

AGRICULTURAL LAND-DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN ZIMBABWE: A REVIEW OF FOUR DECADES OF SAM MOYO'S WORK ON AGRICULTURAL LAND MARKETS AND THEIR CONSTRAINTS

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ABSTRACT Rights to land have changed hands several times across Zimbabwe's racial, class, socioeconomic, and political divides over the past century. This has occurred through greatly varying mechanisms, depending more on sociopolitical power dynamics and less on the supply and demand of land. Discussion of agricultural land-delivery systems in Zimbabwe requires an understanding of the deeply embedded socioeconomic and political factors that have driven supply and demand of agrarian land. This paper examines Professor Sam Moyo's work on the evolution of land markets from the pre-independence era through the 2000s to the development of the new emerging land-market transactions in the countryside. Moyo's work shows how the state-led land-delivery system reconfigured the agrarian structure, changing it from a bimodal to a trimodal system. Giving due consideration to the different economic models that have been pursued by the Government of Zimbabwe since independence, and investigating how these have shaped power relations with regard to land, we attempt, from a political economy perspective, to develop an understanding of the land-reform program. Moyo's work on Zimbabwe's land markets shows how market-based approaches to land redistribution will always be inadequate for addressing social and historical injustices, because they favor capital at the expense of the peasantry. This article utilizes a tri-modal agrarian structure to analyze recent data from a 2013–2015 survey conducted by Sam Moyo Agrarian Institute for Agrarian Studies (SMAIAS). These data support Moyo's arguments: for example, that the pressure for Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) emanated from below, and that a spectrum of beneficiaries, outside the usual political elite, accessed land. Data analyses revealed continued demand for land from both local (informal markets) and international (large land deals) players, further substantiating Moyo's claim that there remains an unresolved land question in Zimbabwe.

Key Words: Land markets; Land reform; Land delivery systems; Fast Track Land Reform Program; Land demand and supply.

INTRODUCTION

Land markets are sensitive and complex because land is immovable, which problematizes its commodification. Land is a social good and a human right. Therefore, land markets deal in the methods, nature, and extent of transferability of rights to a piece of land. A number of different types of land markets exist, such as agricultural and non-agricultural, urban and rural, and formal and informal land markets. These markets continuously intersect and overlap, meaning that

the existence of one market does not supersede the existence of others. In this paper, land refers to rural agricultural land. Descriptions of land markets and/or land-delivery channels over the past four decades, therefore, describe the methods, processes, and trajectories of the claims of different groups of people to agricultural land rights. This paper accounts for the effects of inequitable land access, landlessness, and differentiated control of quality land on the different land-delivery systems utilized in Zimbabwe. National land markets are thoroughly politicized, forming the basis for mainstream national agendas. Trade in land, in Zimbabwe as elsewhere, constitutes direct trade of people's means of production, wealth, and source of sociopolitical influence and status. Governments have thus always tried to control land and protect it from the vagaries of unfettered global markets. Land reform and land redistribution have been at the forefront of the Zimbabwe national agenda dating back to the liberation struggle itself. The discussions of the pre-independence Lancaster House Conference (LHC) almost broke down because of disagreements on the land question.

One of the first scholars to write on these issues was the former President of CODESRIA (2008–2011) and former Executive Director of the Sam Moyo African Institute for Agrarian Studies (SMAIAS) (2002–2015), the late Professor Sam Moyo (1954–2015). His arguments, whether through assimilation or opposition, have found their way into discussions of agrarian-land markets and reform. His work covered food production and productivity, food security and sovereignty, rural poverty and underdevelopment, agricultural input and output markets, and agrarian land reform and markets. Moyo was an academic guru whose influence and research transcended political, economic, and academic boundaries. This paper takes up his preferred theoretical framework, the political economy approach, to understand the evolution of agricultural land markets in Zimbabwe. We aimed to understand the economic, political, and social factors that have driven demand and supply in land and land-related policies from independence to the FTLRP and beyond.

Moyo's writing on land markets elucidated the land question in Zimbabwe and how it has been affected by 1) the characteristics of the people demanding land and 2) the economic model adopted by the state, which has implications for the land tenure system (security or insecurity) to be followed. In his rural and agrarian development studies, which span four decades, Moyo viewed land reform as a necessary but not sufficient condition for agrarian reform and national development, thus viewing the land question (and the agrarian question even more so) as being far from being resolved (Moyo & Matondi, 2004). In theoretical discourse, therefore, Moyo hypothesized that land reform was not enough to create an inclusive development of rural spaces. Without complementary support for the agrarian market, simultaneously increasing rural development and reducing poverty would remain problematic. Moyo wrote extensively on how market-led land reforms would always favor the wealthy and achieve inefficient redistribution outcomes. Issues such as historical race and class-based land ownership imbalances could not, in his view, be addressed through market-led land reform. Moyo argued that social equity in land access was best achieved

through state-led land reform, which had to be radical in nature, given the pervasiveness of neo-liberalism in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

One of Moyo's major contributions to Zimbabwean agrarian studies was the proposal of a state-led reform to dismantle the existing bimodal agrarian structure in favor of a trimodal one. The former consisted of inequitable relations of land ownership, with large-scale farmers possessing private property rights, while peasants held communal tenure rights. Integration into the input and output markets differed immensely between these two. Prior to the new agrarian structure, differentiation was polarized, with the large-scale farmers being in complete control of the land markets and well-integrated into export markets for lucrative cash crops (Moyo, 2011a: 202–204). Moyo (2014) argued that market-led land-delivery systems perpetuated this dualism, because large-scale landowners would have better chances over peasants in purchasing land if such systems were adopted. Thus, the resultant tri-modal agrarian structure, incorporating large-scale farmers, numerous small-to-medium capitalist farmers, and an expanded peasantry, could only be brought about through non-market-led land reforms. The tri-modal agrarian framework ideally supports arguments of re-peasantization and semi-proletarianization, which have serious implications for post-reform class and accumulation analysis (not discussed in this paper). Thus, it is imperative to draw lessons from Moyo's works, which covered the trajectory taken by land markets (and land policy) under the various national economic production models adopted in Zimbabwe. The span of his work extends from the time before the land-market phases of the LHC agreement, through land market liberalization (late 1980s to 1990s), and land reform (2000s) to the emerging land market deals in the agricultural sector (2010 and beyond). This paper approaches land markets through the lens of the research of this great land and agrarian expert.

LAND IN CONTEXT

Zimbabwe's economy fundamentally depends on agriculture, as do most economies of southern Africa. Approximately 70% of the population derives their livelihood from it directly, and it accounted for an average of 16% of the GDP over the last five years (World Bank, 2017). Understanding land access goes beyond understanding agricultural land values and the prices that it attracts on the supply and demand schedules, as it encompasses a variety of other factors that are difficult to quantify and that have a bearing on agricultural land markets. Before discussing the evolution of the land markets, it is important to conceptualize the terms used, specifically with regard to the complexities of trading agricultural land on the open market.

I. Land as a Commodity

Market-led redistribution of land requires land to be tradable, that is, to be considered as a commodity. The ease or difficulty of commodifying agricultural

land hinges on the definition of land. There are a number of definitions of land in the literature, depending on the field of study. In economics, land, together with labor and capital, form the basic factors of production. It is associated with an economic value, expressed in price per hectare at ownership, transfer or when paying for its use (rent). Modern scholarship has broadened the definition to reflect other non-productive uses. Land has become any delineable area of the earth's terrestrial surface, encompassing all attributes of the biosphere immediately above or below this surface (rivers, swamps), the plant and animal populations of that area, settlements and physical results of past and present human activity on that part of the terrestrial surface (UN, 1994; FAO, 1995). How we define land has implications for our understanding of demand and supply and, inevitably, on its value in the 'market.' Moyo & Skalness (1990) argued that it was inadequate to define land in an economic context only, and that struggles for land and the political economy of land reforms should also be considered.

In this respect, viewing (agricultural) land as a commodity becomes problematic for the simple reason that its market value is not merely affected by production costs. Supply and demand schedules on their own cannot explain the value attached to a piece of land that has a river flowing through it, trees, minerals underneath it, and the graves and memories of a particular group of inhabitants. Land values in economic principle are determined by the demand of land, which in turn is affected by the intended use of that land relative to the supply of other lands for that particular use. This type of analysis of land markets reveals a disarticulated market system for land, where two attached pieces of land can have different prices or values.

Moreover, the land question in Africa needs to be examined in the wider context of struggles over land rights "embedded" in the control, by external capital and the state, of extensive lands, which harbor minerals and other valuable natural resources (Moyo, 2007)

Market-based transactions are considered to be efficient, equitable, environmentally sound, and compatible with other sectors of the economy. While this is easily applicable to markets for real commodities, it does not apply to agricultural land markets. From a political economy perspective, Moyo showed how complex it is to assign a value to any piece of land, because it can be linked to alternative land uses, which change over time. The discovery of a precious mineral or the intention of constructing residential or industrial infrastructure can drastically change land values. In addition, two different land values may exist for peri-urban and non-peri-urban agricultural land with similar land uses. In some pre-Zimbabwe land valuations (1965 to 1990s), the racial category of the user and the size of the land were used to determine the value. The exclusive use of supply and demand schedules to determine land values resulted in the commodification of land, a commodity that can be traded regardless of its sociocultural dimension. The commodification of land had serious exclusionary effects on socioeconomically vulnerable groups (the downtrodden),

such as women and children. The downtrodden have an insatiable desire for land but do not have the means (resources) to purchase it on the free market; thus, they lack effective demand. They do not have the means to purchase land unless it is provided to them for free. The essence of a market-led land-delivery system is that it seeks to permanently transfer land from less efficient producers to more efficient users. This land-delivery system would exclude the downtrodden, with their limited educational skills and access to capital and credit.

II. Conceptualization of Land Markets in Zimbabwe

As noted, if land were a commodity, its price would be affected by factors of 1) supply (price of the complementary or substitute goods, number of sellers in the market, and production costs) and 2) demand (incomes, consumer tastes and preferences, number of consumers, and potential future prices). Although this paper does discuss the behavior of the suppliers of land, it dwells more on the behavior of the demanders and how they eventually triggered a paradigm shift in the land-delivery system. Soon after independence, neo-liberal policies forced land seekers to access land through market-led land-delivery systems. Pressure for the creation of market-based land access in Zimbabwe mainly originated from international capital, the LHC agreement, and the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) (Moyo & Matondi, 2004; Shivji, 2009; Moyo, 2010). However, this approach, which depended on responding to market supply and demand, was problematic, for the following reasons:

- (1) There were too few sellers: these were less than 5000 white settlers who had control of over 15 million hectares of prime arable agricultural land (Utete, 2003). Markets are inefficient when the supply of a good is concentrated in the hands of a few (monopoly).
- (2) The behavior of these few sellers was highly unpredictable, as they were not responding to demands for land by the majority of the Zimbabweans.
- (3) The buyer of the land, the state (on behalf of the people) was financially crippled and unable to drive effective demand.
- (4) There is no substitute for agricultural land.
- (5) In a purely competitive market, the government plays a regulatory role, guaranteeing fair practices in the market. However, according to the LHC agreement, the government was required to take an active role, as it had the first right of refusal for all agricultural land that was presented by white commercial farmers. From 1980–1990, the government received funds from Britain, bought land, and redistributed it to its people, albeit at a slow pace (see section 3). This then presented policy and ideological inconsistencies.

Moyo disagreed with Bojo (1993) and other scholars who argued that direct state participation in land markets distorted land-use values. African land markets do not respond only to market forces but are also affected by the history of land appropriations during the settler regimes. They are marred by class, gender,

racial, and ethnic inequalities that can never be addressed by market forces; thus, the participation of the state is required. In this regard, understanding land markets requires a political economy approach to answer various national land questions. The land question that has been the focus of much of Moyo's work is concerned with the following:

[...] the adequacy of the quantity and quality of land [...], the method and costs of land acquisition and redistribution, the efficiency of land use in both the large farm and resettlement areas, the suitability of those benefiting from land redistribution, the fairness and equitability of procedures for dealing with land demands, and the economic impact of land reform (Moyo, 1994).

LAND SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Agricultural land markets have seen a myriad of characteristic changes, from peasants to white settlers (appropriation and colonization), to the slow market-based land reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, and the more recent FTLRP (white settlers to the peasants). Thus, land markets have been determined by who controlled the land, the type of tenure by which it was




Fig. 1. Forms and sources of agricultural land demand in Zimbabwe
Source: Adapted from Sam Moyo, various writings.

controlled, and the level or intensity of demand for the land by those who did not have land. These three variables formed the basis for the supply and demand functions for land in Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2005a). Furthermore, to understand land demand, an analysis of the social dimensions (connections, agency, and organization level) of the land seekers, and their place in a broad economic model and property rights regime had to be determined. The demand for land needs to be understood before we can understand how land markets evolved. This demand has taken various forms and emanated from various sources since the birth of the country (Fig. 1).

Moyo highlights how each source of demand has a different power or influence in the land markets. Different forms of demand can be linked but cannot be tied exclusively to one source. For example, traditional authorities may be heavily linked to demands for restitution, but it may also apply pressure for redistribution. The social, political, and economic dimensions (goals and ideology) of each particular grouping determine the type and extent of demand thereof (Moyo & Matondi, 2004). Before the reforms, land markets in Zimbabwe were dominated by a minority of white settlers exercising private property rights. Moyo discusses the different degrees of power and goals of the above-mentioned sources of demand within the context of 1) the socialist policies initially adopted in Zimbabwe (1980–1990), 2) the liberalization of the economy, and 3) the adoption of the FTLRP.

I. Structure of Land Markets from 1980 to 1997

The FTLRP was not a static policy but a continuum set in motion by the arrival of white settlers in the 1890s through to the 1960s (the land alienation period). A number of land reform experts have focused on the events that took place after independence, and some even isolate the 2000 land reform in their analysis of land reforms. After Europeans had settled in present day Zimbabwe, their new government controlled land markets and, in most cases, local indigenous populations were not allowed to purchase freehold land. It was only later, in the 1930s, that Native Purchase Areas were created to allow a small black elite to participate in the land markets. Beginning in the 1930s, through a number of laws (the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, the Land Husbandry Act of 1931, and the Tribal Trust Lands of 1965), oversize tracts of land were appropriated by the white settlers and converted to private property, creating a dualistic agrarian structure. This means the contemporary land question in Zimbabwe originated in geo-political, economic, social and demographic factors as well as in the current widespread global imperative (Moyo, 1992).

In 1980, the government faced the task of trying to correct the existing imbalance, which was deeply imbedded along racial and class lines. Approximately 70,000 white settlers controlled 70% of the agricultural land, while a group of black indigenous people 100 times as large had access to 15% of relatively less-productive lands (Moyo, 2000a). In this section, we discuss the pre-FTLRP attempts to redistribute land under different economic models and, hence, separate

the discussion into two sections: 1980 to 1997. Later years are discussed in next section.

1. Economic model and sources of land demand (1980–1990)

In the first decade following independence, the government sought to access and control land within the framework set by the 1980 LHC agreement. From 1980 to 1985, the sovereign state of Zimbabwe was still a fledgling state, so understanding the land tenure system it had inherited proved to be a Herculean task (Herbst, 1987 in Moyo & Skalness, 1990). Government policy was heavily skewed toward supporting large-scale commercial production, even though it was buying land and redistributing it to black families; this formed a contradiction in policy (Mandaza, 1985). During this period, according to some scholars, the LSCF had power and influence through the state (which was upholding the LHC constitution) and through the historically institutionalized myths of the superiority of large-scale over small scale producers (Weiner et al., 1985; Musimbo, 2005). Moyo (1992) refuted this, because small-scale farming was not being supported in the same way. In addition to the Communal Lands Act of 1981, the government passed the Land Acquisition Act (1985) to speed up market-based land reform. This act secured the right of first refusal on any land to the government; thus, before any land was put up for sale in Zimbabwe, it first had to be offered to the government. This had only a limited effect, as the few lands supplied through this means was of poor quality and priced artificially high. Land redistribution in the unfettered markets was profiting the white settlers even more, even while it delayed land redistribution and re-established white settler control in both land markets and financial markets.

More white settlers, the white elite, and foreign companies who had the funds, also bought huge tracts of land through the government for wildlife and tourism. These groups of people presented themselves as a powerful source of effective demand for land in the 1980s (Table 1). In the period from 1980 to 1996, only a small black elite managed to purchase land from the market through private loans secured from such institutions as the Agricultural Finance Cooperation (AFC). However, other black Zimbabweans, traditional authorities, and the Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (WVA) were excluded from the land markets. The force of their agency to access land was not yet radicalized. It is noteworthy that the access of women to land at this stage was extremely low. Even in the white settler farms, women only owned less than 5% of the title deeds, and land markets were extremely male dominated. However, Moyo pointed out that even though the resulting political pressure was not enough to radicalize the land question, it did manage to keep it on the agenda through the ESAP era. Furthermore, the would-be salient voices of the WVA were muted, and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were also in a dormant stage during these times (Table 1). The black elite were also suppressed to some extent, although the majority purchased land outside the land redistribution program (Moyo, 2002a).

Consequently, the state led the demand for market-based land reform, but it

Table 1. Source, type and effectiveness of land demand 1980–1997

Period	Sources	Demand type	Influence/Power
1980–1990 Statist (later SAP)	White settlers	Tenure security	High
	State	Redistribution	Low
	Peasants	Redistribution	Low
	ZNWVA	Redistribution	Low
1990–1997 Neo-liberal (ESAP)	White settlers	Tenure security	High
	Foreign capital	Leasing and buying	High
	State	Redistribution	Low
	Peasants	Redistribution	Medium
	ZNWVA	Redistribution	Medium

Source: Adapted from Sam Moyo (various writings).

was limited by the LHC until its expiration in 1990. The government was expected to gain control of the land-delivery channels once LHC had passed. By 1990, only 70,000 families had been resettled, out of a target of 160,000, on 7% of arable lands. Funding from the UK, Germany, and the United States of America did not flow to the government, as agreed in the LHC. By 1988, the flow of funds had been drastically reduced, with only £44 million being received amid tighter restrictions set by the conservative UK government. In addition to allowing the white settlers to set the price of the land they wished to sell, the LHC agreement gave them the right to choose what currency they preferred to be paid in. This further complicated and delayed the land market transactions, given the shortages of foreign currency that were rampant at that time. The result was stunted progress in land redistribution from 1980 to 1997.

2. Economic model and sources of land demand (1990–1996)

The turn of the first decade saw the expiration of the LHC agreement and adoption of a new economic production model, as the government announced that it had adopted the WB-funded ESAP. Under pressure to reduce economic stagnation and rising unemployment, the GoZ erroneously opened up the economy and reduced public spending and subsidies, which worsened social infrastructure and gave the private sector complete control of the economy. The effect of this in the land market was a 180° shift of focus from redistribution to purely market-based transactions, which was even worse than under the LHC agreement. At this stage, the government was unclear about the implications of continued land redistribution (the Land Acquisition Act of 1992-LAA, which sought to acquire land through compulsion); at the same time, they followed a market-based economy mode of production. On paper, the LAA granted the ability to expedite redistribution. It gave the government powers to compulsorily acquire land, pay compensation on a non-market basis, limit the size of large-scale farms, introduce a land tax, and introduce a system of land designation (to enable systematic land acquisition). Dube & Midgley

(2008) argue that the LAA would have had the potential to hasten land reform had it been supported by the local farmers, donors, and the international community. Instead, it was ridiculed and, following the recommendations of the IMF and World Bank, support was re-focused on large-scale commercial production. Land redistribution was shelved during ESAP as the focus shifted to the implementation of the economic reforms, under supervision from the Bretton Woods institutions (Moyo, 2014: 2). We also note the effect of this policy on land use, as more land-use options presented themselves through tourism, wildlife, and preservation of bio-diversity (leading to land-grabbing).

Moyo & Skalness (1990) stressed three more factors acting against an increased focus on radicalized land markets: 1) the influential party elite who were purchasing land at an alarming rate, such that adopting land reform policies would go against their interests, 2) the coming together of the two parties ZANU and ZAPU in 1987 (institutional/structural forces) de-radicalized the land reform movement, and 3) the continued economic crisis extinguished any thoughts of state-led radical land reform. By 1995, the prospects of a state-led reform looked grim. By 1996, agency from below emerged, increases in the rates of peasants squatting on commercial farms, land occupations, popular protests, armed confrontations, and resource poaching as a form of agency against a state unwilling to do redistributive land reform became widespread (Moyo, 2000a).

By 1997, ESAP had torn through the land markets, causing disaster and untold mayhem to the lives of the rural poor by increasing differentiation in land use, labor, and commodity marketing (disregarding the 1992–1995 drought) (Moyo, 2000b). The state withdrew from the land markets, reduced extension and subsidies. The opening up of the economy unlocked access to the land markets for foreign capital and the white elite, alienating land further from the general populace. More black business capitalists joined the white settlers in their quest to access land. CSOs and CBOs were still silent at this stage (Table 1). The farmer organizations also failed to incorporate the peasants' voices, as in most cases these were formed by white master-farmers who opposed land redistribution. Suddenly realizing the limited options available through neo-liberal markets, the state and various stakeholders in the land markets began discussing other ways of rapidly redistributing land, including land restitution and state-led land reform.

LAND MARKETS AND REFORM POLICIES, 1997–2010

Although ESAP was officially abandoned in 2001, the government began to move away from it in 1996. Budgetary support from the UK had officially expired. The Labour Party, newly arrived in power, made it clear that it was not going to support further land reform programs through the infamous Clare Short letter (Secretary of State for International Development). The intensity of land squatting, inversions and occupations grew. The WVA, which had been formed in 1989, took it upon themselves to initiate the restructuring of land markets.

I. Land Reform Program Phase 2 (LRP P2, 1997–1999)

Consequently, a number of conferences and meetings were carried out including, *inter alia*, the well-known 1998 Harare Land Reform Donor Conference. Prior to the conference, a land task force was established, which saw the implementation of the program and that it adhered to the agreed guidelines. These included identifying farms and publishing a list of them in the Financial Gazette to give time for the farm owners to challenge the process. The government identified 1,471 farms for resettlement. An array of variables, ranging from land under-utilization, multiple farm ownership, derelict land, absentee farm-owners and proximity to communal areas (CAs) were used to identify farms (Moyo, 2000b). This raised concern among a variety of stakeholders leading into the 1998 conference resulting in the concerned parties being brought together to discuss redistribution and resettlement options. At this stage, there were low-key land occupations by CA people as they occupied white farms near them. The state sent the police and sometimes the army to stop these “illegal” occupations.

Sadly, the program failed. It was implemented within a liberalized market that put emphasis on the private property rights of white settlers. Just as in the 1993 and 1995 court cases against the state’s compulsory land acquisition program, the landowners challenged and won back 40% of these farms. After this, farm occupations intensified, beginning with the well-known one in the village of Svosve in 1998 and spreading to other areas such as Manicaland, Masvingo, and even Matabeleland (despite poor soils and rainfall for crop production in that area). This time around, the peasants (through the WVA) had amassed political connections and were no longer facing state resistance. While other scholars (Elich, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2002) viewed this social movement as the work of the powerful elite of the ZANU PF party, Moyo (2000a) opposed it, arguing that the WVA had established itself with the influential elite. Moyo (2000a) maintained that the government, realizing the extent of the land occupations and pressure for land by the poor, had co-opted it into its land acquisition agenda.

Upon realizing this, the international community began to take the Zimbabwe situation seriously. A UK mission was dispatched to Zimbabwe (representing Europe and the United States) to negotiate with Mugabe. A report was created by this mission, which concluded, again, that the government of Zimbabwe was on the verge of appropriating land from white farmers without compensation, a move they had been trying to push through into the constitution ever since the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Moyo, 1994; 2000b; Moyo & Yeros, 2007). The 1998 donor conference was subsequently organized to try and mobilize funding to the Zimbabwe government so that it would pay compensation. The property rights that were defined in the constitution in 1980 were still being protected under law, which delayed the compulsory land acquisition process, much to the chagrin of the state, WVA, and elite political leaders, further fueling radicalism. The WVA, peasants, and the state itself were starting to realize the impracticality of any land reform approaches that respected the private property rights of the

white settlers. Moyo argued, in this context, that the intense resistance of the white settlers played a great role in the eventual radical land reform.

Thus, 1997 marked the threshold of land reform strategy in Zimbabwe, given that it raised the question of whether the ruling party and its government could muster serious political resolve to challenge the legacy of settler land and property rights as enshrined in existing legislation and the “rule of law” (Moyo, 2000b).

The 1998 donor conference took place in September. In attendance were representatives of 48 countries and other international donor organizations. The most significant outcome of this conference was the agreement to set up a task force for joint land reform (to launch the second phase of land reform), which the international community and donor agencies would fund. This was an attempt to find a balance between land acquisitions and market-based redistribution (Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Nevertheless, the UK agreed to join but the GoZ had to meet certain conditions, such as a reduction of human rights violations and improvements in the levels of democracy (Hanyama, 2009). However, in doing this, it failed to understand how these issues were part of the national land question. The donor conference crumbled.

By 1999, GoZ still was not able to smoothly redistribute the remaining 60% of farms, as more court challenges came. This unified the peasants, the state, WVA, party officials, and traditional authorities behind the land reform agenda. For the first time since independence, the WVA had effective power and was grounded politically, making it a very powerful agent for reform (see Table 2). However, the country was still officially following a neo-liberal economic model, which meant, to some extent, that the government was obliged to balance the interests of some key white and black capitalist farmers (Moyo, 2002a). Although

Table 2. Source, type, and effectiveness of land demand 1997–2014

Period	Sources	Demand type	Influence
1997–2007 State controlled	White settlers	Tenure security	Low
	State	Redistribution	High
	Peasants	Redistribution	High
	ZNWVA	Redistribution	High
2008–2014 Re-liberalization	Foreign capital	Tenure security, Leases, Purchase	High
	State	Redistribution	High
	Peasants	Redistribution, Tenure security	Medium
	ZNWVA	Redistribution, Tenure security	Medium

Source: Adapted from Moyo (various writings).

more discussion with the international community ensued from 1998–2001, the prospects for a further market-led land-delivery system looked grim. Among other conferences, Mugabe met with then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in September 2000, which saw the UN technical assessment team arrive in Harare. Eventually, they concluded that the framework for land reform was in place, but the process faced huge legal challenges, which would slow down any reform (Moyo, 2002a). Further inquiries through Obasanjo culminated in the Zimbabwe issue being tabled in the Commonwealth, eventually coming to be discussed by a team of nine ministers from member states (including the UK) in Abuja. The result was the Abuja commitments, which, again were halted by UK as it refused to honor the agreed terms of the meeting. Eventually, the UN and all donors advised the Zimbabwe government to delay the FTLRP indefinitely. The Zimbabwe government refused.

To this end, the GoZ attempted and failed to push a referendum to amend the constitution to allow it to seize farms without compensation. Interestingly, NGOs and CBOs came to life here, on the opposite pole of the land reform agenda. Most NGOs failed to admit the reality of the need for land reform, and others criticized it without giving alternatives.

II. Fast Track Land Reform Program (2000–2010)

In the wake of the failed donor's conference, failed LRP P2, and a rejected referendum (1997–2000), small cases of land occupations, farm inversions, and squatting then developed into full-scale occupations that would last until 2003–2004. Once the peasants and WVA put the FTLRP into motion, the state responded with a new land acquisition law in 2000, which finally removed the need to pay compensation for the invaded farms. In this respect, a state-led economic model of production was adopted, which saw the GoZ reasserting authority throughout the agrarian markets from input distribution to output marketing. Between the first rejection of the referendum in February and July 2000, the GoZ engaged WVA, the elite of the ruling party, landowners and donors again (the UK in April and the UNDP in June) to find amicable ways of performing the inevitable land reform. This proved futile and resulted in an escalation of confrontation leading to the full-scale state led FTLRP by August 2000 (Moyo, 2002a). As highlighted, power and control over land markets was in the hands of the masses by May 2000. Even the GoZ and some in the elite of the party feared losing control over the situation (Moyo & Matondi, 2004). The WVA has been described by scholars as a toothless bulldog; however, it managed to keep the land question on the agenda. It radicalized the question by mobilizing grassroots support from the congested CAs (Table 2).

This highlights WVA's ability to engage with the general populace to garner support at the same time as developing political alliances with the political elite, thus guaranteeing the success of land reforms (Moyo, 2002b). The state later gained control by creating District, Provincial, and National Land Committees, composed of representatives of the land demand drivers (WVA, government

officials, national security officials, party officials, and local traditional authorities), through which land seekers could apply for land.

Although the WVA was already carrying out land occupations, officially, the FTLRP was launched in July 2000 as part of the second phase of the land reform. It was a completely different creature from the previous land-delivery systems. It was ideologically different, in that it no longer respected the property rights of the white settlers. This reform was institutionally supported by the state, as seen through the addition of constitutional amendments that allow for no compensation, removed legal challenges to land occupiers, and provide protection for them from eviction (Rural Land Occupiers Act 2000). Some of these statutes relied on presidential decrees vested in the Presidential Powers Act to be passed. Additionally, the FTLRP was to be taken up in an accelerated manner, speeding up land identification, planning, demarcation, and resettlement of the people. This program, in a break with the past, had provisions to provide basic primary (access roads, dip tanks, and boreholes) and some secondary infrastructure (schools and clinics). It was launched countrywide to improve comprehensiveness and even redistribution in all provinces, using only locally sourced resources (Hanyama, 2009). However, as with the previous reform program, the FTLRP hinged on achieving equitable racial land ownership, poverty reduction, and increased productivity, which formed the socioeconomic objectives of the reform. Furthermore, it targeted the decongestion of CAs, improving their land access, and the formation of an indigenous commercial farming sector (Moyo, 2002a; Hanyama, 2009). The allocation procedures were affected by the land occupations, which started after the 1998 donor conference. The majority of the land seekers who took part in the land occupations were later officially given usufruct rights (permissive) under the A1 resettlement tenure model, with land sizes ranging from 1–30 ha, depending on the natural region (NR). The other resettlement tenure system was the A2 model, which was for those who proved that they had the means to utilize more land. In general, there are two forms of land holding in this model, the one exercised on lands with 30–150 ha (subject to NR) and those on lands with 150–400 ha. The A2 model beneficiaries hold leasehold tenure title. The FTLRP also left some former white-owned LSCF and some large corporate farms untouched if they were deemed strategic farms. These are still held through freehold tenure title.

The results of the FTLRP have been the focus of debate for the past decade, as scholars and government policy makers grapple with the task of fully understanding its nature and implications. Moyo (2014) argues that the exclusive use of economic variables to measure the impact of the reform is inadequate and that there is a need for deeper social and class analysis in addition to economic analysis. He proposed the use of a tri-modal agrarian structure. Utilization of this tri-modal structure enables analysis of the land reform based on such variables as land size (adjusted to reflect differences in quality and the agro-ecological potential of the land), the tenure system that the land was under, the control of land holdings, access to markets (support), accumulation, labor, technical capacity, and organization of production. Analysis of these variables

enabled the classification of the beneficiaries into peasants (1.3 million), small-to-medium capitalist farmers (30,000), and large-to-corporate capitalist farmers (250) (Moyo, 2005b: 42). As alluded to previously, differences in these have implications for the mobilization of labor and incomes. By 2010, around ten million hectares of land had been redistributed during the FTLRP to over 170,000 households under the A2 (commercially oriented, 13% of the land) and A1 (small scale, 70% of the land) settlement models. This was 10 times the land and 2.5 times the number of beneficiaries as in the 1980–1999 reform, all done in a quarter of the time. To understand the emerging tri-modal agrarian structure, we examine some approaches used to gain access to the land during this period, using data from a household survey conducted by SMAIAS (2013–2015). The data were collected in six districts, representing the five main agro-ecological zones or Natural Region (NR) in Zimbabwe, from NRI (wet region ideal for crop production) to NRV (dry region ideal for livestock production). Analysis explores this tri-modal approach, examining data collected from the three emerging settlement types after the FTLRP (A1, A2, and the CA). In the sections that follow, we present evidence to support Moyo's argument that the FTLRP and the pressure for land-market reform and property-rights reform for land emanated from below. The characteristics of the people who gained land resemble the characteristics of the groups of people who, as the bulk of Moyo's writing makes clear, were in the forefront of land demand before the FTLRP.

1. Land access approaches and patterns

The land markets are now dominated by peasants (on less than 10 ha per farm), who are settled on 73% of Zimbabwe's arable land, followed by small-to-medium capitalist farmers (30 to 150 ha), settled on 9% of the arable land. The level of land quality and quantity, off-farm income, class, influence, and gender and age structures differ among peasant farms, which indicates a further differentiated control of the land markets (Moyo & Matondi, 2004; Moyo et al., 2014). SMAIAS survey data showed that the land access method depended on the type of land demanded. Farm occupations were more common in the A1 sector (46.4% A1, 12.5% A2), while the A2 sector was dominated by official allocations (84.8% in A2, 48.7% in A1). The majority of the A1 beneficiaries took part in the land inversions before the official FTLRP started and they were eventually regularized. There were also beneficiaries in both the A1 (0.4%) and A2 (0.7%) sectors (Fig. 2) who claimed to have purchased the land during the FTLRP period, confirming the existence of informal agricultural land markets.

Therefore, across the two settlements, only 33.5% of the beneficiaries accessed land through occupation and the majority's land was formally allocated (62.5%). In general, for the majority of land seekers, access to land in the A2 was heavily linked to associational brokering, while that of the A1 was mainly participation-based, coupled with negotiations with local land authorities. However, participation in the land inversions, engagement with local land authorities and WVA did not guarantee land access. It took a great deal of dedication and commitment: beneficiaries often had to spend several nights




Fig. 2. Mode of land access for landholders by type of settlement
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).




Fig. 3. Scale of land allocation from 2000 to 2013
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

camped in the forest in what became known as “bases,” awaiting re-allocation from District Land Committees (Moyo, 2011a; Sadomba, 2011).

2. Periodization of land access

The scale and magnitude of the land reform generally reveals the extent of the demand for land in the Zimbabwe land markets. From the SMAIAS data, it is clear that approximately 75.7% of the land redistribution occurred between 2000 and 2003, with the remainder taking place from 2004 to 2015. Interestingly, land demands were differentiated in different regions of the country, with some regions such as the Mangwe district, having completed 94.5% of its redistribution by 2005. Mangwe is in Matabeleland, which is NRV, and it receives very low rainfall. However, it was an area that was at the forefront of land occupations and land demands from 2000–2003 (Fig. 3). The same situation can also be said about the Kwekwe district, which is in Midlands province and is predominately NRIII. To a greater extent, these two districts were the base for the ZAPU party before the unity accord of 1987. This finding seems to confirm Moyo’s (1992) argument that the unity-accord between the two political parties de-radicalized the land reform agenda in Matabeleland. Other regions came late

to the party, as evidenced in the Midlands, where the highest number of land allocations occurred after 2004. A higher proportion of land allocations that took place from 2004 were in the A2 rather than in the A1 sector, a situation that obtained in all the districts surveyed (Fig. 3). The rate of land allocations per year was highest in the first three years of the FTLRP. The pace of land allocations between 2000 and 2002 was faster for A1 (inversions) and, later, the use of formal channels took center stage from 2002 onwards. Although occupations or informal allocations persisted up to 2006, their scale was significantly lower.

3. Socioeconomic characteristics of land beneficiaries

Media reports and academic literature have suggested that the politically connected elite, WVA members, and their immediate families were the only beneficiaries of the land reform. A socioeconomic analysis of the beneficiaries is necessary to understand who they are beyond the war veterans or political elite rhetoric.

(1) Geographic origins of land beneficiaries

The origins of beneficiaries played a significant role in the type and amount of land they could access. As Moyo (2000b) noted, the manner in which the 1,471 farms were chosen in 1997 and 1998 depended on their distance from CAs, to reduce the cost of relocation. Most land occupations occurred in farms close to CAs, as in the occupations of the villages of Masvingo and Svosve during the initial stages of the FTLRP (Cliffe, 2000; Moyo, 2000a). The FTLRP wanted to reduce overcrowding and poverty rates in these areas. For this reason, most land beneficiaries (53.6%) in the SMAIAS 2013–2014 survey came from the CAs (Table 3). Furthermore, the biggest number of land beneficiaries came from CAs within the immediate district (24.8%), followed by those from within the immediate province (19.6%), while those from other provinces were 9.2% of land beneficiaries within this group. Hence the distance from the area of origin to the desired or demanded piece of land bore heavily on the extent and the scope of land demand in land markets. These questions the widely held belief that most land was taken by the political elite, who predominately stayed in the diaspora.

Urbanites commanded a significant proportion of the participants in the FTLRP process, as 29.7% of those resettled originated from urban areas. Here, it is noteworthy to highlight the role of the tri-modal approach, since it was a deliberate state policy to create a new agrarian middle class. This state-led reform policy was able to articulate protests across the rural-urban spaces and simultaneously radicalize the working-class (Moyo, 2011a). The third-largest group of people came from former large-scale commercial farms, accounting for 9.3% of the land beneficiaries (90% of them coming from the same district). This group of people mainly included former farm workers in formerly white-owned farms. Interestingly, some media reports suggested that the program only benefited rural dwellers who supported the ruling party.

Table 3. Place of origin by settlement type

Place of origin	A1		A2		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total CA	311	63.9	102	36.0	413	53.6
CA in this district	147	30.2	44	15.5	191	24.8
CA in this province	114	23.4	37	13.1	151	19.6
CA from other provinces	50	10.3	21	7.4	71	9.2
Total LSCF	56	11.5	16	5.7	72	9.3
LSCF in this district	52	10.7	13	4.6	65	8.4
LSCF in this province	4	0.8	3	1.1	7	0.9
Diaspora	1	0.2	0	0.0	1	0.1
Urban area	88	18.0	140	49.4	228	29.7
Place of employment	14	2.9	15	5.3	29	3.8
Old resettlement	13	2.7	5	1.8	18	2.3
Other places	4	0.8	5	1.8	9	1.2
Total	487	100.0	283	100.0	770	100.0

Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).


Furthermore, some studies argue that land could only be accessed around each individual's area of origin (this was only true for farm workers); on the contrary, people could generally apply for or take part in land occupations as was they saw fit.

(2) Family structure (size and membership) of beneficiaries

The driving force behind the demand for land in the markets is also visible in the sizes of beneficiaries' families, as they sought to secure land to subdivide or bequeath to family. The plurality of households from the CA in the A1 sector generally had a family size range of 3–5 members per farm beneficiary (36.1%), while the second most common range was 6–7 members (26.7% of respondents), followed by 8–9 members per household (14.9%) (Fig. 4). Generally, A2 farms relied mostly on hired labor and had fewer members in their households than the CA and the A1 (SMAIAS, 2014). At the extreme end of the A2, in the CA there were larger families than in the resettled areas.

(3) Educational levels of land beneficiaries

Survey results revealed that the educational level of the participants of the land markets varied from no formal education to having a tertiary degree. A plurality (43.4%) of those who took part in land resettlement had a basic level of education (ordinary level), followed by primary education (33.1%), and tertiary education (13.9%). Approximately 7.8% of participants had no formal education (Table 4). Level of education also affects planning, power and influence in

**Fig. 4.** Household size by model

Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

Table 4. Education levels attained by plot owner for newly resettled farmers

Education level attained	A1		A2		CA		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No formal education	45	9.6	8	2.7	32	10.2	85	7.8
Total primary	188	39.8	45	15.2	125	39.7	358	33.1
Some primary education	104	22.0	16	5.4	68	21.6	188	17.3
Completed primary education	84	17.8	29	9.8	57	18.1	170	15.8
Total 'O' level	205	43.4	118	39.9	148	46.9	471	43.4
Some secondary education	84	17.8	41	13.9	65	20.6	190	17.5
Completed secondary education	121	25.6	77	26.0	83	26.3	281	25.9
Total 'A' level	5	1.1	14	4.7	0	0.0	19	1.8
Total tertiary	29	6.1	111	37.3	10	3.2	150	13.9
College education	21	4.4	42	14.2	8	2.5	71	6.6
University degree	7	1.5	69	23.3	2	0.6	78	7.2
Vocational training	1	0.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1
Total	472	100.0	296	100.0	315	100.0	1,083	100.0

Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

societal processes: that is, it can be a source of inclusion or exclusion (SMAIAS, 2014).

(4) Employment profiles of beneficiaries

The 1980–1990 land reform targeted the unemployed, ex-combatants, and ex-farm workers in an effort to provide them with alternative sources of livelihood. This has been criticized by proponents of market-based approaches, who argue

Table 5. Previous employment status of landholders

Periodization of employment	A1		A2		CA		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Never been employed	204	42.8	57	19.2	158	50.2	419	38.5
Total previously employed	201	42.1	155	52.2	86	27.3	442	40.6
Before 1995	33	(16.4)	16	(10.3)	21	(24.4)	70	(15.8)
Previously employed 1996 to 1999	33	(16.4)	17	(11.0)	10	(11.6)	60	(13.6)
2000 to 2006	83	(41.3)	76	(49.0)	20	(23.3)	179	(40.5)
2007 to 2014	52	(25.9)	46	(29.7)	35	(40.7)	133	(30.1)
Currently employed	72	15.1	85	28.6	71	22.5	228	20.9
Grand total	477	100.0	297	100.0	315	100.0	1,089	100.0

Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

that the unemployed are not in a position to productively utilize the land, because they lack capital and the ability to access the capital. Moyo & Skalness (1990), however, argued that to restructure agrarian markets effectively, granting the general populace access to land was extremely necessary. However, land reform on its own was not sufficient; institutional, policy, and financial support were equally important.

In the SMAIAS household survey, a plurality of the respondents had been previously employed (40.6%) while a slightly lower number (38.5%) had never been employed prior to accessing land. Approximately 20.9% of the households were currently employed (Table 5). This gives an indication of the extent of demand for land as seen through higher proportions of people who took part in land resettlement programs despite being in employment. This analysis helps us to understand the levels of skill, size of networks, extent of habits built over time, and depth of the resource bases of the landholders. The largest proportion of farmers who had never been formally employed was found in the CA (50.2%) and A1 (42.8%); they were being given a source of livelihood by the land reform program.

On the other hand, the majority of the A2 land participants (52.2%) had been previously employed. Further disaggregation of previously employed households shows that a greater number of these stopped working in 2000–2006 in both the two resettlement models (A1 [41.3%] and A2 [49.0%]). This period was the farm establishment phase, when farmers were settling into their new land, which may indicate that a number of farmers left their employment to be full-time farmers, especially in the A2 sector.

4. Gender composition of land holders

Women's ownership of, and access to, land has been a contentious issue in the literature (Moyo et al., n.d.). Women's role in agriculture cannot be overstated, as they are at the forefront of virtually all farm activities, from household




Fig. 5. Gender of plot owner by settlement type
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

production to reproduction. However, there remains a mismatch between their role in the sector and their level of land access, a situation obtaining even during the era of the white settlers, when women owned just under 5% of the arable land (Rugube et al., 2003; Moyo, 2005b). In the old resettlement areas, 5% of the land was held by black women in their own right. Some studies have argued that women had access to land through their spouses (83% of women respondents in the SMAIAS survey, Fig. 5), since most men who have land have wives who have equal access to the land (new tenure laws require registration of the wife [wives] if a land holder is married). However, this is open to varied interpretations, as differences in rights exist between different households: one wife may have access to the land while another does not.

By 2010, women's access to land was estimated to be between 12% and 18% (Buka, 2002; Utete, 2003; GoZ, 2007). Furthermore, access to A2 land presented increased constraints, as beneficiaries needed proof of ability to produce before they could access the land. This discouraged the participation of women, who are historically disadvantaged and denied access. Some women entered their husband or son's names when applying for land to ensure access during the land reform (Buka, 2002; Utete, 2003; GoZ, 2007).

In the SMAIAS survey, women accounted for 19.7% of all land beneficiaries who received land in their own right in the resettlement areas. As expected, the percentage of woman beneficiaries was higher in the A1 (23.2%) than in the A2 (16.2%). A greater number of women accessing land were widows (59.7%), followed by those who received land in their own right but were monogamously married (22.6%) (Table 6).

Table 6. Gender of landholder by marital status and settlement type

	A1				A2				CA				Total			
	male		female		male		female		male		female		male		female	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Monogamy	288	79.1	31	28.4	223	90.3	18	36.7	184	81.5	7	7.8	695	83.0	56	22.6
Polygamy	44	12.1	5	4.6	12	4.9	1	2.0	21	9.3	3	3.3	77	9.2	9	3.6
Single	6	1.6	4	3.7	3	1.2	4	8.2	5	2.2	1	1.1	14	1.7	9	3.6
Divorced	9	2.5	9	8.3	4	1.6	5	10.2	1	0.4	12	13.3	14	1.7	26	10.5
Widowed	17	4.7	60	55.0	5	2.0	21	42.9	15	6.6	67	74.5	37	4.4	148	59.7
Total	364	100.0	109	100.0	247	100.0	49	100.0	226	100.0	90	100.0	837	100.0	248	100.0

Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

EMERGING LAND MARKETS AFTER THE FTLRP

The demand for land from around 2007 onwards took a new twist, especially in light of the global food crisis, which saw global markets pushing for large-scale oriented food production systems to ensure global food security. There was still great demand for land among local people, as can be seen in the ever-growing list of applications for it. By 2009, the government had managed to identify 760,000 ha, which was demanded by 100,000 land seekers. Post-FTLRP, there has been a resurgence of foreign capital into Zimbabwe land markets through collusion with government, the elite, CSOs, and MNC (land grabbing). These will be discussed in this section. Emerging markets are characterized by large-scale land deals as well as localized land sharing, leasing, and renting.

I. Agricultural Land Markets after FTLRP

The FTLRP nationalized all agricultural land; therefore, no land sales can occur under the currently available land tenure. However, new forms of local and international land deals emerged post-reform, signaling a new dimension in the land markets (Moyo, 2009).

1. Informal land market


The nationalization of land brought with it a new tenure system that allows no land transactions of any nature without state approval, thereby making any subsequent land transactions informal. However, these markets have persisted. The extent of this market depends on a variety of factors, including inter-settlement class struggles.

SMAIAS (2014) underscores the difficulty of collecting data on informal deals and land sharing arrangements. However, approximately 5.9% of the respondents to the SMAIAS survey openly agreed that they were sharing their land, and the numbers were highest in the resettlement areas, A1 (7.5%) and A2 (7.1%) (Table 7). It is very important to note that these findings may grossly underestimate

Table 7. Land sharing by settlement type

Is there anyone else with access to your land?	Settlement type							
	A1		A2		CA		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Yes	36	7.5	21	7.1	7	2.2	64	5.9
No	442	92.5	274	92.9	309	97.8	1,025	94.1
Total	478	100.0	295	100.0	316	100.0	1,089	100.0

Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

**Fig. 6.** Non-farm owners with access to land by settlement type

Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

the occurrence of informal land markets post FTLRP. This is an area that requires further study.

In the A1 sector, most land sharing was done with relatives and/or friends (83.3%), followed by former farm workers (8.3%), a situation also obtaining in the land sharing deals in the CAs. In the A2 sector, with its larger amounts of land, 47.6% of land sharers were former farm workers, followed by relatives and/or friends (33.3%). In land sharing in the A2 sector, where the plurality of the landholders shares their land with their employees, access to land may be tied to the provision of labor on the same farm. Resettled farmers engage in these land deals to incentivize their workers. Consequently, A2 farmers were found to share land, mostly, with farmworkers, while A1 farmers mostly shared and leased out land to friends and relatives (Fig. 6).

Informal interviews show that a significant number of white former farmers and foreign capital owners (South African, Chinese, etc.) are working with black farmers on their allocated pieces of land to produce tobacco, wheat, and soybean. The presence of foreign capital in these markets had accentuated government fears of a reversal of the land redistribution process. The government has tried to re-gain control of these informal land market activities by formulating land-sharing policies that require that land-sharing deals be done through the

Ministry of Lands. Although the rural lands act (20:18) has provisions for sharecropping and the leasing of land through the ministry, further informal interviews found that the majority of these deals were informal (the ministry was not notified). Overall, 68.8% of those sharing land did so with friends and relatives, while 20.3% shared land with their farm workers. This also points to the feared, unanswered land question in agrarian studies. These informal land market deals necessitate debating a second land reform and LSCF-sector land downsizing in Zimbabwe.

II. Land Tenure Issues after FTLRP

The reform program drastically reconfigured property rights to land, which has had huge effects on the land markets. Contemporary tenure issues have mainly been driven by foreign capital pushing for the re-establishment of private property rights, as they argue that the reform rendered land as dead capital (De Soto, 2000). However, it is not a given that titling can automatically lead to success in the aftermath of the FTLRP, as it could also lead to increased class and racial clashes, which would depress economic and social development and trust in property titles once again (see Martin, 2008). Some farms are still held under freehold tenure, especially the farms that were termed strategic for the economy during the FTLRP. In the SMAIAS household survey, 83% of the resettled farmers held offer letters (permissive tenure) as ownership documents,




Fig. 7. Type of tenure document possessed by landholders
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

Table 8. Type of tenure-related conflicts faced

Type of conflict	A1		A2		Ca		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Boundary dispute	26	51.0	47	65.2	7	38.9	80	56.7
Access to natural resources	1	2.0	4	5.6	4	22.2	9	6.4
Access to infrastructure	1	2.0	1	1.4	0	0.0	2	1.4
Inheritance	2	3.9	0	0.0	4	22.2	6	4.3
Ownership of farm/plot	20	39.2	19	26.4	1	5.6	40	28.4
Other types of conflict	1	1.9	1	1.4	2	11.1	4	2.8
Total who faced conflicts	51	100.0	72	100.0	18	100.0	141	100.0

Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).

while 13.3% and 2.6% are reported to have already-processed permits and 99-year leases, respectively (Fig. 7). From the initial stages of the FTLRP, the GoZ has tried to provide constitutional provisions to protect land beneficiaries and the process of land redistribution (e.g., constitutional amendment 97 of 2006, which removed the need for payment of compensation for repossessed land) as well as those who recognized the ownership rights of the land seekers who took part in the initial farm occupations.

The anticipated illegal land-market deals have basically been the driving force for the GoZ's stance on issuing private property ownership rights to newly resettled farmers. It is feared that the demand for land by global capital will increase land values and, as a result of decreasing profits for small-scale producers, farmers might be forced to sell off their land (Pinckney & Kimuyu, 1994), thus reversing land reform. Land-tenure issues remain contested, especially between the GoZ and the private sector (the agricultural finance stakeholders), in terms of the level of security of tenure in current lease and offer letters in agricultural land markets. Although the majority of resettled farmers express confidence in the tenure documents they hold as proof of ownership, they are concerned that these documents are not accepted by financial institutions as proof of ownership (SMAIAS, 2014). Demand for land tenure has been pushed off to some extent by the middle and upper classes of land beneficiaries (Moyo, 2011b). Approximately 4% of respondents to the SMAIAS survey reported being threatened with eviction by government officials, while 0.8% of the respondents reported being actually evicted from one farm before being reallocated to another one.

Interestingly, approximately 95% of respondents to the survey had tenure documents, while 5% had no form of government documentation of ownership of land (SMAIAS, 2014). For farmers who faced land-tenure related land conflicts, these conflicts were largely boundary disputes (between farmers, reported by 56.7%) and disagreements over ownership of pieces of land (between farmers and GoZ, reported by 28.4%) (Table 8).

Informal interviews have also shown how class struggles remain at the forefront

of certain farmer-to-farmer conflicts, with those farmers who have limited access to resources and no political influence facing more conflicts. Thus, land conflicts also have a gender dimension to them. More female than male farmers faced more conflicts as male neighbors believe they can increase the size of their land holdings by encroaching onto female-owned land. The A2 women landholders are more susceptible to land conflicts, reported by 34%, in comparison to the 10.8% reported in the A1 sector (see SMAIAS, 2014). Other issues raised relating to land tenure include a lack of clarity in the role of traditional authorities, who seem to have extended their authority from the CAs to the resettled areas, complicating the rights that leaseholders or permit holders have over a piece of land.

III. Large-scale land investments

The GoZ now controls the major part of all land. This gives ultimate power to the state, power that, if misused, may lead to undesirable outcomes. A number of scholars have written on the new scramble for Africa and highlighted how the state was going to bed with foreign capital. Zimbabwe is no exception when it comes to this, with agreements ranging from tourism partnerships to mining and agriculture. Government-owned land has been leased to a number of foreign investors. Such agreements were in the tourism sector, or various Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) farms leased out under the Build, Operate and Transfer Agreements (BOTA). However, the most recent example of this third wave for Zimbabwean land has been the concentration of land for sugarcane production aimed at bio-fuels production, whereby some farmers were moved to accommodate projects in Mashonaland west, Masvingo, and Manicaland. Concerns have been raised about the real motives for these large-scale investments. Some of the farmers affected had been newly resettled. Hence, large-scale land investments are already reversing land reform. Such investments have also come in, disguised as contract farming and/or out-grower systems, as evidenced in some cases in the Chiredzi district (Mazwi & Muchetu, 2015).

CONCLUSIONS

Land markets are, and always will be, politicized, consequently justifying government intervention. Moyo's work on land markets, spanning more than 40 years, offered explanations for the trajectory taken by agricultural land markets in terms of who demanded land, what type of demand it was, and how state economic production models affected its land-delivery mechanisms. State intervention has been constrained by LHC agreements and financial and legal systems, which frustrated the peasants, who took it upon themselves to correct historic injustices through extra-market approaches. Nevertheless, the success of these interventions from below depended heavily on collaboration with state apparatus. While it remains a fact that market land transactions should not be

eliminated (only regulated), a state-led approach was appropriate and needed to be forged. Moyo's central argument was that market-led land reform, carried out under a market-oriented economic model, will always favor capital, the elite, and white settlers (a minority) at the expense of the peasantry (the majority). Land seekers had varied socioeconomic backgrounds, levels of education, family sizes, political influence, and employment histories determining their placement within Moyo's tri-modal agrarian structure. Land markets in Zimbabwe continue to be highly unpredictable, in part as a result of the re-emergence of demand for land by global capital from 2007 and 2008. This was stimulated by the global food crisis, which culminated in a new scramble for land (Moyo's term) or land grabs. At the household level, demand for land continues to be high, as seen by the rampant land sharing arrangements in the A1 and A2 sectors. There also exist informal land sales between beneficiaries. Beneficiaries derive security from their tenure documents, but this highlights the fact that the need for 99-year leases stems mainly from the need to use them to secure credit from financial institutions. Furthermore, farmers desired these new documents to reduce boundary conflicts.

Market-based land reforms and state-led reform approaches remain the major forms of land-delivery mechanisms in post-independence Zimbabwe. A limited number of beneficiaries have accessed land through informal markets, restitution, inheritance, and/or customary approaches. The Zimbabwe land-delivery markets have proved that a state-led approach flouts liberal political rights (settlers' property rights), reinvents the law, and scores less in terms of efficiency and democracy than market-led land reforms. While market-led reforms respect the existing system of law and property rights, they are extremely slow (the pace of redistribution 1980–1999) and serve the interests of the resourced at the expense of the downtrodden. We have further learned that state-led reforms are able to score higher on redistribution; decongestion of the CAs, women and youth participation, equity and social rights, correction of historical social injustices, and delivering land to the majority in a short space of time, while using minimum resources. For successful state-led land reforms, it is important to understand clearly the limitations and strengths of the economic production model in place, and the magnitude and potential of pressure from below to alter land-delivery systems. Furthermore, land reforms must be complemented with land registration and the provision of financial services to ensure increased productivity. Finally, the strength and limitations of the land delivery channel should be evaluated against the objective of land reform. That is to say, market-led land markets, if adopted, require regulation and, in cases where historical land injustices prevail, state-led interventions become more applicable.

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