

DEVELOPMENTALISM SUPERSEDES IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES: REPRODUCING ‘KIBBUTZ’ IN POST-CONFLICT ANGOLA?

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ABSTRACT *Colonato de Cela*, an agro-industrial project in Angola is a clear illustration of the interest of the state, both colonial and independent, in the development of rural areas that are not easily penetrated by state governance. It, along with a twin project, *Colonato de Limpopo*, in Mozambique, was one of the biggest development projects in the post-war period in the colonies of Portugal, which adopted the concept from Israeli agricultural settlement schemes. Portugal was not the only country to borrow the scheme from Israel, but also newly independent countries in Africa did. Active promotion of the scheme by the Israelis through diplomacy led to its wide acceptance, as did the urgent needs of the host countries and their recognition of Israel as a feasible model. By the time of 1973 Arab-Israeli War, these countries no longer accepted Israeli technical assistance. However, its spirit was revived in 2005 after the end of the civil war when the Angolan government inaugurated the *Aldeia Nova* project whose forerunner was *Colonato de Cela* in order to settle demobilised soldiers. Throughout the contemporary history of the development scheme transfer, this analysis shows that the practices of developmentalism by the state with independence or regime change easily supersedes the ideological differences.

KEYWORDS: Agriculture; Angola; Development; Scheme transfer; State-building.

INTRODUCTION

Aldeia Nova (New Village) is a revival of a colonial project in Angola, which has a forerunner named *Colonato de Cela* that was developed under Portuguese rule in the 1950s. This model of colonial development has been cited in the Angolan and Portuguese media, mainly as an introductory explanation for the large scale agricultural development in Angola since the 2000s (Diário de Notícias 2008). In the years after World War II, described by Low and Smith (1976: 12–16) as the ‘second colonial occupation’, the colonial powers began scrambling for the economic development of the colonies. At the same time, the Bandung Conference in 1955 created political solidarity among the Third World countries, while the achievement of economic development was left to the newly independent countries to challenge.

The Angolan government inaugurated the *Aldeia Nova* project in 2005, three years after the end of the 27-year long civil war. It was one of the sub-projects of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) between 2002 and 2009 for the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, covering seven countries coming out of conflict: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. In the Angolan context, the *Aldeia Nova* project aimed at the

integration and settlement of demobilised soldiers of the civil war. After implementation, *Aldeia Nova* failed in 2008 along with the end of MDRP; the composition of the settlements changed drastically, as most of the ex-combatants passed over their property to the others who were not ex-combatants (Jornal de Angola 2010a; Interview with Rede Terra, 2015). It was again revitalised in 2011 with the aid of Israeli technical assistance. The project was implemented from the top; thus, it was the opposite of integration and peacebuilding from below (Ramsbotham et al. 2005: 216).

In this context, this paper aims to explore the points of genesis, continuity, discontinuity and further commonality in the revival of large-scale development projects that embody the developmentalism of their times to understand the character of the state, which is the driving force behind these projects. This article traces the routes of scheme transfer in the global context and explores the necessity to highlight the ideological uniqueness in large-scale development at the stage of nation building while the development scheme contains more similarities than uniqueness as a result of scheme transfer. This article also shows that commonality extends through the colonial, post-colonial, and even post-conflict period regardless ideological differences by presenting Lusophone Africa's case with special focus on Angola and Mozambique as prolonged cases of colonial development into the 1970s and as the cases of post-conflict state-building.

As the case of this paper shows, the same development scheme has been adopted from different perspectives in different political contexts and times, namely nation-building and state-building. While I have no denying the significance of independence, of gaining the sovereignty to govern one's own territory (Cooper 2008), the question I focus is how the state exercises its power for the challenges of governance through development faced after the independence or regime change. This paper presents the commonality in the orientation of the states at the stage of nation-building or state-building.

Before entering into the present discussion, the concepts of nation-building and state-building should be reviewed. Nation-building is a perspective that sees the establishment of a new national identity and has a high affinity with political ideologies that promote the establishment of identity. State-building, on the other hand, is a perspective that sees the strengthening of state institutions. The institutions and functions of the state include its functions as a policy-making and implementing body, which is the focus of this paper.

On the other hand, if we want to capture the social dynamics of revolution and ideological shifts, the perspective of state-formation is also useful for the early establishment of national identity, which corresponds to nation-building (Spruyt 2018). State-formation has been adopted as a perspective that captures the consolidation of institutions in post-conflict states, especially since the 1990s and 2000s (Sato 2012). It captures the contingent consequences of the strengthening of state institutions since the 1990s, which are not only directed by external pressures, but are also heavily influenced by domestic and international political dynamics (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010). However, in line with the purpose of this paper, it seems appropriate to analyse the cases dealt with in this paper from the perspective of nation-building and state-building, rather than from the perspective of state-formation.

The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. The first section briefly describes the central Angolan case and the research methodology. The second section gives a global overview of developmentalist practices during the period of national construction. The third section focuses on practices by Portugal, and the fourth section on those by Tanzania and Mozambique. The fifth section examines the practice of developmentalism during the period of nation-building and finally draws out its implications.

1. COLONATO DE CELA AND ALDEIA NOVA, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Colonalto de Cela, or today's *Aldeia Nova*, is located in Waku-Kungo, Kwanza-Sul Province on the Amboim Plateau at an altitude of 1,475 metres and along the transit zone to the central highland Bié Plateau. There are three rivers surrounding Waku-Kungo: the Queve River and its two branches, the Nhia River and the Cussoi River. During the colonial period, irrigation was constructed and the Kuwanza-Sul Province now has 10,600 hectares of irrigated land, the second largest amount in Angolan provinces after the 27,000 hectares of Luanda (Costa 2006). The location is about 410 kilometres from Luanda via the shortest route. However, in 2016, surface travellers had to take the longer route via Porto Amboim, which is about 522 kilometres, because of bad conditions. It is about 190 kilometres away from the provincial capital Huambo at the centre of Bié Plateau.

Along with field visits to *Aldeia Nova* in Kwanza-Sul in 2015 and to Bengo and Malanje Provinces in 2016, information was obtained through interviews with traditional authorities, in this case the *soba* as the key person in local communities, and the director of an Angolan non-governmental organisation, *Rede Terra*, working in the area of land resource management.

Other materials were also collected at the Historical Overseas Archives (Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino: AHU) and the Historical Diplomatic Archives (Arquivo Histórico Diplomático: AHD), both in Lisbon, Portugal and the Historical Archives of Angola (Arquivo Histórico de Angola: AHA) and the National Library of Angola (Biblioteca Nacional de Angola: BNA), both in Luanda, Angola between 2015 and 2016.

2. DEVELOPMENTALISM AND SCHEME TRANSFER IN NATION-BUILDING

The transformation of development from a colonial to a nationalist project during the late colonial period is crucial to understanding contemporary development practices (Van Beusekom and Hodgson 2000; Decker and McMahon 2021). During this change, the developing actors have certainly changed from colonial governments to governments of independent states, but it is also true that there has been a consistency in the nature of the state to intervene in society, and more specifically to try to penetrate the influence of the uncapturable rural communities (Hyden 1980). To be the driving force for development, as Scott pointed out, both colonialism and revolution are hospitable to high modernism which is a strong belief in scientific and technical progress that were associated with industrialization, for different reasons, and each regime disposes of an unusual degree of power (Scott 1998: 89, 97). Thus, some scholars immediately recognised the new wave of developmentalism coming together with democratisation (Agrawal 1996; Van Beusekom and Hodgson 2000).

Bonneuil (2000) details the wide range of views on the intellectual connection between agrarian development and specified state intervention as a tool for state-building in the transition between the colonial state and postcolonial Africa, especially in settlement schemes, which require control over the land and the people. This argument is similar to the argument by Beinart et al. (2009) which shows the continuity of the veterinary science and policy in Anglophone southern Africa, including a critique of socialist policies in Tanzania and Mozambique. Schneider (2006) also argues that the colonial basis of the authoritarian character within the postcolonial state and the construction of the citizen and subject are reflected in the practice of developmentalism exemplified by Tanzanian villagisation. This contrasts with Mamdani's (1996) perspective on institutions.

From the late colonial period to the decades of nation-building, the commonality of developmentalism and the nature of the state can be clearly seen by tracing the routes of scheme transfer and the timing of implemented projects. Given his own experience as a colonial officer in British East Africa, Chambers (2005) points out the continuity and irreversibility of the development projects along with commitment by the state. Bonneuil (2000) argues that these pre-packaged schemes were key elements in making of expert knowledge and postcolonial state-building in Africa.

In the case of late colonial experiences, each colonial power fortified its development agency toward the end of colonial period and began working in its empire to build the basis for contemporary bilateral cooperation. The routes of scheme transfer were kept open beyond the independence and regime change, allowing independent developmentalism (Cooper 2002) as seen in the following overview.

For example, in Anglophone Africa, the British Overseas Food Corporation implemented the East African Groundnuts Scheme at Kongwa in Tanganyika from 1947 to 1951. Its technical design was adopted as part of *Ujamaa* after 1962 (Lal 2015). The Perkerra irrigation scheme in Kenya was studied in 1936, launched in 1952, and then revived in late 1960 (Chambers 2005). The West African Oil Seeds Mission was succeeded in post-independent Ghana by the Gonja Development Company between 1948 and 1957 and then revived as the Damongo project between 1951 and 1956 (Campbell 2013). In Belgian Congo, the previous *Paysannats* system and cotton production were tightly connected between 1947 and 1959. In the case of Lusophone Africa, *Colonato de Cela* in Angola was started in 1952 (Costa 2006) and *Colonato do Limpopo* was launched in Mozambique in 1954 (Bowen 1989; Valá 2003) as the two largest development projects among the Portuguese colonies. Both kept their forms and received strong state intervention after independence in 1975.

The rise of those similar agricultural projects in Africa in the late colonial period had been facilitated by the establishment international organisations, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN) established in 1945 as part of the developing UN system in the late 1940s. Another key organisation was the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA), which was established in 1950 when there was very little machinery for technical and scientific co-operation in Africa. The CCTA, as a forerunner of multilateral cooperation, was established by the UN as a joint commission composed of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia. The CCTA accelerated communication over administrative and technical issues among the members (Gruhn 1971).

There are several routes, bilateral and multilateral, of introduction for these scheme transfers into African continent, though there are numerous cases commonly adopted the scheme from Israel. The presence of Israeli technicians was especially obvious in case of irrigation systems combined with agricultural settlement schemes: *kibbutz* (collective property and work) and *moshav* (a smallholder's cooperative settlement) (Peters 1992; Schwartz and Hare 2000). For example, Tanzania's Mwanza agricultural settlement near Lake Victoria implemented in 1962 (Sankari 1979) and Zambia's Luanshya agricultural settlement in the copper belt implemented in 1967 were both cases of bilateral aid from Israel (Schwartz and Hare 2000). Even the extensively promoted *Ujamaa* practice was technically not original to Tanzania (Jennings 2002; Lal 2015), as will be detailed later in this paper.

It is worth mentioning that the late colonial and immediate post-independence developments in Africa often accepted Israeli technical cooperation. This has to do with Israel's active aid diplomacy to improve the difficult international relations it faced from

the beginning of its existence, as symbolized by the fact that Israel, founded in 1948, was excluded from the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Ojo 1998: 8). The Israeli government accelerated its aid diplomacy in 1958 in the immediate aftermath of the Second Arab-Israeli War (1956–1957) with the creation of the Israeli Agency for International Development Cooperation, commonly known as Mashav, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Yacobi et al. 2020). In between the repeated Arab-Israeli conflicts, Israel developed an active aid diplomacy towards African countries. In terms of bilateral cooperation, between 1958 and 1970 Israel sent 3,948 experts abroad for technical cooperation, 63% of whom were sent to Africa. Also, between 1958 and 1972, 9,182 people from African countries were trained in Israeli institutions. Also in the framework of multilateral cooperation, for example, in the year 1969 alone, 38 Israeli experts were sent to Africa through various United Nations agencies (Ojo 1998: 18). As we have seen before, it was not only the colonial powers that introduced the development scheme from Israel in their colonies but also post-independence states, such as Ghana and Tanzania. This may have occurred because there was no contradiction in the new elites' understanding of practical communism for rural governance and agricultural production.

However, there was a contradiction between ideologies applied by the regimes opposed to each other, who nonetheless adopted the same scheme from Israel into their rural development projects. The Portuguese rural settlement scheme was also inspired by the Israeli moshav through the 1960s, while the Frelimo was inspired by observing the villagisation in Tanzanian *Ujamaa* in the early 1960s. Colonial policies and practices in Lusophone Africa, therefore, should be viewed as a part of the wider history of the developmentalism, the ideology which support the interventionist policy of governments to achieve rapid economic growth in developing countries (Hodge et al. 2014: 18). A recent case study on Mozambican state-building even stretches the continuity of state character and state-society relations into the age of liberal democracy (Sabaratnam 2012). Along these lines, this article proposes an additional perspective on the nature of state by highlighting the necessity of ideological uniqueness, such as Lusotropicalismo by Portugal or *Ujamaa* by post-independence Tanzania, while they were commonly inspired by and adopted the same development schemes.

3. SETTLEMENT SCHEME WITH LUSOTROPICAL FLAVOUR

In the context of global 'colonisation' in terms of settlement of new territories, Portuguese policy makers were not looking only at external territories, such as Africa, in the twentieth century. Her national territory itself was transformed into an experimental field of new settlement and rural development (Pinto 2000). The genesis of the modern settlement scheme of Portugal goes back to 1929, when the Portuguese government launched a nationwide mobilisation for bread self-sufficiency as a tentative solution to the weight of wheat importation in her commercial deficit after the Great Depression (Saraiva 2009: 40). At that time, the future dictatorial Prime Minister, António Salazar, was the Minister of Finance (1928–1932). Justified by its economic necessity, Portuguese agriculture began to be modernised especially in the southern part of her territory, which was developed as large-scale farms rather than the traditional small scale farms in the northern part of the country.

Agricultural settlement of Santo Isidro de Pegões in the Alentejo region, about 50 kilometres east of Lisbon, is an example of internal colonisation in the southern part of Portugal with people from overpopulated northwest; the driving force behind this was

the Internal Colonisation Board (*Junta de Colonização Interna*), established in 1936 by the Ministry of Economy under the dictatorship called the New State (*Estado Novo*, 1933–1974), which rose after the collapse of the republican government (1910–1926). The Internal Colonisation Board modelled its colonisation plan on fascist Italy and on the Nazi settlement proposals (Saraiva 2016). The National Agricultural Experiment Station (NAES) (*Estação Agronômica Nacional*) was established as a scientific arm of the Ministry in 1936; its first director, an agronomist named António Sousa da Câmara, became the leading figure in the internal colonisation project in Portugal. He followed international trends in agricultural technologies, as he had a prior academic career at the Plant Breeding Institute in Cambridge and the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Breeding Research in Berlin (Saraiva 2009). In the next decades, the NAES provided more experts to the Board of Export of Colonial Cotton Board (*Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial*) and the Centre for Cotton Research (*Centro de Investigação Científica Algodreira*) in Mozambique (Saraiva 2009).

The internal colonial project aimed not only modernisation of agriculture but also the reservation of state land for agricultural activities (Câmara Municipal de Montijo 2013). In sum, it was the turning point of land resource management in the 1930s in Portugal (Silva 2013: 179) and was extended to external colonies. Prior to the Second World War, Portugal had referred to the Italian success story when reforming its agriculture to improve the productivity of its wheat, and the Italian case had also been referred to by Germany. The Portuguese also referred to the American experience in the management of large-scale water resources through the construction of dams, sending technical officials to study there and importing dam-building technology (Saraiva 2016). The model for rural development for the post-war period was the Israeli settlements, which provided a picture of a modern rural community that bridged agricultural reform with flood control through dam construction and irrigation. The Portuguese agricultural settlement program, as mentioned above, had been planned before the Second World War. The plan was interrupted by the war, and the models to be referred to before and after the war were changed from Italian and German practice to Israeli practice, but they all have in common that Portugal modelled on cases which attracted attention from a technical and political point of view in their respective periods. As Cooper (2002: 4) points out, the transition of the preservationist colonialism of the 1930s to the ‘developmentalist colonialism’ in the 1940s and 1950s involved experts in agricultural technology and civil construction looking for an inclusive solution for the economy, urbanisation, agronomy, livestock, engineering, architecture, and landscape conservation.

Based on the project plan elaborated between 1937 and 1938, the Agricultural Colony of Santo Isidro de Pegões was founded in 1952. In addition to other social infrastructure, it featured two dams, irrigation, and pond. It was around the same time, in 1951, that a legal framework for studies of external colonisation was made and then implemented a year later in *Colonato de Cela*, Angola, followed by *Colonato do Limpopo* in Mozambique in 1954.

Beginning in 1953, Portugal introduced a series of six-year Overseas Development Plans (*Plano de Fomento para o Ultramar*). The plans developed the concept of Lusotropicalism, an idea originally articulated by the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre. Freyre’s conception of Lusotropicalism noted Portugal’s unique ability for ‘civilising’ indigenous people in the tropical world by ‘blending’ and assimilating their cultures, rather than denigrating and discounting them. Although the idea was ignored in the early stages of *Estado Novo* in the 1930s and the 1940s because of its justification of racial mixing, the Salazar regime in the 1950s adopted the concept of Lusotropicalism as a ‘useful ideological veneer’ (Penvenne 2005: 81) to justify colonial domination. The Minister of Overseas



Figure 1 Satellite view of Santo Isidro de Pegões. Source: Google satellite (Accessed August 27, 2019)



Figure 2 Poster for the internal colonisation. Source: Câmara Municipal de Montijo 2013.

Provinces promoted this idea and invited Freyre to visit Portuguese colonies in 1951 to 1952 (Hodge et al. 2014).

The first six-year plan (1953–1958) provided roughly \$55 million to Mozambique and \$100 million to Angola for investment in general infrastructure, such as roads, ports, railways, and communications. The second plan (1959–1964), published in 1958, became a driving force for the development of settlements in the 1960s. The government sent a mission to Israel and recognised the *moshav* as a model for organising rural communities in Angola and Mozambique (Fonseca 1960).⁽¹⁾ The second plan doubled its budget and diversified into health, middle and higher education, and agricultural development. Combined with other similar projects in Cunene in Angola and Umbuluzi in Mozambique, the agricultural projects funded under the second Overseas Development Plan received a substantial portion of the budget. Through the second plan, the settlement schemes received 71 percent of all agricultural investment in Angola and 84 percent of agricultural investment in Mozambique (Bender 1978; Penvenne 2005; Castelo 2014).

Colonato de Cela is the first and most representative model of white settlement in rural

Angola due to the size of public investment and number of families settled. The work, begun in 1951, established fifteen villages, each composed of a church, primary school, and 25 to 30 agricultural households with farmland. The first settlers, who arrived in early 1953, received, on the basis of a 25 year state loan, a house, yard, seeds, livestock, farm implements, a plot of about 18 hectares, and a monthly subsidy until the first harvest. The loan contract specified that each settler was expected to repay the state for the items received upon their arrival after their fourth year at the settlement. These agricultural development projects were not limited to family agriculture and also included with 51 middle-scale farms between 100 hectares to 120 hectares in size (Costa 2006: 213).

Despite the ideological uniqueness observed in Lusotropicalism, the practice in these investments did not differ from the practices of other colonial powers. The *Colonato de Cela* development project in Angola and the *Colonato de Limpopo* development project in Mozambique both involved high-profile, settlement schemes combined with irrigation projects. Ten years after installation, in 1964, *Colonato de Cela* consisted of 515 families, totalling 2,586 settlers in 15 villages (Costa 2006: 79). The sister project of *Colonato de Limpopo* consisted of 14 villages with 1,466 families in 1963, despite an expected total of



Figure 3 Satellite view of *Aldeia Nova*, Cela, Waku-Kungo, Kwanza-Sul Province. Source: Google satellite (Accessed August 27, 2019)



Figure 4 Henhouse and Residence at ex-*Colonato de Cela*, *Aldeia Nova*. Source: Taken by the author in August 2015.



Figure 5 Poultry & dairy products from *Aldeia Nova*. Source: Taken by the author in August 2015.



Figure 6 Satellite view of ex-*Colonato de Limpopo*. Source: Google satellite (Accessed August 27, 2019)

3,000 families (Costa 2006: 166).

Rural development as part of modernisation also brought the sudden construction of urban centre in the middle of the development site, as observed in Cela. The city of Cela, founded in 1901 and called Santa Comba in the colonial period, has a history as a commercial transit post and was renamed for the birth place of António Salazar, Santa Comba Dão in Portugal, in 1926 (ANGOP 2019). A bird's eye view of the city shows the figure of a wine bottle or pigeon, with the central church at the top. It shares common features of city planning in the 1950s and 1960s, the high peak of modernist construction, with Brasilia in Brazil and Chandigarh in India. Modern construction in the middle of rural spaces symbolised the aspirations of newly emerging states.

However, because the choice of Cela as the site of agricultural settlement had no detailed basis of soil science or prior market study, the results of white settlement were miserable (Costa 2006; Castelo 2016). The government continued to expand the settlement scheme, introducing additional technical assistance from North American companies for irrigation in 1958 and sending a mission to Israel in 1960 to study not only irrigation but also concepts



Figure 7 Residence at ex-Colonato de Limpopo. Source: Taken by the author in May 2019.

for the second development plan for community administration, such as *moshav* and *kibbutz* (Fonseca 1960; Costa 2006).

The government's understanding of poor production in the early stages of settlement was presented in a series of reports published by the Angolan Agricultural Survey Mission in the early 1960s. The vast majority of the targeted land seemed to have no effective agricultural occupation for the eyes of the Mission members, most of the time due to the mission's poor knowledge on agricultural practice by African peasants. Not only in Angola but also in Mozambique, Portuguese practices of agricultural settlements in the prolonged late colonial period in the 1950s until the 1970s worked against the tide of rising nationalism in the colonies (Penvenne 2005).

The genesis of Portuguese rural development combined with agricultural settlement occurred at the end of the 1920s. It equivalent to the phase of state-building just after the establishment of the new regime, which took its power by military coup after the political instability during the first republic (1910–1927). Though the implementation needed to wait until the end of the Second World War, the new regime, *Estado Novo*, demonstrated its power concentration through the implementation of centrally planned projects. Recovery from the political instability easily got a consensus on concentration of political power. In order to mobilise support for the national project, the government put special emphasis on ideological originality. The settlement scheme did not share that originality; on the contrary, the government intention was to follow international trends in development.

4. INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENTALISM IN TANZANIA AND MOZAMBIQUE

The scheme transfer goes beyond ideological differences. During the same period in the 1960s, the Portuguese colonial government accelerated the settlement according to the second development plan (1959–1964) in Angola and Mozambique, while Tanzania implemented *Ujamaa* villagisation after independence in 1961. Also, during this time, the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: Frelimo), founded

in 1962 in Tanzania, observed the process of *Ujamaa* villagisation. Frelimo set up its main military base in Nachingwea in the south of Lindi Region, one of the leading regions for the construction of *Ujamaa* villages, along with Mtwara. In particular, the successful case of the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA) in the Mtwara Region on the left bank of Rovuma River had grown to include 17 villages by 1967 (Lal 2015). By 1973 the number had increased to 1,103 villages in the same Mtwara Region and 589 villages in the Lindi Region (Yoshida 1979). Frelimo then modelled it not only from a developmental perspective but also from a military perspective for the liberation struggle, building communal villages beginning in 1964. This included strategic villagisation to rival that done by the colonial government on the right bank of Rovuma River in the northern part of the Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique. The Rovuma River is the natural border of these two countries, and the landscapes of the sides of the river are like a mirror reflection, including the vestiges of villagisation.

Ujamaa has been influenced by the varieties of socialism, as Lal (2015: 8) presenting a decentralized, pastoral version of socialist democracy, rather than proclaiming as a prepacked or fixed blueprint for revolutionary change. Even though any attempt is made to implement top-down nationalisation in the manner of Soviet-style socialism, the degree of penetration of state power in the newly independent African country is too uneven from place to place. The other alternative was the communal socialism of the village community as practised in Israel and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the practice in China was intended to allow the state to siphon wealth from rural areas through a combination of Soviet-style top-down and village-community-based practices. *Ujamaa* incorporated a variety of these prior socialist practices, but at the same time, in contrast, its practices were not limited to rural and peasant organising. It redistributed capital from urban to rural areas in order to eliminate colonial exploitation and inequality, and promoted the development of social infrastructure in rural areas, such as education, healthcare, water supply facilities and warehouses for storing agricultural production (Yoshida 1979; Lal 2015).

There have been diverse ideologies within socialist thought, and that there have been attempts to share the means of production in line with each ideology. But at any rate, all based on the need to expand productivity to achieve economic growth. What is clear is that developmentalism which is also an ideology supports a policy of state intervention in economic development, can easily transcend the ideological differences for the purpose of achieving economic growth.

The scheme for the construction of *Ujamaa* village was not consistent from the outset and the Tanzanian Government had to go through a trial and error process. According to Lal (2015), the Tanzanian government experimented with two different models of villagisation under Nyerere regime. Firstly, based on the scheme recommended by World Bank's survey mission in 1959–1960, echoed a technocratic strand of colonial policy and the international trend of modernisation and development through the construction of clustered settlements. The Tanzanian government implemented the first plan from 1963 to 1966 but abandoned it by 1966 because of its capital-intensive nature, state-supervision, 'expert' staff requirements, tensions among farmers, and tensions between farmers and managers.

The second one was more decentralised. The government encouraged cooperative farming channelled through the National Service and TANU Youth League (TYL). Emphasising voluntarism, the National Service was composed of Tanzanian youth between the ages of 18 and 25 to work on 'nation-building' projects. It was begun in 1963 under the oversight of officials from Israel and Yugoslavia. The original idea for the creation of the National Service, proposed by Tanganyika's Minister of Health and Labour in 1960, drew on Ghana's Builders Brigade founded in 1957, which mobilised groups of youth to

work in agricultural production schemes modelled the practice in Israel (Lal 2015). The TYL also took the initiative and locally established the RDA in 1962 as an amalgamation of communal villages.

During the early 1960s, the Israeli practice of liberal socialism, focusing on the cooperative farming based on *kibbutz* or *moshav*, had a certain influence on the construction of communal villages in Tanzania as Israel was a major donor of aid-in-kind and the fourth largest donor of financial assistance, after the United Kingdom, United States, and Federal Republic of Germany (Okoko 1987; Pratt 2009: 133, 168). There were continuous mission visits to Israel from Tanzania. Tanganyika's Minister of Agriculture visited Israel in 1961, and a delegation of Tanganyikan farmers and trade union members also visited Israel for three weeks in 1962. During the years between 1962 and 1968, Tanzania received about 30 Israeli experts, including ten experts in settlements schemes. In the same period, about 500 Tanzanians studied in Israel. This was a considerable number compared to the national power, given that the number of Tanzanian students in Britain between 1961 and 1968 was around 850, and that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was 350 by mid-1986 (Okoko 1987: 193–196). The Tanzanian practice of construction of communal villages based on the Israeli aid, became obviously politicised after the Zanzibar Revolution in 1964, drastically declined after the third Arab-Israeli War in 1967 and with the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war in 1973, not only Tanzania but also other African countries definitively broke off diplomatic relations with Israel (Ojo 1988: 35). In particular, since the Zanzibar Revolution, the Tanzanian government has strengthened its links with China, USSR, and other eastern countries, while a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts have led to a decline in diplomatic relations between Tanzania and Israel (Peters 1992; Lal 2015: 63).

As Frelimo was established in Dal es Salaam in 1962, its founding members were strongly inspired by the challenges for nation-building for TANU and followed the early stages of *Ujamaa* village construction in Tanzania with strong state intervention period between 1971 and 1975 (Yoshida 1979), just before Mozambique's independence. Mozambique, after the independence in 1975, had no direct cooperation with Israel as Tanzania did because Israel had already withdrawn development aid from Africa realising the difficulty of securing political support after the third Arab-Israeli War.

However, prior to independence, Frelimo established communal villages in liberated areas and experimented with a variety of agrarian cooperative systems, not only for military purposes but also for village governance based on Tanzanian *Ujamaa*. The essence of Tanzanian National Service and the TANU youth league was reproduced in Mozambique as the Dynamizing Group (*grupo de dinamizador*), which began leading communities instead of traditional authorities. The role and power of the Dynamizing Group was strong, especially from 1975 to 1977, before Frelimo created new party cells and established a national legislative system (Isaacman & Isaacman 1982: 307).

Tanzania implemented a more centralised development scheme initially in the first half of the 1970s and turned to a decentralised one later. What the Frelimo cadres witnessed in Tanzania was the early stages of the construction of the *Ujamaa* village, which was carried out under strong state intervention, and they did not witness the subsequent change of policy in Tanzania before starting the practice in Mozambique. Moreover, the late independence of Mozambique in the middle of Cold War when USSR was expanding its influence left little space other than adopting Marxist-Leninism as a principle for nation-building in the third party congress in 1977.

Along with the political and economic guidelines approved in 1977, Frelimo nationalised the land including *Colonato de Limpopo*, which was reconstituted as the Limpopo Agro-Industrial Complex (*Complexo Agro-Industrial do Limpopo: CAIL*) in the same year.

Frelimo's agricultural policy for 1977–1983 placed heavy emphasis on state farms and neglected smaller peasant and community farms. The thousands of peasants who had fled into the old *Colonato de Limpopo* soon after independence were driven out (Bowen 1989). Strong state intervention caused dissatisfaction among peasants, creating the space for the penetration of the rural by the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana: Renamo), an anti-communist opposition group (Roesch 1988).

At the fourth party congress in 1983, Frelimo acknowledged its mistakes in pursuing economic policies that favoured large-scale, central-planned, and capital-intensive projects and adopted new plans promoting more peasant and communal farming projects over the larger state farms. The previous development plan for 1975–1983 was obviously beyond the technical and organisational capacity of county's labour force. After the fourth party congress, CAIL was dissolved into small-scale companies (Bowen 1989; Valá 2003). The rest of the land was distributed for private and family farming. Though the management of old *Colonato de Limpopo* was not always successful, the production still continued as it was located in the area under Frelimo's protection against RENAMO, while old *Colonato de Cela* was located almost at the front line against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The civil war in Angola caused greater difficulties for the operation of old *Colonato de Cela* as seen in the following discussion.

The post-independence period in Angola is divided into two phases. During the first period between 1976 and 1984, the Marxist-Leninist government had a centralised development plan similar to that of Mozambique. In terms of legal measures, the Angolan government nationalised farms and restructured the *Colonatos* into eight agricultural complexes in 1977, including *Colonato de Cela*. *Colonato de Cela* was transformed into the Cela Agri-Livestock Complex (*Complexo Agro-Pecuário da Cela*: CAPC).

The introduction, production, and management of dairy products at CAPC was assisted by Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, including a visit from 28 technical assistance personnel from Bulgaria in 1979 (Costa 2006: 211, 235). The leading Angolan agronomist in the post-independence era, Enrique de Barros, continued to idealise the Israeli practice as a model of rural development in the late 1970s and 1980s (Costa 2006: 282). After the nationalisation, 31 of the 51 middle-sized farms that existed during the colonial period continued production; other small farms with 50 to 60 hectares were restructured into 14 production units under the Complex (Costa 2006: 213).

However, as Cela was located in a strategically important area for defending against the advance of UNITA, which was supported by the United States and South Africa, from the southeast, it became a target of UNITA.⁽²⁾ Some of the settlements were totally abandoned or transformed into the military bases by the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government (Costa 2006: 357). This period became marked by a decrease in production and an increase of importation of primary materials. Additionally, the war situation brought about the substitution of the Global Plan for Emergency (Plano Global de Emergência) for the national plan in 1983. The emergency plan was more sector-based, with bad inter-sectoral coordination, and put financial priority on increasing the production of petroleum and diamonds and offering products and other properties for defence (Costa 2006).

The end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of foreign military support brought some changes. Firstly, the Angolan government officially shifted its economic policy from socialism to capitalism, as privatisation had been underway since the end of 1980s. Secondly, the withdrawal of foreign support also made the civil war drag on endlessly, fuelled financially by natural resources such as diamonds. In 1991, CAPC was transformed into the Agrarian Development Office (*Gabinetes de Desenvolvimento Agrário*: GDA). But,

the war situation made GDA inactive, as it was located at the frontline against UNITA, until the end of the civil war in 2002.

The two colonial projects and their vestiges in Mozambican and Angolan underscore the argument made by Lal (2015). He points out that the principles in the post-colonial projects were strikingly multivalent but constituted the shared priority of a variety of political projects across the 1960s world. These commonalities partly resulted from active borrowing from foreign developmental schemes and grew more organically out of common structural or contextual conditions.

5. DEVELOPMENTALISM AND SCHEME TRANSFER IN POST-CONFLICT STATE-BUILDING

In Angola, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP, 2002–June 2009) funded a special project to reintegrate ex-UNITA combatants in early 2003, which was implemented by the UN Development Programme and the FAO. The MDRP was followed by a six-year program (2009–2015) called the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP). The TDRP was financed by a multi-donor trust funded by the African Development Bank, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Sweden. At the national level, the Angolan Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP) was implemented by the governmental Institute of Socio-Vocational Reintegration of Ex-Militaries (*Instituto de Reintegração Socio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares*: IRSEM).

While reinsertion was a transitional safety net, reintegration is a longer-term process for the ex-combatants and their families to ‘re-enter’ civilian life which they have never belonged to during 26-years war and to adapt economically. According to the final evaluation of the MDRP, there were an estimated 105,000 demobilised ex-combatants from the UNITA military forces and 33,000 from the Angola Armed Force (*Força Armado de Angola*: FAA) who needed to be demobilised by the project. About 85,000 ex-UNITA soldiers were demobilised by the end of 2002 and an estimated 20,000 more were demobilised by the end of March 2003. In sum, only slightly over 97,000 of the expected 105,000 were identified and demobilised. Demobilization of FAA soldiers was to have been completed by the end of 2006 but was still underway on a pilot basis with 278 in 2010 (Scanteam 2010).

Under the framework of ADRP, 177 sub-projects were approved and funded, and 88 sub-projects would be financed and implemented under the framework of the new Government Reinforcement of Reintegration Program (*Program Geral de Desmobilização e Reintegração*) (Scanteam 2010). ADRP needed to collaborate and coordinate with other governmental institutions and programs. It was clear that the Angolan government intended to link the integration of ex-military members with the rehabilitation of old *Colonato de Cela* in order to accelerate agricultural modernisation, developing the agriculture and livestock industry in that region and at the national level. It was developed into the *Aldeia Nova* together with the Institute of Agricultural Industry and Commercial Development Study (*Sociedade de Estudo e Desenvolvimento Industrial Agrícola e Comercial*: SEDIAC), as will be explained later in this section (TDRP 2008, O Portal do Serviços de Cidadão de Angola 2011).

The Angolan government repaired the houses and infrastructure of the old settlement for 250 families. Each family would receive one residence and a plot of about three hectares in 2005, as part of the global management of the project with logistic, credit, and product transformation and commercial assistance. For the purpose of reintegration of ex-soldiers,

the government undertook the project beginning in 2003. One hundred million USD was invested in *Aldeia Nova* for rehabilitation and the construction of eight agricultural villages and one logistic centre, which organises and supports farming and the raising of livestock. The project included the rehabilitation of eight churches, 12 schools, six medical post, 160 cow sheds, 240 aviaries, 80 pigsties, and 1,500 kilometres of waterways for irrigation, once lost before the independence due to its abandonment by Portuguese settlers (Jornal de Angola 2010b).

In that context, in Kwanza-Sul in 2006, 4,584 demobilised soldiers of UNITA were involved in the overall project in the municipality of Cela and the surrounding communities at Kassongue, Kibala and Mussende. Old *Colonato de Cela* was chosen by the Portuguese non-governmental organisation OIKOS as one of the project sites among the 177 sub-projects under ADRP (World Bank 2009); this was the only sub-project in Cela. The sub-project led by OIKOS in Cela was to construct agricultural development centres in the communities of Sanga and Quissanga Kongo, along with the headquarters in Cela. The sub-project selected 1,129 demobilised soldiers for work there and for the distribution of 200 oxen, 150 plows, 500 goats, and 2,000 hectares of land, combined with seed and fertilisers for the production of rice, fruits, and vegetables. The ex-combatants were supposed to receive agricultural, technical, and commercial education for their socioeconomic reintegration (ANGOP 2006).

At the rehabilitated *Aldeia Nova*, the project invested about 30,000 USD for each family and the beneficiaries received a house, three hectares of agricultural land next to their residence, and livestock such as cows, chickens, or pigs. The families must repay the loans within the next 25 years. The milk, eggs, and meat they produce would be carried to the logistic centre, where it would be processed and shipped to the market with the logo mark of *Aldeia Nova*. All of the houses were the same size: 70 cubic meters, with energy and water supplied by common sources and furniture and televisions provided by the project. The participants were composed of the families of government troops, UNITA's troops, and refugees who fled from armed conflict.

At this occasion of rehabilitation of agricultural facilities in *Aldeia Nova* since the end of civil war, Israeli technicians also participated in the project and explained the function of a *kibbutz*, which Angolans were trying to adopt locally. According to the project director, *Aldeia Nova* has two objects. The first object is the reintegration of 300 demobilised soldiers from the overall number of more than one hundred thousand. The other object is the challenge to reactivate the zone as it had been during the age of Santa Comba, as a centre of intensive agriculture or, more precisely, capital-intensive agriculture.

It was not only small-scale farmers that were involved in the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector at Cela. SEDIAC also produces maize and soya in Waku-Kungo. In an area of 3,300 hectares divided into 2,100 hectares of maize and 1,200 hectares of soya, it has an average production of 10,600 tons of maize seeds and 3,000 tons of soya seeds. SEDIAC employs about 300 workers but needs finance for expensive primary materials and to increase its cultivation with a pivot watering system. SEDIAC holds 40 middle-scale farms between 100 hectares to 120 hectares. Of its 300 workers, ten are foreigners (ANGOP 2015), including a Brazilian agronomist manager who was employed during the field visit in 2016.

In 2007, the *Aldeia Nova* project was expanded to other areas of the country including, for example, Agro Quiminha in Bengo Province just 50 kilometres away from Luanda. Each family involved in this project subscribes to the loan contract to be the owner of a house and a plot valued at \$32,600 (Diário de Notícias 2008). According to the local journal, the *Aldeia Nova* project has invested \$400 million to promote agricultural



Figure 8 Satellite view of Quiminha, Bengo Province. Source: Google satellite (Accessed 27 August 2019)

modernisation since 2008 in Bengo, Malange, Bie, Cabinda, Huambo, Lunda-Norte, Moxico, Zaire, and Uije. It was reported that the project would serve 200 to 300 families on average in each province, with exception of Bengo province where 500 families of demobilised soldiers and local peasants participated (Jornal de Angola 2008a).

However, *Aldeia Nova* was not free from criticism. Fernando Pacheco, an Angolan agronomist and the ex-president of a non-governmental organisation, contends that the centralised character of management in *Aldeia Nova* does not fit for the farmers, making it the most expensive agricultural project since independence. He also points out that it has not been adequately studied. Pacheco's critique is noteworthy given that he was the director of Agricultural Policy within the MPLA in the 1980s and one of the founders of the non-governmental organisation Action for Rural Development and Environment (*Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente*: ADRA) in the early 1990s and was a director until 2008 (Rádio Angola 2018). In the beginning of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration projects soon after the end of civil war, more priority was placed on agriculture and livestock projects in rural areas, but this shifted to vocational training because IRSEM realised that the majority of ex-military members today live in urban area. It was urgently necessary to support their initiatives for income generation by means of, for example, micro-credit (TDRP 2008).

Actually, some problems have been recognised by the municipal assembly of Cela, including that some of the 200 residences had already been listed for sale by the last years of ADRP in 2008–2009. Others questioned the sustainability of the project, its cost, the efficiency of the industrial centres, access to the market, the competitiveness of its products, and whether a centralised model of management would work for project efficiency (Jornal de Angola 2008b). The *Aldeia Nova* dairy farms and the SEDIAC middle-scale dairy farms produce meat, butter, and cheese; the traditional farms in these projects produce soybeans, maize, groundnuts, pineapple, potato, sweet potato, cassava, and fresh greens. However, the products are not marketed locally and, therefore, do not meet the local needs for food security (Jornal de Angola 2008c; Rádio Angola 2018).

In 2008, when the radical decline in oil price hit Angolan finance severely, the government seemed to show their intention for industrial diversification. But, the question about food security should still be underlined, as the major products and their production process were not locally-oriented. The more relevant point is the fact that more new players would participate in Angolan agriculture as the bilateral agreement between Angola and

Brazil was signed in 2015 (Agronegócios 2015), and Angola received a Brazilian mission composed of agri-business investors in 2018 (África 21 Online 2018). Their practices are large-scale, market-oriented agriculture, as it is more closely connected with the production process at CEDIAC in Cela, which has been directed by Brazilian managers for years. These circumstances of the participation of new players in agricultural development in Angola also reflected the behaviour of emerging countries in international relations, as both demanders and suppliers of development schemes.

On the contrary, it is worth considering why the Mozambican case of *Colonato de Limpopo* was not revived after democratisation in the context of post-conflict state-building in the same manner as in Angola. While the *Colonato de Cela* in Angola became a frontline base during the civil war and ceased to operate completely, the *Colonato de Limpopo* in Mozambique located within the sphere of influence of the ruling party, Frelimo, and continued to operate during the socialist period even with civil war as the public corporation CAIL. However, with the abandonment of socialism from the mid-1980s onwards, the Mozambican government has dismantled CAIL and redistributed the rights to use the agricultural land in the area to small private companies and individual farmers without proper management of irrigation. After the war, the government launched several projects for the rehabilitation of irrigation facilities, but left aside the issue of the re-organisation of the peasants and farmers in the area. In addition, the post-war reform of the Land Law, which was to be enacted in 1997, posed a challenge to the reconstruction of the relationship between the state and the farmers and peasantry who were already farming there. In this respect, it can be understood that the new land law of Angola was passed in 2004, the year before the start of the *Aldeia Nova* project, and that land use and rural development started to be aligned. In Mozambican case, instead of tackling these difficult issues head on, only the restoration of the infrastructure took precedence. Then the irrigation facilities were severely damaged by the floods of the Limpopo River in 2000 and 2013, and are still an extension of the disaster reconstruction after 2013.

In addition to the differences in the process of reconstruction from the conflict, there are also differences between the two former settlements in terms of the risk of natural disasters. The ex-*Colonato de Cela* in Angola locates in the high mountainous area and its water is supplied by the rivers of the country. On the other hand, the ex-*Colonato de Limpopo* in Mozambique locates in the lower basin of the international river Limpopo. The ex-*Colonato de Limpopo* itself has a dam for flood control, but there are several dams on the upper reaches of this international river. The fact that the ex-*Colonato de Limpopo* suffered major floods in 2000 and 2013, and water shortages in other years, illustrates the difficulties in managing the water resources of international rivers. International aid funds provided for rehabilitation of irrigation facilities in the context of post-conflict economic recovery, disaster reconstruction and more recently the Green Revolution in Africa (Kajisa and Payongayong 2013). However, the former focus on organising rural communities for inclusion of smallholders has disappeared and attention now focuses on the use of large-scale irrigation facilities and improving agricultural productivity.

CONCLUSION

Developmentalism superseded the ideological differences throughout the colonial, post-colonial, and post-conflict regimes. Newly independent African countries were eager to find the right model to achieve their rural development. Most of the post-independence African development projects were ideologically unique, as they were linked to nation-building

soon after independence. But, their practical uniqueness was technically limited. They continued colonial schemes or adopted existing schemes.

As some of the cases were continuation of colonial projects, these post-independence development projects were not technically unique in comparison with 'second colonial occupation' efforts. But, the essential difference is the agency to elaborate and to implement the projects embodied within the state of the newly established regime. In this point, there are some commonalities to be shared by the demand side and supply side of development schemes.

On the demand side, the introduction of the scheme from Israel coincided with political and military objectives to occupy the land by Portuguese settlers in Angola and Mozambique and settlers in Israeli *kibbutzes*. Soon after the independence or regime change, proper self-representation in the domestic political arena was one of the political necessities. This demand is common in not only Portugal, Angola, and Mozambique but in Ghana, Tanzania, and other post-independence countries. The urgent needs of the host countries and their recognition of the Israeli example as rural development and peasant organisation let them adopt the Israeli practices. To the extent that material is currently available, the interest of policy makers at the time was heavily weighted towards the technical aspects of organising and schemes for rural development, and it was not possible to ascertain from the archival material whether they were ideologically committed.

There is heterogeneity in host countries among colonial powers and post-independence countries. But the common features on the demand side suggest that the authoritarian character of the regimes helped developmentalism to transcend the differences among the political ideologies. The host countries also shared their political backgrounds as they recently experienced regime change, independence, or the end of civil war. The cases vary, but they all needed national leadership for unity, leading to top-down projects.

Even on the supply side, to be a model for rural development and scheme exportation as aid diplomacy of an emerging country was useful self-representation in the international arena. Wide acceptance of the Israeli practices was a result of the scheme export along with bilateral Israeli diplomacy. Looking back at the needs of demand side and supply side, the scheme transfer happens when the needs of both sides coincide. Their needs might include national, international, economic, and political agendas. This would explain the continuous situation of *Colonato de Cela* as *Aldeia Nova* revived in post-conflict Angola, not only with Israeli support but also with Brazilian support, the latter an emerging country among the BRICS. This understanding would be applicable to states' character and worth rethinking its meaning in the age of land reform.

Under the circumstances full of the difficulties to become independent in the post-World War II world order, in the polarised world of the Cold War, or in maintaining the framework of a single state rather than separating after a civil war, governments seeking to rebuild their systems of governance may have promoted state-led development in order to demonstrate their legitimacy by taking the lead in nation-wide or large-scale projects. In this sense, the motivation of the state for large projects is not simply economic, but highly political. This tendency is even stronger in times of transition from the old regime.

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NOTES

- (1) When Portugal was looking for a model for overseas settlement in the late 1950s, there were references in the discussions to settlements in Katanga in the Belgian Congo (Agência Geral do Ultramar 1952) and in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Agência Geral do Ultramar 1956, 1958). However, it seems that the former was a settlement associated with mining development and the latter was a settlement plan associated with agricultural operations, mainly focused on tobacco and cotton production through plantations, and was not seen as providing an adoptable model for Portuguese agricultural settlements aiming at smallholder settlement and rural development. As far as the author has been able to ascertain using the cross-sectional database on Portuguese colonial rule (namely *Memórias de África e do Oriente*), the only reports on agricultural settlements by the official visiting delegates, other than those in Portuguese colonies at the time, are those on Israel. Date Base: *Memórias de África e do Oriente* (<http://memoria-africa.ua.pt/>) (Accessed June 23, 2021).
- (2) Interview with traditional authorities called *soba*, Cela, Cuanza Sul, August 22, 2016.

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