia and Botswana</td>
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<td>1966-1989</td>
<td>Namibian War of Independence</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Establishment of Bushman Battalion 31 in Caprivi Region; SADF began to recruit !Xun and Khwe soldiers in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Bushman Battalion 36 established at Tsumkwe in Bushmanland by SADF; 1,000 !Xun and Khwe relocated by SADF from Caprivi to West Bushmanland; SADF began to recruit local Ju/'hoan and !Kung San into the military in Nyae Nyae</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Plan announced to turn Bushmanland into a game reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The Ju/wa Farmers Union (JFU), later called the Nyae Nyae Farmers Cooperative (NNFC) formed; Bushman Advisory Council formed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Run-up to independence involving meetings with government and NGO officials; debate over Bushmanland</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Ceasefire declared on 1 April, UNTAG enters Namibia, SWAPO wins November elections; San participate in elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Milestones</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Namibian independence declared on 21 March 1990; relocation of !Xun and Khwe soldiers and their families to Schmidtsdrift, South Africa by the SADF in March; West Bushmanland resettlement and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>An interim leadership group set up in West Bushmanland to represent the 12 communities</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>June: a meeting of San was held at Mangetti Dune in preparation for the October regional conference on San peoples (Gaborone, Botswana)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Outbreak of lung plague among cattle across the border in Botswana, resulting in the government’s destruction of 320,000 head</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>The Working Group of Indigenous Minorities (WIMSA) founded</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Demonstrations by Hai//om San to claim ancestral land in Etosha National Park</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Founding of the NNC and the gazettement of Nyae Nyae as the first communal conservancy in Namibia; government recognition of Tsamkxao ≠Oma as the Ju/'hoan Traditional Authority and John Arnold as the !Kung Traditional Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Announcement by the government of Namibia that refugees from a GRN-UNHCR refugee camp in Osire, central Namibia would be resettled at M’kata in Tsumkwe District West</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Anthropological investigation of the Tsumkwe District West to assess potential impacts of the establishment of a large refugee camp at M’Kata</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Death of Jonas Savimbi of UNITA; moves made toward peace accords with Angola; !Xun and other San began to return to Angola</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>Establishment of the N≠a Jaqna Conservancy in Tsumkwe West in July</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>N≠a Jaqna Conservancy Constitution re-drafted; plans made for the establishment of a West Tsumkwe Community Forest Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Government of Namibia announces plans to establish resettlement farms in Tsumkwe West</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>!Kung Traditional Authority John Arnold attends the 8th annual meetings of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) in New York; support for N≠a Jaqna and 30 other communal conservancies agreed by GRN and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Late April invasion of Nyae Nyae by Herero farmers from /Gam; their cattle were confiscated by government, but the Herero remained in Tsumkwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Tsamkxao ≠Oma attends the 9th annual meetings of the UNFPII in New York in April along with Gerson Kamutuka, head of the San Development Office in the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office; discussions were held in Namibia on governance issues in N≠a Jaqna Conservancy and the !Kung Traditional Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Firing of N≠a Jaqna Manager for embezzlement of funds from N≠a Jaqna Conservancy in August; work on a new conservancy constitution</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Two members of Nyae Nyae Conservancy, one of them the son of the Ju/'hoan Traditional Authority, attended the 11th annual meetings of the UNFPII in New York in May.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2. Orthography of the Ju/'hoan language

The Ju/'hoan San of southern Africa have been fortunate to have had the assistance of skilled linguists, anthropologists, educators, and other development workers who have assisted them in recording their language so that they can use it in education and the development of materials such as history books. Today, the Ju/'hoansi number some 11,000 people who reside in northeastern Namibia and northwestern Botswana. Some Ju/'hoansi live on land designated as communal in Namibia, while others reside in commercial freehold farm areas (e.g. in the Gobabis and Grootfontein farms areas).

Work was done on the Ju/'hoan language by linguist Jan Snyman who in 1975 developed and published a Ju/'hoan dictionary. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s work on the Ju/'hoan language was carried out by Patrick Dickens in conjunction with people from Nyae Nyae (Tsumkwe District East, Otjozondjupa Region). The orthography that was developed for the Ju/'hoan language was accepted in October 1991 by the Namibian Ministry of Education and Culture as the official orthography for the language of the Ju/'hoansi people.

The main impetus for the creation of the orthography and Patrick Dickens’ Ju/'hoan-English, English-Ju/'hoan Dictionary was the lack of curricular materials for the primary education of Ju/'hoan children in their own language. The dictionary has been used in the village schools in the Nyae Nyae region. A whole set of educational materials are now available in the Ju/'hoan language, thanks to the efforts of the Nyae Nyae Conservancy and the Nyae Nyae Development Foundation of Namibia (NNDFN). The dictionary has also proved useful to professional academics and development workers who are collaborating with the Ju/'hoan people in both Namibia and Botswana.

The Ju/'hoan alphabet is almost like the English one, except that it has four extra consonants for “clicking” sounds. Each of these clicks is as important to Ju/'hoan-speakers as, for example, the letter “b” is to English-speakers. The Ju/'hoan and other San languages are characterized by these clicks, which are produced by drawing the tongue sharply away from points on the roof of the mouth. The various click symbols in the Ju/'hoan language are designated as follows:

1) “/” The “first” click (dental), sounds like “tsk, tsk!” and is made by putting the tongue just behind the front teeth. As in G/ui.

2) “≠” The “second” click (alveolar), is a soft “pop” made by putting the tongue just behind the ridge back of the front teeth. As in N≠a Jaqna or ≠Toma.

3) “!” The “third” click (alveolo-palatal), is a sharp “pop” made by drawing the tongue down quickly from the roof of the mouth. As in !Xun.

4) “//” The “fourth” click (lateral), is a clucking sound like that made in English to urge on a horse. As in G//ana.