SINGLE-LEVEL STRATEGIES FOR FULL-INFORMATION
BEST-CHOICE PROBLEMS, I

* 佐々木浩太 坂口 実 (Minoru SAKAGUCHI)
** グロッケンベルク大 K. シャウスキー (Krzysztof SZAJOWSKI)

ABSTRACT. Some best choice problems with full information and imperfect observation and their extension to two player competitive situation are discussed. Players observe one by one sequentially a sequence of iid random variables from a known continuous distribution with the objective of choosing one of the $k$ largest. The observations of the random variables are imperfect and the player (or players) is (are) informed only of whether it is larger than or less than a previously determined decision level. The problem is to find the optimal decision level that maximizes the probability of achieving his objective. The solution of this one person game is derived. In the two player competitive situation two typical types of the optimal stopping games for choosing the best observation are formulated, transformed into continuous games on the domain $[0, \infty)^2$, and solutions of them are given. It is shown that our optimal stopping games are easy-to-state but hard-to-solve.

1. INTRODUCTION

The subject of the paper is a class of optimal stopping problems for a sequence of iid rv's with full-information (FI) but imperfect observation to guarantee the maximal probability of achieving some objects. In 1975 Enns [1] first considered and solved the problem where the objective is to choose the best rv. Some generalization are posed and solved by Porosiński [8]. In Sakaguchi [11, 13], some more general problems are discussed. In Section 2 we formulate and solve the optimal stopping problem for finding the optimal threshold strategy that maximizes the probability of selecting one of the $k$ largest rv's. It is shown that the asymptotically optimal threshold strategy is to stop at the earliest rv that is larger than $e^{a_k}$, where $a_k$ is determined by the equation

$$ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{a_j}{j(j+1)!} = \frac{1}{k}. $$

In the subsequent two sections the optimal stopping problem for selecting the best rv, i.e. the case $k = 1$, solved in Section 2, is extended to optimal stopping games where two players compete in selecting the best rv. Two typical types of the optimal stopping games, where each player’s objective and information condition are, by the notation used in Sakaguchi [15],

1º): Selecting best/ Players priority/ Common/ Zero-sum, with FI

and

2º): Selecting best/ Earlier stop/ Each/ Non-zero-sum, with FI,

respectively in Section 3 and 4.
In 1\textsuperscript{st}) Players 1 and 2 observe a common iid sequence of rv's, which are sampled one by one sequentially. Facing each rv, each player should accept the earliest rv that exceeds his decision level. If one player accepts a rv and the other rejects it, the game is left thereafter as the other player's one person game. If both players stop simultaneously at a rv, then Player 1 accepts it, by his priority, and the game is left, thereafter as Player 2's one person game. A single player who accepts the best rv is the winner, getting reward of one unit from the opponent. Player 1(2) wants to maximize (minimize) the expected payoff to Player 1. Related interesting results can be found in Neumann, Porosiński & Szajowski [7], Porosiński & Szajowski [9] and Majumdar [5]. The no-information case priority games have been considered by Enns & Ferenstein [2], Sakaguchi [12] and Szajowski [17].

In 2\textsuperscript{nd}) there are two independent iid sets of rv's. Players observe the private iid sequence of rv's. Facing each rv, each player should accept the earliest rv that exceeds his own decision level. A player who is the first to stop at the best one in his set of rv's is the winner. The case, where both players stop at the best one in each set of rv's, is a draw. Players' aims are to maximize his own the winning probability. An interesting related work is Mazalov [6], where players' objective are slightly different from the one in the present paper. Other related works, but in the null information case, were done by Presman & Sonin [10], Fushimi [3] and Sakaguchi [12].

For both of cases, 1\textsuperscript{st}) and 2\textsuperscript{nd}), the game is transformed into a continuous game on the domain $[0, \infty]^2$. Numerical solutions of them are given.

The considered problems are related to the full information best choice problem considered by Enns [1], Sakaguchi [11], Porosiński [8] and the game version of the problem considered by Neumann, Porosiński and Szajowski [7], and Sakaguchi and Snario [13].

2. Best choice problems for choosing one of the $k$-bests

Let $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n$ be a sequence of iid rv's obeying uniform distribution on the unit interval $[0, 1]$. The $X$'s are sequentially observed one by one, but the observation is imperfect and we can only know whether the observed rv is greater than or less than a prescribed level $z \in [0, 1]$. After $X_1$ is observed, we have to either accept or reject the observation. Our aim is to accept one of the $k$ bests among all rv's. Neither recall nor uncertainty of selection is allowed. In this paper we restrict ourselves to the strategies which reject the rv's less than $z$ and accept the earliest rv greater than $z$. We call a win the event in which we accept a rv satisfying the objective. The event in which either we fail to accept any rv or accept rv dissatisfying his objective is a loss. We are looking for the decision level $z$ which gives the maximum probability of win.

Let $P(k)(z)$ be the probability of win for selecting one of the $k$ bests under the strategy with the decision level $z$. Then since the winning event by accepting an rv on or before the $(n - k)$-th is

$$\bigcup_{m=1}^{k} \bigcup_{j=1}^{n-k} \{(X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_{j-1} \leq z < X_{j}) \cap \{\text{exactly } m - 1 \text{ rv thereafter } > X_{j}\}\},$$

we have
(2.1) \[ P^{(k)}(z) = \sum_{m=1}^{k} P^{(k,m)}(z) + z^{n-k}(1 - z^{k}) \]

where

(2.2) \[
P^{(k,m)}(z) = \sum_{j=1}^{n-k} \int_{z}^{1} (1 - x)^{m-1} x^{j} \, dx
\]

is the probability that the accepted rv on or before the \((n-k)\)-th is the \(m\)-th best with \(1 \leq m \leq k\).

We use the following abbreviations in Theorem 1:

- p.w. is the probability of win with the decision level \(z\);
- a.d.l. (a.p.w.) is the asymptotic decision level (probability of win), when the decision level is such that \(z = e^{-a/n}\), with \(a > 0\) and \(n \to \infty\).

Let us define functions

(2.3) \[ H_{n}(z) = \sum_{m=1}^{n} \frac{z^{-m} - 1}{m}, \]

(2.4) \[ G_{n}(z) = \sum_{j=n}^{\infty} \frac{z^{j}}{j(j+1)!}. \]

**Theorem 1.** (i) For \(k = 1\) (i.e. selecting the best) the probability of win is \(P^{(1)}(z) = z^{n} H_{n}(z)\) and the optimal strategy is to choose \(z_{0}\), which is determined by the equation

(2.5) \[ H_{n}(z) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{z^{i}} \]

and the maximum of probability of win is \(n^{-1} \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_{i}^{t}\). Therefore

(2.6) \[ a.d.l. = \exp(-\frac{a_{1}}{n}) \]

(2.7) \[ a.p.w. = \frac{(1 - e^{-a_{1}})}{a_{1}} \approx 0.5174 \]

where \(a_{1} \approx 1.5029\) is a unique root in \((1, \infty)\) of the equation

i.e. \(G_{1}(a) = 1\).

(ii) For \(k = 2\) (i.e. selecting one of the two best) the probability of win is

(2.8) \[ P^{(2)}(z) = z^{n}[2H_{n}(z) - n(\frac{1}{z} - 1)], \quad n \geq 2, \]

and the optimal strategy is to choose \(z_{0}\) which is determined by the equation

(2.9) \[ H_{n}(z) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{z^{i}} + \frac{n-1}{2}, \]

The maximum of \(P^{(2)}(z)\) is
Moreover we have

\[
P^{(2)}(z_0) = \frac{2}{n} \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} z_i^n - z_0^{n-1}.
\]

Moreover we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a.d.l.} & = \exp(-\frac{a_2}{n}) \\
\text{a.p.w.} & = \frac{2(1 - e^{-a_2})}{a_2} \approx 0.7265
\end{align*}
\]

where \( a_2 \approx 2.0177 \) is a unique root in \((a_1, \infty)\) of the equation

\[
\int_0^a \frac{e^t - 1}{t} \, dt = \frac{e^a - 1}{a} + \frac{a - 1}{2},
\]

i.e. \( 2G_2(a) = 1 \).

\( \text{(iii) For } k = 3 \text{ (i.e. selecting one of the three best) the probability of win is} \)

\[
P^{(3)}(z) = z^n [3H_n(z) - \frac{n(n-1)}{2} z^{-2} - 1 + \frac{n(n-5)}{2} (\frac{1}{z} - 1)], \quad n \geq 3,
\]

and the optimal strategy is to choose \( z_0 \) which is determined by the equation

\[
H_n(z) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{z^i} + \frac{(n-1)(n-2)}{6} \frac{1}{z^2} - \frac{(n-1)(n-5)}{6} \frac{1}{z} + \frac{n+1}{3}.
\]

The maximum of \( P^{(3)}(z) \) is

\[
P^{(3)}(z_0) = \frac{3}{n} \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} z_i^n + \frac{(n-1)(n-4)}{4} (z_0^{n-2} - z_0^n) + \frac{n-5}{2} z_0^{n-1}.
\]

Moreover we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a.d.l.} & = \exp(-\frac{a_3}{n}) \\
\text{a.p.w.} & = \frac{3(1 - e^{-a_3})}{a_3} - 2 + \frac{a_3}{2} e^{-a_3} \approx 0.8355
\end{align*}
\]

where \( a_3 \approx 2.4934 \) is a unique root in \((a_2, \infty)\) of the equation

\[
\int_0^a \frac{e^t - 1}{t} \, dt = \frac{e^a - 1}{a} - \frac{2}{3} + \frac{a}{2} + \frac{a^2}{12},
\]

i.e. \( 3G_3(a) = 1 \).

3. A zero-sum best choice game where players' priority is given

A zero-sum game version of the discrete-time, full information and imperfect observation best choice problem is considered in this section. Two Players 1 and 2 observe sequentially a sequence of \( n \) iid rv's from uniform distribution on \([0, 1]\), with each objective of choosing the largest rv. Let Player 1(2) chose a single level \( z (w) \), and he rejects rv's as long as they are less than \( z (w) \) and accepts the earliest rv's that is \( z \geq z(w) \). If the earliest rv that is \( z \geq z \) appears, Player 1 is given the priority to accept it and drops out from the game thereafter.

The player accepting the largest rv wins the game and he is paid a unit reward from the opponent. Player 1(2) wants to maximize (minimize) the player I's expected payoff.

Let \( M(z, w) \) stand for the payoff to Player 1 when the levels \( z \) and \( w \) are chosen. Then for
$z < w$ we have

\[(3.1) \quad M(z, w) = \sum_{s=1}^{n} z^{s-1} \int_{z}^{1} x^{n-s} dx - \sum_{s=1}^{n-1} z^{s-1} \int_{z}^{1} x^{n-s} dx + \sum_{s=1}^{n} w^{s-1} \int_{w}^{1} y^{n-s} dy - w^{-1} \frac{w-z}{z} \int_{z}^{1} x^{n-1} dx.\]

Similarly for $z > w$ we have

\[(3.2) \quad M(z, w) = \sum_{s=1}^{n} w^{s-1} \int_{w}^{1} x^{n-s} dx + \sum_{s=1}^{n} w^{s-1} \int_{w}^{1} y^{n-s} dy - \sum_{s=1}^{n-1} w^{s-1} \int_{w}^{1} x^{n-s} dx + w^{-1} \frac{w-z}{z} \int_{w}^{1} x^{n-1} dx.\]

Note that $(3.1)$ and $(3.2)$ coincide at $z = w$ and so the game is a continuous game on the unit square $0 \leq z, w \leq 1$.

Define the function for $a \in (0, \infty)$,

\[\Phi(a) \approx \int_{0}^{1} \frac{e^{at} - 1}{t} dt = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{a^{j}}{j!}.\]

This function is strictly increasing and convex function with $\Phi(0) = 0$, $\Phi'(a) = a^{-1}(e^{a} - 1)$ and $\Phi''(a) = a^{-2} \sum_{k=2}^{\infty} \frac{a^{k-2}}{k(k-2)!} > 0$.

Now let $z = e^{-\frac{a}{n}}$, $w = e^{-\frac{b}{n}}$, with $a, b > 0$ and $n \to \infty$. Then $(3.1')$ - $(3.2')$ becomes a continuous game on $[0, \infty)^2$, with the payoff function

\[(3.3) \quad M(a, b) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{a-b}(e^{-b} - e^{-a}) + e^{-a} \Phi(a-b), & \text{if } 0 < b < a, \\ e^{-b} [(b-a) \Phi(b) - \Phi(b-a))] - \Phi(b) - a(\frac{1}{b} - 1), & \text{if } 0 < a < b, \end{cases}\]

Note that $(3.3)$ is a continuous function on $[0, \infty)^2$ with value $ae^{-a}$ on the halfline $a = b > 0$ and we have

\[(3.4) \quad M(a, 0) = e^{-a} \Phi(a) = e^{-a} \int_{0}^{\infty} \frac{e^{t} - 1}{t} dt, \]

\[M(0, b) = -e^{-b} \Phi(b),\]

both of which are reasonable facts since setting $z$ or $w = 1$ means that the game is actually one-person game.
Theorem 2: For the zero sum game on \([0, \infty)^2\) with the payoff function \((3.3)\), a saddle point \((a_0, b_0)\), with \(0 < a_0 < b_0\), exists and the saddle value is
\[
e^{-b_0} [(b_0 - a_0)(\Phi(b_0) - \Phi(b_0 - a_0) - \Phi(a_0) - a_0(b_0^{-1} - 1)) + e^{-a_0}(\Phi(a_0) + 1) + \frac{a_0}{b_0} - 1] \cong 0.3233,
\]
where \((a_0, b_0) \cong (1.57205, 2.99628)\) is determined by a simultaneous equation
\[
e^{-a}(\Phi(a) - \Phi'(a)) + e^{-b}(\Phi(b) - \Phi'(b)) = e^{-\sigma}(b - a)
\]
(3.7)
\[
(\Phi(b) - \Phi(b - a)) + (\Phi(b) - \Phi'(b)) = (b - a)\{\Phi(b) - \Phi'(b) - \Phi(b - a) + \Phi'(b - a)\}
\]
\[+ a^{-1}(e^b - 1 - b + b^2).\]

The theorem shows that Player 1 sets his decision level \(z_0 = e^{-a_0/n}\) higher than the opponent in the optimal play, and the saddle value is positive, reflecting Player 1's advantage over his opponent due to the higher priority in playing the game.

4. A non-zero-sum best choice game where winning requires earlier stop

A non-zero-sum game version of the discrete time, full information and imperfect observation best choice problem is considered in this section. We first state the problem as follows:

1. There are two Players 1 and 2, and a sequence of \(n \) iid bivariate rv's \((X_i, Y_i)\) from independent uniform distribution on \([0, 1]^2\). Player 1(2) observes \(X_i(Y_i)\)'s sequentially one by one.
2. Let Player 1(2) choose a single level \(z(w)\). He rejects \(X_i(Y_i)'s\) as long as they are less than \(z(w)\) and he accepts the earliest rv that is \(X_w \geq z, Y_w \geq w\), where \(\sigma\) and \(\tau\) are the stopping times of the players.
3. If one of the players stops (accepts), the other player is not informed of this fact and continues playing. We call a “win” for each player the event in which he gets to be the first to stop at the best one in his set of rv's. If the two players stop simultaneously at the best one in each player's set of rv's, both of them are the winners.
4. The aim of each player in the game is to determine his decision level by which the probability that he becomes a single winner is maximized.

Let \(M_1(z, w) = M_2(z, w)\) stand for the probability of winning for Player 1(2) when the levels \(z\) and \(w\) are chosen. Then we have
\[
M_1(z, w) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} z^{i-1} \int_{z}^{1} x^{n-i}dx \left\{ w^{n} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} w^{n-1} \int_{w}^{1} (1 - y^{n-i})dy \right\}.
\]
\[
= (zw)^n \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{z^{j-1} - 1}{j} \left\{ w^{n} - w^{j} + w^{j+1} - \sum_{i=j+1}^{n} w^{i-1} \right\}.
\]

\(M_2(z, w)\) is equal to \(M_1(z, w)\) with \(z\) and \(w\) interchanged.

By letting \(z = e^{-a/n}, w = e^{-b/n}\), with \(a, b > 0\) and \(n \to \infty\), we obtain a non-zero-sum continuous game on \([0, \infty)^2\) with payoff functions.
\begin{align}
M_1(a, b) &= e^{-a} \left[ \Phi(a) - be^{-b} \int_0^1 \Phi(at) \Phi'(bt) dt \right], \\
M_2(a, b) &= e^{-b} \left[ \Phi(b) - ae^{-a} \int_0^1 \Phi'(at) \Phi(bt) dt \right].
\end{align}

We note that (4.2) gives
\begin{align}
M_1(a, 0) &= e^{-a} \Phi(a), \quad M_1(0, b) = 0, \\
M_2(0, b) &= e^{-b} \Phi(b), \quad M_2(a, 0) = 0.
\end{align}

and
\begin{equation}
M_1(a, a) = M_2(a, a) = e^{-a} \Phi(a) - \frac{1}{2}(e^{-a} \Phi(a))^2 = \frac{1}{2} [1 - (1 - e^{-a} \Phi(a))^2],
\end{equation}
on the halfline \(a = b \geq 0\). Again setting \(z = 1\) \((w = 1)\) means that Player 1(2) does not play any role in the game. Furthermore we find that
\begin{equation}
M_1(a, b) + M_2(a, b) = 1 - (1 - e^{-a} \Phi(a))(1 - e^{-b} \Phi(b)),
\end{equation}
by an evident identity
\[a \int_0^1 \Phi'(at) \Phi(bt) dt + b \int_0^1 \Phi'(bt) \Phi(at) dt = \Phi(a) \Phi(b).\]

Now we find an equilibrium for a pair of payoff functions (4.2).

**Theorem 3.** For the non-zero-sum game on \([0, \infty)^2\) with the payoff functions (4.2) the equilibrium point exists and it is \((a, b)\) with \(a = b = a_0 \cong 1.6065\) where \(a_0\) is defined by \(\Psi(c) = 0\). The common equilibrium value is
\[e^{-a_0} \Phi(a_0) - \frac{1}{2}(e^{-a_0} \Phi(a_0))^2 \cong 0.3830.\]

Therefore the probability of draw of the game is 0.2339.

\[\text{and} \quad \psi(c) = e^c \frac{\partial M_1}{\partial a} \bigg|_{a=b=c} = e^{-c} \left[ \frac{1}{2}(\Phi(c))^2 - \frac{1}{c}(\Phi(2c) - 2\Phi(c)) \right] - \Phi(c) + \Phi'(c),\]
REFERENCES


* Research Institute for Information Systems, Nagoya University of Commerce and Business Administration, Komenoki, Nissin, Aichi 470-01, Japan

** Institute of Mathematics, Technical University of Wrocław, Wyspiańskiego 27, PL-50-370 Wrocław, Poland

E-mail: szajow@im.pwr.wroc.pl