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<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>FUJIOKA, Masaki</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>社会システム研究 = Socialsystems : political, legal and economic studies (2016), 19: 69-85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue Date</td>
<td>2016-03-28</td>
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<tr>
<td>URL</td>
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Kyoto University
Understanding the History of American Universities during the Cold War Era

— The Validity of the Concept of “Tension” —

Masaki FUJIOKA

Introduction

This article aims to consider the effective standpoints for approaching the historical study of American universities during the Cold War era. The next section details two interpretations, which are in sharp conflict, of different viewpoints taken by historical studies on American universities during the said era. Studies that espouse other interpretations apart from the two have not yet emerged. Hence, this article reviews previous research on and examines several case examples of universities during the Cold War era, followed by a discussion on how the concept of “tension” proposed by the historian Richard Hofstadter in Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (1962–1963) can potentially provide a completely new outlook on this matter.

I Previous Studies on American Universities in the Cold War Era

Many studies have focused on universities in the United States during the Cold War (particularly on the research activities at such universities). These studies can be roughly divided into two categories. However, such studies have resulted in poor outcomes, given the universities’ characteristics and relations with politics and society in the U.S.

The studies under the first category, which flourished until the 1990s, hinged upon the view that American universities in the Cold War era played a role as “perpetrators” to a certain degree. For instance, many universities participated in the Vietnam War through their intellectual assets. As such, the universities had been targets of accusations. The nature of studies in this category aimed for a critical discussion on the contention that universities during the Cold War were controlled by the U.S. government and supportive incorporated foundations. A classic example is James Ridgeway’s The Closed Corporation: American Universities in Crisis (1968) criticized that university researchers have been “bought out” by the government. At the core of the arguments was that universities supported the Cold War policies of the U.S. by providing justifications. Any collusive relationship between the government and the university at the time was, therefore, viewed with suspicion. As an
exceptional instance, Gene Lyons thoughtfully pointed out that “what is learned today may be disproved tomorrow, [but] be subsequently assessed as a crucial point of departure for a highly productive line of inquiry, or, more modestly and usually, be valued as part of increasing understanding in a field of [Behavioral Sciences] without decisive” that whether Behavioral Science created collusive relationship with the U.S. government or not in The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and Federal Government in the Twentieth Century (1969). On the other hands, owing to some restrictions during that period, it was difficult to understand and analyze historical facts. As a result of this situation, relevant books focused entirely on criticisms of prior criticisms, which were deficient in terms of understanding and analysis.

After the mid-1980s, however, profound empirical studies, which focused on leftists in the unfolding mainstream trends at universities and in the academic world, have emerged. These studies could depend on primary historical sources and sought to explain historical facts. Significant books regarding this development include Ellen W. Schrecker’s No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (1986) and Sigmund Diamond’s Compromised Campus: The Collaboration of Universities with Intelligence Community, 1945-1955 (1992). In addition, Christopher Simpson traced the processes of creating the Communication Research field under the initiatives of the federal government’s psychological warfare policy in his book, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960 (1994). By the mid-1990s, Noam Chomsky and others published The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years (1997), which comprised articles that emphasize the history of oppression of the universities during the Cold War. Another example is Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences during the Cold War (1998) edited by Simpson. It can be observed the government’s funding to universities was critically discussed in a paradoxical fashion, saying that “it is unlikely that the field [including Development Studies, Area Studies, Communication Research, and Operations Research] could have evolved in anything like [their] present forms without early infusions of fund and contracts from intelligence, propaganda, and military agencies, or from foundations working closely” during World War II until well into the 1960s.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, a different and remarkable academic trend emerged. This trend falls under the second category in which studies focused on individual initiatives of people at universities. The studies in the second category pointed out that certain people at universities were proactively involved in the formation of U.S. national/foreign policies and creating the Cold War order in the academic world. These studies argued that certain individuals became extremely involved in the course of exploration of new academic fields and the acquisition of funds necessary for such exploration. People at universities were thus seen as partially responsible for the formation of the Cold War order. Examples of works under the second study category include Ron Robin’s The Making of the
Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Military-Industrial Complex (2000), in which the formation process of Behavioral Sciences is discussed on the basis of Thomas Kuhn’s Paradigm Theory. Other examples are The Social Sciences Go To Washington: The Politics of Knowledge in the Postmodern Age (2004), edited by Hamilton Cravens, and Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature (2012), edited by Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens. These two books paid attention to how the academe and intellectual life became closer to the government, how the ideas of social science contributed to public policy, and what type of social system was established.

Academic circles in the U.S. diligently approached research on the academe and intellectual life. In 2003, David Engerman suggested in his article that the “narrative of pure universities and scholars corrupted by national security imperatives” be rejected, adding that studies instead deal with how crucial components often emerged for reasons unrelated to the U.S.–Soviet conflict. The academic trend seemed to shift to the second category and it becomes predominant after the appearance of Engerman’s article.

However, this shift does not guarantee that the second study category has been problem free. It should be evasive to overlook the historical facts that the relationships among universities, societies, and the federal government became direct and more closely integrated during the Cold War. First, the federal government’s financial support to universities for scientific studies evidently increased, as shown in Table 1.

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<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>$135</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>310</td>
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<td>1953</td>
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Incorporated foundations proactively provided financial support as well.

Second, it should be necessary to pay attention to the existence of liberal faculties. Faculty members, who entered universities in the mid-1930s and became liberal students, comprise the mainstream of universities’ faculties by the end of World War II. Their experiences of, especially the Great Depression and World War II, had helped develop their leftist inclination. During the Cold War period, the trend for such faculty members to be considered leftists/communists and to be attacked at congressional hearings became more common as discussed by Schrecker. Diamond also clarified...
that even Harvard University, which advocated academic freedom, had established a system for monitoring communist faculty members on campus during this period. It can be observed that the second study category seems not to make light of such historical background.

Another problem is that the nature of the second study category appears to be problematic in certain ways. Engerman believed that universities, as portrayed in the first category, must be remote and idyllic intellectual communities. On the basis of this recognition, Engerman made the following assertion: the purpose of the first study category was to reveal that “the anti-Communist crusade of the late 1940s and 1950s was . . . political interference” with the universities and it “vitiated the sanctity and security of the universities.” He further said that universities have “solitary scholars, appointed solely on the basis of their talents . . . , enjoying the time and resources to explore a freely chosen subject to their heart’s content and free to express their results to the scholarly or wider community.” Engerman was against this historical view and insisted that it is excessively idealized and represents an “idyll that never was.”

Although he clarified that the first category was an anachronism, the second study category was deficient in that, compared with the first category, no proposal was made as to the degree of effectiveness of the second type of study. Further, the second category may have been enormously influenced by the academic trend focusing on the individual identities that generally dominated the social sciences at the time. The root causes of the second category existed in relation to this point and were clarified by Rebecca Lowen in *Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford* (1997), which was highly evaluated by Engerman and regarded as a typical example of a work of the second category.

In her book, Lowen identified factors that allowed Stanford University, a local institution facing financial difficulties in the 1930s, to be transformed into a top-notch research university that became widely known in the U.S. during the Cold War. Among the factors that Lowen identified was the insatiable desire of the university’s trustees and administrators to acquire federal funds. However, three problems arise as regards Lowen’s research: 1) it adopted the same viewpoint with those written in the late 1960s of criticizing the federal government’s control over the university in terms of attributing the changes in universities to financial motivation; 2) it paid excessive attention to developments in the university’s trustees and administrators, instead it failed to describe specific trends in academic research; and 3) in relation to problem 2), it failed to define the nature of the term “Cold War University,” which was also used in the title.

A sharp conflict of views on research can be observed between the two categories being focused on targeting universities during the Cold War. As such, the studies that serve as a “bridge” connecting these two is ideal and desirable. However, apart from the said conflict, another problem exists. To put it briefly, this problem is that the history of universities in the U.S. has not been considered a
subject of American history.

II Universities’ Histories Ignored by Historians and Olivier Zunz’s New Perspective

The study of American history has, thus far, ignored universities in the different periods in history. In the mid-1950s, the Institute of Early American History and Culture (IEAHC) published a series that aimed “to explore a special historical field, which scholars have neglected or indifferently exploited or in which renewed interest has developed in our own times.” 11 IEAHC’s projects set off Whitfield J. Bell, Jr.’s Early American Science (1955) and William N. Fenton’s American Indian and White Relations to 1830 (1957). The Institute decided to take up educational history as the theme of its third project and request Bernard Bailyn, a professor at Harvard University, to write the book on American educational history. Bailyn was an authority in research on economic history of the American colonial period and founding eras, but he was not a specialist for research in educational history. IEAHC’s reason for requesting Bailyn to work on the project, thus, remains uncertain, but in response to the request, Bailyn collected and reviewed an enormous quantity of previous studies. And then he published the book, Education in the Forming of American Society: Needs and Opportunities for Study in 1960.

According to Bailyn, IEAHC seemed to have hoped for him “to present in some coherent form a survey of the writing that now exists in that area and a number of recommendations for future work, including a list of specific topics for papers, monographs, and surveys.” 12 However, it could not to be satisfied by IEAHC or scholars in educational history, since Bailyn added criticisms on the amount of books and articles on the history of education. He severely criticized existing research on the history of education at the beginning of his book.

“But when I attempted to follow these directions I found myself confronted with a peculiar problem. The field of study with which I was concerned, unlike the history of science, law, or Indian-white relations, has not suffered from neglect, which firm direction and energetic research might repair, but from the opposite, from an excess of writing along certain lines and an almost undue clarity of direction. The number of books and articles on the schools and colleges of the colonial period, on the methods of teaching, on the curriculum, school books, and teachers is astonishingly large; and since at least the end of the nineteenth century the lines of interpretation and framework of ideas have been unmistakable. And yet, for all of this, the role of education in American history is obscure. We have almost no historical leverage on the problems of American education. The facts, or at least a grant quantity of them, are there, but they lie inert;
they form no significant pattern.”

Bailyn’s critique is based on the following points: 1) narrow-minded research in educational history arrived at conclusions based on the assumption that schools were self-absorbed and all logic and momentum for the development of schools existed within the schools; and 2) such research resulted in isolation from general research on American history. Supporting his first point, Bailyn pointed out that the targets of research were limited to public schools and such subjects as curriculum problems in teacher-training institutions. For his second point, he opined that though “modern histories of the colleges are lavish with detail on the period of colonial origins, the eighteenth century colleges have been badly neglected by historians.” On the basis of such recognitions, Bailyn made a suggestion that “what is needed . . . is not so much projecting new studies as a critique of the old and, more important, an attempt to bring the available facts into relation with general understanding of the course of American development” in order to propose a resolution for breakthroughs.

While there were objections against Bailyn’s criticisms of the history of education, a fruitful outcome had been achieved in the attempt to confront and overcome his criticisms with ardent and honest attitudes. A careful reading of Bailyn’s criticisms, however, reveals that he offered no explanation why researchers in American history ignored universities, noting the lack of academic rigor in both the selection (as targets of study) of researchers in educational history engaging in research and methods of treating historical documents. In this regard, observations from the standpoint of the relationship between universities and nationalism would be useful.

In The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848 (1962), the historian Eric Hobsbawm stated that “the progress of schools and universities measures that of nationalism, just as schools and especially universities became its most conscious champions” in 19th century Europe. On the bases of this statement, Benedict Anderson argued in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1991) that “academic institutions were insignificant to American nationalisms[sic].” Hobsbawm and Anderson recognized that American history researchers considered American universities to be institutions irrelevant to nationalism. This recognition would lead American history researchers, mainly engaging in research relating to social and national history, to ignore the existence of universities.

Despite these circumstances, researches that pointed out the historical linkage between American universities and nationalism has emerged in recent years. Among the historians engaged in such research is Olivier Zunz, who wrote in 1998 Why the American Century?. His work provides groundbreaking viewpoints on the incorporation of history of university development into the history of the development of American nationalism.

Zunz pointed out that an institutional matrix, comprising universities, government agencies
(e.g., government research institutions), corporate research institutions, foundations, and military agencies, among others, was established in the U.S. after the late 19th century. This institutional matrix was created for the purpose of mobilizing all national powers (particularly the academic and intellectual fields) and creating a powerful nation state. The formation process of this matrix entailed the organization of systems serving as research institutions by universities. Mobility of intellectual personnel was remarkably high within the matrix. Hence, a shift from compartmentalized and specialized knowledge to practical ones was easy. Natural science was mainly applied to industries at the end of the 19th century, but knowledge produced in the fields of sociology and economics was reflected in measures taken by the federal and state governments at the beginning of the 20th century. Consolidation among organizations within the institutional matrix became stronger in the U.S., in contradiction to the 20th century Europe where the relationship between universities and the government had weakened. Through such arguments, Zunz asserted that the institutional matrix gave rise to nationalism in the U.S. as well as advanced and constituted a foundation for supporting the ideology of the “American Century” in the second half of 20th century.20

Zunz’s study highlighted the historical fact that American universities were steadily connected with nationalism after the late 19th century. This viewpoint allows the incorporation of research on the history of universities into American history. Zunz’s research, however, seemed to have limited impact on the trend of research in American university history. The reason is that there remain the ideas among researchers in educational history as follows: schools and universities are “unique areas supported by educational value . . . in a self-sustained manner.” Consequently, research on American university history is seemingly considered to constitute house history, that is, “preoccupied with the insular events and historical records of a single, specific campus.” Such studies are entirely focused on chronology, thereby lacking analytical frameworks.

Further, ignoring Zunz’s work has created the condition in which the unsolved problems he identified have been remained to be unsolved. Zunz asserted that pluralist approaches to political and cultural aspects were pursued after the late 19th century America. Zunz recognized this historical background and, thus, attempted to raise the awareness of readers that the institutional matrix represented a “trend toward integrating knowledge on a national scale.” This meant that “across the nation . . ., [there are] requirements [for] newly minted national professional associations, universities, [and] corporate bureaucracies.” The institutional matrix, hence, involved a movement toward American homogenization that was contrary to pluralism.

Zunz said that Why the American Century aimed to learn and understand “how the histories of knowledge, class, and pluralism intersected to create a strong center capable of major achievements at home and abroad.” However, as he pointed out, the conflict between the drive toward homogeneity and the drive toward diversity could not have been reconciled during the 20th century. As a result,
“scientists, professionals, policymakers, and so-called public intellectuals created major obstacles for
themselves and their country by mistaking success for understanding, abstractions for realities, and
ideology [of American Century] for ideas [of Pax Americana].”24 Therefore, studies in university
history that does not consider the Zunz’s work would lose not only the opportunities to connect with
the general study of American history but also the ways to a profound understating on the conflict
homogenization and diversity in American society.

As he ended his narrative at the period immediately after World War II, it is difficult to observe
the aforementioned problem through Zunz’s Why the American Century. To overcome this problem,
studies will be hoped to focus on the history of American universities during the Cold War era. Only
then would it be possible to attempt to search for a viewpoint that would “bridge” the two different
views regarding universities as pointed out in the previous section and present views on the problem
Zunz left in his book.

The subsequent section details the observation on these problems through a presentation of
several case examples drawn from the history of Soviet Studies at universities in the U.S. during the
beginning of the Cold War.

III Soviet Studies within the Institutional Matrix

Philip Mosely, CIA, and the Ford Foundation

The first case example is the Russian Institute at Columbia University (CURI) established in
1946, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. The CURI rejected to cooperate with the U. S.
government in the scholarly areas and maintained distance from American society where anti-Com-
munist movements were widespread. Instead the CURI paid intensive focus on students’ education.
As a result, the sponsor Rockefeller Foundation criticized the CURI for not submitting conspicuous
research results. The problems raised by the Rockefeller Foundation involved Geroid Robinson,
Director of the CURI, and Philip Mosely, a professor in international politics. Robinson, a leading
research authority of Russian history until World War II, did not publish even a single book during
his time at the CURI, as indicated in my previous article25. Mosely’s works, meanwhile, revolved
around discussions of his own experiences during World War II that were relevant to international
politics at that time; his works was found to be inconsistent with his role as an academic researcher26.

However, it was not possible for the CURI to build an academic and intellectual community
different from other universities by maintaining distance from the U.S. government and foundations
during the Cold War. Robinson, indeed, continued to reject requests for research from the federal
government, but he did not restrict the research activities of other professors27. As a result, profes-
sors, being more suitable for the requirements of Cold War Studies, have appeared at the CURI.
Among these professors was Abram Bergson, an economics professor at the CURI. He engaged in a research related to the Soviet Union’s economy jointly with the U.S. Air Force and the Rand Corporation. Bergson eventually transferred to the Harvard University’s Russian Research Center (HURRC) and became its director.

Another was Mosely. He participated in Operation Research conducted and supported by the federal government at Johns Hopkins University confidentially. This Operation Research elapsed in 1949, three years only after CURI’s establishment. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which focused on this project, forged an agreement with Mosely that allowed him to access top-secret information retained by the CIA during the period from 1951 to 1954. In addition, Mosely became highly important in the world of Soviet Studies and in U.S. diplomatic policies. He was a leader of the American Political Science Association in the early 1950s and president of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1952 to 1956; he also served as board and committee member at the Ford Foundation.

Mosely had established his relationship with the CIA in the beginning of the 1950s, which was an embryonic period for U.S. Area Studies. This made Mosely politically important to the Ford Foundation, which provided more funds with universities’ Area Studies than the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York. In fact, the Ford Foundation decided to pump at least $30 million into China-related studies during the mid-1950s, following the advice of Mosely. Moreover they collaborated with the CIA for the promotion of Area Studies and provided Mosely with information supplied by the CIA.

However, as is the case with academicians at other universities, Mosely could not completely escape the criticism of anti-Communists or McCarthyists at universities. In fact, he was required to testify before the Subversive Activities Control Board in 1953. The CIA, however, kept on believing in Mosely. In 1955, CIA’s John Whitman sent a letter to Mosely requesting that he make arrangements for recruitment of the CURI students for the organization. Mosely then recruited several students who later joined the CIA. The historian Bruce Cumings pointed out that “Mosely was happy to oblige” such requests in this regard.

The CURI as an institution decided to maintain its distance from external institutions as already indicated. Despite this, Bergson formed a relationship with the Air Force and the Rand Corporation for confronting and resolving difficulties. The same applies to Mosely with the CIA and the Ford Foundation. The relationships established by the university staff clearly indicate the difficulty facing universities seeking to either withdraw from the institutional matrix or keep an academic and intellectual community independent of the institutional matrix. In this way, the institutional matrix played the role of strongly insisting for a homogenous academic and intellectual community as part of the American nation during this period.
The academic and intellectual communities existed to remain in the institutional matrix to enhance national power. But, this does not mean that universities were able to continue to maintain beneficial positions. There is a case in which an institution was forced out from the institutional matrix by the U.S. congress and American society based on an anti-Communist argument. This case brings to the fore questions whether the academic and intellectual communities, which had lost the means to rely on the institutional matrix, would be able to survive.

**Harvard University's Refugee Interview Project**

Another example entails the development after the end of a Soviet Studies initiative known as the Refugee Interview Project (RIP) implemented by the HURRC. The RIP was based on contractual research with the Human Resources Research Institute (HRRI) of Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, during the period from 1950 to 1954. The term “refugees” in this project mainly refers to Soviet nationals forcibly taken by Germany as workers from German-occupied regions during the Russo-German War in World War II. The term also includes Soviet soldiers who escaped from the Red Army amid the confusion right before the end of the war. The HURRC received funding equivalent to 1 million USD from the HRRI in order to accomplish the RIP. This project aimed to provide options (e.g., “Soviet cities which ought or ought not to be bombed.”) as regards airstrikes on Soviet cities.

The HURRC mainly conducted interviews with Soviet refugees who had escaped to U.S.-occupied regions in Germany and Austria, or New York. The RIP also collected and analyzed the questionnaires filled out by the refugees. The Air Force and the HRRI hoped the final report to include a list of 30 Soviet cities to be bombed.

Since the beginning, however, the researchers involved in the RIP aimed at a more extensive Soviet research that was beyond the selection of airstrike locations. The HURRC, hence, changed its name inside of the HURRC from RIP to “The Project on the Soviet Social System,” which was rather different from the airstrikes research. As such, the RIP was closed down in 1954 after it was attacked by U.S. Congress and the anti-Communist movements in Boston. But the HURRC obliged to submit the final report to the Air Force. Subsequently, “Strategic and Psychological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System (Vulnerabilities of the Soviet System)” was submitted to the Air Force as the final report in 1954 and then *How the Soviet System Works?: Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes*, which was “substantially the same [with] the final report” was presented to the public in 1957. Both report and the published document, however, lacked the arguments that the HURRC originally intended to pursue. These works merely presented research results.

**The Soviet Citizen: Soviet Studies being sophisticated**

Certain HURRC researchers had implemented the RIP in accordance with their contracts with
the HRRI since 1950. For example, Alex Inkeles, a sociologist and RIP’s leader, thought that the purpose of the RIP was to collect basic information for the analysis of Soviet society. Moreover, Inkeles believed that outcomes resulting from such research should be made publicly available. However, Inkeles could not ignore RIP client Air Force’s desire to keep most of the obtained data confidential. He reluctantly accepted Air Force’s request, but nonetheless divided the results of his study into two types of reports: 1) internal and completely confidential reports; and 2) reports to be made public in the future.

In fact, the HURRC intended to ascertain the structure of Soviet society from a wider perspective that differed from the intentions of the Air Force at the time of the opinion surveys. Certain questions relating to HURRC’s intention were incorporated. Examples of such questions include: “Were the [savings] deposits deducted from earnings or did they come out of take-home pay?,” “Who were the chief purchasers of food in the Kolkhoz market?,” and “Who paid the tractor drivers?” These questions had contributed little to strategy formulation, such as for Air Force’s attack goals.

The above questions were utilized considerably in Nine Soviet Portraits, a 1955 novel by Raymond A. Bauer, a researcher at the HURRC. This novel attempted to express the living environments of “typical” Soviet citizen[s]“ and was commissioned by Walt Rostow, a professor in economic history at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies (i.e., While “you psychologists and sociologists” tend to take people apart, can you describe “the day to day experiences of a real, living person” in the Soviet Union?).

In 1959, five years later “Vulnerabilities of the Soviet System” was submitted to the U. S. Air Force, Bauer and Inkeles presented The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society to the public at an academic form. The one of the purpose of this book served to clarify points relating to “the attitudes and life experiences of Soviet citizens,” a subject with which Americans at the time had little familiarity.

The Soviet Citizen sought “to find comparable data [on the Soviet Union] from other industrial countries and particularly the United States” by analyzing the data obtained by RIP researchers. The authors, Inkeles and Bauer, aimed to reveal that “there [was] an extraordinarily close correspondence . . . between the pattern of experiences and attitudes of Soviet citizens and their counterparts . . . in a variety of other large-scale industrial societies having a markedly different culture and history and possessed of quite dissimilar political institutions.” (Emphasis mine.) The main intention of authors was to present facts that came as a great surprise to many people.

As mentioned above, the HURRC had already submitted the final report to the Air Force in 1954, and published the book, How the Soviet System Works in 1957. In these two documents, the Soviet Union was considered to be an enemy. The reason is that it was inevitable that statements would be inserted relating to “strategies” to be used against the Soviet Union based on contractual relation-
ships with the Air Force and in consideration of McCarthyism, which attacked academism in the U.S. at the time.

Both Inkeles and Bauer, however, had left the HURRC upon the publication of *The Soviet Citizen* in 1959. They were already scholars at the Stanford University’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences[^1]. A changing era and environments surrounding them, including the end of the so-called red purge, allowed assertions that should have been contained in “Vulnerabilities of the Soviet System” and *How the Soviet System Works* to reach the forefront through *The Soviet Citizen* in a more sophisticated manner.

The strong emphasis of *The Soviet Citizen* served to present the following two points. The first one is that the most important elements comprising the Soviet system were functions for labor, which applied to all other modern societies. A more specific assertion was made as follows: “The substratum on which the distinctive Soviet features are built is after all a large-scale industrial order which shares many features in common with the large scale industrial order in other national states of Europe and indeed Asia.”[^2] (Emphasis mine.) Through the analysis based on the above point, the authors’ aim of *The Soviet Citizen* was clearly to present the similarities between Soviet and other industrial societies, including that of the U.S.[^3] Inkeles and Bauer also pointed out the following tendency of the Soviet citizens: “In large measure, the response [of the complaint] of Soviet citizens to their social system is an extraordinary degree comparable to the response of citizens in other large-scale industrial societies, notably the United States, to their industrial system.”[^4]

The second emphasis point is that there was no possible way for Soviet citizens to undertake political activities based on their political beliefs or in pursuit of freedom. The more specific assertions were made as follows: Soviets showed “no disloyal behavior on their own part during their life under the Soviet regime, at least during periods of social and political stability” and there is no “sufficient cause for the mass of citizens to move them to the forcible action that would be required to change” the political system in the Soviet Union[^5]. Inkeles and Bauer detected that Soviet citizens “accepted and supported the idea of government ownership and control of the economy, and they seemed basically disposed as well to accept the idea of centralized and essentially autocratic determination of national policy.”[^6]

This does not mean that there were “the mechanisms whereby loyalty is maintained, whereby doubts are kept out of consciousness, [and] whereby the individual not only controls his behavior but his thoughts as he pursues his life goals” within the Soviet system[^7]. This mention demonstrated the intentions of the authors to prove wrong the supposition that a social system controlling the lives of individuals in the Soviet Union existed within the regime.

Inkeles and Bauer, instead, thought that the historical development that created freedom and democratic political system was peculiar “in Anglo-Saxon countries and on the continent of Western

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[^5]: The strong emphasis of *The Soviet Citizen* served to present the following two points. The first one is that the most important elements comprising the Soviet system were functions for labor, which applied to all other modern societies. A more specific assertion was made as follows: “The substratum on which the distinctive Soviet features are built is after all a large-scale industrial order which shares many features in common with the large scale industrial order in other national states of Europe and indeed Asia.” (Emphasis mine.) Through the analysis based on the above point, the authors’ aim of *The Soviet Citizen* was clearly to present the similarities between Soviet and other industrial societies, including that of the U.S.
[^6]: Inkeles and Bauer also pointed out the following tendency of the Soviet citizens: “In large measure, the response [of the complaint] of Soviet citizens to their social system is an extraordinary degree comparable to the response of citizens in other large-scale industrial societies, notably the United States, to their industrial system.”
[^7]: The second emphasis point is that there was no possible way for Soviet citizens to undertake political activities based on their political beliefs or in pursuit of freedom. The more specific assertions were made as follows: Soviets showed “no disloyal behavior on their own part during their life under the Soviet regime, at least during periods of social and political stability” and there is no “sufficient cause for the mass of citizens to move them to the forcible action that would be required to change” the political system in the Soviet Union. Inkeles and Bauer detected that Soviet citizens “accepted and supported the idea of government ownership and control of the economy, and they seemed basically disposed as well to accept the idea of centralized and essentially autocratic determination of national policy.” This does not mean that there were “the mechanisms whereby loyalty is maintained, whereby doubts are kept out of consciousness, [and] whereby the individual not only controls his behavior but his thoughts as he pursues his life goals” within the Soviet system. This mention demonstrated the intentions of the authors to prove wrong the supposition that a social system controlling the lives of individuals in the Soviet Union existed within the regime.
[^8]: Inkeles and Bauer, instead, thought that the historical development that created freedom and democratic political system was peculiar “in Anglo-Saxon countries and on the continent of Western
Europe,” and hence “borrow or emulate” was “not easy.” As such, the authors asserted that an objective viewpoint regarding the value of freedom. They intended to present the following points: Soviet citizens did not share a philosophy of striving for freedom at the risk of their lives (which was an obvious concept in the Western world) and establishing a suitable regime. Inkeles and Bauer instead emphasized the strong needs for Soviet citizens to dissolve their uneasiness with life that stemmed from a distortion of industrial society. They said in The Soviet Citizen that the Soviet citizens hoped to “end the terror, . . . , improve the impoverished standard of living, [make] the welfare state principles more effective, [and] pay a decent return for farm labor.”

Inkeles and Bauer eventually intended to maintain a viewpoint that reflected the standpoint of Soviet citizens. The Soviet Citizen, hence, was not written in a way that the Soviet regime was portrayed as having different political and cultural systems from those of the U.S. This point was not a particularly notable issue from an industrial perspective. The authors made the point that research emphasizing the peculiarities of the Soviet regime was problematic.

When The Soviet Citizen was nearly completed in February 1958, Inkeles expressed his views to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Committee members showed a strong interest in the study Inkeles and Bauer had been dealing with, asserting that the Soviet Union was understood to be a modern industrial nation.

The Committee members were also interested in how the Soviet Union, a totalitarian country, had the characteristics of a modern industrial nation. Democratic Senator J. William Fulbright requested that Inkeles state his opinions on the characteristics that had remained unchanged since the Russian Empire era in the 19th century. Inkeles pointed out that the imperialistic attitudes previously held by the Soviet regime had continued to weaken in the Soviet regime, a modern industrial society at the time.

However, the Foreign Relations Committee members, including Fulbright, did not accurately understand Inkeles (and Bauer’s) standpoint that “the modern industrial social order [in the Soviet Union] appears to be compatible with either democratic or totalitarian political and social forms.” Inkeles even further asserted that the Soviet regime was less likely inclined to adopt a tyrannical government as time went on. The Committee was, however, skeptical of such a view.

Meanwhile Sociologist Daniel Bell criticized the assertions made by Inkeles and Bauer. Bell stated that the research method of the RIP did not clarify even a single point. Bell asked Inkeles whether the Soviet system was “characterized . . . by the centralized control of political power?” and did “all other aspects of the system derive from [such a] fact?” Subsequently, Inkeles was interviewed by critical scholars, including Bell, after The Soviet Citizen was published. Inkeles shared his future plan to conduct research on modern industrial systems, including the Soviet regime, with a focus on individuals instead of the Soviet government’s power structure.
As indicated above the RIP was earlier shut down by U.S. Congress, but it regained attention in the late 1950s. This meant that the points of discussions that should have been developed in “Vulnerabilities of the Soviet System” (1954) and *How the Soviet System Works* (1957) were organized well in *The Soviet Citizen* (1959) without the various constraints of the institutional matrix. This also meant that the points of discussion refined through a form of academic and intellectual life had emerged. Bell’s criticisms should be interpreted as being based on the judgment that *The Soviet Citizen* should receive sufficient academic criticism. Indeed, it is difficult to identify how *The Soviet Citizen* was more refined than *How the Soviet System Works*. Using the same data in *How the Soviet System Works*, new discussions rebuilt from a totally different angle constitute collateral evidence that Inkeles and Bauer may have passionately intended to re-examine the nature of *How the Soviet System Works* and the research activities of the RIP and many issues could not be discussed in *How the Soviet System Works*.

The series of events related to *The Soviet Citizen* indicates that academic and intellectual life had regained vigorous power since Soviet Studies had been forced to withdraw from the institutional matrix owing to a loss of available opportunities. Moreover, it should be observed that the U.S. Congress, which had ended the RIP, showed an interest in *The Soviet Citizen*. Although this was caused partially owing to the end of McCarthyism, this also meant that Soviet Studies involving the academe and intellectual life had been successful in a different form from that of Soviet Studies represented by “Know Your Enemy”.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, I would like to summarize the discussions mentioned above as well as review the institutional matrix and Soviet Studies during the initial period of the Cold War, and then consider the relationship among the academe and intellectual life, the institutional matrix, and Soviet Studies. The case example of the CURI showed that, even if deviation had been intended, a movement for homogenization with the government took place concurrently. As such, CURI’s attempts to remain separate from the institutional matrix did not necessarily create an opportunity for the nurturing of different types of academic and intellectual output.

In contrast to the CURI, the RIP, conducted by the HURRC, was initially part of the institutional matrix. But it eventually regained its power in a different way owing to a loss of the means to rely on that matrix. From this point of view, diversity was brought to the academe (e.g., Soviet Studies). This does not entail that the institutional matrix only had negative impacts on the academe. The RIP could not have been carried out without the Air Force’s support at the initial phase. As such, academic outcomes would not have been achieved if total exclusion from the institutional matrix had taken
It seems to possibly explain this complex relationship to a certain degree, using the term “tension,” taken from Richard Hofstadter’s *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life.* Hofstadter pointed out that the great writers and thinkers in the 1950s made great achievements because such achievements were indeed caused by “the tension between protest and affirmation.”

In light of the aforementioned points, the RIP would be a typical example of “involvement with its problems which may provide other illuminations” based on an access to power, whereas academics and intellectuals as well as the authorities maintained a certain tension.

In the construction process of the institutional matrix that allowed the development of academic and intellectual communities to be used for the promotion of the American Century, the concept of “tension” can suggest the following concurrent driving forces: 1) forces that favored the academe and its intellectuals as well as U.S. homogenization; and 2) forces that allowed diversity and pluralism to be realized. The concept of Hofstadter’s “tension” is helpful in understanding the complex and diversified characteristics of Zunz’s institutional matrix.

**NOTES**


6) David Engerman, “Rethinking Cold War Universities: Some Recent Histories,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* vol. 5, no. 3 (Summer 2003), 81.


12) Ibid., 3.


14) Ibid., 5, 9, 14.

15) Ibid., 55, 87.

16) Ibid., 4.


24) Ibid., 187–188.


29) Ibid., 167.


31) Ibid., 168.


33) Clyde Kluckhohn, Alex Inkeles, and Raymond A. Bauer, “Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System: A Final Report Submitted the Director, Officer Education Research Laboratory (AFP&TRC of ARDC), Maxwell Air Force Base Montgomery, Alabama,”

34) See the following works on RIP. Charles Thomas O’Connell, “Social Structure and Science: Soviet Studies at Harvard” (PhD diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1990); Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 51–52; Engerman, “The Rise and Fall of Wartime Social Science.”

35) Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 57.


37) Ibid., 382.


40) Ibid., 4.

41) Ibid., xii.

42) Ibid., 383.

43) Ibid.

44) Ibid., 391.

45) Ibid., 392.

46) Ibid.

47) Ibid., 284.

48) Ibid., 392.

49) Ibid.

50) Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 183.


52) Inkeles and Bauer, The Soviet Citizen, 390.

53) Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 185.


55) Engerman, Know Your Enemy, 185.


57) Ibid., 429.