<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>American Rule and the Formation of Filipino &quot;Colonial Nationalism&quot; (&lt;Special Issue&gt;State Formation in Comparative Perspectives)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Abinales, Patricio N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>東南アジア研究 (2002), 39(4): 604-621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Date</td>
<td>2002-03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/2433/53705">http://hdl.handle.net/2433/53705</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Departmental Bulletin Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textversion</td>
<td>publisher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kyoto University
American Rule and the Formation of Filipino "Colonial Nationalism"

Patricio N. Abinales

Abstract

This paper examines the themes developed by the colonial bureaucrat-scholar Joseph Ralston Hayden in his book *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (1942), the first comprehensive academic study of Philippine political development under American rule. It argues that the book is suggestive of how American officials tried to extricate themselves out of the dilemma of conceiving of a colonial state modelled after the United States but finding themselves confronted by a mutated version dominated by Filipino leaders. In seeking an academic explanation out of this problem, Hayden’s book also gives readers an insight into why the United States remains extremely popular during the late colonial and throughout most of the post-colonial periods.

This paper explores themes developed by the American colonial bureaucrat-scholar Joseph Ralston Hayden in his book *The Philippines: A Study in National Development*. Hayden was vice-governor of the Philippines from 1932 until the eve of World War II. Before his appointment, he was professor of political science at the University of Michigan, a “long student of the Philippines, a Republican and an articulate advocate of a continuing connection between the United States and the colony.” Hayden started working on the manuscript...

* The author wishes to thank Professor Reynaldo Ileto for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
** Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

1) The book consists of five parts. Part I (12 chapters) centered on the institutions of colonial governance and the changes that they experienced through time. Part II (5 chapters) was devoted to political parties and the Filipino national leadership that was then dominated by Manuel L. Quezon, Sergio Osmena and the Nacionalista party while Part III (6 chapters) dealt with public, private and Catholic-based education. In Part IV (4 chapters), Hayden discussed “some problems” of the Commonwealth, albeit strangely limiting himself to issues of national language, literary, social welfare and public health. Finally, Part V (4 chapters) situated the Philippines within the changing political dynamics of the Asian region and the possible future of Philippine-American relationship.

2) His Philippine specialization got Hayden the vice-governor job. Pres. Franklin Roosevelt appointed him despite his Republican party loyalty. One gets this sense of his extensive Philippine interest at the J.R. Hayden collection at the University of Michigan. Hayden was a prodigious newspaper item assembler, preserved whatever official communications which went through his office, and kept tab of the various kinds of non-administrative correspondence he received and sent, including those of his family. His collection remains one of the best sources of Philippine colonial history to this very day.
script after he ended his term as vice-governor and completed a draft by November 1941. The book was published a year later and it covers the period 1916–41, starting when the Americans began to expedite the tutelage training of Filipinos and ending with the establishment of the Filipino-controlled Commonwealth of the Philippines and the preparations for an expected war with Japan.

Hayden was thus in an advantageous position to evaluate the successes and pitfalls of the Filipinization process. But that is not all. The Philippines is also distinct for being the first comprehensive academic text on Philippine political development. Hayden wanted to show “the underlying forces which have produced this [national] development” and how their “basic characteristics” influenced the future of the Philippines as well. Unlike the patently racist recollections of other American officials, The Philippines presents itself as a dispassionate and careful evaluation of the efficacy of tutelage politics; hence, it should merit readers’ deference because of its purported objectivity [Hayden 1942: xviii].

As this essay would suggest, however, this academic hue made it possible for Hayden to recast the American colonial experience in light of unexpected outcomes. During his tenure, tutelage training turned out to be less than perfect. What began as an attempt to install an American-type democracy had ended in the appearance of a one-party regime dominated by one supremo—Manuel L. Quezon, head of the Nacionalista Party, one of the two powerful leaders of the Filipino legislature, and later president of the Philippine Commonwealth. Moreover, instead of a stable and peaceful political engagement between Filipino leaders and their followers and between the “native” elite and masses, colonial politics was shocked by a series of poor peoples’ revolts and a challenge from aging nationalist revolutionaries in the late colonial period.

The way Hayden dealt with these unexpected results was to be selective in his citation of colonial successes and failures. Where tutelage politics led to positive results, he underscored how vital American input was to these successes. But where the outcome diverged from the original American intentions, he discreetly de-emphasized American role and portrayed these deviations as uniquely Filipino. Yet, despite these misgivings, Hayden had to recognize that the Philippine polity was still an American creation. It had to be preserved as the only viable political framework that could bring about the full fruition of Filipino nationalism, particularly in the light of the radical and populist criticisms. Thus, even as Hayden showed concerns about Quezon’s “authoritarian turn,” he had to defend it as the only feasible way to ensure stable governance. It may be Filipino—and as such, it fell short of American standards of what a democracy was; but it was still a regime that,

3) Hayden warned of the difficulty in studying institutions that “are constantly being modified through us, as are those of any society.” He added that the “social sciences have not produced any technique rapid enough to produce an instantaneous photograph of them that would be accurate when published.” But by indicating their origins and through “[c]omparisons with analogous developments, historical and contemporary” one could discern their main features and evaluate their impact on the future [Hayden 1942: xix].
because of its American lineage, was still the better choice than the alternatives of its radical critics.

It is through this selective citation that we can also see how scholars like Hayden tried to preserve the United States’ unique status as the only colonial power in Southeast Asia to hand over the reins of government to its “natives” as early as the first decade of its rule. The Filipinos may have fallen short of the American ideal, but the very act of ceding power set the United States apart from the other colonial powers in the region. She acted as the teacher who helped the Filipino student take his first steps towards independence. When the apprentice chose to quicken matters, the United States too had the maturity to let the child figure out where to proceed and not interfere in its quest.

The paper will first look at how Hayden reworked ideological and political connections to distinguish where American tutelage politics made a positive impact in the colonial state and where it had the least influence. I then discuss how Hayden distanced American intentions and early policy successes from the changes that an expanding Filipino power made on the colonial state. The final section explains why Hayden defended the colonial state despite its becoming less the image of what Americans hoped the Philippine polity would look like. The conclusion elaborates on the value of the book as a textual representation of academic-bureaucratic modifications of the colonial project and how these alterations enabled American colonialism to leave a popular legacy in the Philippines.

**Legitimizing Colonial Takeover**

Early on, Hayden made clear where the lineages of the Philippine body politic lay. He argued that the colony was privileged to have experienced two “forms of Western government, the Spanish or Latin” and the “American or Anglo-Saxon one” [ibid.: 30]. What Spain had built the United States preserved. This she did by protecting the Philippines from more pernicious external influences like the “racial inundation by mass immigration from any other Oriental country.” In the end, what secured the foundations of Philippine nation building was American democracy. “The United States,” according to Hayden, “familiarized the Philippines with the institutions of modern democracy and [gave] it an opportunity to adapt them to its own use.” American colonialism then “entrusted [Filipinos] with genuine political power and thus enabled them to develop an experienced native leadership in national and local affairs” [ibid.: xviii, underscoring mine].

Taking over Spain’s role unavoidably brought up the issue of the Philippine Revolution against Spain, the establishment of the Malolos Republic by revolutionary leaders, and the subsequent war against the Americans. Hayden could not ignore their historical import, but neither could he praise them as exemplary acts of a people’s national liberation struggle as this would have gone against the grain of America’s “historic mission” to train the Filipinos in democracy. To get by this hurdle, Hayden incorporated these
events into his narrative. He described them in glowing terms as popular articulations of self-determination and aspirations for national liberation—themes that were similar to that of the Americans and the Spanish. The comradeship was thus established even if the Spanish and Americans killed thousands of Filipinos during the Revolution and the Filipino-American war, respectively.

The revolutions of 1892 and 1898 were an expression of the desperate determination of a small number of Filipino leaders that the people should possess the individual civil rights and the national liberties inherent in the Western type of political organization. The revolutionary leaders were enabled to gain popular support by the oppression of government—by concrete abuses which a self-respecting people such as the Filipinos could not endure. Yet, Aguinaldo, Mabini, Bonifacio and the other revolutionary heroes were fighting the political heritage of the West. The revolts of the Filipinos against Spain and even against the Americans were evidence that although Spain had not granted liberty in the Philippines she unwittingly had taught it there. The lessons of those heroic struggles for freedom are too often neglected by Americans who would understand the Philippines. Perhaps the nation-making sacrifices and heroes of the Filipinos are only the more effective in binding these people together because they are in the foreground rather in the background of Philippine history. [ibid.: 30]

By denying the Revolution its own political identity and describing it as simply yet another constituent of the “great Western political tradition,” Hayden erased the antagonism intrinsic in the Revolution as an anti-colonial act. He defused the militant character of the Revolution by arguing that there existed no fundamental philosophical differences between colonizers and colonized. Finally, he opened up a pathway for Filipino leaders who, because they were already “Spanish-trained” and acquainted with the “Anglo-Saxon” side of the Western political tradition, could collaborate with the new colonizer. The Americans, in turn, were transformed from enemies into partners and advisers of the very same revolutionaries.

Integrating the Revolution into his narrative, however, was not enough to neutralize it. It was also essential to undercut its symbolic power that could reinvigorate Filipino allegiance to the independence movement of the 1890s. Hayden did this by presenting readers with the Revolution’s so-called most important downside—its elitist leadership. He admitted that widespread Filipino support for the Revolution was a response to “concrete abuses which a self-respecting people such as the Filipinos could not endure,” and that at its peak, the Revolution symbolized “the heroic struggles for freedom [that were] too often neglected by Americans who would understand the Philippines” [loc. cit.]. But he also drew readers’ attention to its questionable origins. The Revolution, as pointed out, was also “the desperate determination of a small number of Filipino leaders” to get rid of the Spaniards. It was conspiratorial, elitist and, because it was a desperate act, it was a reckless one.
Moreover, while it inspired the majority to revolt against Spain, its locus of power was extremely undemocratic because of the “small number of Filipino leaders” that spearheaded it. Leaders like Emilio Aguinaldo and Juan Luna represented not the revolutionary masses but “a minutely small educated class separated from the ignorant masses by a gulf so great as to be almost incomprehensible to the American without experience in the Orient” [ibid.: 163]. Given these dubious beginnings, it was impossible for the Revolution to succeed and the goal of nationalism fulfilled. Only with the American would these aspirations be rejuvenated, albeit in a form and pathway different from the Revolution’s.

The Revolution’s tainted origins inevitably made the Malolos Republic a flawed regime. The government set up by Filipino revolutionaries may have “democratic and progressive” features resting on “the doctrine of popular sovereignty and contained broad and detailed provisions [which reflected the Filipinos’] wide knowledge of modern political institutions and the thoughtful adaptation of them to meet the ideals of the dominant Filipinos of the time” [ibid.: 32]. But it could not provide Filipinos “a stable and democratic republic [as] the fundamental elements from which the democratic government springs were not possessed by the people of the Philippines in 1899” [ibid.: 32]. The Malolos leaders’ lack of experience in running a government, and their preference for conspiratorial politics predictably led to the undoing of the progressive features of the Malolos Constitution. And again, it was only upon the Americans’ arrival that these “fundamental [democratic] elements” [ibid.: xix] began to take on more a democratic shape.

Hayden did not deny Spanish oppression, but he also pointed out that since Spain was part of the “political heritage of the West,” not everything about her presence in the Philippines was negative. He reminded readers not to forget that although in practice the Spanish government of the Philippines was in many respects corrupt and demoralizing, yet in theory and profession the colonial system of Spain was fine and uplifting. Spanish and Filipinos may have failed to maintain high standards, but those standards were ever before them in laws and precepts of both the State and the Church. There could be no better evidence that these standards did make an impress upon the Filipino mind than the ultimate rebellion of the Filipinos against Spanish rule.” [ibid.: 29–30, underscoring mine]

Of the Filipino’s bloody war against the Americans, Hayden was predictably curt. He made no mention of the brutality inflicted by the American expeditionary force on Filipinos, and his brief comment on the war focused on how Americans and Filipinos started as protagonists but eventually became friends as a result of a “shared heritage.” The war was thus a passing glitch that was immediately and easily displaced by friendship and cooperation.
The Antinomies of Filipinization

“America’s avowed purpose,” according to Hayden, “was up to a certain point identical with that of the Filipino nationalist leaders: to create a unified people who should govern themselves by democratic processes.” She did not “thwart the Filipino nationalists but merely [want] to guide them and keep them from outrunning their own experience and the political development of the people as a whole” [ibid.: 324]. To facilitate this effort, the Americans granted the Filipinos autonomy: “Filipinos were legally free to determine the form of their government and to express their political ideals in a fundamental law of their own devising. They were also unhampered by any political coercion or even uncouth advice as to the manner in which they should use their legal authority” [ibid.: 39].

The initial phase of trusteeship was successfully implemented. Hayden wrote:

The American officials were in a far better position than their elective Filipino colleagues to insist that the people take what was food for them, whether they wanted it or not. They occupied a position of independence which no elective official in the United States enjoy. . . . [The] American chief executives took advantage of this position and of the great powers of their office to aid in the “education” of the Filipino for modern self-government by holding them, so far as practically possible, to American standards of performance. Their position of detachment from the elements of Filipino political life which necessarily limited the actions of the Filipino officials made it possible for them to do this. Circumstances made it relatively easy for them to assume the Galahad role which they often seemed to play. [ibid.: 173-174]

Government agencies like the civil service, the police force and the various ministries became paradigms of harmonious American-Filipino cooperation and “honesty and efficiency.” The American army, with able support from the Filipino-manned Philippine Constabulary, restored order and stability in the peripheries of the colony, making it possible—for the first time—to imagine a unified Las Islas Filipinas, something that was never experienced under Spanish rule [ibid.: 93].

Filipinos responded enthusiastically to the introduction of electoral politics and the establishment of a Philippine Assembly. However, along the way the flow of the trusteeship project was altered. The catalyst was the Democratic Party’s victory in the 1912 American presidential elections and the party’s promise to hasten the timetable for Philippine independence. Once their top leaders were in place, Democrats under the new governor-general, Francis Burton Harrison, took the first step towards Filipinizing the colonial state by reducing American participation in it. Within a short span of time, “many of the ranking American officials had been swept out of office and replaced by Filipinos” and American presence in the colonial state “was reduced from 2,623 to 614,” a drop “from 29 per cent to four per cent.” By the end of Harrison’s second year, over 90 per cent of the administration had been transferred to Filipino hands [ibid.: 96-97].
Hayden was openly contemptuous of what the Democrats and Harrison had done. He described their actions as made in “rash haste and [dictated] by personal, racial and political bitterness.” He added: “[The Democrats] placed greater emphasis upon self-government . . . than upon good government. They felt that responsibility for the affairs of the Philippines would rest upon Filipino rather than upon American shoulders. They believed that the Filipino people would progress more rapidly politically and be more contented under a less efficient government controlled by themselves than under a more efficient one directed chiefly by Americans. They proposed to turn the government of the Philippines over to the Filipinos speedily and completely, and then to withdraw the sovereignty of the [US] over the Philippines” [ibid.: 97]. This “rash” policy altered the visage of the colonial state, upsetting the hitherto balanced fusion of Spanish, American and Filipino political features in favor of the least developed of the three—the Filipino. Given that the Filipinos were still at the early stage of their political education, this policy led to institutional and procedural mutations that undermined the project of installing American democracy in the Philippines.

The metamorphosis was most prominent in the legislature and the party system. Hayden observed that while “the institutions of the new Filipinos should be developed along the lines of American democracy” [ibid.: 168], the 1907 Philippine Assembly that was supposed to embody this principle was of “a different spirit . . . from those found in Capitol Hill in Washington” [ibid.: 174]. It became “an instrument for the attainment of independence rather than as a normal lawmaking body.” Its leadership was elitist, consisting of Nacionalista party politicians who “neglected no opportunity to increase the authority of the Filipino legislature at the expense of the American chief executive” [ibid.: 100]. Subsequent legislatures adhered closely to the pattern established by the 1907 Philippine Assembly with “their rules and organization the Filipino chambers . . . closely resembling their American prototypes in Washington and the state capitals [but] in spirit and action that they have been distinctively Filipino” [ibid.: 174, underscoring mine].

Legislative caucuses which were criticized as instruments of boss rule in the United States and purportedly neutralized in the post-McKinley era, became the norm in the Philippines [ibid.: 186–189]. While the American Congress experienced delays in the passing of laws, the Filipinos were worse—legislative delays became permanent fixtures of legislative routine, and Filipino assemblymen had made a habit of passing badly written laws. What American legislators considered fiery debates over policy, the Filipinos turned into “bitter party warfare and much guerilla activity” [ibid.: 337]. Finally, while American lawmakers used pork barrel for policy purposes, Filipinos turned it into a weapon to ensure reelection [ibid.: 196]. What prevented the legislative from further regression was the energetic intercessions by American governor-generals who employed their executive powers to save “the country from the full consequences of legislative inepti-

4 Hayden was referring to the drawn-out proceedings of the 6th Philippine legislature of 1922.
tude” [ibid.: 190]. That said, the legislative was not entirely that flawed; it also had its finer moments, including an “above-the-average standards in its own procedures and in its cooperation with the [American governor-general] in the difficult task of law-making” [ibid: 195]. On certain occasions, Filipino leaders actually transformed the legislature into “a free forum for the debate of major issues raised by many particular bills, by the policy of the majority and its leaders, by the Governor-General or one of the executive departments.” Still, in these debates, oppositionists “were virtually never denied a public hearing” [ibid.: 195–196]. The legislature thus had all the potentials of becoming an impressive institution, but it could not attain this goal because of imperfections caused by hasty Filipinization.

The legislature likewise was unable to bring out its democratic potentials because of the singular domination of the Nacionalista Party. The party was formed as the peaceful alternative to Aguinaldo revolutionary movement [ibid.: 315]. It became “a forum from which to proclaim the cause of independence, and as an instrument to wring the last possible degree of autonomy out of the existing governmental arrangement.” The Nacionalistas familiarized Filipinos with “the idea and the practices of party politics,” and became “a powerful instrumentality for overcoming the divisive forces in Philippine society and developing the diverse inhabitants into a unified people conscious of Philippine nationality and determined to achieve Philippine independence” [ibid.: 323].

Nacionalistas also knew how to play hardball with the Americans. After its founding, its leaders “lost no opportunity to increase Filipino power in the government by open or subtle encroachment upon the legal prerogatives of the [American-dominated Philippine Commission]” and marginalizing the rival Federalista Party which advocated Philippine statehood. While their ambitions to share power with the Americans were obvious, Filipino leaders were aware that until the latter granted independence, they had to play within the rules—broad as they were—laid down by the Americans. They were not obstructionists and they accepted “the grant of legislative power . . . and determined by using it wisely to demonstrate their country’s fitness

5 Among the reasons cited by Hayden to explain the Nacionalista’s pre-eminence were the following: the skill with which the Party exploited the independence question; the quality of its leadership; the “constructive partnership” that it entered into with the Americans. Hayden added that the Nacionalistas also “enjoyed all the political advantages that are the fruits of long continued control of government, especially in the Orient and in states steeped in the Latin tradition: among them, patronage, control over the electoral machinery, the administrative departments, and, to a lesser extent, the courts; access to ample political funds; and superior prestige.” Finally, their opponents “lacked those issues upon which real and vital opposition parties are usually built: sectional feeling (which existed but did not coincide with party lines), politico-religious questions, urban versus rural interests (the only large city was normally opposition, but the Islands are overwhelmingly rural in character), the tariff (legislation concerning which was subject to American approval), organized labor versus capital (there was little industrial labor and the agricultural laborers were virtually unorganized during most of the period), and foreign affairs” [Hayden 1942: 376–377].
Filipino power expanded tremendously after the Democrats accelerated Filipinization, with Nacionalista leaders “given practically a free hand in the development of a native extra-legal political system for the actual operation of the government established by American law” [ibid.: 324]. Again, the only deterrent to this rapid expansion of Filipino power was the American executive who still had “the final control” of the government. After 1934, however, even this restraint had weakened as the Nacionalistas shifted gears from fighting for independence to actually preparing to take over full power under the Commonwealth [ibid.: 373]. There were attempts by a variety of opposition parties to challenge the Nacionalistas, but they were no match to the latter’s electoral and patronage machinery [ibid.: 340, 401–405]. In the absence of any major rival and with the hands-off policy of most American governor-generals, the only “meaningful” politics became the factional fights inside the party [Paredes 1989]. Indeed, the only time the Nacionalistas felt their power slip a bit came when “unrestrained fights over the conditions and leadership” produced a split inside the party in the mid-1920s [ibid.: 373]. This was mended only when the factions saw the need to reunite to ensure a united Filipino control of the Commonwealth. Hayden noted that: “After five years of the Commonwealth it is generally agreed that only a split in the Nacionalista Party could produce an effective party of opposition” [ibid.: 453].

Ultimately, factional politics were merely a reflection of the struggle for power between the Nacionalista’s two top leaders—Sergio Osmena, who controlled the party and the legislature until the 1920s, and Manuel Quezon who took over in the mid-20s and dominated colonial politics until the eve of World War II [ibid.: 222–223]. Hayden was ambivalent towards these two leaders. On the one hand, he was clearly in awe of them. He described Quezon as “the big jefe [to whom] lesser figures go to him when they can” [ibid.: 443]. In another instance, he shows the extent of Quezon’s presence in colonial politics:

Never in Philippine history have provincial and municipal officials been subjected to such exacting supervision by the chief executive as President Quezon has bestowed upon them during the past five years. Governor-General Wood exercised a salutary influence for good local government. He made frequent inspection trips through regions not unusually visited by ranking officials from Manila. Governors, presidentes and the provincial representatives of the insular bureaus sought his approbation and feared his criticism. Other Governor-Generals sought to keep in personal touch with provincial affairs. They lacked the administrative staff which Mr.

6 The split rose over differences as to who was able to get the most favorable law pertaining to Filipino autonomy and independence from the U.S. Congress. Manuel Quezon and his faction thought that the law negotiated by an “independent mission” led by Sergio Osmeña fell short of what Filipinos wanted. Quezon would later form his own “independence mission” and return with the Tydings-McDuffie Law, which was essentially the same as the one negotiated by Osmeña [Hayden 1942: 338–342, 436–438].
Quezon has developed, however; nor did the Filipino “grapevine” bring them the mass of information that daily reaches Mr. Quezon. No Governor-General ever disciplined half as many provincial governors as has President Quezon and large numbers of erring lesser local officials have been brought to book by him. [ibid.: 296-297]

While he praised Osmena for being “no spoilsman,” he also reminded readers how the latter deftly accumulated enormous power when he was Speaker of the Philippine Assembly and president of the Nacionalista party [ibid.: 100]. Hayden observed, for example, that as a result of the hasty Filipinization program of Democratic governor-general Francis Burton Harrison, “the leadership not only of the House of Representatives, but of the entire legislature and of the executive branch of the government was concentrated in Mr. Osmena” [ibid.: 326]. He further noted how his opponents often accused Osmena of “caciquism” and how Quezon once criticized him for being “undemocratic” [ibid.: 175, 329, respectively]. Together with Quezon, Osmena was responsible for promoting politics “by one means or another” [ibid.: 374]. While never did Osmena and Quezon openly defy constitutional processes, their frequent use of “extra-legal measures” to defend and expand Nacionalista power, became the defining characteristic of colonial politics.

On the other hand, the total domination by Quezon, Osmena and the Nacionalistas bothered Hayden a lot. He saw the way they used power as anathema to the American idea of what colonial politics should be like; in fact it could seriously derail the entire democratic process. But Hayden was also pragmatic enough to recognize that Nacionalista dominance was a necessary evil. Filipino leaders and American officials were then confronted with unstable circumstances arising from unrestrained Filipinization and rise of economic and social problems especially as the Philippines began to be affected by the Great Depression. Democratic institutions may have been installed but certain quasi-authoritarian practices were necessary to ensure long-term regime stability. This, to Hayden, was the objective reality that everyone had to understand.

However, it is also from this “objective” portrait that we notice Hayden making a textual maneuver in order to deal with the question of American’s complicity in this authoritarian mutation of the colonial project. Throughout the book, Hayden emphasized that unlike neighboring colonial powers which maintained a repressive and authoritarian grip over their possessions, the United States occupied the Philippines militarily but immediately agreed to “listen” to the desires of Filipinos as articulated through their “Spanish-trained” leaders [ibid.: 30]. Translated into policy, this “benevolent assimilation” meant allowing Filipinos to play a major role in colonial governance and in determining the direction of national development. Almost overnight, the United States was thus transformed from an invading force to an ally, adviser and guide to the Filipinos’ moderated nationalism.

The experiment worked but only for a short duration. The first signs of a deviation from the democratic desiderata were the Filipinos’ refusal to discard the quasi-authoritari-
an administrative tradition they learned from the Spanish. Hayden saw this as “the fruits of long continued control of government, especially in the Orient and in states steeped in the Latin tradition, among them, patronage control over the electoral machinery, the administrative departments, and to a lesser extent, the courts.” This control extended down to the lower levels where Filipino politicians ensured their electoral victories by creating “feudal structure extending from the ‘national leader’ to the party workers in the most distant barrios” [ibid.: 46, underscoring mine]. Thus, at the same time as it claimed a popular mandate and patterned itself after American parties, the Nacionalista Party was likewise an organization that retained pre-democratic and hence pre-American attributes.

Filipinization preserved this Spanish legacy and combined with personal ambitions and factional infighting, it molded colonial politics into an entirely “Filipino system” of which the final outcomes were the one-party regime and the personalistic leadership of Quezon and Osmeña. Hayden could not help but to comment snidely that these were the “natural and inevitable result[s] of the grant of complete autonomy to the Philippines. This is what ‘Filipinization’ means, and not merely the replacement of Americans by Filipino officials” [ibid.: 443, underscoring mine]. The withdrawal of American personnel further weakened whatever democratic obstacles that could have prevented this pragmatic union of Spanish authoritarian practices and Filipino ambitions. Filipino defense of these non-democratic features “upon grounds of expediency, especially those of efficiency and stability in government” only added one more layer to its full legitimization. The Commonwealth finally “marked the end of the Philippine attempt to establish a government operated under the Anglo-American party system” [ibid.: 453].

Yet, it was precisely because of the emergence of this distinctly Filipino system that Hayden was able to dissociate American colonialism from Philippine politics, and put a safe distance between the American political system and colonial politics. He argued: “The system may or may not be ‘democratic’ from the standpoint of other peoples. But it is a Filipino system, and he is rash indeed who asserts that thus far both the system and the men who are applying it in the Government of the Commonwealth have not received the steady support of a large majority of the Filipino people” [ibid.: 374–375]. In short, the United States, beginning in 1916, had ceased to guide the Filipinos through the intricate path of democratic politics. The Filipinos were already doing this themselves; and by the establishment of Commonwealth, American influence was barely discernible.

By depicting the Americans as being disempowered by Filipinization, Hayden distanced American colonial officialdom from whatever fate would befall the Philippines under the rule of the “big jefe” Quezon. He further could argue that this “Filipino system” (i.e., the Commonwealth) cannot be compared to other political systems, and criticized those who entertained such comparisons as failing to recognize that this indigenous state was “a political system that for thirty years was beaten out on the anvil of Philippine experience” [ibid.: 374–375]. Moreover, those who sought to portray Filipino colonial politics as a replica of the American system had argued using the wrong assumptions. Comparison
with the United States was unfair to both societies since the political conditions in each were vastly different. In fact, “the Anglo-American party system cannot function normally except in countries in which the form of government is beyond current political controversy and is sufficiently stable so that an opposition party may press home its attacks upon the government of the day and by lawful means turn it out of office without danger of provoking violence or subverting the constitution” [ibid.: 453, underscoring mine]. And in this case, the Philippines would not fit the criterion.

While the “American prototype” had, at the turn of the century, began to discard some of its less-attractive features (i.e., its patronage and machine politics), and had become more genuinely democratic, the Philippines, remained unable to do so. Patronage politics and caciquism had in fact entrenched further its political deformity. The best way to understand Philippine colonial democracy therefore was not to be comparative in one’s perspective, but to be local. And whatever prognoses, ethical conclusions or policy approaches were deduced from this approach would only be applicable to a Philippine setting and not somewhere else.

That said, it did not mean that Hayden was surprisingly not worried that Quezon’s centralization of power opened the possibility for Filipino “totalitarianism.” This model of political development had already started to disturb Americans with the parliamentary victories of the Nazis in Germany and the Black Shirts in Italy. But oddly enough, Hayden did not defend the Filipino leader from such accusations, and instead argued that even this possible totalitarian drift could only be understood if one recognized it as Filipino-made and not a copycat of European parties:

There are observers—Filipino and American—who discern in the Commonwealth Constitution the legal basis for a Philippine political system very different from that generally anticipated in the United States. How far the Philippines will eventually go in erecting the totalitarian structure, for which the constitutional foundation has been laid, remains to be seen. . . . Whatever institutions the Filipinos will produce will not be mere replicas of those which have appeared in either the totalitarian or the democratic states. They will be native and not foreign institutions just as those which have developed in the Islands during the past four decades are Filipino and not American. [ibid.: 44]

In the end, however, Hayden remained optimistic that things would reverse back to the original American plan. The Commonwealth may be a “Filipino system,” but its parts of its foundations were also American. Given that Filipinos and Americans continued to work together, the possibility of a resurrection of the democratic features lost under Filipinization remained. The American birthmark on many agencies of the state likewise suggested that in time, bodies like the legislature may be able to return back to its “Anglo-Saxon experience” and “perform its proper functions in the Philippine state” [ibid.: 227–228]. Finally, and quite ironically, social and political pressures from the Filipino
underclasses, the imperatives of economic recovery amidst the Great Depression, and regional instabilities had created “so fluid a state in the Philippines that almost any line of development is possible,” including that of return to the American original goal [ibid.: 453]. These possibilities however were premised on accepting the Filipinized colonial state as a given and protecting its legitimacy and standing from those who seek to undermine or overthrow it.

Thus despite its flaws, the Filipinized colonial state and its one-party politics was the only authority in the archipelago, and Quezon, despite his authoritarianism, the only “chief executive perfectly qualified” to run the Commonwealth [ibid.: 68, 70]. It was a regime that American officials were committed to defending despite the mess unrestrained Filipinization had created. The above hope that this slide would reverse was one reason; the other was the emergence of political challenges to Nacionalista hegemony from below.

**Defending the Defective**

Hayden was increasingly aware that widening class disparities between the wealthy “fifteen or twenty per cent and the [poor] eighty per cent of the population [which] cannot be bridged by any fiat extended to create political democracy” would have tremendous repercussions on colonial stability [ibid.: 378]. He devoted an entire chapter to evaluating lower class politics, focusing on two efforts by these “unrepresented minorities” to present a political alternative to Quezon and the Nacionalistas—the Sakdal party of Benigno Ramos, and the electoral challenge posed by two veterans of the Revolution, Emilio Aguinaldo and Gregorio Aglipay on Quezon’s quest for the Commonwealth presidency.

The Sakdals’ main attraction was its broad political platform that included “immediate and genuine independence, the elimination of high salaries, waste and graft from the government, the reduction of taxes, and economic reforms drastic enough to end the poverty over which they were the victim” [ibid.: 363]. They likewise got the public’s attention by criticizing the Quezon-Osmena “oligarchy” collaboration with the Americans to weaken national independence and its conspiracy with the landed elite to impede the marginalized’s access to the social wealth [ibid.: 371, 377–378]. The Sakdals intensified their campaign when it became clear that the Nacionalistas had turned the independence issue into a mere factional battle for control of the soon-to-be-formed Commonwealth. Organizing teams were sent to the urban and rural poor communities to set up chapters, while party “intellectuals” approached the middle classes to broaden the Sakdal base. When they felt ready, the Sakdals fielded candidates in the 1934 legislative elections, but managed to win only a few seats. The more radical elements within the party blamed its loss on Nacionalista electoral perfidy and fraud. They led a provincial uprising on May 2–3, 1935, especially after it turned out that those among their comrades who were elected were easily co-opted by the Nacionalistas. The revolt was the highpoint of the Sakdal opposition
Hayden criticized the Nacionalistas for failing to recognize that the Sakdals “came from the other side of a deep political, social and economic chasm, and had already shown that they were ready to resort to violence in order to overcome the handicaps placed upon them by the existing political system” [ibid.: 378]. He was aware of how valid the Sakdals’ class issues were, but he also knew that giving the Sakdals their due would undermine Nacionalista rule. He thus praised the government for swiftly responding to the rebellion and the Nacionalistas, for their uncanny ability to break Sakdal ranks by co-opting some of its leaders, particularly those who were elected to the legislature.

This, however, was not enough. Hayden acknowledged the ethical foundations of the Sakdals and praised their commitment to social justice and national independence, but he also criticized the Sakdal leadership for exploiting the ignorance, credulousness and religious “backwardness” of the poor to pursue their political agenda [ibid.: 397–398]. The uprising failed to contribute anything to the political education of the masses; on the contrary, it impaired their political senses by mixing personal concerns with political aspirations. The revolt was “an example of the gullibility of the Filipino tao [and a] revelation of his historically demonstrated willingness to fight for what he conceives to be his country’s welfare, for his political rights, or to avenge personal insults and injuries” [ibid.: 392]. Those who risked their lives may have joined it for noble ends—“to defend their rights as citizens and perform their duties as patriots”—but their actions did not erase the fact that they were deluded into rebelling by their irresponsible leaders. Like the Philippine Revolution, the Sakdals’ politics had to be completely de-legitimized if only to save the rule of Quezon and the Nacionalistas.

Emilio Aguinaldo campaigned for the Commonwealth presidency by reviving themes associated with the revolution against Spain and promising to restore the Malolos Republic. He vowed to “defend the poor, repudiate the acceptance of the ‘Independence bill’ and secure immediate independence.” He was initially ignored by the Nacionalista until he began organizing a Philippine-wide campaign network with the Los Veteranos de la Revolucion Filipina (Veterans of the Philippine Revolution) as its core [ibid.: 404, 414–415]. Once they decided he was a threat, the Nacionalistas began a systematic counter-propaganda war against the old revolutionary. Using their allies in media, they portrayed Aguinaldo as “a former dictator seeking to regain power [and] reinstall the ‘brutal dictatorship’ of the one-time Philippine Republic” [ibid.: 416–417]. They resurrected the unexplained role of Aguinaldo in the deaths of Andres Bonifacio, the founder of the revolution.

7) The Sakdals ran candidates in eight Central Luzon provinces in 1935 promising “complete and absolute independence” to its audience and attacking the hypocrisy of the Nacionalistas when they “split” over the appropriate independence bill to get from the US Congress. The Sakdals won three seats in the lower house, a governorship and a coupe of council seats at the municipal level. But the party was unable to maintain the fidelity of its parliamentarian-elect who joined one faction of the Nacionalista upon assuming their seats [Golay 1936: 16].
tionary organization Katipunan, and of Antonio Luna, the revolution’s most able general. The Americans also helped in the campaign, threatening Aguinaldo with prosecution when he warned that his followers would rebel if he lost the elections.

Quezon and Osmena kept themselves above the propaganda war, portraying themselves as the more realistic leaders and the “mature, liberal statesmen, conscious of their responsibilities and determined to meet them squarely” [ibid.: 423]. They pointed to their record of service to Philippine society, especially their “broad program of social betterment . . . seeking to improve the position of the masses. Their platform called for the continuation and intensification of this effort.” They also “made relatively few campaign promises; emphasized the responsibilities, obligations and difficulties of citizenship under the Commonwealth; held out no hope for reduced taxes; dwelt upon the necessity for honest, just and economical government which would be sensitive to the needs of the common man; advocated universal military training for national defense; preached a strong, self-respecting nationalism but promised to protect all legitimate foreign interests in the Philippines; pledged themselves to defend the Constitution and to abide by it as the supreme law of the land” [ibid.: 422–423]. Furthermore, compared to the romantic radical rhetoric and incendiary posturing of Aguinaldo, Quezon’s and Osmena’s oratory “and attitude inspired confidence among those Filipinos who were reasonably well satisfied with conditions as they were, and in the American and foreign communities.” Aguinaldo’s presidential bid may have been “founded upon patriotism” but it was “patently hopeless in the Philippines of 1935” [ibid.: 411]. It was not only dangerous, it was outmoded. The campaign worked. Quezon won by a wide margin and tough talk from Governor-General Frank Murphy defused any plans by Aguinaldo forces to mount post-election open protests [ibid.: 431–434].

It was clear where Hayden bias lay. The image he painted of Aguinaldo was that of someone representing a past age. Aguinaldo’s politics—despite the patriotism it evoked—was made more dangerous because it wanted to restore what was essentially “a military autocracy based upon force, treachery, assassination and general terror” [ibid.: 417]. He did not only reinforce an earlier argument that the Revolution and its leaders were flawed but also impressed on readers that these were relics of the past, at best to be commemorated but never to be used as models of a Philippine future.

The one thing positive about these challenges was that they served as reminders to Americans and Filipinos that the colonial state was far from perfect. The Sakdal uprising was a strong indication that the majority of Filipinos remained marginal political actors and they had yet to receive their share of the economic benefit from Filipinization. The 30 per cent who voted for Aguinaldo and Bishop Aglipay were “a substantial minority, too large a one to be safely left without direct representation in the national government, especially as the majority of these voters are from a fairly definite class which feels that it is being exploited by the groups in power” [ibid.: 427]. Hayden, however, could still not bring himself to lay the full blame on Quezon et al. after describing them as representing
the moderating voice of Filipino politics. In fact, he was never clear as to who was responsible for this social condition. Hayden hinted about the accountability of Nacionalista leaders but was not categorical in stating who the guilty parties were. And perhaps rightly so. For to blame Quezon and the Nacionalistas would only confirm their links to the major problems of caciquism and corruption. It would thereby validate what the Sakdal and Aguinaldo had been fighting against. These radicals’ criticisms of a compromised independence could lead to an uncovering of the back room deals and political bargaining made by the Nacionalistas with the Americans. Writing at a time when the Commonwealth was besieged by criticisms for being dictatorial, Hayden had to stop short of condemning the culpability if not outright involvement of Quezon and his Nacionalista cohorts in maintaining an unjust social order.

Finally, there was his own political philosophy to consider. Hayden was a state-builder; it would be difficult for him to imagine himself advocating the colonial state’s destabilization, much less overthrow even if it has become imperfect under Filipino hands. It was ideologically impossible for him to write anything positive about “candidates [who] represented nothing except a violent protest against the Presidente and all his works,” and it was surely unimaginable that he would advocate popular uprisings to “improve the position of the underprivileged masses and thus enable the Filipino people to achieve more rapidly their ideals of national unity and democracy” [ibid.: 26]. To do so would overturn the foundation of the American trusteeship project. The Sakdal uprising and Aguinaldo’s electoral challenge therefore had to be de-legitimized lest it opened up a can of worms that would seriously have an effect on the progress of the Commonwealth.

Conclusion

Among other things, The Philippines: A Study in National Development is an important document as it helps us understand why, unlike the Dutch and the Javanese or the French and the Vietnamese, the United States was able to retain a durable legitimate standing vis-à-vis the Filipinos. Scholars have cited the role that colonial education, the vote, the destruction of the radical and the enfeeblement of the nationalist opposition, Filipino training in American-style politics and the Filipinization of the colonial state have played in enabling Filipinos to identify much more closely with American rule [Majul 1998: 201–246; Constantino 1974; Constantino and Constantino 1992; May 1987; McCoy 1993; Boss 1995; Anderson 1998: 192–226]. What Hayden added to these commonly shared exegeses was to explain this “popularity” based on American political and ideological contributions to colonial and national state formation.

One of the book’s concern was to emphasize this contribution and remind readers that Philippine national development may be a Filipino creation in the last instance, but without American initial guidance it would not have succeeded. At its very core, the Filipino
system had also American features. The book can thus be read as an attempt to elaborate on the American contribution to formation of what Benedict Anderson calls “colonial nationalism,” i.e., a 20th century model of nation-state building that was “a blend of popular and official nationalism” [Anderson 1983: 114]. It represents an attempt by an academic to locate American colonialism not with official reactionary nationalism but with popular nationalism.

Aware of the resilient political memories of the 1896 Revolution and the Filipino-American war, and given the long-term limitations of outright suppression, colonial officials, American politicians and policy-makers sought ways to mitigate their impact on Filipinos. Colonial rule was justified as the appropriate vehicle to preserve features of these historical events and bring about their fruition, this time however within the framework of “benevolent assimilation.” Filipino leaders who were equally sensitive to these historic conjunctures but fearful of what they saw as the uncontrollable and anarchic impulses of mass nationalism, concurred. The quest for the Filipino nation that brought about the Revolution and the war can still be realized by Filipinos, although this time in a new political terrain and employing a different political strategy.

While the Americans eventually lost control of the colonial state to Filipino politicians led by Quezon, they contented themselves in the fact conceding power did not mean losing political popularity. American colonialism’s legitimate standing among many Filipinos remained durable during the Commonwealth and beyond. Filipinos gave Americans their unquestioning loyalty even after they abandoned the Filipinos to the Japanese in World War II, and guaranteed that the Philippine Republic remained the United States’ staunchest ally in the post-war period. In no other instance in Southeast Asia was a colonial power able to maintain such “goodwill” from most of the colonized as the America was in the Philippines.8 This unusual condition was not merely the product of successful coercion, cooptation and collaboration, and public (re)education. More importantly, it was the outcome of “genuine” American assistance and involvement in a “nationalist project.”

It would take another half a decade after the war before this hegemony was seriously threatened by Filipino nationalists and radicals.

Bibliographic References


For a proximate experience in Southeast Asia, see the British in Malaya, who, like the Americans, handed power to the “native elite” [Amoroso 1996].

620