

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), the philosopher, is known for his views on intersubjectivity (Intersubjektivität), that is, the community of subjects or the attributes that subjects endow to the shared world. The theory of intersubjectivity apparently develops into ethics, but in his published works, at least, no obvious connection is seen between them. Therefore, I attempt to find the cause for the apparent disconnection and clarify the ethical implications of his theory of intersubjectivity, using the manuscripts that remained unpublished in his life.

Chapter 1 “Monologue” in the 1st Edition of *Logical Investigations*

First, I explain the role of “monologue” as defined in the 1st edition of *Logical Investigations* (*LI*; 1900/01). The *LI* program describes how logical concepts are recognized according to the sense-giving act (i.e., the act that attributes sense to a word and relates it to an object through that sense). To emphasize the sense-giving act, Husserl omits the irrelevant function of language (intimating function) and the irrelevant quality of the act (non-objectifying act). Intimation (Kundgabe) refers to the function of manifesting the lived experience of a sender of signs to a receiver, and the non-objectifying act is an act founded on another act (representation, perception, judgment, etc.) that has an original object. Both the intimating function and the non-objectifying act are essential for communication. Therefore, a speech act without them is characterized as a “monologue.”

Chapter 2 Husserl's Ethics before the Rewrite of *Logical Investigations*

In the lectures on ethics by Husserl at Göttingen University (1908/09, 11, 14), he presents a plan of ethics based on the formal theories of value and practice. There, he considers non-objectifying acts, especially those founded on value and normative judgments, but does not consider their role in communication. Thus, his view on ethics in this period cannot explain the fact that norms are imposed by the other person too in communication, whereas he considers only the norms that one imposes by selecting the best choice in one's practical realm. Therefore, in view of such a limitation, Husserl's ethics remains as the theory of ethics, without consideration of others' norms.

Chapter 3 Husserl's Theory of Intersubjectivity before the Rewrite of *Logical Investigations*

In this chapter, I switch from Husserl's ethics to the theory of intersubjectivity that he developed in the same period. Husserl tries to incorporate the concept of "intimation," which he adopted from the Brentano school, into his theory of intersubjectivity. Intimation (Kundgabe) and the receipt of intimation (Kundnahme) are both considered in his theory of intersubjectivity. Remarkably, the extension of the concept of "empathy" (Einfühlung), borrowed from Theodor Lipps, and that of the concept of "receipt of intimation" were the same at first. However, in his lecture, "the fundamental problem of phenomenology" (1910/11), his definition of "empathy" is confined to the experience of others' living bodies. On the contrary, Husserl calls the concrete transcendental subject "monad" and develops a kind of monadology as a theory of relations between monads. Thus, his theory of intersubjectivity consists of two parts: the theory of empathy and monadology. Here, the experience of others (Fremderfahrung) in general narrows down to the experience of others' living bodies. Thus, there is no room to handle the experience of others in social practices. Such a restricted theory of intersubjectivity, therefore, lacks an ethical aspect.

Chapter 4 "Communication" in the Rewrite of *Logical Investigations*

There is a disconnection between Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity and ethics based on the influence of *LI*. However, Husserl leaves unpublished texts for rewriting *LI* in which he attempts to present a new framework to deal with communicative expressions. Therefore, I examine these texts in this chapter and seek clues from them to reconstruct Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity. I focus especially on the 6th Investigation of *LI*, for which he had planned a radical rewriting because his views on the non-objectifying act had changed. From this changed perspective, he had to consider not only declarative sentences (expressions of objectifying acts), but also other types of sentences (expressions of non-objectifying acts) that play an important role in communication. Therefore, he could no longer discard communicative expressions, and hence describes them from the viewpoints of both the sender and the receiver. This new approach enabled him to handle any type of sentence considered an expression of a non-objectifying act and intimation in communication. Thereby, the methodological restrictions imposed in the 1st edition of *LI* are completely removed. Such changes are, however, deviations from the original program of *LI*, and hence, their results are not clearly seen in the 2nd edition of the 6th Investigation of *LI*, but are evident in the theory of the experience of others, thereafter.

Chapter 5 Development of the theory of the experience of others

It can be inferred from related texts that Husserl distinguishes three types of experiences:

empathy (Einfühlung), understanding (Einverstehen), and receipt of the addressal (Aufnahme der Anrede). Understanding involves attributing the thoughts intimated in the expressions to a sender, and receipt of addressal refers to the act of receiving intimation of another's intention to communicate something. Based on this interpretation, I trace the development of Husserl's theory of experience of others to around 1921, when he planned a "big systematic work." In some manuscripts for this plan, Husserl tries to describe the modes of our body and our world in every kind of experience of others. The role of the body in empathy is to be the medium of unintentional intimations, and the place where such bodies coexist is the natural world. On the other hand, the role of the body in understanding is the medium of intentional intimations, and the place where such bodies communicate with each other is the social world. However, in this framework, it is difficult to explain "receipt of addressal," which lies between empathy and understanding. A communicative intention (an intention to communicate something) and its receipt make possible a transition from the natural to the social world, but such a receipt is not yet clear enough.

Chapter 6 Arrival point of the theory of the experience of others

In this chapter, I proceed to the theory of the experience of others proposed in Husserl's latter days and clarify his ideas on understanding and receipt of addressal, which are not referred to in *Cartesian Meditations* (1931). Especially in a manuscript titled "Phenomenology of the community of communication" (Phänomenologie der Mitteilungsgemeinschaft), Husserl describes the transition from a community of empathy to a community of communication and focuses on the receipt of addressal, which plays an important role in this transition. In the community of empathy, I may notice the existence of another (alter ego), but to regard "another" as "you" requires a kind of experience other than empathy. In the course of the manuscript, it becomes the act of "listen[ing] to" (zuhören) the addressal of another subject, although one cannot understand the meaning of the other's expression.

Chapter 7 Connecting Husserl's Theory of Intersubjectivity and Ethics

In this chapter, I try to connect Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity to ethics in two ways. First, the theory of the receipt of addressal can be understood as a complement to his theory of ethics because in his latter days, he began to consider the social aspects of our human practices, although he could not develop it sufficiently. Using the results of the theory of experiences of others, the gap between individual life and social life can be bridged. Second, Husserl's theory of the receipt of addressal can be compared with the phenomenological ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, because both

try to describe the experience wherein “you” and “I” initially form a social relationship. Understanding both theories as alternatives to clarify such a fundamental relationship, we can evaluate the ethical significance of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity in a wider context.