

Hume on Chance

Yoshitaka Toyokawa

Traditionally, David Hume (1711-76) is seen to negate chance, “negation of a cause” (T.1.3.11.4), as other contemporary philosophers did. Indeed, in his *Treatise* and *First Enquiry*, Hume indicates his negative views of chance and states that chance is [...] directly contrary to experience (T.2.3.1.18), or that it is universally allowed to have no existence (E.8.25). However, when we consider Hume’s philosophical methodology and description of our epistemic attitudes, we can find some points where Hume implicitly allows the existence of chance. Some commentators have pointed out, and criticized, Hume’s inconsistency about chance, but as far as I can see, these critics fail to capture what Hume really intended to say, and what still remains problematic on this problem in Hume’s Philosophy.

Taking the issue above mentioned into account, this paper aims, firstly, to examine how Hume discusses the problem of chance, paying attention to two concepts: namely, the “vulgar” and “philosopher.” These concepts play an important role in distinguishing and delineating several distinct modes of “experience,” which is also a vital concept of Hume’s Philosophy. From this point, I show that the two modes of experience are concerned with the way people apply “rules” of judgment to an apparent irregularity, and that Hume negates chance, siding with “the philosopher” and intending to correct insufficient causal judgments of the “vulgar.”

Secondly, this paper attempts to point out ontological and epistemological problems Hume has with regard to chance, and to investigate whether, and how, these problems can be settled. I proceed to suggest that, while Hume is carelessly committed to the ontological negation of chance which his philosophy essentially cannot offer (in that case the problem cannot possibly be solved); yet, from the epistemological viewpoint, Hume succeeds to some extent in describing how we learn to negate chance. However, it is to be remarked that when Hume’s philosophy epistemologically handles the problem of chance, “experience” is thought to contain some public character which is alien to the phenomenalist feature of Hume’s philosophy.

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Die Eigentümlichkeiten von Fichtes

„Deduzierter Plan einer in Berlin zu errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt“

Ryutaro Tamada

In diesem Artikel kläre ich die Eigentümlichkeiten von Fichtes *„Deduzierter Plan einer in Berlin zu errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt“* (1807, 1817). Diese Überlegung basiert auf drei Standpunkten in Verbindung mit Fichtes *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (1807 08, 1808). Diese sind Trieb, Liebe und Dialog. Die logische Zusammenstellung von Fichtes Werk wird klarer, indem eine Folge von Argumenten durch den Begriff des Triebes von Fichte untersucht wird. In den *Reden* wird die Änderung von einem sinnlichen Trieb zu einem geistigen Trieb dargestellt. Der Begriff dieses geistigen Triebes passt zum Terminus eines grundlegenden Triebes in Fichtes *Sittenlehre* (1798). Man kann erkennen, dass es über der Bedeutung von Trieb auf der deduktiven Basis eine praktische Bedeutung in sich hat.

Das Prinzip dafür, bis akademische Kunst zu reichen, ist die "Liebe" für diese Kunst. Wenn wir den Begriff der Liebe durch die wesentliche Struktur eines Triebes verstehen, wird der Einsatz in deduktiver Logik hier klar. Mit einer Lehranstalt dient Philosophie als Basis. Die Verbindung zwischen einem Lehrer und einem Studenten ist eine Verbindung "eines Dialoges ohne eine Unterbrechung." So zu sprechen, ist eine Lehranstalt eine "sokratische Schule." Der Gedanke an die Vorherrschaft direkter Kommunikation wird bestätigt, indem wir Fichtes Gedanken an Dialog und Sprache als ein Begriff eines geistigen Triebes oder aus der Liebe basierend deuten. Die Vorherrschaft der Gehörsprache statt einer visuellen Sprache ist seine wesentliche Sprachsicht, die seit Fichtes Sprachtheorie begriffen worden ist.

(Lehrer an der Takigawa-Daini Mittel- und Oberschule)

The Possibilities of “Issue Contextualism”

Keishi Matsue

In the theory of knowledge or epistemology, there can be various positions. This paper discusses “contextualism,” a concept that has been taken notice of and debated recently. In particular, I will introduce the “Issue Contextualism” of Michael Williams, who is one of the famous disputants of contemporary skepticism, and discuss the possibilities of Issue Contextualism.

The aim of this paper is to clarify the characteristics of Williams’ contextualism. For example, his contextualism gives adequate consideration to the normative side of knowledge. His position emphasizes the importance of this normative epistemology. On the other hand, Williams inserts a “Default and Challenge structure” into the middle of his contextualism. In order to resist skepticism, the Default and Challenge structure of knowledge-claim saddles challengers, as well as claimants, with justificational obligation.

In contextualism, there can be various positions, too. In comparison with “Conversational Contextualism,” which is the mainstream form of contextualism, Michael Williams himself calls his position “Issue Contextualism.” This position pays attention to the issue context in the justification of knowledge. According to Issue Contextualism, the skeptic does not raise the standards for knowing, but changes the subject (or issue).

In this paper, I will first confirm how Michael Williams deals with skepticism. He carries out a theoretical diagnosis of skepticism, and questions the naturalness or intuitiveness of the skeptic’s arguments. Secondly, I will emphasize the characteristics of Issue Contextualism, while comparing it with Relativism and Conversational Contextualism. Finally, I will point out the problems in Williams’ position (especially regarding “Epistemological Realism”), but I want to support his situation from a pragmatic point of view.

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Reality and Beliefs

– Locke and Berkeley, Peirce and James

Takefumi Toda

My aim in this paper is to show the possibility of Berkeley's idealism. To do this, I first discuss that the relation between Locke and Berkeley is similar to the relation between Peirce and James. Locke and Peirce respected the scientific method and presupposed the real world as the starting point for their investigation. It is often said that Berkeley denied this presupposition. Such an interpretation is correct in some senses. However, I suspect that Berkeley could have reconstructed the Lockean real world by turning it into ideas in the mind, without denying it.

I think William James deliberately did this for Peirce. James is the one who tried to reconstruct what reality is like and explain it by using empirical terms. I think that James' trial was to explicate Peirce's concept of reality. Moreover, there are some possibilities that he found that method in Berkeley's argument.

Second, I will show the difference between Berkeley and James regardless of their similarities, and at the same time I will point out the problem both thinkers have in their respective theories.

Berkeley's idealism seems to have some problems. For example, he needed God to maintain the objectivity of our world, but we can doubt the usefulness of such an argument from a modern point of view.

However, I think his idealism is highly suggestive to us when we think about what the world is like. His idealism contains both subjective and objective worldviews. They are related to each other, and they form the essential basis of our modern worldview. I will show that Berkeley's idealism is a good example of having such a structure.

Classical Empiricism and Naturalism

Yasuhiko Tomida

In his "Five Milestones of Empiricism," W. V. Quine explained that his empiricism was a sort of naturalistic one that was established through five steps from original, classical empiricism. However, classical empiricism itself was originally "naturalistic" in Quine's sense of the term. Strictly, any philosophical standpoint must have a naturalistic character so long as it adopts the "theory of ideas" based on the "idea idea" that Descartes introduced. In this sense Descartes' position, too, is implicitly naturalistic, though it has an explicit, foundationalistic tendency.

In this article I first clarify what framework Locke's theory of ideas possessed, thereby making it clear that it was originally naturalistic. The framework is three-term-relational, comprising hypothetically posited "Things themselves," "Ideas" in the mind, and the "Mind" that perceives the ideas. Then I argue that Berkeley and Hume distorted the Lockian naturalistic, three-term-relational framework in their respective ways. For example, though he erases the first term, "Things themselves," Berkeley still maintains the "idea" idea. Seeing that "Idea" was introduced by positing the new "Things themselves" hypothetically, Berkeley's notion of "ideas" without "Things themselves" is logically problematic. Lastly, I assert that Kant's basic position was based on a Lockian naturalistic framework and that the framework of his transcendental idealism was established by distorting Lockian logical space in a certain different way.

Kant, of course, is not an empiricist, but to grasp the character of classical empiricism it is indispensable to recognize the fact that his transcendental idealism is based on Locke's naturalistic theory of ideas.

Richard Rorty once criticized Locke's and Quine's naturalistic epistemologies for devoting their energies to a useless purpose. If we recognize, however, the naturalistic character that classical empiricism originally possessed, then we may be able to develop a view different from Rorty's.

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Lire et relire Nakahara Chûya

Yves-Marie ALLIOUX

Trois axes de « re-re-lecture » de NAKAHARA Chûya ont été privilégiés dans notre approche : la vision de la nature, le caractère politique, la thématique amoureuse.

Même si on peut la rapprocher de celles de Rousseau ou Rimbaud, la vision de la nature a été reconsidérée dans le cadre plus large du sentiment traditionnel de la nature en Chine et au Japon. L'harmonie « asiatique » de l'homme avec la nature semble toutefois quelque peu rompue, chez Chûya, aussi bien par les soubresauts de l'Histoire et de la société que par sa psychologie propre.

Le caractère politique de la poésie de Chûya, ensuite, a été réexaminé à la lumière des critiques qui avaient été faites par ÔOKA Shôhei à la première étude que nous avons publiée sur le sujet dans la revue *Bungaku* (Iwanami) en 1977. Sur ce point, cette « re-re-lecture » n'a pu que renforcer nos premières intuitions sur les différences de conception qui existent entre les lecteurs français et japonais, sauf exceptions notables, dans la façon d'appréhender le politique et, *par conséquent*, dans la manière de lire et interpréter les textes littéraires.

La thématique amoureuse, enfin, a été repensée en considérant l'importance de la relation triangulaire tant dans la littérature moderne japonaise depuis NATSUME Sôseki que dans la vie même de NAKAHARA Chûya. Les analyses de René GIRARD sur le caractère mimétique du désir peuvent, notamment, nous faire prendre conscience des particularités d'une relation triangulaire « à la japonaise ». Le point essentiel, cependant, serait ici plutôt l'effacement de la thématique amoureuse auquel procède le poète dans son œuvre, disparition qui pourrait correspondre, selon nous, à un processus psychologique de « sublimation ».

Quelles que soient les thématiques envisagées, nature, société, amour, il nous a semblé aussi qu'une approche psychocritique s'inspirant non seulement de FREUD mais aussi de LACAN ou, à sa suite, de Julia KRISTEVA devrait apporter un approfondissement essentiel à la compréhension de l'œuvre, notamment dans ses tendances narcissiques ou sadomasochistes, tandis qu'elle nous en apporterait, à nous lecteurs aussi bien japonais que français, un surcroît de « jouissance » (au sens lacanien du terme ?).

La parole serait alors donnée aux spécialistes de Lacan, ce penseur extrêmement important pour ce qui est de la psychanalyse, mais très novateur aussi dans l'interprétation des œuvres artistiques et littéraires.

(Professeur Associé invité à l'École Doctorale des Études en Sciences Humaines et Environnementales de l'Université de Kyoto)

Analysis of 'external pressure': On the actors involved in university reform

Kouichi Watanabe

In this article, I would like to analyze discourses of the actors involved in university reform in Japan, which has proceeded at a rapid pace in recent years. Although the university reform is officially undertaken through the Reports by Central Council for Education, the discussions at the Council and the reform policies based on its Reports have been deeply influenced by the multiple actors outside of university or academic society (so-called the 'external pressure').

Among those actors, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) has been inclined toward the 'development of global human resources' while advocating the 'construction of a lifelong learning system', Ministry of Finance (MOF) has promoted the 'concentration in core competence' policy to utilize a limited budget effectively, and the government and ruling party (Liberal Democratic Party) has insisted on the necessity for the 'development of global human resources' and the 'governance reforms'. The government and ruling party borrows those catchwords from the economic organizations (Japan Business Federation and Japan Association of Corporate Executives), and, to make matters worse, has put the plan into action by using nominally, as its own policy, some concepts suggested by international organizations (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: OECD, etc.) and the rank of world university rankings (Times Higher Education, etc.). The resulting educational policy of the external actors is subjected to economic one.

If the university as an association for education and research should reform by itself, its internal pressure must be increased.

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On Universities

Keiichiro Kamino

This talk provides some basic materials for discussing universities by briefly summarizing their history in Western Europe. Universities are a part of the society in which they function, and are only viable if they respond, in a manner consonant with their natures, to the implied needs and positive demands of changing cultures as well as to the social, economic, and political environments. Therefore, this historical approach is adopted, because the essentialist questions of 'what the university is, and what it should be' can hardly be effective.

Although the earliest universities emerged in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the spirit of inquiry and the tradition of learning originated from the Greeks, and were then transmitted by Rome. The Church thereafter assumed the task of education from ancient paganism, which is why our brief historical summary begins with the Greeks.

The history of universities can be divided into four periods: the first (pre-university period) from the Greeks until the establishment of universities; the second, until the Renaissance; the third, until the rise of the scientific revolution; and the fourth, up to the present day (particularly after the nineteenth century). Some comments may be required to explain further.

The culture of ancient Greece greatly and decisively influenced and even determined later European cultures. This can be initially observed in the fact that the concept 'culture' was formed from the Roman concept 'humanitas', which in turn was based on the Greek concept 'paideia' (education). Second, education in mediaeval universities was based upon the 'seven liberal arts', which were inherited from Greek culture. The third period began at the end of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the influence of the Renaissance became so strong that scholasticism gradually lost its hold. Greek then began to be taught at some universities, as the Renaissance represented the renewal of the Greek and the Roman spirit. The fourth period is the age of university revolution, or the time when universities expanded rapidly, as initiated by the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century, which continues today. However, this expansion has caused many problems, as one might generally claim that the universities do not clearly perceive their positions in society.

Based upon the knowledge of the history mentioned, I will conclude my talk by drawing attention to two points. In the past, universities generally considered their task to be preserving knowledge at the highest level, transmitting it, and expanding it. While this remains one of their most important functions, their primary task can never be purely intellectual. Instead, a university must also understand its fundamental mission of helping in the formation, cultivation, and transmission of a sense of value. Another point is that any attempt at university reform should be based upon the power emerging from the hearts, alongside a critical but rational mind, of university members. Otherwise, any attempt at reform will be doomed to fail, as history has shown.

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