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Kyoto University
Francisco Xavier Salgado, Civil Servant 
and Pioneer Industrialist in 
Eighteenth Century Philippines

Salvador P. ESCOTO

Abstract

Proud as Spain was for having extended her hegemony to the Philippines, attempts were made to 
abandon that distant outpost of the empire. The island colony in Asia was a constant drain to 
the royal treasury and, consequently, Mexico had to supplement the revenue deficit with an 
nannual subsidy (situado) for over two hundred years.

A breakthrough in the Philippine economic development occurred in the late eighteenth 
century. The Bourbon reforms implemented many innovative measures that finally made the 
government self-sufficient.

Concurrent and interrelated with these government-initiated activities was the glimmering of 
entrepreneurship, the emergence of a few Spaniards interested in developing the resources of the 
land. Brought up in a society that looked down on industrial and commercial activities as 
"ungentlemanly," Francisco Xavier Salgado was a rare breed who dabbled in manufacturing, 
mining and agricultural ventures. He displayed practically all the qualities deemed necessary to 
achieve success in a business enterprise: an adventurous spirit willing to take a risk, an 
egerness to learn a new trade and the patience to stick with it in times of adversity, a thorough 
knowledge of the inner workings of the government acquired through many years as a civil 
servant, and a sizeable fortune to finance his projects. Living in an autocratic system of 
government, Salgado is a classic example of the daunting hardships an entrepreneur had to 
overcome in the pursuit of his economic goal—the bureaucratic maze of regulations that stifled 
individual initiatives, the jealousy and pettiness among his peers, and the bitter partisanship and 
retribution of higher public officials. This article recounts and analyzes the saga of Salgado, the 
pioneer industrialist in eighteenth century Philippines.

The eighteenth century is considered a watershed in the history of hispanic colonial Philippines. 
Programs of reforms instituted by the Bourbon monarchs during this period wrought political, 
economic, military, religious and other administrative changes throughout the Spanish empire. 
Although the innovative ideas expounded by the thinkers of the Enlightenment arrived late and 
diluted in the Philippines, the economic projects they inspired were to a large extent successful. 
As "the doyen of Filipino historians" pointed out, it is the century that marks "the real 
breakthrough in Philippine economic development." Another writer went even further, stating 
that "it would not be an exaggeration to say that the period contains the key to understanding

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the contemporary [Philippine] situation” [De la Costa 1967: 70; Routledge 1975: 39].

Among individuals often mentioned in discussions of this period is Don Francisco Xavier Salgado, the entrepreneur who fittingly represents the economic development in the Islands. “[He is] an honest citizen,” stated Governor-General Francisco José de Ovando (1750-1754), “well known for his efforts to develop industry, and to promote those mechanical arts that are most beneficial to the public.” As the prolific dean of Spanish Filipinists, Lourdes Díaz-Treichuelo, rightly points out, Salgado truly epitomizes his time, because his colorful career virtually spans the entire century. A scion from a noble family of Galician ancestry, he was born in Madrid in 1713 and was a young man of twenty-two when he went to the Philippines. In 1736, he began working as a low-level functionary in the government of Fernando Valdes y Tamón (1729-1737) and was still alive (the exact date of his demise is unknown) during the administration of Rafael María de Aguilar, 1793-1806 [Díaz-Treichuelo 1963: 216, 217]. He had personal dealings with many prominent personalities of his time, from the noted English agriculturist Nicholas Norton and the famous Fiscal Francisco Viana to the tough British Captain, Thomas Backhouse, and the distinguished Spanish botanist, Juan de Cuellar. He had clout with Governors Ovando, De la Torre (1765-1767), and Raón (1767-1770); was the confidante of ecclesiastical acting-governors Archbishops Arrechedera (1745-1750), and Lino de Espeleta (1759-1761); wielded great power under Simón de Anda during the British occupation of Manila (1762-1765), and remained his influential friend during his regular term as governor (1770-1776). On the other hand, he was disliked by Pedro de Arandia (1751-1758), Archbishop Antonio Rojo (1762-1765), and especially by José Basco (1778-1787).

Due to his grand projects unusual in his time, Salgado is regarded in history as a mining speculator and agriculturist. Less known, however, are his long years of public service and his steady climb to the top of the bureaucratic ladder.

For chronological convenience, Salgado’s life can be divided into three phases: 1) His early career (1736-1762), a period that provides only a glimpse of his life apart from his mining activities. 2) The glorious period (1762-1765), a brief span of time during and after the British invasion of Manila when Salgado wielded considerable political and administrative power. 3) His vicissitudes and fall (1788-1792), a phase that highlights his agricultural undertakings, while his standing in the community began to decline and gradually transform his twilight years in bitter isolation.

The paucity of materials on his early career is probably due to the burning of his house by the English soldiers, which resulted in the loss of his personal papers. Fortunately, in response to the king’s order for a list of persons deserving royal rewards for services during the war, some information is contained in Salgado’s application for a title of nobility in 1767. Salgado’s impressive pre-war services are listed as follows [Servicios antes de la guerra, 1767, AGI: Filipinas, leg. 629]:

1736  ......a minor clerk in the central government
1745-1750 (?) ......Second ranking official in the accounting office
1747  ......Shipmaster of the vessel Santo Domingo bound for New Spain
An examination of the services rendered in this application indicates that the turning point of Salgado's career occurred in 1745 during the interim government of Archbishop Arrechedera. He was apparently highly regarded by his superiors because beside retaining his high rank in the influential accounting office, he was also able to assume such lucrative positions as shipmaster and, of crucial importance, as contractor of the monopoly of coconut wine for many consecutive years. At least once, Governor Ovando overruled his treasury officials as well as Fiscal Leandro Viana, and renewed Salgado's contract without putting the monopoly at public auction. The wine monopoly was so lucrative that, according to Viana, it usually yielded the contractor an annual profit of 40,000 pesos. Granting that the amount was only 30,000 pesos or a little bit less since Viana was biased against Salgado, the profit was still enormous. The annual salary of an army captain or provincial governor at that time was 300 pesos, the archbishop of Manila and his cathedral prebends received a total of 9,800 pesos, and the governor-general 13,235 pesos [Viana, Financial Affairs in the Islands, 1765, BR 1903-1907: Vol.50, 111: Martinez de Zuñiga 1893: 126-127]. Since Salgado held this monopoly for about 14 years, he became one of the richest men in the Philippines. It was this accumulated wealth that subsidized his expensive mining and other industrial ventures.

Because of his experiences in diverse positions, Salgado became thoroughly knowledgeable of the conditions throughout the colony. By becoming an owner of a trading vessel [Garcia 1976: 29], he acquired a businessman's insight into the logistical and financial problems of maritime commerce. A stint in the military followed when Arrechedera made him deputy commander in Camarines in southern Luzon. Ovando later appointed him captain of the Spanish infantry and then sargento mayor in Zamboanga, a powerful office over which provincial governors had no jurisdiction, thus Salgado was answerable only to the governor-general. While most Spaniards were concentrated in Manila or its suburbs, and therefore seldom saw a barrio in the countryside, Salgado's career gave him a rare opportunity to traverse the entire Philippine archipelago from northern Luzon to Mindanao in the south. Thus, he gained first-hand information of the actual conditions and problems of the colony. Though he was out of office when Arandia became governor-general, he rebounded spectacularly during the interim government of Archbishop Espeleta (Salgado married his niece), who appointed him to the powerful office of Secretary of the Central Government [Servicios antes de la guerra, 1767, AGI: Filipinas, leg. 629]. All official correspondence from provincial governors, petty officials and ecclesiastics passed through his hands. In this position as head of the bureaucracy, he obviously mastered the inner workings of the government.

Salgado reached the apex of his career during the British invasion of Manila in 1762. One of the few Spaniards who managed to escape before the fall of the city, he transported 111,000 pesos of the royal treasury to Laguna de Bay at his own expense. This helped Anda finance...
the expenses of rallying the support of the provinces at this initial stage of the war. In order
to maintain the loyalties of the natives in Laguna de Bay, Batangas, Taal and Tayabas, Anda
appointed Salgado sargento mayor to these provinces. Thanks to his wealth, Salgado became a
financier and supplier of weapons to Anda and to General Antonio Bustos, the chief military
commander, and thus helped sustain the resistance movement. Reportedly during this period,
he gave Anda 92,000 pesos and ten boxes of wrought silver. The relations between the two
men developed into a close friendship so that whenever Anda had to leave his headquarters in
Bacolor, Pampanga, to inspect other areas, he summoned Salgado to take over as intendant
general during his absence. Salgado’s only son, José Eslava, a promising merchant in his own
right, added more to the patriotic aura of his father. José gave away most of his fortune to
subsidize the war. He also fought against the British and was captured, but until he died of a
disease in prison, he managed to send intelligence information to Anda. It was his father,
however, who helped save the resistance movement by preventing the treasure of the galleon
Filipino from falling into the hands of the enemy. At the port of Palapag, Salgado personally
detained the messenger who was sent by Archbishop-Governor Rojo, then under the control of
the British authorities, to collect the more than one million pesos brought by the ship from the
Acapulco trade in Mexico. Instead Salgado persuaded the archbishop’s envoy to switch his
loyalty to Anda [Servicios durante la guerra, 1767, AGI: Filipinas, leg. 629; Barras y Aragon
n.d.: Intr., 57-59]. This large infusion of money strengthened tremendously Anda’s forces,
which eventually bottled up the British in Manila.

With the end of the Seven Years War and the ensuing cessation of hostilities in 1764,
Salgado was appointed delegate to the armistice conference to discuss the transition period with
Captain Thomas Backhouse, the chief British negotiator. Afterward, Anda commissioned
Salgado to supervise the return to normalcy in Manila, giving him broad powers to deal with
public law and order and the logistics of furnishing food supplies to the starving people in the
capital. The provisions given to the British to hasten their departure as well as Anda’s gifts of
chicken, pigs, vegetables and fruits to reciprocate for a party given in his honor by the English
governor were obviously the work of Salgado. It was understandable that Salgado was among
the first Spaniards to receive indemnity from the British for properties lost during the war
[Barras y Aragón n.d.: Nota A, 71-78; see also Quiason 1966: 184].

For a while, Salgado enjoyed a frisson of triumphant accolades, respectability and influence.
When Viana finished his famous work on his economic plan to make the Philippines financially
self-sufficient, Interim-Governor De la Torre gave a copy to Salgado for his written comments
before forwarding it to Spain [Manifiesto que hizo a S.M. . . . Salgado, 1765, AGI: Ultramar,
leg. 516,518]. Since the royal treasury in the Islands was bankrupt in 1764, the king appealed
to the affluent citizens of Manila for help. Salgado donated 6,069 pesos, 11 granos and 4/5
tomines. He also gave the Santa Inés mine as a gift to the king, thus adding 22,000 pesos to the
coffer every time an interested person won a contract to operate the mine through public
bidding. Another spectacular feat of Salgado had to do with the historic voyage of the frigate
Buen Consejo, which arrived in 1767, establishing for the first time direct trade between the
Philippines and Spain. The merchants in Manila, who perceived the new commercial line as a threat to their traditional trade with Mexico, gave it a hostile reception. The unpopular ship seemed destined to remain stranded indefinitely at the docks due to a shortage of wheat biscuit needed to provision its return trip to Spain. To solve the problem, Salgado decided to send a vessel to buy the cereal in China. By the time the wheat-laden ship returned to Manila, the crisis had deepened to such a degree that most Spaniards including those in convents and religious schools felt the absence of wheat on the dinner tables. Of the 21 bakeries in Manila and the suburbs, only 4 were open for business and 2 of them eventually closed. Despite the fact that the price of wheat soared to 20 pesos per picul [139.44 lbs. or 63.25 kg.], Salgado sold it to the government at the normal price of 7 pesos [Servicios después de la guerra, 1767, AGI: Filipinas, leg. 629].

Salgado, the Pioneer Industrialist

Salgado dabbled first in manufacturing and mining from the 1750s through the late 1770s and then shifted to indigo and cinnamon cultivation from 1766 until the early 1790s. Available source materials on these topics are markedly disproportionate, with manufacturing having the least and agriculture the more abundant data available. Below is a brief account of his undertakings:

1) Manufacturing of Sailcloth in the Suburb of Manila (Early 1750s)
Salgado set up 21 looms which reeled out more than 70,000 yards for the sails of ships a year. The enterprise prospered initially, producing uniforms for soldiers and sailors, as well as clothing for poor people. The shortage of cotton yarn eventually ended its operation and Gov. Ovando's attempt to promote cotton cultivation among the natives was of no avail. The British finally destroyed the factory and used the looms as firewood [Díaz-Trechuelo 1966: 113-114].

2) Iron Mining in Mambulao, Camarines (1753-1754)
While serving as military deputy in Camarines in the early 1750s, Salgado became interested in reopening the old iron mine of Mambulao, which was abandoned in the 1660s. After operating it for only a year, Salgado gave it up due to poor yields, harsh terrain and the prohibitive cost of shipping the metal ore to the iron-works in Manila. Since the beginning of this enterprise, the fiscal vigorously protested to the king the many privileges given to Salgado by the governor. Finally, a royal cédula (decree) arrived nullifying the contract, because Ovando awarded it to Salgado without public bidding [Díaz-Trechuelo 1965: 766-770; Ortiz 1974: 109-113].

3) Iron Mining at Santa Inés in the Province of Tondo (1754-1757)
This quarry of iron ore was discovered by Salgado, who invested 46,000 pesos in constructing roads, clearing forests, building lime-kilns and warehouses, and huts for workmen. At the height of its operation, it employed 300 laborers excluding carriers who transported the ore to
the ironworks. The mine yielded about 4,000 piculs of iron that were converted to bullets, ploughs, cauldrons, frying pans and cast iron. However, it was shut down when Gov. Arandia deported the Chinese ironworkers in compliance with the royal cédula ordering their expulsion. He could have exempted them in view of the importance of mining to the islands' economy, but his dislike of Salgado was the real motive of his intransigence. To make the best of the situation, Salgado subsequently offered the mine as a gift to the king. Archbishop Rojo briefly reopened it, but the invading British burned it down and killed nine master foundrymen. Operations were finally resumed under government management during the administrations of Anda and Basco.

4) Copper Mining in Masbate in Southern Luzon (1774-1777)
Governor Anda, an avid promoter of mining, gave his friend Salgado a distinctly favorable government contract that included the recruitment of expert miners from China and the exemption from expulsion of 14 Chinese mine workers from Cebu. Unfortunately, Anda died in 1776, and the officials of the royal treasury who were hostile to Salgado did not give him the assistance called for in the contract. Consequently, Salgado was forced to end the undertaking. The entire expedition of rented boats, hired workers, and several months of food and clothing provisions had to return to Manila the following year [Plan de la Contrata 1775, AGI: leg. 638, fols. 1-40; Díaz-Trechuelo 1965: 771-772, 787-790; Barras y Aragón n.d.: Intr., 54-56, Nota A, 66-67, 81, Nota B, 89-90, Nota C, 96-98].

5) Indigo Production in the Hacienda Calauang (1776-1782)
Shortly after the war, Salgado began experimenting in the making of indigo dyes based partly on the formulae he had obtained from Guatemala and the Coromandel Coast. In 1776, Salgado sent samples of his work to the royal botanist, which were evaluated as comparable to those produced in Guatemala. On the basis of this report, the king ordered Gov. Raón to promote the cultivation of indigo in the Islands. In 1772, with the help of Gov. Anda, Salgado received a royal grant of land and the exclusive right to produce indigo for 20 years, albeit reduced later to 15. He found the land best suited for his project in San Isidro de Calauang in the province of Laguna de Bay, about ten leagues from Manila. It took almost three years to clear the forest, build roads, and construct the workers' dwellings and necessary structures in preparation for the first planting and experiments. Salgado invested 60,000 pesos in this project, and Anda assisted him with 26,000 pesos and doubled his permiso (the amount of merchandise) assigned in the lading of the galleon to Acapulco. The unpredictability of nature and the absence of a necessary, imported ingredient called cuajo affected adversely the quality and quantity of the indigo production. Eventually, Salgado announced that he found a solution to the problem with a good plant substitute called anonang [CP 1894-1905: Vol.20, 444-445; Barras y Aragón n.d.: Nota A, 62-64, Nota B, 84-92, Nota C, 93-107].

Before his departure for the Philippines, Gov. Basco received royal instructions dated 22 April 1777 to ship 150 arrobas (1 arroba — 2/11 picul or 25 lbs.) of indigo a year to Spain.
Upon his arrival, the new governor ordered Salgado to meet the king's order. Years passed and Salgado was able to send only a few pounds of samples that were again evaluated to be as good as those produced in Guatemala and Santo Domingo. Whether stating the truth or not, Salgado gave many excuses for the delay in satisfying the royal order, but still demanded exemptions from the *alcabala* (sales tax) and tributes from his workers which Basco required them to pay. He also protested against the experiments conducted by natives under the guidance of an Augustinian friar, Fray Matias Octavio, the parish priest of the town of Tambobo located near Calauang. Salgado rightfully claimed that these practices infringed on the indigo monopoly granted to him by the crown. Disgusted with Salgado's non-compliance and irritating complaints, Basco advised the king to cancel Salgado's exclusive right. This was carried out by a royal cédula on 20 June 1781. Although Salgado’s dye was initially superior to that of his competitor, eventually with the governor’s generous patronage, the quality and quantity of the friar’s product in Tambobong (now, Malabon, Rizal Province) improved. With no help from Basco, Salgado’s product was ruined. On the other hand, Fr. Octavio’s indigo production, with the powerful support of the Economic Society of the Friends of the Country founded by the governor, prospered and became one of the most lucrative exports of the Philippines up to the mid 1800s. Thus, Salgado, who pioneered in this industry, ended with heavy financial losses and his prestige in the community plummeted [Representación de . . . Salgado, 1778, AGI: Filipinas, leg. 495, ff. 1-50; Díaz-Trechuelo 1966: 98-111; Barras y Aragón n.d.: Nota D, 108-113]

6) Cinnamon Cultivation in Calauang (1774-1792)

This was Salgado’s last and longest undertaking, and highlights his tenacity in the face of financial hardship and persistent harassment from his enemies. From the beginning, Governor Basco tried to prevent Salgado from engaging in this industry. While he distributed thousands of cinnamon trees and numerous bags of seed from Zamboanga and Misamis to aspiring planters (in keeping with the goal of the Economic Society which he founded to promote agriculture by private enterprise), he refused to give even one sapling to Salgado. Nevertheless, the resourceful entrepreneur not only obtained many trees from Mindanao through several middlemen, he also acquired saplings and seeds from Ceylon and China. The 13 cinnamon trees he planted in 1774 increased to 395 by 1778, and exceeded one thousand in 1780, and grew rapidly thereafter every year [Díaz-Trechuelo 1966: 78-79].

The creation of the Royal Company of the Philippines in 1785 was responsible for the arrival of Don Juan de Cuellar, who enjoyed the honorary title of His Majesty's botanist. He visited Calauang in 1787, and was so impressed that he wrote a glowing recommendation of Salgado's work to the king. By then, Calauang had 3,000 cinnamon trees and 5,000 grains sown in nursery beds. Because of Salgado's advancing age and his unreliability as reported by Basco, the king appointed Cuellar administrator of the hacienda on 20 January 1788. Under Cuellar’s supervision, some samples were sent to Spain. After analyzing them, Don Castro Ruiz del Cerro, the successor of Dr. Ortega, found less gum content and urged more experimentation
until the product resembled that of Ceylon. Because of this report, the king ordered the intensification of cinnamon cultivation, enjoining the governor to lend assistance whenever needed, and to continue the enterprise under Cuellar’s technical direction. Salgado’s cultivation of cinnamon increased prodigiously. In 1789, there were 18,735 trees of various ages and variety from Mindanao, 55 trees from China, 6 grown from seeds from Ceylon, and 25,510 seedlings sown in 96 seed-beds. Cuellar hinted that in May or June 1792, three million trees of right age would be ready with an estimated production of 3,750 pounds of cinnamon. They would increase threefold in 1794, and were projected to reach a record yield of 219,846 pounds by 1796 [ibid.: 79-86; Barras y Aragón n.d.: 67-69; Informe de Cuellar al Rey, Manila, 27 junio 1791, MN: MS-312].

To maintain its growing production, Salgado needed badly a loan of 30,000 pesos. The Philippine Company was supposed to allocate four per cent of its yearly profit to defray the hacienda Calauang expenses, and the Consulado (analogous to the Chamber of Commerce today) had to contribute four per cent of the duties collected from merchants. Despite repeated royal orders to strictly enforce this allotment, Salgado received only 1,100 pesos in 1790, an amount he loudly decried as too little. On 30 June 1791, Salgado threatened that without additional money, he would be forced to dismiss all workers except 12 to maintain the upkeep of the hacienda. Accordingly, Gov. Marquina ordered both the Royal Company and the Consulado to give Salgado 15,000 pesos each, and in exchange they were to have a lien on the hacienda. Nothing came from this arrangement. Consequently, on 2 September 1792, Salgado borrowed a large amount of money, mortgaged his hacienda, and sold some of his belongings with the hope that the king’s order would eventually be obeyed. Unfortunately, his expectations did not materialize.

The fate of the hacienda Calauang was sealed as a result of new analyses made on the recent batches of samples sent to Spain in February and March 1792. The new royal botanist, Don Juan Diaz, reported that the quality of the new cinnamon samples was worse than those examined in 1789 by his predecessor Dr. Cerro, which he blamed on the method of incision used in its cultivation, which removed “the most active and precious parts of the cinnamon instead of removing the gum.” With this setback and the deliberate lack of support from the Consulado and the Royal Company, Salgado was forced to abandon his cinnamon cultivation [Diaz-Trechuelo 1966: 86-89, 91-92; Porlier a Salgado, San Lorenzo, 24 octubre 1789; Representación de Cuellar al Rey, Manila, 27 junio 1791, MN: MS-312].

Salgado’s Enemies

Unlike the American system of government in which there is a clear-cut separation of powers, in the Spanish system the functions of the executive, legislative and the judicial branches somewhat overlapped and thus engendered jurisdictional conflicts. Consequently, frequent quarrels arose between the church and state, the governor-generals and the audiencia, the cabildos and the provincial governors, and between public officials and private individuals.
This practice became known unofficially as the check and balance of powers Spanish style, a built-in mechanism that lamentably created chronic factionalism and spawned even violent enmity in the colonies. The feuding groups or individuals invariably appealed their respective cases to the king. The Spanish crown did not deliberately foment these wranglings, nor actively discourage them, but merely used them to control various factions and to reinforce their dependence on the mother country. The history of Hispanic America is replete with these strifes, and the Philippines is no exception.

Unfortunately, one of Salgado’s bitterest enemies was the famous Fiscal Leandro Viana, known for his remarkable plan to improve the economy and make the Philippines self-supporting. Viana was the rector of the old College of San Bartolomé Mayor of the famous University of Salamanca when he was appointed fiscal to the Audiencia of Manila. Deeply imbued with the Enlightenment spirit of reform, he arrived in the Philippines on 13 May 1750. A confrontation soon developed between these two strong personalities—the veteran Salgado and Viana, a fresh academician fired with zeal to serve the king and ignorant of the political patronage incrusted for centuries in Manila. The new fiscal allegedly developed an immediate dislike for Salgado [Díaz-Treichuelo 1963: 219] .

It did not take long for Viana to notice the anomaly of Salgado’s contract for the operation of the Mambulao mine in 1753. According to Gov. Ovando, he gave the contract without public bidding because Salgado was the only person with enough wealth, strong determination and technical knowledge to initiate such an undertaking. Because of Viana’s persistent denunciations of the deal, Salgado lost the long lawsuit of which Viana proudly commented: “[it] resulted in 36,000 pesos being deposited to the royal treasury and another sum which Salgado lost due to my testimonies in my dispatch to the king.” The “another sum” the fiscal was referring to was another 36,000 pesos which Salgado claimed from the crown for his investments at the Santa Ines mine. Because it was closed due to the Governor Arandia’s expulsion of the Chinese miners, Salgado gave it as a gift to the crown. When Archbishop Rojo became the interim-governor in 1760, two subsequent contractors, Francisco Casañas and Juan Solano, won the lease to operate the mine. Salgado then sought disbursement of 36,000 pesos he had invested for the road construction, machinery, factories, warehouses and dwellings for the workers, implying that the new contractors would have been unable to operate the mine without them. Again, Viana thwarted Salgado’s efforts with the argument that his right for reimbursement had expired. In the fiscal’s triumphant words, “Salgado was virtually bankrupt” [Viana, Financial Affairs, 10 July 1776, BR 1903-1907: Vol.48, 107].

The enmity was exacerbated by the British capture of Manila. Salgado was a staunch supporter of Anda and savored the immense power he wielded over vast regions during the war years, while Viana was holed up in Manila along with Archbishop Rojo, Oidores Francisco Villacorta and Manuel Galban under the control of the enemy. The hatred and jealousy between these two groups became more intense after the death of Rojo when his faction selected one of the oidores as the legitimate governor-general. After the war, the situation was reversed—Viana was again in power, while Salgado was relegated to being an outsider. This time the
clash between the two was over the wine monopoly. First, Salgado's contract was supposed to expire in 1764, but the arrival of the British interrupted its completion. Viana wanted Salgado to pay the fee for the remaining two years as stated by law 3, vol. 9, book 9 of the Laws of Castile. Furthermore, Governor Raón awarded Salgado a new five-year contract to administer the wine monopoly beginning with the year 1764. Viana wanted the contract annulled because Salgado obtained it for only 24,000 pesos a year, while this monopoly according to the fiscal produced a net profit of 54,000 pesos in five years. He wanted the bid increased to benefit the royal coffer. After much altercation, Viana compromised: Salgado could keep the renewed contract for just two years, provided he pay the arrears. By then Salgado was no longer interested in the new five-year contract and refused to pay the indemnity for the two war years. The fiscal appealed the modified case to the Audiencia, where his partisans—Oidores Galvan and Villacorta—sat in judgement. Assured of victory, Viana gloated saying: “having won the first two lawsuits is quite surprising in Manila where the rich like Salgado got their way through gifts and bribery. [Gov.] Raón . . . was angry because he would lose the 20,000 pesos bribe Salgado gave him” [Viana al rey, Manila, 22 enero 1767, LCC: ff. 6v–8].

Salgado countersued and harsh accusations were exchanged as seen in the many letters sent to Spain by both sides attempting to discredit the other, while asking their respective patrons for protection. In his letter to the Marquis of Esquilache, the powerful minister who initiated the expulsion of the Jesuits from the vast Spanish empire, Viana tried to ingratiate himself by flattering the marquis with the following words: “The expanse of that [Iberian] peninsula is too narrow to circumscribe the greatness of your name and is only limited by the immense confines of the four corners of the globe, which resonates the love, zeal, constancy and integrity with which your superior talents are employed for the service of the king.” Then, Viana stated that he did not come to Manila to please the rich residents, but to serve the king and expose the neglect of these islands. For this reason, he was the target of attacks by his enemies and was seeking his protection, to cover him under “[his] powerful wings” [Viana al Marquis de Esquilache, 5 enero 1767, LCC: ff. 1–2v].

In another letter sent to the king through the Council of the Indies, Viana complained that “Salgado was so mad at him that he announced publicly that he would not stop the lawsuit even if he loses all his wealth provided he would have the satisfaction of seeing me in the gallows.” Viana continued:

Since the time I required him to indemnify the royal treasury with 36,000 pesos for his Mambulao mine contract and to sell to the royal warehouse four pesos per pico of iron instead of the current price of ten pesos, he holds implacable hatred toward me and contempt for my office, calling me a second-rate fiscal and a petty academician . . . . I was trying to bend backward in my dealing with Salgado by giving him a choice: either pay the fee for the remaining war years or continue being the contractor of the wine monopoly to complete those years. Salgado submitted to Raón a memo against me. I wanted a copy in order to defend myself, but my request was denied. In order to prolong the lawsuit, Salgado submitted a certification of his merits and services, which is irrelevant to the case and
further delays the litigation, which has been pending for the last two years and nine months. It is
beneath my character and good breeding to be motivated by vindictiveness against Salgado, who
charges that I use my office to harm my enemies. He is scheming daily using whatever means to
intimidate me, but I'm not scared. [Viana al rey, Manila, 22 enero 1767, LCC: ff. 7v-8v, 11]

On the other hand, in his memorial (undated but should be 1766 according to the analysis
of Barras), which contained certifications of his merits and services, Salgado complained to the
king that since the British withdrawal, he had suffered in his person and property the most
merciless and continuous persecutions at the hand of Oidores Galban, Villacorta and especially
Viana, without any cause except that during the war “I sacrificed my life and assets in your
service rather than render obedience to the enemy, which was done by these distinguished
persons.” Salgado added:

When they tried to divest Anda of his command at the death of Archbishop Rojo, not only did I not
consent, but I alerted Anda of what was happening. Such was their anger toward me that now that
they are again in power, they are trying to employ every means to mortify me, and they say they will
stop at nothing until they annihilate me. Thus, I suffered severe financial losses and so many
aggravations answering many charges against me. I became so depressed that I was ready to return
to Spain. It was granted on the condition that I take the route via Mexico. This implies a long,
exhausting voyage, which my health could not take. [Barras y Aragon n.d.: Nota A, 82-83, Nota B,
88-89]

In his letter of 4 December 1769 to Arturo Porlier, the colonial secretary, Salgado
commented on his dispute over the mine in Mambulao: “It took 12 years for the royal
cédula to arrive, and I was condemned to pay what I did not owe. In regard to the wine monopoly, the
royal order said I complied with the contract, but the fiscal has his own way of interpreting it
against me. I appealed to the Supreme Council of the Indies and it ruled in my favor. The
fiscal and the royal treasury officials once again examined and reexamined the decree, each one
interpreting the wording according to their way of thinking, and once again turned it against me.
A third royal order was not enough so that a fourth became necessary. The long litigation cost
me a lot of money. That is why rich people hesitate to invest their money just to avoid these
ministers.” Salgado ended his letter by exultantly telling Portier that he finally won the long
lawsuit [Salgado a Porlier, Manila, 4 dic. 1769, CP: Vol.22, 453-454].

Meanwhile, the disputed wine monopoly was put in public auction. Of the three
competitors, a Chinese by the name of Teodoro Faqoaga won a four-year contract for 16,000
pesos a year. Several months later, it was nullified because of an alleged fraud committed.
Salgado accused him of bilking his customers by overpricing the wine while at the same time
using a false unit of weight. The two other bidders were also disqualified—a corregidor (a
provincial governor of a less developed province heavily populated by natives), Diego Alvarado
Horcasitas, and María Isabel Careaga, who had small children under her care. Salgado charged
that the three were actually in cahoots and Faqoaga, who was later fined 16,000 pesos, was just a front. The penalty for the other two included some lashes to be administered to the woman, but it is not known whether this was carried out. A new bidding was held on 27 April 1767, and José Joaquín Martínez won the contract for five years by offering to pay 40,000 pesos a year. Salgado trumpeted that he had saved the crown 120,000 pesos in five years plus the 16,000 pesos fine [Expediente de testimonios sobre el estanco de vino... por] Salgado... Manila, 1 junio 1768, AGI: Filipinas, leg. 629, fols. 3v-40].

Simon de Anda's arrival in Manila in 1770 as governor-general brought an exhilarating feeling of relief to Salgado. With Anda as his protector, the shoe was now on the other foot. The new governor wasted no time in arresting his old enemies, Oidores Galván and Villacorta, on charges of corruption and dereliction of duty. Salgado, however, did not have the satisfaction of seeing Viana squirm. The fiscal was no longer in the Islands. Partly as a reward for his remarkable work on developing the resources of the Philippines, and partly due to the influence of powerful friends in Spain, the king had not only conferred on Viana the title of "Count of Tepa," but also promoted him fiscal to the Audiencia of Mexico and later counselor in the powerful Council of the Indies. Nevertheless, Salgado's enemies were temporarily silenced.

Meanwhile, Salgado was reliving and savoring the good old days. Anda pampered him with many favors. The governor obtained for him from the king a monopoly of indigo production for 20 years, a generous government assistance of 36,000 pesos to promote his indigo cultivation in Calauang, and a highly gratifying contract to exploit the copper mine in Masbate. When the Consulado was inaugurated in Manila in January 1771, Salgado's name appeared prominently in the list of inducted members. Still enjoying honorable standing in the elite social circle of Manila, he was one of four individuals nominated for the position of "prior" or president of the prestigious association. Although elected later as one of the five deputies, he announced before his assembled peers that he could not accept the new office, because he would soon devote his time to indigo cultivation. Nevertheless, he remained one of the 151 rank-and-file members of the Consulado [Martín Palma 1981: 63-65, 146-151].

Unfortunately, Anda died in 1776, and the royal treasury officials who were supposed to help Salgado's mining venture did exactly the opposite by obstructing its operation. For instance, provisions that would have reached Masbate within a week arrived after four months of rough navigation because these officials delayed the sailing permit and the vessel missed the monsoon. With this and other aggravations, Salgado had to recall prematurely all the workers from Masbate. As one writer observed: "despite the death of the oidores, who were imprisoned by Anda and the absence of Viana in the Islands, their friends and supporters who remained in the bureaucracy continued their insidious attacks on Salgado" [Díaz-Trehuelo 1965: 789-790].

Salgado's application for a title of nobility also became entangled in partisan politics. At first, the Council of the Indies rejected his request and suggested that he ask for a lesser kind of reward. After Anda's arrival and his subsequent strong endorsement of Salgado's application, the Council softened its opposition and showed a willingness to grant Salgado's petition with the
following conditions: 1) the title of nobility would last only during his lifetime and was non-transferable to his descendants; and 2) he should have enough material possessions to enable him to live a life style befitting his rank. After Anda’s death, The Council demanded documented proof of his family’s hidalgo lineage. In other words, the title he sought would be based not on his accomplishments in the Philippines, but on his ancestry. The additional requirement practically quashed whatever hope Salgado had in obtaining his objective. Considering his advanced age, his geographical residence, and the time and expenses involved in ferreting out the needed documents, Salgado’s quest for the honorable title became an illusion [Barras y Aragon n.d.: Nota A, 60-61, 72-73].

The new governor, José Basco, eventually dealt the lethal blow to Salgado’s already declining prestige. Two unfortunate incidents soured the initial good relationship between these two men. The first had to do with the untimely death of Nicholas Norton, the famous English agriculturist, who had received a royal grant to cultivate cinnamon in Mindanao. The governor decided to continue the project under the direction of seven Dutch sailors, who managed to escape from their Moro captors in 1779. The operation was later abandoned because the cinnamon they produced had a bitter, gummy taste. Salgado imprudently remarked that the Dutchmen did not know really much about cinnamon-raising, but were hired merely because they were Dutch—which of course Basco resented. On another occasion, the governor was enraged when Salgado sent samples of his work to Spain in 1778 without his knowledge. Dr. Casimiro Ortega, the royal botanist who evaluated the cinnamon specimen, considered it almost as good as that produced in Ceylon. In 1780, he wrote to Basco urging him to encourage the experiments. The governor dismissed Salgado’s samples as merely the repetition of his indigo products that had no significant value. As far as he knew, Salgado’s cinnamon had also that bitter, gummy taste. Accordingly, the governor ordered Salgado to give him information about the method of his production, but the latter refused on the grounds that he had already sent it (which he did in 1781) to Spain and did not want it known until further notice from Madrid. Basco repeatedly demanded compliance and Salgado continued to resist, unaware that the governor had by then a copy of the desired formula sent to him by Dr. Ortega. Long after Basco’s departure from the Islands, Salgado still paid dearly for this confrontation [Díaz-Trechuelo 1966: 70-74; Barras y Aragon n.d.: Nota B, 88].

From then on, local public officials began to ignore Salgado. Worse, he lost his standing in the high social circle in Manila and was even ridiculed by his peers. Whenever Salgado as a member of the Consulado arrived even a few minutes late for important meetings, the deliberations would be over and the votes counted. There was also a malicious effort to belittle him in the royal court. In a published list of donors who responded to the king’s appeal of 17 August 1780 for financial assistance to defray Spain’s involvement in the American Revolution, someone wrote Salgado’s name with the demeaning contribution of one peso. Furthermore, one of the boxes Salgado sent to Spain in 1781 arrived without the samples, which were replaced with cotton and sand, and the rest of the boxes were stuffed with useless indigo [Barras y Aragon n.d.: Nota A, 64-65; Nota D, 112. Nota E, 116].
Salgado spent the final years of his life in Calauang like a defiant hermit, tirelessly experimenting and expanding his cinnamon cultivation. Still feisty and apparently in good health until 1793, he continued writing to the king and to the Council defending himself against his enemies and flaunting the rapid growth of his cinnamon production. Despite Cuellar’s appointment as the new administrator of the hacienda, the antagonistic attitude toward Salgado persisted. The Royal Company and the Consulado continued to give many excuses for not complying with the king’s order that they contribute 36,000 pesos each to help defray Salgado’s cinnamon-raising’s expenses. In his letter to Antonio Porlier, Cuellar complained that “there are in this colony some people who do not look with pleasure at the development of cinnamon, doubtless because it is against their interest. There are also hostilities in the official circle because they are afraid that our products will come out superior and replace theirs.” When Alejandro Malaspina, who headed the famous Spanish scientific expedition, reached the Philippines in 1792, Cuellar sent him a report of his extensive cinnamon research in Calauang. Cuellar warned him not to be misled by “reports and idle talks disseminated by those who harbor ill-will against the hacienda Calauang” [Salgado a Porlier, 4 dic. 1769, CP: Vol.22, ff. 453-454; Salgado a Portier, 2 oct. 1789, MN: MS-312; Cuellar a Malaspina, Manila, 22 enero 1789, Barras y Aragón n.d.: Nota F, 120-121].

Conclusion

Since World War II, scholarly research has been heavily concentrated on Philippine nationalism which began in the 1870s. It is understandable then that the name of Francisco Xavier Salgado seldom appears in history books. When mentioned, he is usually portrayed as a fascinating figure with innovative ideas and an audacious, enterprising spirit\(^1\) [Cushner 1971: 187-188; De la Costa 1965: 109-110]. After Basco and Viana, he is usually depicted as the quintessential representative of the economic development in eighteenth century Philippines. It was no exaggeration when he told the king that no Spaniard since the conquest had ever undertaken the unprecedented step of exploiting the natural resources of the colony except him [Barras y Aragón n.d.: Nota C, 100]. But as the curious reader delves deeper into his life, he realizes that Salgado was a bureaucrat turned private entrepreneur, and that his various positions in the government served as a pivotal mainspring for his remarkable forays into the erstwhile neglected fields of manufacturing, mining and agriculture. In fact, Salgado, the pioneer industrialist, would be unthinkable without Salgado, the public official. Unfortunately, as his private life is studied further, then his personal flaws and foibles gradually emerge and begin to

\(^1\) Because of his valuable contributions to the colonial economic development of the Islands, a good, high-quality work on Salgado is long overdue. Diaz-Trechuelo wrote a considerable number of pages about him in the three articles used in this essay, but they were written within a larger framework of the eighteenth century Philippine economy. Barras’s work falls far short of what its title conveys. It is actually a compilation of several of Salgado’s correspondence and short extracts of contemporary letters about him, preceded by a lengthy introduction.
tarnish his hitherto charming, unblemished image.

For instance, Salgado included his role as "shipmaster of the patache Santo Domingo in 1747" among his services to the crown, even though he had really little to brag about this service. The list was supposed to be an enumeration of his major accomplishments that would convince the king to reward him with the title of nobility. The mission of that vessel was indeed of pressing importance—to bring back to financially-strapped Manila the situados (annual subsidies from Mexico), which the Philippines had not received since 1743. True, Salgado with his official title as "maestre de plata" was apparently entrusted with the safekeeping of the anticipated load of silver, which was the economic life-blood of the colony. As it turned out, the Santo Domingo, which set sail in early August, limped back to Cavite battered by storms and foundering due to heavy leakage. In a lawsuit, The City and Commerce of Manila held the interim-governor, Archbishop Arrechedera, responsible for the mishap. Among other things, they accused the prelate of a heavy-handed display of favoritism in his appointment of ship officials. Although the Council of the Indies later exonerated the archbishop, there was really nothing worthy of royal reward for Salgado's role in this navigation [Garcia Gonzalez 1976: 82-93].

Most disturbing is the nagging suspicion of Salgado's dishonesty. For instance, he never gave Nicholas Norton any credit for the initial experimentation he received on the production of indigo, although the Englishman explicitly stated that it was done under his guidance. Then, Salgado later acquired the questionable habit of sending samples of his experiments to the king. The early analyses by the royal botanists were usually brimming with optimism—"as good as the indigo produced in Guatemala," or "almost as good as the cinnamon from Ceylon." Afterward, however, he was unable to supply the amount of indigo demanded by the king, and the quality of his cinnamon became worse. Dr. Casimiro Ortega, the royal botanist, and then Gov. Basco began to suspect that the early samples provided by Salgado were not products of his experiments, but were purchased from Guatemala or Ceylon and were presented as his. Understandably, whether true or not, Basco came to this devastating conclusion: "Salgado could not comply with the royal order [to send the 150 arrobas of indigo a year], because he had no time to experiment, what with his gambling habit and whatever time he had is spent in further beautifying his already magnificent estate . . . . The truth is he does not know how to produce it [indigo]" [Barras y Aragon n.d.: Nota D, 112; Porlier a Anda, Madrid, 21 oct. 1789, MN: MS-312].

On the basis of Salgado's promising indigo experiments in 1766, a royal grant of 1773 gave him an extensive land that became the grand estate of Calauang. It took three years to put his project in operation. When Basco arrived in 1777, he gave Salgado the royal order to ship 150 arrobas of indigo a year to Spain. Several years passed, and Salgado was not able to comply with the royal demand with the exception of several boxes sent in 1779 that probably consisted of around 12 arrobas. His excuses included the inclemency of nature like floods and pests, and human errors such as the estate overseer's mistake in sowing. Whether Basco gave Salgado enough time to mass produce enough indigo is a matter of speculation. The governor, however,
did not believe Salgado's alibis and felt justified in recommending the revocation of his exclusive right to indigo production—which the king did in 1781. Basco felt he was proven right in giving the full government patronage to Fray Octavio who eventually developed successfully the indigo industry on a commercial basis [Barras y Aragón n.d.: Intr., 64-65, Nota B, 84-89, 90, Nota C, 93-97, 100-101, Nota D, 108-111, 113; Díaz-Trechuelo 1966: 102-106; See also Bowditch, 1796 in McHale 1962: 31n.]. However, the government patronage could also be carried out too far. Is it possible that Basco gave away Salgado's secret formula for manufacturing indigo to further help the friar? As stated earlier, despite Salgado's refusal to divulge this information, the governor-general got it anyway from Dr. Ortega, the royal botanist.

Salgado's cinnamon cultivation follows the same pattern. The earlier experiments were impressive, but his samples were received with suspicion by his critics. As expected, Basco was skeptical and considered them as unreliable as those of the indigo. Instead, he advised the aging Salgado to retire and spend the remaining years of his life in peace and tranquility. Nevertheless, Salgado continued expanding his plantation so that by 1792, he had more than two million saplings and cinnamon trees. Despite all his toil and expenses, the outcome was a rerun of the indigo enterprise. Ultimately, any attempt to improve the quality of the indigo produced in the Philippines was bound to fail, because the main cause of its bitter, gummy taste was the type of its soil, and not of lack of human efforts and resourcefulness. Consequently, cinnamon production was totally abandoned by the nineteenth century [Díaz-Trechuelo 1966: 99-104; Barras y Aragón n.d.: Nota A, 64-69, Nota F, 117-122; MN: MS-312, ff. 8-39v].

Salgado had other picadillos. The generous gifts he lavished on the crown such as his donation of the Santa Inez mine seemed prompted by an intent to get an eventual refund. His sale to the government of iron ingots or wheat at a low price was not entirely due to patriotic zeal, but because those were the contractual requirements of the Spanish laws. In his projects, he was often reckless and seemed to delight in doing things on a grandiose scale with little anticipation of adverse consequences. Because of his lavish manner of operation, much money and human labor were wasted. Sometimes, he spread himself too thin by tackling simultaneously several major projects. In the late 1770s, for instance, while deeply immersed in indigo production, he invested heavily in copper mining in Masbate and at the same time began dabbling in cinnamon. The fact that he had many enemies, and many of his peers ignored or ridiculed him does not seem to speak well of his character. Of course, part of that was motivated by envy and the stiff competition of other enterprising indigo and cinnamon growers. He was probably considered a traitor by the Consulado because of his role in supplying wheat to the unpopular Buen Consejo, and his co-members believed that his cultivation of indigo and cinnamon undermined the Consulado's traditional commerce with Acapulco. This was further exacerbated by the involvement of the Philippine Royal Company and especially the Economic Society, which advocated free cultivation of agricultural products and strongly opposed Salgado's indigo monopoly. Another possible cause of Salgado's unpopularity was his probable crankiness, maybe, even senility. Contemporary writers were silent or discreet in commenting on his economic role. For instance, Fray Martínez de Zuñiga had this to say of him:
In . . . Laguna province, lies the estate of Calauang, whose owner, a Spaniard (Francisco Salgado by name), tried to raise indigo and cinnamon. This man has a big fancy for projects and spent his money fomenting several lines of business that can be of much utility to the Philippines, but due to ill-fortune he was fault-finding that he was often enmeshed in lawsuits. He was known all his life as a man who always resorted to lawsuits so that on his death it was necessary to prepare an order so that he might be buried. These lawsuits were responsible for the failure of his projects. I tried the cinnamon raised in his estate and found it to be very good, but everyone persisted that it is not of much value and has no saleability . . . . The Royal Company has acquired this estate by lease in order to encourage agriculture.

Tomás de Comyn briefly alluded to Salgado’s failure in his indigo venture, but did not mention his name in regard to cinnamon production [Martínez de Zuñiga 1893: 131-132; Comyn 1820: 13].

On the other hand, Salgado had many redeeming qualities. Gov. Ovando described him as “a person in whom gather the admirable qualities of faithfulness, dedication and efficiency.” The famous Englishman Nicholas Norton praised him as “a man of inquiring and tenacious mind” [Diaz-Trechuelo 1965: 766; 1963: 217; 1966: 98]. His contribution alone to the success of the resistance movement against the British, particularly his role in safeguarding the treasures of the galleon Filípíno, would be sufficient to offset many of his shortcomings. Anda’s success against the British would not have happened without that huge infusion of money at his disposal. Beside the many public services he rendered like the provisioning of wheat to the frigate Buen Consejo, he truly deserves the title of “pioneer industrialist” who blazed a path for others to follow. Despite his many failures, he achieved some measure of success in manufacturing and mining at Santa Inez. He provided livelihood to numerous native laborers who built the roads and cleared the forests for his mining and agricultural projects. Although his indigo undertaking was a bust, he shared his formula of making it with several people. Salgado wrote to the king that he taught the formula for making indigo dye to his steward and assistants so that after his 15-year monopoly elapsed, the indigo production would continue without interruption in the colony [Barras y Aragón n.d.: Nota A. 66, Nota C. 105-106]. The second director of the Economic Society, Don Francisco Moreno, frankly acknowledged that Salgado had indeed discovered the manufacture of indigo paste, “although others more fortunate than he, with the help of the Society, developed it better and took credit for it.” In fact, in his letter to José Galvez, the colonial secretary, on 30 December 1770, Salgado clearly stated that Fray Octavio, whose parish in Tambobong was located near Calauang, learned the formula of making indigo from one of his assistants in 1765. Bolstered by Basco’s patronage and blessings, this enterprising friar received later the credit of producing indigo dye on a commercial basis. Largely because of him and those who continued his work, indigo production in the Islands soared to 180 quintals (about 140 tons) in 1788 and peaked at between 400 to 500 tons in mid 1790s. While it did not become the premier export of the Philippines, it
nonetheless retained its position of significance with an average export of 100 to 200 tons in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, its domestic consumption was a huge success. Indigo dye soon became a common household item in the Philippines until the eve of World War II. True, Fray Octavio perfected the indigo production, but it was Salgado’s earlier experiments that made it possible [Díaz-Trechuelo 1966: 110-111; Barras y Aragón n.d.: Nota B, 90; Bowditch 1796: 30-31n.].

Salgado’s case is a classic example of why it was almost impossible to exploit the natural resources of the Islands during his time. So much is said about the Spaniards’ aversion toward this kind of enterprise. But when some rare individuals with unusual talents wanted to engage in manufacturing and other industrial pursuits, the obstacles laid before them were so daunting that in frustration they had no recourse but to abandon their undertakings. Instead of giving incentives to would-be developers, the Spanish government had too many obfuscating rules and exasperating trivial regulations, which some public officials used to manipulate and effectively stall the process unless they were humored or bribed. Salgado succeeded to a large extent because as a former bureaucrat, he knew the inner workings of the governmental machinery. He had influence, technical skills, and enough money to scatter around. So, the question to be asked is not why he ultimately failed, but the fact that he almost succeeded in the restrictive atmosphere of such an autocratic society.

Because of partisan politics, Salgado did not receive the title of nobility. Obviously, the influence of Viana, and especially of the powerful ministrer, Pedro Calderón — who was no admirer of Anda — was crucial in the decision of the Supreme Council of the Indies to turn down Salgado’s application. Whether it was indeed a fair decision needs further study. One may wonder who deserves more the reward — Viana or Salgado? The former was a scholar who conceived an elaborate plan to develop the resources of the Philippines and showed an amazing knowledge of every conceivable source of potential taxes to increase the revenue of the government. Because of his pragmatic awareness of the political and economic realities in global colonial competitions, some of his major proposals were implemented. It is the general perception that he obtained the title of “Count of Tepa” based mainly on his remarkable writings. Unlike the outstanding achievements of Calderón, his contemporary and erstwhile oidor of the Manila audiencia in mid-eighteenth century.2) Viana had a dubious role during the war and his services as fiscal were not particularly spectacular. Consequently it is also assumed that his powerful friends in the royal court in Spain contributed immensely to his rapid promotion.

In view of Salgado’s remarkable services to the king, there is a move to rehabilitate his name. In defence of Salgado, Diaz-Trechuelo castigated Basco as too autocratic, irascible and intolerant of others’ opinions. She explained that Salgado never committed himself to supply

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2) His main achievements were the tax reform (cuenta abierta) of 1741, and the pragmatic measures he employed in trying to solve the agrarian problems in northern Luzon, including his tactful suppression of the 1754 revolt. For detail, see Dennis [1977: 75-81, 100-116] and García Abásolo [1991: 26-37].
the crown 150 arrobas of indigo every year. That was Basco’s idea. On his part, Barras has profusely eulogized Salgado’s many accomplishments and services to the crown. He accused Basco of slander and brutal treatment of Salgado [Díaz-Trechuelo 1963: 227; 1966: 105-106; Barras y Aragón n.d.: Intr., 53, Nota A, 64-65].

In conclusion, Governor Basco ultimately ruined the life and career of Salgado, who spent his remaining years as a virtual pariah in Calauang—forlorn, ignored, even ridiculed, and died an embittered old man. Salgado’s life can be summarized in the following words: He had a wonderful life story that developed into a poignant human drama, filled with visions, dreams, adventures, hardship—and, yes, some moments of glorious triumphs—but in the end, a tragedy.

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