

Ramsey as a Deflationist about Truth

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In general, F. P. Ramsey's view on truth is said to have a deflationist tendency. But there can hardly be said to be consensus on (1) in what sense his view deflates the conception of truth, (2) what implications this kind of view has in the context of his whole philosophy, especially with regards to his theory of belief and judgement.

This paper concerns these questions, arguing as follows, that in regard to the first question, what Ramsey says about truth, while surely leaving no room for accepting ontological or epistemological characterizations of the concept and thus having to be read as a sort of deflationism, is to be understood, not as the strong "redundancy" theory normally attributed to him, but rather as a moderate version of deflationism, similar to Horwich's minimalism or Field's deflationary theory. That is to say, Ramsey is not one of those who asserts that truth-predicate itself has no meaning and truth is not a property, but who indeed admits that truth *is* a property, a syntactic or 'logical' property. And, with regard to the second question, the relation between his pragmatic theory of judgement or belief and his deflationary theory of truth supports this kind of moderate interpretation. Moreover, the paper argues that today's "success semantics" is, though often attributed to Ramsey, not intended by himself.