

In this book, we first investigate the context that shapes the sphere of thought of Classical German Philosophy. We organize the situation of the thinkers who were able to accept Kant's critical philosophy at a relatively young age, with the students of the "Tübinger Stift" at the forefront, by drawing auxiliary lines of "Spinozism" and "critical philosophy." In Chapter 1, we trace the history of the Leibniz–Wolff school's criticism of "Spinozism" as "atheism" and "fatalism." In this context, "Spinozism" was not so closely associated with Spinoza's ideas as it was with the label for dangerous ideas that denied the existence of God, and this kind of "Spinozism" became common knowledge in academic circles. It was Jacobi who corrected this prejudice and brought a new image of Spinoza to Germany. In Chapter 2, we discuss Jacobi's response to the book, focusing on the "architectonic" philosophy system in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, from the perspective of the "thing-in-itself" problem and the theory of "causality." There, the tendency toward "subjectivism" and "idealism" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was called into question. This debate led to the second edition of the "Refutation of Idealism." Next, we interpret the debate between Kant and Maimon, focusing on the issue of the "thing-in-itself" and the theory of "causality." At that time, "Spinozism" was an issue, so we clarify the meaning of the criticism from Maimon's theory of the "divine mind."

The second part of the book clarifies the thought of Flatt, who was a major influence at the Tübinger Stift, from the aspect of Kant's and Fichte's reception. Flatt's interpretation of Kant is concentrated on the theory of "causality," the results of which are summarized in *Fragmentarische Beyträge*, and his "Lectures on Metaphysics." We point out that these interpretations of Kant were an extension of the writings and letters of Ulrich and Schulz, and clarify Flatt's theory of "causality" after identifying the characteristics of Kant's interpretation. Furthermore, because Flatt was also in a co-controversial and contentious relationship with Jacobi, we show that these disputes were based on "reason" and "sensibility" while clarifying the similarities and differences between Flatt and Jacobi (Chapter 3).

Next, as a legacy of Kant's philosophy, we clarify the characteristics of the theoretical standpoint of Fichte's early conception of the "Wissenschaftslehre." For this purpose, we clarify the depth of Fichte's problems and the nature of his issues by comprehensively comparing not only *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*, but also its preparatory works, "*Eigne Meditationen über ElementarPhilosophie*" and "*Praktische Philosophie*," as well as his letters at the time. At that time in Germany, centering on Jena, "Spinozism" was one of the points of contention in the acceptance of intellectual studies. We do not subsume this under the label of "Spinozism," but rather carefully trace what it meant by each theorist through a reading of letters and other sources. Then, to estimate the actual impacts of Schulze and Maimon, who are generally considered to have greatly influenced Fichte, we interpret the texts of these skeptics and compare and contrast them with Fichte's (Chapters 4 and 5).

In Chapter 6, we address the theory of "intellectual intuition (*die intellektuale Anschauung*)" to

highlight Fichte's academic methodology through a comparison with Schelling. Again, one of the main points of contention was "Spinozism"; Fichte explained that in Schelling's case, the issue was "Spinozism" as a passage to reach the "Absolute" (specifically, the "scientia intuitiva" in the *Ethica*). Thereby, Fichte pointed out that although Schelling was a Spinozist in some respects (as he himself confesses), he was a Fichtean in others.

In Chapter 7, we show that Hegel's relational ideas were fostered through discussions among Hölderlin, Sinclair, and Zwilling at the "Bund der Geister" in Frankfurt, and that their theoretical development was deepened mainly through the results of the constellation research to clarify their theoretical development. They were impressed by Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, but skeptical that it was "Spinozism," which explained everything from the action of subjectivity. They sought a way to reconstruct the lost "synthesis" by transforming Fichte's ideas. This "synthesis" led to the famous Spinozistic slogan "*hen kai pan*." We show that this "synthesis" was initially conceived as "indifferent," but gradually came to be considered holistically and relationally, and the main point of discussion shifted in a direction that sought to reach it through "aesthetic intuition" and "intellectual intuition." This book places their theory, which has disappeared into the background of this history of philosophy, as the fundamental motif of Hegel's holistic thought of the Jena period.

In the third part, based on the revelations from the "history of the constellation" reproduced in the first two parts, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* clarifies the logic of the "generation" of "Wissenschaft," which was the original subject of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The following issues have been raised in the conception of "Wissenschaft" in Classical German philosophy so far. First, Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, accepted the "aggregation" of the "parts" ("moment" in Hegel's terminology) of Wissenschaft. Thus, what is the relationship between the "whole" and the "parts" and the "methodology" that justifies the "aggregation," and what should "Wissenschaft" be grounded in have become issues. Based on the idea that the "Religion" and "Absolute Knowing" chapters in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be regarded as answers to these difficult questions, this book summarizes these ideas under the slogan "From Chaos to Order." This is the fundamental characteristic of "phenomenology," which reaches "Absolute Knowing" by describing phenomenological knowledge. Thus, the problem of "beginning" is also solved. Hegel does not have to rely on "intellectual intuition" to the same degree as Fichte, Schelling, and Hölderlin, nor does he have to start from an ideal "whole" from the beginning, as the members of the "Bund der Geister" thought, but rather, can talk about its "beginning" or "generation." This methodological idea of a "generating beginning" is Hegel's answer to the theory of "causality" and the foundation of "Wissenschaft," which have been reiterated many times in Classical German philosophy (Chapters 8, 9, and 10).

The historical quality of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* can only be clarified by placing the specificity of its approach within the flow of Classical German philosophy. In this book, we consider this the "hidden source" of Hegel's metaphysical speculation and attempt to elucidate the significance of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* concept in continuity with the Tübinger Stift.