
Author(s): Yoshihara, Kunio

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Kyoto University

The author’s central thesis is that Thailand is no longer a bureaucratic polity. His reasoning is that “organized business has formed politically effective extra-bureaucratic groups and the policy of the government is no longer determined solely by the bureaucratic elite” (p. 14). In this, he disagrees with such political scientists in Chulalongkorn University as Chaianan, Sukhumbhand, and Suchit, who argue that Thailand is still essentially a bureaucratic polity (for reference, see p. 17). (The author is with the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University.)

Not being a political scientist, I am not in a position to judge whether he is right or not, but, as an economist, I was interested in his argument that “Through political and economic collective work ..., these [business] organizations have urged and facilitated the shift of the national economic strategy to an export-oriented one” (p. 14).

Thailand’s export-oriented strategy started with the Third National Economic and Social Development Plan (1972–1976), but the big shift towards this strategy came in the early 1980s. How this came about had not been well documented until this book was published. On pages 76–87, the author explains how the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee (JPPCC) came to be formed. This explanation can be also taken as the basic explanation of how government policy came to be export-oriented, for the major reason for setting up the JPPCC was to create a positive environment for export promotion.

One interesting discussion in this connection is the rise of the Sino-Thai business class. Unlike the heyday of bureaucratic politics in the 1950s, when there was a disjunction of wealth and power (the government under the indigenous Thai and the economy under the Chinese), by the early 1970s the economy had come to be dominated by the Sino-Thai, second- and third-generation Chinese with Thai citizenship and education (p. 77). At the same time, the Thai civil bureaucracy had been taking in the Sino-Thai, and many of them had risen to high government positions. And the flow was not one way: the children of bureaucrats entered the ranks of business executives, accounting for one-fifth of the business elite in the late 1970s. As a result of these developments, the government became more willing to listen to the business sector, while the latter became able to approach the government with confidence.

The author discusses specific cases, among which the most interesting to me are those of the gem and jewelry industry (pp. 97–98) and the tourist industry (p. 127), which became major foreign exchange earners in the 1980s. The author does not focus on textiles, which became the first export-oriented manufacturing industry and remained the major export industry until recently, when it was replaced by the electronic and electrical machinery industry. If he had done so, I wonder how his findings would have fitted into his overall discussion. Government-business cooperation in this case dates back to the early 1970s, when the industry faced excessive capacity and had to export part of its output. The sharp increase of textile exports was the result of the slow, but steady administrative changes which had been going on as the result of consultation between the government and business in the 1970s.

One industry in which the government was very much autonomous in policy formulation was finance. The author discusses this on pp. 140–141. The major supervising agency, the Bank of Thailand, consults with individual companies or their associations (the Thai Bankers Association in particular), but its policy has never been dictated by them. This is the industry at the core of the modern credit system, and the government of a developing country is usually unwill-
ing to leave its development to the slow, sometimes chaotic process of market forces (as is done in Western Europe) but wants to get directly involved in supervising and nurturing it. The relatively smooth development of modern credit institutions in Thailand (such as banks, finance companies, the stock market) can be attributed partly to the effective guidance of the Bank of Thailand (which is now sponsoring the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission to replace the present regulating arrangements for the Stock Exchange of Thailand). Among government agencies, the Bank of Thailand holds a unique place: well before the 1980s, it had been corruption-free and efficient, unlike other government agencies.

Thailand cannot be characterized as a strong state, like such NICs as Singapore and South Korea, as the author correctly points out (p. 170). If Thai development is considered to have been relatively successful, what should be the relation between the government and the business sector in other developing countries? The author argues that until it can strengthen its state structure, its development "will be better served by a society-oriented approach which encourages an active participation of societal actors in economic policy-making" (p. 170). The trouble with this argument is that, for a developing country, Thailand has a fairly strong government. This may not be so compared with Korea or Singapore, either today or when their per capital incomes were similar to that of Thailand today, but compared with other ASEAN countries, Thailand's bureaucracy is impressively strong. This is related to the fact that the country has been largely an authoritarian state (first under absolute monarchy and then under the military). Into such a strong state structure, businesses have been incorporated at a pace virtually dictated by the bureaucratic elites. When the state structure is weak, as in the case of the Philippines, business interests capture the government, and changes in government policy (such as a shift to export-oriented policy) become difficult since they threaten those with vested interests in current policy. The ability of the Thai government to shift to export-oriented strategy is not unrelated to its ability to provide infrastructure and general administrative services (which economists call public goods). The author does not ignore the problem of government, but because of his focus on business associations, the government's relative strength and autonomy do not emerge clearly in this book.

(Kunio Yoshihara 〈吉原久仁夫〉· CSEAS)


インドネシア独立革命は国内各地に様々な反応、変動を引き起こしたが、その多様なスペクトルの中でも、アンボンの南マルク共和国（Republik Maluku Selatan, 以下 RMS）革命は、その反革命的性格により際だっているとされていた。各地の反応をコンパクトにまとめたオードリー・ケイヒン編「インドネシア革命の地域的ダイナミクス」の中で RMS についての章を担当したショーベルがこのほど [Chauvel 1985]. 11 二十章にも及ぶモノグラフをオランダの立地地理言語民族学研究所から出版した。シドニー大学へ提出した博士論文をもとにしたものであるが、RMS 運動へと至る、アンボン人なるエスニック・アイデンティティの形成過程について、かなり精細な史的記述を試みている。依拠する資料も、オランダ、インドネシア側の文献だけでなく、生存している関係者へのインタビューも行われており、その記述は詳細かつバランスのとれたものになっている。

RMS が如何なる経緯で生まれたかについては、いままま「オランダ植民地支配の中で特権的利益を享受していたアンボン人（特にクリスチャンの植民地軍兵士）が、インドネシア共和国に併合されることで権益を喪失する状況に直面し、あえて

1) 公刊された論文としては他に、[Chauvel 1980] 等がある。