

## Hume on two causes

### – Regarding the problem about definition of cause

Yoshitaka Toyokawa

Undoubtedly, the causal theory proposed by Hume has been a representative one that still has great influence on philosophy today. However, there remain some distinct interpretations about how to understand his theory of causation. I think one of the reasons is that, although Hume explicitly gave a definition of cause in his *Treatise* and *First Enquiry*, he sometimes used the term “cause” in a meaning different from that expressed in the definition. Therefore, in order to grasp Hume’s precise position on theory of causation, first of all, we need to carefully examine his ways of using “cause,” without restricting our consideration within his definition of cause.

From the point above mentioned, this paper aims to distinguish Hume’s conception of cause into two different parts, namely, the cause expressed in the definition and the cause introduced in a section in which Hume mentions “Rules by which to judge of causes and effects,” and to emphasize similarities and differences between those two “causes.” Though the second cause has not thus far been much considered by commentators, I think we can’t appreciate Hume’s theory of causation without taking the second cause distinctly into account.

First, I show that these two “causes” share the content of the three rules for causal inference and that the sharing, considered in itself, could lead us into “naïve regularity theory of causation” or merely an irrational and skeptical theory that many critics wrongly attribute to Hume.

Second, I show that these two “causes” differ in faculty which operates when we conceive causes, and in how they can be justified in our causal inference. Besides imagination and custom, which are necessary for the first “cause,” the second “cause” requires reason and reflection. According to Hume, our causal inferences are essentially justified only by reflection. This seems to mean that we can justify only the second “cause,” but at the same time, I think, Hume implicitly suggests that the first “cause” too can be justified, in a different way from the second.

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## 'Material Falsity' of Ideas in the *Third Meditation*

Keishi Matsue

In the *third Meditation*, as you know, Descartes tried to accomplish proofs of the existence of god. In these demonstrations, he used various concepts and logical reasoning, which we shall attempt to clarify. To do so, we must examine in particular the meaning of the technical term 'idea,' which appears for the first time in the *third Meditation*. In this paper, we will deal with the problem of the 'material falsity' of ideas, one of the important issues concerning the word 'idea.'

According to the description in the *third Meditation*, falsity itself originally can occur only in judgments. However, there is another falsity (material falsity), which occurs in ideas, if they represent non-things as things. Arnauld and Descartes argue the rightness or wrongness of this notion in the *fourth Objections and Replies*. In this argument, they specifically discuss ideas of heat and cold in order to clarify what 'material falsity' is (Descartes also refers to them in the *third Meditation*). These ideas are of sensations; the problem of what causes them in the mind is resolved in the *sixth Meditation*, where Descartes explains ideas caused by interaction between our bodies and external objects. In the *third Meditation*, however, the existence of the external world has not been determined. That is why it could become a problem whether it is appropriate to refer to the 'material falsity' of ideas in the context of the *third Meditation*.

In the first half of this paper, I arrange complex arguments concerning the 'material falsity' of ideas, focusing especially on the ambiguous boundary line between 'judgments' and 'ideas,' which line renders the concept of 'material falsity' unclear. In the latter half, I debate whether it is right or wrong for Descartes to have introduced the concept of 'material falsity' in the *third Meditation*.

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## Die Triebskonzeptionen in der Sprachtheorie Fichtes

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In diesem Artikel betrachte ich die Rolle, die der Begriff des Triebes nach Fichte in seiner Sprachtheorie spielte. Danach ziele ich darauf, ihre praktische Möglichkeit und Grenze vom Standpunkt der Moralitätstheorie zu erklären.

Fichte redet über die Sprache bei den berühmten aufeinanderfolgenden Vorträgen *“Reden an die deutsche Nation”* (1808), die er für die Öffentlichkeit in Berlin unter Napoleons Herrschaft aufführte. Demzufolge werden die Menschen von der Sprache weit mehr gebildet, als die Sprache von den Menschen. Wie ist Fichtes Denkweise, in Bezug auf den linguistischen Aspekt? Sich auf den Begriff des Triebes konzentrierend, studiere ich diesen Aspekt für diesen Artikel mit Aufmerksamkeit, und stelle die zwei Sprachtheorien *‘Von der Sprachfähigkeit und dem Ursprung der Sprache’* (1795) aus seinem Artikel der Jena Periode und *“Reden an die deutsche Nation”* aus seinen Vorträgen der Berlin Periode gegenüber.

In seinem Artikel *‘Von der Sprachfähigkeit und dem Ursprung der Sprache’* schreibt Fichte über die Sprache, „Sprache, im weitesten Sinne des Wortes, ist der Ausdruck unserer Gedanken durch willkürliche Zeichen“. Und er schreibt über die Sprachfähigkeit „Sprachfähigkeit ist das Vermögen, seine Gedanken willkürlich zu bezeichnen“. Die Frage, warum Menschen auf die Idee kamen, durch das Medium der Sprache ihre Gedanken einander zu vermitteln, untersuchte Fichte. Unter Betrachtung des Begriffes des Triebes in diesem Artikel wird die Bedeutung seiner Wissenschaftslehre, sowie seine Sprachtheorie, die sich später in *“Reden an die deutsche Nation”* entwickelte, deutlicher.

Der vernünftige Mensch hat einen Trieb, mit sich selbst übereinzustimmen. Der Trieb, auf diese Identität zu zielen, ist eine praktische treibende Kraft in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre. Ich begreife die Verbindung zwischen Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre und seiner angewandten Philosophie vom Standpunkt der Sprachtheorie.

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## A reconsideration of Kant's Spinozism focusing on Schelling in *Opus postumum*

Hiroaki Uchida

*Opus postumum*, as generally known, is the manuscripts which Kant wrote in his last years, especially from 1796 to 1803. He exclusively dealt with the problems of physics and natural philosophy such as "the moving forces of matter" and "the ether or caloric" until 1799, because he originally intended to publish these manuscripts under the title of "transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics". Around 1800, however, he gradually began to mention the epistemological or metaphysical topics, for example, "how is experience possible?", "the thing in itself", "God and the world", "transcendental philosophy" and so on.

Moreover, in the VIIth and Ist fascicles written in 1800-1803, Kant not only repeatedly referred to "Spinozism", but also surprisingly regarded it as "transcendental idealism". In the same way as Spinoza, we find also Kant's allusion to Lichtenberg and Schelling as following: "System of transcendental idealism by Schelling, Spinoza, Lichtenberg, and, as it were, three dimensions: present, past and future." With regard to this obscure passage, some scholars insist that Kant approved of Spinozism and regarded Schelling as his own successor. Other scholars claim that he criticized Spinozism and Schelling's philosophy.

This paper attempts to clarify why Kant referred to Spinozism, and whether or not he affirmed the philosophy of Spinoza and Schelling. In my opinion, his numerous critical references to Spinozism in *Opus postumum* indicate that, on the one hand, Kant intended to oppose "fanaticism", and on the other hand, he aimed to develop his own system which he named "the highest standpoint of transcendental philosophy". Taking into consideration the fact that both Schelling and Spinoza are mentioned together in a single sentence, Kant did not look on Schelling as his own successor. I verify the above-mentioned interpretation by analyzing the usage of words and phrases, for example, "self-positing" and "time and space" in *Opus postumum*, *Litteratur Zeitung Erlangen No. 82* and some of the initial works of Schelling.

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