

Nature and Createdness in Origen's *De Principiis*¹⁾

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I Introduction: The Nature of Rational Creatures

Origen discusses in *On First Principles* 3.1,²⁾ a systematic doctrine of free will,³⁾ where, after persuasively demonstrating this doctrine seen in the apostolic teaching (praedicatio apostolica),⁴⁾ he confirms it by the authority of the Scriptures (scripturarum auctoritate).⁵⁾ In fact, Origen tries to investigate, step by step, the opinion which denies free will based on certain sayings in the Scriptures, which incline us to conclude that our nature (natura, φύσις) was predetermined as either good or evil. He opposes such an assertion,⁶⁾ based on the Scriptures in appearance as it is quite contradictory to the apostolic teaching

and therefore, he tries to demonstrate and systematize ecclesiastical faith by means of his unique biblical hermeneutics.⁷⁾ In his argument on 'human nature', he considers our good or evil actions in this world as oppose to our ultimate salvation or damnation. Can we say, however, this way of understanding our nature is appropriate? Should we claim that this very way of understanding our nature itself be based on the natural deterministic thinking which he himself refutes? The purpose of this paper is to clarify how Origen understands the nature of rational creatures, namely, our human nature, or our existence itself.

II Is Neglegentia Our True Nature?

Origen develops quite an interesting teaching on the grounds and reasons for evil in many places in *On First Principles*, namely, before the creation of this world, described in the first two chapters of Genesis, there had already been the creation of rational existences or creatures, which have also since fallen. Moreover, their original fall is said by Origen to be attributed to 'neglegentia (ἀμέλεια)' of those rational creatures.⁸⁾ Not only in his early work *On First Principles* but also in his later work *Contra Celsum*,⁹⁾ Origen uses the same explanation for their fall as follows:

Obviously, differences exist in the hearts of men, both among those who have inclined to goodness, since they have not all been moulded and shaped equally and like each other in their propensity towards it, and among those who because of their neglect (δι' ἀμέλειαν) of what is good rapidly pass to the opposite extreme;

(*Contra Celsum* 6,45)

In addition to this, we may find two other interesting examples of the verb ἀμελέω in his later 'work', or record, *Dialogue with Heraclides*.¹⁰⁾ The first example is very practical and gives pastoral advice which deals with the relation between our faith and life.

If then we wish to be saved, let us not be concerned about faith to the neglect of practical conduct of life, nor again let us place our confidence in our life (μη̄ περῑ τὴν πίστιν μὲν γινόμενοῑ περῑ τὴν πράξιν̄ ἀμελω̄μεν τοῦ βίου, μη̄ οὐδὲ πάλιν τῷ βίῳ̄ θαρρῶμεν'). Let us realize, let us comprehend, let us believe that it is on the ground of both that we either receive our acquittal or blessedness, or receive the opposite of these.¹¹⁾

(Dialogue of Origen with Heraclides 9,16–18)

The second one is Origen's effort to persuade his listeners that we need to understand both the inner and outward man, namely, the immaterial and corporeal meaning of the Scriptures.

The inner man has a heart. "Hear me, ye who have lost your heart." (Isa. 46:12) They possessed a heart, that of the body; it was not that heart which they lost. But when a man neglects to cultivate his intellectual life, and in consequence of much idleness his thinking capacity has atrophied ("Ὅτα δὲ τις ἀμελήσῃ τῆς γεωρίας τῆς ἕξεως νοητικῆς, καὶ ἀπὸ πολλῆς ἀργίας ἀποθῆται τὸ διανοητικόν), he has lost his heart, and it is to such a person that the words are added; "Hear me, ye who have lost your heart."¹²⁾

(Dialogue of Origen with Heraclides 22,5–8)

Therefore, as in his doctrine expounded in *On First Principles*, the original fall in their pre-existent state precedes the creation of this physical world, Origen quotes the third chapter of Genesis no more than four times,¹³⁾ which is often cited as biblical authority to explain our human fall or original sin. Even so, in the only example of the four, referring to the opposing powers (*contrariae virtutes*), Origen regards the serpent, inspired by the devil, as the cause of the transgression of Adam and Eve,¹⁴⁾ which, however, is just one of the numerous examples of temptations towards man by those opposing powers.

If so, what is the original fall in the pre-existent state of rational creatures? How should we understand the meaning of this unique doctrine in Origen? For the present, it may be useful to look more closely at some of the more important texts concerning this doctrine.

According to Origen, rational creatures (*rationabiles creaturae*), or intelligent beings who have free will (*liberum arbitrium*, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον), are quite a few but definite in number,¹⁵⁾ all are of one nature¹⁶⁾ and have been made subject to the rule and governance of those holy and blessed orders¹⁷⁾ due to their one nature. They “obtain first of all their existence from God the Father, and secondly their rational nature from the Word, and thirdly their holiness from the Holy Spirit.”¹⁸⁾ Though rational creatures have been created in such a good and blessed state, if at any time satiety (*satietas*) should possess their hearts, they would fall slowly from their place through negligence (*per neglegentiam*).¹⁹⁾ Origen makes use of the following illustration to show what this loss or fall is, for those who live negligently (*qui se neglegentius egerint*).²⁰⁾ Suppose a man has gradually become skilled in the science or art of geometry or medicine, up to the point of reaching perfection,

having trained himself for a long time through instructions and exercises so as to acquire completely the knowledge of the aforesaid art. So long as the geometrician or doctor in question occupies himself in the studies and rational instructions relating to his art, the knowledge of the subject will remain with him. If, however, he loses interest in these exercises and neglects to work (Si vero dissimulet ab exercitiis et neglegat ab industria), then through this negligence (per neglegentiam), his knowledge is gradually lost, a few details at first, then more and so on until after a long time, all his skills vanish into oblivion and are utterly erased from his memory. Yet if, in the first stages of his fall, when the negligence which threatens to ruin him has not yet gone very far, he is aroused and without delay returns to himself, it is certainly possible for recovery of which had been but recently lost and a renewal of that knowledge, which by that time had been only slightly erased from his mind, can be made.²¹⁾

Furthermore, Origen, after asserting that no created being is stainless by essence or by nature (substantialiter vel naturaliter), nor is any one essentially polluted, concludes that it lies with us and with our own actions whether we are to be blessed and holy, or whether through sloth and negligence (per desidiam et neglegentiam), we are to turn away from that blessedness towards wickedness and loss; the final result of which is, that when too much involved has become wickedness, a man may descend to such a state (if any shall come to so great a pitch of negligence) as to be changed into what is called an opposing power.²²⁾

The following text also serves as a good illustration of such a doctrine in question. Origen, contemplating the beginning of all things from their end, asserts that if rational creatures are careless and indifferent about this participation (participatione

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neglegant atque dissimulent) in holiness (sanctitas) and wisdom (sapientia) and in the divine nature (deitas) in blessedness of their original creation, then each becomes the cause of their own lapse or fall by the fault of their own personal slothfulness (vitio propriae desidiae).²³⁾ Therefore, Origen describes that, in rational beings, sloth and weariness in taking trouble to preserve the good (desidia et laboris taedium in servando bono), coupled with disregard and neglect (aversio ac neglegentia) of better things, begin the process of withdrawal from the good.²⁴⁾

Several observations in the last few paragraphs have shown that it is quite clear that Origen explicitly thinks of our negligence, disregard, slothfulness and so on,²⁵⁾ as the cause of our evil actions in this world, or as what may be said their more fundamental cause, namely, that of the original fall of rational creatures. In order to get some understanding of our question on human nature, let us discuss the subject in view of 'neglegentia' in general terms.

Therefore, since, not only in our lives in this world but also in our pre-existent state, our 'falling' tendency from the good towards evil through 'neglegentia' is referred without fail, we cannot but ask whether 'neglegentia' is our original condition or natural state in creation, namely, our 'nature' itself, in the view of natural determinism. It may rightly be pointed out why God has created rational creatures without 'neglegentia', as they begin to fall because of their 'neglegentia' from remaining in the state of blessedness, much less than from doing good. If the main cause of the original fall is attributed to this 'neglegentia' and it is inevitably accompanied by their creation, Origen then seems to hold onto the same idea of natural determinism which he himself strongly refutes.²⁶⁾

Nevertheless, his illustration, using a geometrician or

doctor, shows that the creation as a blessed state participating in a just and good God was prior to the original fall, which prevents us from accepting the idea that our fall is the inevitable result of our creation. In addition, as the fall through 'neglegentia' is clearly described as that preceding the creation of this world, namely, the fall preceding to the creation of our physical substance, in which Origen explicitly asserts that no created being is pure or stainless, by essence or by nature, nor is any one essentially polluted, we cannot think 'neglegentia' is a necessity, just merely incidental to our substance.

Reflection upon all these things makes it clear that, though pursuing our question whether 'neglegentia' is our nature or not, we can almost reach the answer through negation, but still not to the point which drives us to enquire into the very question itself, that is; is 'neglegentia' our true nature? For the purpose of explicating Origen's true intention of using such expressions, it is worthwhile examining his understanding of 'nature (natura, φύσις)' as a whole.

III Liability to Change in Existence

We noted a little earlier that, in the first chapter of the third volume of *On First Principles*, Origen strongly refutes the opinion that our 'nature' has already been determined as either good or evil.²⁷⁾ The natural determinism in which our salvation or damnation is thought to depend, not on our potential but on the predetermined nature of each soul,²⁸⁾ by cutting off the basic relationship between our deeds in this world and our salvation or damnation, though appearing to believe in God's providence, is nothing more than an arrogation of the finite, namely, the created human beings, as, by asserting that some are determined

either to be saved or damned, it anticipates God in judging others who have the same 'nature'. It is such an acting judgment which refuses the providence of God, which controls the whole world or everything existing or happening within it,²⁹⁾ that Origen refutes as the arrogation against the source of holiness, namely, God.

This will lead us further into a consideration of how Origen himself, who strongly denies such an arrogation, understands our 'nature' as God's creatures. According to our doctrine, that is, according to the faith of the Church, Origen discusses that all souls and rational natures were made or created (*omnes animae atque omnes rationabiles naturae factae sunt vel creatae*),³⁰⁾ and are incorporeal in respect to their proper nature, yet though incorporeal, they were nevertheless made (*quae omnes secundum propriam naturam incorporeae sunt, sed et per hoc ipsum, quo incorporeae sunt, nihilominus factae sunt*);³¹⁾ Therefore, it is quite clear that, in contrast to the nature of God, who has no beginning and can never cease to be what He is³²⁾ and whose powers have not been at any time in abeyance for a single moment,³³⁾ always ceaselessly working,³⁴⁾ the nature of rational creatures is proved to be changeable and convertible (*mutabilis et convertibilis erat natura rationabilis*) by the very condition of its being created, for what did not exist but began to be is by this very fact shown to be of a changeable nature³⁵⁾ in existence.

Furthermore, as God is good by nature (*deus, qui natura bonus est*),³⁶⁾ and we can imagine no moment whatever, when God's power was not engaged in acts of doing good,³⁷⁾ there is neither a potential or reality of evil. Contrary to such a nature, holiness in every created being is an accidental quality and what is accidental, may also be lost,³⁸⁾ and among all rational creatures there is none which is not capable of both good and evil.³⁹⁾ Yet,

however, when we say that there is no nature which cannot admit evil, we do not necessarily indicate that every nature has actually done so; nor on the other hand will the statement that there is no nature which may not admit good, prove that each nature has admitted what is good.⁴⁰⁾

On these several grounds, we may reasonably conclude that Origen basically understands the 'nature' of rational creatures as oppose to the nature of God, from the point of 'mutability in existence' due to their 'Createdness'. Thus we see that Origen, who draws a sharp distinction between potential and reality of evil,⁴¹⁾ recognizes our 'nature' not as static nor determined but as dynamic, or having a relation between God and His creatures, that is, 'Createdness'.

IV Mobility of Will

If we fully realize that Origen's understanding of the nature of rational beings is our self-understanding as a mutable existence due to the fundamental difference from the nature of God, namely, our 'Createdness', we can be convinced that Origen expounds on God, as follows, in terms of 'neglegentia'. He points out that we should not suppose the powers which God Himself uses to do good, create and providentially sustain, should at any time have ceased from performing works worthy of themselves and have become inactive (*vel piguisse eas agere et operari quae se digna erant vel dissimulasse*),⁴²⁾ and understand that God Himself wishes to show that it was not the delay of divine providence but the will of each human mind which was the cause of its ruin (*non dissimulation divinae providentiae, sed humanae mentis arbitrium causa sibi perditionis existit*).⁴³⁾ In this way, in order to make us, rational creatures, aware of our

nature of the 'Createdness', Origen describes the power and work of God by completely denying their or its 'neglegentia'.

At the same time, he turns his attention to the following phase which the nature of rational beings holds, as it is certain that no living creature can be altogether inactive and immovable (nullum animal omnimodis otiosum atque immobile esse potest),⁴⁴⁾ much more than must a rational being such as a human being be always engaged in some movement or activity (Multo ergo magis rationabile animal, id est hominis naturam, necesse est semper aliquid movere vel agere).⁴⁵⁾ In this way Origen replaces nature with free will. After the discussion that the soul preceding our physical birth also holds free will, which always moves (semper movetur) in the direction of either good or evil, he makes similar remarks that the rational sense, namely the mind or soul, cannot likewise exist without such a movement (sine motu aliquo).⁴⁶⁾

This movement (motus), pointed out in rational beings, is, far from being denied by Origen, rather described in God, as follows: for it is both impious and absurd to say that God's nature is to be at ease and never to move (otiosam enim et immobilem dicere naturam dei impium est simul et absurdum).⁴⁷⁾ As a further example, Origen points out, in quite a similar tone, that it is equally absurd and impious to suppose that these powers of God have been at any time in abeyance for a single moment (Quas virtutes dei absurdum simul et impium est putare vel ad momentum aliquod aliquando fuisse otiosas).⁴⁸⁾ We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that the nature of both rational creatures and God is grasped with consanguinity by Origen, in respect to the 'movement' of the will's freedom and powers, namely, 'mobility of will'.

V Discontinuity and Consanguinity

From our investigation of Origen's understanding of the nature of rational creatures by means of the term 'neglegentia', we have shown clearly that consanguinity (consanguinitas)⁴⁹⁾ between the Creator and His creatures in the phase of will, as well as that of discontinuity in the phase of existence which may be said to be a major difference in nature between the two.

The common ground between discontinuity in mutability of existence and similarity in mobility of will, based on their 'movement', is nothing less than being mutable, mobile, namely, being free. In other words, God who creates the non-existent into the existent is a God who voluntarily wills and creates the creatures holding free will. The freedom of God, the Creator and the Absolute, never involves the reality and potential of evil, while the freedom of rational beings, the creatures and the finite, involves this potential and, regardless of holding or not their substantial bodies, their potential and reality of evil is always like two sides of the same coin.⁵⁰⁾

Therefore, when Origen accounts for our free will, given to us by God (a deo nobis datum esse)⁵¹⁾ and perceives that the Creator granted to our minds, also created by Him, the power of free and voluntary movement,⁵²⁾ we realize that, by proclaiming freedom of rational beings in the view of such an exacting 'Createdness' that what they are, is something neither of their own nor of eternity, but given by God (a deo datum).⁵³⁾ Origen profoundly reflects on and fully respects the original value of our freedom, namely, the unstable nature of human beings.

The importance of that meaning of the 'Createdness' which is never restricted to no more than being created, cannot be overemphasized. For although we, the creatures, are aware of

the absolute discontinuity in our finiteness in the phase of the liability to change in existence, we, holding fast to such mobility of free will as similar to the Creator, never fail to involve, in our very nature, the very basic question of how we have been created to live in relation to the Creator, or what sort of way to live, in order to deserve being created. 'Createdness' certainly implies the very questioning of the relationship to God, always being asked strictly in front of God, the Creator, which is the cost of our freedom.

Origen's true intention to use quite a practical term or expression 'neglegentia' for the cause of our original fall preceding the creation of this physical world, is a truth little understood hitherto in Origen studies though it is a very essential one. The relationship between God and His creatures is not confined to the creation of this world, but is always constantly sustained through activity on the part of God towards man. Origen, holding such a firm faith in God's love, repeatedly asserts that the relationship between the Creator and His creatures is never broken off and that, what is more, because it connotes the polarity between discontinuity and consanguinity in the field of freedom, God Himself ceaselessly asks us to search for its meaning through 'neglegentia', that is, the lapse in the relationship with God, of rational creatures, namely, us, who cannot tolerate such polarity. When we read such a statement in Origen, we should be careful not to make such an irrelevant criticism that his cosmological speculation is completely preposterous. We should instead draw our attention to his attitude of a faithful and sincere search,⁵⁴⁾ where, perseveringly contemplating quite practical and ethical questions mentioned above, he tries to answer them by his practice of the search itself.

VI Man Created 'to the Image of God'

Through understanding the significance of Origen's practical contemplation, we have almost reached the core of the question on our own nature. Origen asserts that there is a certain affinity between the mind and God, of whom the mind is an intellectual image (*propinquitatis quaedam sit menti ad deum, cuius ipsa mens intellectualis imago sit*).⁵⁵⁾ For God created our rational nature, 'to His own image and likeness' (Gen. 1:26), incorruptible (*Incorruptibilem namque fecit esse rationabilem naturam, quam et 'ad imaginem suam ac similitudinem condidit'*),⁵⁶⁾ and man received the honour of God's likeness (*imaginis dignitas*)⁵⁷⁾ in his first creation, when, by learning the Scriptures, he was nourished by the food of divine wisdom to a whole and perfect state, and as he was made in the beginning, will be restored 'to the image and likeness of God' (*'ad imaginem dei ac similitudinem' reparatur*).⁵⁸⁾

As Origen firmly believes, man, created 'to the image and likeness of God', remains the ceaseless works of God for him from the creation to the end. Since all things which exist were made by God, and there is nothing which was not made except the nature of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, and because God, who is good by nature, wished to have those whom He might benefit and who might enjoy receiving His benefits, He made creatures worthy of Himself, namely, creatures capable of deserving to receive Him,⁵⁹⁾ we are always positioned to stand in front of God, as responsible subjects who should participate in His works towards us.

In the preceding chapter, I pointed out that rational creatures, endowed with freedom by God are, at their cost, always asked to pursue the meaning of their own 'Createdness'

in the co-relationship between God, the Creator and themselves, which is truly a severe request under the absolute Otherness, or discontinuity between God and themselves. At the same time, however, when we, the finite rational creature, fix our gaze upon such an abyss of freedom and search by means of free will, which was given by God, for our self, or our very nature created 'to the image of God' in this created world, the humble search will prove to be a sincere response to His merciful works, urging the activity of God who assiduously works towards us.⁶⁰⁾

VII Conclusion

On the way to investigating the key to elucidate the problem of evil in Origen's *On First Principles* primarily focusing on his view of free will, we found the characteristic usage of the term, which we call 'neglegentia', appearing without fail concerning the cause of the original fall of rational creatures in their pre-existent state. As Origen never explains the reason for this, we presented the question whether or not 'neglegentia' is our true nature. While enquiring into that question, we were driven to reflect on what in the world Origen thinks of as our nature itself. Thus, from what has been said above, we may come to the conclusion that, in Origen's thought, the nature of rational creatures is regarded as not determined or static but as mutable and mobile, that is, he understands our nature in the relation between God and ourselves.

Moreover, gazing at the difference between and consanguinity with God and His creatures, we realized not only our tense or lax relationship with God, derived from our having been created as free existences, but also Origen's true intention to use such practical or pastoral terms as 'neglegentia' when

developing his unique doctrine of the original fall of rational creatures in their pre-existent state.⁶¹⁾

Therefore, reflection on these, has shown us that the essential meaning of our being, created 'to the image and similitude of God', lies in the thought that finite creatures who grasp their own nature of the 'Createdness' in relation to God, the Creator, can truly be responsible subjects to God in the field of freedom endowed for them by God Himself.

In conclusion, Origen's profound insight into the meaning of our 'Createdness', which was revealed by our analysis above in *On First Principles* in terms of 'neglegentia' as the clue, will offer a significant perspective on our further enquiry into the problem of evil.

NOTES

- 1) An earlier version of this paper was presented as the fourth chapter of my Doctorate Dissertation, "Understanding of Createdness in Origen's *De Principiis*," at Kyoto University in 1998. This research owes much to the thoughtful and helpful suggestions of Dr. W. Mizugaki, Professor Emeritus in Kyoto University.
- 2) The textual edition of *De Principiis* (*Περὶ ἀρχῶν*) used throughout is as follows: *Origenes: Vier Bücher von den Prinzipien*, hrsg., übers., mit krit. u. erl. Anm. vers. von H. Görgemanns u. H. Karpp, (3 Auflage; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992). I also refer to *Origène, Traité des principes*: par H. Crouzel et M. Simonetti, Sources Chrétiennes No 252, 253, 268, 269, 312, (Paris: Cerf, 1978–1984). Quotations from this work give *PArch* volume, chapter, and section (and in parentheses, the page and line numbers in accordance with Koetschau's recension in the GCS); For the English translation of this work, I have mainly followed G. W. Butterworth, ed. and trans., *Origen, On First Principles* (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973).
- 3) For detailed arguments on Origen's understanding of free will, see my paper, *The Dynamic Theodicy in Origen's De Principiis*, published in THE

- MEIJI GAKUIN RONSO (*The Meiji Gakuin Review*), No.584 (Tokyo: The Society of the Faculty of General Education, Meiji Gakuin University, October 1996), pp.27–41.
- 4) Cf. *PArch* 1. Praef.4–5 (p.9,12–p.13,6).
 - 5) Cf. *PArch* 3.1.6 (p.201,7–p.204,4). The authorities, Origen cites, are as follows: Mic. 6:8, Deut. 30:15, 19, Isa. 1:19–20, Ps. 81:13–14 from the Old Testament, and Matt. 5:39, 22, 28, 7:24, 26, 25:34–35, 41, Rom. 2:4–10 from the New Testament.
 - 6) Cf. *PArch* 3.1.7–24 (p.204,7–p.244,9).
 - 7) Cf. *PArch* 1. Praef.10 (p.16,9–15). A fuller study of Origen's hermeneutics, shown in these passages, is too involved a subject to be treated here in detail. A brief discussion of his hermeneutical principle is in my paper, "The Searching Spirit: The Hermeneutical Principle in the Preface of Origen's *Commentary on the Gospel of John*," *Origeniana Sexta*, ed. by G. Dorival et A. Le Boulluec, (Leuven: Peeters, 1995), pp.433–439.
 - 8) Cf. *PArch* 2.9.6 (p.169,28–170,2): "Verum quoniam rationabiles ipsae creaturae, sicut frequenter ostendimus et in loco suo nihilominus ostendimus, arbitrii liberi facultate donatae sunt, libertas unumquemque voluntatis suae vel ad profectum per imitationem dei provocavit vel ad defectum per negligentiam traxit." On the uniqueness of this theory, a somewhat briefer comment is given in my paper, *The 'Neglegentia' (ἀμέλεια) Motive in Early Christianity*, published in THE MEIJI GAKUIN RONSO (*The Meiji Gakuin Review*), No.602 (Tokyo: The Society of the Faculty of General Education, Meiji Gakuin University, October 1997), pp.1–25.
 - 9) For the English translation of this work, I have mainly followed H. Chadwick, *Origen: Contra Celsum* (Cambridge: University Press, 1980), p.362, where in n.4, with his sharp insight, he points out that "For neglect as the origin of sin, cf. *de Princ.* II, 9,6."
 - 10) For translations, I have mainly followed H. Chadwick, *Dialogue of Origen with Heraclides and the Bishops with him concerning the Father and the Son and Soul*, in J. E. L. Oulton and H. Chadwick, *Alexandrian Christianity* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), pp.437–455.
 - 11) The textual edition of *Dialogue with Heraclides*, I have used *Entretien d'Origène avec Héraclide*, introduction, text, translation and notes by J. Scherer, (Sources Chrétienne No 67; Paris: Cerf, 1960). See p.74 (p.140, 22–p.142,1). The page and line references from J. Scherer's former edition (Cairo, 1949) are given in parenthesis.
 - 12) J. Scherer, *Entretien d'Origène avec Héraclide*, p.98 (p.164,1–2).

- 13) The four quotations in the third chapter of Genesis in *De Principiis* are as follows: 2.3.4 (p.119,6–9), 3.2.1 (p.244,16–20), 3.6.5 (p.287,16–20), 4.3.1 (p.324,1–4, p.323,26–p.324,20). On this familiar subject, J. Barr acutely points out, “Genesis 3, then, is at best ambiguous as a description of ‘the’ Fall of Man, as a pointer to ‘original sin’.” See J. Barr, “Authority of Scripture: The Book of Genesis and the Origin of Evil in Jewish and Christian Tradition” in *Christian Authority: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick*, ed. by G. R. Evans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 59–75, esp. pp.61–62 and pp.73–74.
- 14) Cf. *PArch* 3.2.1 (p.244,14–20).
- 15) Cf. *PArch* 2.9.1 (p.164,10–p.165,4).
- 16) Cf. *PArch* 3.1.22 (p.239,3–8; 20–23); 3.5.4 (p.275,23–25).
- 17) Cf. *PArch* 1.6.2 (p.80,24–p.81,27).
- 18) Cf. *PArch* 1.3.8 (p.61,6–8): “primo ut sint habeant ex deo patre, secundo ut rationabilia sint habeant ex verbo, tertio ut sancta sint habeant ex spiritu sancto.”
- 19) Cf. *PArch* 1.3.8 (p.62,20–p.63,7): “Si autem aliquando satietas cepit aliquem ex his, qui in summo perfectoque constituerunt gradu, non arbitror quod ad subitum quis evacuetur ac decidat, sed paulatim et per partes defluere eum necesse est (ita ut fieri possit interdum, si brevis aliquis lapsus acciderit, ut cito respiscat atque in se revertatur), non penitus ruere, sed revocare pedem et redire ad statum suum ac rursus statuere posse id, quod per negligentiam fuerat elapsus.”
- 20) Cf. *PArch* 1.4.1 (p.63,10–12).
- 21) Cf. *PArch* 1.4.1 (p.63,12–29).
- 22) Cf. *PArch* 1.5.5 (p.77,19–p.78,5). We should pay special attention to *PArch* 1.5.5 (p.78,1–5): “Et per hoc consequens est in nobis esse atque in nostris motibus, ut vel beati et sancti simus, vel per desidiam et negligentiam ex beatitudine in malitiam perditionemque vergamus in tantum, ut nimius profectus ut ita dixerim malitiae, si qui eo usque sui neglexerit, usque in eum deveniat statum, ut ea quae dicitur contraria virtus efficiatur.” As Koetschau notes, compared with Jerome’s version of this passage, Rufinus’ translation above seems to be unfaithful to the original. However, we still and without doubt find ‘neglegentia’ as the cause of their fall. See Jerome, *Ep. ad Avitum* 3: “Et in consequentibus: Quibus, inquit, moti disputationibus arbitramur sponte sua alios esse in numero sanctorum et ministerio dei, alios ob culpam propriam de sanctimonia corruentes in tantam neglegentiam corruisse, ut etiam in contrarias fortitudines verterentur.”

- 23) Cf. *PArch* 1.6.2 (p.81,11–18): “Si vero ab huiusmodi participatione neglegant atque dissimulent, tunc vitio propriae desidiaie alius citius alius tradius, plus alius vel minus, ipse sibi causa sui lapsus vel casus efficitur. Et quoniam, ut diximus, casus iste vel lapsus, quo de statu suo unusquisque declinat, quam plurimam in se habet diversitatem pro mentis ac propositi motibus, quod alius levius, alius vero gravius ad inferiora declinat; in hoc iam iustum iudicium dei providentiae est, ut unicuique secundum diversitatem motuum pro merito sui decessus et commotionis occurrat.”
- 24) Cf. *PArch* 2.9.2 (p.165,27–28).
- 25) It is well known that *De Principiis* was handed down to us in a Latin translation by Rufinus at the end of the fourth century, except for some surviving fragments in Greek. Therefore, those Latin terms which I quote in this paper, such as ‘neglegentia’, ‘desidia’, ‘dissimulatio’, ‘segnitas’, ‘otium’, etc. and their variants, may well be the terms adopted by Rufinus in his translation. If we try to pick out Greek terms corresponding to these as much as possible, considering the problems of reliability of Rufinus’ translation, ‘neglegant’ in 1.6.2 (p.81,11) corresponds to “μη προσεχόντων εαυτοῖς” in *Epistula ad Menam* by Justinianus (p.81,1), and “per neglegentiam” in 3.1.13 (p.218,18) to “δι’ ἀμέλειαν” in *Philocalia* (p.218,6). It is important to note that this expression “δι’ ἀμέλειαν” is also used to explain the original fall in Origen’s later work *Contra Celsum*, which survives in the original Greek. See *Contra Celsum* 6,45 (p.116,8–9). For further details of the history of understanding of the usage of the term ‘neglegentia’, see my paper, *History of the Understanding of Origen’s Doctrine of the Original Fall*, published in THE MEIJI GAKUIN RONSO (*The Meiji Gakuin Review*), No.618 (Tokyo: The Society of the Faculty of General Education, Meiji Gakuin University, July 1998), pp.17–35. With regard to the brief historical survey of the word ἀμέλεια and its verb ἀμελεῖν, mainly in the Bible, Philo, the Apostolic Fathers, the Apologists and Clement of Alexandria, see my paper, *The ‘Neglegentia (ἀμέλεια)’ Motive in Early Christianity*, pp.2–19. The detailed analysis of each term mentioned above cannot be discussed here for lack of space.
- 26) With regard to Origen’s refutation against natural determinism, see my paper, *The Dynamic Theodicy in Origen’s De Principiis*, pp.32–33.
- 27) We cannot overestimate that the primary consideration in Origen’s refutation against natural determinism is based not on the simple defence of man’s free will but on Origen’s unshakable faith in constant activity on the part of God towards man. See my paper, *The Dynamic Theodicy in Origen’s*

De Principiis, pp.36–38.

- 28) Cf. *PArch* 3.1.8 (p.206,10–13; p.206,23–p.208,9; p.208,14–28).
- 29) Cf. *PArch* 4.1.7 (p.303,3; 15–16).
- 30) Cf. *PArch* 1.7.1 (p.86,5–6).
- 31) Cf. *PArch* 1.7.1 (p.86,7–9).
- 32) Cf. *PArch* 1.2.11 (p.44,22–p.45,9).
- 33) Cf. *PArch* 1.4.3 (p.66,1–3).
- 34) Cf. *PArch* 1.3.8 (p.62,13–15).
- 35) Cf. *PArch* 4.4.8 (p.360,12–17).
- 36) Cf. *PArch* 4.4.8 (p.359,11–12).
- 37) Cf. *PArch* 1.4.3 (p.66,9–10).
- 38) Cf. *PArch* 1.5.5 (p.77,22–23).
- 39) Cf. *PArch* 1.8.3 (p.99,14–15): “nihil est in omni rationabili creatura, quod non tam boni quam mali sit capax.”
- 40) Cf. *PArch* 1.8.3 (p.99,22–23): “ista si dicimus naullam esse naturam, quae non possit recipere malum, non tamen continuo etiam recepisse malum designatur, (et rursum nulla natura est, quae non recipiat bonum, et tamen non idiciro omnis natura probabitur recepisse quod bonum est).” With regard to the latter part of this quotation in parenthesis, I have followed the suggestion of using *Apologia Sancti Pamphili pro Origene*, which the editors make. See the critical apparatus of the H. Görgemanns and H. Karpp’s text mentioned and its translation S.256–257.
- 41) In the study by Keiji Nishitani, *The Problem of Evil in Augustine (Works 3; Studies on Western Mystical Thought; Tokyo: Soubunsha, 1986)*, pp.281–317, he makes a close reflection on the question of potential and reality of evil. See esp. pp.296–303.
- 42) Cf. *PArch* 1.4.3 (p.66,7–8).
- 43) Cf. *PArch* 3.1.17 (p.228,33–34).
- 44) Cf. *PArch* 2.11.1 (p.183,13–14).
- 45) Cf. *PArch* 2.11.1 (p.183,16–17).
- 46) Cf. *PArch* 3.3.5 (p.262,10–12): “et libertas arbitrii vel ad bona semper vel ad mala movetur, nec umquam rationabilis sensus, id est mens vel anima, sine motu aliquo esse vel bono vel malo potest.”
- 47) Cf. *PArch* 3.5.3 (p.272,23–24).
- 48) Cf. *PArch* 1.4.3 (p.66,1–3).
- 49) Cf. *PArch* 4.4.10 (p.363,29–30): “Unde et consanguinitatem quandam per hoc habere videntur ad deum.”
- 50) As H. Koch acutely points out, “Die Möglichkeit des Falles liegt im

- Unterschied zwischen Schöpfer und Geschöpf. Bei Gott ist die Güte substantiell und kann daher nie fortfallen, bei der Schöpfung dagegen ist sie akzidentiell und hat daher immer die Möglichkeit, aufzuhören." See H. Koch, *Pronia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus*, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1932 reprinted edition, New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), pp.96–159, esp. p.106.
- 51) Cf. *PArch* 3.1.24 (p.243,26–29).
- 52) Cf. *PArch* 2.9.2 (p.165,25–26): "Voluntarios enim et liberos motus a se conditis mentibus creator indulsit."
- 53) Cf. *PArch* 2.9.2 (p.165,21–22): "Quod sunt ergo, non est proprium nec sempiternum, sed a deo datum."
- 54) Cf. *PArch* 4.2.2 (p.310,17–22). With regard to this feature of Origen, see my paper, "The Searching Spirit," p.439, n.41.
- 55) Cf. *PArch* 1.1.7 (p.24,18–19).
- 56) Cf. *PArch* 3.6.1 (p.280,10–13).
- 57) Cf. *PArch* 3.6.1 (p.280,10–13).
- 58) Cf. *PArch* 2.11.3 (p.186,10–13).
- 59) Cf. *PArch* 4.4.8 (p.359,9–10; 11–14): "omnia, quae sunt, a deo facta esse, et nihil esse quod factum non sit praeter naturam patris et filii et spiritus sancti, . . . volens deus, qui natura bonus est, habere quibus bene faceret et qui adeptis suis beneficiis laetarentur, fecit se dignas creaturas, id est quae eum digne capere possent."
- 60) As J. R. Lyman acutely points out, "Origen focused not on interrupted contemplation, but on a defence of the dynamic self-determination of creatures and the goodness and justice of God. All levels of existence, from that of angels to humans to demons, were determined not by divine will, but the individual response of the creature to God; thus response created identity." See J. R. Lyman, *Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, Eusebius, and Athanasius*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p.61.
- 61) I should like to put special emphasis on Origen's own way of thinking, which I call 'cosmological expansion within thought'. See my paper, *The 'Neglegentia' (ἀμέλεια) Motive in Early Christianity*, pp.18–19.