

要約

Modernity and the Self: A critical study in the prehistory of the Kyoto School

CERDA PHILIP KAIN

In a brief window between the June 1926 publication of Nishida Kitarō's essay, "Place," and the philosopher's death in June 1945, something was happening in Kyoto that has drawn comparison with Jena at the turn of the nineteenth century. In the wake of the "Place" essay, the philosopher Sōda Kiichirō (1881-1927) would refer to this development as "Nishida philosophy," and five years later, a former student of Nishida's, Tosaka Jun (1900-1945), would christen the broader emerging phenomenon as the "Kyoto School." Today, the "Kyoto School" is a fraught category, and the field of Kyoto School studies is grappling with the peculiar problem that it has not reached clear consensus on what it is about.

This thesis aims to make a contribution toward addressing this situation by carrying out a critical study in the prehistory of the Kyoto School. In Chapter One, "Prehistory and Critical Study," we consider the problem that Kyoto School studies has not reached a productive coordination of efforts, a symptom of which is the dissatisfying phenomenon of "Kyoto School Internalism." Taking the reception of Nishida Kitarō as a case study, we will investigate the causes of this phenomenon and clarify the need for methodological reflection. Through this reflection, I propose that the motivations of Kyoto School Internalism may be charitably understood in terms of "contextual history," while dissatisfaction with this phenomenon is intelligible with respect to "philosophical history." Both contextual and philosophical history are guided by fundamental assumptions about historical relevance and philosophical significance. These assumptions are not conclusions that we can draw directly from historical texts or by working with problems in

philosophical subspecialities but instead belong to the “history of mind.” The task of the history of mind is to examine the assumptions behind philosophical questions and to adjudicate between alternatives.

I believe that the lack of a productive coordination of efforts signifies that our field has not yet found an effective way to relate these three approaches to history. I propose that doing so requires securing a framework for contextually motivated philosophical history and that such a framework can be established by attuning contextual history to the history of mind. Carrying out such an attunement and establishing such a framework is the task of “critical study.” Critical study must begin with an hypothesis about what assumptions in the history of mind to evaluate and what particular context to investigate. With regard to the history of mind, reflection on the controversial reception of Nishitani Keiji vividly evidences that assumptions about modernity play a central role in our understanding of the Kyoto School. On this basis, the “modernity question” is adopted into our critical hypothesis. With regard to contextual history, present lacunae in Kyoto School studies suggest that a critical study of Nishida’s and Nishitani’s works prior to the June 1926 publication of “Place” could serve as an efficacious starting point.

Chapter Two, “Modernity, Tradition, and the Self,” initiates the critical study by specifying the “modernity question” in terms of what Nishida was doing and why. For many working on the Kyoto School, it is plain that Nishida’s project was both philosophically significant and well-motivated. Yet, the explanations for these often hinge on ambiguous or implausible assumptions about the relationship between modernity and tradition. In clarifying these faults, I motivate the hypothesis of “detraditionalization.” On this hypothesis, institutions, including those conceived as “traditional,” attained a new status in virtue of belonging to a newly emerging global cosmopolitan social order. No longer to be taken for granted, these institutions became subject to the reflective

problem of legitimacy. Next, I turn this hypothesis to context. By examining recent work on one of Nishida's important Meiji predecessors, Inoue Enryō (1858-1919), I will show that in *An Evening of Philosophical Conversation* (1886-1889) he raises philosophical difficulties in understanding what it means "to become oneself." We will then turn to Nishida's two *Drafts on the Science of Ethics* (1905-1906), as well as the *Lectures in Psychology* (1904-1905), and by examining how Nishida defends the "origin of and need for the science of ethics," I contend that Nishida was grappling with the problem of "becoming oneself" as a demand arising from the distinctly modern developments in his social world, developments that we can characterize in terms of "detraditionalization." According to Nishida, the Meiji Restoration brought with it new reflective demands such that to "become oneself" meant that one had to see this reflectivity as a problem, to, paradoxically, "appropriate" one's own agency.

Chapter Three, "Self-Consciousness and Genuine Individualism," investigates the role of "personhood" in Nishida's "science of ethics" and offers a partial defense of his account. To do so, I draw on the two *Drafts*, the *Lectures in Psychology*, and his notes collected as the *Fragments on Pure Experience*. Our contextual question concerns Nishida's characterizations of reflexivity and the possibility of "genuine individualism." The science of ethics conceives reflexivity through the evaluative self-relation of ontological truth. All forms of life enjoy this relationship, but the life of self-conscious mind has unique features. Where the other animals find reflexive satisfaction in their bodily condition, agents find reflexive satisfaction in the rational appropriation of their own agency. Appropriation is achieved rationally in accord with social ideals or norms, the connecting points of social self-consciousness, which is itself normatively reflexive. According to Nishida, the unity of the individual and the unity of society are themselves united in virtue of sharing this connecting point within the mutual recognition of persons. This account seems to run

into the vicious circularity that Dieter Henrich has indicated in “the reflection theory of the self.” I respond to this potential problem by showing that, while there is a circle of “becoming oneself,” it is not vicious and indeed sheds light on the dynamics of “detraditionalization.”

In Chapter Four, “Absolute Spontaneity,” I argue that we can understand Nishida’s thinking at the time of *An Inquiry into the Good* as a response to detradditionalization within the highest levels of epistemic practice and, in that sense, as a contribution to the modernist philosophical project. Since the task is to understand the basic assumptions in Nishida’s problematic, we can avail ourselves to many resources beyond the *Inquiry* itself, including the second of the *Drafts on the Science of Ethics*, Nishida’s Meiji-era notebook, *Outline of Philosophy*, the *Fragments on Pure Experience*, as well as “On the Claims of the Pure Logic School in Epistemology” (1911) and “Answering the Critique of *An Inquiry into the Good* by Mr. Takahashi (Satomi)” (1912). Through an examination of these texts, I clarify the sense in which Nishida’s project is a post-Kantian attempt in metaphysics. On the one hand, Nishida and Kant agree that cognitive experience is an activity of discursive thinking. On the other hand, Nishida’s “method of concept development” rejects Kantian restrictions on empirical cognition to the appearances available to human sensibility. At the time of the *Inquiry*, the touchstone of experience is, not attributable to the putative *restrictions* of human nature, but lies in the unrestricted spontaneity of discursivity. Within the “method of concept development,” the spontaneity of discursivity is, in turn, ontologically wedded to the satisfaction of personhood.

Chapter Five, “The Absolute as Idealism,” turns to the young Nishitani’s defense of the “priority of the subject and validity of idealism” in “The Going Beyond of What Stands Against: The Not-Minding Only-Mind Doctrine” (1925), with reference to “Kant’s Aesthetic Ideas: On the Interrelation of Intuition and Feeling” (1926) and the “Biographical Sketch of Schelling” (1927).

In “Going Beyond,” Nishitani retrieves Hegel’s *Science of Logic* in order to preserve “the meaning of the living activity of the subject.” In order to clarify the philosophical significance of this approach, I draw his considerations into a recent controversy over Hegel’s science of logic and its import for establishing, what I will call, a priori freedom. On the one hand, Nishitani’s considerations highlight problems in Markus Gabriel’s New Realism, while, on the other hand, lending support in favor of the centrality of “apperception” granted by Robert B. Pippin’s Absolute Idealist approach. I conclude by qualifying and clarifying the significance of logic and apperception for a priori freedom. The result will be a contextually motivated philosophical history, or, in other words, continuity secured between past and present.

With context thereby attuned to the history of mind, we conclude by reflecting on the nature of critical study. A critical study is an attempt to both recognize another philosopher as a person, by trying to understand his or her context, and *recognize oneself as a person*, by exercising thinking oneself. Such apperceptive recognition, in turn, hinges on one’s ability to situate both parties in our shared history of mind.