EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN AFRICAN COLONIAL CONTEXTS: THE CASE OF INSTRUCTIONAL MEDIA IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA (1930–1980)

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ABSTRACT The colonisation of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) by the British in 1890 profoundly affected the development of the country. One of the enduring influences of colonialism has been the introduction of a state-directed formal education system.

The history of the colonial educational policy was largely shaped and constrained by the values and assumptions of a white racial elite, determined to maintain a socio-economic and political dominance over other ethnic groups in the country.

Key Words: Educational policy; Media; Colonialism; Southern Rhodesia.

INTRODUCTION

The colony of Southern Rhodesia (also referred to as Rhodesia) was an outcome of nineteenth century British imperialism. Its main distinguishing characteristic was the presence of a relatively large and stable white settler population living among a majority African population and determined to make the colony a permanent home. This was in contrast with many other colonies on the African continent where settler interests tended to be less entrenched. The Rhodesian white population was to play a pivotal role in influencing the course of development in the colony from 1890 onwards. Education is one of the areas where this influence was exerted.

White settlers were influenced by a pervasive and deeply held belief in white supremacy. This resulted in the development of a complex educational policy which sought to guarantee white privilege, while at the same time, promoting limited and segregated African development. This monograph is an analysis of colonial educational policy with respect to the development of media for instructional purposes. Policy initiatives and innovations in Rhodesian education were the means to clearly defined political and socio-economic ends. Educational policy and innovations are, therefore, assessed from this broad perspective.

A review of the literature during the early stages of the study indicated that an understanding of the educational policy would be enhanced by a careful consideration of the racial prejudices and insecurities which largely motivated the white community in Rhodesia. Cognisant of the fact that "concepts of racial superiority were the dominant influence at work in the formation of colonial education policies" (Ruddell, 1982: 3), the concept of racism was adopted as the main interpretive framework for the study. Miles & Phizacklea (1979) defined racism from a
use the term racism to refer to those arguments and beliefs which serve to identify and set apart a minority group or groups on the basis of some physical and/or hereditary characteristic(s) and then attribute to that group(s) some other negatively evaluated feature (p.2).

This definition was developed in the United Kingdom and it assumes that racism is directed to a minority group. Colonial experience indicates that racism can be practiced against a majority as well. The issue is further complicated by the fact that in colonial Rhodesia, settlers of British descent tended to regard themselves as a racial category, distinct from other ethnic groups of European descent, such as Afrikaners.(2) This had consequences on the educational policy, which will be explored at some length in this study.

RACE, EDUCATION AND CLASS IN RHODESIA

1. Unlocking the Educational Tradition

The origins of the formal education system in Rhodesia can be traced to the end of the 19th century when the country was colonised by the British. As a result, a new formal system of education emerged to supplement and gradually replace traditional non-formal education.

The principal concerns of successive Rhodesian governments were the promotion of the narrow, economic interests of settlers, a white supremacist hegemony
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dominated by Anglo-Saxon culture, and the general enhancement of a secure environment for whites. These concerns were to influence educational policy in the country during the colonial period (1890–1980).

The origins of white settlement can be traced to 1888 when foreign mining interests, based in South Africa and under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes, began to express an interest to expand northwards. On 11 February of that year, Lobengula, who was described as the "permanent chief" of the "Amandebele country and its dependencies," signed a treaty of friendship with the British (Commons Debates, G. G. B., June 18, 1888: 428). The treaty was interpreted by the British to mean that the king would not "alienate any portion [of his country] without the previous sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa" (Commons Debates, G. G. B., June 18, 1888: 428).

Just over a year later, in 1899, Lobengula signed the Rudd Concession which granted British interests led by Cecil Rhodes the right to enter the country and establish mining settlements. There was some controversy surrounding the Concession, and the British member of Parliament, Mr Labouchere, was compelled to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies whether:

it is a fact that Lo Bengula [sic] denies having knowingly signed a Concession such as that held by Messrs. Rudd, and asserts that the missionary who acted as interpreter between him and Mr Rudd erroneously interpreted the document to him (Commons Debates, G. G. B., April 2, 1889: 1384).

The Under Secretary confirmed that a Concession had been signed but denied knowledge of the controversy surrounding the document. Despite the dispute, Cecil Rhodes' Chartered Company began active preparations to move into the country. Colonel Carrington, an employee of the British government, began a recruitment campaign for men who would "maintain law and order in the new territory" (Commons Debates, G. G. B., March 18, 1890: 1141). Some British members of Parliament had reservations about the proposed annexation and one parliamentarian pointed out that the recruits were being promised rewards such as gold claims, shares in gold mining companies, or administrative positions in the territory. The government replied that a telegram received from Rhodes indicated that "Lobengula has sanctioned...occupation" of the province of Mashonaland, and "no collision with Lobengula" was anticipated (Commons Debates, G. G. B., March 18, 1890: 1141–1142).

Rhodes' forces moved into the country in 1890 after the British government had granted his British South Africa Company (B.S.A.C.) a Royal Charter to run the colony. The Charter empowered the Company to "discharge all the responsibilities of government" (Keatley, 1963: 108). The powers granted by the Charter evidently violated the limited terms of the Rudd Concession. In an official communication to the B.S.A.C., Sir Henry Loch, the British High Commissioner at the Cape cautioned that:

the [Rudd] concession...does not confer such powers of government as are mentioned in Clause 3 and 4 of the Charter. The powers will have to be obtained whenever a pro-
per time for approaching Lo Bengula [sic]...arrives (Keatley, 1963: 115).

One way of regularizing the occupation of the territory and extending white control was to defeat Lobengula in a full-scale war. The declaration of war was made feasible by the increasingly militant resistance of Africans to white domination. War broke out in 1893. The settlers triumphed, and Lobengula’s kingdom collapsed. In 1894, Jameson, the territory’s Administrator, “formally declared that the King being dead, the white government had taken his place” (Keatley, 1963: 186). Each man who had volunteered in the war was rewarded with “loot” listed as a £9,000 farm, twenty gold claims, and a share in Lobengula’s cattle herd, estimated at about half a million (Keatley, 1963: 180).

A second war broke out on March 23, 1896, when a country-wide attack on the settlers was initiated from the province of Matebeleland. The settlers eventually prevailed, albeit with a heightened sense of insecurity. An uneasy peace was established and lasted until the early 1970s when the final military onslaught, which overthrew the colonial government, resumed. In 1980, the Africans regained control over the country and renamed it Zimbabwe.

By 1898, the British government had authorised the establishment of a Legislative Council in the colony. It consisted of six representatives of the B.S.A.C. and four elected members representing the white community. It was not until 1911 that the number of elected members exceeded Company nominees. Debates in the Legislative Council show that white settlers were anxious to reduce the power and influence of the Company. In 1923, the British government granted the colony Responsible Government, leading to the creation of a Legislative Assembly. This effectively ended Company rule. There were no African representatives in the Legislative Assembly. Britain reserved the right to veto locally enacted legislation which adversely affected Africans.

Although Rhodes’ Chartered Company had “declared the occupation of [the colony]...in the name of the Queen,” the British government made it clear that the Company “would be liable for all future expenses” (Meridith, 1979: 19). The administration of the territory, for the first thirty-three years of occupation, was, therefore, entrusted to a private and commercial company. In return, the company “was entitled to raise taxes, promulgate laws, maintain a police force, recruit administrators, and build roads and railways.” As Rolin (1978: 97) noted, in Rhodesia:

businessmen and financiers combined to conquer and then to administer while the mother-country remained more or less inactive. These capitalist entrepreneurs have carried out the task of colonisation themselves, largely at their own expense.

The rich gold deposits in the South African Rand led white settlers to expect similar reserves in Southern Rhodesia. When these were not found, the Company faced financial problems. Figure 2 illustrates the financial position of the Company in its early years of operation.

The failure to find large gold reserves increased the economic importance of agriculture (Palmer, 1977: 80). Legislation was passed to cede vast tracts of land from
Africans to the white community. The land acquisition policy culminated in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. This divided the country into European and African areas, with the small European population getting about half of the territory's land resources, in the most agriculturally productive areas of the country. The Land Apportionment Act became the cornerstone of what was called the Native (African) policy. Writing in the 1923 issue of the Native Affairs Department Annual (NADA), Wilson described the goals of this policy as follows:

The object[ives] of our Native policy...are the development of the native in such a way that he will come as little as possible in conflict or competition with the white man, socially, economically and politically (Wilson, 1923: 88).

It was in pursuance of this policy that the racially segregated educational system of Rhodesia evolved. In a territory where Africans formed a large and rapidly increasing majority, the provision of an efficient education system was expected to secure the future of the settlers. A brief overview of how the racially segregated system of education evolved follows.

2. The Origins of the Formal Education System for Africans

Rhodesia was a product of British empire building. Yet as Keatley (1963) pointed out, the turn of the 19th century saw two kinds of empire builders at play in Southern Africa. Cecil Rhodes epitomized the empire builder in the "hard political sphere. He built with money and military power" (Keatley, 1963: 121). The second type of empire builder was the missionary. From 1859, when Robert Moffat established the first mission station at Inyati, until the end of colonial rule
missionary enterprise dominated the development of African education in Rhodesia. By 1900, about 18 Christian denominations were operating in Rhodesia (Challiss, 1982). From the early days of white settlement, Cecil Rhodes went out of his way to stimulate missionary activity in the country. Rhodes had a number of reasons for encouraging the growth of missionary activity. First:

missionary endeavour helped to fulfil the injunction of the [Royal] Charter which called upon the British South Africa Company to concern itself with the general welfare of Africans. In an age when the Imperial government expected the colonies to be self reliant and at a time when the British South Africa Company expenses largely precluded expenditure upon public education, it was fortunate that a large number of missionary societies were to be attracted by Rhodes to work in the territory (Challiss, 1982: 455).

Second, Rhodes believed that missionary education for Africans which focused on elementary literary skills and religious instruction, was compatible with his own belief that “the transition of Africans from barbarism to civilisation must be gradual” (Challiss, 1982: 29). Third, Rhodes presumed that Christian influence would pacify Africans. As he put it, “missionaries are better than policemen and cheaper” (Challiss, 1982: 28–29).

The state’s financial contribution to African education had been enacted in 1899 through an Education Ordinance which stated the conditions for state aid to schools. However, by 1907, only three schools out of about a hundred qualified for aid. Speaking in the Legislative Council in 1922, Moffat noted that the number of Africans receiving education was about 51,000 at an annual cost to the state of £16,500 (Council Debates, B. S. A. C., May 15, 1922). Moffat congratulated the authorities for education an “extraordinarily large number of [African] pupils...at a very small cost.” The year before, in 1921, the state had spent approximately £200.000 (Council Debates, B. S. A. C., May 13, 1921) on the education of 5,621 white pupils (Rep. Dir. Educ., B. S. A. C., 1921).

Government expenditure on African education was not in proportion to African contributions to the state’s revenues. As early as 1894, the colonial authorities introduced taxes on Africans. The Hut Tax of 1894 affected households, while the poll tax of 1904 was levied on all males over the age of 14, including pupils. These taxes were an important source of revenue for the financially feeble B. S. A. C. administration. In the 1903/4 financial year, the state raised £100,806 from direct taxes on Africans and an additional £59,119 from various forms of indirect taxes on Africans (Challiss, 1982). Yet, in that same year, the state’s contribution to African education was a paltry £153.15s (Challiss. 1982). The significance of the African contribution to revenue is indicated in Figure 3. These contributions were made at a time when whites paid no direct taxes to the treasury (Council Debates, B. S. A. C., March 31, 1899). Clearly then, the Company exploited Africans for its own benefit and for the benefit of the settlers.

Although Government aid to African education was minimal, it was nevertheless effectual in strengthening the state’s influence on the curriculum in African schools. The Education Ordinance of 1903, Order “D,” for instance, indicated a
clearer emphasis in government policy on the development of industrial training and the form it would take. There was:

no insistence...that African pupils should learn to read and write, either in English or in their own languages.... The sole purpose of such instruction, Duthie [the Director of Education] explained, was to help reduce friction between African labourers and their white employers who often had misunderstandings with each other on account of mutual unintelligibility (Challiss, 1982: 58–59).

Africans showed an interest in formal education and this is reflected by enrollment figures. There were an estimated 8,577 African pupils attending grant-aided schools in 1912 (Rep. Dir. Educ., B. S. A. C., 1912). In 1929, the number of this category of pupils had reached 108,752 (Rep. Dir. Native Educ., S. R. G., 1929).(3)

The administration of African education in the colony originally fell under a Director of Education who was also responsible for European education. This relationship lasted until 1927 when the Department of Native Education was inaugurated. This brought educational policy in line with general government policy which sought to maintain segregation and limit African educational development.

3. The Origins of the Formal Education System for Europeans

Education for white children under the B.S.A.C. administration began through voluntary efforts of individuals and organisations. In the early years of white settlement, the Company administration was preoccupied with the problems of subduing Africans and establishing conditions for a viable white settlement. As indi-
cated in the preceding discussion, the colonisation of Rhodesia was, in the short term, unprofitable for the Company.

The financially stringent environment of early Rhodesia led to acrimonious debates in the Legislative Council between Company representatives, who were in the majority until 1911, and settler representatives. In 1907, Longden, the Midlands province representative in the Council, accused the Company of promoting "commercial interests in this country to the detriment of the rights of the people" (Council Debates, B. S. A. C., May 1907: 47). Contributing to the same debate, Colonel Grey moved that "immediate steps be taken to improve and enlarge the [educational] system in accordance with the growing needs of the country." He urged that "neither time nor expense should be spared" in developing white education (Council Debates, B. S. A. C., May 1907: 47). This debate led to the founding of an education committee to inquire into European education. It was chaired by Hole, a representative of the Company, and commenced its deliberations in January, 1908. The Hole Committee recommended that the voluntary school system be gradually replaced by a public school system financed by the state (Rep. Educ. Comm., B. S. A. C., May 1908). These views were echoed in the subsequent official enquiry on education of 1916.

The idea of state-directed public schools aroused resistance from the Afrikaner section of the white community. Afrikaners, who were nearly a quarter of the white population, were Dutch descendants who had come into the country from South Africa. From the early years of settler rule it was clear that they:

favoured local parental control over the choice of teachers, and felt not only that schools should ensure that pupils learnt Dutch, which was the official language of the D.R.C.[Dutch Reformed Church], but also that they should be taught about their national heritage and culture in order to take pride in being Afrikaner (Challiss. 1980: 24).

The majority of the settlers in Southern Rhodesia were of British origin who presumed that the colony should develop along British cultural traditions. The 1908 inquiry into education, therefore, recommended that English should be the sole medium of instruction in public schools. Afrikaners, on the other hand, felt that Southern Rhodesia, like South Africa, must have an official bilingual policy. Given these differences, an ideological clash was inevitable, and Afrikaner campaign for separate schools intensified from 1913 onwards (Challiss, 1980). Foggin, the Director of Education in the colony, was reluctant to accommodate Afrikaner demands, regarding them as of "political (nationalist) in origin."(4) In his view, the "agitation ... apparently aims at keeping Dutch children entirely apart from those of British settlers in Rhodesia .... It is not in the main spontaneous and not local in origin." Clearly, accusing fingers were being pointed to South African, Afrikaner nationalists.

Not all Afrikaners favoured confrontation. The need for solidarity became pressing towards the referendum of 1922. In this referendum whites were asked to choose between self-government and union with South Africa. British settlers, mostly against union with South Africa, were anxious to gain Afrikaner support for self-government. These factors helped the two ethnic groups to reach a com-
promise. In this compromise, Afrikaners agreed to hand over their schools to the state, and, in return, Afrikaans language instruction would be offered “in all schools where parents ask for it.” Foggin believed that, with this compromise, there was “no possibility of a revival of the Separatist Movement.” Clearly, white settlers were willing to “subordinate political, social and economic differences...for racial solidarity” (Challiss, 1980: 4).

The pact between the two white ethnic groups and the growing stability of white settlement permitted the state to take decisive steps towards the improvement of education for white children. By 1925, the Colonial Secretary was able to say that the colony was spending more money per white pupil in education “than any other country in the British Empire” (Assembly Debates, S. R. G., May 20, 1925: 675). The high quality of education was confirmed by Tawse Jollie who spoke in support of her parliamentary motion calling for compulsory education for white children at the primary school level (Assembly Debates, S. R. G., May 20, 1925). Jollie vigorously pursued the issue of compulsory education for white children, introducing motions on the subject in 1920, 1925 and 1928. When she addressed the Legislative Assembly in 1925, she linked the education of white children to racial security. The position of whites could only be secured if white children were not allowed to have “a lower level of education than some of the natives, or indeed...a low level of education at all” (Assembly Debates, S. R. G., May 20, 1925: 667).

White Rhodesians, living in a conquered land and pursuing white supremacist policies, were clearly concerned about a “native problem.” Writing in 1924, Keigwin cast the problem in this way:

They [Africans] will be our servants, our neighbours.... We shall need their assistance. If only on the grounds of assuring to ourselves that assistance, we must face our duty towards them. Because we wish to keep our race pure, because we wish to preserve our cherished institutions, because in effect we are resolved to build a sound white community, it does not mean that we shirk our obvious duty towards this backward people whose place we have taken in the land.... In this light then, bearing in mind our underlying policy of segregation, let us consider anew the question of their education and industrial training (Keigwin, 1924: 54-45).

But educating Africans created a dilemma. As Wilson (1923: 87) put it:

The problem before us is not that of educating the native: it is to know what to do with him when we have educated him.... That natives are being educated and will be educated, that they cannot possibly be prevented from imbibing a knowledge of our arts and crafts even if we should forbid all native schools — that is the native problem, or rather is the phase of the problem which is most menacing to the white man in Africa (emphasis in original).

Wilson unambiguously defined the “native problem” in terms of education. It was, therefore, to be expected that white settlers should consider this to be of the utmost importance in preserving their dominant social position. Lavish spending on white education could be justified by arguing that white Rhodesians faced peculiar circumstances threatening the survival of white settlement. Given this frame of
mind, compulsory education for white children, and not for Africans, made sense. Compulsory education for white children was introduced in 1931. From 1922 onwards, expansion in facilities for white schools was evident in both primary and secondary schools. The school system which emerged was modelled on the English public school with an unequivocal academic emphasis.

By 1929, the Director of Education could declare that the white community had a "complete and well established system both of primary education and secondary education of the relatively academic type" (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1929: 7). Two different and unequal educational systems had emerged, "one education for winners and one for the losers" (Ruddell, 1982: 302). The discussion now turns to developments in the period from 1930 to 1945.

EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND MEDIA, 1930–1945

1. Rhodesian Politics, 1930–1945

Rhodesian politics in the 1930s and 1940s was dominated by one political figure, Godfrey Huggins, who was later Lord Malvern. When Huggins took over the office or Prime Minister in 1933, one of the key issues on the political agenda was the "native question," a critical feature of which was education. There was some concern that literate Africans might use their reading and writing skills for political purposes (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 92). Education for Africans was, therefore, viewed with apprehension.

The policy of limiting African education turned out to be incompatible with the emerging need for competent personnel, such as "agricultural demonstrators, laboratory assistants and dispensers" (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 92). In the 1920s, the state had supported a segregationist scheme proposed by Keigwin. The goal of the scheme was to develop Africans in their own areas and provide them with industrial training with a limited literal component. Domboshava and Tjolotjo government schools were opened for this purpose. The Native Education Commission of 1925 reported adversely on the Keigwin scheme. They found that:

...almost from the outset that the original objectives of the development of native industries were departed from. The Director of Native Development can hardly be blamed for this, except possibly for want of foresight in failing to appreciate the demand and necessity for a larger measure of literary training (Rep. Comm. Native Educ., S. R. G., 1925: 18).

The report continued:

It is clear that from the evidence of the pupils themselves that the [African] Reserves offer at present no market for their services and that they must look to European centres of industry for the utilisation of their acquirements (p. 19).

Gradually, the state was coerced into accommodating African demands for an in-
crease in literary training. However, it was not until the early 1940s that moves were taken to reformulate policy in line with these changes.

The policy with regard to white education was completely different. The Compulsory Education Act of 1930 made education free in all white primary schools (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1931). The spirit behind the Compulsory Education Act was aptly summarised up by the Colonial Secretary when he declared:

We are very anxious to fit our children for the economic life of the country, and that ordinary economic life is leadership, because our unskilled labour is performed by the native (Assembly Debates, S. R. G., March 19, 1930: 44).

The white population increased moderately between 1930 and 1945. While the population was 50,100 in 1931, by 1941, it was estimated at 69,300 (Palmer, 1977). This modest increase reflected the settlers' ambiguous attitude to immigrants and fears that large-scale white immigration would result in white unemployment. In addition, Rhodesian settlers harboured prejudices against non-British immigrants and:

Huggins though by no means hostile to foreigners...shared the prevailing belief that the colony should concentrate on men of British stock whose numbers should be no more than supplemented by a "carefully regulated flow" of "assimilable aliens" (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 125-26).

The white Rhodesian community of the 1930s, therefore, remained, by choice, small and exclusive. By 1939. Southern Rhodesia had weathered the economic recession of the early 1930s. The pre-war military rearmament industry had boosted earnings from base metals and the colony's gold output "nearly trebled in value" between 1931 and 1939 (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 122). Writing about this period, MacDonald found money "plentiful" and business "brisk" (MacDonald, 1976: 1). Whites appeared to be succeeding in creating an island of prosperity in Southern Rhodesia. The climate of prosperity was reflected by a Legislative Assembly motion initiated by Major Hastings which sought to establish a state-funded sea-side holiday home for landlocked Rhodesian children. The aim of the home would be to "improve the quality of the population" (Assembly Debates, S. R. G., April 10, 1935: 808). "We cannot," he argued, "afford in this country to have anything but the best."

The two major instructional media innovations during this period were radio broadcasting and correspondence education. Both were developed for the education of white children. Radio broadcasting will be treated separately and later in the study.

2. Correspondence Education for White Children

In 1929, an education commission was founded as a result of the debate initiated by Tawse Jollie in the Legislative Assembly (Assembly Debates, S. R. G., June 13, 1928). The commission examined a wide range of issues related to European educa-
tion. The chairman of the commission was Frank Tate, who had previously been a Director of Education in Australia.

The main recommendation of the commission was that primary education should be made free and compulsory for white children. Compulsory education required that educational institutions be accessible to thinly dispersed rural white children. Drawing on the experience of its chairman, the commission recommended that correspondence education “of the Australian type” be introduced for white primary school pupils who, for some reason, could not attend normal school (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1929).

Correspondence education was inaugurated in 1930 by Miss Whitford of Australia who was “specially selected by Mr Tate” (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1930: 9). The initial enrollment was 45 students and by the end of the year, 104 students were enrolled. In 1931, the Report of the Director noted that “progress made has exceeded anticipation, notably as regards numbers, but more especially in respect to the quality of work done” (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1931: 4; see also Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1931: 5). The structure of the programme was based on four components, namely, the student, a parent (normally the mother), a teacher, and printed materials. A radio broadcast component was added in 1950, but was not central to instruction (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1950).

Children learning by correspondence were expected to move to the conventional school at some point, the decision being left to the parents. The work covered was, therefore, designed to be equivalent to that in the conventional schools. While correspondence education appeared to succeed, there were strong views that it should be restricted to the early years of schooling and children should transfer to boarding schools as soon as they were old enough. In 1939, for instance, the Director’s report on education argued that:

...education by correspondence inevitably omits much that is now considered inherent in sound education. It cannot provide the normal teaching contact between teacher and pupil; it cannot provide controlled social contacts with other children; and perhaps most important of all, it cannot ensure proper oral training. Parents concerned should make every effort to send their children away to school, at any rate towards the end of the primary school course; certainly at the latest, at the end of the year in which the child becomes 12 years old (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1939: 3).

The concern for “controlled social contacts” and the reference to “proper oral training” were mainly directed to children whose background and mother-tongue were not English, and the majority of these were Afrikaners.

The end of the Second World War saw a rapid increase in the size of the white population due to post-war immigration. The increase in immigration figures reflected a change in immigration policy. The economy grew much more rapidly in the post-war era and the country could absorb a greater number of immigrants. Many of the immigrants who came to the colony had visited it as servicemen during the Second World War.

The increase in immigration resulted in a rapid rise in student numbers and boarding schools could not admit all eligible students. This resulted in a wider ac-
ceptance of correspondence education. In one report, the correspondence school is described as doing "excellent work and its reputation stands high throughout the [Central African British] territories" (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1957: 31). By 1953, 1,023 pupils were enrolled. Figure 4 illustrates the trend in enrollment figures between 1930 and 1953.

As late as 1967, a parliamentary committee reported favourably on the correspondence school. It concluded that "pupils getting their early tuition from the Correspondence Course Centre are generally more advanced than their contemporaries who attend the normal primary schools" (First Rep. Select Comm. Educ., R. G., April 20, 1967: 38).

Many observers had not expected the Correspondence School to succeed (Wakatama, 1983). A number of factors account for its resilience. There was political will arising from white concerns about education. There was parental support as well. In addition, the autonomy enjoyed by the school enabled it to operate with minimum interference from traditionalist skeptics. It was also fully integrated with the traditional school sector and pupils could move from one system to the other without difficulty. Finally the school benefited from adequate support in the form of competent teaching staff: the school had 17 full-time teachers and an enrollment of 940 in 1958, a teacher-pupil ratio of one teacher to 55 pupils. Such a ratio, for a correspondence school, was most favourable, if not extravagant. It reflects the determination of the authorities to make correspondence education a success.

The great strides in the education of white children were not matched in African education. The key issue in African development continued to be the 'native question,' that is, guaranteeing white privilege and promoting limited African development. It is to these issues that the study now turns.
3. Changing Perspectives on African Development, 1930–1945

By the early 1940s, the policy of strict segregation envisaged by the 1930 Land Apportionment Act faced increasing problems and "under the weight of sheer administrative pressure Huggins began to adjust his ideas, even though he did not bother to cast his policy into a theoretical framework" (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 127).

The Second World War increased the demand for the colony's agricultural and mining exports. The demand for minerals such as chrome and asbestos was particularly high. Furthermore, global shortages of goods formerly imported from war-torn Europe stimulated the domestic manufacturing industry. These developments created an escalating demand for African labour outside the agricultural and mining sectors. Previously, the country had supplemented its needs for unskilled labour by using contract workers, mainly recruited from neighbouring Malawi (Clarke, 1974). However, the growth of the manufacturing sector required a more stable labour force. In addition, the enlistment of 8,448 white men and 1,479 white women (Gann & Gelfand, 1964), 15 percent of the white population, for service in the war created an unprecedented need for African labour to assume responsibilities traditionally associated with white workers.

The colonial administration was also experiencing growing pressure from British groups such as the Fabians, the Aboriginal Protection Society and some British members of parliament, to demonstrate a clear commitment to African welfare. Locally, missionary bodies who had supported the Land Apportionment Act in the belief that it protected Africans from European settlers, were, by 1940, condemning the same Act.

Within Huggins' political party, there was an energing consensus that if the country was to experience continued economic growth, the economy had to be restructured. This meant diversifying the economy by supporting industrialisation, in addition to the traditional exports of minerals and tobacco. Danzinger, for instance, argued that, "the existing economic structure would not allow further progress commensurate with the territory's resources" (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 175). Support for this came from Guest, who argued for reform and pointed out that, "industrialisation would have to be based on unskilled and semi-skilled black labour, and the African workmen's standard of living would have to improve" (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 176).

Speaking in Parliament in June 1941, Huggins presented the case for a formal amendment to the law barring Africans from setting up homes in the urban areas. He conceded that the changing needs of the economy required new approaches. "The crux of the problem in the urban areas," he contented, "is the married native." He went on:

One remedy would be to prohibit the residence of native females in the European areas of the town and neighbourhood. This would be a fatal policy for the development of the colony because no native would remain on the job long enough to learn it. The whole subcontinent suffers from the inefficiency of the masses and the employment of far too many inefficient labourers because they are supposed to be cheap
The outcome of this debate was legislation which legalized African family housing in urban areas. These settlements were outside the orbit of missionary activity and needed facilities such as schools. The government was compelled to develop and fund urban African schools beginning in the late 1930s. Access to education was, however, to remain limited and largely voluntary and the Native Education Commission (Kerr Commission) of 1952 revealed a trend of stagnation in African education. The number of teachers employed remained the same in the ten-year period 1939-1949, and decreased slightly thereafter. In 1949, 72.2 percent of teachers in African schools were untrained — the figure in 1940 was 73.3 percent. And the quality of teacher training programmes was poor for teachers in African primary schools. Teacher training programmes “could by no means be considered as adequate training for a teacher in a primary school” (Rep. Native Educ. Comm., S. R. G., 1952: 22).

Despite the increased activity of the state in African education, the gap between the education of African and European children had widened dramatically since 1907 when Grey introduced a motion in the Legislative Council deploring the state of education available to white children (Council Debates, B. S. A. C., May 1907).

EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND MEDIA AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1. The Changing Political and Economic Context

Education in the post Second World War era witnessed ambitious innovations in the instructional media. These innovations occurred in a rapidly changing socio-economic and political environment and one important influence was the inauguration of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In the referendum of April 1953, the white voters of Southern Rhodesia voted to enter into a political and economic partnership with white settlers in the British colonies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This partnership heralded the birth of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Africans, particularly those from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, were opposed to the Federation (Shamuyarira, 1965). Their determined resistance to the expansion of the harsh brand of Southern Rhodesian white-rule led to the eventual dissolution of the Federation ten years later, in 1963, and to the birth of the two African nations of Zambia and Malawi. These countries had formerly been Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In economic terms, Southern Rhodesia benefited enormously from the Federation, and more, especially, from Northern Rhodesian copper reserves. Copper prices soared in the late 1940s and early 1950s, reaching an all-time high in 1956. The steep rise in copper prices was a result of post-war reconstruction as well as the “stockpiling of strategic materials” as a result of the Cold War and the Korean War (Holleman, 1973: 11). Copper became a key resource in financing the Federal economy. Barber (1960a: 84) illustrated the role of Northern Rhodesia’s copper in-
dustry in financing the Federation as follows:

In the financial year 1956–57 the Northern Rhodesian copper companies paid £32 million in taxes. Only £11 million of this total was collected by the Northern Rhodesian Government. Thus £21 million of the £32 million total accrued to other governments. The Federal government retained £16 million as its share — a sum amounting to more than 60 percent of its income tax receipts in that year. Clearly one territory (and one industry within it) has made the major financial contribution to the federation.

Southern Rhodesia also benefited from a transfer of major items of expenditure from the territorial government to the Federal government. The “major expenditure items transferred to the Federal government...[were] those which provide[d] services primarily for Europeans” (Barber, 1960a: 85). Consequently, Southern Rhodesia, which had the “heaviest concentration of European population,” experienced substantial relief to its budget, particularly with respect to services for whites (Barber, 1960a: 85).

Figure 5 illustrates the changing demographic pattern over the period 1901–1973. The rapid rise in the numbers of the different population groups is evident. Figure 5 also shows that the white population more than tripled between 1941 and 1961. In the same period, the African population doubled. Increases in the white population were mainly due to immigration, while the increase in the African population mainly reflected fertility rates.

Figure 6 indicates the expenditure on African and European education for the period 1950–1958. There were increases in expenditure on both African and European education during the Federation and more African children were receiving

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**Fig. 5. Southern Rhodesia 1901–73 Population Growth.**

*Includes all non-Africans.

“some exposure to education” (Barber, 1960a: 91). However:

one fact must stand at the forefront in such discussions: more is spent on education for a white population of less than 300,000 than on an African population of more than 7,300,000 (Barber, 1960a: 91).

Clearly, commitment to African education was weak.

From the early 1940s the main economic goal of the Huggins administration was the expansion and restructuring of the economy based on agriculture and mining to one based on industry. As the first Federal Prime Minister, Huggins continued to pursue these goals. However, the weak commitment to African education created a shortage of skilled labour. Nevertheless, the economic boom of the post-Second World War period encouraged an optimistic assessment of this problem. It was argued that:

capital-intensive production on an assembly-line basis may permit the employer to increase the productivity of the African worker without advancing his employment status. Productivity could be increased because the worker has more equipment to assist him. But the tasks performed by the African might continue to be unskilled (Barber, 1960b: 75).

Hence:

a growing industrial base in the economy, using capital-intensive techniques, may offer a means of reconciling the long-standing objectives of settler supremacy to changed economic conditions (Barber, 1960b: 78).
Consequently:

with the use of higher and more expensive technology, the African can produce more without an improvement in his industrial status. And, what is equally important, new jobs can continue to be created for Europeans to fill (Barber, 1960b: 79).

2. African Perspectives

The official motto of the Federation was ‘partnership’ between the territories and between the races. In 1954, Yamba, an African member of the Federal Assembly from Northern Rhodesia, tested white commitment to partnership when he tabled a motion which called on the Federal government to legislate for the equality of all races in “public places” (Federal Debates, F. R. N. G., July 20, 1954: 1483). The federal Prime Minister (Huggins) described the motion as “very mischievous” (Federal Debates, F. R. N. G., July 20, 1954: 1967). Citing the example of post offices which had separate facilities for European settlers and Africans, the Prime Minister said, “you cannot expect the Europeans to form up in a queue with dirty people.” He concluded, “let us recognise at once that there is going to be inequality, and there is going to be differentiation.” This debate increased African opposition to the Federation. The demands of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for secession mounted and culminated in the 1959 riots in Nyasaland which left 51 dead (Leys, 1960). The fate of the Federation was sealed and it was clear that it would be only a matter of time before it broke up with the consent of Britain.

The political problems facing the Federation were compounded by the economic recession of the late 1950s (Clarke, 1977). In March 1956, the price of copper reached the record figure of £437 a ton, but by July, the price had collapsed to £264 (Holleman, 1973). The speed and magnitude of the collapse was unprecedented and it seriously affected Federal revenues. It was in this environment of declining economic prospects for the Federation and rising African militancy that the Dominion Party, which was later renamed the Rhodesia Front (RF), emerged in Southern Rhodesia. Campaigning on a strong white supremacist ticket, the party gradually grew in popularity and eventually won the Southern Rhodesian territorial elections of 1962. The federation ended during the early days of the RF’s rule.

The Rhodesia Front represented a calculated attempt by the settlers to avoid the prospect of facing political change. After the break-up of the federation, the party led Southern Rhodesia to an unconstitutional break with Britain and eventually to a civil war in the colony, as Africans decided that a negotiated solution to the racial inequities was not possible. During its rule, the RF was determined to consolidate the position of Rhodesia as a land of opportunity and affluence for whites. From the 1940s and particularly during the Federation, a healthy economic structure based on manufacturing, mining and agriculture had emerged. This gave the whites confidence that the country could survive the international isolation which followed the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965. Indeed, in the early years of UDI, the Rhodesian economy performed well, sustaining a high standard of living for the quarter of a million or so whites. In this re-
restricted economic environment, white aspirations were largely met through the denial of African political and economic rights.

3. Correspondence Education for Africans

The late 1940s saw the beginning of a rapid rise in African demands for upper primary and secondary education. In response to this, the Department of Native Education facilitated the development of correspondence education. By 1957, arrangements were being made for correspondence students to sit for secondary school examinations such as the South African Matriculation examination, the Southern Rhodesia Junior Certificate and the General Certificate of Education of England. The willingness of Africans to use correspondence education as an “alternative route to higher education” (Wakatama, 1983) was welcomed by the authorities who viewed it as cost-effective.

In 1959, the Department of Native Education granted the privately owned Central African Correspondence College (CACC) the status of an aided school. This allowed the state to subsidise the cost of correspondence education for the benefit of African students. In addition, the move allowed the state to work closely with CACC so that its activities would be closely aligned with government educational policies. Since the government subsidised approved CACC courses, the company was guaranteed a lucrative and monopolistic market which was only challenged in 1962 when the International Correspondence School (ICS) of the United Kingdom established an office in the country.

The authorities appeared surprised by the high demand for education. In 1960, for instance, the Director of Native education noted that:

> To the African, education is a never ending process and age is no limit. Men of over 40 think nothing of entering for courses...[and] examinations...in their spare time. For many of them it is a difficult task, but their determination evokes our admiration. (Rep. Dir. Native Educ. S. R. G., 1960: 19).

Despite the growth of correspondence education, examination results of correspondence students were consistently very poor (Rep. Dir. Native Educ., S. R. G., 1959). However, CACC enrollments grew rapidly, and, in 1962, the college had 20,000 students, taking courses ranging in levels from primary school to University entrance (Rep. Sec. African Educ., S. R. G., 1962). In 1964, there were reportedly “nearly three times as many students engaged in correspondence secondary education as there are in the formal secondary schooling” (Rep. Sec. African Educ., S. R. G., 1964: 11).

The structures established for correspondence education have survived into the 1990s and it is clear that the post-colonial government intends to retain them. However, the demand for correspondence education has declined, particularly at primary school level, as a result of the post-independence increase in accessibility of education to Africans.
4. Programmed Learning

In 1962, the educational authorities initiated investigations into the possibility of using text-based programmed learning approaches at the secondary school level. As the 1963 report on education argued, programmed learning was “widely accepted as an approved educational medium by both British and American educational authorities” (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1963: 59). The Federal Ministry of Education tested some materials in a number of European secondary schools including Prince Edward, Mount Pleasant and Gifford Technical High School (Hawkridge, undated). Serious problems were observed. The first problem was pupil boredom. Initially, this problem was linked to the faster pupils but “after the novelty wore off, the proportion of the class which was bored increased” (Hawkridge, undated: 39). The materials also lacked the support of teachers who did not like losing their total control of the classroom. Teachers also believed that the materials were an inferior substitute for their classroom practice.

Programmed learning materials were tested in African schools as well (Hawkridge, undated). Despite the early claims of success, programmed learning was only a passing fad in Rhodesia and educational authorities, who encouraged more research in African schools, did not eventually adopt it as a solution to educational problems.

5. Educational Television

Educational television (ETV) was a product of white optimism in the early days of the Federation. Local officials were encouraged by similar projects in countries such as Italy and the United States. The most encouragement for educational television came from Butler, the head of the Education Aids office, later renamed the Audio Visual and Television Services. To the Federal authorities, television offered the chance of putting the region at the cutting edge of innovation in education (Supplementary Rep. Educ. Comm., S. R. G., 1962).

Teaching aids, such as television, were seen as a solution to the problem of financing the growth in African education. Addressing the Federal Assembly on the eve of the break-up of the Federation, the Federal Prime Minister identified ETV as one of the major achievements of the Federation. He argued that “major developments of African education, particularly in the secondary field, cannot come about with the retention of traditional methods” but would require the use of “mass media of instruction,” such as “television” (The Break-up, F. R. N. G., 1963: 98). From another perspective, Butler argued that educational television instruction was particularly important for “Africans and in a lesser degree those of Asian or mixed racial origin, [who] are handicapped by their environmental conditions and lack of background.” The goal of educational television would be to “replace this missing background.”(8) For the students of all races, television was expected to extend “the somewhat rigid limits of the school course” and to offer a “wider knowledge of the world — an extension from examination education to a more worldly general education.”(9)

The success of the ETV experiment depended on a robust broadcast programme
of materials production. The initial assessment of the cost-effectiveness of ETV largely underestimated the demands of producing such materials. Furthermore, the planning for ETV did not envisage a scenario where the Federation would break up, as it did in 1963, depriving the authorities of critically needed Federal funds.

6. The Development of the Television Project

In 1960, Butler was awarded a specialist grant by the United States government to visit the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to study the experiences of these countries with television (Rep. Ed., F. R. N. G., 1960). During this period, a £10,000 grant was received from the British-based Dulverton Trust to support the ETV project. A condition of this grant was that the television project should be directed to African as well as white schools (Rep. Ed., F. R. N. G., 1960). Additional grants were secured from local sources. A programme production unit, "housed in the first entirely educational television studio on the African continent," was set up (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1963: 59). In September 1961, television was inaugurated on an experimental basis. In 1962, ETV was judged a success and the government agreed to establish it on a "permanent basis" (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1962: 27). One hundred and five television sets were installed in African, European, Coloured and Asiatic schools as indicated in Table 1.

Despite the early claims of success, it was soon clear that the work required to run ETV had been underestimated (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1961). Much more work was in store when the decision was taken to make ETV permanent. It was realised, "that the improvisation undertaken to make local productions possible during the early stages would be inadequate for a sustained and permanent service" (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1961: 73). The financial situation was worrisome and Butler noted that ETV activities "involve a somewhat higher expenditure than was anticipated."(10) Despite these problems, officials at the Audio Visual and Television Services were optimistic about the future of ETV.

The enthusiasm for television was not shared by teachers in white schools who were concerned that ETV overwhelmed the functions of the Audio Visual and Television Service which they had traditionally enjoyed. ETV experienced additional problems at the end of the Federation when the financial base of European education was considerably weakened. A decision was made to reduce the cost of ETV by cutting back on local programme production and making up for this with imported film substitutes. This strategy was not popular with participating ETV schools and the number of active participants began to decline rapidly. The 1967

Table 1. Distribution of TV receivers, 1961.

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<th></th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Coloured and Asiatic</th>
<th>African</th>
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<tr>
<td>Salisbury</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>*Copperbelt</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
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*Northern Rhodesia.
report on education found that, “if ever television is to make the educational contribu­tion of which it is capable, an effective and economic way of producing material locally must be found” (Rep. Educ., R. G., 1967: 26). After 1967, official interest in ETV waned, and it only received passing comments in the education reports of 1968 and 1969. In 1970, it was officially terminated.

The introduction of ETV had coincided with the inauguration of broadcast television in the country. Television was a new and exciting medium, and expectations tended to be exaggerated. The caution that “instructional powers do not reside solely in the media” (Clark & Salomon, 1986: 72) was perhaps not taken into account. The failure of the Rhodesian television experiment is not unique. Similar initiatives in other developing countries, such as El Salvador, the American Samoa, and the Ivory Coast, failed to live up to expectations (Anzalone, 1988). The reasons are similar. They include the inability to meet recurrent costs, and the underestimation of the effort and resources required to sustain the projects.

7. Other Initiatives

The 1950s witnessed sustained and successful efforts to develop the quality of white schools. Resources, such as radios, slide projectors, film projectors and tape recorders, were introduced as part of this effort. Until 1952, educational authorities considered the colony’s white education to be among the best equipped in the world (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1955). However, from 1952 onwards, “this happy state...suffered considerable decline as a result of the yearly discrepancy between financial provision and the growth of the school population” (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1955: 18). The rise in the school population was caused by a rapid increase in the size of the white population. Educational services were stretched “almost to breaking point” (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1955: 18). From the late 1950s, the size of Southern Rhodesia’s white population stabilized.

The use of Federal funds for white education helped the colony to overcome the problems created by a rapidly rising school population. An assessment of the quality of educational resources is provided by a draft copy of Butler’s speech at the opening of the Audio Visual and Television Headquarters in 1963. Butler argued that the resources available in the country were “unrivalled on the continent of Africa.”(12) His draft speech shows that he considered mentioning that these facilities were “unequalled even in Britain” but he decided to delete the reference in his final speech.(13) He was perhaps being tactful since the guest of honour was British. However, the original insertion of the claim indicates how highly he regarded the service for whose creation he had been the main moving force.

8. Summary

The use of Federal reserves to finance white education in the years 1953–1963 made it possible for the authorities to cope with the post-Second World War growth. Teacher-pupil ratios were kept low. In the primary schools, the ratio averaged one teacher to twenty-seven pupils in 1957 (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1957) and rose slightly to one teacher to 29 pupils in 1963 (Rep. Educ., F. R. N.
G., 1963). The teacher-pupil ratios in the secondary school were one teacher to seventeen pupils in 1957 (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1957) and one teacher to nineteen pupils in 1963 (Rep. Educ., F. R. N. G., 1963). Southern Rhodesia, with the largest white settlement of the three Federal territories, was to benefit the most from the Federal support for white education. As a result, by 1963, when the Federation broke up, the whites had succeeded in creating learning environments comparable to and in many cases superior to those available in the best schools in Europe.

The 1940s saw increased government involvement in African education. Between 1940 and 1970, the number of government primary schools for Africans rose from 2 to 89 (Riddell, 1980). Teacher training facilities were expanded as a result of recommendations made by the Native Education Commission of 1952. However, African demands for education far exceeded existing opportunities, particularly at the upper primary and secondary school levels. Teacher qualifications remained low. Television was viewed as one of the most important tools for solving the problem of access and teacher shortage in African schools. It failed to live up to expectations. Programmed learning failed to generate long-term interest among both students and staff. Correspondence education flourished, providing an arduous path to higher education for Africans. However, the students were minimally supported by the colleges and were ill-prepared for the challenges of private study.

EDUCATION, MEDIA AND CULTURAL HEGEMONY

1. British Tradition and Tensions between Different Groups

The colonial authorities sought to achieve white power based on an Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony dominated by upper class English values.

That Southern Rhodesia was founded by Cecil Rhodes’ commercial company should not obscure the fact that it was a British colony. This link was highlighted by Cary (1970: 35) who maintained that Rhodes’ application for the formation of a Chartered Company was:

encouraged by a Colonial Office which badly wanted to see the vacuum in Central Africa filled by British influence, but which lacked the finance and public support to create an orthodox Crown colony.

Southern Rhodesia was British, and this was a heritage which the majority British settler community affirmed and asserted vigorously during the colonial period. From the early days of white settlement, Rhodes had taken care to appoint British administrators whom he perceived as representing the upper echelons of British (Anglo-Saxon) cultural traditions. A number of authors described the early Rhodesian administration as exhibiting “snobbery” (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 34; Holderness, 1985: 17). Chaplin, one of the early administrators of the colony, is described as “having been educated at Harrow and Oxford in the approved
fashion" (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 55). In a society where white racial solidarity was perceived as crucial for survival, these class distinctions were subtle, rather than glaring, but they nevertheless indicated deeply held convictions about the nature and direction in which Rhodesian society should evolve. Defending the record of colonialism in the country, Colonel Grey, a member of the Legislative Council, described Rhodesians as "Englishmen" with the same values as their kin in England (Council Debates, B. S. A. C., July 1, 1903).

The desire to develop the colony along British traditions created tensions between Africans and the European settlers, and between the different cultural groups representing the white community. The nature of these tensions will be discussed in this section of the study using radio broadcasting as an illustrative case. The choice of radio broadcasting is effective, because it highlights colonial language policy which was one of the most politically sensitive issues in the period under review.

2. Language Policy and White Power

As early as 1908, the committee on education chaired by Hole concluded that, "English language should continue to be recognised as the sole medium of instruction," in the colony (Rep. Educ., Comm., B. S. A. C., May 1908: 14). This policy met with considerable Afrikaner resistance. The white Rhodesian population was quite diverse and included persons originating from countries like Greece, Ireland, Scotland, England, and Yugoslavia (Holderness, 1985). The diverse origins of the white community ensured that the goal of "mould[ing] the people of Rhodesia into one united race" would not be effortless (Council Debates, B. S. A. C., May 15, 1922: 341). The most determined resistance to British dominance came from Afrikaners who had a history of conflict with the British in the South African Boer War. Furthermore, Afrikaners had won the concession of a dual language policy in South Africa.

In 1917, Ballantyne, the Legislative Council representative for Melsetter, raised the issue of language policy in a letter to Foggin, the Director Education. He urged Foggin to re-examine the colony's language policy. Ballantyne's district had a strong and militant Afrikaner constituency and he warned that, "unless the two races, Dutch and English, can come together...the future of the country is dark indeed."(14) Foggin replied that his hands were tied, since the law of the land was that, "instruction during the ordinary school hours should be given through the medium of the English Language."(15) In another letter to Reverend Reyneke, who was an Afrikaner leader, Foggin reiterated this position:(16)

The law in Rhodesia is...that English is the sole medium of instruction and while the interpretation of the law by the Department is on liberal lines, it is impossible that I should seek by administrative measures to make the law inoperative.

Foggin was correct in his interpretation of the law. This was also a law which he, as the highest ranking civil servant in education, believed in. In 1923, Foggin concurred with Macintosh, the inspector of schools, that although Afrikaans had been
recognised as a teaching subject, it was not appropriate to issue a syllabus for it. Macintosh had argued that:(17)

...the issue of the syllabus in Afrikaans itself though technically not open to objection, and having the advantage of stating the requirements of the Department with exact precision, it is without precedent and might be construed as a form of bilingualism.... There is no need for the Department taking action which may be viewed as theoretical and experimental at the present moment...in a subject which, owing to its connection with other than purely educational matters, is beset with dangers and difficulties.

This is a surprising and, perhaps, dishonourable position in view of the fact that the state had agreed to permit Afrikaans language instruction as a concession to Afrikaner separatists (Challiss, 1980). The watchful eye of the Department of Education over the issue of language was also in evidence in 1921, when Foggin instructed the Head of the Boys High School that the teaching of Greek should "cease forthwith." He explained that his "view is that it is very doubtful whether the teaching of Greek is justified in the schools in the territory."(18)

Foggin's official position was that adding Greek to the curriculum would overburden the child. The same reason was used to restrict the use of Asian languages. In 1959, the Under Secretary for Education declared that "Gujarati has no official place in the curriculum of government schools in the Federation."(19) Afrikaans had been able to win recognition because of the political strength of Afrikaners. Other languages were not as successful.

The issue of language also came up in the Parliamentary debates of the education bill of 1956. The bill sought to permit the inclusion of new languages, in addition to English, in a limited number of European schools. It was intended to benefit foreign diplomats whose numbers had increased during the Federation. The bill was received with "shock" by representatives of the English-speaking electorate (Federal Debates, F. R. N. G., June 27, 1956). The Minister of Education was compelled to insert clauses which precluded inclusion of new languages in the curriculum unless the school concerned catered for the children of temporary residents and then only under exceptional circumstances and subject to a report to Parliament. These conditions were too stringent to change the status quo.

While Rhodesians of Anglo-Saxon origin dominated the politics and culture of the colony, they did not constitute a uniform and consensual culture. For many Rhodesians in the 1930s, the "ideal immigrant" was often thought of in "terms of a teenage girl's dream...[of] a man tall, dark and handsome, with a string of military decorations, a distinguished bearing and impeccable accent, an upper class landowner" (Gann & Gelfand, 1964: 126). The aspirations of the bureaucratic elite to develop a "well-bred" European population compelled Duthie, the first Director of Education, to send "Circular 11a of 1912" to all parents and guardians of children attending white high schools in the Salisbury area. In this circular, Duthie argued along these lines:(20)

You have doubtless realized that the youth of this country are at a disadvantage in the
manner of learning the correct pronunciation of the English language. More often than not, their ears are accustomed to variants of the English language far from pleasant to hear and which if acquired would in later years betray a lack of cultured training.... In all cases, either of boys or girls, incorrect enunciation or slovenly speech puts them at a disadvantage in cultured society.

Duthie recommended that parents who could afford it, should send their children to Miss Maltby, “a trained elocutionist,” for a fee. Circular 11a angered some parents, who voiced their disapproval to the Administrator of the colony. The Administrator asked Duthie to explain:\(^{(21)}\)

His honour enquires whether it is meant to imply that members of the staff appointed upon your recommendations are not competent to teach the correct pronunciation of the English language.

One outcome of this controversy was the establishment of the Rhodes English Competition which was sponsored by the trustees of Cecil Rhodes’ estate. The aim of competition was “to encourage the study of English literature and to promote accuracy and taste in writing the language.”\(^{(22)}\)

3. Broadcasting to European Schools

Radio broadcasting to white schools was inaugurated in 1943, initially as an experimental project largely financed by the Alfred Beit Trust (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1947). Alfred Beit, a contemporary and friend of Cecil Rhodes, made a fortune from mining in South Africa. The radio programmes started on a weekly basis and were organised by a Schools Broadcast Committee. The subjects broadcast were “music, science, English travel, nature and discussions” and interest was reported to be “high” (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1945: 128). By 1946, the broadcasts were daily (Rep. Dir. Educ., S. R. G., 1946). In 1948, the responsibility for the service was assumed by the Department of Education and a full-time broadcasting officer was appointed.

Department of Education officials claimed that broadcasting to schools provided “supplementary classroom work on the imaginative side”\(^{(23)}\) as well as “cultural uplift.”\(^{(24)}\) They saw radio as a powerful tool for achieving this goal. The Secretary to the Schools Broadcast Committee suggested that broadcasts prepared by “expert teachers” would provide inputs superior to those attainable by teachers.\(^{(25)}\) This was vigorously challenged by Blakeway, Head of the Girls High School. Blakeway argued that teachers in her school were able “to give the girls far more general education and ‘cultural uplift’ than they are likely to obtain from the Broadcasts — especially as at present constituted.” She went on, “last year a pupil said to me, must we go to the Schools Broadcasts? An odd one here or there is worth hearing — the majority are awful.”\(^{(26)}\) Clearly, the head of an important and influential school, was of the opinion that the role of radio in “cultural upliftment” was being overplayed.

Another problem was that Afrikaner students in some rural school districts had
problems understanding the broadcasts which were all in English. (27) One solution
would have been to include some Afrikaans. This was considered and rejected by
education officials, because it was presumed that such a concession would generate
"propaganda for a second language medium." (28) Evidently, no step was to be
taken which could be construed as enhancing a bilingual policy.

A final problem was the relevance of broadcasts to teaching goals. In 1943, the
head of Eveline High School suggested that broadcasts should relate more to
classroom work. (29) This point was pursued more vigorously by Blakeway of Girls
High School. At the inception of the broadcasts, Blakeway had granted the
Schools Broadcasting Committee permission to employ some of her pupils in pro­
gramme production, mainly in activities such as singing. Within months she had
changed her mind: "This is an academic school in which we have examinations and
definite syllabuses," (30) she said. She went on:

It is most inconvenient to release girls during mornings. I would be grateful if you
and your committee would refrain from asking the Girls High School to participate in
these School Broadcasts. (31)

On the surface, Blakeway appeared to be seeking to protect her pupils from
disruption of their school work. However, in elaborating her position, she
questioned the structure and role of broadcasts. She insisted that:

Although we have appreciated various school programmes, I think that twice a week
is once too often! Our timetable suffers considerably through making the changes
essential to enable the school to hear programmes and I consider once a week (or even
once a fortnight) would be ample if we are expected to listen to them all. During the
third (examination) term, I don't think this school will be able to spare the time for
any of these Broadcasts. (32)

It was not surprising that with the arrival of tape-recorders in white schools, the
use of radio declined dramatically from 1956 onwards. By 1960, broadcasting
equipment was largely idle.

4. Broadcasting to African Schools

White settlers generally regarded African culture and traditions as primitive.
The Education Commission (Kerr Commission) of 1952 described African culture
as "rudimentary" (Rep. Native Educ. Comm., S. R. G., 1952: 7). While white set­tlers tended to be contemptuous of African culture, they were nevertheless ap­
prehensive about the potential of Africans to compete against them, especially on
the economic front. One way of minimising this threat was to limit African edu­
cation. There was, however, some recognition of the importance of African educa­
tion for the economic life of the country. The dominant white attitudes to African
education could, therefore, be characterised as ambivalent. This ambivalence was
evident in colonial educational strategies for Africans, which sought to reconcile
limited and segregated African development with white supremacy. It is in this
light that the strategies adopted in the development of media should be viewed.

The decision to re-orient the activities of the radio broadcasting unit towards African education was made in 1962 (Rep. Sec. African Educ., S. R. G., 1962). This was after white schools had turned away from radio broadcasting from 1956 onwards, in preference for tape recorders. African schools were not included in the tape recorder scheme. Broadcasts to African schools were designed to teach spoken English. African languages were poorly regarded by educational officials, and were not a component of radio broadcasts. The view that African languages were lowly regarded is supported by the findings of the 1929 Commission of Enquiry into Education which "advised against the teaching of either Shona or Ndebele in European schools on the grounds that the two vernacular languages were likely to become extinct" (Challiss, 1982: 140).

The teaching of spoken English was consistent with the recommendations of the Native Education Commission of 1952 (Kerr Commission). The Commission concluded that the African child was going to be drawn more and more "into the orbit of the European" (Rep. Native Educ., Comm., S. R. G., 1952: 21). It was recommended that "speech training be emphasised in all secondary and teacher-training courses" (p. 21) and that children be taught through the "medium of the mother tongue" in the first years of schooling, and then in English in the higher grades (p. 23). The importance of spoken English was endorsed by the Education Commission of 1962 (Judges Commission). At that time, education officials were contemplating a review of language policy in African education. The changes under consideration favoured a more aggressive English instruction policy than that recommended by the Kerr Commission ten years earlier. This line of thinking was supported by the findings of the Hope Fountain mission "experiment." The findings of the mission experiment suggested that African children should be taught in English from the first year of school "without using specially trained teachers" (Rep. Sec. African Educ., S. R. G., 1962: 17). It was also claimed that African children taught in English from the first year of school made more rapid progress in school than those initially taught using the medium of an African language. The authorities at Hope Fountain recommended that the use of English from the first year of schooling might make teaching more efficient so that primary school education could be shortened by one year. The research design did not inspire much confidence and the findings were intended to be preliminary. However, reports by the Secretary for African Education quoted the Hope Fountain mission findings widely (Rep. Sec. African Educ., S. R. G., 1962). The findings were also noted in the influential Judges Report (Rep. Sec. African Educ., S. R. G., 1962). The Judges commissioners were also influenced by testimony from local educational authorities. One line of reasoning presented by Europeans giving evidence to the commission was that:

Many [Africans] do not continue their formal education after the primary stage. For this reason as much time as possible in school should be spent in using English. A superficial knowledge of English means a superficial knowledge of English culture. The externals will be learnt, e.g., material comforts, but not the things of deeper value, such as standards of conduct (Rep. Educ. Comm., S. R. G., 1962: 101, empha-
Language was viewed as a vehicle of communication and also as a tool of cultural influence. The Judges Commission endorsed the findings of the Hope Fountain study and concluded that "the costs of losing some of the advantages of early vernacular instruction" would be more than compensated by "fostering a more rapid acquaintanceship with English idiom at an impressionable age" (Rep. Educ. Comm., S. R. G., 1962: 100).

It should be noted that Africans were keen to learn English and the ability to speak English was a highly valued status symbol. The African nationalist, Nathan Shamuyarira, highlighted the value Africans attached to spoken English in the 1930s and the following excerpt illustrates his point:

"We youngsters used to gather round the students [who had returned from school] just to hear them speak English. At concerts or weddings one of the most exciting items came when everyone stopped to listen to English being spoken by the students (Shamuyarira, 1965: 15).

The favourable attitude to English among Africans was clearly different from that of the Afrikaners towards the same language. Afrikaners, it must be emphasised, descended from a Dutch European culture and clearly saw themselves as in competition with the English with respect to spheres of influence on the African continent. Africans, on the other hand, believed that English language instruction was important because of the international status of English.

The issue of spoken English among Africans was in the spotlight again in the early 1970s. Concern was expressed by the Commission of Inquiry into African Primary Education of 1974 which "received frequent complaints about the poor quality of speech compared with the standards of a few years ago" (Rep. Comm. Inquiry African Primary Educ., R. G., 1974: 9). The Commission described these problems as due to "infelicities of accent and intonation; and ambiguity in distinguishing between some of vowel sounds which do result in failures of communication" (Rep. Comm. Inquiry African Primary Educ., R. G., 1974: 9). By this time, radio broadcasts to African primary schools had been in operation for just over ten years. There was "considerable criticism" of the effectiveness of radio. Teachers involved in African education suggested that tape recorders would be more effective than radio. The same conclusion had been reached by white schools nearly twenty years earlier. The Commission dismissed these complaints as "largely impressionistic and based upon very limited trustworthy evidence" (Rep. Comm. Inquiry African Primary Educ., R. G., 1974: 23). The request for tape recorders was rejected by the Commission for reasons of expense. It is odd that the Commission dismissed the testimony by teachers in such an off-handed manner. It is likely that their work was constrained by the government policy of limiting the development of African education.

This was the last major official assessment of radio broadcasting to schools. Broadcasts directed to schools has continued in post-colonial Zimbabwe (Hungwe, 1988). There is reason to believe that present day claims of effectiveness are not
based on thorough research, but on bureaucratic necessities to maintain a schools broadcasting service.

5. Summary

The discussion on broadcasting has shown the close link between language policy and the interests of an Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony. As the Judges Report argued, "there are needs of the people at large for the minimal needs of a lingua franca" (Rep. Educ., Comm., S. R. G., 1962: 104). The conclusion was that "apart from the more highly sophisticated training in English," the general population needed to develop spoken English skills in the interests of the business life of the country (Rep. Educ. Comm., S. R. G. 1962: 104). Radio broadcasting was intended to support this policy.

As late as the 1970s, educational authorities were more preoccupied with the problems of speech, rather than literacy, even though the majority of the African population remained illiterate (Riddell, 1980). The 1969 census of the population indicated that about 40 percent of the Africans over the age of 7 had never been to school (Riddell, 1980). This problem did not, however, receive adequate attention. There was a tendency to regard literate Africans as a threat to white interests. This view is supported by a number of sources. The Education Commission of 1952 was "unable to recommend" mass literacy programmes for Africans funded by the state (Rep. Native Educ. Comm., S. R. G., 1952: 58). The Commission concluded that mass literacy programmes should only be pursued if they could be linked to "practical community development, thus illustrating the benefits of literacy in relation to the normal needs of life" (Rep. Native Educ. Comm., S. R. G., 1952: 58). And in 1969, a parliamentary committee on education found that "the present system of African education is not reducing illiteracy" (Third Rep. Select Comm. Educ., R. G., 1969: 8). However, the committee failed to make any meaningful recommendations on the problem except to suggest a reduction in the African birthrate as one possible solution.

EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND INSTRUCTION: CONCLUSION

This study has examined the educational policy in Rhodesia, with special reference to educational media. Rhodesia was born out of the white racial opportunism of the late nineteenth century. An understanding of educational policy in the country is best developed by accepting race as a key socio-economic and political variable. From the early days, white settlers were determined to use education as a tool for alleviating class differences among themselves. As a minority race living in the midst of a conquered and dispossessed African society, the settlers felt compelled to minimise the ethnic and class struggles among themselves. The dominant Anglo-Saxon and the Afrikaner groups had largely resolved their differences by 1930. Educational media initiatives such as the correspondence school and radio broadcasting were intended to strengthen white solidarity and advancement. The concerns for racial solidarity resulted in the creation of a racially based educational
system. As Parry (1969: 83) argues, "there obviously is an intimate relationship between the educational system of a country and its elite." Since Rhodesia sought to develop a racial elite, the educational system reflected these goals.

White Rhodesians saw themselves in the same light as 'pioneers' in such countries as Australia and the United States of America. Describing Ian Smith, who was the Rhodesian Prime Minister during UDI, Reed (1966: 71) remarked, "he is about the same age as Washington when the struggle for American independence was fought. Like Washington he is a farmer...like Washington he grows tobacco." However, unlike white settlements in Australia and North America, Rhodesia had to contend with a majority African population, who were determined to resist political subjugation. This situation was clearly volatile and it was only a matter of time before white rule was overthrown. The predicament had been foreseen as early as 1930 by Henry Clay, then professor of social economics at the University of Manchester in England. Clay was commissioned by the Southern Rhodesia government to conduct a study of industrial relations in the territory. He felt that the economy of the colony had fundamental weaknesses. The high wages enjoyed by Rhodesian whites were higher than those in South Africa, and "very high when compared with England or any other European country" (Rep. Industrial Relations, S. R. G., 1930: 36). Yet, he went on:

> If the community as a whole be considered natives, as well as whites, the average return to labour and the average income is not high. White incomes are high only because there is an extreme inequality of income between white and native workers even in the same industry and workshop (Rep. Industrial Relations, S. R. G., 1930: 37).

He argued that the racial discrimination policies of the colony were not good for the economy because they constrained the development of the productive abilities of Africans as well as limited their purchasing power. The state's policies were based on an economic fallacy that "there is a limited amount of work to be done." In reality, "there is no rigid limit to work awaiting additional resources in labour and capital" (Rep. Industrial Relations, S. R. G., 1930: 42). Hobsbawm echoed the same views when he argued that an important discovery in the American economy was that "the largest potential market was to be found in the rising incomes of the mass of the working citizens" (Hobsbawm, 1969: 176). And "where servants are plentiful and cheap, the demand for vacuum cleaners is small" (Hobsbawm, 1969: 176).

The needs of the changing socio-economic and political climate, and, in particular, the emergence of a modern economic sector gradually forced changes in the form, content and accessibility of education. However, the educational system remained racially differentiated and unequal over the colonial period. In general, educational policy initiatives were designed to sustain the interests of a racial elite. The educational policy formulation was, therefore, constrained by narrow racial considerations. The result was an underdevelopment of both the physical habitat and the intellectual and skill resources of the African population (see, for instance, Ranger, 1985; Shamuyarira, 1965). These factors were to contribute to
an economic and political crisis which led to the fall of the white government through a guerrilla war in 1980.

NOTES

(1) The British colony of Southern Rhodesia was established in 1890. From 1953 to 1963 the territory was one of the three territories that made up the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At the break-up of the Federation in 1963, the country assumed the name Rhodesia. In 1980, Rhodesia became Zimbabwe when African guerrilla armies defeated white rule.

(2) See, for instance, S824/438/1 [Education: European, Asian and coloured Division: Correspondence and other papers: The teaching of Afrikaans in schools: March 19, 1896–June 5, 1917] Ballantyne to Foggin, April 12, 1917.

(3) The total number of pupils in school, including those attending non-aided schools was 14,736 in 1912. The total grant to African schools was £3,884 for 8,577 pupils, which was less than 10 shillings per pupil. The officials seemed to have problems estimating the number of pupils in non-aided schools scattered countrywide. However, the number of pupils in aided schools gives a reliable indicator of the growth of demand for education by Africans.

(4) S824/438/1 Foggin to Sir Lewis, February 27, 1917.

(5) S824/438/1 Foggin to ? (missing page), May 11, 1917.

(6) S824/438/1 Foggin to ? (missing page), May 11, 1917.

(7) The development of state-funded African primary schools preceded the formal change in policy by a few years.


(10) F212/6 from Butler to J. McClurg, Director General FBC, August 31, 1961.


(14) S824/438/1 Ballantyne to Foggin, April 12, 1917.

(15) S824/438/1 Foggin to Ballantyne May 5, 1917.


(20) E2/5/3 Duthie to parents and guardians of pupils attending Salisbury High schools:
[Circular 11a of 1912], May 10, 1912.
(23) S824/192/2 [Educ: European, Asian and Coloured division: Correspondence: Broadcasting to schools—programme committee: April 17, 1941—October 1, 1943] Statement by Sec., Schools Broadcasting Comm.
(25) S824/192/2 Statement by Sec., Schools Broadcast Comm.
(27) See, for instance S824/192/2, Rutherford to Schools Broadcast Comm., February 16, 1945.
(29) S824/192/1 Headmistress, Eveline High School to Chief Education Officer, August 19, 1943.

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