

Das Sein als der ab-gründige Grund in Heideggers Denken – der Übergang zur Gründung als „Esspielt, weil es spielt“.

Hoko Nakagawa

Heidegger hat den Zusammenhang zwischen dem „Grund/Gründung“ und dem „Sein/Seinsentwurf“ eingesehen und der negativen Charakteristik des Seins angemessen den „Grund/Gründung“ in Verbindung mit dem negativen Begriff wie dem „Ab-grund“ definiert, um das Sein als „frag-würdig“ zu halten und die Seinsfrage zu restrukturieren.

Heideggers letzte Frucht langjähriger Erörterung vom „Grund/Gründung“ : *Der Satz vom Grund* (SG)(1955) beinhaltet nun die Selbstkritik über sein früheres Denken wie „Vom Wesen des Grundes“(WG)(1929) oder wie *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (BP)(1936-38). Also müssen wir den Gehalt seiner Selbstkritik aufklären, um genügend das Sein als den „ab-gründigen Grund“ zu verstehen. Da sollen wir insbesondere die Vertiefung der Bedeutung zweier konstruktiven Motive von der „Gründung“ (des „Entwurfs“ und der „Geworfenheit“) in Acht haben.

In WG (1929) hat Heidegger die wesentlich vielfältigen Bedeutungen des „Entwurfs“ und der „Geworfenheit“ beschränkt und dem „Entwurf“ den Vorrang vor der „Geworfenheit“ gegeben und die „Geworfenheit“ in die Möglichkeit von der Unmöglichkeit des „Entwurfs“ selbst übergegangen, dafür konnte er nicht klar den „Ab-grund“ als die Erschütterung des „Seinsentwurfs“ selbst darstellen.

Dagegen in BP (1936-38) in der „Gründung“ beim Ereignis des Seyns („Kehre“) wird die „Geworfenheit“ in die Unmöglichkeit des „Entwurfs“ selbst als solche entworfen, nämlich der „Entwurf“ vom Dasein wird auf Grund des „Ent-wurfs/Wurfs“ vom Seyn durchführt. In dieser „Gründung“ wird der „Ab-grund“ als die Veränderungsmöglichkeit des „Seinsentwurfs“ selbst gewonnen. Allein in dieser „Gründung“ können wir Dasein selber über die Verwirklichung der Veränderung des „Seinsentwurfs“ selbst („des anderen Anfangs“) entscheiden und an diesem Punkt besteht der Vorrang des „Entwurfs“ vom Dasein noch da.

Und in SG (1955) wird das Sein als der „ab-gründige Grund“, das sich von unserer Willkür ganz frei und von selbst bewegt, durch das „Spiel“ charakterisiert. In der „Gründung“ vom Sein als das „Spiel“ wird der „Entwurf“ vom Dasein dadurch durchführt, dass wir Dasein es auch als Willkür aufgeben sollen, letztlich und anfänglich nur aus eigener Macht den „anderen Anfang“ verwirklichen zu wollen. Wir gründen den „ab-gründigen Grund“ in der Weise, daß „das Sein spielt, weil es spielt“, d.h. wir sollen „Ent-wurfs/Wurfs“ vom Sein frei geschehen lassen und wollen am Ort des „Geschicks des Seins“ (Da) verbleiben, wo die Möglichkeiten der anderen „Seinsentwürfe“ nur in der Einsicht der bisherigen geschichtlichen „Seinsentwürfe“ entstehen.

Kiyoshi Miki's Konvertierung

Ryutaro Tamada

Wenn man an die Überlegungen in den späteren Jahren von Kiyoshi Miki denkt, gibt es die Meinung, dass diese in seinen postumen Arbeiten "Shinran" erscheinen würden. Diese Arbeit war wahrscheinlich unfertig, es war das Schreiben, das zusammen mit "der Logik der Einbildungskraft" sein wichtigstes Werk werden sollte. Es wird ziemlich natürlich sein, dass das Hauptthema der Überlegungen von Miki allmählich zur Philosophie der Religion bewegt, wenn ich das religiöse Interesse von Miki in Betracht ziehe. Ich ziele darauf, das religiöse Bewusstsein als das grundlegende Laufwerk seiner Überlegungen hervorzuheben, während ich dem Nachdenken von den späteren Jahren von Miki folge.

Er kommt unter einem großen Einfluss von Heidegger und Marx in einem Bildungsprozess zu seinen Gedanken. Aber man meint, dass die Basis der Situation seiner Überlegungen auf einer religiösen Konvertierung steht. Es ist auch notwendig, bei dieser Aussage an seine zehnmonatige Kriegserfahrung in den Philippinen im Jahre 1942 zu denken. Woran dachte er wohl die tatsächliche Kampfvorderseite Ostasiens sehend? Ich kann eine Spur des Vertiefens von seinem religiösen Interesse ergreifen.

Der Startpunkt der Überlegungen von Miki gilt immer für die tägliche grundlegende Erfahrung im menschlichen Leben. Diese fußen auf dem historischen Bewusstsein und dem Bewusstsein der schlechten Person in "Shinran". Die Eigenschaft der Gedanken in Shinran ist an demselben Punkt mit dem Buddhismus zu verstehen, wie der Mensch gedacht hat. Miki hat die Gesetzmäßigkeit dieser Gedanken anerkannt. Und er hat das klare vorgeschriebene Bedürfnis nach der Bedeutung gefühlt.

Miki sagt, "der Sinn des Hochmuts des Lebens verwandelt sich in ein Schuldbewusstsein in Shinran." Er behauptet, dass die tägliche grundlegende Erfahrung als "Dunkelheit" erfahren wird. Miki sieht etwas Dämonisches im menschlichen Ursprung. Würde er sein ursprüngliches religiöses Bewusstsein durch die Kriegserfahrung vertiefen?

(Lehrer an der Takigawa-Daini Mittel- und Oberschule)

Heidegger on the Way from Onto-Historical Ethnocentrism to East-West Dialogue

Bret W. Davis

Some scholars may still wish to debate whether Heidegger was the greatest Western philosopher of the twentieth century. Most all will agree, however, that among those who make the short list for this distinction, Heidegger not only committed the most egregious political error but also, at least in the 1930s, was the most unabashedly ethnocentric thinker of the lot. Heidegger often asserted that Germany, as “the land of poets and thinkers,” had a central world-historical role to play in any possible recovery from the technological nihilism of the modern epoch. And yet, it is also arguably the case that, among the greatest of twentieth century Western philosophers, Heidegger demonstrated the most sincere and sustained interest in clearing the way for a radical dialogue with East Asian thought. East Asian students and scholars were among the first to show interest in his work, and he reciprocated by conversing with them and reading translations of texts from the Daoist and Zen traditions in particular. “From a Conversation on Language (1953/54): Between a Japanese and an Inquirer” is not only a noteworthy indication of this interest, it is also widely acknowledged as one of his most important texts. The ensuing question that I pursue in this article is this: How are Heidegger’s entrenched ethnocentrism and his profound interest in East-West dialogue related? While neither can be wholly confined to one or another period in his thought, I will show how, starting in the late 1930s, Heidegger begins to recover from the most ethnocentric period of his thought, and how he starts thinking of his reflections on the Western history of being as a preparation for what in 1953 he came to call “the inevitable dialogue with the East Asian world.”

Ultimate Philosophies — A Question of their Core

Sujeong Lee

This paper aims at leading reader's concern to the so-called 'ultimate philosophies' against the stream of trivialization of philosophy, which could be counted as one of the characteristics of our times.

The main point of view of this paper is based upon the idea that there are four great sources of philosophy: Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, and Socrates (in alphabetical order.) Precisely the teachings by these four 'holy men' construct the 'ultimate philosophies'. This kind of view is not common but could be justified by the evidence of (1) their dominant influence on the people, (2) their contribution to the 'quality' of human life and world, (3) their sphere in the whole world philosophies, (4) their own sublime lives, etc.

Although it is not easy to give the entire picture of their teachings because they are too enormous, we can nevertheless approach to their philosophical system through their 'core concepts': 'going over' (Buddha), 'rectifying [正 zhèng]' (Confucius), 'love' (Jesus), 'knowing' (Socrates). We can find these four in their famous phrases, "gate gate pāragate pārasaṃgate bodhi svāhā", "There must be rectifying of the name" (必也正名乎), "Love each other", "Know thyself". This paper reveals the real meaning of these four 'core concepts' and illuminates the background of their emphasizing: 'ignorance', 'sins', 'sufferings [dukkha]', 'unrighteousness [不正 bùzhèng]'.

These four 'ultimate philosophies' share the same unique ultimate goal: 'The good' [το ἀγαθόν]. We can say that this is not only the principle of philosophy but also the principle of the being itself.

Finally, this paper appeals to reader for the 'appropriation of the philosophical tradition' or the 'internalization of the philosophical words', just for the purpose of achieving the spirit of the ultimate philosophies.

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Locke's and Reid's criticism of scepticism: from the perspective pragmatism

Takefumi Toda

Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid is said to have strongly criticized the 'theory of ideas'. This was because he considered that such a theory leads to scepticism. Especially he considered that Berkeley and Hume proved it. Of course, John Locke was also one of the targets of Reid's criticism. Interestingly, Reid refers to Locke much more than to Hume in his *Essay on Intellectual Powers of Man* because he thinks it is important to refute the core of the theory of ideas (that is, Locke's theory) rather than argue about Berkeley or Hume's approaches. It is true that there are many differences between Locke and Reid. The former is a representative theorist of perception and the latter is a direct realist. Reid seems to think that this difference is important in avoiding scepticism. However, I see a great deal of similarity between them in their approach to avoid scepticism, especially in the framework of their epistemology. Their strategy for escape from scepticism is not demonstrative but structural. I mean that they both do not refute scepticism directly by argument, but rather by adopting an epistemological structure by which they can avoid scepticism. The difference between them is in the base of their epistemological structures. Locke based his epistemological structure on science and Reid on common sense. In spite of this difference, I emphasize the similarity in their strategy in this paper and, in addition, point out that their epistemological attitude strongly accords with that of the pragmatists, especially with that of the founder of pragmatism, C. S. Peirce.

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Husserl and Heidegger on the certainty of *sum* (“I am”)

Hiroshi Abe

As shown in his unpublished manuscript *Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage* [*Testament of the Question of Being*], Martin Heidegger’s last years saw him have an idea of “Phänomenóphásis” [= phainómenon + phásis], which should be contrasted with classical phenomenology. This paper aims at clarifying what makes Heidegger’s phenomenophásis different from Husserlian phenomenology.

For this purpose, we compare Husserl with Heidegger in terms of the certainty of one’s own existence. According to Husserl’s *Ideen* I, nothing can be more certain than the pure Ego’s being, because this is fully and directly given in its self-reflection. On the other hand, Heidegger claims that Dasein’s fundamental certainty lies in its own possibility of dying, i. e. the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein as such: In order to be convinced of its own existence, Dasein should be faced with the possibility that it does not exist any more and understand itself as authentic self or “nobody” from a worldly point of view.

Based on this comparative consideration, we finally provide a possible interpretation that Husserlian phenomenology regards the self as self-transparent, whereas Heidegger’s phenomenophásis emphasizes that it remains the ever-questioning enigmatic self.

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Passivity of an Ethical Subject in Levinas' *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*

Yoshiyuki Sato

According to *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, all human activities are selfish and deprive the Other, to which they relate, of its otherness by assimilating it. Therefore, to relate to the Other as the true Other, one has to relate to it with pure passivity. A typical relation with the Other (the other people) without assimilation is an ethical one, and Levinas asserts that when in an ethical relation with someone, he/she demands a responsibility that is without selfishness.

Furthermore, Levinas considers that recognizing someone (or something) is an activity in itself and must impair his/her otherness. However, the question is whether one can relate to someone ethically, without recognizing him/her as someone. With respect to this point, Levinas states that someone who demands responsibility without any selfishness is not a person one can see, rather he/she is a third person behind this person. Levinas admits that one cannot present any evidence of responsibility because of the third person's absence. Thus, it is not evidence but *a kind of impulse beyond reason* that agitates one and forces one to fulfill his/her responsibility.

However, there is a limitation in Levinas' theory. According to him, recognizing oneself as a subject continuing in time is not approvable because he considers any recognition as an activity, that is, a selfish activity that is morally impermissible. In contrast, undertaking a responsibility (e.g., offering one's bread to someone) is accompanied by one's *future* loss, which one will be unaware of without a selfish activity. However, if one offers bread, being unaware of one's future hunger, is the gift a mere imprudence? Can the gift be regarded as truly carrying out one's responsibility? Moreover, if we suppose that it is a kind of impulse, and not reason, that makes one help someone else, it follows that demonstrating an unhelpful behavior would not be one's fault but attributable to the lack of "force from the outside." But we are afraid that such a way of thinking would deteriorate the moral subject's responsibility.

In fact, the "outside" is not the real outside, and the "force" is not a real physical force. These metaphors distort moral reality.

Levinas' theoretical presupposition given in the beginning furnishes the reason why he insists the passivity. However, it is necessary to be free from his presupposition and metaphors and reconsider ethical facts.

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“Locke’s ‘Tabula Rasa,’” Reconsidered

Yasuhiko Tomida

Some people still talk about John Locke’s “tabula rasa.” In his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, however, he does not actually use the words “tabula rasa.” Although Locke did use “rasa tabula” in his 1671 drafts of *Essay* (John Locke, *Drafts for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Other Philosophical Writings*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch and G. A. J. Rogers, vol. 1 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990], *Draft A*: p. 8, *Draft B*: p. 128), in the published *Essay* he used the term “white Paper” (John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* [1690], II. i. 2). Moreover, the phrase “tabula rasa” itself had been used by many people since a long time ago in the relationship with Aristotle’s *De anima*, III. For example, it is found in Albertus Magnus (1200–1280), Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), Henry of Ghent (c. 1217–1293), and others. For these reasons, the phrase “Locke’s ‘tabula rasa’” is quite misleading.

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« Laissez les morts ensevelir leurs morts » — quelques réflexions écrites en marge de l'article du professeur Shingû
« Changements post mortem, contrôle étatique et transmission de l'impossible en psychanalyse »

Yves-Marie ALLIOUX

Dans son article « Changements post mortem, contrôle étatique et transmission de l'impossible en psychanalyse », le professeur Shingû cite un célèbre poème zen : « Vivant devenir mort et une fois devenu mort librement accompli tout acte sera bon ». N'est-ce pas justement la position d'Antigone telle que Lacan l'analyse dans un de ses séminaires ? À l'opposé, le Christ dit à ses disciples : « Laissez les morts ensevelir leurs morts ! » Cette parole, où l'on voit d'habitude une néantisation de la mort et du deuil à la lumière de l'espérance d'une vie éternelle, semble condamner non seulement Antigone, mais aussi la plupart des sagesse antiques ou non chrétiennes. Cependant, cette injonction ne pourrait-elle pas nous encourager à admettre et accueillir au plus profond de nous, plutôt que dans d'étatiques cimetières, la présence encombrante de nos morts ? Telle est la question que nous nous sommes posée en lisant l'essai du professeur Shingû.

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Butterfly Souls

Michael Radich

Summary

In the Zhuangzi, the dreaming mind is famously equated with a butterfly. In Burman cultures, which are generally thought to be genetically related to Chinese culture, “souls” (the element in the person that transmigrates from one lifetime to another) can also be identified with butterflies (with the term “butterfly soul”). Is there a possible cognate relation between these two notions? Or could the trope of “soul” (whether dreaming or transmigrating) as butterfly have been diffused from one context to the other? However, a cursory comparative examination of tropes in a range of cultures and folklores widely dispersed across the globe quickly shows that both of these hypotheses are inadequate. If not necessarily a human universal, the trope of soul as butterfly must have been “re-invented” independently in multiple cultures in world history. This “lightweight” case study (weighing perhaps as little as the butterflies themselves) thus ends up serving as a useful exercise in the lessons of broad comparison. The present study stops at bequeathing the observation of the wide diffusion of this trope as a question to scholars in other fields: How might we account for the recurrence of this figure in such diverse cultural contexts?

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Management, Obsessionality, Desire and Interpretation

Ian Parker

Abstract

This paper explores conditions of possibility for psychoanalytic discourse. It focuses on the embedding of this discourse in forms of organization in which modern management and Lacanian work in 'Critical Management Studies' plays a crucial role. The paper is structured by questions concerning adaptation, obsessionality, desire and interpretation, and I show how Lacan in *Seminar VI* illuminates as well as intervenes in, 'interprets' these aspects of order and power.

Keywords: Psychoanalysis, Lacan, obsessionality, desire, interpretation, Critical Management Studies

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