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Kyoto University
FOCUS ON FOREIGN AID: The Case of Select Norwegian Aided Projects in Tanzania

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ABSTRACT Under the United Nations categorization, Tanzania is one of the 25 poorest countries in the world. The world community of nations has positively come to the aid of these nations. Tanzania is one of the poor countries with an effective alternative development strategy. For, aid is most effective where the recipient country has a defined area of need in order that foreign aid may become a proper supplement to national resources for the identified endeavours. Tanzania has committed herself to socialist construction with ingenious specificity. Her main goal is to reach self-reliance with foreign aid being accepted as a catalyst.

Norway is among the many countries which have generously come to the aid of Tanzania. More exemplarily, Norway has even given a grant to Tanzania for Tanzanians to evaluate Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania. Most donor countries shy away from such a venture fearing exposures which could prove embarrassing! I had just returned home from being an Assistant Professor of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, U.S.A., in September 1976, when I was called upon to be field supervisor of the evaluation effort. Thus, this paper contains first hand experiences of the man on the scene.

INTRODUCTION

The United Republic of Tanzania is committed to the policy of socialism and self-reliance. However, the state of abundant poverty which plagues the country makes it imperative for Tanzania to give a weighted positive reception to foreign aid. Consequently, Tanzania’s development plans take into account a heavy reliance on foreign aid. The Nordic countries as a group have been very generous in aiding Tanzania. One member of this group, Norway, even gave Tanzania a grant to evaluate certain Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania. The responsibility was placed upon the Department of Political Science and I was assigned the task of field supervision.

The University of Dar-es-Salaam embarked upon the evaluation of Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania in a deliberate effort that sought to combine theory and practice in the training of its students. This is so because it became imperative for the institution of higher learning to introduce its students to the Tanzanian reality at the levels of both production and work. Practical assignments are given to students during the long vacation from April to June every year. In the long vacation of 1977, six students were selected to evaluate the impact of a number of foreign aid projects in Tanzania which are carried out in cooperation with Norway, the donor country. The Ministry of the Treasury okayed the Norwegian Agency for International Development, NORAD, to work with the Department of Political Science at the University of Dar-es-Salaam in this joint evaluation venture. On the part of Tanzania, it was the first time that a donor country requested the recipient country to make the evaluation. This was seen in Tanzania as an important gesture which is also exemplary.

From the University’s angle, any evaluation of a foreign aid project in our country is primarily a Tanzanian concern. We see the follow-up of such projects as part of the planning and implementation process which offers new vistas in the experiences of our students and
their staff supervisor(s). Scholarly attention is given to the study of a given aid in the socio-economic and political spheres locally, regionally and nationally. A study thus consummated becomes a baseline for future studies. Furthermore, such studies are considered useful in generating data for feedback to our Government. We learn from such research involvement about the larger issue of the actual and attained impact of the aid, i.e. the whole infrastructure of the impact of aid.

Several questions arise. Do we utilise aid to conform to our aid needs? Are linkages with foreign firms and our own bureaucracy pertinent and compatible with our alternative development strategy? What bottlenecks do we face?

These are but some of the critical questions that must be raised to help lead us in the making of some important recommendations. The task is interesting as well as challenging as we take note that foreign aid to Tanzania has increased almost twenty times in the period since the Arusha Declaration of 1967 that committed the country to "self-reliance" than in the pre-1967 level.

PROCEDURE

In accepting the responsibility of evaluating the Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania, the Political Science Department represented the Government of Tanzania while NUPI, the relevant Norwegian Institute, coordinated the study for Norway. The evaluation research was intended to build up general expertise of the University in project evaluation in the field and sites of operation. Thus it was an important contribution to our own planning. Our concern in this particular case centered on three development units:

1. The Road Betterment Units (RBU's) in Rungwe and Lushoto,
2. The Sao Hill Saw Mill in Mufindi, Iringa, and
3. The Tanzania Coastal Shipping Line (TACOSHILI).

Our plan called for students to be stationed at the impact points: Rungwe, Lushoto and Mufindi. The Coastal Shipping offered opportunities at Lindi and Mtwara ports. Dar-es-Salaam itself offered the contact point with relevant ministries, corporations and institutions.

The procedure involved the initial identification of five thematically related research issues:

1. The implementation of the production target.
2. The Tanzanization of the project in terms of provisions for training.
3. The hypothesis that the projects contribute something over and above prescribed targets, i.e. the multiplier effects of aid projects as catalysts of development,
4. The impact of the project and its social implications in the sense of "who benefits?" and
5. The organization issue:
   (a) The place of the project in the Tanzanian administration,
   (b) Does it help or hinder the realization of the project goals? and
   (c) The degree of the project's integration into the Tanzanian economy and society.

All these themes were intended to help the students in their work exposure to the Tanzanian praxis.

METHODOLOGY

Following upon the above related procedures, our methodology was based upon the principles of induction and deduction. Data was collected theoretically and practically. It was then scholarly synthesized to enable us to deduce from it and come up with the relevant ob-
Observations. Experiences of the researchers and their supervisor who circulated among them throughout the research period, became part of the inputs needed to bring the outputs in the deduction end of the methodology.

Our starting point was the five identified thematic issues which propelled our urge to find answers as they collectively formed our hypothesis. We were concerned with the economic success and cheapness in the case of the Shipping Lines and whether or not there are undue strains operationally. Efficiency and material success were investigated to see if the combination encourages material success. Researchers were made aware of the differences between Norway, one of the richest non-oil producing countries in the world because of capital-intensive per capita, and Tanzania which relies mainly on labour-intensive industries as people work in jobs that in industrial states are performed by machines. We also looked at the possibilities of whether the Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania could create other opportunities, e.g. in shipping—fishing,—in lumber: paper: and in better roads—spill-overs. Obviously, it was inevitable that we had to prod the question whether or not production was for internal markets or for sales abroad? Corollary, we investigated as to how the production in question reduced dependence and to what extent the local market and local demand are the primary objects?

Social forces were not overlooked either. We examined the effects of the projects on the local people: education, accessibility, ties of kinship, infrastructure, i.e. who does it support? effects on local culture in the sense of whether the projects make the local people assume risks as against tradition?

Another area was that of political commitment in building rural areas. In this regard we looked at the possibility of the projects as catalysts to further the socialist construction at the grassroots level. In contrast we looked at the possibility of capitalism creeping in through the back door as projects open out new opportunities for individual entrepreneurship. Hence, this is where the unintended consequences can be explained and we balance the peoples' responses to national goals.

Still under methodology, we looked into measurement tools. Questionaires were used as useful tools but not the absolute. Other ways of finding information were encouraged. These instruments of measurements were designed on the basis of the definition of the problem, i.e. do these instruments fit into the hypotheses and concepts? Researchers were encouraged to be good “housekeepers”, i.e. to have a budget. to have an accounting system of their own transport and living expenses. They were reminded of the popular saying that “time is money” and how both of these: “time” and “money” are important and need to be approached with care as unforeseeable and unpredictable expenses arise sometimes very unexpectedly. It is therefore important to set aside for contingencies and emergencies.

Finally, our methodology called for the need for compromise. For, research is a political enterprise with numerous players. It is a product of the mind as labour is a product of the body. Research is burdensome but fun. It stimulates and must be enjoyed even though one approaches it with a strong sense of seriousness. Objectivity, subjectivity and impartiality were stressed upon researchers in addition to being trustworthy, understandable and believable bearing in mind the fact that we need a general validity. For, available guidelines may be inadequate and there is no absolute answer.

**HISTORY**

In comparison to other donor countries, e.g. Britain or the United States of America, Norway is a recent entrant into the donor category as far as Tanzania is concerned. In 1970, Nor-
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way made her first contributions to this country through loans given to the Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB). TIB aims at financing and promoting productive undertakings aimed at employing the country's natural resources. Norway's 1970 contributions were aimed primarily at supporting established concerns like the Tanzania Tourist Corporation (TTC), the National Agriculture and Food Corporation (NAFCO), the Tanzania Electrics Supply Company (TANESCO), etc. These original Norwegian support efforts to the Tanzania Investment Bank were channeled as loans at first. In 1971, these loans were changed into a grant. However, the Bank itself continued to operate on commercial loan basis. Norway continued to scrutinize the Bank operations until 1975 when the scrutiny was removed following the example set by Canada and Sweden.

In granting these aid loans, Norway pushed for and obtained the understanding that a Norwegian consultancy firm would plan the factory or build the ship while the implementation would be done by Norwegian personnel. All these services being paid for by Norway through the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD). Stipulations concerning the linkage between NORAD and TIB were spelt out in State Paper No. 18, 1973–74. The following goals were specifically mentioned in the paper: That the projects supported by TIB should
1. create or increase employment opportunities,
2. extract and/or refine local resources
3. increase export earnings/reduce import expenditures, and
4. foster rural (district) development.

Norway was to
(a) provide technical services personnel to Sao Hill,
(b) provide suitable training facilities for Tanzanian personnel, and
(c) arrange consultancy services (transfer of know how) through the Norwegian firm (FORINDECO) to TWICO.

As can be seen, all the above features were concerned with manpower development aspects which is a major goal of the projects. In this regard it was agreed that training be done in Norway. In addition, there were to be an in-service training, demonstration effects, counter-part training, etc., as mentioned in the files.

ISSUES AND ANSWERS

We now reach a point when we survey the work we accepted to do. There are many observations and many conclusions that could be drawn out of the researches. We are, however, examining each issue and how it fared before our conscious eyes.

1. Training

Training surfaced as the least aspect in the list of priorities in all three subject areas: the Road Betterment Units, The Sao Hill Saw Mill and at TACOSHILI. Since much less had been done in the area of training, there was a lot of frustration on the part of the African counterparts. They had not been given real chance to enable them to takeover eventually. Norwegian officials discussed matters in the Norwegian language instead of English or Swahili to the detriment of the African counterparts. In addition, almost all operating manuals and other books relevant to the work operations were in Norwegian. The Norwegians gave as an excuse the fact that they had deadlines to meet and therefore they did not have time to offer technical training to the Africans. Consequently, they expected the Africans to learn by observation and by practical experience. Most of the Norwegians sent to Tanzania in the
projects we evaluated were not themselves well educated academically. This probably explains their inability to put together a feasible training programme for their Tanzanian counterparts.

An interesting notation or anecdote on the issue of training emerged at Lushoto in 1977. The Norwegian establishment at the Lushoto Road Betterment Unit decided on constructing a tennis court. Saturdays and Sundays were set aside for this job. All the Tanzania counterparts were invited to take part as part of their “practical training”. The result was disastrous, as only two out of five counterparts turned out. This infuriated the Norwegians who concluded that the Tanzanians were not interested in training. “Well, if this is their attitude towards training,” one of the Norwegians commented, “they can go to complain anywhere; we won’t make a move! We have duty and we have family. We cannot spend time for training. We do not have that kind of time.”

The Lushoto counterparts were contacted for a feedback. They gave a different picture. They said that true they were “invited” to take part in constructing a tennis court which was an extra-curricular activity geared towards the enjoyment of the Norwegians and their European visitors. The counterparts believed that their participation was needed not really for training purposes but merely being exploited for contributing labour. They thus resented what they considered to be an unwanton exploitation of their labour.

After a long discussion, the Norwegians at Lushoto finally conceded that they were going to try to find time for training the Africans. However, they warned that they were not going to be running a school up there nor would they have time to give formalized teaching to the counterparts.

Still on the issue of training, the Lushoto counterparts shed more light. Their understanding was that they joined the project to understudy the Norwegian expatriates and eventually, through training, takeover from them. Responsibilities were given to the Tanzanian counterparts in accordance to their respective counterpart positions. However, after the first Norwegians left (1973–75), their successors did not give to them their respective duties and responsibilities. In fact, often times when the African counterparts made decisions in their jobs, they were rudely vetoed and rebuked by the Norwegians. Consequently, the other junior workers lost faith and respect for them. Low working morale ensued. Besides, the Tanzanian counterparts were even threatened with poor personal reports at end of the year. The counterparts concluded that the Norwegians sent to Africa were not of competent callibre yet became instant “big shots” after crash training in mechanical work for only three months.

Those counterparts who had gone to Norway enjoyed the “tourism” part of it but complained that they did not receive theoretical training. They found Norwegians at home in Europe to be very hard working. They also observed that mechanization was extensive in Norway, something that could not be duplicated in Tanzania. For example, oil gravelling was common in Europe to prevent dust. The fact could not be made applicable to Tanzania because of the hot weather. During their training in Norway itself, the counterparts found that their training did not include the principles of laying down gravels on the roads which was what they had to do at the Road Betterment Unit in Lushoto. The principles of levelling, surveying and the use of available tools were not taught to them either. They said they gained the knowledge that in those jobs what was primarily needed was LABOUR. Those who trained on ships for TACOShili complained that they were made into janitors and servants instead of bonafide trainees. A number of them resigned.

At Sao Hill Saw Mill in Mufindi, legitimate training was given to workers. Three of the counterparts had gone to Norway for six months in 1977 to train as logger, electrician and saw mill production manager counterparts. Complaints that arose at Sao Hill on the issue of training included the assertion that since the counterparts were mainly people with good ex-
experiences and highly trained to start with, they really did not care much about training which to them was a waste of time and a gimmick to delay their taking over the relevant jobs.

The way Sao Hill was shaping up in the middle of 1978, it was acquiring a rather distinctive personality to the extent that it might not be easy to Africanize it. The Norwegian Accountant explained it better when he said, “I cannot hand over my Accounts Department to a counterpart. I don’t even expect him or even the other counterparts to replace us, for, the time is not yet ripe to handover our duties.” Obviously, faced with such attitudes, the counterparts become demoralized. A number of them asked for transfers.

In the case of the Tanzania Coastal Shipping Lines, the issue of training had remained in limbo. Initially, a very ambitious formal training programme was put on paper and had remained there ever since. It was not specified in any document as to whether TACOSHILI or NORAD was responsible for training. Consequently, no training had taken place. However, before the completion of our survey in December 1977, training arrangements were announced for 1978 and early 1979.

We conclude the issue of training with a brief flash at the Rungwe Road Betterment Unit. There, by the middle of 1978, Africanization had almost completely been consumated. There were only two Norwegians left: the Resident Engineer (the man in-charge of the establishment), and the Chief Mechanic. The relationship between them and their African Counterparts and the other African Office bearers was good, and indeed exemplary. Frustrations were minimal and there was a high working morality. One of the African officers, the Construction Supervisor Counterpart, was in Norway for a three months training period in the company of three others from Lushoto. That training lasted from May to August, 1977. Upon his return, his impressions slightly differed from the others, probably because he assumed his full duties and replaced the Norwegian he had understudied. He did concur though that Norway’s use of highly sophisticated machinery in road construction made their Norwegian training experience rather irrelevant to the Tanzanian reality. Perhaps more theoretical knowledge would have been appropriate, he suggested.

2. Production Target Issue

In any evaluation work, perhaps one of the fundamental questions revolves around the issue of specified targets. A more relevant question may be asked this way: “To what extent has the production target been implemented?” Setting a target or a goal is akin to planning and may be equated to “building a castle in the air.” However, when goals are set with a purposeful determinism, the chances are that sooner of later effective implementation becomes fait accompli. Sectors evaluated under our scrutiny all faced delays from the original target dates. The Road Betterment Unit at Lushoto and the Sao Hill Saw Mill are given here as cases in point.

The Target Issue at Lushoto

The original feasibility study on tea and feeder roads in Lushoto was carried out by the United Research Company. Its priorities included the road from Mombo to Lushoto which is a key road that opens the Western Usambara Mountains to one of Tanzania’s main arteries: the Dar-es-Salaam—Arusha all weather main road. The link from Mombo to Soni was yet to be included under the Road Betterment Units projects. The stretch from Soni to Lushoto had not been included either. Logically, the Lushoto-Soni-Mombo road should have been improved first in order to facilitate easy access and spare vehicles of frequent needs for repairs. The road itself is the heart of the Lushoto District. This importance was recognized by the Norwegian expatriates who felt that before ending the Lushoto project they should have been allowed to work on the Mombo stretch.
The Mombo-Lushoto road was initially built by the Germans during their colonial hey-days in German East Africa (current Tanzania). It was improved upon by the British administration. The Mombo Hotel exhibits a picture of the first automobile that travelled to Lushoto and shows the elaborate reception at Mombo as the vehicle arrived from Dar-es-Salaam. West Germans have had an interest in building it under the Lushoto Integrated Development Project (LIDEP) which now is completely Africanized and functioning well, or under the Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme (TIRDEP). It became an international issue to allow the Norweigians instead of the Germans to work on the Mombo-Lushoto road using tarmac facilities. Consequently, the subject was shelved to the detriment of the Lushoto District and Tanzania as a whole.

The Lushoto and Rungwe Road Betterment Units were the results of negotiations between Tanzania and the World Bank and the International Development Agency. They resulted in an agreement to assist the development of smallholder schemes in 1970–71. The Agreement carried the following aims:

1. Expansion of tea growing in Lushoto and Rungwe districts.
2. Strengthening of Tanzania Tea Authority in organization and operations.
3. Construction of two and expansion of three tea factories: two in Rungwe (Katumba and Mpuguso) and one in Lushoto (at Mponde).
4. Creation of Leaf-Collecting services and their transportation.
5. Construction of tea nursery with high-grade plants.
6. Provision of credit to project growers for plants and fertilizers.
7. Construction of tea roads especially feeder roads for tea collection.

The links to the smallholder project are the roads. The tea roads in Rungwe and Lushoto became thrown in with a number of further feeder roads into the present Road Betterment Units which have been financed through Norwegian aid. Norway agreed to finance the two Road Betterment Units and to supply personnel to these Units. Tanzania had requested for assistance in 1970 and obtained the Norwegian Agreement in 1972. Construction in the Lushoto District was set for completion by early 1975. However, there was a three years delay.

The Target Issue at Sao Hill

Activities at Sao Hill in Iringa Region are of a long standing. 1954 may be taken as a turning point since the Sao Hill man-made forests were established as a commercial center. Tanzania’s Villagization Project launched in 1971 cleared the populations at the Sao Hill area and moved the people to the periphery villages of Chengarawe, Matanana and Nyororo. In 1972, a group of experts from Norway and Tanzania embarked upon a feasibility study of the Sao Hill Saw Mill Ltd. It was determined then that the Sao Hill Saw Mill be restored while its production be expanded using the Sao Hill forests as the local raw materials. By March 1976, installation of the modern saw mill machines commenced. Production began within the same year after the completion of the relevant constructions.

That Sao Hill has become a viable productive area was confirmed by the Norwegian Forest Project Manager, a Swedish expatriate, who described the Hill forests as “beautiful and exciting.” A good feeder-road system has been constructed as a result of establishment of the industry. Work on the Saw Mill machines was launched by March 1976. The small engine which was already there was set aside for training purposes and for low scale production. The larger engines were in place by mid 1976. The engines were being operated on the basis of 8-1/2 hours continuous service daily. Introduction of double shifts was being considered but to be launched when the industry was completely installed and production reached its full capacity.
In 1977 when our evaluation was in full swing, there was a tremendous rise in production from 800 m³ per month to 1,700 m³ a month (m³ = cubic meters) by September 1977. At that rate, there was great hope of surpassing the production target of 10,000 m³ per annum. Additionally, staff housing units, both European type and others were other aspects related to the production issue. In fact, the panorama of the Sao Hill Saw Mill site gives the picture of a complete “face lift.” With most of the major constructions in place, Sao Hill became such a lovely place that it posed the possibility of being a tourist attraction eventually. It has acquired a physical plant personality that should make any worker proud of being identified with Sao Hill.

3. Development Issue

“An aid is an aid”, Julius K. Nyerere. In other words, aid is a foreign element injected into domestic circulation. Consequently, aid in its various forms: loans, grants, etc., subscribes to the phrase, “development by injection”, Che-Mponda. Injections are applied to prevent or cure infections. Human bodies are more susceptible to this kind of treatment. However, we are using this phrase here on an institutional or national sphere with its appropriate international linkages. Aid is resorted to in order to bring about or hasten development and modernization. We may narrow it down to the Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania and evaluate its developmental issue.

The development issue concerns success or failure of implementation. Quarterly reports from the industries, plans which are available from the Tanzania Tea Authority, TWICO, and Sao Hill Saw Mill, Project evaluations made by the World Bank and reports of the relevant factories at the respective sites and other Governmental sources provide most of the necessary data and statistics for purposes of evaluation. On developmental issues, we shall be concerned primarily with the Sao Hill Saw Mill and the Road Betterment Unit at Lushoto.

Developments at Sao Hill

Starting from a mere wilderness, Sao Hill area has become a transformed island of affluence. Aside from the omnipresent infrastructures, the Sao Hill Saw Mill industry has created and opened out a wide variety of job opportunities from the sophisticated skilled positions requiring the physical presence of expatriate officers down through the hierarchically ordered ranks to that of a messenger or janitor and wood cutters. At the time of our evaluation, the Sao Hill industry employed around 240 people as listed on its pay-roll. There were 23 loggers, 100 workers at the big engine. The remainder ranged from watchmen, boarders, cooks, drivers, messengers and janitors, electricians and mechanics, and the counterparts.

Social developments were also being realized at Sao Hill. Workers’ families were extended various social services that were an outgrowth of the industry’s spill overs. For example, the authorities donated money that opened a new football field. The premises also harbour a dispensary that provides free services to workers, their families and neighbours. Other social benefits include housing units which offer examples of good houses for all to copy or adopt. Benefits accruing from the engineering department include its help in solving mechanical problems of district government vehicles including spare parts. Pieces of wood discarded at the Saw Mill or in the forest are picked up free of charge by anyone interested in them. The Sao Hill Saw Mill was indeed developing well enough to become a viable industry when fully operational. Its outputs reached as far as Mozambique, Zambia, Rwanda and Burundi with other markets being sought all over Eastern Africa.

Developments at Lushoto

The Road Betterment Unit (RBU) is a special organization in the Ministry of Works. It is a
new arrangement which Tanzania negotiated from the World Bank and the International Development Agency as a loaner for the Small Holder Scheme for Tea Development in 1970-71. The Road Betterment Unit included the building of roads as part of the project. The headship of the Road Betterment Unit was placed in the hands of expatriate consulting firms as guarantors of the fact that the roads would indeed be constructed properly and possibly on time. At a late stage in the negotiations, Tanzania engaged Norwegians to see the project through after the principle of the Betterment Units was already agreed upon.

The bulk of the large Tea Development Scheme (U.S.$10.5 million) was provided by both the World Bank and the International Development Agency. When a foreign donor provides the bulk of needed financing, the recipient state cannot escape "strings attached" to it, Tanzania was no exception in this case. In fact, both IDA and the World Bank applied pressures that came to retard the time limit. Additionally, road building itself was subordinated to tea development. As a result, the tea credit/loan ran into snags.

The Acquisition of Buildings Acts of 1971 expropriated around 3,000 buildings of which some 150 units valued at approximately £2.5 million sterling belonged to British firms or nationals. Tanzania ignored the ensuing British protests and Great Britain in turn worked hard and succeeded in frustrating Tanzania's Master Plan by requesting the World Bank to freeze Tanzania's request for Development Loan as a lever to extract compensation for the lost property.

These pressures caused delays in the signing of the necessary agreements thus rendering unrealistic the target dates for the fulfillment of the road building. The Norwegian/Tanzanian Agreement was signed in April 1972 and the roads were supposed to be completed in Lushoto in January 1974 and in Rungwe in September 1973. There had thus developed a legacy of the tight production time in the Road Betterment Units.

In the Lushoto District a revised schedule for completion of the roads was pushed to December 1978. The time schedule was as follows:

Status of the Roads

Roads built by the Road Betterment Unit are supposed to be permanent all weather roads. However, roads as anything else require constant maintenance. Here is a brief run-down of some of the roads I travelled through during some of the on-spot inspection tours:

i. Korogwe-Mashewa Road (56 km)

This road was completed on schedule but was given no maintenance and had deteriorated

Table 1. Road betterment unit: Lushoto (334.8 km).

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<th>Road</th>
<th>Distance (in km)</th>
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<td>Soni-Bumbuli</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>October 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumbuli-Tomota Junction</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>January 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mponde-Vuga</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>February 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mponde-Funta</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>March 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbulala Road</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>March 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwamumvo-Kwashangalawe</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>March 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balangai-Tomota</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>August 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngwelo Road</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>September 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magamba-Mlalo</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>December 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomata Junction-Bungu</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>January 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bungu-Makambini</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>June 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korogwe-Mashewa</td>
<td>56.2</td>
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<td>Malindi-Sungu</td>
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<td>Umba-Mkomazi</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>December 1978</td>
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Source: Lushoto RBU Office leaflet
pretty fast though still passable. The road passes through four sisal estates and is primarily
needed by lorries that pick-up sisal. The area is thickly populated. Five buses per day served
the communities.

ii. Makambini–Dindira–Bumbuli–Soni Road (58 km)

This was the first road to be completed. Its main problem was frequent landslides which
made maintenance cost rather high. The reason for this demur was because the high banks
were cut vertically rather than slantingly. Consequently, there was need to recut the banks
in a slant to correct the situation. This was not done by the time of the evaluation because the
management was concentrating on completing the other roads whose high banks were being
cut the correct way. Along this road are tea feeder roads leading to Mponde tea factory, to
Mbulela and Kwashanglawe up to Vuga. This area is also one of the largest coffee growing
areas. The Coffee is sold to the Usambara Development Corporation (USADECO) at Soni.

iii. Lushoto–Magamba–Lukosi–Malindi–Mlalo Road (53 km)

Completed in 1977, this road leads to the main fruit and vegetable growing areas of Lu­
shoto District. Lorries collecting wattle for processing at Giraffe Factory use this road. At
Lukosi is a branch road leading to Monolo, Sunga and Mtae (21 km). There is another
branch road at Malindi leading to Sunga and Mtae (12 km). These areas are densely po­
pulated and grow vegetables and fruits, coffee and maize (or corn).

iv. Mkomazi–Mnazi–Umba River (77 km)

This is the last road to be seriously worked on. It was scheduled to be completed by Decem­
bear 1978. At first, 7 kilometers were done but work had to be suspended because manpower
was too spread out. It passes along the plains that surround the Usambara Mountains. It is
quite scenic with abundant wild life.

v. Mombo–Soni–Lushoto

The Road Betterment Programme did not include this road in its endeavours. The Mombo–
Soni–Lushoto road is the heart and crux of the Lushoto District.

4. Organizational Issue

Whenever there is a function to be performed by one or more people in a systematic way,
organization is involved. Organization and follow-ups lead to an orderly implementation.
There is no apparent lack of concrete models regarding organization, for literature on the
subject is abundant both nationally and internationally. The difficulty may lie in the fact of
achieved standards of organization due to the special form of development connected with
particular schemes. The special form of development aid under our scrutiny had been used to
carry out the bulk of international development assistance work under the project form. Im­
plementation timetable, financing and efficiency are usually the main concerns in this regard.
This makes us confronted with the demand for results. The confrontation comes at a time
when there seems to be a shift from the project form to donor-oriented form. Experiences which
have been built up internationally in the course of the recent decades, especially since the
ascendancy to independence of numerous countries in the early sixties, are no longer satisfac­
tory in the new situations. We therefore have to find new solutions and new approaches in
connection with the organizational problem. The transition here is from project support to
programme support.

Programme support or donor-oriented form has come about in the light of the changed
circumstances referred to above. The stress here lies in the fact that the growing acquisition
of experiences and expertise in the recipient country's administration lures an irresistible de­
mand that the recipient country's Government be granted full control in all development pro­
jects thus avoid the "strings attached" enigma. Consequently, it is desirable to link develop­
ment aid as closely as possible to local plans and aspirations.
Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania try to compromise the two approaches to international aid: the project form and the donor-oriented form. Perhaps the reason for this ambiguity in Norwegian aid is caused by the unsureness of the Norwegians to give full confidence to recipient administrative machineries in Tanzania. They have not yet shifted the benefit of the doubt in favour of Tanzania:

"The general picture one gets of the recipient country's economic and social policy, its administrative capabilities and political capacity to use economic resources responsibly and effectively, on the background of the country's own conditions will be decisive for Norwegian evaluations of assistance work of this programme kind (st. meld. nr. 94: 23)."

As a result, Norwegian projects in Tanzania are administratively "an island entire unto themselves". In the bureaucratically ordered hierarchical scale, the projects are laterally or horizontally placed rather than placed within the vertical line of authority. They were set up as special entities within the Ministry of Communication and Works (COMWORKS).

The Norwegian Project Manager was placed in the ministry's head office in Dar-es-Salaam to be responsible directly to the Ministry. The problem with this arrangement is that Tanzania is decentralized with semi-autonomous Regions (Prefectures) that comprise of numerous districts. Norwegian aided projects are usually set up or installed in the rural areas administratively run by Regions and districts (local governments). The special status of the Norwegian projects exempts them from being accountable to local governments. Hence, they operate with an air of arrogance which inevitably frustrates good relations with communities surrounding them.

The Norwegian projects are self-contained construction or industrial Units (especially the Road Betterment Units and the Sao Hill Saw Mill) operating for the Ministry in the localities. The Units are not integrated in the districts' planned activities. Local labour force enters the Norwegian aided projects only through recruitment of casual labour. Otherwise, the projects are foreign elements in the localities and are outside local decision-making. They are preoccupied with the specified functions, e.g. road building or installation of saw mills, etc., and have to follow tight time schedules. Any contact with local communities or administrations are a peripheral luxury and depend on the good naturedness of individual expatriates. Where such good naturedness lacked as was the case with expatriates in the Lushoto Road Betterment Unit, frictions occur. In the Lushoto case an "Observer" published the following letter on the "Peoples Forum" in the Daily News (December 29, 1977) under the title "Various Malpractices":
"For a long time now we have been fighting various malpractices such as nepotism, favouritism and neocolonialism. How far have we succeeded?"

"The RBU is a NORAD aided project for reconstruction of Roads in Lushoto District. I have been in this firm for almost a year and what I have experienced disturbs me. There is no worker's committee and favouritism is a daily business plus many corrupt ideas."

"There is also, maladministration. Workers are made to fear the administrators, who act as if they were demigods. They don't listen to the advice given,"

"I appeal to the concerned authorities to save us from this situation."

In discussing with people around the District, we were told that socially the expatriates were a failure and that what the "Observer" noted were very close to the truth. District authorities interviewed a month after the publication of the above letter admitted privately that there was some truth in the content of the letter. At the time the expatriates shied away from interview on the subject. However, on my second visit in April 1978, they admitted that owing to the pressure of meeting construction deadlines their social neglect could be misinterpreted but promised to try to improve their image in the district.

Politically, Tanzania, being a socialist committed state is human oriented rather than materially oriented. There is thus an inevitability of conflict when expatriates come here imbued only with goal orientation. However, the Lushoto episode must be considered as an isolated case because the other Norwegian communities (in Tukuyu and Sao Hill) had nothing but praise from their localities especially Mr. Andersen, the Resident Engineer at Tukuyu.

On the basis of our socialist orientation we, Tanzanians, are obviously reluctant to accept the solution of establishing independent foreign run units within our territoriality. It is on these premises that one can logically conclude with regard to the organizational issue that in a situation of real choice, Tanzanians might not accept units and special projects that remain foreign elements in the national administration.

5. Spillover Issue

A look at out last issue that of "spillovers" necessitates an evaluation of the impact of foreign aid at the local and the national levels with special noting of the effects of the aid project at the said levels. It thus calls for special attention to be focussed upon the social tendencies, the possible levelling out of economic disparities and the rise in the standard of living at the impact area. These changes manifest themselves in a number of areas: the availability of work and work techniques, the nutritional standards, offers for health and school facilities, the conditions of women, new techniques and organizations.

The four Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania which were evaluated in our endeavours: TACOSHILI, Sao Hill Saw Mill and the Road Betterment Units in Rungwe and Lushoto Districts, proved that there had been tremendous positive impacts resulting from the presence of the aid projects. This observation is also substantiated in the look of satisfaction on the faces of the people directly touched by the projects.

Developmental schemes automatically create job opportunities of varying quality and quantity. There are those sophisticated positions requiring foreign or expatriate personnel, skilled jobs requiring some technical expertise and the manual labour jobs. All Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania have had numerous job opportunities for Tanzanians who would probably be unemployed and have given opportunities to others to add newer dimensions to their experiences as they join in as counterparts.

A further development is provided by the existence of good transportation systems especially with regard to TACOSHILI and the Road Betterment Units. We all know that a good infrastructure is necessary for proper economic development. Thus improved transportation system is more or less a pre-requisite to rapid economic growth. In the areas mentioned above,
the ensuing rapid transportation has resulted in the movement of goods and services from
source areas to markets and vice-versa. The construction of feeder roads in Rungwe and
Lushoto has overcome distances to link hinterlands to market areas. This aspect has helped
the implementation of the national policy of “villagisation”. Numerous “Ujamaa Villages”
have sprung out off feeder roads made better under the Road Betterment Units programme.
This helps in Tanzania’s approach to rural transformation based on ujamaa’s planned vil-
lages. Since the roads have made villages more accessible, the Government has been enabled
to assist these communities in the provision of the following services: capital equipment e.g.
agricultural machinery an fertilizers, technical advisers of various types, and community
facilities such as schools, health centers, water supplies, etc.

Local impact of this development by injection is reflected in the fact that smallholders have
become more numerous. Many people both in Rungwe and in Lushoto who used to “escape”
to cities such as Dar-es-Salaam, Tanga, Moshi, Arusha and Mbeya, etc. have returned to
their home districts to take advantage of these new economic opportunities opened up by the
new better roads. Some of them have turned businessmen as shopkeepers, timber and fire-
wood sellers and bar owners, etc. As can be seen, these spillovers are not limited to tea
farming alone. There has been a great deal of diversification in the agricultural sector. Coffee,
pyrethrum, cocoa, cashewnuts, tea itself, various types of beans, groundnuts or peanuts,
maize or corn, bananas, rice, finger millet, potatoes, wheat, cassava, vegetables, sial and
fruits galore, have increased in acreage and level of production. Agriculture is the backbone
of Tanzania’s socialism and the Road Betterment Units have certainly given it “a shot in the
arm” in the affected areas.

Vehicles, if they could speak, have reasons to say “thank you” to the Road Betterment
Units since now they have a prolonged life. Before the betterment of the roads, local vehicles
hardly lasted three years due to bumpy roads and potholes which reduced their lives.

One other interesting spillover is the favourable impact of the Norwegian aided projects in
Tanzania on the position of women in the affected areas. These side effects should be of in-
terest to any donor country current and potential:

1. Transportation has been made easier. One woman in Lushoto elaborated on this point
by saying that before the betterment of the roads it was very hard for them to keep their
“kanda mbili” (sandals) on their feet when it rained because the sandals used to stick in the
mud! She added that it was easier for them now to move economic crops to markets using
automobiles rather than carrying things on their heads as before.

2. Their income has increased due to these new facilities as they, the women, are able to sell
more than before the betterment of the roads. They have thus become better dressed and are
therefore more able to keep husbands, whereas before, because of shabby dressing, they
stood a chance of losing them. The new economic opportunities have also retrieved the men
back to the villages from urban escapes.

3. The roads have enabled expectant mothers to get health care during pregnancy and at
the time of childbirth. Before road betterment it was a problem getting them to hospitals for
delivery and many women lost their lives when complications emerged.

4. Politically, the betterment of the roads has helped spread out the women’s organization
“Jumuia ya Wanawake wa Tanzania”. There is a branch of the organization in every village.
Leaders are now better able to visit the village ladies to educate them on the need to become
union members, to keep good health and child care, handicraft and tailoring, etc. Women in
the villages are now also able to go to the districts for general meetings. They participate in
national or patriotic projects on their own accord and in large numbers.

5. Whenever there is development, there are also problems. The women who benefit from
the Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania do also face problems. There are no ambulances for emergencies, no hostels to accommodate delegates thus making it difficult for the women to meet as often as they would like, lack of telephone services hinder easier communication, lack of funds frustrates their plans to build multi-purpose headquarters which would be used also for training standard VII school leavers, and although the roads "are good, but we don't have vehicles at our disposal to facilitate easy communication", one of the Union officials lamented.

CONCLUSION

A poor but developing Tanzania has effectively embarked upon the road to recovery and escape from the enigma of poverty. In the process she has committed herself to succeed though self-reliance. Yet, as the world is impregnated with interdependence, Tanzania did not shy away from seeking or accepting aid to supplement her own deliberate efforts. She, therefore, did not hesitate to stretch her hand for a developmental injection of foreign aid.

One of the countries in the Nordic group of nations helping Tanzania is Norway. Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania are widespread in terms of geographical dispersian and impacting effects. Our research involved only a token of what Norway is assisting Tanzania. The research was made possible by funds provided by the Norwegian Agency for International Development. For Tanzania, this was the first time that a donor country also provided funds for the recipient state to evaluate progress in implementation, with the main implementers being personnel from the donor country itself.

As an overall field supervisor, I made contacts with relevant authorities at the relevant Government and parastatal bodies both at the national and local levels. The overall closing impression remains that foreign aid is a shot in the arm of a developing nation. It is an inevitable accompaniment to development. It is as reliable as a prescribed injection to a patient! Foreign aid is most effective where the recipient nation has defined its area of need so that the aid becomes a proper supplement to national resources for the identified endeavours.

The Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania, at least those we evaluated, showed the possibility that aid projects can become sore enclaves in the communities in which they are located. This is the result of the concern for achieving result without minding the social consequences that accompany the planting of an alien community in the hitherto "native" society. Those in positions of accountability in this regard should call their humanity to bear upon ensuing humanitarian needs.

Perhaps one of the most hurting developments is the counterpart issue. Counterparts who are already experienced and well qualified usually join a project establishment with the eagerness of rising expectations. Their patience in waiting to take-over runs very thin especially so when they learn that the qualifications of the European counterparts is far below their own. Therefore, every effort be made to bring relief. If there is to be a prolonged postponement of the Africanization of the project then the local counterparts should be given extended long-term training opportunities in the donor country, which should include training in the donor's language.

Finally, let me conclude by saying that the Norwegian aided projects in Tanzania which we evaluated showed promise that they were rightly timed in terms of boosting Tanzania's development. Human problems that cropped up could be solved at the local level by replacing the concerned personnel. Otherwise, in general, the Norwegians lived up to the expectations and left a trail of an exemplary partnership for other potential donor countries to follow.
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