Switching the Strategy for Processing Presupposition Triggers: Split of Focus and the Reinterpretation of Triggers' Scope

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify factors that assist in switching from the default strategy (resolution strategy) for interpreting presupposition triggers to the secondary one (accommodation strategy or rejection strategy), namely, mechanisms by which the context is made inappropriate for the presupposition of triggers in such utterances as: the professor went to Chicago again. Previous research on how presupposition triggers are processed has discussed the following two cases: those in which the entire proposition demanded by a presupposition trigger already exists in the context and those in which no part of the demanded proposition is present. This paper scrutinizes cases located somewhere on the continuum between the two 'idealized' cases, i.e., those in which part of the utterance is entailed by the context. By examining such cases, in which it is not so obvious whether the hearer adopts resolution or accommodation/rejection, we derive a hypothesis on our subconscious choice of a strategy for processing a presupposition trigger. The hypothesis in this paper is that, given that presupposition triggers are in nature the focus of their sentences, in case only part of a proposition demanded by a trigger is provided in the context, several linguistic items (the trigger and other items expressing what is not provided in the context) compete for the job of the focus of the sentence, resulting in difficulty in grasping the speaker's intended message. This hypothesis will, via its niche in the scope of explanation, show that multiple factors interact in driving the hearer's choice of a strategy for processing presupposition triggers.

Keywords: presupposition; presupposition trigger; resolution; accommodation; rejection; informativeness; information structure; split of focus; *again*; *too*; *futatabi*

1.   Introduction

This paper proposes a hypothesis on the decisive factors subconsciously used in choosing a processing strategy for interpreting utterances carrying certain presupposition triggers.[1] When one says that Catherine went to New York again, it is usually commonly understood that she has been there at least once before. If so, the hearer identifies the repetitive event verbalized in the utterance as the commonly understood belief (resolution strategy). Alternatively, the speaker may say

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[1] This research throws light on processing by hearers, but the analyses given here can be expanded to intentions by speakers.

the same thing even if the hearer is not aware that Catherine has been to New York before, and behave as if it had already been shared before the utterance. In addition to her explicit reactions to the absence of the presupposition,[2] the hearer has two choices: to develop the topic based on the ad-hoc pseudo-presupposition in question (accommodation strategy), and to ignore the linguistic item *again*, thus interpreting only the rest of the utterance (rejection strategy).

The processing of utterances carrying linguistic items such as *again* has been discussed in previous literature (cf. Heim 1990, Beck 2007, Tiemann et al. 2014), and the above example illustrates three strategies that have been the topic of linguistic research long since identified. One of the strategies in the example is concerned with the case where the whole proposition in the utterance, except information described by the word *again*, is already shared as a presupposition by the participants, whereas the other two strategies fall under the case where the participants are familiar with no part of the proposition of the utterance. Generally, these 'idealized' cases have been the only subjects of investigations on strategies for processing presupposition triggers, although obviously there are other types of cases that occur frequently, namely, cases located somewhere on the continuum between the two idealized cases. These continuum cases include ones in which the hearer believes that only parts of the proposition of an utterance including *again* are shared by the members of the conversation. In cases of this kind, it is not as obvious as it is in the previously reported cases whether the hearer adopts resolution or accommodation/rejection. This paper discusses such cases, because examining such cases can assist in constructing a hypothesis of what conditions encourage the hearer to switch from resolution strategy (default strategy) to accommodation or rejection strategy (secondary strategy).

The hypothesis to be suggested here is the one that covers examples outside the scope of the hypothesis proposed by Sato (2018), which explains several examples from the aspect of informativeness. The remodeled hypothesis of this paper employs the notion of "focus" as developed by Lambrecht (1994) and argues that difficulty in interpreting the main focus of an utterance leads to a subconscious choice in favor of accommodation or rejection rather than resolution. The next section briefly introduces terminology on presuppositions. In the following section, the hypothesis proposed by Sato (2018) will be explained, and we will see that informativeness alone cannot explain the adoption of resolution strategy in certain examples. Then, in section 4, as a first step toward constructing a new hypothesis that covers the range of phenomena not dealt with by Sato's (2018) hypothesis, we will discuss that presupposition triggers tend to be the focus of their sentences *per se*. After the explanation, in section 5, we will go on to the hypothesis that the focus characteristic of a presupposition trigger serves as a factor in deciding whether to resolve or accommodate/reject the presupposition. Section 6 will sum up the essence of the analyses in this paper.

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[2] Repair is one of the possible explicit reactions. Conditions on occurrence of repair in interpreting presupposition triggers are discussed by Glanzberg (2003).

2.   Theoretical Background

This section explains basic terms related to presuppositions and processing strategies in cases where a hearer encounters presupposition triggers.

2.1   Presupposition and Trigger

There are two different definitions of "presupposition," one of which is based on truth-conditional semantics, while the other is based on pragmatics. The phenomena to be discussed in this paper lie within the realm of the latter. Levinson (1983) defines a pragmatic presupposition as follows:

(1)   An utterance A *pragmatically presupposes* a proposition B iff A is *appropriate* only if B is *mutually known* by participants

(Levinson 1983)

For example, utterance (2a) needs (2b) and (2c) to be mutually known.

(2)   a. He regretted beating his wife.
       b. He has/had a wife.
       c. He beat his wife.

In actual conversations, the appropriateness of an utterance does not depend on whether certain propositions are mutually **known**. Knowing a proposition *sensu stricto* entails that it is true and that the person who believes it is in a position to have obtained enough evidence to know it (cf. Hintikka 1962, Audi 2010). The appropriateness of an utterance in natural discourses cannot depend on metaphysical truth but rather on our epistemological assumptions about metaphysical truth, and thus *being mutually known* is too restrictive for the definition of presupposition. To ensure the appropriateness of an utterance, furthermore, certain propositions do not need to be **believed**, either. To judge the appropriateness, they have only to be mutually **accepted** by the participants. Stalnaker (2002) defines acceptance as follows:

> Acceptance [...] is a category of propositional attitudes and methodological stances toward a proposition, a category that includes belief, but also some attitudes (presumption, assumption, acceptance for the purposes of an argument or an inquiry) that contrast with belief, and with each other. To accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason. One ignores, at least temporarily, and perhaps in a limited context, the possibility that it is false. Belief is the most basic acceptance concept: the simplest reason to treat a proposition as true is that one believes that it is true.

(Stalnaker 2002: 716)

Let us see what it means that propositions have only to be accepted. We can imagine the following scenario: Ken always lies to Beth and Beth is aware of this. One day Ken tells Beth that he has gotten married, and says (2a) to her. In this situation, neither Ken nor Beth believes that (2b) is true, but when Beth understands (2a), she is able to use (2b) as the basis for an understanding of (2a), and in this sense, (2b) makes the utterance of (2a) appropriate. As illustrated by this scenario, if propositions are accepted just for the purpose of the conversation, they nevertheless support the appropriateness of utterances. Considering this fact, the following definition of presupposition is closer to being sufficient and necessary, especially if a presupposition is to be defined in terms of appropriateness.

(3)   An utterance A *presupposes* a proposition B iff A is *appropriate* only if B is *common ground* for participants

"Common ground," according to Stalnaker (2014), is a kind of propositional attitude[3] and can be rephrased with mutual acceptance for the purpose of conversation.[4] This definition identifies presupposition as a common-ground proposition determining the appropriateness of utterances.

Whether a proposition should be common ground is often decided by the use of certain linguistic items. These items are named "presupposition triggers" (Levinson 1983). For example, *his* and *regretted* in (2a) are presupposition triggers. The former demands that (2b) be common ground and the latter that (2c) be common ground. This paper mainly deals with the triggers *again* and *too*, but the analyses here can be applied to *even* as well. Therefore, the terms "presupposition triggers" in this paper refer to the set of *again*, *too* and *even*.[5] Next, we will examine what strategies hearers adopt when they encounter presupposition triggers.

2.2   Processing Strategy

According to Domaneschi (2016), when a hearer interprets utterances with presupposition triggers, she subconsciously follows one of the three paths outlined in (4).

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[3] As the terms "knowledge" and "belief" are used to refer to what is known and what is believed, "common ground" can be used to refer to what is common ground.

[4] Stalnaker (2014) defines common ground with reference to the definition of mutual knowledge (cf. Lewis 1969, Schiffer 1972). Clark (1992), however, defines common ground in another way.

[5] The set is included in the list of so-called soft triggers (cf. Kripke 2009, Abrusán 2016), but this list includes triggers that are not related to the phenomena and the analyses in this paper, and therefore this paper does not employ the term.

(4)   a.   **Resolution**: Identify the proposition in an utterance as common ground.[6]

b.   **Accommodation**: Accept as presupposition the proposition that is demanded by the trigger but is not common ground.

c.   **Rejection**: Reject the trigger and therefore do not regard what is common ground as presupposition of the trigger.

Interpreters usually try to adopt resolution first, but if they cannot, they choose accommodation or rejection. In this sense, resolution is the **default** strategy, and accommodation or rejection is the secondary one. Let us see the following example.

(5)   Yesterday, Robin went to Nick's house again.

If the hearer believes, at the time of the utterance, that Robin went to Nick's house sometime before *yesterday*, this belief will function as a presupposition (resolution). If she does not believe it at that time, either accommodation or rejection takes place. If she thinks that the idea of Robin previously having gone to Nick's house is conceivable, she may accept it for the purpose of the conversation (accommodation). In the case of accommodation, common ground, or context, will not be referred to at all, especially to establish the created ad-hoc presupposition. In contrast to the case of accommodation, if the hearer has a reason to doubt the presupposition, she will ignore the presupposition trigger *again* (rejection), thus resulting in interpreting only the rest of the utterance. In what follows, the hypothesis proposed by Sato (2018) on the mechanism whereby accommodation or rejection rather than resolution takes place will be explained.

3.   Informativeness of Presupposition

This section introduces a hypothesis on the condition of the switch from the default resolution strategy to accommodation or rejection strategy in Sato (2018). Sato (2018) states that the presupposition of *again* in (6b) is more likely to be resolved than the one in (7b) or the one in (8b), and that the one in (7b) is more likely to be resolved than the one in (8b).

(6)   a.   John bought a flower for Amy.

b.   Two days later, John bought a flower for Amy again.

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[6] Domaneschi (2016) does not introduce the notion of common ground. For ease of discussion, this paper adopts the term to define the three strategies.

(7) a. John bought a flower for Amy.

b. Two days later, John bought a flower for Beth again.

(8) a. John bought a flower for Amy.

b. Two days later, Kent bought a book for Beth again.

This is obvious from the contrast between (6b) and (8b). When we interpret (6b), the shared situation described in (6a) is the presupposition of *again*, which can be rephrased as resolution. In contrast, in interpreting (8b), (8a) cannot easily work as the presupposition of *again*, resulting in accommodation or rejection. Strictly speaking, we adopt resolution if it is obvious from the sequence of utterances that (8a) refers to a proposition that *someone bought something for someone else* rather than the literal interpretation. In cases of this kind, what matters is the event of *buying*, and uttering (8a) is interpreted as meaning merely that a *buying* event happened. As a result, (8b) can be regarded as expressing information on the repetition of the same kind of event, and resolution of *bought* alone takes place. Resolution of this kind will be mentioned in section 5, but the main concern in this paper is the literal interpretation of utterances rather than the interpretation which results from ad-hoc semantic bleaching, and thus here we will see cases where accommodation or rejection takes place in interpreting (8b).

Since resolution is the default strategy, the difference in processing strategies above can be considered to stem from the difference in whether there exists a common-ground proposition qualified to serve as the target of resolution. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that resolution is equal to regarding as presupposition a proposition shared by the context and an utterance with *again*, shared propositions of this kind determine whether resolution is chosen or not. Stated differently, characteristics of shared propositions are the primary factor in resolution. Taking this into account, Sato (2018) hypothesizes that what yields the difference of processing strategies is the "informativeness" possessed by shared propositions of this kind. Informativeness here can be replaced with specificity. In fact, the difference among the examples above is the specificity (or abstractness) of the propositions shared by the context, i.e., (6a), (7a), and (8a), and the utterances containing *again*, i.e., (6b), (7b), and (8b). The shared propositions can be ordered as in Figure. 1 in the next page, according to their degree of abstractness. In Figure. 1, the propositions in the higher positions have more specificity than those in the lower positions. The proposition shared by (6a) and (6b) is located in a higher position than the one shared by (7a) and (7b) or the one shared by (8a) and (8b), and the one shared by (7a) and (7b) is in a higher position than the one shared by (8a) and (8b). These facts imply that we can more easily adopt resolution when a shared proposition is specific than when it is abstract. Putting it another way, abstract shared propositions are more likely to cause accommodation or rejection than specific ones. For instance, the proposition shared by (6a) and (6b)—i.e. *John bought a flower for Amy*—is more specific than the one shared by (8a) and (8b)—i.e. *AGENT bought THEME for BENEFACTIVE*—and this lets

us choose resolution more often in interpreting (6b) than in interpreting (8b). In contrast, the latter shared proposition is more abstract than the former one, and this leads us to subconsciously choose accommodation of the ad-hoc presupposition—i.e. *Kent bought a book for Beth*—or rejection more often in (8b) than in (6b).


Figure.1　Hierarchical Structure of Abstractness (Sato 2018: 89)

Sato (2018) states that the requirement of informativeness for establishment as presupposition is harmonized with the idea that what is asserted by the use of *again* is an **unexpected** repetition of a certain event. Hearers assume that the use of *again* comes with a presupposition on an event that is not expected to be repeated according to the parties' belief systems. Therefore they regard a proposition as a presupposition of *again* only if it is not easily inferred that an event of the proposition in question ought to occur repeatedly, or only if the repetition of the event of the proposition is noteworthy enough to bother mentioning. We can reason that, if propositions shared by the context and an utterance with *again* are as specific as *John bought a flower*, then the repetition of the events will usually be regarded as worth verbalizing, thus leading to establishment of the propositions as presuppositions. That is to say, resolution will be chosen in this case. In contrast, if shared propositions are as abstract as *AGENT bought THEME for BENEFACTIVE*, then the repetition of the events will not be worthy of attention, which deprives the propositions

of the right to be presuppositions. In other words, the default strategy, i.e., resolution, will fail, and accommodation or rejection will be subconsciously chosen as an alternative. Considering this logic, the ordinary usage of *again* is harmonized with the hypothesis of informativeness.

In short, according to Sato (2018), the hypothesis on the informativeness, or specificity, of presuppositions entails that specific propositions in the context can be presuppositions of *again* (resolution), and that abstract propositions will not be chosen as presuppositions; rather, hearers will instead create more specific presuppositions without reference to common ground (accommodation) or ignore the term *again* (rejection). This hypothesis can be applied to other presupposition triggers. Below is an example involving *too*. The capitalization of *Kate* means that this word is stressed by the speaker. *Too* requires an item marking a difference from the context (9a), and in this example, the stressed agent *Kate* highlights that the agent in (9b) is different from its counterpart in (9a), *John*. In this paper, items for comparison, like *Kate*, are called focus items, as will be explained later.

(9)   a.   John went to Tokyo.

       b.   As far as I remember, KATE went to Tokyo, too.

The proposition of (9a) will be easily regarded as the presupposition of *too*. Now contrast (9) with (10), where accommodation will be much more likely than in (9).[7]

(10)   a.   John went to Tokyo.

       b.   As far as I remember, KATE went to Kyoto, too.

In (10), what is shared by the context and the utterance that includes *too* is the proposition that *AGENT went somewhere*, which is more abstract than its counterpart in (9), namely the proposition that *AGENT went to Tokyo*. If the hypothesis of the informativeness on presupposition is adopted, here as well, *too* will prevent presuppositions from being semantically vacuous. In this case, to establish an informative presupposition, the hearer of (10b) will not regard the context (10a) as presupposition, and thus will avoid establishing the uninformative presupposition that

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[7] As mentioned above, resolution takes place if some information is semantically bleached. For example, in order for 'compulsory' resolution, (10b) reads *Kate went somewhere*, with ignorance of the concreteness possessed by *to Kyoto*, especially in conversations in which the unfolded topic is *who went somewhere*. The concern of this paper lies within the realm of the interpretations stemming from the hearer's attempt to interpret the speaker's intention in expressing (10b) as written here, and thus interpretation through ad-hoc semantic bleaching will not be the main topic in this paper. However, as an exception, the restitutive usage of a Japanese presupposition trigger *futatabi*, which is accompanied by this kind of interpretation, will be discussed in Section 5, as its analysis will contribute to refining the hypothesis suggested in this paper.

AGENT went somewhere.[8] This sets the stage for the choice of accommodation or rejection. If accommodation is chosen, the hearer will infer the more specific presupposition that *AGENT went to Kyoto*.[9] If rejection is chosen, the trigger *too* will be ignored. As in the cases involving *again*, accommodation and rejection of presuppositions of *too* can be explained by the hypothesis of the informativeness of presuppositions.

Considering its ability to explain accommodation and rejection, one might think that informativeness seems to play a decisive role in accommodation and rejection. In fact, however, it cannot explain every case of accommodation or rejection. Cases exist in which informativeness is **not** a decisive factor, although it might **urge** accommodation or rejection. Now see the example below. The presupposition of *too* in (11b) will be easily gained from resolution, even though the information shared by the context and the utterance that includes *too* seems as abstract as that in (10).

(11) a. Nick went to the park.

b. ROBIN went somewhere, too.

In this example, information shared by the context (11a) and the utterance with *too* (11b) is that *AGENT went somewhere*, namely, the whole proposition of (11b) except for the focus item *Robin* and the trigger *too*.[10] The semantic content of this is the same as that gained from (10). If informativeness were the only factor for resolution, the interpreting strategy for *too*'s presupposition in (11b) would be the same as that in (10b). Concretely, the strategy applied to both (10b) and (11b) would be resolution, or otherwise accommodation or rejection. However, this is not what actually happens. In interpreting (11), the hearer usually regards the quite abstract proposition shared by (11a) and (11b)—i.e. *AGENT went somewhere*—as a presupposition, therefore succeeding in resolution without establishing an ad-hoc presupposition (accommodation) or ignoring the trigger *too* (rejection).

Therefore, the choice of processing strategy is influenced by other factors, as well as informativeness. Here we have to realize that (11) differs from (10) in that the whole proposition except for the trigger *too* and the focus item *Robin* can be found out from the context. It follows that

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[8] Precisely, *AGENT* here refers to *someone other than KATE*, but that is not the point here. What should be noted is the difference between *went to Tokyo* and *went somewhere*.

[9] *Too* in this example demands that a certain item (*Kate*) in the utterance be different from its counterpart in the context, so that the accommodated presupposition will have an abstract agent.

[10] The details of focus items will be explained in the next section. The point is that focus items function for comparison between the events described by utterances carrying triggers and those included in the context. In cases of *again*, time expressions become a focus item and distinguish a presupposition event from an event of a proposition of an utterance containing *again*. In this sense, focus items and triggers do not express presuppositional information in nature. Therefore, focus items, along with triggers, do not have to be considered, as to what information is shared by the context and utterances with triggers.

whether the whole proposition of an utterance with a trigger lies in the context determines the choice of a processing strategy, namely resolution or accommodation/rejection. Then, what needs to be discussed is why the whole proposition of the utterance with a presupposition trigger should be entailed by the context, especially for resolution. As a preparation to clarifying this, the next section sheds light on the focus characteristics of presupposition triggers.

4.   Focus and Presupposition Trigger

Lambrecht (1994) states that every utterance consists of expressions of "focus" and those of "presupposition." Here is an example. Small capital items express focus, which is to be explained here.

(12)   a.   Where did you go last night?

   b.   I went to the MOVIES.

(Lambrecht 1994)

What is asserted by the utterance in (12b) is that *the place I went to last night was the movies*. The subject of this assertion is given, or common ground, as it is verbalized in (12a), while the predicate is new. Therefore, in this example, combining new information with common ground creates an asserted proposition. In utterances with a purpose of sharing information, information combined with topical common ground is called focus, which contributes to making an assertion on the topical common ground; topical common ground verbalized in an utterance is called a presupposition, which is a notion different from "presupposition" defined in (3). At first glance, it appears that the focus might be identified as the "information point" of a sentence,[11] which possesses the greatest concentration of information (Bolinger 1954) or as a message block which the speaker wishes to be interpreted as informative (Halliday 1967). Nevertheless, this explanation would not be accurate. As highlighted by Lambrecht (1994), focus itself does not consist of expressions or words but rather of information. Now, we want to note that the presupposition suggested by Lambrecht (1994) is different from that defined in Stalnaker (2014). For ease of discussion, this paper hereafter refers to the presupposition in Lambrecht (1994) as an "Utterance Presupposition" (U-Presupposition), and to that in Stalnaker (2014) as a "Common Ground Presupposition" (C-Presupposition). In the next page, we can see a similar, but different, example which assists in our understanding of focus and U-presupposition.

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[11] When "sentence," not "utterance," appears in this paper, it refers to an utterance's aspect as a linguistic expression.

(13) a. Where did you go last night, to the movies or to the restaurant?

  b. We went to the RESTAURANT.

(Lambrecht 1994)

The asserted proposition here is that *the place we went to last night was the restaurant*. In this case, both the subject and the predicate of the asserted proposition are common ground, and thus the asserted proposition is created by combining one part of the common ground with other topical parts of the common ground. As can be seen from this example, focus does not need to be new information. Before moving on to the relationship between focus and presupposition trigger, we want to make sure that, in addition to the cases above, there exist cases where an asserted proposition consists only of focus.

(14) a. What happened?

  b. MY CAR BROKE DOWN.

(Lambrecht 1994)

In this case, the asserted proposition does not include parts of common ground,[12] and the whole of the sentence expresses focus. This kind of focus is called "sentence focus." To summarize the discussion by Lambrecht (1994), there are two kinds of utterances: the utterances where common ground plays a role as a U-presupposition, which is combined with focus, and the utterances where only focus exists.

Now, we will see focus-presupposition structures of utterances with presupposition triggers. According to the terminology proposed by Lambrecht (1994), (15b), after the utterance of (15a), has the structure of (15c).[13] What constitutes the information structure in (15c) is **not** the linguistic items themselves but rather the information corresponding to them. *P* below refers to U-presupposition, and *F* to focus.

(15) a. Yesterday, John went to the library.

  b. Today, he went there again.

  c. $[\text{Today}]F_1$ [he went there]P [again]F_2

Here, *again* demands that the repetitive event *he went there* be common ground. Considering that it is common ground, the event information in question serves as the C-presupposition of *again*. When *again* is used, what is asserted by its use is not the C-presupposition but rather its repetition. The C-presupposition is a topic on which repetition is asserted, and thus it constitutes part of the

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[12] Common ground needs to be activated (cf. Chafe 1994) at the point in time.

[13] This information structure is constructed for the default interpretation of resolution.

U-presupposition but not part of the focus, which contributes to making an assertion on a topic.[14] In contrast, *again*, which has the meaning of repetition, is the focus. In addition, the repetition indicated by *again* is, of course, based on two events occurring at **different** points in time. The logical consequence of the use of *again* is the verbal implication or entailment of two points in time. This means that, in (15), F_2 (*again*) comes together with F_1 (*today*), and thus they should be treated as related parts of the focus. Considering this, (15c) can be rewritten as (16).

(16)   [Today]F [he went there]P [again]F

In this paper, items expressing what is logically entailed by the use of presupposition triggers are named "trigger-based focus items," or "focus items" for short. The trigger *again* usually has a trigger-based focus item related to time.[15] In contrast, *too* can have trigger-based focus items of various kinds, because the use of *too* entails comparison of a participant, location, or time of a repetitive event, and focus items are often marked by stress. For example, in (11) above, the focus item is *Robin*, as can be judged from the spoken stress placed on it. Some other presupposition triggers such as *even* have focus items as well.

Note that triggers and trigger-based focus items do not always express what is focus of an utterance. Consider the following example. (17b) is a response to the question (17a).

(17)   a. Did you hear that John went to the library again today?
        b. I know he went there again today.
        c. [I]P_1 [know]F [he went there again today]P_2

In addition to *I*, the proposition *John went to the library again today* in (17b) is now a U-presupposition. However, if attention is paid to the internal information structure of the presupposition itself, we can see that there is a presupposition-focus structure inside the presupposition. F_{INT} is the focus inside the U-presupposition P_2 and P_{INT} is the U-presupposition inside P_2.

(18)   a. I know that he went there again today.
        b. [I]P_1 [know]F [[he went there]P_{INT} [again]F_{INT} [today]F_{INT}]P_2

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[14] It should be stressed that so-called "given" information (cf. Lambrecht 1994), or common ground in this paper, does not always become a U-presupposition. Given information can, in many cases, be the focus of an utterance. What is stated here is that if a proposition that is common ground **is demanded by presupposition triggers**, it is a U-presupposition.

[15] Two different places can indicate that what happens at one place is different from what happens at the other, and thus sometimes places or other items become trigger-based focus items.

Whether they are embedded in a subordinate clause or not, a piece of information that is expressed by presupposition triggers and trigger-based focus items is more foregrounded than certain propositions are, and hence information of this kind should be called a "relative focus," as opposed to a "relative U-presupposition" or a "relative presupposition." In (18b), the unity of *today* and *again* is a relative focus contrasted with relative presupposition, namely, *John went to the library*. In this sense, presupposition triggers and trigger-based focus items can be considered to express what is the relative focus in any utterance. In this section, we have seen that, in utterances with presupposition triggers, the triggers and focus items can be characterized as expressions of focus, and the C-presupposition of the triggers function as U-presuppositions, which are combined with focus for the creation of a message. Even when a sentence containing triggers is embedded in a subordinate clause, the relationship between triggers/focus items and C-presuppositions will be maintained as that between relative focus and relative presuppositions. Next, with reference to the discussion here, we present a revised hypothesis on the choice of accommodation or rejection, which will be a key to identifying why the whole proposition of an utterance with a trigger needs to be in the context for resolution.

5.   Split of Focus and Plurality of Asserted Propositions

This section establishes a new hypothesis on accommodation or rejection by offering an answer to the question stemming from the difference between (10) and (11). This question will be tackled from the perspective of information structures as discussed in section 4. Now, let us consider the information structures of (10b) and (11b). When the hearer of (10b) and (11b) attempts to adopt the default resolution strategy, she subconsciously **adjusts** the scope of *too* to the phrases expressing common ground information, because resolution is an identification of verbalized information in the scope as common ground. The resulting information structures will be represented as (19) and (20), respectively.[16] Here, the elements of the information structures are information, not linguistic expressions.

(19)   (As far as I remember) [KATE]F_1 [went]P [to Kyoto]F_2 [too]F_1

(20)   [ROBIN]F [went somewhere]P [too]F

As mentioned in section 3, (11b) differs from (10b) in that all the parts of the utterance except for the focus item and *too* express common ground information. In attempting to resolve the C-presuppositions of *too*, the hearer first adjusts the scope of the trigger to the phrases expressing

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[16] *As far as I remember* in (10b) plays a role in informing the hearer of the degree of belief in the asserted proposition. In this sense, the expression contributes to the illocutionary act of assertion (cf. Austin 1962, Searle 1979, Vanderveken 1990), but does not constitute part of the asserted proposition. For this reason, this paper regards the expression not as part of the focus.

common ground information in the utterances. Therefore, the C-presupposition part in (10b) is different from that in (11b). As a C-presupposition becomes a U-presupposition, the difference in the range of C-presupposition results in a difference in that of U-presupposition, or in the range of focus. In (20), *Robin* and *too* serve as the focus, and, as *Robin* corresponds to a trigger-based focus item, these two function together as the focus. (19), in contrast, possesses the following elements of focus: *Kate*, *to Kyoto*, and *too*. Like *Robin* in (20), *Kate* corresponds to a trigger-based focus item, and therefore the set of *Kate* and *too* serves as the focus. What causes the difference in the range of focus is the content of the phrase *to Kyoto* in (19). This is not information of a trigger-based focus item, and its being the focus has nothing to do with *Kate* and *too* also being the focus. (19), therefore, suggests that (10b) has two independent elements of focus. This paper calls this phenomenon, i.e., when one utterance contains two unrelated elements of focus, a "split of focus." The split of focus in (19), or (10b), brings about two possible asserted propositions, namely, *in addition to John, Kate went somewhere* and *Kate went to Kyoto*. This plurality of asserted propositions makes it hard to interpret what the intended message is, and (10b) needs to be reinterpreted so that the reinterpreted information structure does **not** contain two independent elements of focus. Then, all that is required of the hearer is the reinterpretation of the scope of *too* from only the phrase expressing the information already in the context (*went*) to the whole of the utterance except for the focus item (*went to Kyoto*) or to no part of the utterance.

This can be rephrased as the switch from resolution strategy (to identify information in the utterance as that of the context) to accommodation (to **pretend** to regard the information of the whole utterance except for the focus item and *too* as common ground) or to rejection (to ignore the trigger). If accommodation takes place, the hearer of (10b) will create an ad-hoc C-presupposition *went to Kyoto*, thereby interpreting this as the U-presupposition[17]. The resulting focus consists of *Kate* and *too*, leading to the only asserted proposition that *in addition to someone else, Kate went to Kyoto*. If rejection takes place, the hearer will ignore *too*, and two other interpretations will be possible. One is that *Kate* and *to Kyoto* constitute a set of focus elements contrasted with the U-presupposition *went*. This interpretation will be accepted if the hearer judges that the event of *going* is the unfolded topic of the conversation, and thinks that the agent and the goal constitute a set of focus elements. This regrouping of the agent and the goal into a set of focus elements cannot be achieved without abandoning *too*, for *too* requires one of the participant expressions as a focus item, conferring the right to express focus on it alone and preventing it and other participants from being a set of focus elements.[18] Again, note that it is hard to interpret that *Kate* and *to Kyoto* serve as individual elements of focus, which causes a split of focus. The other possible interpretation is that (10b) has sentence focus. In this interpretation, *went* in (10b) does not have a connection with that in (10a) in that the presence of *went* in (10a) does not motivate the use of *went* in (10b), and *went* in (10b) is a constituent of the focus. In short, in both cases of accommodation and rejection,

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[17] If accommodation is adopted, *went* in *went to Kyoto* is not identified as *went* in (10a). The whole of *went to Kyoto* is an ad-hoc C-presupposition created by the hearer.

[18] If *to Kyoto* is interpreted as referring merely to *somewhere*, there will not be a split of focus.

split of focus can be avoided. Considering this explanation of the difference between (19) and (20), split of focus will be the decisive factor in accommodation or rejection.

It seems hard, though, to apply this explanation upon adopting either accommodation or rejection as opposed to resolution to utterances like (21b), which follows (21a). In (21b), if the hearer tries to adopt resolution and subconsciously adjusts the scope of *again* to linguistic items expressing common ground information, the scope will be *cooked a rice bowl in Japan*, which verbalizes C-presupposition, and therefore U-presupposition. This simultaneously means that *Mike* is not inside the scope of *again*, such that *Mike* and *again* seem to cause split of focus. If so, accommodation or rejection should be adopted, but in practice, resolution will be adopted, possibly without hesitation. We can easily interpret the utterance as meaning that, *besides John, Mike cooked a rice bowl in Japan*, resulting from identifying *cooked a rice bowl in Japan* in (21b) as the counterpart to that in (21a), i.e., by adopting resolution without split of focus.

(21) a. Last year, John cooked a rice bowl in Japan.
      b. This year, Mike cooked a rice bowl in Japan again.

Here it should be doubted that *Mike* and *again* individually express focus. When *again* is in an utterance, trigger-based focus items usually mark a point in time. This, as mentioned above, is because repetitive events necessarily happen at different points in time, and because the verbalization of two different points in time ensures that the two repetitive events are **not** identified with each other. Now what should be realized is that repetition of events can be accompanied by a difference in participants as well as a difference in occurrence time. This is exemplified by the difference between (21a) and (21b). The event of (21a) has *John* as an agent, while that of (21b) has *Mike*. This kind of uniqueness to one event at a certain time provides the expression of the unique participant in question with the ability to serve as a trigger-based focus item, especially if it is regarded as an **essential marker** of the difference between two events instead of time expressions that serve as default markers, or in some cases along with time expressions. In the case of (21b), *Mike*, along with time expressions, clearly informs hearers that the event of (21b) is different from that of (21a), and thus *Mike* should be regarded as a trigger-based focus item. Considering this, (21) does not make a good counterexample against the hypothesis of split of focus. Note that, in utterances like that in (8b), accommodation or rejection usually takes place. Many of the event participants in (8a) are different from their counterparts in (8b). Even if one of several expressions about participants like the agent *Kent* is regarded as a trigger-based focus item, the existence of the rest demands a plurality of asserted propositions as seen in (10b). Therefore, it is quite hard to adopt resolution in such a case.

Next, we want to consider the so-called restitutive usage of *again* (cf. Beck 2007), because this phenomenon offers a means of scrutinizing the condition of split of focus. (22) and (23) are examples using the Japanese presupposition trigger *futatabi*, which corresponds to *again* in

English.

(22) *Kyonen Taroo-wa Tookyoo-o deta. Kotosi   kare-wa futatabi Tookyoo-o deta.*
      last.year Taro-ᴛᴏᴘ Tokyo-ᴀᴄᴄ left   this.year he-ᴛᴏᴘ   again   Tokyo-ᴀᴄᴄ left
      "Last year, Taro left Tokyo. This year, he left Tokyo again."

(23) *Kyonen Taroo-wa Tookyoo-o deta. Kotosi   kare-wa futatabi Tookyoo-ni modotte kita.*
      last.year Taro-ᴛᴏᴘ Tokyo-ᴀᴄᴄ left   this.year he-ᴛᴏᴘ   again   Tokyo-ʟᴏᴄ back   came
      "Last year, Taro left Tokyo. This year, he came back to Tokyo again."

Futatabi in (22) is used to mark repetition of a certain event. In this example, what was repeated is *Taro leaves Tokyo*. This usage is called "repetitive." In contrast, although it can be interpreted as repetitive, *futatabi* in (23) can also be interpreted as marking a backward transition to a certain situation shared by the speaker and the hearer rather than a repetition of the whole described event; in this interpretation, it is implied that the common ground situation *Taro is in Tokyo* has happened two or more times. This usage is referred to as "restitutive."[19] By interpreting *futatabi* in (23) as restitutive, (23) suggests that the event *Taro comes back to Tokyo* was **not** repeated.

Here, the information structure of the restitutive usage of *futatabi* is the topic to be discussed. In (23), the scope of *futatabi* is *Taro was in Tokyo*, which is not verbalized in the utterance with *futatabi* but is included in the event of *Taro came back to Tokyo*, while the motion part of *came back to Tokyo* does not lie within the scope of *futatabi* especially in the restitutive interpretation. Then, *Taro was in Tokyo* is a C-presupposition, which makes it also a U-presupposition. The trigger *futatabi* and the focus item *this year* jointly express the focus. The problem here is the motion part of *came back to Tokyo*, which lies outside the scope of *futatabi*. This seems to cause split of focus, which leads to giving up on resolution (trying to identify information in the utterance as that in the context) and adopting either accommodation (treating the proposition described by the whole utterance except for the focus item and the trigger as common ground, and regarding only information of the trigger and the focus item as the focus) or rejection (ignoring the trigger). In practice, however, the hearer does not abandon resolution in interpreting *futatabi* in (23) as restitutive. Without split of focus, the hearer of (23) can easily understand that what happened twice was *Taro is in Tokyo*, and can leave the motion part of *came back to Tokyo* outside the scope of *futatabi*.

Then, in order to reveal why split of focus does not occur in (23), we need to clarify the difference between *to Kyoto* in (10) and *came back to Tokyo* in (23), that is to say, between the

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[19] This paper discusses a prototypical example of the restitutive usage; that is, an example that can be interpreted as meaning that **common ground** situation has happened two or more times. As will be mentioned below, resolution easily takes place in examples of this kind, although they include new information. To develop the hypothesis of split of focus, this paper scrutinizes the prototypical example, and for the same reason, cases will not be discussed in which no information in an utterance containing restitutive *futatabi* is common ground.

expression that causes split of focus and the one that does not. One obvious difference between them is in relation to the context. *To Kyoto* cannot be inferred from *to Tokyo* in the context, nor can *to Tokyo* be inferred from *to Kyoto*, whereas *came back to Tokyo* in (23) refers to an event logically entailing the resulting situation *was in Tokyo*, which is already common ground when *came back to Tokyo* is understood.[20] In this sense, whereas both *to Kyoto* and *came back to Tokyo* express new information in the conversation, only the latter simultaneously refers to information that is already common ground at that time. This fact provides us with an insight into why the unity of the trigger *futatabi* and the focus item *this year* does not compete with the motion part of *came back to Tokyo* for the role of focus, resulting in no split of focus. One possible reason is that participants in the conversation realize that the speaker intends to share with them, by using the expression *came back to Tokyo*, that the common ground situation of *is in Tokyo* happened twice (repetition on common ground information), and that the motion part of *came back to Tokyo* (new information) is not to be communicated. In other words, it is recognized in the conversation that the speaker refers to common ground information by an expression referring to information that consists of common ground information and new information. Of course if the speaker wants to express a backward transition to a situation already in the context, it seems reasonable for the speaker simply to express this by saying that *kotosi Taroo-wa futatabi Tookyoo-ni ita*, meaning *this year Taro was in Tokyo again*. However, the Japanese term *futatabi* requires the scope to be a dynamic event, not a situation. This semantic restriction justifies the verbalization of a dynamic event to communicate a situation. For this reason, participants in the conversation accept *came back to Tokyo* as expressing *was in Tokyo*, which in turn gives a clear explanation on why split of focus does not occur. The utterance of (23) does not possess two individual elements of focus. Stated differently, the motion part of *came back to Tokyo* does not serve as the focus of the utterance.[21] Therefore, the hearer can adopt resolution as opposed to accommodation or rejection.[22]

This explanation is harmonized with the idea that (10b) causes split of focus. One might think that, if common ground information that constitutes part of information carried by a new linguistic item prevents split of focus, information shared by the context and an utterance containing a trigger

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[20] Already shared information here is different from information found out only for understanding utterances involving triggers, e.g., *went somewhere* shared by *John went to Tokyo* and *Kate went to Kyoto, too*. Note that, if *to Tokyo* in (10a) is commonly understood as *somewhere* for some reason, *went somewhere* will be the already shared information in question. Then, (10b) will be easily regarded as meaning that *KATE went somewhere, too*, resulting in resolution.

[21] This does not entail that this kind of information is ignored, because it is possible that information of this kind will be treated as C-presupposition or U-presupposition in the following phases of the conversation. Therefore, someone might want to treat it as a kind of focus. In order to distinguish this from what is called focus in this paper, it may be more appropriate to term the latter kind of focus the "main focus."

[22] The analysis so far can be applied to other triggers such as the English terms *again*, *too*, and *even*. Of course, the semantic restriction seen in *futatabi* may not be seen in other triggers, and other factors may encourage the use of expressions referring **partially** to new information to mean common ground information, not the new information in question.

such as *too*, e.g. *went somewhere* shared by *went to Tokyo* and *went to Kyoto*, would prevent split of focus, too, because information of this kind should be regarded as a kind of common ground. However, as mentioned above, split of focus **does** occur in this case. Information of this kind is not included in the set of information that has been activated (cf. Chafe 1994) before in the conversation, and thus participants in the conversation do not regard it as the **potential basis** for asserting something else. Therefore, even if a new item partially refers information that can be, at the time of the utterance of the item, found out in what preceding expressions mean, it cannot be interpreted as used to mean the information in question. That is to say, what **has been** common ground can function as the basis for following assertions, whereas what **has become** common ground cannot be the basis for the assertion through which it has become common ground.

Note that, information of this kind can be the basis for the utterance and the new information part referred to by the new item does not cause split of focus if antecedent utterances are interpreted as meaning what serves as the basis for utterances involving triggers. For example, if the hear of (10a) believes that it means that *John went somewhere* rather than the more concrete proposition *John went to Tokyo*, *went somewhere* has been common ground when she hears (10b). In case the antecedent utterance is originally based on the topic *went somewhere*, (10b) can easily be regarded as meaning *Kate went somewhere, too*, followed by the adoption of resolution. Likewise, split of focus does not occur if it is **possible** to reinterpret what the discussion has been on. If the hearer of (10b) can reinterpret (10a) as meaning *John went somewhere*, it can be, on the spot, regarded as what has been common ground, and the hearer can adopt resolution without confusion with regard to what the speaker really intends to assert. For this to be realized, it needs to be natural that (10a) means *John went somewhere*, and thus if, as a result of reflecting on how the discourse came to (10a), the hearer feels awkward with this reinterpretation, it cannot be realized.

Now we can refine the explanation of the condition on split of focus, with reference to this analysis of the restitutive usage of *futatabi*. In the interpretation of the default resolution strategy, if, in addition to a presupposition trigger and focus items, an utterance contains items expressing new information, the hearer can identify several individual elements of focus. This is what has been called split of focus in this paper. Split of focus attaches an utterance with several possible asserted propositions, causing confusion with regard to the speaker's intentions. Therefore, the hearer is likely to give up on resolution and adopt accommodation or rejection as an alternative. This is why a split of focus leads to accommodation or rejection. As mentioned earlier, in utterances with presupposition triggers, if items expressing new information partially refer to already shared information, the hearer recognizes that the intention behind the usage of these items is to refer to the shared information, and therefore she does not regard them as expressing what is called focus in this paper. This means that, in such cases, split of focus does not occur, and the hearer adopts the strategy of resolution. Summing up the details of the hypothesis suggested here, split of focus in utterances with triggers, which results in accommodation or rejection, occurs only if there are new items other than the triggers and focus items, and if the items in question do not

refer to common ground information at all. This hypothesis of split of focus, whose coverage of phenomena is larger than that of the hypothesis of informativeness as described in section 3, explains the mechanism whereby accommodation or rejection takes place.

6.   Conclusion

This paper has suggested a new hypothesis on hearers' switch from the default resolution strategy to accommodation or rejection strategy, especially in interpreting an utterance with a trigger such as *again*. Accommodation or rejection usually takes place if the whole information expressed by an utterance with a presupposition trigger is unfamiliar to the hearer, but this is not the only situation in which it can occur. Even if some parts of the information referred to in an utterances can be identified from information in the context, such utterances can sometimes be interpreted more easily by the processing strategy of accommodation or rejection than by the default strategy of resolution. Sato (2018) mentions the possibility that informativeness determines whether a hearer will adopt resolution or accommodation/rejection. If what can be found out in the context as a candidate for C-presupposition is abstract, or uninformative, asserting a repetition of it does not contribute to information exchange, which is the purpose of the assertion. This causes a switch in processing strategy from resolution to accommodation or rejection.

There are some examples, however, that this hypothesis on informativeness cannot explain. Therefore, this paper has asserted, from the perspective of information structure as proposed by Lambrecht (1994), that when new information other than presupposition triggers and focus items is included in the utterance, split of focus occurs unless the new information in question consists of new parts (e.g. motion part of *came back to Tokyo* in (23)) and given parts already in the context (e.g. *was in Tokyo* in (23)). Split of focus allows there to be several possible asserted propositions, which makes it hard to understand what the message intended by the speaker really is. As a result, the need to reinterpret the information structure arises. This need is satisfied by regrouping the C-presupposition, i.e., by pretending to think of the information in the whole utterance except for the trigger and the focus item as common ground and adjusting the scope of the trigger to the phrases expressing the newly established common ground. This is the pattern of the switch from resolution to accommodation. The need for the reinterpretation of the information structure can be satisfied in another way as well. If the trigger is ignored, the utterance can be interpreted as having the former U-presupposition and a new focus consisting of formerly-individual focus elements. In addition, if rejection is adopted, the utterance can be regarded as having a sentence focus. A sensible interpretation of the utterance's focus is thus possible. This is the pattern of the switch from resolution to rejection. In both cases, split of focus is the decisive factor in abandoning the strategy of resolution. In order to create a comprehensive model of the mechanism whereby processing strategy for presupposition triggers is subconsciously chosen, the hypothesis of split of focus needs to be combined with hypotheses on what serves as a factor for choosing between accommodation and rejection. The resulting model will be capable of serving as the basis for

future research grounded in quantitative verification.

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