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Once again on the Forms of Oath in Classical India (II): in Connection with the Relationship between the Inst., Dat. and Acc.

Toru YAGI

From Vedic times onwards, people resorted to such divine means of proof as an oath (sāpatha-)

1

or an ordeal (divya-)

2

not only in lawsuits but also in other situations. A person used the oath in order to dispel suspicion and prove his or her innocence when suspected of being guilty of such bad conduct as cannibalism

3

or theft

4

or unfaithfulness

5

or in order to declare his or her resolution concerning future commitment to revenge

6

loyalty

7

or an alliance

8

or the like. The latter type of oath is equivalent to a kind of promise (pratijnā-

9

/pratiśrava-)

9

. The ordeal

10

was also resorted to when the authenticity of a person’s claim to be a Brahmin

11

was challenged or someone was suspected of theft

12

. Thus the oath concerns either the past, the present or the future as the case may be, while the ordeal refers only to the past or to present status depending on the past. In either case, the crucial point is that both the oath and the ordeal are a means of last resort, by which the judgement of a god is called forth on the truth or the falsehood of a statement, as

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3 RV 7.104.15 (= AV 8.4.15).

4 For example, Mbh 13.95.56-69, 70-71, 72-74; 13.96.16-41. See Hara (1987) and Klein-Terrada pp.28-36, p.60, l.l-5.

5 For example, Mbh 3.75.7-9; 3.275.23-24; 5.172.14-15; R 7.88.9-11.

6 For example, Mbh 2.61.43-46; 2.63.13-14; 2.68.21-22.

7 For example, Mbh 8.50.34. See Hopkins p.333, l.l.31-32; p.334, l.l.13-14.

8 Kāś 7.17.7.

9 Hopkins pp.317-318.

10 ŚB 11.2.7.33.

11 TāṇḍyaB 14.6.6.

12 ChU 6.16.1-2.
a request for the testimony of the god as true witness. As Lariviere has pertinently pointed out: “So the intervention by the gods to determine the truth of a statement (i.e. daivapramāṇa) seems even to have been a part of the procedure of accepting testimony from a witness (one of the types of manuṣa-pramāṇa).” 13 It is therefore appropriate that both the oath (mainly the former type of oath) and the ordeal should be incorporated into the judicial system 14 and established as legal procedures 15 .

The declarations can be classified into three different types of the oath 16 . In this paper, reconsidering the relationship between them, I would like to show that they signify one and the same gesture as an action of swearing in spite of the difference in manner of expression, and to clarify as far as possible the relationship between the instrumental, the dative and the accusative 17 .

I. Three types of declaration

i. Type I: (Declaration I+) Declaration II.

[“A is (, oh interlocutor Z,) B.”] “I would incur (, oh god Y,) the loss or the receipt of (a guarantee) X if A were not B.”

Here Declaration I consists of either denial of a charge or a suspicion, or resolution concerning a future undertaking. Declaration II is the oath itself, which is nothing else but a conditional curse laid on an oath-taker by himself 18 . Type I is a verbal declaration including neither the root ṣap- “to swear” nor the roots ā-labh-/sprś- “to touch”. This corresponds to the definition of an oath given by Medhātithi, which runs:

\[
\text{nanu ca yady aham evam kuryām tad idam anīṣṭam āpnyām iti saṃkirtanakriyā ṣapathah} \quad \text{(Manubhāṣya ad MS 8.113).}
\]

14 ĀpDhS II.11.29.6; II.5.11.3; GauDhS 2.4.12.
16 I have tried to sketch out the relationship between them in my paper “Notes on the Forms of Oath in Classical India”, Professor Lakshman Sarup Centenary Volume (forthcoming). The oath by drinking consecrated water (kośa-), which occurs in the Rājatarangini (or KSS 119.39) and has been fully investigated by Kölver, is set aside.
17 The demonstrations or the explanations, which are necessary but omitted here, will be given in my paper “Once again on the Forms of Oath in Classical India (I) : in Connection with Kātyāyana’s vt.8 “ṣapa upalambhane” on Pāṇini 1.3.21”, Professor George Cardona Felicitation Volume.
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“The oath is a verbal declaration: if I should have done so, I would incur this undesirable (ανιπτα)(result).” (Hara 1991, p.51)

This type of definition is largely adopted by jurists (dharmaśastrin). The typical examples of Type I are as follows:

\[ \text{adyā mūrīya yādi yātudhāno āsmī, yādi vāyus tatāpa pārūṣasya (RV 7.104.15). “So may I die this day if I have harassed any man’s life or if I be a demon.” (Griffith p.100)} \]

\[ \text{ayaṅ caratī loke ‘smīn bhūtasāksī sadāgatiḥ, eṣa muṇcatu me prāṇān yadi pāpaṇ carāmy aham (Mbh 3.75.7). “The ever-restless wind that courses through the world, spying on all creatures, shall rid me of my life if I have done any wrong.” (van Buiten p.360)} \]

The latter example shows more clearly that the oath is a conditional curse laid on an oath-taker by himself, though the former is not substantially different from the latter because the former can be paraphrased, for example, as follows:

\[ \text{“adyendra ātmāṇaṃ hantu ” “Indra shall kill my own self today” or “adya tvam, indra, ātmānaṃ jahi” “Oh Indra, kill my own self today”} \]

Therefore, it would be better to formulate Type I as the following:

[“A is (, oh interlocutor Z,) B.”] “(Oh you god Y,) bring me the loss or the receipt of X if “A is B” were false.”

In addition, by using the root śap- “to curse”, we could paraphrase the above-mentioned examples as follows:

Type Ia: \[ \text{adya (indren) ātmānaṃ (=me jivitaṃ) śape yadi yātudhāno ‘smī,}} \]

\[ \text{“Today (by means of Indra) I curse my own self (=life) if I am a sorcerer.”} \]

\[ \text{sadāgatinā me prāṇān śape yadi pāpaṇ carāmy aham.} \]

\[ \text{“By means of the wind god I curse my vital breaths (=life) if I (=Damayantī) have done any wrong (such as unfaithfulness).”} \]

---

Type Ib\textsuperscript{20}: \textit{adya (indreṇa) ātmanā (=me jīvitena ca) ātmānaṁ śape yadi yātudhāno 'smi.} “Today (by means of Indra and) by means of my own self (=life) I curse my own self if I am a sorcerer.”

\textit{sadāgatīna me prāṇaiś cātmanām śape yadī pāpaṁ carāmy aham.} “By means of the wind god and by means of my vital breaths (=life) I curse my own self if I have done any wrong.”

These paraphrases would convince us of the propriety of the definition above. Other examples, which are classified according to the items of X, are as follows:

A: (The loss of the oath-taker’s) life
\textit{āyus-}: \textit{AiB} 8.15 (see Lüders p.657, note 3); \textit{prāṇān}: \textit{Mbh} 3.75. 8-9; 3.275.23-24.

B: (The loss of the oath-taker’s) identity
\textit{kṣatriya-}: \textit{Mbh} 3.154.26; Dāmodara: \textit{BālaC} 3.11; Yaugandharāyaṇa: \textit{PratijnāY} 1.16; 3.9.

C: (The loss of the oath-taker’s) possessions in a broad sense
C\textsuperscript{1}: human beings
\textit{prājā-}: \textit{AiB} 8.15.

C\textsuperscript{2}: possessions
\textit{loka-}: \textit{AiB} 8.15.

C\textsuperscript{3-1}: (The loss of the probability of going to) Heaven (due to C\textsuperscript{3-2})
\textit{Mbh} 2.61.45; 2.63.14; 2.68.21; 7.51.24; 9.20.20.

\textsuperscript{20} The examples of Type Ib are the following:
\textit{buddhebhyāḥ sataśaḥ śape yadi punaḥ kutrāpi kapālinī-pinottuṅga-kucāvagūhāna-bhavaḥ prāptah pramododayah}(\textit{Prabodha} 3.18).
\textit{savāmi bārṇhattañena jai idīśi kadā vi diṭṭhapuṇvā} (\textit{Ratnāvalī Act} 2, see Hara 1991 p.58).
\textit{savāmi devē caraṇeḥiṃ jai kassa vi pūrado paśemi} (\textit{Ratnāvalī Act} 3).

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C3–2: (The loss of the oath-taker’s) merits

\( iṣṭāpūrta-/sukṛta-: \) \( AiB \ 8.15; \) \( janmasukṛta-: \) \( PaṇcaT \ p.235, \) ll.21-22;
\( (tapaścaryāyāḥ) \) \( phala-: \) \( R \ 7.96.20 \) (ed. Kumbhakonam).

E1: (The receipt of the probability of going to) Hell (due to E2)

\( Mbh \ 7.16.29-34; \) 7 51.25-36.

E2: (The receipt of various) demerits such as sin, crime, vice, dishonour, impurity and the like.

\( Mbh \ 13.95.56-74; \) 13.96.16-41; \( R \ 2.69.14-28; \) \( SkandaP \ 6.32.68-80; \)
\( PuṣkaraM \ 11.50-63; \) \( AmbacoraJ \ 344,169-172; \) \( BhisaJ \ 488,77-90. \)

In Type I, it is usual that Declaration I, which we may well expect, is not expressed explicitly, but implied by Declaration II. This could be comparable, I presume, with the English expression “I could fly if I were a bird”, which implies “I am not a bird, therefore I cannot fly”.

ii. Type II: Declaration I+Inst.+(Dat./Voc.)+\( ṣáp “to swear” \)

“A is (, oh interlocutor Z,) B.” “By (a god Y as true witness and by a guarantee) X I swear (to you).”

Here the interlocutor expected to appear in Declaration I is put in the vocative or often omitted in Declaration I, or is transferred to a main clause, which substantially corresponds to Declaration II in Type I and in which he is put in the dative and/or vocative or omitted. On the other hand, a god to be invoked in Declaration II in Type I, where he is put in the nominative (and/or vocative) or omitted, may well be expected but is in fact usually omitted. The typical examples are:

“\( ātmanā \) bhrātyōhiś cāhaṃ dharmeṇa sukṛtena ca
iṣṭena ca ṣape, rājan” “śudayisyāmi rākṣasam” (\( Mbh \ 3.154.44). \)

“O king, by my own self (\( ātman), by my brothers (\( bhrāṛṛ), by meritorious action (\( dharma), by good deeds (\( sukṛta) and by my oblations (\( iṣṭa), I swear, I shall slay this Rākṣasa.” (\( Hara \ 1991 \ p.52 \)
\( bharatenātmanā \) cāhaṃ ṣape te, manujādhipa, yathā nānyena tūṣye-
myam \( ṛte \) rāmavivāsanāt (\( R \ Vol.2 \ App.I \ No.9 \ 1.74=\)Kumbhakonam 2.12.49).

“By (my own son) Bharata and by my own self I swear to you, oh king, that I will not be pleased with anything other than the banishment of (the crown prince) Rāma.”
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Other examples are the following:

A: life
   ātmanā (R Vol.2 App.I No.9 1.74; Bhārataṇa Sutta 3.154.44; Vol 9 1412*; Úrubh 1.64)
   jīvitenā (Mbh 12.136.126; ātmajīvitenānīrīṣṭena śapathena PratiṣṭhāY 1.6 prose)
   pādehiṁ (Mṛcch 1.30 prose where Śakāra swears to Vasantsenā; 8.37 prose where Śakāra swears to Viṭā)

B: identity
   baṃhattaṇena (Ratnāvalī 2.42 prose; baṃhasutenā in another edition; baṃhaṇṇena Mṛcch 5.39 prose, see Hara 1991 p.58)

C: possessions in a broad sense
C¹: human beings
   putra- (putraiḥ R 2.42.20; Rāmeṇa Vol.2 200*; Bharatena Vol.2 App.I No.9 1.74; putrāḥyaṁ Mbh 7.131.6; sutaiḥ 7.125.24)
   bhrāty- (tribhīr bhrātrbhiḥ R Vol.6 App.I No.9 1.31; bhrātrbhiḥ Mbh 3.154.44; Bhīmena Yāmābyām 8.50.19)

C²: possessions
   sāstrenā (Mbh 6.102.68 v.l.)
   dhanusā (R 2.18.13)
   mūlapalena (R 5.34.36)
   vāhanājyudhaiḥ (MS 8.113; NS 1.181; vāhanaśastrāṇi NS 2.20; BS 8.33)
   go-bhyā-kāṇcanaï( (MS 8.113; NS 1.181; -rajatāni NS 2 20; -kanakāni BS 8.33)

C³⁻¹: Heaven (due to C³⁻²)
   svarga-lokana (R 7.97.6 v.l.; -bhogena v.l.)
   vīralokaiḥ (Úrubh 1.64)

C³⁻²: merits
   sattvena (R Vol.2 378*; 2.18.13; 821*; 831*; 2.45.4; 7.97.6; Mbh 6.102.68; 7.53.37; Vol.9 1412*; 8.50.18; 9.29.19; 9.42.29; saccena Svapna 4.3 prose; trisattvyena PaṇcaT pp.61-62; MS 8.113; NS 1.181; satyāṃ NS 20.2; BS 8.33 v.l.; ŚukraN 737 cited in Pendse p.290)
   sukrtena (R 2.10.19; Vol.2 831*; Mbh Vol.1 612*; 3.154.44; 6.102.
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68; 7.131.6; MS 8.256; sukṛtāṇi NS 20.2

iṣṭena (R 2.18.13; Mbh 3.154. 44; 7.131.6)
iṣṭā-pūrtena (Mbh 7.125.24; 7.131.14; 9.29.10)
dattena (R 2.18.13; dattāṇi NS 20.2)
kṣatradharmeneṣa (R 1.57.8)
cāritreṇa (R 6.104.6)
japena (Mbh 9.29.19)
tapasā (Mbh Vol.9 1412*)
dānena (Mbh 9.29.19)
dharmeneṣa (Mbh 3.154.44)
vīryeṇa (Mbh 7.125.24)

C4: pleasure
bhāvānu vakta-vanitā-surate (Ghaṭakarpa, Lüders p.670)

D1: (The loss of) something, which does not belong to the oath-taker but which is desirable for him.
tvaṭprasadēna (Mbh 8 50.18)
sakhyaṇa (Mbh 6.102.68)
mountains (Dardara-, Malaya-, Vindhya-, Meru-, Mandara-R 5.34.36)

D2: human beings, who do not belong to the oath-taker but who are not only dear to him but also superior, inferior or equal to him.
Vāsudevena (Mbh Vol. 10 678*: Arjuna swears to Yudhiṣṭhira)
Kṛṣṇacarāṇaiḥ (Mbh 7.131.14: Śātyaki to Somadatta)
**tvaṭpādena (Mbh 8 50.18 v.l.: Arjuna to Yudhiṣṭhira)
**tvayā (Mbh 12.138.185 ed. Kumbhakonam: Lomaśa the cat to Palita the mouse)

**padbhyaṁ tasya (MārkP 21.92)
**bhavatā (Ūrubaḥ 1.64 : Aśvatthāman to King Duryodhana)
candaṇaa savāmi tuvja **hiaṇa (Mrçch 6.11: Viraka to Candanaka)
ajjuke savāmi bhāvaśa **śīśaṁ (Acc.!) attaṇakehim pādehim (Mrçch 1.30 prose: Śakāra to Vasantasadā)
savāmi bhāvaśa **śīśaṁ (Acc.!) attaṇakekelakehim pādehim (Mrçch 8.37 prose: Śakāra to Viṭa)
savāmi devie **caraṇe him (Ratnāvalī Act 3 Intro: Madanikā to Kān-
canamālā)

E2: demerits
sarvaiḥ pātakaṁ (MS 8.113; NS 1.181)
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With regard to the items marked with two asterisks, their function must be carefully investigated. By the way, *Mbh* 9.64.34-35, where the root *vadh-* “to declare”, not the root *śap-*, is construed with *satya-*, *iṣṭāpūrta-*, *dāna-*, *dharma-*, and *sukṛta-*, is substantially an oath.

iii. Type III: Declaration I + Acc. + -ā-labh-/*sprś- “to touch”

“A is (, oh interlocutor Z,) B.” “I touch (, that is, swear on, a god Y and a guarantee) X.”

Here the interlocutor expected to appear in Declaration I is put in the vocative or omitted in Declaration I, or is transferred to a main clause, which substantially corresponds to Declaration II in Type I and in which he is put in the vocative or omitted. On the other hand, a god expected to be invoked in Declaration II is usually omitted. The typical examples are:

\[
yathā, śālvapate, nānyaṁ naraṁ dhyāmi kathāṁ cana
\textit{tvām rīte, puruśavyāghra, tathā mūrdhānam ālabhe} (Mbh 5.172.14).
\]
As “I (=Ambā) have never thought of, oh king of Śālavas, any other man than you, oh man (as brave as a)-tiger”, therefore (, that is, in witness of the truth of my declaration) I touch my head (=I swear on my head).

\[
nāhatvā vinivarte 'ham kṛṇam adya raṇājirāt
\textit{iti satyena te pādau sprśāmi, jagatipate} (Mbh 8.50.34).
\]
“If I do not slay Kṛṇa today, I (=Arjuna) will not return from the battle-field”, because of (, that is, in witness of) the truth (of my declaration) I touch your feet, oh king (=Yudhiṣṭhir) (=I swear on your feet).

Other examples are the following:

A: life

\[
ātmānam (Mbh 3.281.98; 5.172.15; 13.2.71; 14.80.15; 15.6.12)
\]
\[
mūrdhānam (Mbh 5.172.14)
\]

C: possessions in a broad sense

C\textsuperscript{1}: human beings

\[
.putra-ḍārasya śirāṃsi (MS 8.114; BS 8.33; putrādimastakam KS 420; putrādīnāṃ śirāṃsi ĶuṅkE 737 cited in Pendse p.290)
putra-ḍārādi-śapathān (Hārīta cited in Pendse p.287)
\]

21 Add *parā-mṛś-* (*Mahāsuta*J 537,403) and *ā-dā-* (*Mahāsīla*J 51).
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C²: possessions
   ōyudham (R Vol.2 455*; 2112* 1.8; 3.26.3; Vol.3 504* 1.22; Mbh 1.205.29; 3.15.10; 3.240.39; 7.123.16; 7.160.12; 8.50.19)
   aśtraśya (karma- P.2.3.65 in connection with sāṃsprśan) vipro 'pi śatraśyāpi ca kṣatriyaḥ (SkandaP 1.2.44.11ab, cited in Pendse p.291)
   gadām (Mbh 5.73.14)
   asi-/satti- (śatrī-) (MahāsutaJ 537, 403)
   kagg- (kadga-) (MahāśilaJ 51)
   dhanāni (ŚukraN 737 cited in Pendse p.290)
   tīla- (ViS 9.6) rajata- (ViS 9.7) suvarna- (ViS 9.8)
   hastiskandha-aśvaprśtha-rathopastha-śastra-ratna-bīja-gandha-rasa-
   svarna-hiraṇyani (KAŚ 7.17.7)
   hiraṇya- (Vasiṣṭha cited in DhK p.243)

D²: human beings, who do not belong to the oath-taker but who are not only dear to him but also superior to him.
   bhartṛcaraṇān sprśtvā...śapathaiḥ (KSŚ 119.37)
   mātaraṃ pitaram (SkandaP 1.2.44.12, cited in Pendse p.291)

F: items** the function of which must be carefully investigated.
   **te/tava pādau (R Vol.2 455*; 677*; Mbh 3.75.6)
   **te pādapanikajasparśena (Kād p.294)

W: items which function as a witness, not as a guarantee.
   sūciḥ pādau ravaḥ sprēt (SkandaP 1.2.44.10, cited in Pendse p.291)
   māṁ (one of the epithets of Lākṣmi according to, for example, the Abhidhānaratnamāla 1.31) sāṃsprśaṁs tathā vaisyāḥ śudraḥ svagū-
   rum eva ca (SkandaP 1.2.44. 11cd, cited in Pendse p.291)
   agny-udaka-sīl-prākāraloṣṭa- (KAŚ 7.17.7)
   devatā-pitr-pādāḥ (NS 20.2)
   deva-brāhmaṇa-pādāḥ (BS 8.33)
   pūjyam (SkandaP 1.2.44.12, cited in Pendse p.291)
   pūjya-pādān (ŚukraN 737 cited in Pendse p.290)
   śudraṁ dūva-karaṇ śapayet (ViS 9.5)
   sīrodhdṛtamahi-karam (ViS 9.9)
   brāhmaṇaṁ sītoddhṛtamahi-karam eva śapayet (ViS 9.17)
   gośakrd-darbhān (Vasiṣṭha cited in DhK p.243)
   puspa-, pādalambhana (Hārīta cited in DhK p.442)
II. The relationship between Type I, II and III

i. The relationship between Type I and II

The comparison of Type II with Type III shows that Type II is equivalent to Type III. This means that “Inst.+şap-” (“to swear by Y and by X”) corresponds to “Acc.+ā-labh-/spré-” (“to touch Y and X”), in other words, that “to touch Y and X” implies “to swear on Y and X”. When the root şap- means “to curse”, we call it şap1-. On the other hand, when it means “to swear”, we call it şap2-. The relationship between Type I and II are as follows:

Type I: (“pāpaṁ na carāmy ahām”) “ayaṁ carati loke ’śmin bhūtāsākṣī sadāgatiḥ esa muṇcato me prāṇān yadi pāpaṁ carāmy ahām” (=şap2 atha-)

= Type Ia: (“pāpaṁ na carāmy ahām”) “sadāgatinā me prāṇān şap1 e yadi pāpaṁ carāmy ahām”
“By means of the wind god I curse my vital breaths if I have done any wrong.”

= Type Ib: (“pāpaṁ na carāmy ahām”) “sadāgatinā me prāṇais cātmānaṁ şap1 e yadi pāpaṁ carāmy ahām”
“By means of the wind god and by means of my vital breaths I curse my own self if I have done any wrong.”

= Type II: “pāpaṁ na carāmy ahām” “sadāgatinā me prāṇais ca şap2 e”
“I have not done any wrong.” “By the wind god and by my vital breaths I swear.”

From these, we get the following well-known equation:
şap2- “to swear” =şap1- “to curse”+ātmānaṁ+yadi...
= “to curse one’s own self on a given condition”

ii. The generalization of Type I, II and III

Even if an interlocutor Z to whom one swears is referred to, the situation is the same if we set aside detailed grammatical discussion. Type I, II and III are generalized as follows:

Type I: (“A is, oh Z, B.”) “I would incur the loss or the receipt of X brought by Y if A were not B.”

= (“A is, oh Z, B.”) “Oh you Y, bring me the loss or the receipt of X if A were not B.”
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= ("A is, oh Z, B.") "Y-ā X-aṁ śap1e yadi..."

"By means of Y I curse X if..."

= ("A is, oh Z, B.") "Y-ā X-ā cātmānam śap1e yadi..."

"By means of Y and by means of X I curse my own self if..."

Type II: “A is, oh Z, B.” "Y-ā X-ā ca Z-e śap2e"

"By Y and by X I swear to Z.”

Type III: “A is, oh Z, B.” "Y-aṁ X-aṁ ca spṛśāmi/ālabhe”

I touch (, that is, swear on) Y and X.”

Thus, Type I, II and III are all equivalent. This means that they signify “one and the same gesture as an action of swearing”, that is, “the action of touching Y and X” in spite of the difference in manner of expression. As M. Hara has pertinently pointed out in a series of his works22, X is, in most of cases, a substance or something regarded as a substance. Therefore, it is touchable, disposable and transferable. When an oath-taker swears, for example, by the truth (satya-), it is a “merit-substance” called “the truth” and accumulated in his body, which results from “the truth” and assures him of going to Heaven after death. With regard to Type II, the expression “By Y (as true witness) I swear” is usual in the European oath, while the expression “By X (as a guarantee) I swear” is so in the Indian oath, as has already been pointed out by learned scholars23. And Type III shows that, in the context of the oath, “to touch” is either “to touch Y” or “to touch X”. “To touch X” implies “to lay a curse on X”, in other words, “to offer X insecurity”. On the other hand, “to touch Y” implies “to make obeisance to Y as true witness”, as has been pointed out by Hopkins24. But the trouble is that there are some cases in which it is not easy to ascertain whether Z functions as a mere interlocutor, as a guarantee X, as a witness Y or as a witness and interlocutor, when an oath-taker touches the feet of Z.

III. The function of a person put in the Inst., Dat. or Acc.

As we have seen above, Y, put in the instrumental in Type II or in the accusative in Type III, functions as a witness, while X, put in the instrumental

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24 24 Hopkins p.333.
in Type II or in the accusative in Type III, functions as a guarantee. And Z, put in the dative in Type II, functions as an interlocutor.

i. Consideration from the point of view of Vyākaraṇa

The following points are a well-known fact:

1. The root ̕s̕ap- (dh.1.1049 or 4.59 “sāpa ākroṣe”, svaritē) is an ubhaya-padin “root which takes the active ending or the middle ending as the case may be” (P.1.3.72).

2. It takes a direct object (sakarmaka-).

P.1.3.72 “svarita-ृ-itāḥ kartrabhīprāye kriyaphale (ātmānapadām 12)” prescribes: (The middle ending is introduced) after (a root) which has as index a svarita “(nasalized) vowel with the circumflex accent” or ृ when the result of an action (denoted by the root) is intended for an agent (of the action). The root ̕s̕ap- put in the middle voice has been interpreted as denoting “to curse one’s own self/sich verfluchen, that is, to swear/geloben”, which is of course not erroneous as a conclusion, but is not exact in the sense that the process of arriving at the conclusion is omitted. Given that the word ākroṣa- in dh.1.1049 or 4.59 is synonymous with the word ̕s̕apa- “curse, that is, the action of cursing”\footnote{See, for example, the Abhidhānaratnamālā 1.149a “sāpa ākroṣa ākṣepaḥ”}, P.1.3.72 only prescribes, in the case of the root ̕s̕ap- “to curse”, that ̕s̕ap\textsuperscript{1}e (I curse) is equivalent to “ātmāne (P.1.4.32) ̕s̕ap\textsuperscript{1}e (I curse for my own sake)”. That is to say, people say “ ĕp\textsuperscript{1}e (I curse)” instead of taking the trouble to say “ātmāne ̕s̕ap\textsuperscript{1}e (I curse for my own sake)”. It never prescribes that “ ĕp\textsuperscript{1}e (I curse)” is equivalent to “ātmānaṃ (P.1.4.49) ̕s̕ap\textsuperscript{1}e (I curse my own self)” Then, whom do I curse, because the root ̕sap- takes a direct object? For my own sake (ātmāne), I curse ( ĕp\textsuperscript{1}e) my own self (ātmānaṃ) or someone/something else (param) as the case may be. This results in the following equation:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{̕s̕ap\textsuperscript{1}e (P.1.3.72):} & \quad \Rightarrow (\text{ātmāne (P.1.4.32)}) \ ̕s̕ap\textsuperscript{1}e: \\
\text{I curse (on condition that}} & \quad \text{I curse (for my own sake).} \\
\text{the result of the action of cursing} & \quad \text{If the action of cursing is finally} \\
\text{is intended for myself).} & \quad \text{directed to X, not to myself, then,} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\Rightarrow (\text{ātmāne Y-ā X-āṃ}) \ ̕s̕ap\textsuperscript{1}e: & \quad \text{I}
\end{align*}
\]

\text{curse (X by means of Y for my own sake).} \\
\text{If the action of cursing is finally} 
\]
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directed to myself, not to X, then,

\(= (\text{ātmane } Y-ā X-ā \text{ ca ātmānam}) \)

\(\text{sap}^1 \text{e}: \) I curse (my own self by
means of Y and by means of X
for my own sake).

If we generalize these, then,

\(= (\text{ātmane } Y-ā X-ā \text{ cātmānaṃ}) \text{ sap}^1 \text{e}: \)

I curse (my own self by means of Y
and by means of X for my own sake).

[In the case of the active voice, read
\(\text{parasmai} \) (P.1.4.32) for \(\text{ātmane} \)
and \(\text{sap}^1 \text{āmi} \) (P.1.3.78) for \(\text{sap}^1 \text{e}.\)]

This holds good for the oath \(\text{sap}^2 \text{atha}^-\), when we take into account the
equation mentioned at the end of II.i.

The only difficulty is a case in which the root \(\text{sap}^1^-\) "to curse" is put in
the middle voice and is construed with an interlocutor Z such as \(\text{te} \) (you)
put in the dative, for P.1.3.72 shows that, when \(\text{sap}^1^-\) put in the middle
voice is construed with a person put in the dative, the very person is a
curser/oath-taker himself, not the interlocutor Z such as \(\text{te} \) (you). Pāṇini
has got over the difficulty by formulating P.1.4.34 "\(\text{slāgha-hnui-sthā-śapām}
\text{jñāpsyamānaḥ} \) (sampradānam 32)" which defines a specified type of indirect
object as follows: With reference to the roots \(\text{slāgh}-, \text{hnui}-, \text{sthā}-\) and \(\text{sap}-\),
one to whom (something/someone) is being desired (by the agent) to be
made known" (by the action denoted by each root) is (technically called)
an indirect object. As for Kātyāyana, taking P.1.4.34 into account, he has
taken the trouble to formulate vt.8 "\(\text{sapa upalambhane} \)" [(The middle ending
is introduced not only after the root \(\text{krīḍ-} \) preceded by \(\text{anuv-} \), etc., but also
after the root \(\text{sap}-\), only when this is used) in the sense of \(\text{upalambhane} \)]
on P.1.3.21 "\(\text{krīḍo 'nu-saṁ-paribhyas ca (ātmane padam 12, ānāḥ 20) \)" [which
prescribes: (The middle ending is introduced) after the root \(\text{krīḍ-} \) (dh.1.373
"\(\text{krīḍṛ vihāre} \), udāttet P.1.3.78) (, only when this is) preceded by \(\text{anuv-} \), etc. (, blocking P.1.3.78.)) in order to point out explicitly Pāṇini’s ulterior motive for
the formulation of P.1.4.34. A detailed discussion on these points is omitted
here.

In short, the root \(\text{sap}-\) “to curse” is put in the middle voice, in Pāṇini’s
opinion, according to P.1.3.72 in spite of P.1.3.78, only when the root implies
“the action of making (someone) know (the agent’s own intention)” [\(\text{ṛṇāpana} \)
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-, which corresponds to prakāśana- “the action of making (the agent’s own intention) clear (to someone)” in P.1.3.23, by the action of cursing the agent’s own self on a given condition, and even if the result of the action “jnāpana-/prakāśana-” implied by the root is not intended for the agent. In Kātyāyana’s opinion, the root šap- is put in the middle voice according to vt.8, not to P.1.3.72, in spite of P.1.3.78, only when the root implies the action “upalambhana-” by the action of cursing the agent’s own self on a given condition, and even if the result of the action “upalambhana-” implied by the root is not intended for the agent. Thus, the root šap- put in the middle voice is legally construed with the interlocutor Z such as te (you) according to P.1.4.34, not to P.1.4.32.

ii. The interpretation of the word upalambhana- by the Kāśikā

The meaning of the word upalambhana- in vt.8 “śapa upalambhane” is a particularized one of the registered general meaning of the word ākroṣa- in dh.1.1049 or 4.59 “śapa ākroṣe”, in other words, the meaning “upalambhana” is included, as the particular, in the meaning “ākroṣa/śapa”. The former is not equal to the latter, nor independent of the latter. The former does not include the latter, either. The demonstration is omitted here. In any case, I think that both Kātyāyana and Patañjali interpret the word upalambhana- as denoting “the action of making (someone) perceive/understand”. On the line of Muni-traya, Kaiyata and Nāgeśa interpret the word as (implying) prakāśana- “the action of manifesting/making clear”. On the other hand, the Kāśikā interprets the word upalambhana- as “vācā śarirasparśanam (the action of touching a body with a declaration)”. This means the following: 

śapatha-(oath, the action of swearing)=upalambhana-=vācā śarirasparśanam-.

Therefore, the expression devadattāya šap2 ate “He swears to Devadatta (that A is B)” cited as an example is equivalent to devadattan sprśati/ālabbate ("A is B," ) He touches (the feet of) Devadatta’. Thus, the definition of an oath given by the Kāśikā, which is followed by Jinendrabuddhi, Haradatta and Bhaṭṭojī, perfectly corresponds to Type III. It is not certain whether the Kāśikā regards the word upalambhana- as synonymous with sparśana-/ālambhana- “the action of touching” or as denoting “the action of making (someone) perceive/understand”. But I presume that the former alternative is implausible because it amounts to the absurdity that the root šap2- “to swear” denotes also “to touch” to be denoted by the roots sprś-/ā-
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Therefore, I believe that the Kaśikā also interprets the root śap²-
“to swear” as implying upalambhana- “the action of making (someone) per-
ceive/understand” by the action of swearing. And “the action of making
(someone) perceive/understand” takes the form of “the action of touching
a body with a declaration”. This reflects, I believe, “the way of swearing”
prevalent in those days. In any case, the crucial point is that “Dat. +śap-” in
Type II is equivalent to “Acc. +sprš-/ā-labh. ” in Type III. For example, “Z-e
śap² e ” [I swear to Z (that A is B).] is equivalent to “Z-am spršāmi/ālabhe”
[(“A is B,”) I touch (the feet of) Z].

iii. The explanation of an oath by Nāgęśa
śapatir nānārthaḥ. asty ākrośe, devadattaṃ śapatīti, nindatītyarthaḥ.
asti tatvāvedanapūrvakaṃ tatpratyāyanāya brāhmaṇaḥ kvacid
dhastādinaṃ sākyāṁsparśarūpe mānasasparśarūpe vā śapate, yathā
vipraih śape, kṣātradharmena śapa ityādau. tītīyā tu karmano ’pi
caranatvavivaksayā. asti prakāsane, devadattāya śapate, kathayatītya-
arthaḥ. tatra svaritettvāt siddhe ‘kartrabhīpṛyārtham idaṃ. tad api
prakāśanārtha eva.
(Or, the root śap-) is (used) in the (particularized) sense of action of
swearing, which, preceded by a declaration (by an oath-taker) of a fact,
takes the form of action of touching (such an object as) a Brahmin,
etc., on a certain part (of his body) with a hand, etc., directly or in the
mind in order to convince (an interlocutor to whom he swears) of the
very fact as in, among others, (such an expression as) “vipraih śape
(By Brahmins I swear)” or “kṣātradharmena śape (By the duty of the
warrior class I swear)”. [Therefore, according to the present definition
of an oath, we may well expect such an expression as “vipraih spršāmi
”, i.e., (“A is B,”) I touch Brahmins (directly).’ or “kṣātradharmena spršāmi”, i.e., (“A is B,”) I touch the duty of the warrior class (in my
mind).’] But (, in the above-quoted expressions,) the third case ending
(expressing the instrument of the realization of an action denoted by a
root) is (used) because one desires to express that the direct object (, expressed by the second case ending, of the action of swearing— here
this action of swearing takes the form of action of touching denoted

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26 In the Dhatupātha, the meaning “to touch” is not given to the root śap-. Only Yāska
gives the meaning “to touch” to the root śap- in the Nirukta 3.21 “śepah śapateḥ
sprṣatikarmaṇaḥ”, which means that the word śepa- “the male organ” (is derived)
from the root śap- (which denotes) “the action of touching”.

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by the root \( spṛś- \) is also the instrument (of the realization of the action of swearing denoted by the root \( ūp- \)).

Nāgęša’s explanation of an oath perfectly corresponds to the definition of an oath given by the Kāśikā. The crucial point is that “\( \text{Inst.} + ūp- \)” in Type II is equivalent to “\( \text{Acc.} + spṛś-\text{/ā-labh-} \)” in Type III. For example, \( vipraih ūp^2e \) “By Brahmins I swear (that A is B.)” is equivalent to \( viprān spṛśāmi\text{/ālabhe} \) ‘(“A is B,”) I touch (, that is, swear on, the feet of) Brahmins.’

iv. Hopkins’ remarks

It is necessary to list as many items as possible, to analyse them in connection with the relationship between an oath-taker, an interlocutor and someone by/on whom the oath-taker swears, and to ascertain their function in order to clarify the peculiarity of the Indian oath. As is often pointed out, these items generally fulfill the function of a wager or a guarantee (in a broad sense, including personal security). And a god as a third person as it were, not the interlocutor to whom the oath-taker swears, disposes of the guarantee if the oath has turned out false, which is fundamentally different from a gamble or the contract with regard to, for example, a housing loan. As we have already seen, Type I, II and III are substantially equivalent in spite of the difference in manner of expression, and so “that (Y or X) by which one swears” in Type II corresponds to “that (Y or X) which one touches, that is, swears on” in Type III. When the oath-taker touches his own self, the question what part of his body to touch generally depends on the superiority or inferiority in the social rank of the oath-taker and the interlocutor, that is, the superiority or inferiority according to the caste or according to the relationship of lord and vassal, of husband and wife, of parent and child or the like in the case of the same caste. The same also holds good when the oath-taker touches the interlocutor or someone else. Generally speaking, if the oath-taker is inferior to the interlocutor or someone else, he touches either his own head or the feet of the interlocutor or of someone else. If he is superior, he touches (either his own feet or) the head of someone else.

Firstly, according to Hopkins, ‘to “touch the feet (of Z)” is to “make obeisance (to Z)” ’ (p.333), which seems to me that Z is a person who functions as if he were a god, such as our witness Y (not our guarantee X) in Type III, while ‘ to “swear by the feet (of Z)” is to swear by the person (Z)’ (p.334), which assures me that Z is our guarantee X in Type II\(^{27}\), if I dare to

\(^{27}\) See Hopkins p.328, ll.6-10.
distort what he remarks (p.331, l.7-p.335, l.6). The latter case holds good, for instance, in the example “śape ḫam Kṛṣṇacaraṇāṁ īṣṭāpūrtena cāī’ va ha” (Mbh 7.131.14) cited by him, where Kṛṣṇa functions (, or Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna function), without doubt, as a guarantee X who holds joint and several liability for the declaration of the oath-taker Sātyaki. However, this is equivalent to “ālabhe ḫam kṛṣṇacaraṇāṁ īṣṭāpūrtāṁ caiva ha”. From my distortion it follows that Kṛṣṇa functions as a witness Y like a god (who has the power of life and death over Sātyaki and to whom, therefore, he makes obeisance), while the very same Kṛṣṇa functions as a guarantee X. In other words, in the former expression, it is a god that would dispose of both the life of Sātyaki’s beloved lord Kṛṣṇa and his īṣṭāpūrta, while, in the latter, it is Sātyaki’s beloved lord Kṛṣṇa that would dispose of his īṣṭāpūrta. This is absurd because Kṛṣṇa functions as a guarantee X, not as a witness Y nor as an interlocutor. Kṛṣṇa could not dispose of Sātyaki’s īṣṭāpūrta, for he is not a god, but a human being. Kṛṣṇa is not an interlocutor, for the interlocutor to whom Sātyaki swears is a detestable enemy Somadatta.

If, not when an oath-taker swears by the feet (of Z), but only when he touches the feet (of Z), Z functions as a witness Y, what becomes of “the husbands (of Svayaṃprabhā etc.)” in KSS 119.37 “ātrārthe bhartṛcaraṇān sprṣṭvā manmantrisāṁmīdhau svayaṃprabhādyāḥ sapathair antarasthā bha-vantu naḥ”? Here Svayaṃprabhā’s husband, among others, functions, without doubt, as a guarantee X not as a witness Y nor as an interlocutor, for the interlocutor to whom she will be made to swear is (either a king’s minister as an observer or) King Merudhvaja himself. It is true that Hopkins’ interpretation with regard to the significances expressed by the action of touching is correct and convincing, but he should have explained the fact that there is a certain case in which “to touch the feet (of Z)” is “to lay a curse on the feet (of Z)”, that is, “to swear by the feet (of Z)”.

Secondly, such an expression as “devatā-pitṛ-pādāḥ” or “deva-brāhmaṇa-pādāḥ” occurs in the later Law Books, where a deity/god the feet of whom are touched by an oath-taker (in the mind or directly in the case of an image of a deity/god) functions, without doubt, as a witness Y. If Z the feet of whom the oath-taker touches functions not as a witness Y but as a guarantee X just like a weapon (āyudha-) touched by Arjuna (Mbh 8.50.19) or her own head (mūrdhan-) touched by Ambā (Mbh 5.172.14), Hopkins should have explained why the function of Z differs from that of a deity/god though the action of touching the feet is the same.

Arjuna swears on the feet of his elder brother, King Yudhiṣṭhira, that he
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will not return from the battle-field if he does not slay Karna today (adya) (Mbh 8.50.34). Yudhishthira may be dear to Arjuna, just as Prince Rama is so to his father, King Daśaratha. To Arjuna, the life of King Yudhishthira may be even more important than his own life, just as, to King Daśaratha, the life of Rama is so. To mortgage the life of such a superior interlocutor as Yudhishthira to the interlocutor himself without his consent may convince him of the truth of the oath-taker’s declaration. But, in the present case, Yudhishthira himself could verify Arjuna’s declaration in a day as if he were a god as true witness, just as, in the case of a gamble, a gambler himself can verify the declaration of the other on the spot. And Yudhishthira himself could dispose of his grace (“tava prasādena” Mbh 8.50.18) without the intervention of a god, just as, in a gamble, a winner can dispose of the wager of a loser without the intervention of a third person.

Thirdly, if the crucial point of Hopkins’ remarks lies in this that to “touch the feet (of Z)” is to “make obeisance (to Z)”, it follows that Z the feet of whom the oath-taker touches functions as the interlocutor, just as Yudhishthira really does so in Mbh 8.50.18 “te sape (I=Arjuna swear to you =Yudhishthira)”. This is obvious from his remarks: {It is clear that touching the feet is thus an attestation in the form of submission. The speaker who touches another’s feet deprecates. He risks by accompanying oath, whatever he may hope from the hearer’s favor, just as Arjuna swears “by thy grace” while touching the emperor’s feet, meaning that on failure to fulfill his oath he will expect to lose the royal favor.} (p.334) But, even in this case, Hopkins should have explained that Svayamprabha’s husband Trailokyamalin, King of the Daityas, whose feet are to be touched by her, functions as a guarantee X not as an interlocutor while King Yudhishthira, whose feet are touched by Arjuna, functions as an interlocutor not as a guarantee X.

In order to clear up the above-mentioned distortions, Hopkins should have paid more attention both to the difference of the function and to the fact that Type I, II and III are substantially equivalent. Z whose feet are touched by the oath-taker functions as an interlocutor (like Yudhishthira) or as a guarantee X (like Kṛṣṇa or Trailokyamalin) as the case may be. What matters is whether the feet touched by the oath-taker belong (to the oath-taker himself,) to someone else (such as a witness Y or a guarantee X) by/on whom he swears, or to the interlocutor to whom he swears. Thus, the crucial point of Hopkins’ remarks lies in this that he has pertinently pointed out that Z is, in Type III, touched by the oath-taker even in the case of Z’s being the interlocutor, who is, in Type II, put in the dative. This corresponds perfectly

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to the interpretation by, among others, Haradatta. According to him, Type II “yudhiṣṭhirāya śapec (I swear to Yudhiṣṭhira)” is equivalent to Type III “tvatpādau spṛśāmi (I touch your feet)”. On the other hand, according to Nägeśa, Type III is equivalent to Type II “yudhiṣṭhirēṇa śape (By Yudhiṣṭhira I swear)”. Then, what function does Yudhiṣṭhira fulfill? A clue to the present problem lies, I believe, in the following points.

1. agny-udaka-sītā-prākāraloṣta ...ālebhire (KAŚ 7.17.7)
   pādau raveh/mām (SkandaP 1.2.44.10-11)
2. devatā-pitr-pādāḥ (NS 20.2)
   deva-brāhmaṇa-pādāḥ (BS 8.33)
   pūjya-pādān (ŚukraN 737 cited in Pendse p.290)
   śudrāṃdūrvā-karamśāpayet (Viś 9.5)
   sīrodhṛtamahi-karam (Viś 9.9)
   sītoddhṛtamahi-karam (Viś 9.17)
3. “buddhebhyaḥ śataśahṣape yadi punaḥ kutrāpi kapālinī-pīnottuṅga-kucāvaguhana-bhavaḥ prāptah pramododayah” (Prabodha 3.18)
4. The occurrence of such an expression as “śape tvāya(I swear by you)” (Mbh 12.138.185, ed. Kumbhakonam) or “bhavatā sapāmi (By your Highness I swear)” (Urubh 1.64) is remarkable in spite of Hopkins’ remarks {...but, as against the Comm., besides the questionable grammar, the idiom te śape meaning “swear to thee” is common...} (p.328)

IV. Conclusion

From the discussion on Type I, II and III, the following points are clear.

1. The intervention of a god Y as true witness is fundamentally indispensable.
2. Logically a god Y as true witness is put in the nominative (in Type I), in the instrumental (in Type II) or in the accusative (in Type III).
3. It is true that a god Y is seldom referred to, but there are a few cases in which he is explicitly mentioned.

Type I:

sadāgatiḥ (Mbh 3.75.7)
tigmanśuḥ (Mbh 3.75.8)
candramāḥ (Mbh 3.75.9)
mātariśvā sadāgatiḥ (Mbh 3.275.23)
agnir āpas ākāśaṃ pṛthivi vāyur (Mbh 3.275.24)
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Type II:

varuneṇa (only in Gorresio 5.34.8)

Type III:

agny-udaka-sitā-prākāraloṣṭa- (KAS 7.17.7)
pādau ravoḥ/māṁ (SkandaP 1.2.44.10-11)
devatā-pitr- pādāḥ (NS 20.2)
deva-brāhmaṇa-pādāḥ (BS 8.33)

4. One/that whom/which an oath-taker touches, that is, swears on, is either a god Y as true witness or a guarantee X.

Haradatta’s interpretation shows:

5. An interlocutor Z put in the dative (in Type II) is also touched by the oath-taker, just as (the feet of) Yudhiṣṭhira is touched by Arjuna in Mbh 8.50.34 (cf. 8.50.18).

This reveals that a guarantee X including, of course, personal security is not put in the dative (in Type II), for it is totally absurd for the oath-taker to swear to the guarantee X: A is, oh guarantee X, B.

In the case of Yudhiṣṭhira, does he function as a mere interlocutor the feet of whom Arjuna swears on? In the above-cited Prabodha 3.18, Buddhas, who are such divine beings as a god Y, are put in the dative.

“buddhebhyah śataśah śape (=ātmame X-ā ātmānaṁ śap¹ e) yadi punah kutrāpi kapālini-pīnottuṅga-kucāvagūhana-bhavaḥ prāptaḥ pramododayaḥ”

This is equivalent to:

“buddhebhyah śataśah (X-ā) śap² e na kutrāpi kapālini-pīnottuṅga-kucāvagūhana-bhavaḥ prāptaḥ pramododayaḥ”²⁸.

This is also equivalent both to:

“buddhaiḥ śataśah (X-ā) śap² e na kutrāpi kapālini-pīnottuṅga-kucāvagūhana-bhavaḥ prāptaḥ pramododayaḥ”

and to:

“buddha(apād)ān śataśahsprśāmi/ālabhe na kutrāpi kapālini-pīnottuṅga-kucāvagūhana-bhavaḥ prāptaḥ pramododayaḥ”.

²⁸ If X is not referred to as in this example, we had better think that X is the life of an oath-taker and that X is omitted because of a truism, taking into consideration the fundamental idea of the oath “Selbstverfluchung zum Tode für den Fall der Unwahrheit der Aussage” (Lüders p.658).
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This means that “By Buddhas I swear” is equivalent not only to “I swear to Buddhas” but also to “I swear on Buddhas”. Clearly Buddhas function not only as interlocutors but also as witnesses. Here the oath-taker directly requests Buddhas to bear witness that A is B. The same holds good, I believe, in the case of a human being. That is to say, only when a human being the feet of whom are touched by an oath-taker is an interlocutor to whom the oath-taker swears, this human being functions not only as the interlocutor but also as the witness. The function of witness, originally belonging to a god in Heaven, is transferred to a human being (such as a king or a Brahmin, who is comparable to a god) on Earth. Generally speaking, unlike a god, this human being does not know whether the declaration “A is B” is true or not, but he functions as if he were a god who has the power of life and death over the oath-taker when the oath has turned out false. Thus, Yudhiṣṭhira functions not only as the interlocutor but also as the witness. Likewise, the expression “vipraḥ śape (By Brahmins I swear)” cited by Nāgeśa is equivalent not only to “vipr(ā)pādān spṛśāmi (I touch the feet of Brahmins)” but also to “viprebhyaḥ śape (I swear to Brahmins)”. Brahmins function not only as interlocutors but also as witnesses. On the other hand, the duty of the warrior class (kṣātradharm议事) in the expression “kṣātradharmeṇa śape (By the duty of the warrior class I swear)” functions, of course, as the guarantee, not as the witness nor as the interlocutor. It is absurd for the oath-taker to swear to the duty of the warrior class: “A is, oh duty of the warrior class, B.”

In conclusion, I think, against Hopkins’ remarks (p.328, ll.6-10), that the notion “By a witness Y I swear” exists even in the Indian oath, whether Y is a divine being (such as Varuṇa in G. 5.34.8) or a human being (such as Vipra in the above example)\(^{29}\).

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ABBREVIATIONS

Acc.: Accusative
MärkP: Mārkandeyapurāṇa
AiB: Aitareyabhārāmaṇa
Mbḥ: Mahābhārata
AmbacoraJ: Ambacorajātaka
Mrčch: Mrčchakaṭīkā
AnĀSS: Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series
MS: Manusmṛti
AV: Atharvaveda
NS: Nāradaṃśri
ĀpDhS: Āpastamba’s adharmasūtra
PaṅcaT: Paṅcatantra
BālaC: Bālakarita
Praboda: Prabodhacandrodaya
BS: Brhaspatismṛti
PratijñāY: Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa
BhisaJ: Bhisajātaka
PuṣkaraM: Puṣkaramāhātmya
ChU: Chāndogypaṇiṣad
R: Rāmāyaṇa
Dat.: Dative
RV: Rgveda
dh.: dhātupāṭha (in Böhtlingk)

SB: Śatapathabrāhmaṇa
DhK: Dharmakośa
ŚukraN: Śukraniti
GauDhS: Gautamadharmasūtra
SK: Śiddhāntakaumudī
HOS: Harvard Oriental Series
SkandaP: Skandapurāṇa
Inst.: Instrumental
Śvapna: Svapnavāsavadatta
KAŚ: Kauṭiliyārthaśāstra
TāṇḍyaB: Tāṇḍyabrāhmaṇa
Kād: Kādambarī
Vṛṣa: Vṛṣṇasūrya
KS: Kātyāyanasmṛti
ViS: Viśnuśruti
KSS: Kashi Sanskrit Series or
Kathāsaritsāgara
Voc.: Vocative
vt.: vārttika
MahāsilaJ: Mahāsilavajātaka
YS: Yājñavalkyasūrī
MahāsutaJ: Mahāsutasomajātaka

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