

Immaterialism and Commonsense:
Which of Our Commonsensical Beliefs concerning
the Objects of Perception Berkeley intended to support?

Masashi Yamakawa

As is common knowledge among Berkeley scholars, there is doubt as to whether Berkeley's Immaterialism is compatible with our commonsense concerning the objects of perception. Various commentators have shown much interest in the problem of reconciliation between Berkeley's Immaterialism and our commonsensical beliefs especially concerning (1): reality, (2): continuity, (3): publicity of the objects of perception, and (4): our perceptual immediacy to the objects.

In this paper, I first examine how Immaterialism could be accommodated to those beliefs respectively, and then purpose to clarify which of our aforesaid commonsensical beliefs Berkeley especially intended to support through his philosophy of Immaterialism.

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Michael Williams' Contextualism: 'Default and Challenge structure'

Keishi Matsue

In the theory of knowledge, various problems are still being discussed. The main problem is especially clarifying what knowledge is. In other words, how do we justify knowledge? There are many responses to this question, for example, from epistemological internalism, externalism, foundationalism, and theory of coherence. Although these approaches are different, they try to survey the necessary and sufficient conditions to be knowledge. In such a case, as is known, the justification condition is particularly problematic, because this condition is necessary to exclude mere opinion, and what kind of situation any belief is properly justified in should be clarified.

In this paper, relative to this justification condition, I will discuss Michael Williams' contextualism. The aim of this paper is to clarify the characteristic of his contextualism. In order to achieve this aim, I will first examine D. M. Armstrongs' reliabilism, which is one of the classical forms of reliabilism. Epistemological reliabilism is one of the effective approaches to resist skepticism and resolve the problem of justification. However, reliabilism does not give enough consideration to the normative side of knowledge. Knowing is not only a factual state but also a particular normative status. Michael Williams' contextualism emphasizes the importance of this normative epistemology.

On the other hand, Michael Williams inserts the so-called 'Default and Challenge structure' in the middle of his contextualism. 'Default and Challenge' contrasts with 'Prior Grounding', which supports skeptical argument. In order to resist skepticism, the 'Default and Challenge structure' of knowledge-claim saddles challengers, as well as claimants, with justificational obligation.

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A Theory of Perception in Thomas Reid

— A problem of immediate perception

Takefumi Toda

The aim of this paper is to investigate Thomas Reid's theory of perception. His theory is very complex and has perplexed many thinkers. Reid's theory insists that our perception is immediate; however, some critics doubt its validity. This is one of the central problems in Reid's theory and therefore it requires consideration. In this paper, I focus on the relation between sensation and perception, and also elucidate the conception of objects. Based on these considerations, I attempt to interpret Reid's interpretation of immediate perception.

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Considering Enactivism: Revaluation of the Concept of Existence in Perception

Yoshiyuki Sato

The theory of enactivism has received much attention in cognitive science. This theory argues that perception does not consist of the receiving of information about the existing world but rather the active investigation of the world by means of the body. Enactivism is made up of several branches. This paper will examine A. Noë's *Action in Perception*, a main work presenting one of these branches, and attempt to demonstrate why one of his inclinations is incorrect.

We have the illusion that perception consists of making detailed representations of the world in the brain. Noë explains the source of this illusion by making a comparison to information gained from the World Wide Web. The immediate accessibility to this information sometimes makes us feel as if we possessed it in our computer. Noë clarifies that in a similar manner, the immediate accessibility to details about the world makes us feel as if we possessed such detailed representations in our brains. He also applies this explanation to reason why we, in a sense, "perceive" the backside of an object. However, he regards the backside as another front, and misses the properties of the backside. I think his mistake comes from his dismissing an individual's existential relationship to the world that constructs those properties. The above-mentioned illusion is, I believe, also caused by a person's existential relation to backgrounds, to which backsides belong.

Extending the enactivist view in his particular way, Noë disapproves of the clear distinction between perception and thinking. However, his perspective would permit no essential difference between perception and judgment based on the mechanically collected information about an object. However, when I judge in this way, I do not feel myself perceiving the object. On the other hand, I feel as if I perceived an object itself when I touch it with a stick in my hand. In this paper I clarify some important attributes of perception, comparing such a judgment with touching an object with a stick. One attribute is that in perception an object presents itself directly. The attribute is not factual but rather ontological because it is derived from the manner of being of the subject and of the world. Noë, however, fails to understand this. His misunderstanding about this and the other attributes results from his view that insists on the continuity between perception and thinking and his disregard for the concept of "existence."

Through the argument outlined above, I reevaluate the present-day efficacy of "existence" in perception.

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Die Grundlagen der Freiheit.

Eine Einführung in das 'Leib-Seele-Problem'

Thomas Buchheim

Three conditions for human freedoms are to be distinguished: (1) The reality of the activity of living individuals, (2) the causal relevance of mental states and (3) an irreducibly subjective aspect in living things. These conditions provide a way of describing the relation between body and soul, such that the conditions are fulfilled: firstly, the reality of activity implicitly assumes the substantial identity of body and soul in every active individual that exists as a body. Secondly, there are however fundamental formal differences between the mental and physical states of such bodies, so that a duality of the states possessed by a living individual has to be recognised along with the substantial identity of its body and soul. Hence the causal relevance of mental states for the occurrence of certain actions may act as the peculiar mark of freedom. Finally, the distinction between the objectively recognised existence of states and the subjective possession of them is the reason that certain actions cannot be deduced from objective knowledge of reality, however complete the latter may be. This argument shows that actions cannot be seen as the logical consequence of preceding states of the world, even if the actions in question were causally completely determined. Such a view of actions is, however, the standard justification that freedom is incompatible with determinism.

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