Martial Law and Realignment of Political Parties in the Philippines (September 1972-February 1986): With a Case in the Province of Batangas

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Citation

Issue Date
1991-09

URL
http://hdl.handle.net/2433/56443

Type
Departmental Bulletin Paper

Textversion
publisher

Kyoto University

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I Introduction

Since its independence, the Philippines had been called the showcase of democracy in Asia, having acquired American political institutions. Similar to the United States, it had a two-party system. The two major parties, namely, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Liberal Party (LP), had alternately captured state power through elections, while other political parties had hardly played significant roles in shaping the political course of the country.  

1) The leadership of the two parties was composed mainly of wealthy politicians from traditional elite families that had been entrenched in provinces. The parties in each province were structured based on vast networks of patron-client type relationships between individuals cutting across social classes. This kind of parties are hereinafter referred to as traditional parties.

2) One major challenge to the political system as such was the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the National Liberation Army, a peasant army in Central and Southern Luzon, which staged armed rebellion under the leadership of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) against the government in 1949. But it was effectively suppressed by the government by the mid 1950s.

3) For discussions on the circumstances under which martial law was declared and the reasons why it was declared, see, for example, Brillantes, Jr. [1987] and Daroy [1988].

The imposition of martial law by President Marcos in September 1972 shattered Philippine democracy. The country was placed under Marcos' authoritarian control until the revolution of February 1986 which restored democracy. At the same time, the two-party system collapsed. The traditional political forces lay dormant in the early years of martial rule when no elections were held. When elections were resumed in 1978, a single dominant party called Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) emerged as an administration party under Marcos, while the traditional opposition was fragmented which saw the proliferation of regional parties. Meantime, different non-traditional forces such as those that operated underground and those that joined the protest movement, which later snowballed after the Aquino assassination in August 1983, emerged as significant political actors especially in opposition to Marcos.

The period from September 1972 to February 1986 when the special presidential
election was held that triggered off the revolution is politically a very interesting period. This is so not only because various political forces, including those that had hardly been significant actors before martial law, came into play but also because they interacted with one another in a complicated way. They did so sometimes as allies and at other times as adversaries both above- and underground leading to the overthrow of Marcos' authoritarian regime.

Many scholars have studied the development of these various political forces and their interaction. Many studies were published in a competing manner shortly before and after the revolution. They have presented various viewpoints, interesting interpretations and insightful analyses. However, although their studies are based on fairly abundant data, there still is room for further fact-searching to make significant scholarly contributions. This is because the details have not always been documented sufficiently and have sometimes been misrepresented especially regarding the underground social democrats. In addition, since their studies have concentrated mostly on the national level, even factual information about what happened at the local level has not yet been systematically provided.

In view of this, what follows is an attempt to give an account of how different political forces, especially political parties, developed and interacted with one another in the period in question. It first inquires into the development at the national level and then focuses in relation to it on the province of Batangas as a case at the local level.

II The National Scene

Upon the imposition of martial law, Marcos arrested many of his political enemies of different persuasions and suppressed political activities against his government. He abolished the Congress and suspended elections for several years. While the people were silenced with fear or acquiesced with a hope for social reform and economic development, he established his martial law regime. Under his strong influence, a new constitution was promulgated in 1973. Its transitory provisions and subsequent amendments virtually gave him dictatorial powers for an indefinite "interim" period. Marcos consolidated his control over the military. He attacked the economic bases of powerful political families that he called oligarchs to be taken over by his close associates or cronies. He elevated technocrats to key government positions including cabinet ministers which

4) The most comprehensive works on this topic will be Wurfel [1988] and De Dios et al. [1988]. Those from the leftist viewpoint include Malay, Jr. [1988] and Avinales [1988]. Others include Nemenzo [1985], Landé [1986] and Thompson [1988].

5) The reasons why the development of the underground social democrats under the Marcos regime has not been documented sufficiently will be that it had been very difficult to have access to data and that their force was relatively small so that they did not draw so much attention as the CPP-NDF-NPA. But their role in the anti-Marcos struggle should deserve more attention.

6) This paper is a slightly revised version of a part of the author's Ph.D. dissertation [Kimura 1990: 87-121].
had previously been given to politicians.

Faced with the situation, traditional political forces such as the NP and the LP whose primary activity was to gain power and patronage through electoral contests became inactive. They were reactivated only in 1978 when elections were resumed. In contrast, non-traditional political forces came to play significant roles as opposition to Marcos. The most important of all was the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Others included the social democrats, civil libertarians and human rights advocates, and certain segments of the religious sector. (The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is excluded from the discussion here on the ground that it is limited to Muslim Mindanao.)

The CPP was founded on December 26, 1968\(^7\) by Jose Ma. Sison who was then leading the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) or the Patriotic Youth League. Affiliated with the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) for some time, he split with it in 1967 because of irreconcilable differences with its old leadership. Influenced by Mao Zedong thought, the CPP committed itself to the revolution by means of a protracted, rural based “people’s war.” In January 1969, Bernabe Buscayno and his men, who had been with remnants of the Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the National Liberation Army in the Pampanga-Tarlac area, joined the CPP and in March of that year formed its military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA).\(^8\) The NPA started as a small army in Tarlac with twenty automatic rifles and fifteen handguns. By the time martial law was declared, its armory had increased to 350 high-powered weapons. Its operational zone had already extended to the Cagayan Valley in Northern Luzon, and it had a few armed propaganda units in Bicol, Southern Luzon, Western Visayas and Mindanao [Umali Undated as quoted in Nemenzo 1985: 57].

Under martial law, the NPA grew rapidly despite military repression. Oppression radicalized many activists, most of whom were students, and drove them underground to join the CPP-NPA. They in turn contributed greatly to its rural organizing. As of 1983, the NPA had at least 12,000 full-time guerrillas and 35,000 part-time militias. It was operating in 56 out of 72 provinces, and in 400 out of 1,500 municipalities. It was argued that at least 20 percent of the barangays were controlled or infiltrated by the NPA [Nemenzo 1985: 57]. In addition, the CPP initiated the formation of the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1973 in order to bring together all forces hostile to what it called the “US-Marcos dictatorship.” With the NPA as one of its component organizations, the NDF has since become a countrywide apparatus having branches in all provinces and cities [Nemenzo

\(^7\) However, Gregg Jones suggests that the founding congress was delayed and started on January 3, 1969 and that the founding members agreed that the official date would be recorded as December 26, 1968 (the seventy-fifth anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birthday) [Jones 1989: 17].

\(^8\) For an excellent account of the establishment of the CPP, see Nemenzo [1984] and Jones [1989].
While many radicalized activists joined the CPP-NPA-NDF, others with a social democratic orientation kept a distance from them and continued their own anti-Marcos struggle. There emerged two significant organizations of social democrats, namely, the Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) or the Philippine Democratic Socialist Party and the Katipunan ng mga Sandigan ng Pilipino (KASAPI).

The PDSP has its origin in different groups organized by the activists at the turn of the decade. In 1971, the Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Sosyalistang Pilipino (KDSP) or the Philippine Social Democratic Movement was formed by seventeen such groups, among them the Hasik-Kalayaan headed by Norberto Gonzales and the Kilusan ng mga Anak ng Kalayaan by Fr. Romeo J. Intengan. In May 1973, the KDSP was reorganized into a political party to be called the PDSP. The party described itself as Filipino nationalist, democratic, socialist and committed to the armed struggle for national liberation [PDSP 1983 as quoted in De Dios et al. 1988: 434–435]. In 1976, the PDSP and another social democratic organization, namely, the Lakas Diwa formed in 1970 by Ed Garcia together with Noel Tolentino, Conrado Limcaoco, Ed Valenzuela, Mar Canonigo and others, merged to form the Nagkakaisang Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (NPDSP) or the United Philippine Democratic Socialist Party. Norberto Gonzales, Fr. Romeo Intengan (the ideologue of the PDSP) and Mar Canonigo became its chairman, vice-chairman and secretary-general respectively. (NPDSP was renamed PDSP in 1980.)

In the early years of martial law, their force was so small that they did not draw the attention of the government. In December 1977, the NPDS in the name of the anti-Marcos politicians, most of whom were LP leaders, created an alliance called Katipunan ng Bayan para sa Kalayaan (KABAKA) to boycott the referendum in that month. The NPDS provided the mass base for the politicians whose political machinery had broken down with the advent of the martial law regime. In the Interim Batasang Pambansa elections of April 1978, it actively supported and campaigned for the LABAN candidates in Metro Manila. It also initiated the April 6 noise barrage and provided poll watchers. Immediately after the elections, the NPDS was declared a subversive organization by the government, and its principal leaders were arrested. From then on, realizing that parliamentary struggle was meaningless under the dictatorship, it boycotted all the elections before 1986 and concentrated in armed struggle. In 1980, the PDSP set up a headquarters in Sabah in alliance with the MNLF. By this time, it had established its military arm, the Sandigan. 9)

KASAPI was founded in 1970 by young activists, among them Jose Luis Alcuaz and Herman Laurel who became Chairman

9) The account of the PDSP here is based on the author’s interviews with Mar Canonigo, Quezon City, July 29, 1988; Roy Oliveros, Quezon City, September 8, 1989; and Norberto Gonzales, Quezon City, September 13, 1989.
and Secretary General, with Fr. Jose Blanco as spiritual leader. It was based in the Jesuit-run Apostolic Center. When martial law was declared, some leaders were captured; members became inactive; and the organization experienced a set back. In mid-1973, KASAPI started to rebuild by organizing students, the urban poor and a segment of professionals. Along with the PDSP and Lakas Diwa, it participated in the negotiations, which practically started in 1973, to unite the social democrats. But, when the NFDSP was formed, KASAPI did not join it. Like the PDSP, KASAPI operated underground and opted for armed struggle against Marcos. (For this Fr. Blanco, an advocate of active nonviolence, became inactive beginning in 1975.) The armed elements of KASAPI, in collaboration with certain elements of the US-based anti-Marcos opposition, formed the April 6 Liberation Movement, an urban guerrilla force responsible for the series of explosions in Metro Manila in 1980.

KASAPI also participated in the electoral struggle. In the 1978 elections, it formed the Partido Sambayanang Pilipino and fielded several candidates in Metro Manila. At the same time, it supported selected candidates of LABAN. When the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino (PDP) was formed in 1982, KASAPI cadres entered the party clandestinely, recruited new cadres through PDP (later through PDP-LABAN) and operated within the party. KASAPI claims that it had strong influence in forming the platform of the party and in the party institute which was in charge of membership education and training.\(^\text{10}\)

In August 1977, Marcos announced his intention to hold Interim Batasang Pambansa elections and local elections by the end of 1978 as a step toward what he called normalization. The former were held in April 1978, whereas the latter were held only in January 1980. Behind this move of Marcos was growing domestic criticism against the dictatorial government and external pressure especially from the human rights diplomacy of the Carter Administration. The Interim Batasang Pambansa elections were held under a system of region-wide voting districts with block voting in contrast to the pre-martial law congressional elections which had a single-member district system. The resumption of elections reactivated the traditional political forces.

In preparation for the elections, Marcos as the titular head of the Nacionalista Party called a meeting of the National Directorate of the party on February 1, 1978 to reorganize its ranks. As a method of reorganizing the party, the following proposal which was made by former Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr. was adopted:

To organize a coalition movement, united front or umbrella organization that shall include as its members Nacionalistas, Liberals, veterans as well as other political sectoral and socio-civic aggregations and individuals who adhere

\(^{10}\) The account of KASAPI here is based on the author's interviews with Boyet Montiel and June Lee, Quezon City, October 18, 1989.
to the ideals and principles of the New Society, and which shall field its own candidates in the Interim Batasang Pambansa elections. [KBL 1985: 23]

The coalition movement was denominated as the Bagong Lipunang Kilusan ng Nagkakaisang Nacionalista-Liberal, Atbp., which was later renamed Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), and started with the following interim officers [ibid.: 24–25]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Ferdinand E. Marcos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Jose A. Roño</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Luis Vulo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Chairmen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region I</td>
<td>Conrado Estrella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region II</td>
<td>Juan Ponce Enrile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region III</td>
<td>Eduardo Cojuangco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IV</td>
<td>Imelda Romualdez-Marcos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IV-A</td>
<td>Felicisimo San Luis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region VI</td>
<td>Roberto S. Benedicto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region VII</td>
<td>Lorenzo Teves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region VIII</td>
<td>Benjamin Romualdez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IX</td>
<td>Vicente M. Cerilles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region X</td>
<td>Emmanuel Pelaez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region XI</td>
<td>Antonio O. Floreindo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region XII</td>
<td>Ali Dimaporo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The KBL attracted not only most of the Nacionalista politicians but also many of those who were affiliated with the Liberal Party and others. A segment of the NP under Jose Roy, its acting president, did not join the KBL, but adopted the candidates of KBL as its own in the elections [COMELEC 1979b: 3].

As for the Liberal Party, three principal leaders, namely, former Senators Gerardo Roxas, Jovito Salonga and Benigno Aquino, Jr. who were President, Vice-President and Secretary General of the Party respectively, were first united in participating in the elections. But the adoption by Marcos of block voting led the leaders to decide to boycott. However, Aquino, who had been sentenced to death by the Military Tribunal and detained in Fort Bonifacio, was convinced by former Senators Lorenzo Tañada and Francisco Rodrigo that it would be better for him to launch his candidacy [LP Undated: 18]. The election process would provide him with the opportunity to air his views [PDP-LABAN Undated: 1–2]. This divided the Liberal Party.

Since Aquino was detained in Fort Bonifacio, Rodrigo invited opposition political leaders to form a slate to be headed by Aquino in Metro Manila. After a series of marathon meetings, the following twenty-one candidates were selected:

From the Liberal Party Leadership:
1. Benigno S. Aquino
2. Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo
3. Neptali Gonzales
4. Alejandro Roces
5. Ramon Mitra
6. Primitivo de Leon
7. Cesar T. Lucero
8. Rosario Planas
9. Antonio Martinez

From the Nacionalista Party ranks:
10. Ernesto Maceda
11. Juan T. David
12. Felicisimo Cabigao
13. Jaime Ferrer

From Progressives and Independents:
14. Emmanuel "Noli" T. Santos
15. Ernesto Rondon
16. Aquilino Pimentel
17. Teofisto Guingona
18. Napoleon Rama

And from the Labor, Community and Youth sector:
19. Trinidad Herrera
20. Fernando Barican
21. Alexander Boncayao
It appeared that the LP which opted for boycott as a party would not allow the use of its name. Consequently, since the slate was composed of individuals from different groups, Aquino decided to form an umbrella organization. The organization was named Lakas ng Bayan or LABAN for short, and Tañada became its chairman [ibid.: 2–3].

Interestingly, LABAN projected the united front idea with the left as far as taking in four non-traditional, left leaning personalities, namely, Barican, Boncayao, Herrera and Planas in the ticket. The Left under the leadership of the CPP’s Manila-Rizal regional committee supported the LABAN candidates clandestinely.11)

Besides LABAN, many new political parties were formed to participate in the Interim Batasang Pambansa elections: the number of registered political parties, both old and new, at the time of the elections counted thirty-two. Many of the new ones were regional parties [COMELEC 1979a: 512–516].

Though most of the registered parties participated in the elections, only five could put up a good fight against the KBL. They were the Lakas ng Bayan in Region IV (Metro Manila), Bicol Saro in Region V (Bicol), Pusyon Bisaya in Region VII (Central Visayas), Concerned Citizen’s Aggrupation in Region IX (Western Mindanao), and Mindanao Alliance in Regions IX, X and XI (Western, Northern and Southern Mindanao). Among the five, only Pusyon Bisaya and the Mindanao Alliance could elect assemblymen. The overall result of the elections was an overwhelming victory for the KBL.12)

Whether to participate or not in the 1980 local elections was another issue that divided the opposition. While the LP and LABAN, let alone the CPP and the social democrats, were steadfast in their boycott position, many other traditional parties opted for participation. A segment of the NP including the Laurels that had been under the KBL umbrella split with Marcos and fielded candidates under the banner of the NP.

The result of the local elections was again an overwhelming victory for the KBL. All but four elected governors were KBL in the country’s seventy-three provinces; all but six elected city mayors were KBL in the fifty-nine cities. Most other local elective positions were also taken by the KBL. The four non-KBL governors were Natalia F. Dumlao (NUL) of Nueva Viscaya, Jose C. Laurel V (NP) of Batangas, Federico O. Mengote (Independent) of Eastern Samar, and Homobono Adaza (Mindanao Alliance) of Misamis Oriental. The six non-KBL city mayors were Francisco Nepomuceno (Independent) of Angeles City, Julian C. Medina, Jr. (NP) of Cavite City, Cesar C. Climaco (CCA) of Zamboanga City, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (NUL-Mindanao Alliance) of

11) For the coalition politics among different opposition forces under the Marcos regime from the leftist viewpoint, see Malay, Jr. [1988] and Avinales [1988].

12) In fact, while the Pusyon Bisaya won thirteen seats, the Mindanao Alliance and a group of independent candidates identified as Kunsensyang Bayan one each, the KBL won all the other seats. See COMELEC [1979a: 46–48, 329–346].
One reason for the sweeping success of the KBL both in the 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa elections and in the 1980 local elections was the widespread use of election frauds. But the most important reason was that most traditional politicians especially at the local level sided with the Administration because Marcos controlled all the sources of patronage and there was no prospect of toppling him in the near future. Therefore, in the 1978 elections, the KBL had a well-fueled nationwide organization, while the opposition was fragmented and poorly organized; in the 1980 elections, many local candidates competed for nomination by KBL.

Shortly after the 1980 local elections, a group of prominent NP leaders who had split with Marcos started to reorganize the party. On March 28, 1980, former Senator Gil J. Puyat (the party president on leave in favor of former Senator Jose Roy), created the Ad Hoc Committee on the Reorganization and Revitalization of the Nacionalista Party, and appointed to the committee former Vice-President Fernando Lopez, former Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr., former Senators Jose J. Roy, Domacoo Alonto and Dominador R. Aytona with Salvador H. Laurel as interim Secretary General. On the following day, Jose B. Laurel, Jr. was elected Chairman of the committee [Laurel, Jr. 1981: 1]. Incidentally, this caused the split of the NP into the Laurel wing and the Roy Wing. Jose Roy did not attend the committee and claimed his NP presidency on the ground that he had been elected president by the Directorate of the party in 1971 [Anonymous 1980: 1, 6]. Puyat died in March 1981. The Ad Hoc Committee called a meeting of the National Executive Committee on May 10 and recommended to convene the National Directorate on May 11, in which Jose B. Laurel, Jr. was elected as the new party president [NP 1989: 6].

In June 1980, negotiations for a coalition of all opposition parties started among prominent politicians, leading to the formation of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), an umbrella organization, under the joint chairmanship of Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Gerardo Roxas. Coalesced under UNIDO were eight political parties, namely, the NP, LP, NUL, the Interim National Assembly Association (INAA), a segment of Pusyon Bisaya, the Mindanao Alliance, Bicol Saro and the CCA. LABAN also joined UNIDO on a case-to-case basis [Laurel, Jr. 1981: 2]. UNIDO's executive committee (the policy-and decision-making body which was also under co-chairmen Laurel, Jr. and Roxas) was composed of the following members: former President Diosdado Macapagal, former Vice-President Fernando Lopez, former Vice-President Fernando Lopez, former Senators Salvador H. Laurel, Eva Estrada-Kalaw, Jovito R. Salonga, Dominador R. Aytona, Ambrosio Padilla, Francisco Rodrigo, Lorenzo M. Tañada, Rene Espina and Mamintal Tamano, former Representative Rogaciano M. Mercado, former Foreign Affairs Secretary Salvador P. Lopez, 1971 Constitutional
convention Delegates Abraham F.
Sarmiento and Antonio C. Alano, Atty.
Luis A. Jose, Assemblymen Valentino
Legaspi and Reuben Canoy, Governor
Homobono A. Adaza, Mayor Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, and Economist Emmanuel Q.
Yap [UNIDO 1985: 1].

On August 28, 1980, about two hundred
leaders of the nine groups under UNIDO
signed a document prepared by the ex­
ecutive committee and entitled “A National
Covenant for Freedom.” The covenant
listed five goals topped by “the immediate
and absolute termination of the Marcos
dictatorship,” and “the unconditional
dismantling of martial rule and the holding
of free, honest and orderly elections, in
order to establish a truly democratic and
representative system of government
[Laurel, Jr. 1981: 3].”

In January 1981, Marcos lifted martial
law. Then, after holding a plebiscite in
April on a set of constitutional amendments
to change the parliamentary form of
government to a presidential system, which
was approved in spite of UNIDO’s
campaign for “No” votes, he called
a presidential election to be held in June.
UNIDO boycotted the election on the
ground that they could not expect free
and honest election. Marcos won handily.
But, though there were thirteen presidential
candidates including Alejo Santos who ran
under the NP-Roy Wing, the boycott by
the major opposition group reduced the
credibility of the election.

In spite of a certain extent of success in
the boycott movement, however, the
opposition could not gain much headway.
The general public were still apathetic.
In addition, the departure of Benigno
Aquino, Jr. for the United States in May
1980 followed by Jovito Salonga in March
1981 and Gerardo Roxas in June 1981
ostensibly for medical reasons weakened
the opposition leadership. But, the
opposition’s efforts to expand and consoli­
date their forces continued. The process
may be described as a kind of tug-of-war
among different political groups and
personalities in their attempts to unite the
opposition against Marcos who was still
enjoying his comfortable hold on power.

The formation of the Social Democratic
Party (SDP) in December 1981 and the
inauguration of the PDP in February 1982
were among the noteworthy events in the
development of the opposition after the
presidential election. The first attempt to
unite the opposition began with an “Agree­
ment for Unification” signed in February
1982 by Jose B. Laurel, Jr., Diosdado
Macapagal, Lorenzo M. Tañada and Luis
A. Jose, representing NP, LP, LABAN
and PDP respectively. The leaders of the
four parties thereby agreed to work for the
unification of all opposition parties and
groups towards one political party [Laurel,
Jr. et al. 1982]. This resulted in the
expansion of UNIDO.

By April 1982, three more parties
including the PDP joined UNIDO,

13) The SDP was formed by former Information
Minister Francisco Tatad who had split with
Marcos at the time of the 1980 local elections
and joined the NP, Assemblyman Reuben
Canoy who had left the Mindanao Alliance, and
Assemblyman Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who had
been with the Pusyon Bisaya.
It also involved U.S.-based opposition leaders like Benigno Aquino, Jr., Raul Manglapus and Jovito Salonga, who constituted UNIDO's External Advisory Group. The formal name of UNIDO was changed to the United Nationalist Democratic Organization with the same Acronym [UNIDO 1985: 2-3].

The reorganization of UNIDO reflected the strengthening position of Salvador H. Laurel in the organization. But the unity of the opposition was so fragile due to their internal leadership struggle that UNIDO remained as an umbrella organization in spite of the “Agreement for Unification.”

In June 1982, the PDP and LABAN entered into a merger agreement to form the PDP-LABAN with Tanada as chairman and Luis Jose as co-chairman. The merger was formalized in a party convention in February 1983 [Anonymous 1982: 1, 14; PDP 1983: 3]. The PDP-LABAN remained outside UNIDO. The merger united the mass-based organization of the PDP and the traditional politicians of LABAN. It was also geographically complementary since LABAN was Metro Manila-based while the PDP was better organized in the Visayas and Mindanao.

The assassination of Benigno Aquino,
Jr., the arch political enemy of Marcos, on August 21, 1983 changed the political situation overnight. Marcos’ political credibility plunged into a critical level. An economic crisis followed. A citizens’ protest movement arose in a great magnitude especially in Metro Manila. Various forms of frequent mass action mobilized a great number of people.

The protest movement was carried out by numerous, different groups, large and small. The majority of them were formed one after another immediately after the assassination. One of the most important aspects of the movement was the involvement of the urban middle class that had been generally apolitical. Their groups, which were called cause-oriented groups, joined the movement with the groups of students, workers, the urban poor, civil libertarians, etc.

It should not be overlooked here that behind the protest movement were different opposition forces that were trying to exploit the highly politicized masses in their favor. For example, the PDSP tried to recruit new members and to organize the masses or to penetrate into their organizations to give them a political direction.14) So did KASAPI.15) It is natural to assume that the CPP-NDF did the same. Also, prominent businessmen and professionals, some of whom had been close to Benigno Aquino, Jr., started to organize. The traditional political parties also tried to join hands with the protest movement, though the relations between the two were not necessarily cordial except for the PDP-LABAN.

The first major grouping of the protest movement was the Justice for Aquino, Justice for All Movement (JAJA) which was launched as early as August 25 with Lorenzo Tañada as chairman. Barely two months after its inception, it had grown to about ninety chapters and organizations [Diokno 1988: 134]. Among the member organizations were the August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM) led by Agapito “Butz” Aquino, the Kilusang sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan (KAAKBay) led by former Senator Jose Diokno, the Alliance of Makati Associations (AMA), the Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), the Mamamayang Nagkaisa kay Aquino (MANA), the Concerned Artists of the Philippines (CAP), the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), the League of Filipino Students (LFS), the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD), the Samahang para sa Pananampalataya at Katarungan (SAPAK) the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFD), SANDIWA, etc.16)

In January 1984, the Kongresso ng Mamamayang Pilipino (KOMPIL) was held upon the initiative of Agapito “Butz” Aquino. It was an attempt to unite all

14) Norberto Gonzales Interview, September 13, 1989.
15) June Lee Interview, October 18, 1989.
the opposition forces. It invited a wide spectrum of political elements from the right to the left including politicians and leaders of the protest movement. The congress chose fifteen leaders who would constitute KOMPIL's Council of Leaders, its highest governing body. But the question of whether to boycott or participate in the Batasang Pambansa elections of May divided KOMPIL. The leaders reached an agreement on a compromise formula called "A Call for Meaningful Elections." It stipulated certain conditions to be met for the opposition to participate in the elections. The conditions included the repeal of Amendment No. 6 and other oppressive decrees, general amnesty and release of all political detainees, appointment of independent-minded individuals to the COMELEC, etc. [ibid.: 149-152].

These conditions were not met by Marcos. But most of the traditional political parties including UNIDO decided to participate in the elections. The PDP-LABAN was divided over the issue of participation. To avoid confrontation, the party left it to the provincial and city assemblies to decide for themselves [Nolasco 1984: 14]. The issue together with the leadership struggle split the LP into the Salonga Wing, which boycotted the elections, and the Kalaw Wing, which participated [LP Undated: 22]. The former left UNIDO; the latter remained under it. On the other hand, the major groups in the protest movement under JAJA decided to boycott the elections. They formed the Coalition of Organizations for the Restoration of Democracy (CORD). CORD took over JAJA with almost the same member organizations and organized boycott activities such as Lakad para sa Bayan (LAKBAYAN) [Anonymous 1984: 1, 2]. It has to be noted, however, that some personalities in the protest movement, most notably Corazon Aquino, the widow of Benigno Aquino, Jr., opted for participation. The newly formed National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) led by Jose Concepcion also advocated for participation [Diokno 1988: 151].

In spite of the division between those for participation and those for boycott, the opposition could make much headway in the elections. Out of the 183 elective seats of the Batasang Pambansa contested, the opposition could win 64 (including 4 NP-Roy Wing candidates) or about one third, while the KBL won 112, the remaining 7 went to independent candidates. Most of the victorious opposition candidates belonged either to UNIDO or to the PDP-LABAN [COMELEC Undated-d]. Compared with the previous elections, the result clearly indicated the declining support for Marcos. Even some ranking KBL members such as Vicente Paterno (a former Minister of Public Highways and of Industry) and Emmanuel Pelaez (former Vice-President), had left the party because of the Aquino assassination [Anonymous 1983: 1, 2]. Paterno joined NAMFREL. Luis Villafuerte, a former Minister of Trade, also left the KBL and was elected to the Batasang Pambansa under UNIDO.

In early 1984, a small group of influential businessmen and professionals started to
consider a method of selecting the opposition's common presidential candidate. They came up with the so-called fast-track system, a contingency plan in case of sudden holding of a presidential election. In November 1984, Lorenzo Tañada, Corazon Aquino and Jaime Ongpin became convenors to put the contingency plan in place. In its original blueprint, the choice of the opposition's presidential candidate was left to the eleven possible standard bearers (who were chosen by the Convenor Group) and the three convenors [Cunanan 1985a: 26–29]. The eleven possible standard bearers were Agapito Aquino, Jose S. Diokno, Teofisto Guingona, Eva Estrada Kalaw, Salvador Laurel, Raul Manglapus, Ramon Mitra, Ambrosio Padilla, Aquilino Pimentel, Rafael Salas, and Jovito Salonga. The effort of the Convenor Group first resulted in the Declaration of Unity, a document signed by the eleven possible standard bearers and the three convenors or by their proxies except for Laurel and Kalaw.

Almost in parallel with the Convenor Group, the National Unification Committee (NUC) was set up by UNIDO involving mainly the opposition Batasang Pambansa assemblymen in order to adopt a method of selecting common candidates for the local elections and the presidential election scheduled for 1986 and for 1987 respectively. The NUC was composed of representatives of different political parties [Foz 1984: 1, 12]. Cecilia Muñoz Palma and Francisco Rodrigo became its chairman and vice-chairman. The method of selecting common candidates presented by the NUC in a national unification conference in March 1985 was more or less a conventional one which was to start at the local level [Foz 1985: 1, 19].

Negotiations between the Convenor Group and the NUC started as early as December 1984 in order to unite the two groups. But the process of the negotiations were very difficult. The NUC criticized the fast-track system as undemocratic, while the Convenor Group maintained the necessity to meet the emergency situation. The first major breakthrough came in April 1985 when the two groups accepted an agreement made by Corazon Aquino and Cecilia Muñoz Palma. The agreement limited presidential aspirants in a snap presidential election to one each from five major political parties and national organizations. These five parties and organizations were the LP, NP, UNIDO, PDP-LABAN and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) which was then under preparation. But the question on how the final candidate was to be chosen was left to further negotiations [Anonymous 1985: 1, 8]. It should not be overlooked here that Salvador Laurel who was at the

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17 Later in 1984, these businessmen and professionals formed a cause-oriented group called MANINDIGAN. The founding members of MANINDIGAN included Jaime Ongpin, Ramon del Rosario, Jr., Alfredo Benson, Noel Soriano, Joaquin Bernas, Ricardo Lopa, Patricia Licuanan, Lucina Teodro, Jesus Ayala, Narcisa Escaler and Narpalina Lim with Rodolfo Asuncion as legal counsel. After the EDSA revolution, many of these people came to play important roles in the Aquino government occupying key positions including a number of cabinet posts.
helm of UNIDO which had been building up its nationwide machinery had an advantage in the conventional method, while the Convenors Group that was involved in the protest movement which was heavily concentrated in Metro Manila could exert more political influence in the fast-track system.

In line with the agreement, Salvador Laurel was proclaimed as UNIDO's presidential candidate in its convention in June. But, other parties had difficulty in choosing their standard bearers.

Meanwhile, efforts of the protest movement, which were in a slump after the Batasang Pambansa elections, to re-vitalize led to an attempt to form a new alliance called Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN). The negotiations to form BAYAN started early 1985. Its founding congress was held in May.

By this time, three major groupings in the protest movement became clearly differentiated. They were the so-called national democrats, social democrats and liberal democrats.18) Their struggle for the leadership of BAYAN marred the attempt to unite the protest movement. On the second day of the founding congress, the social democrats and the liberal democrats walked out because of their discord with the national democrats over the accreditation of voting delegates. Thus only the national democrats that were in the furthest left among the three remained in BAYAN. The other two groups formed another umbrella organization called Bansang Nagkaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA) in August [Diokno 1988: 158-162].

As the possibility of the snap presidential election grew, the controversy between the NUC and the Convenor Group over the selection of the opposition's presidential candidate was taken over by a new development, that is, the Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM). It was launched with Joaquin "Chino" Roces as Chairman on October 15, 1985. The purpose of the movement was to draft Corazon Aquino by getting one million signatures of endorsement from the people and raising 30 million pesos by December 31, 1985. The cause oriented groups under BANDILA and the PDP-LABAN greatly contributed to the movement by mobilizing their organizations to get signatures.

On November 3, 1985, Marcos, realizing the necessity to seek a new mandate and pressured by the U.S. government, announced his intention to call a snap election through an interview program on American television. This set in fast motion the opposition's efforts to select a common  

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18) The national democrats were in the furthest left among the three. Their program resembled that of the underground left, though they advocate militant but nonviolent struggle. They included the KMU, LFS and NAJFD among the largest member organizations. It is suspected that many organizations of the national democrats are infiltrated by the underground left. The social democrats included sectoral organizations initiated by the PDSP and KASAPI. Cadres of the two underground organizations also formed the Filipino Social Democratic Movement (FSDM) with other leaders of social democrats' organizations. The liberal democrats consisted mostly of organizations of businessmen and professionals among them MANINDIGAN.
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presidential candidate. On November 21, a new coalition called Laban ng Bayan was organized by eight political parties and organizations, namely, the LP-Salonga Wing, the PDP-LABAN, Panaghiusa, the Young Philippine Party, Bicol Saro, the NUCD, the Convenor Group and BANDILA. It endorsed Corazon Aquino as its presidential candidate [Laban ng Bayan 1985].

On November 26, the CAPM achieved one million signatures. On the next day, Corazon Aquino, who had appeared reluctant at the beginning, stated that she would run for president if Cabinet Bill No. 7 which called for the special election for President and Vice-President was finally signed into law. On December 2, the bill was signed into law by Marcos after it was approved by the Batasang Pambansa. On the next day, she affirmed her candidacy.

By December 6, five more parties adhered to Laban ng Bayan. They were the Mindanao Alliance led by Homobono Adaza, the Muslim Federal Party led by Abul Khayr Alonto, the NUL led by Rogaciano Mercado, the Christian SocialDemocratic Party (CSDP) led by Francisco Tatad, and Laban ni Ninoy sa Gitnang Luzon led by Bren Guiao [ibid.: Exhibit D]. The first three had been with UNIDO. It seems that they had just switched from UNIDO to Laban ng Bayan or, synonymously, from Laurel to Aquino.

By this time, the negotiation between Aquino and Laurel had become the focus of the unification of the opposition. On December 11, the last day to file their certificates of candidacy, a last minute agreement was reached between the two. Laurel gave way to Aquino and became her vice-presidential candidate. She accepted his condition that both of them should run under the banner of UNIDO [Cunan 1985b: 6–7]. The Laban ng Bayan and UNIDO made a coalition, which was formalized during the election campaign period.

Thus, the snap election turned out to be a contest between the KBL’s Marcos and Arturo M. Tolentino, his hand-picked running mate, on the one hand and the UNIDO-Laban ng Bayan coalition’s Aquino and Laurel on the other hand, with both legal leftist forces under BAYAN and the underground CPP-NDF boycotting the election. Almost all the political parties and organizations were aligned into the three groups. The NP-Roy Wing which had been closely aligned with the KBL supported the Marcos-Tolentino ticket. There were two other presidential candidates including Reuben Canoy who ran under the Social Democratic Party and four other vice-presidential candidates including Eva Estrada Kalaw of the LP-Kalaw Wing. But they were relatively insignificant.

One salient aspect of the Aquino-Laurel campaign was that a great number of volunteers together with the numerous cause oriented groups under BANDILA participated in the campaign and vigil activities. The activities of these volunteers were coordinated through VICTORY headed by Alfredo Benson, while the campaign activities of the political parties were coordinated through the Aquino-Laurel National Secretariat placed under
Paul Aquino and Violeta R. Laurel. 19) On the other hand, Marcos' side launched the Marcos-Tolentino Movement to coordinate the campaign activities of individuals and groups that were not affiliated to KBL but were supporting the Marcos-Tolentino team. 20)

III A Provincial Scene (A Case in Batangas)

Politics in Batangas as well as in other provinces had been dominated by wealthy political families that competed with one another for political power. Of them, the Laurels had grown the most powerful within a fairly short period after independence under the leadership of Jose P. Laurel, Sr., the war-time President and Senator, and Jose B. Laurel, Jr., the three-time House Speaker. Since independence, most of the congressmen and governors had been Nacionalistas, though there had been many non-Nacionalistas in the town-level elective positions. Since the Laurels had always been with the NP, this fact means that they and their allies (the most notable of them Feliciano Leviste who held the governorship from 1947 to 1971) had dominated politics in the province. Maria Kalaw Katigbak from Lipa City who was elected to the Senate under the LP in 1961 and Jose Diokno from Taal who was also elected to the Senate under the NP in 1963 and reelected in 1969 posed a challenge to the provincial leadership of the Laurels. But their position was not shaken. 21)

The declaration of martial law made inactive the political competition among the traditional political forces in Batangas for several years in which elections were suspended. Most of the politicians including the Laurels acquiesced under martial rule. Senator Jose Diokno, a vocal Marcos critic, was arrested. After his release in 1974, he continued his anti-Marcos struggle and initiated the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) and the Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan (KAAKBAY). But they were based in Metro Manila. In the meantime, the underground opposition, namely the CPP-NDF-NPA, the PDSP and KASAPI, penetrated into Batangas.

The beginning of the CPP-NDF-NPA's penetration into Batangas can be traced back to several founding members of the KM who hailed from Batangas, specifically Nasugbu, Sto. Tomas, Batangas City and San Juan. In 1969, the KM's provincial organization was founded by Jose Luneta; and Rodrigo Javier became its chairman. In 1970, that of the Samahang Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK) (a splinter group of the KM which later reconciled with it) was established by Guillermo Gano, who became its chairman. In 1971, both the KM and the SDK conducted a series of teach-ins in the province to expand their organizations. Upon the declaration of martial law, they suffered

20) Interview with an officer of the Marcos-Tolentino Movement, Makati, Metro Manila, February 1, 1986.
21) For a brief account of the pre-martial law Batangas politics, see Machado [1972: 59-73].
a severe setback because of the arrest of their leaders. Some members became inactive because of fear. But some went underground to sustain the organizations.

The expansion of the underground left started in 1974 when two groups of CPP cadres were sent to Batangas to organize in the eastern and western parts of the province. In later years, NPA presence was most strongly felt in these areas. By and large, however, their influence in Batangas seems to have been quite limited perhaps due to its relatively good economic condition. 22)

The PDSP gained a foothold in Batangas in 1974, when its ranking officer who was a priest approached St. Francis de Sales Major Seminary in Lipa City and recruited new members from the seminarians, among them Roy Oliveros. Then they tried to organize peasants, workers and students. In 1977, the Kapisanan ng Magsasakang Pilipino (KASAMA), a PDSP-backed peasant organization, was formed in Nasugbu and Bauan. 23) KASAPI, which was heavily concentrated in Metro Manila and its adjacent area, also reached Batangas. In 1976, KASAPI cadres organized small fishermen in Nasugbu through the Small Bureau for Small Fisherfolks (SBSF) which was also based in the Apostolic Center. 24) All told, however, the forces of the social democrats in Batangas seem to have been relatively insignificant.

The organizations of the traditional political forces were reactivated at the time of the 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa elections. But, unlike some other regions where viable regional opposition parties were formed and challenged the KBL, Region IV-A of which Batangas is a part did not see any strong opposition party because most of the prominent politicians from the region who participated in the elections ran under the KBL. Those Batangueños included in the twenty-member KBL ticket were Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., Salvador H. Laurel, Soledad L. Dolor and Expedito M. Leviste. There were only eleven opposition candidates in the region for its twenty Batasan seats [COMELEC 1979a: 336]. Thus, the 1978 elections in Region IV-A were one-sided and not really competitive.

The all-out electoral competition among the traditional political forces in Batangas resumed at the time of the 1980 local elections. The elections were contested between the KBL and the NP led by the Laurels who had just split with Marcos. There was no other traditional political party in the province. No regional party was formed. The LP's organization had been disintegrated or, rather, its local building blocks, namely, local factions, had left the party. Most of the politicians in the province were realigned into the two

22) The account of the underground left here is based on the author's interview with one informant who was familiar with the leftist movement in Batangas conducted on the condition of anonymity and also an interview with Guillermo A. Gamo, Batangas City, Batangas, January 23, 1990.
23) Interview with Roy Oliveros, Quezon City, September 8, 1989.
24) Interview with Boyet Montiel, Quezon City, October 18, 1989; and interview with June Lee, Quezon City, October 18, 1989.
parties. Those aspirants who were not included in the tickets of either party ran as independent or unofficially carried the banner of either party.

By this time, Governor Antonio Leviste and most of the incumbent mayors had joined the KBL regardless of their party affiliations at the time of their election in 1971. The NP’s gubernatorial candidate against Leviste was Jose C. Laurel V, a son of former Ambassador Jose H. Laurel III. The NP’s mayoral candidates were generally recruited from political rivals of the KBL mayors in their respective towns regardless of their previous party affiliations.

The results of the elections were as follows. Laurel V won the governorship over Leviste, while Ofelia M. Carpio (KBL) won the vice-governorship over Conrado V. Apacible (NP). Of the eight elected provincial board members, five were NP, namely, Vicente Mayo, Jose Atienza, Bienvenido Medrano, Hernando B. Perez, and Rafael R. Recto; three were KBL, namely, Olegario F. Cantos, Jr., Dominador L. Bonuan, and Maxima R. Recto. Of the thirty-four elected municipal and city mayors, twenty-five were KBL, while the remaining nine were NP. Positions of the vice-mayors and the municipal and city councilors were divided between the KBL and the NP, though some independents were also elected in a number of towns [COMELEC Undated-a; Undated-b; Undated-c]. Compared with most other provinces where the KBL nearly monopolized the local elective positions, Batangas saw a significant advance of the opposition under the leadership of the Laurels.

When UNIDO was formed, the NP Batangas Chapter constituted practically the sole force of UNIDO in Batangas due to the virtual absence of local organizations of other traditional opposition parties in the province. During the 1981 presidential election campaign, the NP Batangas Chapter organized a series of boycott rallies of UNIDO in the major towns. But the KBL that commanded the majority of the mayors and far superior resources was more active in campaigning for Marcos. Lacking a credible opposition candidate, however, the election was not a heated one.

The Aquino assassination of August 1983 had significant political effects in Batangas as well, though they were not so dramatic as in Metro Manila. For one, legal leftist organizations which had almost disappeared shortly after the declaration of martial law started to appear again. But their strength should not be overemphasized. It hardly modified the domination of Batangas politics by the traditional political forces. On the other hand, the traditional opposition steadily gained ground against the KBL, though it did not develop in so far as to induce any significant realignment among the local politicians.

Thus, the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections in Batangas were practically a contest between the KBL and UNIDO. The PDP-LABAN began to organize in 1983 starting from the municipalities of Rosario and Cuenca with Dante Q.

Barbosa, a close associate of Ramon V. Mitra, as coordinator. But it could not expand so much as to be able to field candidates in the elections.

There were fifteen candidates altogether. The KBL fielded Arturo Tanco (an assemblyman, Minister of Agriculture and Harvard-trained technocrat), Manuel Collantes (Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs), Expedito Leviste (an assemblyman and son of the late governor Feliciano Leviste) and Roberto Diokno (an ex-congressman). UNIDO fielded Jose B. Laurel, Jr., Tom Apacible, Hernando Perez and Rafael Recto. Practically all the other seven candidates were independent, though one of them filed his candidacy under the NP without the party’s nomination. Those elected were three UNIDO and one KBL candidates, namely Laurel, Jr., Perez, and Recto on the one hand and Collantes on the other.

The boycott campaign of the protest movement does not seem to have had a significant impact in Batangas, although the CORD sponsored LAKBAYAN passed the province and that there seem to have been its coordinators. Active organizing by the protest movement in Batangas was carried out after the formation of BAYAN and BANDILA in Metro Manila.

Shortly after the founding congress of BAYAN–Southern Luzon in Silang, Cavite in July 1985, two officers for Southern Luzon and two leaders in Batangas who later became Chairman and Secretary General of BAYAN-Batangas formed a core group to establish BAYAN in Batangas. The core group tried to incorporate into BAYAN various sectoral and multi-sectoral groups such as trade unions, organizations of peasants, the urban poor, the youth and students, teachers and professionals, and religious groups.

The founding congress of BAYAN-Batangas was held in Taal on September 28, attended by about three hundred people including Wigberto Tañada and Fr. Jose Dizon, Chairman and Vice-Chairman of BAYAN–Southern Luzon, as guest speakers. Its initial affiliates included the Samahang Magbubukid ng Batangas, Samahang Mangangawil 78, Malayang Katipunang Manggagawa sa Batangas, and Samahang Maralita Baybay Dagat (peasant and labor sector); Barrio Sta. Clara Community (Batangas City based organizations of the urban poor); the League of Filipino Students (LFS) and Kabataan para sa Demokrasya at Nasyonalismo (KADENA) (student and youth sector); the Concerned Teachers of Our Lady Caysasay Academy; and member organizations of the Citizen Solidarity Movement of Batangas, a multi-sectoral group. Individual members of the Southern Tagalog Attorneys for National Democracy (STAND) led by Tañada and of the Medical Action Group also joined BAYAN-Batangas.

BANDILA, the membership of which was heavily concentrated in Metro Manila at the time of its founding congress in

26) Interview with Dante Barbosa, Quezon City, August 5, 1988 and October 31, 1989.

August 1985, also endeavored to expand into the provinces. Its expansion work in Batangas as well as in other parts of Luzon was done mainly in October and November of that year. The social democrats seem to have taken the initiative. Certain BANDILA leaders, using their personal contacts, approached organizations of workers and peasants, youth and professional groups, and church people. For example, Roy Oliveros, now a researcher of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) who later became BANDILA Deputy Secretary General, approached Sto. Tomas Academy Union in Sto. Tomas and Fr. Richard Panganiban of St. Francis de Sales Major Seminary in Lipa City. Riza Yapchiongco contacted the Kapisanan ng Magsasakang Pilipino (KASAMA), a peasant organization based in Bauan and Balayan. Prior to this, Pascual Tonog, a farmer residing in the municipality of Bauan and part-time employee of a trading company in Manila, was introduced to BANDILA Secretary General Mar Canonigo by Raul Daza, Tonog’s provincemate in Samar, in Salonga’s residence in Pasig in September. Canonigo gave Tonog an authority to organize BANDILA in Bauan. Tonog approached the workers of a shipyard of the Philippine National Oil Company, farmers and students. Interestingly, the sectoral composition of the groups approached by BANDILA apparently overlaps that of BAYAN.

It was not easy for BANDILA to recruit members at that time because of fear among the people. In Lipa City, for example, Fr. Panganiban arranged a two-day seminar in St. Joseph Seminary in November and invited people from different sectors of the city to help establish BANDILA. About fifty people attended the seminar and some ranking officers of BANDILA including Canonigo and Deputy Secretary General Toy Nepomuceno came and gave lectures to the participants. Of the fifty participants, only six who were members of a Catholic Charismatic group, became BANDILA members. The six included Willie Cucio, a youth leader, and Eldee Latayan, a bookkeeper of a local bank. After all its efforts, BANDILA could establish itself only in Bauan and Lipa City.

After the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections, some realignment among the Batangas politicians took place. For example, Maxima Recto, a provincial board member elected as KBL, joined UNIDO, while Ben Medrano and Rafael Recto became identified with the Marcos Administration. Some mayors also switched their parties.

Local elections had been scheduled for May 1986. It seems that the local politicians started to make some preparatory moves for the elections by 1985. But most

30) Interview with Pascual Tonog, Quezon City, August 17, 1988.
33) Interview with Pascual Tonog, Quezon City, August 7, 1988.
of them kept from embarking on all-out preparations and took a wait-and-see attitude, because the possibility of the snap election was looming.

Most of the opposition politicians were supporting the presidential candidacy of Salvador Laurel, their Kababayan (province mate). The CAPM was also launched in Batangas under the provincial chairmanship of Dante Barbosa. But it does not seem to have gained momentum so much as in Metro Manila.

When the snap election was called, the KBL campaigned for Marcos and Tolentino. Some KBL politicians, however, reportedly campaigned for Marcos and Laurel. The Marcos-Tolentino Movement was also established in Batangas; and Ben Medrano became its provincial coordinator [MTM 1986: 26-27]. UNIDO campaigned for Aquino and Laurel. BANDILA also campaigned for the opposition candidates separately from UNIDO. BAYAN-Batangas adopted the “conscience vote” position which was the decision of BAYAN-Southern Tagalog in spite of the decision of its national leadership to boycott the election.\(^{34}\)

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