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different, but it is difficult to accept his characterization of Philippine capitalism as booty capitalism and Indonesian capitalism as something else. If booty is understood to be plunder, it can be done by "bureaucrats" as well as by economic oligarchs. Probably, the manuscript was completed before Suharto’s fall in May 1998. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why he states: "Over the long term, obstacles to change will tend to be far more problematic in the patrimonial oligarchic state than in the patrimonial administrate state, or bureaucratic polity" (p. 234). This is probably based on Ruth McVey’s study (quoted on p. 51), but if the former is taken to be the Philippines and the latter Indonesia, the statement is not true. It may be true for Thailand, but definitely not for Indonesia. The author and McVey seem to be overlooking the difference in the degree of institutionalization between Indonesia and Thailand.

One more thing that puzzles me is the use of the word "oligarch" used to characterize the Philippines or its political system. Since it is often used in this way by Philippine specialists, the author may have just followed the conventional use, but in one sense, he is using it in a somewhat unconventional way. His oligarchs start out as economic oligarchs, who vie to control the state for "plunder." The Lopez family certainly fits the bill, but Marcos does not. The author is right in saying that the oligarchs who controlled the state changed over time (this is to be contrasted with the view that the same old families take turns in running the government), but it seems that many came from the families of modest economic means. The Philippine state may be easily captured by people outside the power circles or bureaucracy, but it is quite another matter to characterize it as an oligarchical state as the author defines it.

The above critical comments do not apply to the author’s description of the development of Philippine banking, which constitute the bulk of the book. Strangely, although this is not the author’s area of expertise, it is here that the book distinguishes itself. Banking is an important industry in the Philippines, but hitherto no systematic attempt has been made to look into it. The book covers the period from colonial times to the Ramos administration.


The introductory chapter is followed by 17 chapters, divided into four parts: three chapters in Part I, entitled "The Long Arc of Nationalism"; eight chapters in Part II, "Southeast Asia: Country Studies"; four chapters in Part III, "Southeast Asia: Comparative Studies"; and two chapters in Part IV, "What is Left." Most of the chapters have been published over the past two decades: only three are new. But by collecting all these in one place, the book makes it convenient for us to examine the author’s thoughts on nationalism in general as well as in Southeast Asia.

If one defines scholarly writings as those which ordinary readers find it difficult to understand, Chapter I, entitled "Nationalism, Identity, and the Logic of Seriality," is the most scholarly, for only a few readers would be able to understand what the author is trying to say. The first paragraph would make most readers stop reading if they did not know that the author is an eminent scholar on Southeast Asia and nationalism. Even if they continued in the hope of being able to understand it after they had finished reading the chapter, they would still not make much sense of it. What would put many readers off would be the unfamiliarity of the concept of seriality and how it is related to nationalism.

Although the remaining chapters (at least some of them) are not necessarily easy to read, they offer a great deal to the reader who can concentrate on reading them for a few days. There would not be
much new information or data, but the book offers many insightful discussions. Due to the lack of space, it is not possible to list them all, but let me offer a couple of examples from the first quarter of the book. On p.65 (Chapter 3, entitled “Long-distance Nationalism”), the author views the rise of nationalist movements and their culminations in successful nation-states “as a project for coming home from exile, for the resolution of hybridity, for a positive printed from a negative in the darkroom of political struggle.” In Chapter 4, entitled “A Time of Darkness and a Time of Light” which discusses the philosophy of Soetomo, founder of Budi Utomo (the first nationalist movement in Indonesia), the author says that Soetomo did not discard the past in order to become modern but needed it because he thought he would “grow up by growing back” (p. 94).

There are, however, unsatisfactory parts. For example, on p. 146, the author says: “Branches of foreign corporations . . . were largely exempted from taxation, and were even allowed to bring technicians freely into the country . . .” (this sentence refers to Thailand in the mid 1970s); on p. 147, “. . . less than 30 percent of the farms were still owner-operated” (Thailand in the late 1960s); and on p. 309, “In 1986, then, at the height of the ‘miracle’ . . . .” These are not true. In the case of the last quote, the height of the miracle economy came a few years later (if it is measured in terms of economic growth). Nineteen eighty-six was a recession year for most of the miracle economies of Southeast Asia.

The author attributes the change of economic policy in Thailand in the late 1950s to the “prodding of the World Bank” (p. 268). Although this is often said, it is not quite right. The World Bank encouraged the developing countries to open the country for foreign investment and privatize state enterprises, but Thailand was practically the only country in the 1950s which heeded the advice of the Bank. This is because the World Bank mission which gave that advice was engineered by conservative economic bureaucrats, who could get it implemented with Sarit’s backing. Sarit needed economic development to justify his authoritarian rule.

Chapter 14, entitled “Sauve Qui Peut,” which deals with the present financial crisis, is, at best, mediocre. This is largely because a number of good papers have been already written on it by economists at universities, think-tanks, private research institutes, and international organizations such as IMF. I was hoping that the author could give a good political economy explanation, but there was nothing new there, either. The type of error non-economists (and even many economists) fall into is demonstrated in the first paragraph on p. 305, which compares Korea with Southeast Asian countries. Because Korea used resources during the boom years for building human resources, it “will recover quickly from the Crash.” Korea may recover more quickly, but if it does, it would not be related to a higher level of education. The better educated are politically conscious and demanding, so that the policy needed to overcome the Crash can be more difficult to implement. Thailand may be able to overcome it more quickly because the people are less vociferous and opposition to IMF is weaker. Of course, the author is correct in saying that unless Thailand builds up its human resources, it will not be able to return to the high growth path of the past.

Another unsatisfactory part is the chapters on Philippine politics (especially Chapter 9, entitled “Casique Democracy in the Philippines”). The author borrowed such terms as “casique democracy” and “oligarchy,” but they are left undefined. Are the casique the landed upper class? If so, why did they allow during the “hey day” of casique democracy (1954–72) import substitution and other policies which harmed the interest of the agricultural sector? Import substitution policy in particular made it difficult to import inputs (such as agricultural machinery) or made them expensive, and contrib-
uted to the decline of export crops. Or are the casiQue the upper class? If so, why was Marcos the supreme casiQue? If casiQue democracy is the rule for the upper class, Marcos should have benefited the upper class, but in fact, he harmed many old rich (such as Lopez and other sugar barons) and created new crony capitalists? Also, the term "oligarchy" is bothersome. Clearly, not the same families are running the country, for many presidents in the postwar period came from unknown families. Is it a rule by a few, as defined in the dictionary? But is it so in the Philippines? If the head of state is more powerful in the Philippines, it is probably because of the presidential system. What needs to be done is to define the terms "casiQue" and "oligarchy" in a functional way and explain in what way Philippine politics is casiQue democracy or oligarchy.

In Chapter 15, entitled "Majorities and Minorities," the author explains why Chinese fared differently in post-independence Southeast Asia (pp. 328-329). He points out correctly that they fared worst in the socialist states of Indochina and Burma. He is also right in saying that "in the Catholic Philippines and Buddhist Siam they have made the necessary cultural adaptations." But he then says that "Thanks to British and Dutch colonial policies, this integration is much less complete in Indonesia and Malaysia." Colonial policy may have had some influence, but the author is completely silent on Islam. Both the Philippines and Indonesia, where Chinese constitute a small minority (about 1% in the former and 3% in the latter), pursued nationalistic policy in the immediate post-independence years and made life difficult for Chinese; but by the 1980s, the former had abandoned anti-Chinese policy and Chinese had made "cultural adaptations," while in the latter, Chinese still have not made such adaptations. The main reason for this difference seems to be religious. But, curiously, the author is silent on the influence of Islam on majority-minority relations in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Here and there, the author's liberal-left leaning shows up. Nothing is wrong with it if his analysis is correct, but it seems to blind him sometimes. On p. 168, he says:

Sarit and his heirs had betrayed the country to the Americans. Never before in Thai history had almost 50,000 foreign troops been stationed on Thai soil. The economy had been allowed to fall overwhelmingly into foreign hands. For all the talk of national identity, the dictators had complacently permitted the corruption of Thai society and culture . . . . All in all, the policies of the right had proven not only venal and opportunistic, but shortsighted and ultimately bankrupt.

Did Sarit betray the country to the Americans? Did the economy fall overwhelmingly into foreign hands? I doubt it very much.

But a more contentious issue dividing the left and the right is whether American involvement in the Vietnam War was beneficial or harmful to Thailand. Certainly, it was an expensive war for the Americans (both in material and human terms), but didn't it benefit Thailand by saving the country from the devastating rule of Communists? Just think about the poverty and human rights suppression in Vietnam. Most Thais certainly would not want that. Emotions still run high on this question, so that we have to leave it to future social scientists to give a detached view. An "overwhelming" verdict can be positive.

The Thai state did not defeat the Communists just because it was lucky in the sense that the Communist Party of Thailand could no longer get Chinese assistance after the three-cornered war broke out between China, Vietnam and Cambodia in the late 1970s, but the cessation of Chinese assistance was undoubtedly a major reason. The author says on p. 290 that Peking stopped supporting CPT because
it was interested more in saving Pol Pot and had to
get the help of the Thai military in sending goods to
him through Thai territory. This is sometimes said
certainly makes sense, but is it an intelligent
guess or is there any evidence supporting it. I won-
der. I have never seen it documented.

The few critical remarks above should not be in-
terpreted to mean that there are a lot of flaws in the
book. There are some in my view, but they are
greatly outweighed by good parts. The author
shows through this book as well as the previous one
stimulating intellectually,
or public service endeavor but that it can be highly
interpreted to mean that there are a lot of flaws in the
book. There are some in my view, but they are
highly stimulating intellectually.

(Yoshihara Kunio 〈吉原久仁夫）・CSEAS)

Steve Heder; and Judy Ledgerwood, eds.
Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia:
Democratic Transition under United Nations
Peace-keeping. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996,
xx+277p.

I

今年7月26日，カンボジアで総選挙が実施され
た。選挙はHun Sen 第二首相が率いるカンボジア
児民党とNorodom Ranariddh 元第一首相のフンシ
ンベック党に、今回の選挙運動を通じて急速に勢
力を伸ばしたSam Rancy 党首のサム・ランシー党
を加えた三つ巴の争いとなった。しかしその後、
選挙結果をめぐるカンボジア社会は混迷を極めた。
まず集計過程には児民党による不正行為があったと
して、フンシンベック党とサム・ランシー党が得
票の再検証などを求めた。選挙委員会も比例配分
方式をめぐる混乱を収拾できず。選挙結果の公式
発表が大きく遅れた。8月末にはフンシンベック
党およびサム・ランシー党の支持者が「民主広場」
と命名された国会議事堂前の広場で夜を徹した
座り込みとデモ行進を行い、9月に入るとデモ隊
と警官の衝突によって僧侶を含む死者がでた。

評

「カンボジア人自身の手による選挙」としてそ
の自律性を強調する論調が、今回の選挙に関して
国際世論を中心に多くみられた。その背後には、
今回の選挙が平和裏に執行されカンボジアが自前
の一歩を踏み出したことを見過ごして、カン
ボジア国運営施政機構（以下 UNTAC/United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia）の主
導のもと1993年5月に行われた選挙の「成功」を
確認したいとの国際社会側の期待がある。しかし
実態の結果はその期待を裏切るものであり、逆に
浮上するのは、5年前の国連委任統治下のカンボ
ジアと今回の選挙において顕現した状況はどのよ
うな関連を持つのかという問いである。
1994年3月にボストンで開催されたThe American
Association for Asian Studiesの例会において
組織された、UNTAC活動期間中のカンボジアに関
するセッションを原型とした本書は、この問いに
関して議論を深める一つの手がかりを提供する。

II

本書の収録論文と担当執筆者は以下の通りであ
る。最初の2章では、本書の対象と主題について
俯瞰的な理解を提供するため、UNTAC前史として
のカンボジア現代史或理論的な枠組みが中心に論
じられる。第3章から第8章までのが章は、UN-
TAC期のカンボジア社会に実際にみられた具体的
事象についての各観点からの分析である。

Chapter 1. Politics of Violence: An Introduction
Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood

Chapter 2. Imaging the Other in Cambodian
Nationalist Discourse Before and
During the UNTAC Period
Penny Edwards

Chapter 3. The Resumption of Armed Struggle
by the Party of Democratic Kam-
puche: Evidence from National
Army of Democratic Kampuchea
"Self-Demobilizers"
Steve Heder

Chapter 4. Patterns of CPP Political Repression
and Violence During the UNTAC