Pluralistic solution to mind – body problem :
Berkeley and Pragmatsm

Takefumi Toda

In this paper, I will roughly sketch out one solution to the mind – body problem. From Descartes and Locke's period, it is one major problem for philosophers to locate our mind in scientific world. Philosophers who try to tackle to this difficult problem seem to be increasing by popularity of naturalistic philosophy in 20th century. Among these philosophers, the most remarkable ones are physicalists. But I will take up two different thoughts. One is Berkeley's, an Irish idealist and the other is Pragmatist's. Using these philosophers' arguments, I want to propose the pluralistic solution. I will propose that we should not locate our mind into physical world by force and we should not offer the only one answer to the question of what our mind is. Rather we should define mind variously in various practices or contexts, even if such various conceptions may be inconsistent with each other.

(An associate professor of Kyoto University)

Reference, Conversation, Objects

Masae Kurosawa

The theory of reference discusses how words hook onto the world and how they pick out their referents. This essay deals with the topic viewed from communication between a speaker and a hearer.

This article, first, compares Searle's theory of reference with Donnellan's. Considering both of them, said to be opposed to each other, it will be shown that in a conversation, both the speaker and the hearer communicate and identify a referent; that the descriptions used to do so are their understandings, i.e., their beliefs about that object; and that, furthermore, to identify the referent is to understand mutually what the speaker is saying.

If what has been said is correct, it follows that referents are objects that we know, and that it is beside the point to pick out an object beyond our beliefs, i.e. an object which may not satisfy descriptions but is, in fact, the referent of a referring expression, which is said to be referred by it. Moreover, considering Rorty's argument, it follows that whether the referent exists or not is a matter of our believing in its existence or nonexistence. From the above, then, the difficulty arises in how we decide whether the statement about that object is true or false; it becomes impossible to compare the object and the statement. This difficulty is solved through the mutual understanding of what the speaker says; descriptions used are the speaker's beliefs about that object and that the hearer understands them means he is approving of them. The issue of what the relationship is between the beliefs and the objects is not considered here; that is to be further explained.

（Doctoral Student at Graduate School of Human and Environmental Studies, Kyoto University）

Zusammenfassung

Yuta Sakazume

Bei dieser Abhandlung geht es darum, ein folgendes Verständnis herauszustellen, dass das Kernproblem in *Sein und Zeit* (1927) in der Geschichte liegt. Um dies zu erklären, sehen wir eine Vorlesung vor *Sein und Zeit* nach, die *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion* (GA60, Wintersemester 1920-21) heißt. Durch unsere Betrachtungen wird deutlich, dass in *Einleitung* Existenz und Geschichte untrennbar sind. Konkreter gesagt, an »1. die Verknüpfung der Existenz mit der Geschichte in *Einleitung*« bringen wir die Untrennbarkeit beider folgenderweise in die Helle. Und zwar, *Einleitung* hat einen Gedankenzug, der von der abfallenden Tendenz als die Unmöglichkeit der Geschichte abweicht, indem sich der Vollzugssinn modifiziert, der von dem Gehaltssinn und dem Bezugssinn verschieden ist und die jeweilige unwiederholbare exisinstenzielle ganze Situationsverständnis betrifft. Durch diesen vom Abfall abweichenden Weg führt *Einleitung* zur Verwirklichung der unwiederholbaren Geschichte. An »2. die Erfahrung der παρουσία als der Beweis für die Verknüpfung der Existenz mit der Geschichte« legen wir diesen Gedankenweg weiter fest, indem wir Heideggers Verständnis für παρουσία in *Einleitung* betrachten. Dabei versteht er dies Phänomen als eine augenblickliche einmalige Grunderfahrung der Existenz, die durch Modifizierung des Vollzugssinnes ermöglicht ist, und bestimmt diese Grunderfahrung zugleich auch als eine Zeit oder Geschichte als solche. An »3. die Verknüpfung der Existenz mit der Geschichte in *Sein und Zeit*« vollziehen wir die für uns wichitigste Betrachtung. Denn hier legen wir *Sein und Zeit* folgenderweise aus. Und zwar *Sein und Zeit* hat den gleichen Gedankenweg wie *Einleitung*, in dem Sinne, dass *Sein und Zeit* auch die einmalige Existenz gegen das Verfallen (die abfallende Tendenz) verwirklichen, und dieser Gedankenweg mit der Geschichtsproblematik, die die Überwindung des Verfallens an die Tradition, d.h. die griechische ontologische Tradition besagt, untrennbar verbunden ist. Aus dieser Hinsicht können wir abschließend bestätigen, dass *Sein und Zeit* von Anfang an die geschichtlichen Betrachtungen durchzieht.

(Doctoral Student, Graduate School of Human and Environmental Studies, Kyoto University)

Object and logic —Meinong and Russell

Atsushi Nishimura

In this article, I clarify some of Russell's important philosophical features by comparing the thoughts of Russell and Meinong. Usually they are discussed in terms of their metaphysical consistency due to Russell's argument 'Meinongian objects are inconsistent.' in 'On Denoting'. Instead, in this article I pay attention to Russell's philosophical attitudes, which will emerge through the comparison of them.

First what we have to notice is that, in addition to famous metaphysical similarities, both the early Russell and Meinong have an important point in common. It is well known that they each created a different kind of scholarship, namely logic and object theory, and argued for their necessity. In the background, however, they both have a common complaint on the absence of a meta viewpoint for looking over existing scholarship and a common understanding of the necessity of a framework endowing this viewpoint.

Despite their agreement, he criticizes Meinong's theory of objects. First he criticizes Meinong's classification of objects, claiming that psychological viewpoint is mixed with his method of classification. According to Russell, the order of how we recognize an object is irrelevant in classification and that the order should be determined from a logical viewpoint. He also criticizes Meinong's thought of complexes such as definite descriptions and propositions. His criticism takes place in dealing with the problem of how we should understand the relationship of a complex to its components, taking account of the fact that a complex is more than a mere collection of them. Meinong asserts that first of all the existence of a complex is presupposed and the combination of the elements included in it is assured by privileged relation 'r' , which is necessarily in complex. By contrast, Russell thinks, there is a gap between a complex and its collection of components, and that a complex should not be presupposed but should logically be constructed in some way. His solution is that a complex is constructed by the elements included in it and the fact 'the elements are related to each other'.

This article reveals Russell's philosophical attitude, that is, a logical viewpoint is important in object theory, as well as his criticism of Meinong. His radical attitude that logical viewpoint can be used in dealing with philosophical problems seems to be the key understanding Russell's philosophy.

(Doctoral Student at Graduate school of Human and Environmental studies, Kyoto university)

Freedom in spite of Neurons?
Why neuroscience does not necessarily deprive us of a free will

Thomas Buchheim

(1) Neuroscientific prejudices about the impossibility of free will are mainly based on two arguments:

1. There can be no 'agency' of the will within ourselves which takes its decisions independently of neuronal conditions and processes; and if there were such an agency, it would have no causal effect at all and would thus be meaningless.

2. Whatever does not stand outside of neuronal conditions and processes, is determined by neuronal laws of nature.

(2) The unity and distinctness of actions and persons cannot be discerned from a strictly molecular biological perspective; that is, the latter is 'blind' to freedom and all noumenal or mental distinctions.

(3) However, if, in spite of all this, one assumes that there are actions and acting persons, then it is evident that biographical episodes and bodily processes, that can be described in terms of molecular biology, do not possess the same properties.

(4) Three differences between biographical episodes and bodily processes:

Bodily processes: precise spatiotemporal localization with undelimitable interconnectedness
(sum principle)
completely describable by quantifiable physical properties
any difference in the summated profile of the properties yields a difference in the bodily processes.

Biographical Episodes: are always holistically ascribable to exactly one living system
do not occur without systematic linkage to bodily processes
(organically bound)
are internal variations of the continuity of one and the same life, i.e. not only temporal but rhythmical parts of it.

(5) There is confirming evidence by experiments that the characteristics of biographical episodes play a causal explanatory role for changes in the profile of bodily processes.

(6) In that respect rational characteristics of biographical episodes like speaking and thinking (e.g. their transparency for opposite possibilities) could play a causal explanatory role for changes in the neuronal network of our brain.

(7) Deterministic relationships represent definite but not necessary connections between determinants and what is determined.

(8) Neuronally determined relationships can be connected with characteristics of biographical episodes involving alternative possibilities without becoming modally inconsistent

(Professor at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich)