COMMUNICATION FOR “NEGOTIATION” AMONG THE TURKANA

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ABSTRACT The Turkana, pastoralists in northern Kenya, have a strong tendency to regard any social interactions as negotiable. In their negotiations, they cope with the difficulties of arriving at a mutual agreement by desperately clinging to the principle of sustaining a “cooperative present” while employing various tactics in an attempt to secure their own benefit. When participants in some communication take the attitude that they will focus on the “cooperative present,” they abandon any possibility of taking a negative option in the communication, such as pretending to be unconcerned or straightforwardly rejecting a demand. After initiating a negotiation, they cannot help but realize some form of a positive relationship sooner or later, although this framework doesn’t decisively affect the consequence of negotiation, as is implied by the possibility that the negotiation might be prolonged indefinitely. They never intend to make agreement by depending on an outside standard of justice, but they attempt to establish a standard of justice guided by ‘my’ activeness and thus effectively produce a state representing ‘my’ justice inside the communication.

Key Words: Communication; Negotiation; Relationship; Turkana; Cooperative present.

EXPERIENCE AT THE “COOPERATIVE PRESENT”

In previous studies, I have taken the approach that in order to understand the “body” in the process of communication, it is necessary to first examine the phenomenon of physical resonance, synchrony or propagation (Kitamura, 1983; 1989; 1990a; 1990b; 1992). I have long been fascinated with the phenomenon of touching, laughing, and greeting in such forms as when two parties simultaneously undertake the same action. With such an approach, I have been concerned with the question of “What constitutes communication?” followed closely by consideration of the bodily foundation.

Why should “bodily communication,” defined herein as communication among individuals physically confronting others, be considered important? While this may lack a clear answer, I would like to present my own answer, and develop the ensuing discussion from the standpoint of justifying my answer.

“Bodily communication” is a privileged activity in which we achieve real experiences in the present tense and which is the source of a realistic understanding of our world. We need such a realistic understanding for positively sustaining our own existence. While a lengthy discussion is required in order to describe the experience in the present tense precisely, I will herein simply sketch my thoughts pertaining to this.

Although we feel no uneasiness when staring at something as object, we do feel...
embarrassment when staring at another person or making direct eye contact with another. Such eye contact is fundamentally different from objectively watching something or someone. Washida (1990) extensively analyzed this phenomena in his discussion of the phenomenology of “face,” saying:

In the situation of physically confronting others, I am prohibited from retiring to my own immanent stream of experience from present to past, and dragged to a “cooperative present” in which the future remains unknown, and forced to be continuously exposed to this “present.” The words and expression which I cannot sufficiently control inevitably draw unforeseen words from others and induce in them, expressions that they themselves are unconscious of. Further, I must react to the responses of others. In this way, myself and the others are anchored at a common present, and engage with, intersect with, and synchronize with each other at that “cooperative present.”

The experience in the present tense is, in Washida’s words, an experience at a “cooperative present,” which is sustained by mutual interaction. Washida refers to its significance by emphasizing the passive experience of perceiving the others’ examination of oneself. Ignoring this passiveness means taking a stand of perceiving elements of the external world as objects and merely manipulating them. At that time, the experience becomes enmeshed in future events, the manipulation of which are ideally organized to benefit me. In other words, the experience becomes shadowed by threats and fears from the future.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the aspect of activeness on ‘my’ side, though it is also important to point out that a passiveness on ‘my’ side corresponds to an activeness on the others’ side. ‘I’ must perceive the others’ activeness but at the same time, must not retreat to ‘my’ passiveness. Rather, I must expose ‘my’ activeness at that time and place, whether ‘I’ like it or not. Evacuation to ‘my’ passiveness in this case could signify obedience to power, or subordination to the preceding, in other words, past rules and norms. Expressing this in my own words, experience at “cooperative present” occurs when ‘I’, together with others, become gracefully intertwined as mutually active actors.

I, however, would not like to say that this kind of experience is so valuable in and of itself that we should continuously endeavor to obtain it. The cooperative present and bodily communication can be rather mundane. The reason why these phenomena should be critically examined is that in a highly industrialized society, this kind of communication is thought of totally unrelated to the steady domains of the mainstream, and are, in the least sense, activities of leisure recreation and, at most, activities preserved for briefly retrieving our lost humanness. This kind of communication cannot be thought of as an activity which adults, especially adult males, seriously concern themselves with.

However, from my own standpoint, it is important to make clear how this “mundane activity” is related to the steady domains of mainstream life, those activities which maintain social order and secure personal benefit. I cannot, of course, develop this entire discussion here, but would like to investigate clues to its nature.

I will approach this problem by way of analyzing examples observed among the Turkana people, pastoralists in northern Kenya, whom I have studied since 1986. I
will focus on the aspect of “negotiation” in their social interaction. Negotiation is, as a matter of course, a social interaction related directly to activities in which each individual attempts to secure his own benefit and also to make agreement with others. Among the Turkana, this kind of social interaction is always conducted within the framework of “bodily communication.”

The Turkana cope with the difficulties of arriving at a mutual agreement in their negotiations by desperately clinging to the principle of sustaining a “cooperative present” while employing various tactics in an attempt to secure their own benefit. Analyzing concrete examples, I would like to develop discussion along this understanding.

“NEGOTIATION” AMONG THE TURKANA

At the risk of oversimplifying the case and thereby creating misunderstanding, let me begin by stating that the Turkana are fond of negotiation. Elaborating, they regard any social interactions as negotiable and have a strong tendency to create a competitive situation by orienting their choice in any interaction with others to their own advantages and disadvantages.

Every foreigner who has lived among the Turkana point out their persistent and frequent “begging” as the most impressive experience. Such begging, herein termed “demands,” are a frequent occurrence and take place in a variety of situations. Of course, the side “demanded” (as opposed to “demander”) attempts to refuse the demand as it is impossible to yield and give into every demand on every occasion. This results in Turkana negotiation. Moreover, the demander doesn’t merely state the demand in an ambivalent manner, abandoning it upon refusal, but rather becomes more persistent unless the demanded can skillfully evade the demand.

On such an occasion as the negotiation for bridewealth, in which people intend in advance to negotiate over the transfer of something, persistency in their demand is clearly evident. Among the Turkana, the number of livestock paid on behalf of the groom to the bride’s family is determined through negotiation between the sides. The conclusion of the negotiation is always prolonged until the very day of wedding, and continued down to the last single animal, while the preparations for the wedding proceed, regardless of the state of the negotiations. In the documentary film “Wedding Camels (McDougall & McDougall, 1976),” a negotiation in which the parties are untiringly and patiently conducting negotiations for the privileged opportunity of transferring numerous animals is clearly depicted.

Considering “negotiation” in a general sense, such a case of negotiation, which is oriented toward the ultimate transfer of something, is a concrete example and the descriptions above are sufficient in this sense. However, it must be emphasized in advance that the case of negotiation over transfer of something considered herein is considerably different from that in our society, for example, that of a commercial transaction. In a commercial transaction, people negotiate by focusing on estimates of their gain and loss in a bi-directional transfer of things, an exchange of things or that of commodities for monetary costs. By contrast, in the case outlined here, the transfer resulting from the negotiation is one-directional. This fact is the fundamen-
tal premise of the negotiation examined in this article.

In the one-directional case, it cannot be assumed that the participants aim solely at the transfer of something as an outcome. This is apparent in the case of “begging,” in which the demanded stands only to lose the thing if he agrees with the beggar in the negotiation. In anthropology, this is commonly thought to be related to the notion of “reciprocity,” the belief that the one receiving a gift should in return provide the giver with something. Likewise, in the Turkana case, it is inconceivable that the giver gives something without an expectation of a return.

In the Turkana negotiation over transfer of something, however, their behavior is helplessly inconsistent with what they are supposed to do in accordance with a sense of duty concerning return, in other words, a sense of debt and the expectation of a return. Ohta (1986), who has conducted research of the Turkana in the same area as I have since 1978, pointed out several behavioral characteristics of Turkana negotiation: (1) They never refer to the other’s past debt while participating in negotiation; (2) Turkana adopt the attitude that they regard receipt of a present from others as a matter of course, and never express their thanks upon receipt, in other words, they never confirm that a debt has emerged at that time; (3) Turkana never unilaterally provide a return gift without a request from the other; and (4) Turkana must beg to the other even when they can expect a return gift from him. Ohta emphasized how precarious the sense of debt is in the transfer of something among the Turkana (Ohta, 1986).

In other words, the Turkana, at least in appearance, thoroughly neglect any sense of debt while participating in negotiation. It may be also said that the Turkana participate in only part of the overall negotiation, which is wholly undertaken from the standpoint of loss and gain. Moreover, they handle their negotiations as a matter independent from other events, in this way detaching it from both past debts incurred by transfer of something and also future debts which will emerge as a consequence of the present negotiation. As pointed out earlier, it cannot be said that they are completely free from a sense of debt, however, their communication within the negotiation is focused and organized on a specific point at issue regardless of their rights and duties related to debts.

The specific point at issue about which they attempt to agree on in negotiation and the reason why the process of communication is regarded as an independent matter are the next questions to consider. Ohta (1986) analyzed utterances in “begging” and pointed out that beggars take the attitude that the other should agree with their request unless he regards his relationship with them as negative, and that beggars demand something in an extremely oppressive manner and appear to unilaterally dominate the side of the demanded. These two observation suggest that in the negotiation over transfer of something among the Turkana, participants are not concerned with consideration as to whether the requested thing should be given or not, or which claim of the two parties, the demander and the rejecter, is just. They participate in the negotiation on the premise that the requested thing should be given. In consequence, they attempt, through negotiation, to come to agreement with each other as to whether the demanded side will decide to give the thing at that point in time or not.

In order to analyze the characteristics of communication among the Turkana peo-
ple, I will now describe an encounter I experienced with a Turkana. A woman living in the neighboring hamlet came to me and asked me to buy a cooking pot for her. I declined, apologizing that I did not have enough money to do so. After repeating her demand several times, she suddenly said, “There are two kinds of people. One kind gives the thing requested at once, and the other puts off giving the request until tomorrow. Which kind are you?” When I was told this, I was impressed by the gap between the content of her statement and the fact that I had neither indicated nor thought of buying her a pot the next day.

Upon reflection, however, the meaning of her statement is very clear. Irritated at my response, she wanted to teach me that the only choice in Turkana negotiation is whether the demanded decides to give the thing at that time or not, and that stating an apology and expecting an agreement to refusing is totally irrelevant. Turkana negotiation over the transfer of something designates not only that a request on one side constitutes a clear starting point but also provision of the item by the other side is a distinct and inevitable end point. This process evolves in the form of requests followed by responses, and the entire interaction is organized as an independent matter oriented toward its own end point, presentation of the object.

Rephrasing this: Turkana have in advance adopted the attitude that they regard the transfer of something among people in a friendly relationship as a matter of course. There is, however, another principle which holds that things are never given unless they are specifically begged for. Bodily communication for negotiation is initiated along with the demander’s expectation and subsequent intention regarding what, whom, when, and how to request, and this bodily communication is prolonged, interrupted, restarted, and at some point in time, completed with a demanded’s decision as to whether to agree to the request at that time, to evade the request by way of inserting another topic, or to reduce the request. There is, however, also the option of prolonging the negotiation indefinitely.

These characteristics describe the Turkana framework of negotiation, a framework which loosely controls the behavior of participants in communication. This framework makes negotiation so simple and independent that each participant attempts to agree with the other about whether or not they will realize the expected end, the transfer of a gift, at that time and place.

An understanding of this conclusion becomes the starting point of the following discussion. We, however, must not overlook that it is meaningful only from a viewpoint in which we focus exclusively on an outcome of the interaction. We are too used to regarding negotiation as the means to resolving a conflict of interests, or establishing a compromise. We must keep in mind that Turkana negotiation is an independent matter detached from any possibility of being connected to another end, and as such, is the means to only one end, the transfer of something at that place and time.

There is a great danger in such an understanding. Indeed, the Turkana are strongly interested in the transfer of something as an outcome of negotiation. Moreover, they regard the entire process of negotiation as an independent matter. As far as we maintain the viewpoint that focuses on an outcome of any negotiation, there remains no answer to the question of whether a giver merely loses a thing in such a negotiation.

The only way of answering this question is to abandon our assumption that nego-
tiation is only a means to an end. Among the Turkana, individuals participate in the entire course of a negotiation, from start to finish, and compete with each other over contingent consequences resulting from an accumulation of successional mutual consents which occur in that communication. From this viewpoint, the transfer of something is not the unique privileged purpose that governs the entire course of communication, but only a part which arises in the last phase.

We can take such a reverse view by not separating the transfer of something from the entire course of the communication and thus not regarding the transfer as a privileged fact produced outside the communication. I, however, have no intention of denying that people adhere to notion that the transfer of something is regarded as a particular matter. While the Turkana do have a strong tendency to do just that, they also regard communication for negotiation as an inevitable process undertaken for the transfer of something on the grounds that one is never given anything unless it is begged for, and thus regard the transfer as the last phase of, but inseparable from, the overall communication.

In other words, among the Turkana, communicative space must be created for negotiation before settling any conflict of interests. Participants compete with each other in manipulating the course of the negotiation. At that time, they inevitably participate in the entire course of the negotiation, a creative movement which progresses without interruption in accordance with the necessity inherent in the negotiation, concluding in the transfer of something. In this sense, it is clear that the framework at issue here yields an independent and autotelic character to the communication for negotiation.

This framework doesn’t decisively affect the consequence, as is implied by the possibility that the negotiation might be prolonged indefinitely. This framework is important nonetheless because it gives a completely different appearance to this communicative process. In the following section, I will analyze how Turkana initiate, continue and bring to a close a negotiation based on this framework and what experience they have through this communicative process.

MUTUAL AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION

Understanding of the Turkana cases described above is related to our conception of the word, “negotiation.” In a practical sense, “negotiation” indicates a transaction in which participants intend to come to mutual agreement (at least temporarily) about settling a conflict of their interests while otherwise competing with each other. In the context considered herein, there is an additional condition that the competitive character of negotiation is not necessarily restricted to the case in which a conflict of interests arises in advance of the communication.

The Turkana create a competitive circumstance by deliberately inserting their own interests into the process of communication with others, thereby making it into a negotiation. This does not mean that they always create trouble by expressing their own desires straightforwardly. Instead, by making a situation a negotiation, they explore the full potential range of mutual agreement. In this sense, they seem to be fond of negotiation. This also supports the previous assertion that their negotiation
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is not only a means of resolving an existing problem.

On the other hand, regarding interaction for mutual agreement, an understanding of the word negotiation as indicating a transaction in which each participant regulates his behavior in order to maximize benefit and to minimize loss does little to explain the Turkana cases. Moreover, it is also inappropriate to consider the condition that each participant enters into the negotiation relationship with rights and duties, contributing the viewpoint of “reciprocity.” We should not only look at the transfer of something as a consequence of negotiation and an emergence of debt as its direct reflection, but also include in our scope the entire course of communication for negotiation. In the following description, I will analyze the characteristics of Turkana communication for negotiation, focusing on the aspect of interaction for mutual agreement.

First of all, Turkana communication is thoroughly based on the theme of “relationship.” While I pointed out above that Turkana negotiation proceeds in the form of a demand being followed by a response, the demand consists of asking the other to resolve a problem concerning the demander’s own interests, or to try to involve the other in a relationship through which the other helps them. The demander frequently expresses this concretely, as in the expression, “Help me (kingarakinai)!” In response, the demanded cannot help but agree to the relationship requested by way of presenting a behavior directly concerning his own interests, or propose another relationship. Which is to say, the establishment of a de facto relationship is a direct consequence of coming to a mutual agreement through negotiation.

Although such a characteristic of communication seems to be universal because negotiation is a universal attempt to establish a relationship in which both sides agree with each other, among the Turkana, this comes out in a more concrete and also, in a sense, more extreme manner. When something is demanded of one, or even when one is only addressed, he cannot ignore the addresser. In the subsequent process of negotiation, statements made from a third party’s viewpoint, for example statements such as “Your demand is unfair,” “You are telling a lie,” or “You owe me a debt,” are rigorously excluded. Eventually, all statements in the negotiation come to focus on the relationship between participants, as exemplified by statements such as, “Will you help me?” or “Do you respect me?”

Furthermore, Turkana negotiation is restricted to interaction in the present, in other words, to communication at the “cooperative present.” Turkana never demand something while referring to a past debt, which is also balanced by the fact that a matter agreed upon in the course of or at an end of the negotiation process never restricts future behavior. For example, there is no guarantee that the demander will buy the medicine for which he has requested and received money. Furthermore, it is completely improbable that the demander (now recipient) will return the money in the case that he cannot buy the medicine. Thus, among the Turkana, the manner of dealing with such a case would be for the demanded to buy a medicine and pass it to the demander.

On the other hand, a demander sometimes brings up a past promise. The promise, however, is not presumed fixed in the past and not relevant to the present negotiation. By referring to a past promise, one can only reopen an interrupted negotiation. Recall that in the Turkana mind-set, one who promises to give something tomorrow
is the alternative to the one who gives it in the present.

Even this kind of behavior, that seems to us to be a lie or a violation of a promise is of no matter of concern for the Turkana, who restrict their concern with experiences at the “cooperative present.” There is no indication on the side of speaker that they mind, or are even aware of any gap between their statements and any incidents of the past or potential incidents of the future, even if, on the basis of which these statement could be recognized as lies or a violations of a promise unless such becomes undoubtedly clear. Turkana people, when asking someone to buy a pot for them, may calmly state that they have no pots, even in the case that they do, but simply not at hand. Also, the demanded dare not blame their opponent for this gap.

They never attempt to blame the other in a manner which would seem to be to their own advantage in a negotiation, even though it seems obvious that the other has lied. Turkana behavior does not allow for the claiming of one’s own point of justice in referring to rules or norms which are outside of and prior to the communication at present and thereby forcing the other to give in.

The Turkana never determine in advance, nor depend on an outside standard of justice, by which some category of behavior can be justified or not. They are not concerned that their actions may be considered “stealing” as long as they are not detected. However, they readily return a “stolen” thing, should they be detected. Further, if an owner makes a fuss about losing an item, the receiver secretly returns it. When telling a lie that they themselves believe to be a lie, they do not think of it as unjust, as long as they can establish mutual agreement with the other. However, as a matter of course, they do not believe that stealing and lying are never evil.

Turkana, in advance of any communication, adopt the attitude that they can decide whether some behavior is proper or not by virtue of whether this behavior allows them to achieve agreement with the other.

The justification of ‘my’ behavior is in a sense proved in communication by ‘my’ taking the initiative in communication and driving the other to react in accordance with ‘my’ claim. Turkana regard as the only basis of the justice the fact that ‘I’ make mutual agreement with others, in other words, that ‘my’ behavior is supported by others in the communication and that ‘my’ experience becomes commonly attributed to others (Osawa, 1990).

There is an important point in reference to the connection of this second characteristic to the first, that is communication with the theme of their relationship. When we consider a “relationship,” especially a personal relationship, we tend to regard it as a fixed status which extends over a period of time. Therefore, we are in danger of supposing that any communication concerning their own relationship is a process of confirming a relationship which has been fixed in the past or proposing a relationship with binding force in the future. In other words, we may wrongly assume that the communication is a process of determining their own relationship. The Turkana do not do this. They consider a relationship to be a pattern of combining individual behavior in a communication for negotiation and restrict themselves to interaction about a matter of interest to both sides.

There is, therefore, a reversed logic in the view that their negotiation is a communication act with the result being that they agree with each other about creating a relationship. In fact, as the communication progresses, they cannot help but realize
some form of a relationship. Further, we should recognize that agreement to that end has been made in advance. Realization of some relationship is already promised whenever participants in some communication take the attitude that they will focus on the “cooperative present.” A contingent consequence of such communication is the realization of some relationship, and each participant competes with the other over what it is that they come to agree on with the other.

Such a reversal corresponds directly to the case where they, in advance, take the attitude that they regard a transfer of something as a matter of course in a negotiation regarding whether they will transfer something or not. The participants always start from a point of agreement, indeed, the most essential agreement. They have in advance abandoned any possibility of taking a negative option in the communication, such as pretending to be unconcerned after initiating a negotiation or straightforwardly rejecting to offer a gift. As a number of “small” mutual consents create a track of contingent consequences in the negotiation, the direction of the “great” mutual agreement sooner or later becomes inevitable and unchangeable. This is because the participants cannot, at any point in negotiation, stop and retreat from that negotiation.

This is a consequence of the essential choice they made in advance, that of taking the attitude of a positive participant who is willingly involved in a process of communication at the “cooperative present.” Such a choice requires of them that they abandon consideration of other contingencies and accept whatever consequence a process of communication leads them to. Awareness that one’s own life can proceed only by virtue of one’s own efforts has a practical significance among the Turkana.

THE DYNAMICS OF NEGOTIATION

Turkana negotiation is developed under two conditions as follows:
(1) Communication for negotiation consists of the exchange of messages at a high degree of abstraction, concerning the relationship between participants; and
(2) What each participant agrees to with the other at the end of the negotiation is left to a contingent development of the communication itself.

In communication concerning the relationship between participants, any behavior on various occasions may be indiscriminately made an issue of, and participants therefore can attempt to discover any unlimited possibilities. Communication may, therefore, branch off in an unexpected direction, as some other issue becomes the focus of communication along the course of its development. The following example of unexpected development of communication is one of the most impressive examples I have experienced among the Turkana. The entire course of the exchange is described in order to show this aspect of unexpectedness.

In the fall of 1992, I was in the Kakuma area of northwestern Kenya for my third survey of Turkana. On the evening of October 1st, about twenty neighboring inhabitants started to drink alcohol together. Lotia, the head of the family that I depended on, being slightly drunken, instructed me to slaughter a goat, after which the elders would do the same in turns. I was taken aback at the recklessness...
of this request. I inquired about this to my assistant, whose reaction to this request differed from his usual reaction to such requests, “I have already slaughtered one goat for the elders at the time of my arrival. Is there something different between that case and this one?” He said that this was the case called atukot apei, where each member made agreed to slaughter each other’s animal in turns. I subsequently decided to accept this proposal.

However, as a test, I said that I had no goats. A youth named Lokikati told me it was allowed for me to serve alcohol to drink in place of a goat, and so I agreed to this at once. A woman selling alcohol was immediately called. However, while this was going on, Lotia remained silent. I then criticized him for his silence on the basis that he had proposed that feast. Soon all the other members seemed to support my claim. After a while, Lotia’s youngest brother offered to slaughter his own goat for that feast. Although I thought that the trouble had been settled (because, among the Turkana, an animal of a younger sibling of a family is considered to belong to the head as well), Lotia was still keeping silent. While I resigned myself to returning the woman who sold alcohol, Lokikati asked me to buy alcohol for the youths, because they had cooperated with me even though elders had not. When I hesitated for a while because other members seemed not to be content with this proposal, a nephew of Lotia (the eldest son of Lotia’s sister, who had returned to her parents’ home after her husband’s death) suddenly offered his own sheep to Lotia (his animals do not belong to Lotia). This agreement was then established, and we bought and drank the alcohol.

From the starting point of Lotia’s demand of a goat from me up to this point, the communication proceeded as a series of complicated negotiations in which many people participated on the basis of various clues. What greatly influenced the process was a sense of the relationships which existed between me as a stranger and them as villagers, among relatives (between brothers and between the mother’s brother and sister’s son), and within and between age groups (between elders and youths). It was impressive to note their determination for showing their generosity, actions which were far from maximizing benefit and minimizing loss. In the following description of events which occurred the next evening when we were together eating the sheep, a conflict concerning the relationship between elders and youths cannot help but surface.

In the evening on the next day, we were altogether drinking alcohol at the site of preparation for eating the sheep. A group of youths, led by Lokikati, moved to a nearby site and started dancing. After the elders and others remaining there ate a considerable amount of the sheep, the youths returned and sat at a slight distant from the elders. The youths complained that the sheep was too small to feed all the members present, and the elders criticized the youths for violation of social order based on the age group system in that they were absent and did not perform the required service at a formal feast. Then it began to rain, and the settlement of this dispute was postponed to the following day.

At about eight o’clock in the next morning, the elders gathered and began to prepare for punishment, a fight called alogita, in which they used whip-like
branches to beat the offenders. This group included the main elders of this area, some of whom had not been present the previous night. The youths also gathered at another place, but Lokikati, in the ranks of leader of their age group, was absent. After more than one hour, over ten of younger members of the elders group attacked five youths, who responded by fighting with their backs to a small tree. At last, the older members of the elders’ group directed them to cease the punishment.

After everything calmed down, the participants began to negotiate about the reparation of the youths, and temporarily agreed that each of the two youths would respectively offer a goat. The next day, they slaughtered and ate the two goats. While Lokikati, a leader of youth group, had been totally absent during the day, he appeared that evening, when everyone gathered for drinking. Their discussion there unexpectedly did not become that of a one-sided denunciation. Each side respectively justified their own actions, and the meeting was over without incident. The next day, Lokikati offered his goat for reparation without any other punishment.

Through process described above, the series of incidents ended and never came up after that. Nobody again brought up the agreement about atukot apet, which was the trigger event of this affair. And nobody even slightly showed his thinking concerning the nature of the relationships which contributed to the occurrence of the incident. The negotiation indeed brought the incident to an end.

It is important for understanding the latter part of this affair to know that all of youths who were making trouble were members of the age group called “Ngikoripua,” who had become more influential in local political processes in recent years. Looking at these events from the perspective of these relationships, we can define it as an episode of youths’ challenging the process of entering the adults association. The young people were both provocative in these events leading to the incident from the beginning, but they also played important roles in the negotiations which brought it to a close. One youth who offered his sheep for his uncle was also a member of the “Ngikoripua” group.

Nevertheless, that these young people created the trouble in order to express their challenge is not my point. They never discussed that aspect of the relationship, but rather negotiated with the elders by bringing out the topic which directly concerned their interests. They focused on the fact that the sheep was too small for the occasion as justification for their non-attendence at the formal feast, the point upon which the challenge of the youths could be seen as strongest. And each of these negotiations required as its conclusion a transfer of something, an end connected with each side’s interests. This process consequently established some relationship as an outcome of negotiation over a matter with a conflict of interests.

Because the side which loses something positively participates in and takes initiative in the very negotiation process through which it loses the thing, the negotiations associated with these series of incidents seem to be different from the former example of begging. With this in mind, we can readily understand what is difficult to understand in the case of begging; that the loser seems to acquire something even though an emergence of debt is not apparently recognized. That is the reason why
we are convinced by the representation of these events as a “youths’ challenge.”

The question then is, what did they really obtain? And why do we consider an occurrence of losing a thing as important?

Beginning with the latter, although I have said that the occurrence of losing a thing is important, I do not mean that the occurrence itself is important. Moreover, the emergence of a debt, a direct consequence of this occurrence, is also in itself not an important problem. If the youths’ non-participation in the feast had been recognized as a mere violation of rules and they had offered animals as a compensation for the crime, their behavior would not have been seen as a challenge. It is important here to note that the youths were not afraid of the elders’ threats, that they fought bravely, and that only in the end did they offer animals. Further, the elders did not blame Lokikati for his behavior, and he as well offered his animal. In other words, the offering of animals was considered important because it brought the negotiation to an end after its contingent development.

The youths, therefore, did not only intend to exchange something which they had offered for something else. If, for example, they had hesitated in offering their animals and then had given them reluctantly, their behavior would not have seemed to be a challenge. The important point is that they brought the negotiations to an end by seizing the opportunity at a critical moment and generously offering something. In other words, they forced the other to react in accordance with their claim by actively exercising their option to give a thing, and in that sense, lose it.

Let us return to the allegory. Even if the youths’ provocative demeanor was recognized as a violation of rules and was punished, we may have regarded it not as a crime but as a youths’ challenge. We implicitly appreciate that they have their own standard of justice which is counter to the public standard. When viewed in this light, what the Turkana case means is extremely overt. As the relationship between the side claiming ‘my’ justice (the youths) and the side claimed against (the elders) is rather even, the youths can claim ‘their’ justice as based directly on ‘their’ interests and succeed in forcing the elders to react in accordance with their claim, or in a sense, realize the relevance of ‘their’ justice.

The condition that one side in the negotiation is a youth group, therefore, is not so decisive that it determines the process of the negotiation. Referring to this case as a youths’ challenge is merely a means of appealing to common knowledge. Instead, among the Turkana, this kind of a challenge is undertaken by anyone who intends to bring a negotiation to an end in accordance with his own claim. In other words, before we decide to represent this case merely as a youths’ challenge, we must note the fact that such an opportunity for challenge is universal among the Turkana. In this case, after the youths refused to participate in the feast, there was a ritualized fight as punishment, prepared for the sole purpose of allowing the youths to negotiate. The Turkana accept in advance the inevitable task of realizing ‘my’ justice, and in so doing, prepare the opportunity for negotiation anywhere and at any time.

THE PROBLEM OF ‘MY’ JUSTICE

I have so far presented my analysis of the characteristics of communication for
negotiation among the Turkana by focusing on determining how they participate in the overall course of negotiation and what experience they have therein. The analysis has consequently concentrated on clarifying how they perform the task of making a compromise between two kinds of activities that have mutually conflicting aims, activities which are selfish and oriented toward securing one’s benefits and activities which are social and oriented toward maintaining social order by making agreements with others.

First, I should point out the characteristic of the Turkana rejection of “anything outside of the present communication.” Turkana regard negotiation as an independent communication, while leaving the consequences of negotiation as part of the communication rather than making an exception wherein the consequences are a product which arises “outside” the communication, and in this way, they participate in the whole course of communication while continuously producing a chain of consequences. Moreover, they take the task of having ‘my’ justice be inside communication by way of making mutual agreements without depending on an “outside” standard of justice. In conclusion, the Turkana, through independent negotiations, attempt to have the viewpoint of ‘my’ justice be realized then and there, while they create some relationship with the other.

The fact that each negotiation is independent and relationships and claims of ‘my’ justice are made discontinuously may give the impression that the Turkana live a spur-of-the-moment way of life. However, a way of thinking of a stable relationship and a fixed standard of justice are of relative importance among Turkana. This impression can be attributed to the contrast between approaches based on established forms and those based on emerging processes, moreover, an objective way of knowing about something and a participant way of knowing how to relate oneself to something.

The Turkana, through their communication for negotiation, continuously create relationships with relative others while avoiding fixed standards of behavior. They conduct their behavior in a manner which directly concerns either their own or their opponent’s interests. We perform the task of establishing some relationship with an opponent by virtue of trial and error and by knowing how to relate oneself to the “outside” world by way of repeated self-adjustment. For example, by simple repeating an exercise, one does not come to know the nature of a flute; however, by repeating an exercise, one can come to know what relationship one should make with a flute to become possible to play it. In the same manner, as one learns how to play an instrument by repeating an exercise, the Turkana learn how to negotiate through repeated practice of negotiation process.

However odd it may at first appear, the Turkana way of communication for negotiation, therefore, should be related to a generalized alternative way of knowing. This seems to correspond to an essential way of knowing which is found in the world of organisms when they attempt and ultimately achieve adaptation to an environment by virtue of coming to understand the nature of the relationship that is necessary to adapt to that environment. While it should be referred to as an adaptive way of knowing, the Turkana learn this way of knowing by way of regarding communication for negotiation as a whole body of interactions that continuously produce a chain of consequences and gaining a deeper knowledge from the standpoint
of a participant.

However, what we can understand from our viewpoint focusing on their adaptive way of knowing is only one side of this process. Their attitude toward negotiation is more challenging. When they find an issue concerning their own interests, they create a competitive situation, and, so to speak, pursue something. That is the reason why it is important to understand that they do not only make some relationship by way of adapting to the situation, but rather they undertake the task of having 'my' justice be an important consideration therein.

The second characteristic I should point out is that Turkana restrict themselves to experiences at the “cooperative present.” They begin from a point of agreement that they are positively involved in bodily communication with each other. On the one hand, the Turkana accept their opponent’s activeness, while on the other, they attempt to force him to react in accordance with their demand, which is based on their own activeness. In other words, they attempt to control the creation of the relationship to an orientation which is guided by a relative ‘my’ activeness. Given this perspective, we can understand that their choice to restrict themselves to experience at the “cooperative present” is the Turkana way of performing a troublesome task of making agreement with others based on ‘myself.’

This “agreement” is not an agreement in the sense that it is made through conscious self-adjustment. But it is an agreement in which ‘my’ experience is attributed not only to ‘myself’ but also to the other who confronts ‘me’ on the condition that ‘we’ restrict ‘ourselves’ to experience the communication at the “cooperative present.” Regarding this condition, therefore, it can be said that this agreement is made in advance. Agreement made in advance means the very fact that each side’s action is supported by and is synchronized with the other side’s action in bodily communication. By contrast with communication made through conscious self-adjustment, this communication corresponds to a state of mutual resonance between those participating in a continuously created movement.

In relation to their refusal of something “outside” communication, Turkana do not intend to make agreement by way of bringing in an “outside” standard of justice shared by people. Moreover, they do not even search for clues to what sort of justice they could share. Rather, they attempt to establish a standard of justice guided by ‘my’ activeness and thus produce a state of relative ‘my’ justice at that time and place.

What the Turkana intend to do by way of making agreements based on ‘myself’ is to effectively produce a state representing ‘my’ justice in bodily communication. Once this kind of a pursuit begins, it cannot stop in its positive feedback circuit. The task of producing ‘my’ justice is an individual pursuit which includes a process incorporating a change of ‘myself’, and any reactions of others activate ‘my’ activeness (Bateson, 1979). That is the reason for the Turkana’s tireless activeness. On the other hand, a claim of ‘my’ justice is put to the test of effectiveness against others’ stand, and this overall process may produce ‘our’ justice, an outcome that is inevitably based on the others’ agreement.

I began this article by considering bodily communication as a privileged domain where one can experience a “cooperative present,” and, in this article, I intended to clarify how bodily communication is connected to activities which are concerned
with maintaining social order and securing personal benefit. It is solely by virtue of our imprudence that we consider bodily communication only as a means of making warm bonds between people and as a peripheral phenomenon having limited functions. According to the analysis of the Turkana case herein, it is because we are accustomed to an opportunistic way of thinking that we, on the one hand, attribute a group of activities concerned with maintaining a social order to be institutional rules and norms and, on the other hand, regard activities about securing personal benefit as tactical behaviors based on calculation of loss and gain.

We are accustomed to assume that our ability of resonance with others’ bodies and our ability of understanding based on that resonance are the essential conditions for bodily communication. This analysis indicates that it is important to get into perspective not only this ability, but also this same ability oriented in the opposite direction, that is the ability of pulling out the others’ ability of resonance. When we exercise both of these, we are operating from the same standpoint as the Turkana in negotiation.

How can ‘I’ positively support ‘my’ life, if ‘I’ cannot find a grounding of ‘my’ own justice residing inside ‘myself’? This analysis focused on experiences at the present in bodily communication and clarified the importance of the viewpoint of “body.” This “body” is not opposite to the mind, but rather inevitably connected to the mind, the mind which attempts to confirm and justify ‘myself.’

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