

## PREVENTION MEASURES AGAINST RECURRENCE OF ARMED CONFLICT: THE BAWKU CONFLICT IN NORTHERN GHANA

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**ABSTRACT** Ghana has a reputation as a peaceful country, nevertheless has experienced pockets of violent ethnic conflicts. The Bawku inter-ethnic conflict between the Kusasi and Mamprusi people has been characterized by recurrence of armed conflict surrounding the chieftaincy. This paper examines the prevention measures initiated in Bawku by stakeholders at different levels, namely, the state agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and community representatives as to (i) what kind of prevention measures were implemented, and (ii) which organizations initiated them. The idea of direct and structural prevention measures is applied for analysis. Mediations and security provisions among other measures were initiated by the state agencies to settle farmland issues to avoid court litigations. An early warning system and negotiations were implemented by the NGOs to detect and monitor signs of potential armed clashes. An alert call system was one of many measures initiated by the community representatives to investigate rumors of planned attacks on festivities. State agencies, NGOs, and community representatives as stakeholders have aimed to curb potential armed clashes at an early stage to sustain peace. They envisage further engagements towards resolving the Bawku conflict.

**Key Words:** Conflict prevention; State; Non-governmental organizations; Bawku community; Ghana.

### INTRODUCTION

Ghana is known for its functioning democracy (Danso & Osei-Tutu, 2015). Conflicts, however, periodically have occurred in parts of Ghana for various reasons, for example, over chieftaincy succession, ethnic identity, religion between Christians and Muslims, and land (Bukari, 2013b; Kendie et al., 2014). These conflicts are inevitably ethnic conflicts, and have proved difficult for the state, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the community itself to resolve because armed clashes are recurrent (Tsikata & Seini, 2004).

The Bawku inter-ethnic conflict between the Kusasi and Mamprusi people in Northern Ghana emerged in the year 1931 (Bombande, 2007), and a history of violent armed recurrences ensued over the claim for chieftaincy (Bukari, 2013b; Kendie et al., 2014). Conflict-resolution attempts were implemented by the state, NGOs, and community to resolve the conflict (Bukari, 2013b; Kendie et al., 2014). However, none of the attempts have been completely successful in resolving the conflict (Bukari, 2013b; Kendie et al., 2014). The Bawku conflict has never been declared over, and the parties mentioned above are still making efforts to find amicable ways to resolve it (Awedoba, 2009; Bukari, 2013a; Kendie et al., 2014).

Studies have been carried out on the Bawku conflict (Awedoba, 2009; Bukari, 2013a; Kendie et al., 2014), but analyses of prevention measures and outcome have been missing (Awedoba, 2009; Bukari, 2013a; Kendie et al., 2014). This paper will study the prevention measures, such as the early warning system and alert call system, initiated by stakeholders at different levels to detect, monitor, and curb potential recurrences of armed violence and ask (i) what kind of prevention measures were implemented and (ii) which stakeholders

initiated them against the recurrence of armed conflict in Bawku.

The organization of this paper consists of seven sections. After the introduction, the second section explains the objective, methods, and data collection. The third section briefly describes the profile of Bawku and the history of the conflicted chieftaincy. The fourth section describes the history of armed clashes in Bawku and attempts made to manage and resolve the conflict. The fifth section examines the prevention measures in Bawku based on the author's fieldwork conducted there. The sixth section analyzes the prevention measures, followed by conclusion.

## OBJECTIVE AND METHODS

### I. Objective

This paper examines the various prevention measures against the recurrence of violent armed conflict in Bawku. State agencies, NGOs, and community representatives will be the stakeholders discussed in this paper. Although the literature (i.e., Awedoba, 2009; Bukari, 2013a; Kendie et al., 2014) has investigated the root causes of the Bawku conflict, the key novelty of this paper is in introducing the idea of direct and structural prevention measures in the realm of conflict prevention.

### II. Methods

#### *1. Method of analysis*

This study adopts the idea of direct and structural prevention measures, the two categories of conflict prevention as introduced by Ramsbotham et al. (2016). This paper applies the idea to analyze (i) which of the prevention measures initiated in Bawku were either direct or structural and (ii) which of the measures were initiated by the state agencies, NGOs, and community representatives against potential violence. The term, conflict prevention, in this paper denotes measures to inhibit actions that can lead to deadly violence (Zartman, 2015: 6).

Factors that contribute to prevent violence include: (i) investigating incidents to clarify the parties involved and what actually happened; (ii) counteracting rumors to correct misunderstandings and malicious reports; (iii) facilitating dialogue among the parties; (iv) shuttling negotiations between opposing parties; and (v) building confidence and trust (Fisher et al., 2000).

There are two categories of prevention, namely direct and structural prevention. Direct prevention deals with measures that are "aimed at preventing short-term, often imminent, escalation of a potential conflict" which is associated with armed violence (Swanstrom & Weissman, 2005: 19; Ramsbotham et al., 2016). Examples of direct prevention measures are conciliation, mediation, and negotiation (Ramsbotham et al., 2016).

In contrast, structural prevention focuses "on more long-term measures that address the underlying causes of a potential conflict along with potentially escalating and triggering factors" (Swanstrom & Weissman, 2005: 19). Increased political participation, economic development, opportunities for adequate political and economic inclusiveness, among others, are examples of structural prevention mechanisms (Swanstrom & Weissman, 2005; Ramsbotham et al., 2016).

Implementing direct and structural prevention measures involves multiple parties that include the government agencies, NGOs, and community organizers as stakeholders (Fisher et al., 2000). Again, the stakeholders for this paper are classified into three categories: state

agencies, NGOs, and community representatives.

## 2. Data collection

This paper is based on fieldwork conducted by the author in Ghana and specifically Bawku from August to October 2019, with the aid of a research assistant. The assistant was a lecturer at the University of Development Studies (UDS), and a native of Tamale in Northern Ghana, with first-hand knowledge of Bawku town.

Among the multiple stakeholders involved in preventing violent conflict, key informants were first identified within the stakeholder categories through personal contact. Primary sources of data were collected through semi-structured interviews. Stakeholders grouped into three categories were: (i) state agencies, namely, the National Peace Council (NPC) and the Bawku Police; (ii) NGOs, namely, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and Belim Wusa Development Agency (BEWDA); and (iii) community representatives, namely, the *Bawku Naba* with his elders and Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee (BIEPC) members. The respondents were all senior officials occupying managerial positions in their organizations.

In total, 22 key informants were identified: 1 senior officer each from the state agencies, 1 official each from the NGOs, and 18 community representatives comprising the *Bawku Naba* with his 15 elders and 2 officials of the BIEPC members. Secondary sources of information were collected through academic literature such as journals and published articles.

## PROFILE OF BAWKU AND HISTORY OF THE CHIEFTAINCY CONFLICT

### I. Profile of Bawku

Bawku is the administrative capital in the Bawku Municipal District, Upper East Region, in Northern Ghana. According to the Ghana Statistical Service's (GSS) *Population and Housing Census Final Results Report* conducted in 2010, the Upper East Region has a population of about 1,046,545 (GSS, 2012a; 2014) representing 4.2% of Ghana's population (GSS, 2012b). Bawku municipality has a population of about 98,538 inhabitants and a total land area of 247.23720 km<sup>2</sup> (GSS, 2014). Governance in the municipality is represented by both the local government authority and the traditional authority. The local government authority is represented by the Bawku Municipal Assembly (BMA), and the traditional authority is represented by the Bawku Traditional Council under the leadership of the *Bawku Naba* (chief of Bawku) with 23 sub-chiefs under his authority (GSS, 2014). The *Bawku Naba* title is currently held by Naba Abugrago Azoka II, a Kusasi. His jurisdiction, his authority to rule, covers the entire area of the Bawku Municipal District, and he is also the leader of the Bawku Traditional Council (GSS, 2014).

Agriculture is the major occupation of the people in Bawku, representing 47.0% (GSS, 2014). People grow millet, sorghum, maize, rice, groundnuts, and cash crops such as onions, tomatoes, and soya beans (GSS, 2014). Livestock and poultry production is common in the area with goats, sheep, pigs, cattle, and guinea fowls (GSS, 2014). Bawku town is noted for its commercial activities through trade in foodstuffs such as sweet potatoes and watermelon, manufactured goods, and livestock (GSS, 2014). Trade is conducted by use of donkey carts traveling to Burkina Faso, Northern Togo, Mali, and Niger on market days, due to the proximity of these neighboring states (GSS, 2014).

There are many ethnic groups in the municipality: the Kusasi, Mamprusi, Bissa, Hausa,

Bimoba, Dagomba, and Mossi people. The Kusasi and Mamprusi fall under the Mole Dagbane ethnic group, representing 74.7% (750,205) of the total population in the Upper East Region (Kendie et al., 2014). The exact populations of the Kusasi and Mamprusi are not known, but it is believed the Kusasi are the majority and Mamprusi the minority (GSS, 2014). The Kusasi speak the Kusal language and believe in the *Tendaana* earth priests who serve as the intermediary between their people and the gods of their ancestors (Awedoba, 2009). They celebrate the *Samanpiid* festival annually in December, expressing their gratitude to the gods of the land for a good bumper harvest year (GSS, 2014). The Mamprusi people speak the Mampruli language (Brukum, 2007). Most of the Mamprusi believe in smaller gods while some also believe in Christianity. They celebrate the Damba Festival<sup>(1)</sup> between July and August to commemorate the birth of the prophet Mohammed.

## II. History of the Chieftaincy Conflict

Chieftaincy is a traditional institution in the Ghanaian state (Adjei, 2015). According to the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, Article 277, a chief is “a person who, hailing from appropriate family lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage.”

The first *Bawku Naba*, Prince Ali was the son of the Nayiri (the title name given to the Mamprusi king), who in 1721 was enskinned as chief of Bawku by the Nayiri (Awedoba, 2009; Bukari, 2013a). Prince Ali was tasked by the Nayiri to establish military outposts in six Kusasi localities, namely Bawku, Binduri, Teshie, Sinibaga, Tanga, and Warikambo, to guard the trade routes for the Mamprusi traders in Nalerigu, Tenkudugou in Burkina Faso, and Gambaga towns against Kusasi bandits (Awedoba, 2009).

The Nayiri in Nalerigu (a town in northwest Northern Ghana), was instrumental in the installation of Mamprusi chiefs at Bawku in 1931 (Awedoba, 2009; Bukari, 2013a). The Kusasi people, who claim they were the first to settle in Bawku, had only the *Tendaanas* earth priests as their leaders (Bukari, 2013a). The Kusasi thus came under the authority of the Mamprusi chiefs after 1931 (Awedoba, 2009).

The British colonial authorities in Ghana practiced indirect rule and needed administrative aides to assist them; hence they appointed the Mamprusi chiefs to these posts in Bawku (Awedoba, 2009). In 1931, the British made the *Bawku Naba*, a Mamprusi then chief of Bawku, the paramount chief, thereby elevating the importance of the chiefship in Bawku (Awedoba, 2009). Historical narratives have it that the Mamprusi chiefs suppressed the Kusasi people who took up arms in 1957 to fight for liberation and the right to choose their *Bawku Naba* (Awedoba, 2009). The Kusasi people believed that a Mamprusi *Bawku Naba* and his sub-chiefs were imposed on them only by the colonial authority for administrative purposes (Awedoba, 2009), and they went ahead to appoint their own *Bawku Naba* (*Naba Abugrago Azoka*) in the same year (Bombande, 2007).

Disruption ensued immediately in 1957 over the situation of having two people as *Bawku Naba* which “led to some disturbances and intensified the claim over” the chieftaincy by the Kusasi and Mamprusi people (Bukari, 2013a: 30). The Opoku-Afari Committee was set up in the same year by then Governor General Lord Listowel to investigate the cause of the disturbances, and the committee ruled that the Kusasi *Bawku Naba* was legitimate in accordance with Kusasi tradition (Bukari, 2013b). The committee also concluded that installing a Mamprusi as the *Bawku Naba* was undemocratic and dictatorial (Bukari, 2013b). The Mamprusi elders in the same year (i.e., 1957) then filed a writ at the divisional court to overturn the decision by the Opoku-Afari Committee and won, but, following independence,

President Kwame Nkrumah never recognized the legitimacy of the Mamprusi as *Bawku Naba* (Bombande, 2007). This incident infuriated the Mamprusi and resulted in antagonism between them and the Kusasi (Bombande, 2007; Awedoba, 2009).

In 1958, the Kusasi people regained the chieftaincy after they contested a divisional court ruling at the Appeals Court that upheld the decision of the then Governor General (Bukari, 2013b). After President Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup in 1966, the Chieftaincy Amendment Decree 112 was implemented by the National Liberation Council (NLC). A Mamprusi became the *Bawku Naba*, who reigned until 1980 (Bombande, 2007). In 1981, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) overthrew the NLC in a coup and replaced the NLC Decree 112 with PNDC Law 75, namely Chieftaincy Restoration Law (Awedoba, 2009), which restored a Kusasi to *Bawku Naba*, whose lineage has ruled Bawku to the present time (Bukari, 2013a).

The *Bawku Naba* is currently a Kusasi entitled Naba Abugrago Azoka II, who is also the paramount chief of all sub-chiefs in Bawku (Awedoba, 2009). He enjoys prestige, pomp and benefits from visits by businesses, government dignitaries, politicians, and ordinary individuals, and all courtesies that come with being the chief in Bawku (Awedoba, 2009). The *Bawku Naba* also controls all the agricultural land (Kendie et al., 2014) and has a say in the political appointments of local government representatives (Bukari, 2013a).

## HISTORY OF RECURRENT ARMED CLASHES IN BAWKU AND ATTEMPTS MADE TO MANAGE AND RESOLVE THE CONFLICT

### I. Recurrence of Armed Clashes in Bawku

The events of 1981 according to Bukari (2013a) and Awedoba (2009) lead to armed clashes between the Kusasi and Mamprusi people in 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. However, details regarding the trigger events, casualties, and resolution attempts are not clear. Kendie et al. (2014) analyzed the causes of the conflict as being primarily the chieftaincy and the quest to control the agricultural land in Bawku. In December 2000, there were violent armed clashes recorded in Bawku, triggered by contested election results between the Kusasi and Mamprusi, affiliated with the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP), respectively (Bukari, 2013a).

The counting of ballots after local elections prompted disagreements over the results between the NDC and NPP followers that increasingly escalated (Lund, 2003). A shoot-out between the Kusasi and Mamprusi resulted in the death of 68 people and 200 houses burnt, with an estimated 2,500 people internally displaced (Lund, 2003).

In 2001, another violent armed clash between the two groups was triggered when a mini-shop belonging to a Mamprusi was burnt down, allegedly by some Kusasi youth, where three people were killed.<sup>(2)</sup> A retaliatory attack by Mamprusi youth on a Kusasi mini-shop took the lives of 18 people, wounded 21, and over 30 houses were burnt (Kendie et al., 2014).

In 2007, the Mamprusi provoked the Kusasi people during the *Samanpiid* festival. Some Mamprusi youths yelled at the Kusasi people, insinuating that Mamprusi people were the original rulers of Bawku. This incident led to armed clashes, but the number of casualties was never made clear.<sup>(3)</sup>

In 2008, arguments over the chieftaincy between the Kusasi and Mamprusi triggered violence, resulting in the burning of 104 houses, injuring 16 people, and the death of 8 people. Armed clashes over the chieftaincy continued and in 2008 resulted in 23 houses burnt and 3 people injured (Kendie et al., 2014). Then, armed violence in 2009, also over the chieftaincy,

resulted in the death of five people (Kendie et al., 2014).

## II. Attempts made to Manage and Resolve the Conflict

The Ghanaian central state remains the central focal point with regards to resolving the conflict (Lund, 2003). Kendie et al. (2014) posited that peace efforts focusing on curfews implemented by the state security forces were somewhat efficient. Two notable state agencies are the National Peace Council (NPC) and the Bawku Police. The NPC was established in 2009 by the government of Ghana and was tasked to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts towards sustainable peace. The organization has been involved in the Bawku case since 2009. The Bawku Police, located in the heart of Bawku town, provide security, and deploy officers to keep peace. Both NPC and Bawku Police liaise and cooperate with all the major stakeholders mentioned below.

In 2000, the Upper East Regional Police command was deployed to maintain a curfew to halt the violence (Kendie et al., 2014). After violence erupted nonetheless, mediations and negotiations also were initiated by the national/local government (Kendie et al., 2014). In 2001, a dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed by the Upper East Regional Security Council after more violence. Government officials, then President John A. Kufuor, and Vice President Aliu Mahama held talks with the feuding Kusasi and Mamprusi protagonists to restore calm (Kendie et al., 2014).

In 2007 and 2008, the Upper East Regional Security Council again mediated peace efforts (Kendie et al., 2014). Government officials, including President J.A. Kufour, invited the Kusasi and Mamprusi leaders to the castle that seated Ghana's government at that time to broker peace, but were not successful (Bukari, 2013a). In 2009, then President John Evans Atta Mills and Vice President John Dramani Mahama mediated the conflict. The government deployed security forces from the military and police to impose curfews through the Regional Security Council (REGSEC) and Municipal Security Council (MUSEC) (Bukari, 2013).

These efforts were all unsuccessful in resolving the conflict (Bukari, 2013a). The state may not be capable of resolving the conflict in the foreseeable future (Lund, 2003). The state's efforts have been interpreted partisan by the Kusasi and Mamprusi people, depending on the government in authority (Lund, 2003). Awedoba (2009) also stressed that mediations initiated by the state to resolve the conflict are seen by both the feuding Kusasi and Mamprusi as partial rather than neutral, because of interference from state officials personally affiliated with either of the protagonists.

Also unsuccessful were peace talks and activities by the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and Belim Wusa Development Agency (BEWDA) (Bukari, 2013b). WANEP is a regional NGO network, implementing and operationalizing peacebuilding programs in 15 countries in the African sub-region. WANEP has its head office in Accra and a regional office in Northern Ghana. They have been involved in the Bawku case since 2001, attempting to resolve the conflict.

BEWDA is a local NGO in Bawku which restructured its strategic direction to include conflict- and peacebuilding-related issues in their thematic areas. By doing so in 2001, they became a stakeholder in the conflict, also helping to end the conflict. They cooperate closely with the NPC and BIEPC as well as WANEP. But according to Bukari (2013a), the approaches by WANEP and BEWDA could not resolve the conflict over the chieftaincy issue because of the entrenched positions taken by the Kusasi and Mamprusi people. He also added that political interference by politicians in and around Bawku exacerbated the situation and led to further recurrence of violence (Bukari, 2013a). Awedoba (2009) pointed out that although NGOs did not have needed expertise, their coalition-building efforts should be

sustained, even without any tangible result.

Bukari (2013a) pointed out the negative impacts from continuing violence on socio-economic development in the areas of education, public health, security, commerce, and agriculture. In fact, as a conflict-affected area, it ranks among the “lowest income (80% living in extreme poverty) and literacy (26.3% of adults functionally literate) in the country” (Hughes, 2003: 57).

The efforts from the Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee (BIEPC) to end the conflict have been also ineffective (Kendie et al., 2014). The BIEPC was formed in 2009 by the state as a local peace infrastructure to enable participation of the conflict parties themselves to come up with solutions and solve the conflict. The committee works under the auspices of the NPC and cooperates with other NGOs towards sustaining the peace in Bawku. The composition of the BIEPC comprises representatives from all the ethnic groups in Bawku. This was possible due to a broader acceptance of BIEPC by all the ethnic groups through extensive consultation. Initially consisting of only Kusasi and Mamprusi representatives, it now has representatives of all other ethnic groups, namely Hausa, Mossi, Bisa, and Dangomba. The committee is currently made up of 20 members, including 2 co-chairs held by a Kusasi and a Mamprusi, 12 Kusasi and Mmprusi representatives (6 each), along with the Bisa, Dagomba, Mossi, and Hausa people having 8 representatives (2 each).

## OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT PREVENTION MEASURES AGAINST RECURRENCE OF VIOLENT ARMED CLASHES IN BAWKU

To reiterate, the stakeholders in the Bawku conflict in this paper are of three categories: (i) state agencies (the National Peace Council [NPC] and the Bawku Police), (ii) NGOs (West Africa Network for Peacebuilding [WANEP] and Belim Wusa Development Agency [BEWDA]), and (iii) community representatives (*Bawku Naba* and the Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee [BIEPC]). Using information retrieved from interviews with the members of each category in 2019, this section presents an overview of conflict prevention measures taken (Tables 1, 2, and 3). All parties have initiated some measures and played vital roles in sustaining peace in Bawku for the past decade.

### I. Prevention Measures by the State Agencies

#### *1. The National Peace Council (NPC)*

Prevention measures by the NPC are summarized in Table 1. In cooperation with BEWDA, the NPC initiated the following: an early warning system, peace education, and mediation in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018, and 2019.

The early warning system entails detection of potential danger through contacts who live in Bawku. They identify and report various indications such as sporadic gunshots at night, rumors of attacks during festival celebrations, and any disturbance to the NPC and/or any of the stakeholders, who are then able to respond accordingly. The system was notably active in 2009 post violence, and in 2010 and 2015.

Peace education first was given to the 20-member BIEPC and its sub-committees. The NPC then periodically facilitated a media outreach by using the radio broadcast targeting a larger section of the youth and inhabitants of the area concerning the need to prevent

**Table 1.** Conflict prevention measures by state agencies in Bawku

Year	Actor	Type of activity	Details	Target	Location
2009	NPC	Early Warning System	Engagement to counter rumors of planned attacks during festival.	BIEPC	Bawku
	NPC	Early Warning System	Engagement to counter rumors of planned attacks during festival.	BIEPC	
2010	Bawku Police	Peace Education	Peace message dissemination prior to the elections.	BIEPC	Bawku
	Police	Early Warning System	Engagement to counter trouble during the festival celebrations and <i>darbar</i> occasions.	Bawku community	
2011	NPC	Mediation	Revitalization effort for BIEPC to become active after its dormancy in 2010.	BIEPC	Bawku
2014	NPC	Mediation	Reconstitution of BIEPC to include other ethnic groups and bring in new members.	Elders & youth (Kusasi & Mamprusi)	Greater Accra and Ashanti region
		Early Warning System	Engagement to counter rumors of planned attacks during festival.	BIEPC	
2015	NPC	Mediation	Settlement of litigation relating to farmland and to performing the Okro stick ceremony to end the conflict	BIEPC sub-committee on farmland	Bawku
	NPC	Mediation	Settlement of litigation relating to farmland and to performing the Okro stick ceremony to end the conflict	BIEPC sub-committee on farmland	
2016		Peace Education	Peace message dissemination prior to the elections for peaceful elections	BIEPC	Bawku
	Bawku Police	Peace Education	Peace message dissemination prior to the elections.	BIEPC	
	Police	Early Warning System	Engagement to counter trouble during the festival celebrations and <i>darbar</i> occasions.	Bawku community	
	NPC	Mediation	Peaceful organization of festival celebrations.	BIEPC	
2018	Bawku Police	Provision of security	Escorting participants during the festival celebrations and <i>darbar</i> occasions. Enhancement of visibility to deter criminal acts.	<i>Bawku Naba</i> Bawku community	Bawku
	NPC	Mediation	Peaceful organization of festival celebrations.	BIEPC	
2019	Bawku Police	Provision of security	Escorting participants during the festival celebrations and <i>darbar</i> occasions. Enhancement of visibility to deter criminal acts.	<i>Bawku Naba</i> Bawku community	Bawku

Source: Compiled by the author based on information collected during 2019 fieldwork in Ghana.

violent clashes.

The peace education entails community sensitization on the need to maintain and sustain peace at all times and use appropriate channels, such as the BIEPC, BEWDA, or Bawku Police, to express their concerns. As peace education transformed the BIEPC members, they in turn educated their respective communities comprising the youth and women using the radio broadcast. Peace education is active especially during election periods, since tensions tend to increase along political party lines then, but also during celebrations of festivals and whenever deemed necessary.

Peace education activities have been productive, especially prior to elections. In 2016, the NPC engaged with many groups, including the BIEPC members, youths, women's groups, political parties, and the traditional authority, and organized further peace education. Peace education seems to provide an avenue to celebrate festivals peacefully, and the youth on either side reportedly respond positively to peace messages and avoid clashes and provocations.

The NPC provides the technical backstopping and financial assistance to the BIEPC to engage in peace education for the community as and when resources are provided by the national/local government. This is much needed to ensure that the BIEPC meets their prevention targets, but currently is lacking.



**Table 2.** Conflict prevention measures by NGOs in Bawku

Year	Actor	Type of activity	Details	Target	Location
2009	WANEP	Early warning system	Monitoring of the festivals and <i>durbar</i> celebrations to counter rumors of planned attacks.	BIEPC Bawku community	Northern region (Tamale)
	WANEP	Mediation	Ensuring attendance at community markets and starting peace process to resolve the conflict.	Kusasi and Mamprusi representatives	Ashanti region (Kumasi) and Bawku
		Early warning system	Festival and <i>durbar</i> celebrations monitoring, to negotiate peace.	BIEPC Bawku community	
2010		Peace education	Educating peaceful commitment before, during, and after elections.	BIEPC Bawku community	
	BEWDA	Mediation	Amicable settlement of farmland related issues, and peaceful celebration of festivals.	BIEPC sub- committee on farmland	Bawku
		Negotiations	Undertaking of the Okro stick ceremony to signify end of a conflict.	BIEPC	
		Peace education	Educating peaceful commitment before, during, and after elections.	BIEPC Bawku community	
2016	BEWDA	Mediation	Amicable settlement of farmland related issues, and peaceful celebration of festivals.	BIEPC sub- committee on farmland	Bawku
		Negotiations	Undertaking of the Okro stick ceremony to signify end of a conflict.	BIEPC	

Source: Compiled by the author based on information collected during 2019 fieldwork in Ghana.

**Table 3.** Conflict prevention measures by community representatives in Bawku

Year	Actor	Type of activity	Details	Target	Location
2010	<i>Bawku Naba</i>	Embargo on farming activities	Suspension of farming activities to stop killings on farmland by unknown assailants, encouraging the Mamprusi to participate in Okro stick ceremony and resolve conflict.	Bawku, (Mamprusi people)	Bawku
2016	BIEPC	Alert call system and early warning system	Investigation of rumors of attack during festival, <i>durbar</i> , election periods, and sporadic shootings at night and other incidents.	BIEPC Bawku community	Bawku
2017	BIEPC	Early warning system	Monitoring of peaceful festival celebrations, <i>durbar</i> , and signs and rumors of planned attacks.	Kusasi and Mamprusi community	Bawku
		Peace education	Community sensitization on peace and advocating use of appropriate channels to address grievances.	Bawku community	
2018	BIEPC	Alert call system and early warning system	Investigation of rumors of attack during festivals, <i>durbar</i> , election periods, and sporadic shootings at night and other incidents.	BIEPC Bawku community	Bawku
2019	BIEPC	Negotiation	Undertaking of the Okro stick ceremony to signify end of a conflict.	<i>Bawku Naba</i> BIEPC	Bawku

Source: Compiled by the author based on information collected during 2019 fieldwork in Ghana.

One of the NPC staff stated: We should not only look at the elections as the main time to start engaging to prevent violence but to start now so to achieve a lot, so we are thinking of doing that but because of our financial problems, we take advantage of key events in town and further engage all segments of the population on some of these issues to prevent recurrence of violence.<sup>(4)</sup>

In 2011, NPC conducted mediations, which were through meetings with the BIEPC members to discuss various issues that centered on the peace process. In substance, the NPC met with the 20-member BIEPC to interact and propose new ideas to deal with two

outstanding issues: (i) farmland disputes related to some Mamprusi farmers who lost their farms during violence and (ii) a traditional ceremony where the protagonists reconcile and mark the end of a conflict known as the Okro stick ceremony which took place both in 2015 and 2016. The Okro stick ceremony is a traditional rite of purification and cleansing that is symbolized by burying an Okro stick to signify the end of a conflict.

For this symbolic ceremony, the two factions involved must reach an agreement through civilized means rather than guns to end a conflict. After the ceremony, anyone, whether Kusasi or Mamprusi, who reignites the conflict will face the wrath of the gods. The Okro ceremony to take place in April 2019 with respect to the chieftaincy in Bawku was canceled. The Mamprusi argued that firstly, they would not participate in the ceremony because it was not in line with their culture. Secondly, according to them, the ceremony functioned rather to settle matters on infidelity in marriage. With half of the protagonists missing, the ceremony was meaningless.

In 2014, mediations were again initiated by the NPC who carried out shuttle consultations from Greater Accra to the Ashanti region with the aim of organizing a meeting with about 50 representatives from the Kusasi and Mamprusi towards a reconstitution of the BIEPC after dormancy since 2010 when Mamprusi members withdrew, citing mistrust and unequal treatment. The mediation led to the introduction of additional members from the Kusasi, Mamprusi, Bissa, Hausa, Dagomba, and Mossi people to increase the scope of BIEPC membership.

The NPC further engaged through mediation with the BIEPC members and the sub-committee on festivals to negotiate over peaceful means to celebrate the festivals. The NPC also actively engaged in mediations with the 20-member BIEPC on issues related to festivals, elections, and farmland (in 2015, 2016, 2018, and 2019) which tended to escalate into violence in the area. In the Bawku area, festival undertakings are apt to create tensions because it is easier for the Kusasi people to celebrate their *Samanpiid* festival, while the Mamprusi people would have to go through documentation and many legal processes before they can celebrate their own festival. This is partly because the Mamprusi people do not recognize the *Bawku Naba's* authority, and thus are reluctant to ask his permission to undertake their festival. The Mamprusi people see this action of seeking authorization of their festivities as paying homage to the *Bawku Naba*, which they never want to. On the day of *Samanpiid* festival itself, the Kusasi people especially are noted to sing provocative songs to spite the Mamprusi people, and this heightens tension that easily escalates into violence.

One NPC official stated that, "cooperation's [sic] have yielded results with regards to prevention and this effort is being maintained in the long term towards resolving the conflict." The NPC informant indicated that there have since been attempts to cause violence, but due to a quick response by the informants in relaying information and cooperation from BEWDA, the NPC could quickly engage in conjunction with the Bawku Police to investigate and made arrests where necessary.

## 2. *Prevention measures by the Bawku Police*

Prevention measures by the Bawku Police are described here. The Bawku Police initiated conflict prevention measures (Table 1) in their own unique way. It also cooperated with other stakeholders by taking part in peace education using the radio broadcast during the election period as was markedly seen in 2016. According to the Bawku Police staff, their officers cooperated with BEWDA, assembly members, political party leaders, and opinion leaders, all of whom aired peace messages stressing the need to maintain peace, which has been one of the reasons for the absence of violence in 2016.

Further, they also engaged both the Kusasi and Mamprusi people to desist from

provocative gestures and dances during the celebration of their respective festivals, which were successful in 2016, 2018, and 2019. One police officer pointed out that, “most of the violence experienced was because there were no prevention measures and prevention was never a priority,” and that, “the priority should be prevention at the early stages and not [action] initiated after violence is recorded.”

The police in 2016 were also keen to some early signs of potential violence, including the conspicuous absence of donkey carts that usually conveyed goods from Bawku to Burkina Faso and Togo on market days. When these donkey cart activities were missing, the police would quickly act to verify what was amiss and investigate with cooperation from the BIEPC members.

The police provide security, which is a form of direct conflict prevention, directly deterring potential armed clashes by deploying their personnel for escort duties during *durbar*—a traditional event held occasionally to celebrate special occasions or to usher in festival celebrations, which they did in 2019 and election periods. Such provision of security by the Bawku Police for Kusasi and Mamprusi people during the celebration of the *Samanpiid* and *Damba* festivals, respectively, has been successful. In addition, the police have cooperated with the BIEPC festival planning committee to ascertain the routes to be taken in escorting some participants to the *durbar* grounds in 2016, 2018, and 2019.

Providing security has proved effective, and prevented election-related violence as seen, for example, in 2002 and 2016. In 2016, the police swiftly intervened against an incident during the election. For two consecutive days, counting the ballots could not be completed at the collation center, and this had raised tension. The Bawku Police intervened and evacuated the electoral officers and political party candidates to the Bolgatanga Regional Coordinating Council to finish the ballot count and declare the winner. The sympathizers of both Mamprusi and Kusasi political parties, NPP and NDC, were hampered from mobilizing to engage in violence.

## II. Prevention Measures by NGOs

### 1. *Prevention measures by WANEP*

Prevention measures by WANEP are summarized in Table 2. WANEP implemented an early warning system, mediation, and peace education in 2009 and 2010.

WANEP established the Community Monitoring Teams (CMT) in 2009, comprising five community members and a team leader trained in collecting early warning signs throughout the area. Information gathered is utilized for bilateral consultation and mediation with key stakeholders such as NPC, BEWDA, or BIEPC members. The CMT collects information from within the ranks of various stakeholders as well as among contacts in the town public through phone calls and/or text messages.

A comment that, “the situation in Bawku is better than before considering the peace which has been sustained for the past years,” from one informant shows the high regard held by the WANEP for the CMT in providing early warning signs. The informants were of the opinion that the CMT would need to be sustained at all levels to identify potential violent incidents and curb rumors about possible attacks during the upcoming celebration of festivals by the Kusasi and Mamprusi people and during election periods, considering the tensions generated by these two occasions. The early warning system the CMT implemented is one of the reasons for the absence of violent clashes for the past decade.

WANEP has organized peace mediation, for example in 2010, with the BIEPC encouraging attendance at markets by the opposing parties as well as stop mutual boycotts. WANEP initiated a platform for communication by convening the sides, interacted and

encouraged them to desist from violence and that eventually persuaded the Kusasi and Mamprusi traders to stop the boycott and agree to attend the markets to improve the commerce in the town. This effort also enabled WANEP to restore calm and trust between the protagonists. Here too, because the situation in Bawku is still unpredictable, sustained engagement is critical.

WANEP organized peace education and sensitization on sustaining peace among the leadership of the youth, women, and all other relevant groups, who in turn educated and sensitized the people in their respective communities. After this effort, direct interaction and conversation began between the key figures of the Kusasi and Mamprusi towards finding a lasting solution to the conflict, which has led to sustained peace.

An official of WANEP asserted that the community's cooperation with WANEP has had a positive impact in calming the youth to desist from engaging in violence, although only up to the point until the violent clashes erupted. At the same time, the official stressed the need for added capacity and technical assistance to support the BIEPC, which would allow them to monitor the conflict dynamics, know the context, understand the history, and mete out the most effective guidance.

## 2. *Prevention measures by BEWDA*

BEWDA functions as a peacebuilding facilitator for the BIEPC. The prevention measures BEWDA initiated include the following: the early warning system, peace education, mediation, and negotiations (Table 2).

The early warning system devised by BEWDA uses contacts who detect and report signs of possible violence. It was instrumental in monitoring the situation during the celebration of festivals, known to contribute to heightened tensions, as was done in 2010.

The peace education by BEWDA was a sensitization effort in 2010 to educate people about peace before, during, and after elections. During the fieldwork, there were notably positive remarks concerning BEWDA's efforts prior to the 2016 general elections, which brought about awareness of the need for responsible campaigning by politicians and encouraged freedom of choice in political party affiliation in the Bawku area. BEWDA has periodically engaged and cooperated with the BIEPC to keep the committee active and openly communicate often when necessary.

BEWDA has mediated or negotiated mainly among the BIEPC members on the resolution of outstanding issues, such as celebration of festivals, farmland disputes, and alternative ways to perform the Okro stick reconciliation ceremony. These BEWDA mediations have settled tensions and achieved success with respect to celebrations of festivals, not possible earlier due to (i) the legal processes the Mamprusi people chose to pursue, (ii) contestation of the chieftaincy, and (iii) provocations on festival days that led to clashes in the past. Currently, the Mamprusi have corroborated reports that they celebrate their festival, although they still do not seek permission from or revere the *Bawku Naba*.

WANEP and BEWDA have cooperated and have made strides in maintaining peace due to their constant engagements. The mediations intended to prevent provocations from either the Kusasi or Mamprusi side during these festival celebrations seemed effective, and incidents have been on the decline in recent years.

There have been two kinds of farmland disputes. First, the seizure of Mamprusi farmlands by some Kusasi during violent clashes and subsequent Mamprusi efforts to retrieve them triggered more violence. Second, some Kusasi youths hamper the Mamprusi farmers from accessing their farms, especially at the start of the rainy season, which inevitably leads to violent clashes.

Most of the Mamprusi farmers have their farmlands in the outskirts of the main Bawku

town where most Mamprusi live, and thus to reach their farms they must traverse where Kusasi predominantly reside. All farmland disputes are referred to the BIEPC sub-committee on farmlands for negotiations. BEWDA as the mediator encourages swift resolution to discourage lengthy litigation (After the author's field research was completed, some outstanding farmland related matters were still under negotiation.).

The BIEPC encourages generating new ideas and options to perform the Okro stick reconciliation ceremony to signify the end of conflict, especially on the side of the Mamprusi people. Currently, the support from the state through the NPC has been called in, since WANEP and BEWDA decried the BIEPC as not playing its complimentary role.

BEWDA in conjunction with the BIEPC undertakes peace negotiations periodically, and the opposing sides have adhered to their plea. The situation in Bawku is described by an official of BEWDA as uncertain, because one small misunderstanding along the divisive ethnic lines can escalate into violence. Their sustained engagement is essential.

### III. Prevention Measures by Community Representatives

#### 1. *Prevention measures by the Bawku Naba*

In 2010, the *Bawku Naba* placed an “embargo on farming,” a directive barring any farming activity by the Mamprusi people until the Okro stick reconciliation ceremony was conducted (Table 3). The suspension was initiated as a preventive measure, according to the *Bawku Naba*, to keep unknown assailants from attacking the Mamprusi farmers who worked on their farms located in or near Kusasi territory. Simultaneously, the suspension was also meant to ensure the Mamprusi participation in the Okro stick ceremony signifying the end of conflict. After all, the directive was temporary.

#### 2. *Prevention measures by the BIEPC*

The BIEPC has also initiated conflict prevention measures such as the alert call system, an early warning system, peace education, and negotiations in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Table 3).

The alert call system entails the BIEPC staff calling contacts by phone to investigate or enquire about the veracity of rumors or any incident that can lead to armed violence. The call is made to the Bawku Police and other members of the community. The system helped prevent a near fatal violent clash between the youths of the Kusasi and Mamprusi in 2018 when rumors spread in the Mamprusi camp of a Kusasi-planned attack against them. When the Bawku Police exchanged gun shots with an armed robbery gang, people panicked, and both Kusasi and Mamprusi youths started mobilizing to engage in battle to defend themselves. The BIEPC members communicated using the alert system and found out in time that the police were responding to a shooting caused by a crime.

The BIEPC co-chairmen asserted that the alert call system enabled members of the BIEPC to set up emergency meetings and come up with peace messages to broadcast on the radio to call for calm during the celebration of festivals to prevent violent clashes. It has created a good communication channel between the BIEPC members, Bawku Police, and BEWDA, which never existed previously according to the co-chairmen. This has generated a spirit of co-existence among the BIEPC, which was felt and trickled down to the whole community. In the long run, the BIEPC wants to extend the alert call system to the youth in the community and rely on them to report any incident that could mar the peace in Bawku.

The BIEPC also gathers danger signs in their early warning system, later relayed to the Bawku Police, NPC, BEWDA, and WANEP for prevention measures. An example of an early warning sign, according to the co-chairmen, would be any time families start packing

to leave, especially away from the center of town where Mamprusi live, because it means they fear impending planned attacks. In addition, on market days (every third day of the week), very prominent personnel and traders, especially of the Kusasi, not turning up to conduct business could also be a worrisome sign. Another is when the Mamprusi traders cross the borders into Togo and Burkina Faso for business purposes but their Kusasi counterparts are not around, it means they fear violence may be in the offing.

Hearing cacophonous shooting of weapons is also a way to know there could be an impending clash. People spread rumors that they might have heard gunshots on either side of town, which they believe to be a major indication of people testing weapons in view of an impending clash. The BIEPC members would then quickly meet to establish dialogue and address these concerns before actual violence.

The BIEPC brings messages on the radio promoting peace at all times and advocate the use of civilized means rather than guns to address grievances in the area. BIEPC encourages the youth to maintain a level of caution when discussing issues of a sensitive nature such as elections and farmland, as was done in 2017.

The BIEPC conducts negotiations within the committee to find a common alternative to resolve the conflict and peaceful ways to celebrate the respective festivals. At the time of the field research, the BIEPC was not meeting regularly. This was because the BIEPC only met when deemed necessary due to financial constraints on members to travel to the meeting venue.

The efforts of the BIEPC have born fruit with respect to preventing recurrence of violence through their cooperation in agreeing to negotiate and settle outstanding farmland issues amicably out of court, and the co-chairmen stressed they need to be encouraged through sustained engagement and financial support. All the members of the BIEPC need to be fully committed to peace and encourage the youth and the community members of Bawku to use the channels available, such as the police, BEWDA, and BIEPC leadership to address any grievances related to any other matter, the co-chairmen all agreed.

In 2019, there were meetings among the BIEPC and opinion leaders in the community towards sustaining peace and finding amicable ways to resolve conflicts. In the same vein, progress has been made concerning the Okro stick reconciliation ceremony to denote an end to a conflict, because negotiations were conducted between the two ethnic groups. This has prevented unnecessary bickering, although there is still more to be done. At the time of the author's field study, the Mamprusi BIEPC representatives discussed with their elders regarding an alternative to the Okro stick ceremony, since the one proposed by the Kusasi was allegedly not in line with Mamprusi culture.

The BIEPC members reported that the NGOs' cooperation in Bawku is having a highly positive impact as their neutrality builds trust from within the BIEPC, so they are considered agents of conflict prevention. The two co-chairmen of BIEPC commended WANEP and BEWDA for their technical support, which has widened their knowledge and encouraged maintenance of peace in Bawku.

## ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT PREVENTION MEASURES IN BAWKU

All conflict prevention activities and perspectives (Tables 1, 2, and 3) seem to be perceived positively according to stakeholders in Bawku. The author's study in the field found the early warning system, peace education, mediation, provision of security, negotiation, embargo, and alert call system, all considered to be direct prevention measures initiated in Bawku. This corroborates the conclusion by Ramsbotham et al. (2016: 157) that, when conflicts are close

to violence, “direct prevention comes into play.”

The early warning system and peace education have been initiated by the state agencies, NGOs, and community representatives as a major measure to curb the outbreak of potential armed clashes in Bawku. Direct prevention measures are initiated against potential violent clashes at an early stage whenever possible as to (i) the nonresolved and (ii) outstanding issues for example, the Okro stick ceremony. Direct prevention measures initiated in Bawku have resolved some urgent and imminent issues that had the potential to escalate into violence.

As stated above by one informant, “the priority should be prevention at the early stages and not [actions] initiated after violence is recorded.” There has been an absence of prevention measure analysis to curb potential recurrence of armed violence at the early stages by previous studies (Awedoba, 2009; Bukari, 2013a; Kendie et al., 2014). Furthermore, the author found that structural measures have not been implemented in the area since the period of research. Narratives of state agencies, NGOs, and community representatives show that more focus is placed on preventing escalation of potential armed violence at the early stages because of the uncertainty of the situation in Bawku.

### I. Analysis of Prevention Measures by the State Agencies

The direct prevention measures such as the early warning system, peace education, mediation, and provision of security all positively influence the actions of the protagonists to maintain peace and in the long run help to find amicable ways to end conflict. The direct prevention measures, according to the state agency officers, indicate how protracted the Bawku conflict is and how unstable the situation is. According to the officials, the potential for violent armed clashes recurring is perpetual, if the outstanding issues of farmland disputes and undertaking of the Okro stick reconciliation ceremony are not resolved.

The national government established the NPC to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts towards a sustainable peace, but the officials of the state agencies pointed out that their efforts with respect to prevention of potential armed violence have been inadequate, and this corroborates findings in the preceding literature (Awedoba, 2009; Bukari, 2013a; Kendie et al., 2014).

The author found in the field that officers of the state agencies were, however, committed to preventing recurrence of armed violence at the earliest stage. Obviously, there needs to be more commitment from the national government for this objective, per narrations of the officers as being in hibernation.

### II. Analysis of Prevention Measures by the NGOs

The direct prevention measures of early warning system, peace education, mediation, and negotiation by the NGOs are self-acknowledged as reliable in curbing escalation of potential violence in political elections, celebration of festivals, and unresolved farmland disputes. The author has found that the NGOs’ measures augment those of the state through the NPC and Bawku Police in sustaining peace in Bawku. According to Fisher et al. (2000) and Ramsbotham et al. (2016), those efforts to avert violence by a trust-building third party are particularly important, which applies to the NGOs.

The author found in the field that much emphasis is placed on the early warning system by the CMT. The CMT, itself a direct prevention measure, supports the importance of early detection of potential violence for quick response in Bawku. According to the narratives of the officials from the NGOs, the recurrence of violent clashes at Bawku in the past was

attributable to the fact that there was no early warning system to detect and monitor signs of escalation of violence for quick response. This supported the statement by one Bawku Police officer that prevention measures were not prioritized in the past, hence the recurrence of armed violence.

The author also found in the field that the early warning system has proved to be (i) a major strategy and weapon to curb the outbreak of potential armed violence, (ii) a reliable source of detecting and monitoring signs of potential violent clashes that was non-existence in the past, and (iii) a resource that is depended on by all stakeholders in Bawku for reliable information and bilateral consultations. All direct prevention measures implemented indicate the proactiveness of the NGOs.

### III. Analysis of Prevention Measures by the Community Representatives, *Bawku Naba* and the BIEPC

The farming suspension that the *Bawku Naba* implemented in 2010 as a direct prevention measure shows the active role of the traditional authority in tempering violence between the Kusasi and Mamprusi. The suspension worked and has enabled the *Bawku Naba* and the BIEPC to together resolve the issue of undertaking the Okro stick ceremony.

The BIEPC implemented the alert call and early warning systems which enabled their preparedness at the community level. Peace education and negotiation, as acknowledged by the members of the BIEPC, have strengthened their capacity towards prevention and amicable solutions towards resolving the conflicts. Building confidence and trust between the opposing Kusasi and Mamprusi is considered a requisite in preventing violence. Only when the Kusasi and Mamprusi engage in an extensive dialogue to seek options for solutions they themselves are comfortable with, will there be a mutually positive outcome.

## CONCLUSION

This paper examined the prevention measures initiated by the stakeholders at different levels, namely, the state agencies, NGOs, and community representatives against recurrence of violent armed conflict in Bawku. Results of the field research indicate that all were direct prevention measures, and that they contributed to the absence of violent clashes in Bawku in the past years as the level of cooperation among the stakeholders strengthened.

Contrary to the conclusions drawn in the preceding literature (Awedoba, 2009; Bukari, 2013a; Kendie et al., 2014) on the unsuccessful efforts of the past to resolving the Bawku conflict, the stakeholders, namely, the NPC, Bawku Police, WANEP, BEWDA, *Bawku Naba*, and BIEPC, strongly envisage the potency of their measures not only in curtailing potential violent clashes at the early stages but also in further engagements by the opposing parties towards resolving the conflict.

The author's field research revealed that the early warning system, for example, used by the CMT was relied on by not only the NPC and BEWDA, but all the stakeholders. Veritable cooperation as collectively envisioned by the NPC, Bawku Police, and the NGOs will facilitate exchange of ideas leading to the prevention of potential violence and sustaining peace.

Contrary to the claims by Awedoba (2009) that NGOs do not have the expertise to resolve that issue, the officials at WANEP and BEWDA firmly asserted that, with a sustained engagement between the BIEPC and the youth, prevention efforts would lead to resolving the conflict. To reiterate, the situation in Bawku has been described by WANEP and BEWDA



officials to be only dormant, because any misunderstanding between the two ethnic groups could ignite tensions leading to an easy escalation of armed violence, thereby nullifying the efforts made toward prevention.

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#### NOTES

- (1) The information on Prophet Mohammed and the Damba festival was obtained from a documentary produced with the Chief Zung Lana Mahmoud II of Nanton Area in the Northern Region of Ghana. Online. <https://youtube.be/-Ynicf8WnE> (Accessed January 12, 2020).
- (2) General information from the official website of the media house, GhanaWeb (2001) with the caption, “Interior Minister Briefs Parliament on Bawku conflict.” Online. <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Interior-Minister-briefs-Parliament-on-Bawku-conflict-20044> (Accessed July 1, 2019).
- (3) General information from the official website of Zakaria Alhassan-Tamale. “The Bawku Conflict...1st major conflict erupted in 1983.” Online. <https://zakalhassan.blogspot.com/2008/06/bawku-conflict1st-major-conflict.html> (Accessed June 3, 2019).
- (4) Interview conducted with one NPC officer on September 18, 2019.

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