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TRADITIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THE CASE OF WESTERN PROVINCE, ZAMBIA

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ABSTRACT This paper discusses several issues in relation to 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Zambia. First, the extent to which the Lozi commonality still accorded loyalty to their traditional authority (the Litunga) and the question of whether or not they were going to be influenced to vote according to his will. Second, the issue of the relations that existed between the Lozi Royal Establishment and the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) Government, and its related subject ‘The Barotseland Agreement.’ Third, the issues of the people’s perceptions of the elections, with reference to their being free and fair, the people’s political party/party leader preferences, the people’s rating of the ruling party’s performance in terms of development and the upholding of human rights, etc. Last but not the least, the paper deals with the manner in which the election campaigns were conducted as well as the results of both the Presidential and the Parliamentary polls themselves.

Key Words: Elections; Lozi people; Traditional authority; Democracy; Political participation.

INTRODUCTION

This study is focused on the Lozi(1) people of Zambia’s Western Province (formerly Bulozi or Barotseland). They comprise various ethnic groups who have lived together under the Luyi Kings long before the coming of Europeans. Their state was among the most notable of the kingdoms found in the Southern, Central and Eastern Regions of Africa by the European colonizers. And it was through their then reigning king, Lubosi Lewanika that the British South African Company (B.S.A.Co.) gained a foothold in what came to be called Northern Rhodesia.

I. Purpose of the Study

The study was designed to examine the following factors:
(a) the strength of the attachment that the Lozi people still have towards their traditional authority—the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE).
(b) the Royal Establishment’s attitude towards the government and the existing political parties; and the possible impact of such an attitude upon the 1996 elections.
(c) the people’s perceptions of the 1996 elections vis-a-vis
   (i) their being free and fair
(ii) their envisaged outcomes.
(d) the people’s party/party leader preferences in relation to the elections.
(e) the people’s feelings regarding the government’s performance in the upholding of ‘Human Rights’ and the development of the country generally and that of the Western Province and its constituencies in particular.
(f) the political parties’ organizational structures, campaign strategies and choice of candidates as means of capturing the electorate’s votes.
(g) the possible existence of polarization of voter preferences of candidates on ethnic grounds and the extent of such polarization if at all it exists.

II. Methodology

The study employed both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. It used a questionnaire to obtain quantitative data on certain aspects of the study. It also used interviews, group discussions, library research and print media as alternative sources of data.

The envisaged study area was the province’s six districts. This is because all of them have peculiar features which call for special political investigations. Kaoma, for instance, is multi-ethnic and has the Lozi-Nkoya conflict whose political significance should be of interest to political scientists. Four districts were visited prior to election time. These were Mongu the provincial capital, Senanga, Kaoma and Kalabo. A fifth district (Lukulu) was also visited during the election period.

The questionnaire was administered on people who were picked randomly in various government institutions, compounds, church premises and at chiefs’ palaces mainly. But the people involved had to be literate and of voting age. Information from none literate people was obtained through interviews and their participation in group discussions.

III. Theoretical and General Issues

Every Traditional Establishment constitutes an interest group. Like any other group of people, it has values and interests it cherishes and would like to perpetuate. Every Traditional Establishment also has particular relations with the state. These may be positive, if it views the state as being accommodating of its interests or negative, if it considers the state as being inimical to them. The type of relations normally determines whether the Traditional Establishment will be supportive of the party in power during an election or not. And whatever the case, the Establishment most invariably urges/directs its subjects to vote in a manner it considers most likely to advance its cause. Such directives are not always adhered to, however, unless they are in harmony, rather than at variance with those of the subjects themselves. For although Traditional Establishments are linked to their peoples, the interests of the two groups are not always identical. There sometimes exist differences of opinion or choice between the two; when faced with opposing parties seeking election to political office(s). This actually happened in the Barotseland protectorate in the early 1960s, when the Traditional Establishment’s favoured party, Barotse National Party (BNP) was twice defeated by the United National Independence Party (UNIP).
This study evolves around three basic concepts: traditionalism, democracy and political participation. Below is a brief explanation of each of them.

The first concept is traditionalism. This is defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary as ‘respect or support for tradition ...as contrasted with modern or new practices.’ And the Longman Dictionary of the English Language defines it in two ways, first as ‘the doctrines or practices of those who follow or accept tradition,’ and secondly as ‘the beliefs of those opposed to modernism, liberalism or radicalism.’ Inferred from these definitions is that the word refers to a state of having a liking for or positive values towards a people’s established norms of behaviour (etiquette) or ways of doing things. Inferred from them too is that the term embraces tenets of conservatism. It is in these senses that I have used the term. For it was my desire to find out how far Lozis still adhere to their traditional ways of life and how such adherence might affect the electoral process in their area.

The second concept we need to explain is democracy. Besides Abraham Linchon’s popular definition of the term as ‘government of the people by the people and for the people,’ the word has other definitions and diverse notions as well. Some think of it in terms of a government comprising a large number of representatives coming from the entire country, while others say that it is ‘a government of the state by many, as opposed to a government of a few, or one’ (Austin, J., 1886: 59 quoted in Maine, 1918). The large array of definitions, notwithstanding, however, it is obvious that most, if not all of them, have inadequacies of some sort. For this reason, it has been decided not to wrestle with the issue of the definition of this word here, but to explain it in terms of the various activities that either characterize it or are repugnant to it. The government’s upholding of human rights is a democratic feature for instance, and so is its respect for people’s liberties and individual freedoms. Other manifestations of democracy include the avoidance of bribery and corruption during elections and the over utilization of force or other under-hand methods when seeking votes or political office.

The study examined the existence/maintenance of these rights in the province, or their denial to the people by the government, in order to assess the impact of such maintenance/denial on the people’s political participation process.

The third key concept is political participation. This has been used to refer to people’s involvement in the political process through such avenues as political affiliation, holding/attending political meetings, standing for political office, political canvassing, and voting in elections. The study examined the people’s political participation in relation to these criteria to see whether the prevailing political system in the country facilitates democracy by allowing people a large measure of political participation or otherwise.

IV. Organization of the Study

Organizationaly, the study falls under eight sections. The first is this introduction; which deals with the area of study, its purpose, methodology, theoretical and general issues and the organization of material. The second bears the ‘Historical Background’. The third is on ‘the Lozi People and Electoral Politics’, and deals with Lozi-MMD government relations, as well as the study findings vis-a-vis the Lozi
people’s strong support for traditional authority, their commitment to freedom of choice, as well as the Royal Establishment’s neutral policy towards the elections in the later part of the election campaign period. The fourth focuses on ‘the MMD/UNIP Contest for Support: Electoral Politics before the UNIP Boycott’, which covers such issues as the unpredictability of election results in the early stage of the study, the MMD government’s performance ratings, fears regarding the freedom and fairness of the elections, and the rise in UNIP’s election ratings. The fifth deals with: ‘the UNIP Withdrawal and the MMD/ZADECO Dominance of the Election Campaigns’. It discusses the success or failure of the boycott and the resulting dominance of the campaigns by the two stated political parties. The sixth is about ‘Undemocratic Tendencies in the Electoral Process’, which include such things as bribery, the imposition of candidates, block voting, the use of government vehicles for campaign purposes, etc. The seventh is on the election results (both parliamentary and presidential) and it is followed by the conclusion.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of Western Province, from the founding of the Lozi state in the 17th century, to the end of the ‘One Party Era’ in 1991, can neatly be divided in three phases: the pre-colonial phase, the colonial phase and the UNIP Rule phase which embraces the ‘Barotseland Agreement’ issue.

I. The Pre-Colonial Phase

This began with the founding of the state by Mboo Muyunda, soon after the Luyi arrival in the Barotse Central Plain under the leadership of his mother, Mbuywamwambwa. Once established, the state grew in size and importance under eminent rulers and a highly centralized political structure. The rulers did not only greatly extend the kingdom’s boundaries and sphere of influence, but they managed to keep it intact throughout the pre-colonial period except the short period of Kololo conquest and rule from mid 1840s to 1864. The expansion and consolidation of the state was accompanied by an evolution of a complex socio-economic political order which fascinated Europeans when they came to the area. This consisted of such things as ‘dual kingship’, ‘dual administrative structure,’ and ‘autochthonous democratic ideals and practices’.

Dual kingship began at the time of Ngombala in the 18th century. It came about when the king gave the southern part of the kingdom to his daughter Notulu to administer—albeit on a subordinate basis. Whereas the arrangement later led to occasional power struggles between the senior kingship (Namuso) and the junior one (Lwambi),(3) it helped ease the process of administration in the country by dividing it. This was the more so when other subordinate chieftaincies were subsequently set up at Libonda, Kaunga-Mashi, Seshke, Kaoma, and Lukulu.

The dual administrative structure consisted of the territorial division of the kingdom in chieftdoms and ‘lilalo’,(4) for judicial and general administrative purposes; and that of its people in ‘makolo’ labour and military divisions. The ‘makolo’ divi-
sions were not locally based but had their members in all areas of the kingdom. This meant that people of the same area or even village could belong to different ‘makolo’ and would work or fight in different units because of this.

The territorial division was of enormous advantage to the judicial process. This is in so far as it provided for and facilitated the appeal system. Anyone who felt wronged by another but could not obtain justice from a village or ‘silalo’ based ‘Kuta’ (court), had a chance to appeal to higher ones at the subordinate/senior chief’s capital if he/she wished.

The ‘makolo’ ones were equally valuable. They minimized the chances of local insurrections. Since a ‘likolo’ had its members scattered across the country, it was not easy for its general or any of its officers to organize, let alone effect a successful rebellion against the king. This was because his plans could very easily be discovered and thwarted. This is not to deny the occurrence of revolts against rulers during the period altogether. For as already pointed out some certainly took place and even led to the overthrow of the incumbent rulers. But such revolts were organised at the centre, rather than at local or lower levels of the state structure; and were only possible when leaders of many of the ‘makolo’ divisions were not happy with the status quo.

While the concept of democracy is generally considered to be new to Africa, most of its tenets can be said to have existed in the Lozi political system. These include the right to fair trial (as testified by the existence of the appeal system referred to above); the right to land and other forms of property; freedoms of speech, choice and religion, popular participation in government, etc.\(^{(5)}\) (Gluckman, 1965)

Though land was regarded as belonging to the ‘Litunga’, as per the Lozi saying: ‘minya mupu na ngombe’ (lit. the owner of land and cattle), he merely held it symbolically and in trust for his people. His subjects had rights to it in terms of cultivation, grazing, procuring clay for making pots, etc. They even had the right of protection against trespass upon their holdings by the ‘Litunga’ himself (Gluckman, 1965: 37). Thus when a person went to the ‘litunga’ to ask for land, the latter normally sent him/her to the ‘owners of the land’ in the area he/she wished to settle, with a request that they (the owners) offer him/her a portion. Since people had respect for their rulers and their system, and probably owing to the plentifulness of land supply at the time also, such requests were always granted. And people who thus obtained land, were obliged to go and pay homage to the king for it through the Kushoweleta institution,\(^{(6)}\) in addition to thanking the people from whom they actually got it.

This does not mean that the ‘Litunga’ had no land of his own or that which could be used in his official capacity as ruler. He had an individual right to portions of his ancestral lands (mubu wa sipepo) and many others that were tied to the kingship institution. The latter included ‘masimu a mulena’ (the king’s fields), ‘mishitu ya mulena’ (the king’s forests) and ‘masa a mulena’ (the king’s fish ponds). They were all meant to serve him in various ways. Timber from his designated forests were used for building his palaces, for instance, while fish from his ponds and grain from his institutional fields provided food both for his family needs and those of his private and state visitors. Such food was supplemented by proceeds from the tribute institution, which basically was two dimensional in nature. One form of it (tribute
labour) was responsible for exploiting the king’s land resources to obtain the said food stuffs from them, while its other form (tribute in food and commodities) brought in the said food supplementation and other property requirements.

The ultimate result of the two forms of tribute was the king’s self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and various types of property. This was because they brought in vast quantities of food and commodities, not only from his subjects but from conquered peoples also. The conveyance of these things in great quantities led some outsiders to regard the state as having been highly exploitative and oppressive, just as others had also wrongly associated it with feudalism. All these notions were, however, inapplicable. The state was not exploitative for two reasons.

The first is that the food and commodities a Lozi gave to his/her king comprised a minute fraction of his/her produce. Very few Lozis failed to contribute something to their king, and consequently to the state, since they were not required to give more than they could afford to part with. However, because those involved were many, the things that were given became substantial in the end. They were substantial because they came from many people and not because too much was levied from particular individuals.

Second, the amount of labour required of each Lozi man/woman for royal or state duties was not too great to warrant or justify the use of the word oppression in describing that state. Although people were required to help build mounds for kings’ capitals and/or burial places, or transport canals (maabwa) since the time of Lewanika,(7) the amount of time spent by individuals on such projects was fairly minimal, since work was done in turns, with each group of workers taking a relatively short period of time.(8) Nor was the time required to cultivate the king’s fields excessive. Since the size of such fields was scarcely ever enormous; and because their cultivation involved ‘everyone’ living in the ‘silalo’ (administrative area) where the fields were situated, work lasted a few days—leaving the people the rest of the farming season to attend to their fields. These factors show the inappropriateness of terming the Lozi state exploitative and oppressive.

The feudal tag is equally inappropriate to the Lozi state for three reasons: the none existence of serfdom there, the none practice of individual tenure as was the case in feudal Europe (Gluckman, 1995: 35-40) and the insignificance of labour specialization and the output of durable goods. It is also invalidated by the existence of various rights and individual freedoms, which the state upheld. The existence of such rights and freedoms is attested to in many ways at present. It is talked about and explained by some elderly people, it is manifested in the people’s way of life (e.g. when appointing someone to succeed to a position of authority) and it is recorded in some scholarly works. A pertinent example of the latter is what Max Gluckman wrote concerning the nature of the litungas’ rule. After pointing to the existence of evidence to the effect that Lozi ‘litungas’ do not rule dictatorially he said:

... they lead by Lozi law (mulao wa malozi), a whole body of rules defining rights and duties and of procedures for seeking justice from the Litunga. Most of the law, its body of rights (liswanelo) and justice (tukelo or niti = truth), has existed from time immemorial. (Gluckman, 1965: 37)
Besides upholding the democratic rights and freedoms of its citizens, the Lozi state was also accommodative of other people and their cultures. A typical example of such people are the Mbunda. These first came to Bulozi at the time of Ngombala in the 18th century. This was when a man named Namulimbwa, Yauma from Kutii in Angola visited Kaywa, the leader of the people of Imilangu at the time. Because this man helped Ngombala destroy the Sitamemba/Kambunji chief-taincy in Nyengo (Sumbwa, 1979: 109-111), the king rewarded him with a chief-taincy in Imilangu and promised to welcome any of his tribesmen who might come into his kingdom in due course. Consequently, when two large groups of Mbunda arrived there in the 19th century, they were well received by King Mulambwa—who also elevated their chiefs (Mwenes Kandala and Chiengele) to the level of Lozi princes. Good welcome was equally shown to Mwene Mundu and his people upon their arrival in the area in 1917.

This good welcome was not only accorded to them on arrival, but it was strongly maintained. This helped to unite the two peoples, strengthen their state and enrich it in many ways. They fought side by side during times of war, worked together on public projects, shared their skills and talents, etc. And although the two could not share certain features of life e.g. circumcision, this did not sour their relations, because of the respect for other people’s culture that convention demanded. As a result of this, the state continued to enjoy the harmony and stability that emanated from the democratic practices that accompanied its evolution.

This harmony was disturbed by two incidents that occurred in quick succession following the death of Mulambwa. These were a succession war involving two of his sons (Silumelume and Mubukwanu), and the Kololo invasion. Whereas some revolts used to take place against some ‘litungas’ by their subordinates who ruled the southern part of the kingdom, none of them caused worry and disruption among the people to the extent that these two incidents did. The succession war disunited the people and made them vulnerable to the invading forces, while the invasion plunged the nation in about four years of warfare—which never happened before. Nor did the resulting conquest of the state by the invaders end the turmoil. For, it led to a division of the people, with some remaining in the Flood Plain under the conquerors’ subjugation and the majority emigrating to take refuge—some in Nyengo (in the west) and others in Lukulu and Kabompo (in the north) of the kingdom.

This division perpetuated the animosities of the civil war to the extent that they continued to cause instability in the land for about three decades after the overthrow of the Kololo rule. This is evidenced by the dethronement of the first three rulers of the restored Lozi state—even though the third (King Lewanika) was later restored to his throne and grew to be a great and famous ruler.

II. The Colonial Phase

The beginning of this phase can be traced to the year 1890, when a treaty was signed between King Lewanika and a British South African Company (B.S.A. Co.) official named Frank Lochner. Promising British protection to the Lozi and mineral and mining rights to the company, this treaty was followed by several others that brought the state under British colonial administration. Contrary to the promises
made, however, the setting up of colonial administration did not ensure protection for the Lozi and their property. Rather, it resulted in the curtailment of some of their king’s powers, expropriation of some of his people’s land, the imposition of unwarranted taxes, exploitation of people’s labour and resources, arbitrary arrests, imprisonments, etc. Among the king’s expropriated powers are those relating to the adjudication of criminal cases and that of civil cases involving white men. They were placed under various categories of British administrators.

Notwithstanding his loss of certain powers, however, Lewanika and his successors continued to wield and indeed exercise authority in other spheres of life, particularly those of a customary nature. Among them are those pertaining to local government administration, land, forests, fishing, local taxation, the adjudication of civil cases and the Barotse Native Treasury. These powers were exercised through institutions like the Barotse Native Courts, the Barotse Native Treasury and the Barotse National Council, and involved the state’s bureaucrats (councillors and indunas).

Besides retaining the above powers, Lozis also continued to enjoy nominal recognition as a protected people, with their land being referred to as a ‘Protectorate,’ despite its being within another ‘protectorate’ (that of Northern Rhodesia) and its British administrator as a ‘Resident Commissioner.’ This was in contrast with the other divisions of the territory, which were called ‘Provinces’ and their administrators as ‘Provincial Commissioners’.

The existence of this special status for Buluizi posed problems for the nationalists who were fighting for the country’s independence. Initially, the problem was in relation to politicization in the ‘Protectorate’, and subsequently, with regard to the preparation of the ‘Independence Constitution’. Owing to his distrust for the nationalists, the then reigning ‘litunga’, Mwanawina III, barred their parties, UNIP and ANC, from operating in his domain (Mulford, 1967: 193-228). As a result of this a number of UNIP activists who defied the ban prior to its lifting in June, 1962 found themselves arrested and even imprisoned. They included the late Nalumino Mundia (Caplan, 1970: 195-196), who later became the country’s Prime Minister. The problem relating to the ‘Independence Constitution’ was that negotiations over the matter could not be concluded until a separate agreement to cater for Buluizi’s special position was negotiated and agreed upon. This forced the nationalists to negotiate and come to an agreement with the ‘litunga’. The agreement was signed on 18th May 1964 and it was called the ‘Barotseland Agreement.’ And its bearing document was appended to the country’s ‘Independence Constitution’ of 1964.

III. The Post-Colonial Period and the Barotseland Agreement to October 1991

The post-colonial period in Zambia began with UNIP as the ruling party and Dr. Kaunda as the new nation’s president. The government enjoyed immense support among the people of Western Province at the time, as indeed it did with those of other provinces accept southern. This was manifested (in the case of Western Province) by UNIP’s trouncing of all other parties including the Royal Establishment sponsored Barotse National Party (BNP) in three successive elections that were fought in the 1962-1964 period.
Though enormous, this support for UNIP did not last long among the Lozi. The reasons for this were Nalumino Mundia’s decision to leave the party and take up leadership of the then newly formed United Party (UP),(16) the defeat of all but one of the prominent Lozi politicians in the party’s Central Committee elections held at Mulungushi (near Kabwe) in 1967(17) and the government’s prompt and systematic abrogation of the ‘Barotseland Agreement’ of 1964.(18)

This ‘Agreement’ is undoubtedly among the most renowned issues associated with the history of modern Zambia. It was signed by Kaunda, then Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia – on behalf of his government and Mwanawina Lewanika III, then Litunga of Barotseland – on behalf of himself and his subjects. Duncan Sandys, then Principal Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the colonies, also signed it (Appendix 2).

The nationalists intended it to ensure the inclusion of Barotseland in independent Zambia, in view of the mistrust they had for the ‘Litunga’. The mistrust emanated from secessionist tendencies of the Barotse Royal Establishment, and the clandestine contacts it had with the nationalists’ foes at the time.(19) On his part, the ‘Litunga’ saw the Agreement as the last straw, in his efforts to safeguard his interests and those of his people against UNIP, when it got complete autonomy for the country from Britain on Independence Day. This was because of the dismal failure of all his secessionist endeavours previously.

The last of such attempts evolved around the BNP or ‘Sicaba Party’ as it was generally known in the province. Formation of this party was conceived in the Barotse National Council meeting of April 1962. Apart from re-affirming the policy of secession on the grounds that UNIP intended to destroy the ‘Litungaship’, depose the indents and integrate Barotseland into Zambia, the Council decided upon the formation of a party whose main concern would be to ‘free Barotseland from UNIP rule and make it not a part of Northern Rhodesia’ (Caplan, 1970: 198). When the party was formed in June, this major aim was reflected in its objectives, which read:

... to protect, defend and preserve the protectorate status of Barotseland ... the Barotseland Kingship and to fight for the separation of Barotseland from Northern Rhodesia (Northern News, 18th October, 1962).

The party failed to defeat UNIP in two successive elections, however;(20) and thus failed to demonstrate mass support for the secession bid (as planned) to the colonizing power. This must have been a big blow to the ‘litunga’ and Council over their secessionist hopes. And their hopes must have been completely shattered when its President following Britain’s continued rejection of the idea and when a planned alliance with ANC aborted dissolved the BNP. They, therefore, must have seen the ‘Agreement’ as the only possible alternative to their problem.

In terms of it contents, the Barotseland Agreement provided for the Zambian Government’s upholding of human rights and fundamental freedoms among the people of Barotseland and recognition of the litunga’s powers. It is significant to note that its provisions amounted to retention of the local autonomy that the area had enjoyed during the colonial era. For with powers of government and administration bestowed upon the ‘litunga’ (in almost every facet of life)(21) and that of law
making, it is not surprising that the ‘litunga’ went along with it. This is the more so
that it portrayed a semblance of permanency thus:

And whereas, having regard to the fact that all treaties and other agreements subsisting
between Her Majesty the Queen ... and the Litunga of Barotseland will terminate when
Northern Rhodesia becomes an independent sovereign republic and Her Majesty’s
Government ... will thereupon cease to have any responsibility for the government of
Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, it is the wish of the Government of
Northern Rhodesia and the Litunga of Barotseland to enter into arrangements concern-
ing the position of Barotseland as part of the Republic of Zambia to take the place of
treaties and other arrangements hitherto subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen
and the Litunga of Barotseland.

And whereas on the sixteenth day of April, 1964 a provisional agreement was con-
cluded at Lusaka with this purpose ... it is the desire of the Government of Northern
Rhodesia and the Litunga ... to conclude a permanent agreement with this purpose
(Emphasis supplied). (Appendix 2).

Another assurance regarding the permanency of the ‘Agreement’ is contained in a
speech presented to the Litunga, chiefs and people of Barotseland by Dr. Kaunda at
Lealui (the Litunga’s capital) on the 6th of August 1964. Kaunda was explaining
changes that were then taking place in the country. And speaking on the planned
appointment of Under Ministers for provinces generally and on the functions of the one
to be based in Barotseland in particular, he had this to say:

An Under Minister will be appointed to each province as the personal representative of
the Prime Minister and after independence of the President. In Barotseland the Under
Minister will be a direct link between the Litunga and the Central Government ... will
be particularly responsible to the Prime Minister ... to ensure that the Barotseland
Agreement ... is being honoured. It will be no part of the functions of the Under
Minister to interfere in the day to day running of the Barotse Government... (Emphasis
supplied).

The none interference factor was twice repeated during his speech, when dis-
cussing the role of the Political Assistant to the Under Secretary (who too was yet to
be appointed) and when making reference to the ‘Barotseland Agreement’ itself. Concerning the latter he said:

... I can assure you, Sir Mwanawina, and all Members of the Barotse Royal Family and
of the Barotse Government, that the Government has no wish to interfere with the day
to day running of the internal affairs of Barotseland. This is the responsibility of the
Barotse Government ... the intention of the Central Government will be no more than
to give to the Barotse Government its maximum assistance and cooperation.

I can give an absolute assurance that the customary rights in land in Barotseland will
remain with the Litunga and National Council, and the District Heads of Kutas... Government is satisfied that Government requirements for land for development pro-
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jects in Barotseland will receive the active co-operation of the Barotse Government (Emphasis supplied).

Despite these assurances, however, the Barotse Agreement never lasted. For the Kaunda Government systematically eroded it through a series of legislative measures and eventually had it abrogated in 1969. The first was the 1965 Local Government Act that repealed the Barotse Native Authority Ordinance and thereby abolished the Barotse National Council. The second was the 1966 Local Courts Act that repealed the Barotse Native Courts Ordinance and changed the judicial functioning of the indigenous courts in the province. The third was the 1969 Mines and Minerals Act which deprived the ‘Litunga’ of his mineral rights which were inherent in agreements with the British South African Company. The fourth was the 1969 Constitution of Zambia Amendment Act (No. 5). The last one was the Western Province Land and Miscellaneous Provisions Act (No. 47) which took away the Litunga’s powers over land, forests, fishing, wildlife, etc. and vested them in the president.

The abrogation of the ‘Agreement’ led to discontent among the people of the province, which has persisted to this day. This was not given great expression initially, however, allegedly because those who started doing so were silenced through detention (Post Newspaper, 20/12/92).

The issue thus lay dormant until the advent of multi-party politics in 1990. And its resuscitation brought anxieties upon both MMD and UNIP leaders during the run up to the 1991 elections. It prompted the former to promise a reconsideration of the issue if it won the elections and the latter to make similar gestures to the grieved Lozi.

UNIP’s manoeuvres were particularly significant, if only because they came from the same people who abrogated the ‘Agreement’. In the face of growing despondency among Lozis and mounting opposition from the MMD, the then incumbent president, Kaunda made repeated utterances indicating his readiness to discuss the matter. He first did this at a public meeting at Senanga Boma in March 1992 (Post, 15/3/91) and again when he met a delegation of 38 chiefs and indents led by the Ngambela (Prime Minister), the late Griffith Mukande at State House on the 26th of June 1991 (Post, 27/6/91).

Having abrogated the ‘Agreement’ in the first place, when political power was firmly under his grip, these good will gestures appear to have been occasioned by political expediency, particularly that he did not seem to want to resolve the issue until after the elections that were then envisaged and which actually took place on the 31st of October that year.

The Lozi people saw this ploy and refused to fall prey to it. And coupled with other grievances against the government of the day, such as shortages of essential commodities, high cost of mealie meal, the government’s intolerance of other people’s views, they voted en-mass for the MMD on account of its promises of ‘democracy’, ‘transparency’, and ‘good governance’.

MMD promises prior to the 1991 election raised great expectations among the people of Western Province. Close to their hearts was the prospect of restoring their abrogated ‘Agreement’. Contrary to expectation, however, the defeat of UNIP and the rise to power of the MMD did not bring the controversy over the abrogated ‘Agreement’ to an end. Instead, it led to a series of unfruitful manoeuvres and tactics on the part of both the Barotse Royal Establishment and the government aimed at resolving the issue. These included uncontained recourse to court action (on the part of the Royal Establishment), dialogue, threats, and counter threats.

While dialogue was considered by both to be the best suited method of resolving the issue amicably, it failed to do so because the conflicting parties took uncompromising stances. The Royal Establishment wanted the ‘Agreement’ to be restored in its totality, whereas the government considered certain provisions as being absolute and that they did not, therefore, merit restoration. By pursuing these diametrically parallel viewpoints, no settlement was reached, and the grieved party became increasingly disenchanted with the status quo. This was exacerbated by the government’s alleged incitement of the Nkoya against the Lozi administration. And although frequently denied by the Royal Establishment, the idea of secession began not only to be conceived but also to be given expression by certain elements among Lozi loyalists (Post, 20/2/92).

The issue of disenchantment seems to be evidenced by the Royal Establishment’s reported decision of May 1996 to back Kaunda and UNIP in the elections that were due later that year. Since Kaunda is the man who abrogated the ‘Agreement’ in the first place, and is the same one who promised to witness for the state against the Lozis in the event of the matter being brought before a court of law, the Royal Establishment’s decision to back him must have been prompted by a feeling of extreme despondency against those in power. This is notwithstanding the fact that the man is said to have apologised for the action he took and the view some people have that he (Dr. Kaunda) would probably turn out to be like Lewanika if he regained power. For had the Royal Establishment not been disillusioned with the government, they would not have felt the need to reconsider the position of Dr. Kaunda and UNIP who they know to be responsible for the Agreement’s abrogation.

Although this disenchantment is mainly linked to the government’s failure to reinstate the ‘Barotse Agreement’, it has three other significant causal factors to it as well, especially when the issue of disaffection for the status quo is extended to the ordinary people in the province. These are the sale/liquidation of parastatal companies, stagnation in development and the enactment of the Land Act of 1995. The sale/liquidation of parastatals like the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) had a telling effect on the people of the province. Apart from throwing some of them in the streets through loss of jobs (Appendix 1), it deprived many others of essential services such as the provision of agricultural inputs, purchase of agricultural produce, marketing of various consumer goods, etc. Coupled with stagnation in development (particularly in the area of road construction and maintenance) and the enactment of the Land Act, these things caused the people a great deal of grief, which ultimately led to their loss of affection for those in power.
The extent of the people’s antagonism to the Land Act can probably be gauged from the great criticism it received from Mutangelwa Mbikusita (of the Barotse Cultural Association) and Moses Mwala (a prominent Mongu businessman) when it was still at Bill stage. Mbikusita spoke of it as being ‘definitely a reappearance of the ugly face of 1969 referendum to the people of Barotseland’ and predicted that its implementation will be resisted by people ‘because it (land) is their livelihood. There will be clashes’. And Mwala also went beyond mere criticism of the Bill through his castigation of the President for it. It would be ‘very serious’ for the government to pass the Bill, he stated. ‘It is against the will of God.... It does not matter what they want, this is our land. Even President Chiluba was given his own patch of land in Luapula. What does he want with ours?’ (Post, 14/10/94).

The disaffection was first demonstrated by the government’s defeat in three parliamentary by-elections that were held in the province in 1993 following the formation of National Party (NP) by former MMD parliamentarians. Because the MMD victory in 1991 was overwhelming in the constituencies concerned, this defeat is testimony that its popularity had drastically declined among the people of the province over the two-year period. This is the more so that government had put up a determined campaign to retain the seats.

The loss of support for the government by the Lozis had its parallels among the traditional rulers and peoples of other provinces as well—albeit in varying degrees. This is evidenced by the defeat of MMD candidates in various parliamentary and Local Government by-elections in some of the other provinces (as was the case in Western province) after the 1991 historic elections which brought them into power, and the utterances of several chiefs over the disputed 1996 Constitution and the 1995 Land Act. Parliamentary election defeats were experienced in North-Western Province (2), Southern (1), Central (1) and Northern (2). This shows that peoples’ disenchantment with the government was not confined to Bulozi alone.

While the defeats do not portray any form of disillusionment with the government on the part of chiefs in the other provinces of the country, the utterances of some of the chiefs there point to that kind of phenomenon. Examples of such utterances include those of Chief Malembeka of Ndola Rural, Chief Macha of the Tonga and Paramount Chief Mpezeni of the Ngoni. Speaking on behalf of a chiefs’ grouping known by the term ‘Royal Foundation’, for example, chief Malembeka and his counterpart, Chief Mpezeni of the Ngoni, expressed their displeasure with government on two counts: the President’s alleged refusal to meet them (chiefs) and its enactment of the “Land Act” against the people’s wishes’ (Post, 2/11/95). The utterances of Chief Macha (Post, 18/9/96) and paramount Chief Mpezeni (Post, 2/9/96) were by no means less explicit, nor were they compromising. The former stated his unwillingness to see any version of the ‘Land Act’ because it had been rejected by his people; while the latter castigated the government over the ‘Constitution’, the ‘Land Act’ and the eight UNIP detainees (who were later prosecuted and found innocent) who he said were ‘only arrested for being UNIP.’ He underlined his disgust with the government by suggesting that ‘people should be told to vote for other parties’.

And ceiling the chiefs’ disillusionment with the government was their decision not to take part in elections unless their suggested amendments to the Constitution
were effected (Post, 2/9/96). Made through their ‘Foundation’, following three of its meetings in Kasama, Monze and Kabwe, this decision was a follow-up to yet another radical statement by the Ngoni paramount on 3rd November 1996. Urging other chiefs to champion their peoples’ demands, the chief reportedly said the following:

We are chiefs because of the people. We cannot do what people do not want. Power is the people and what people don’t want, chiefs too don’t want (Post, 7/11/96).

Mpenzeni was apparently referring to the rejection of the 1996 Constitution by many groups of people in the country. And it is interesting to note that the chiefs’ petition which followed this call contained a stinging indictment of what they saw as an ‘MMD imposed Constitution’, which they attacked for being centralist and highly tyrannical in relation to ‘traditional tribal kingdoms’ (Post, 17/11/96).

Disillusionment with the government is not the only thing that the Lozis seem to have shared with people in other provinces during this time. There are several appreciable things that they had in common with them. The first is that of the increase in transport facilities. Whereas previously people had to wait for days at bus stops in order to board a bus, or were sometimes forced to travel as standing passengers from Kaoma to Lusaka, for instance, due to shortage of transport vehicles, this sort of experience ended when the MMD came to power. Availability of transport was thus among the things informants highly credited the present government with. Availability of consumer goods was another. With so many commodities at district centres, people at such centres have access to almost any consumer item they may require – unlike the time of the Second Republic, when many consumer goods were scarcely available most of the time. It is important to stress here, however, that this shared experience mostly involved the province’s district centres’ since they were the ones where such goods were found. People in the remote areas had problems in getting access to them as they had to walk long distances (more than a day in some instances) to get to them. The third is that of ‘Freedom of Speech.’ People begun to freely express their views over political and other matters when the MMD took power. The increased enjoyment of this ‘Right’ in the 1991-96 period was attested to by both the questionnaire respondents and interviewees during data collection, although there were indications that some people received threatening letters from some government officers for exercising this ‘Right’.

Apart from discussing Lozi-MMD Government relations; and their reflections in some other provinces, this section of the study deals with three other issues of relevance to the electoral process as well. These are: the extent of attachment Lozis still have for their traditional rulers, these people’s commitment to freedom of choice and the Royal Establishment’s lassies-faire attitude towards the parties that contested the November, 1996 elections. They are dealt with in the three sub-sections that follow.

I. Lozi People’s Strong Support for Traditional Authority

Results of the administered questionnaire revealed that the Lozi Royal
Establishment enjoys strong support among its people. For, out of the 426 people who responded to a question requiring them to indicate how strongly they believed in traditional issues/authority, 62.4% said ‘very strongly,’ 16.9% said ‘strongly’ and only 15.5% and 5.2% said ‘not so much’ and ‘not at all’ respectively (Table 1).

It is significant to note that of the three districts where the questionnaire was administered (Kaoma, Mongu and Senanga), Kaoma recorded the highest percentages of adherence to the Royal Establishment, with 77.3% and 14.4% of the respondents indicating their belief in traditional authority as ‘very strongly’ and ‘strongly’ respectively, as opposed to the Mongu respondents’ corresponding percentage figures of 52.4 and 26.2 respectively or Senanga’s 54.4 and 16.7. This is surprising in view of the ethnic conflicts which have existed in Kaoma between the Nkoya and Lozi over the past five years or so. For normally, one would have expected the Nkoya to indicate little or no regard whatsoever for the Royal Establishment’s authority and thereby significantly reduce the positive percentages accorded to it (the Royal Establishment). And while it may be argued that these people had their own ‘local chiefly establishments’ in mind when making the responses, this does not seem to be entirely so for two reasons. First because a seemingly similar pattern emerged in the results of another question which specifically mentioned the Barotse Royal Establishment. This is where Kaoma again tops the other districts with 33.3% of the people indicating that they would accept a directive by the Royal Establishment to vote for candidates who are not of their own choice; when the corresponding figures for Mongu and Senanga are 26.2% and 27.5% respectively (Table 2). And second because some Nkoya people are said to have taken part in celebrative dances that marked the installation of the new Lozi senior chief [Isiteketo] in the district despite earlier threats that they would not allow the appointment of another Lozi chief there. In view of these facts, one may consider these results as authenticating the often expressed view by Lozis generally and the Royal Establishment in particular that the Nkoya are not really anti-Lozi but that they are simply used by ‘other people’ to try and weaken the Royal Establishment.28

The Royal Establishment’s enjoyment of widespread support was attested to by most of the people interviewed also. Highlighting the point, one interviewee snapped: ‘Sizo salatwa sisinywa feela kibani basona’ meaning ‘Tradition is loved, it is only spoiled by its owners’.29 Several others pointed to the simultaneous response to the 1995 sounding of the ‘Ngongi’ (a war alerting instrument) as proof of the existence of such support for the traditional authority. This was when Lozis rose en-

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Table 1. Distribution of voters’ responses concerning their rating of their belief in traditional issues/authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>Very Strong</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Not so much</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaoma (194)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongu (84)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senanga (148)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All three districts combined (426)</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62.4%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mass with weapons of various descriptions to defend the ‘Litunga’, upon hearing that the government was about to arrest him.\(^{(30)}\)

That the Royal Establishment still enjoys massive support after many years of colonial and nationalist rule is a reflection of how good its rule had been. Mention has already been made regarding the good welcome that was given to the Mbunda upon their arrival by King’s Ngombala and Mulambwa. Because these were given equality of treatment (by allowing them to participate fully in the affairs of the state) and since this equality has been maintained by successive rulers since then, the goodwill established between the two peoples has been unshakable. Similarly upheld has been the prestige of the Royal Establishment in the eyes of the ‘new comers,’ and the respect they command among them. And coupled with the rights and freedoms assured to everyone in their society, the love that Lozis have manifested for long towards their rulers has scarcely declined.

II. Lozi People’s Commitment to Freedom of Choice

Their support for traditional authority, notwithstanding, most Lozis would not accept a directive from the Royal Establishment requiring them to vote for candidates who are not of their own choice. This was manifested in their response to item 12 of the questionnaire, where 70% of the respondents indicated they would not accept such a directive and only 30% said they would.

Though seemingly contradictory, since the same people showed that most of them strongly believed in traditional authority, this attitude is far from being so. Their refusal is in fact in line with their established practice in matters of appointments. For, among the Lozi, appointments to positions of authority are made on the basis of consultation and consensus.\(^{(31)}\) Many of them would, therefore, find such kind of directive totally unacceptable, unless it was in line with their own preferred choices.

It is interesting to note that this matter was clearly manifested by the results of the Barotse National Council election 1963 (Sumbwa, 1964: 17-18) and the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council one of January 1964 (Sumbwa, 1964 : 18). Fought by UNIP on a nationalist and developmental platform; and the Royal Establishment backed BNP on provincialism and ethnic considerations, both were overwhelmingly won by the former. This showed that most Lozis could not be influenced to vote against what they considered to be in their great interest—even if the attempted influence came from their Litunga.

Table 2. Distribution of people’s would be responses to a directive by the Lozi Royal Establishment to have them vote for candidates who are not of their own choice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaoma (192)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongu (84)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senanga (138)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All three districts combined (414)</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[1.\]
This kind of commitment signifies the existence of an autochthonous type of democracy among the Lozi. For, contrary to old-fashioned ideas that associated their kingdom with feudalism and dictatorial tendencies, their system of appointments was clearly democratic. It ensured a great deal of dialogue among the people when choosing their leaders, which often led to the right people being picked to run their affairs. This is neatly evidenced by the list of ‘litungas’ who ruled the kingdom prior to the coming of the Kololo, as the great majority of them were renowned for various things (such as kindness, militarism and conquests, law making, etc) for which they were loved by their subjects (Jalla, 1969).

III. The Royal Establishment’s Neutral Stand Towards the Elections

Mention was made of the Barotse Royal Establishment’s promise to support UNIP in last year’s elections. This promise became irrelevant when the party decided to boycott the elections at the 11th hour. Whereas many would have expected the Royal Establishment to transfer its support to Zambia Democratic Congress (ZADECO)—which had likewise promised to look into the issue of the abrogated ‘Agreement’ if elected; and was the party which had become the main competitor to MMD among the remaining parties, the National Party, or its splinter group—Agenda for Zambia Party (which is led by a Lozi prince), they did nothing of the sort. Instead, they took a neutral stand; on account of their lack of trust in the parties that took part in the election race.

THE MMD-UNIP CONTEST FOR SUPPORT: ELECTORAL POLITICS BEFORE THE UNIP BOYCOTT

This section of the study has five sub-sections. The first is on the unpredictability of the election results; the second and third on the MMD Government’s ratings (in terms of development and Human Rights promotion), the fourth on fears regarding the freedom and fairness of elections, while the fifth and last is on the rise in UNIP’s election ratings.

I. The Unpredictability of Last Year’s Election Results during the Early Stage of the Study

The 1996 elections were highly unpredictable during the early part of the study. The narrowness of the differences in the number of voters who showed preferences for the two major parties—the ruling MMD and the main opposition UNIP and their leaders when feeling in the questionnaire portrayed this. The differences in the support accorded to the two parties and their leaders were highly insignificant (Tables 3 & 4).

For even though President Chiluba and his party appeared to be in the lead according to these statistics, this was not a true reflection of what the election results were likely to be. This is because his rating and that of his party were boosted by about 60 solid and supportive entries obtained from the Nkoya respondents found at
the palaces of chiefs Mutondo and Kahare. Without these entries, the differences in the number of voters preferring his party as against those for Dr. Kaunda and UNIP would certainly have been minimal. Moreover, it is important to note that even if the Nkoyas would have overwhelmingly voted for the president and the MMD in the elections as demonstrated, that alone would not have guaranteed their win at all. This is on account of their (the Nkoya people) smallness of number. They are such a minority compared to other groupings in the district, such as the Mbunda and Lozi that the factor of their solidarity alone could hardly have made a difference.

The unpredictability factor was further shown by the existence of a large number of voters who indicated that their choice of candidates was to be based on the ability or caliber of those standing rather than on party affiliation (Table 3).

What this implied was that any party (particularly the two major ones) had good chances of winning parliamentary seats as long as they selected candidates whom
the electorate were happy with.

This polarization of voters’ views on which candidates they would vote for, reflected the absence of a party and/or party leader with a massive following in the province at the time. For although MMD and UNIP were acknowledged as the major parties, both had tarnished images in the minds of many of the province’s voters. This is certainly why both of them had less than 40% of the questionnaire respondents indicating willingness to have them returned to power (Table 5). And the closeness of the percentages of those preferring MMD and those in support of UNIP (i.e. 35.3 and 35.8% respectively) tend to show that the two parties were almost equally unpopular.

Many interviewees and group discussants gave indications as to why both parties were not popular. Some blamed the governing MMD for its failures in developing the province (see next section). Others recalled the hardships experienced during the Second Republic – queuing for essential commodities, searches at road blocks, lack of freedom of speech, transport problems, night curfews and arrests, etc. and said that they detested UNIP’s return to power which they believed would lead to a resuscitation of such things.

II. The MMD Government’s Poor Performance in the Field of Development

The people of Western Province are very dissatisfied with the government’s performance in the area of development. Only 22.8% and 18.4% of the questionnaire respondents gave the government ratings of ‘very good’ and ‘good’ respectively, in respect of its performance in the development of the country generally, while those who rated this performance negatively had a combined percentage rate of 58.8% of the people involved (Table 6).

The government’s poor performance ratings in respect of the province and its districts/constituencies were even worse. Those for the constituencies, for instance, show 12.6% and 8.3% under the ‘very good’ and ‘good’ categories respectively, and 18.0% and 61.2% under the bad and ‘very bad’! Evidence in support of this fact was found among interviewees and group discussants. People generally talked of the lack of development under the MMD government and referred to the absence of new projects in their areas as evidence. Some of them pointed to the none construction of new roads (apart from the then uncompleted Kaunga-Mashi gravel one) and the none repair of existing ones as further evidence. Reference was consistently made to the Lusaka-Mongu road’s deplorable state in particular, as a way of underscoring their arguments.

<p>| Table 6. Distribution of voters’ ratings of the government’s performance in development of the country, the province and the constituencies. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEVELOPMENTAL AREA</th>
<th>VERY GOOD</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>VERY POOR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some people attributed the government’s poor performance to the lack of money. This was particularly the case with MMD supporters who argued that their party found ‘government coffers’ empty when it took over government and that this made it difficult to finance the rehabilitation of the greatly dilapidated infrastructure they found.

While there is some grain of truth in this viewpoint, many other people took great exception to it for various reasons. First they dismissed the ‘empty coffers’ argument on the enormity of donor funds that flowed into the country following the setting up of a democratic government in 1991. Such funds, they contented, should have made a great deal of difference had they been well utilized. Second, they pointed to the government’s abandonment of subsidy payments, which were a major feature of life in the Second Republic. This reduced the areas of government’s budgetary allocations, they stated, which government revenue should have managed to appreciably cater for. Third (in the case of the Western Province in particular), the factor of negligence was given as having contributed to the phenomenon. The province, they argued was scarcely developed due to its negligence by the MMD government.

Some subscribers to this view, referred to the better road structures elsewhere in the country as proof of this. ‘Those roads are fantastic’ remarked one interviewee, ‘compared to the Lusaka-Mongu one which is neglected’. And speaking on the same issue, one man asked: ‘Does the government only lack money where Bulolo (Western Province) is concerned? No money for the Lusaka-Mongu road, none for the Livingstone-Sesheke one, none for the Lukulu and Kalabo roads ... when theirs are being worked on? I cannot believe this.’

Besides negligence, some people attributed the shortcomings in the government’s developmental performance to economic mismanagement and gave specific examples to back their contention. It is interesting to note that several of these involved road contractors some of whom achieved virtually nothing in their undertakings. One of these only had trees cut on either side of a 12km stretch of the gravel road he was supposed to widen and resurface. He then abandoned the project when his workers left him for his failure to pay them! Apart from emphasizing the harm such kind of contractors cause to development, they also castigated those who appoint them for not being serious with the issue.

The poor developmental performance constituted an electioneering problem for the ruling party. This was the more so in the agricultural sector where the lack of marketing facilities for farmers as a result of the government’s liberalization policy is a matter of great concern to people. It is significant to note that even some ruling party members considered this matter unhealthy. Explaining that lack of marketing for agricultural products was one of the major issues they found difficult to defend, a group of District Executive Committee (DEC) members in one of the districts stated that there was need to reconsider government policy on this issue. This was important, they said, because the majority of farmers were poor peasants who either lacked knowledge of available markets or were unable to transport their produce to such markets even if they knew where these were.
III. The Favourable Ratings of the Government’s Human Rights Record

People in the province rated the MMD government’s Human Rights record very well. This was especially so in the area of Freedom of Speech where 61.3% of the questionnaire respondents gave it a ‘very good’ rating and 21.2% that of ‘good’ (Table 7). Quite high ratings were also given in respect of the other rights, as can be seen from the table.

Although favourably rated, it is important to take note of the sizable percentages of respondents with negative ratings in some aspects of this area; such as those relating to ‘Freedom of the Press’ and that of ‘the Independence of the Judiciary.’ These (the negative ratings) seem to imply that there are people who perceive some inadequacies in the government’s upholding of these Rights/Freedoms. And this is not surprising. As some people in the study areas listen to the radio, read papers and have access to television, a number of them are bound to share some of the sentiments expressed in these media regarding shortcomings in the maintenance of such rights.

Equally important is taking note of the perceived weakness themselves. This is necessary in that it will enable government to take measures that will help remedy the situation. The importance of this needs no emphasis, since good governance, of which the upholding of Human Rights is an important ingredient, is necessary for both the stability of the nation and the satisfying of the donor countries’ demands.

IV. People’s Fears Concerning the Freedom and Fairness of Last Year’s Elections

One of the main concerns some people initially had regarding last year’s elections was that they were not going to be free and fair. This was the feeling of 52.2% of respondents to the questionnaire (Table 8). They feared two things, political strife and the likelihood of vote rigging.

The fear of political strife was based on various factors including the following. The first was the Government’s envisaged barring of ‘Kaunda’ from standing in the elections. Then anticipated, due to the arguments that were raging over the method of adopting the 1996 Constitution, the issue of barring some people from standing for the Presidency actually became a reality when the relevant Bill was passed by Parliament and subsequently assented to by the President during the course of the year. The second was lack of dialogue between the ruling MMD and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION OF RIGHT/FREEDOM</th>
<th>VERY GOOD</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>VERY POOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of speech (424)</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the press (392)</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Assembly (388)</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence of the Judiciary (382)</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the opposition parties. The third factor was the violence between the parties. This was in reference to the violence that took place between MMD and UNIP supporters during the Mkaikwa Parliamentary by-election. The fourth factor was the MMD’s determination to remain in power while the fifth factor was Kaunda’s insistence on standing for the Presidency even if the law was to bar him.

The fear of rigging appeared to affect very many people. This is evidenced by the fact that, 66.0% and 14.4% of the questionnaire respondents indicated ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ respectively to indicate their positive reactions to the suggestion that counting of votes be done at polling stations to reduce this danger; while the percentages of those who ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ were as little as 9.6% and 10.0% respectively (Table 9).

V. UNIP’s Favourable Election Ratings in the Later Stage of the Study

Although the election results seemed unpredictable at the commencement of the study, the election chances of UNIP significantly improved in the course of time. This was as a result of increased politicization in the province by the party president Dr. Kaunda and other senior party leaders as well as the aspiring candidates in the various constituencies. These capitalized on the disillusionment of the people towards the government as a result of the lack of a ready market for their maize; high cost of commodities generally and agricultural inputs in particular, unemployment, retrenchments, and (in the case of the Barotse Royal Establishment and the Barotse Cultural Association) the government’s failure to restore the abrogated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaoma (174)</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongu (82)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senanga (146)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All three districts combined (402)</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Distribution of voters’ responses to the suggestion that votes be counted at polling stations to reduce the chances of vote rigging.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF RESPONSE</th>
<th>NO. / % OF RESPONDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>276 66.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>60 14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>40 9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>42 10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL RESPONSES</td>
<td>418 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Distribution of voters’ responses to the question on whether the elections were to be free and fair.
‘Barotseland Agreement’. They were also helped by their superb party structure,\(^{(35)}\) which enabled them to easily get their message down to the grassroots and by the ultimate decision of the Barotse Royal Establishment to back them.

Manifestations of the party’s re-emerged popularity came in two ways through the large numbers of people who flocked to Kaunda’s rallies and through the party’s successes in most local government by-elections that were contested in the province at the time. These included four in Kaoma, which brought their number of councilors from one, which they had won during the full council elections to five.

The party’s revamped strength was even acknowledged by a group of the ruling party’s District Executive Committee (DEC) members in one of districts. Confessing that they would have found it extremely difficult to win any of the seats in the district had UNIP participated, they attributed the reasons for this to among other things that party’s superior organizational structure, the cooperation of its members,\(^{(36)}\) the fact that it did not impose aspiring candidates on the people and the failure of the then MMD MPs to visit their constituencies.\(^{(37)}\)

THE UNIP WITHDRAWAL AND THE MMD-ZADECO DOMINANCE OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

The 1996 election boycott by UNIP and a number of other opposition parties was one of the major occurrences associated with that exercise. It was prompted by the government’s final decision to hold the elections under the disputed 1996 Constitution and using the NIKUV Register, which the opposition parties had consistently been opposed to. This section of the study looks at the success or failure of this boycott and its resulting dominance of the election campaigns by the ruling MMD and ZADECO.

I. The UNIP Boycott

The question of whether or not the UNIP boycott was successful, has been discussed by people everywhere in the province. Most of those interviewed felt that the boycott was not only unsuccessful but also ill conceived. The fact that the election exercise went on as planned with many people casting their votes, they said, portray the success of the exercise; and consequently, the futility of the boycott. UNIP, they contended would have won most, if not all the seats in the province, had the party participated in the polls.

The reasons advanced in support of their claim were: the ruling party’s alleged unpopularity among the people; the absence of an opposition party stronger than UNIP, which people could have embraced as an alternative to the ruling MMD; UNIP’s track record which many believed was in various ways better than that of the ruling party; UNIP’s successful performances in various Local Government by-elections prior to the elections and the success of two UNIP members who defied the boycott decision and stood as independents in the Parliamentary elections in their constituencies.

Notwithstanding the above, however, UNIP officials maintained that their boycott
was successful, arguing that most of their supporters refrained from voting. This claim appears to be supported by statistical data on the election results in some polling districts such as Litambya, where only 258 or 33.5% of the 771 registered voters cast their votes.\(^{(38)}\) Since the polling district is situated within the boundaries of the district’s administrative centre, it is obvious that the UNIP members here got the boycott message (unlike some of their colleagues in the remotest areas) and could have decided to stay away from the polls as instructed by their party leaders.

Although supported, the claim regarding the boycott’s success does not seem entirely convincing for the following reasons. The first is that the overall number of people who voted in the parliamentary elections was larger than that of those who did not. Although the difference between the two was insignificant, it is important to note that those who voted were above 50% (actually 53.48%) (Times of Zambia, 18/12/96) of the total registered voters in the province. Moreover, the number of those who stayed away could, to a great extent, have been due to the usual apathy that have characterized by-elections in the post 1991 elections period. This is evidenced by the results of Lukulu East Constituency, where the number of people who stayed away was quite large about 40%, despite the fact that ordinary UNIP members there had resolved to and actually supported the UNIP independent in spite of the boycott.\(^{(39)}\) The second is that UNIP has failed to release the figures of surrendered voters’ cards by their supporters to help authenticate their claim to the effectiveness of the boycott exercise. The third is that the intended purpose of the boycott has not materialized since the elections took place as planned and life has remained normal ever since. Critics of UNIP’s election boycott particularly expressed the last point. But the party concerned took a different view. The election dispute was not over, according to them; and they pointed to the court case over the president’s citizenship as a matter in point. They were confident that another election, which was to be based on an acceptable constitution and voters’ role, was bound to take place this year. ‘History’, as one of them rightly observed, ‘will be the judge over this issue’.

II. The Domination of the Election Campaigns by MMD and ZADECO

In the absence of UNIP, the election campaign was dominated by the MMD and ZADECO in most of the constituencies. This was characterized by their coverage of all areas of the province addressing meetings and distributing campaign posters. This is because they had more resources than any of their competitors. Their abundant resources enabled them not only to travel to many areas of each constituency for campaign purposes; but also to set up and pay campaign teams,\(^{(40)}\) purchase campaign materials and allegedly, ‘bribe’ voters as well.

The alleged use of resources to ‘bribe’ voters was among the main complaints of some of the smaller parties; some of which referred to the slaughtering of cattle by these two parties to feed potential voters in various areas within the campaign period. References were also made to a K5 million cheque that one aspiring candidate gave to a church congregation at the end of their service saying it was a donation from the President. The timing of this alleged donation was seen as having been designed to influence voters in favour of that particular candidate and the President who was seeking re-election. The same is true of some school requisites that were
delivered in some schools shortly before elections when these had been in the district long before that time. (41)

The major problem of this inequality of access to resources by parties during elections is that it brings unfair competition in the election process. Parties with the least means are greatly disadvantaged in many ways. They find it difficult to reach all the potential voters to present their credentials, hire election agents to assist them or get election materials made or printed. As a result, such parties and/or their candidates may lose elections even if they were the best candidates in the race. Their disadvantaged position was clearly stated by an Agenda for Zambia candidate when he said:

'I have support. The only problem is that as a new party we are not yet known... very difficult to cover the constituency when you have no money and no transport. I carry out my campaigns on foot and it is not easy. People in the areas I managed to touch are very supportive.'

UNDEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

The issue of bribery has been referred to as having featured during last year’s election campaigns. This was but one of the features of undemocratic practices that took place in relation to those elections. A number of others existed, which are discussed here under.

The first was the commencement of the campaigns long before the appropriate time. For elections to be fair, there is need for all aspirants to have equal opportunities in carrying out the campaigns. This is not only true of the equality of access to resources such as money, transport, electronic and print media, etc.; but that of the time span of the campaigns as well. Unfortunately it was discovered in last year’s elections that some people started their campaigns much earlier. An example of this is that of a man who had engaged in timber cutting in an area of the constituency in which he intended to stand; while subtly carrying out his campaign. This man is said to have so effectively made a following that many people were allegedly saying: ‘Had it been x, ... Had it been x, when they discovered that he was not among the aspiring candidates owing to the UNIP boycott.

The second undemocratic practice was block voting. This is said to have occurred during one of UNIP’s primary elections. Because the two candidates involved happened to belong to two different ethnic groups, some informants stated, each of the groups in question rallied behind its tribesman. Once the winner was declared, however, the party members are said to have closed their ranks—ready to face their opponents. This practice is not new, however. It used to feature in Kalabo Central Constituency during the Second Republic when voters were often largely divided between Mbunda and Lozi groupings. It once happened in Kaoma Central Constituency as well, where a Mbunda-Lozi grouping is said to have been formed to defeat a parliamentary candidate who allegedly campaigned on an anti-Lozi platform. The candidate was of Lozi-Nkoya origin and had thrice won the seat with Lozi support. His anti-Lozi stance then, was allegedly due to his ambition of having a 10th province created—which was to group all Nkoya people and in which he was
to have greater influence e.g. by being made its Member of the Central Committee. Contrary to his expectation, however, his anti-Lozi stance cost him his political career as he lost the election to his opponent. The problem with the block type of voting is that it may rob constituents of a better representative, if the group backing his less gifted opponent is numerically so strong that he loses the election. This would inevitably lead to poor representation, which might result in retarded development for that constituency.

The third such practice was the imposition of candidates by political parties. This implies the selection by a party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) of a man or woman to stand as a candidate in an election without the wish of party members in the ward or constituency in which the election is to be held. This malpractice is said to have occurred within the ruling party. Contrary to its policy of holding interviews at District Executive Committee (DEC) level and then forwarding results to NEC for ratification, the party allegedly sent two men who never attended such interviews to contest elections in two of the constituencies. While this was tolerated by the general party membership in the affected constituencies, it prompted one of the aspirants to stand as an independent. ‘I had to do this’ he told me, ‘because the whole thing was undemocratic’.

And some DEC members in whose district the other imposed candidate was, were equally critical of the action. Discussing the relative strengths of the parties before the UNIP boycott and being frank about the former ruling party’s strength, they had this to say: ‘UNIP is the party we were worried about. To be frank, there is no constituency we were hopeful of winning because our candidates were imposed. We stay with the people and we know who they want to represent them’. They ended by requesting me to remember to write this issue in order for leaders to ‘know this problem’.

Fourthly there were also some cases of double voting. This matter was revealed by a ZADECO party official who had served as campaign manager and election agent for one of his party’s candidates in his district. He said this when giving reasons as to why his party lost the elections despite their having been so confident of winning. He gave double voting by some MMD supporters as one such reason. This he said was revealed to him by a man who had so voted—using two voter’s cards that bore similar details regarding names, NRC number, residential area but different polling districts.42

Interference with opponents’ campaign meetings was another undemocratic practice. A National Party losing candidate brought this to light. His meeting was scheduled for 14 hours on 4th November 1996, he stated. Despite having had a police permit, he said, some MMD cadres went to the venue about an hour earlier ‘ostensibly to hold their own meeting but in reality to disrupt mine’.

Since there was a law requiring people to apply for police permits to hold meetings seven days in advance (as there still is) collusions of this kind do not seem accidental. They appear to be deliberate attempts to frustrate the process of democracy in the area of political competition.

Delivery of insufficient ballot papers was yet another manifestation of this problem. This is alleged to have occurred in two polling districts of Nalolo Constituency. An example of this is Nalolo polling District, which despite having 723 registered
voters, had only 200 ballot papers delivered there. This resulted in many voters being turned away, thereby denying them their right to choose both their parliamentary representative and their Head of State. And the act of sending insufficient ballot papers was seen by some people as a deliberate move to rob some popular candidates in the areas concerned, of getting more votes. Whether this is true or not, the action is definitely a deterrent to fairness in the elective process.

The last manifestation of undemocratic practices took the form of the use of Government vehicles for campaign purposes. This was one further complaint some opposition members made against the ruling party. Those particularly accused of the practice were MMD parliamentary aspirants who had held ministerial positions prior to the dissolution of parliament. These people were alleged to have continued to use their ministerial vehicles for campaign purposes. This gave them an advantage over their opponents; the more so that, their party, had the greatest resources among those that took part in the elections.

THE ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS

Both the parliamentary and presidential election results registered some surprises. They also brought certain claims by some parties into question—although results obtained in other provinces seem to uphold such claims. Details of these results are discussed in sub-sections 7.1 and 7.2 of this section.

I. The Parliamentary Election Results

The Parliamentary elections in the province were won by the MMD, which got 11 of the 17 seats at stake (one of them unopposed), while the remaining 6 went to ZADECO, Agenda for Zambia Party and independents on an equal basis. While the MMD triumph was not unexpected in the absence of UNIP, the success of the other two parties and the independents was not so obvious to most people in the country. ZADECO, like the National Party, was not rated highly by voters when they filled in the questionnaire at the beginning of the study, Agenda for Zambia was newly born and scarcely known among the people; while independents had no history of standing for, let alone winning elections ever since the time of independence. (43)

Consequently, the success of the two parties and the independents came as a surprise to many. An analysis of the matter, however, tend to attribute this to three factors namely, some candidates’ previous records of good performance as MPs, some candidates’ impressive credentials and some candidates’ fortune.

The two independents seem to have won due to their impressive records as MPs. The popularity of both of them was portrayed during interviews prior to the holding of the elections. In May, 1996 one interviewee referred favourably to one of them, Mr. Crispin Sibetta, when talking about stagnation in the development of their area since he left parliament:

‘There is no development taking place at the moment. Our schools are a testimony. The projects which were initiated by Sibetta under the Luena Self-Help Association
for Development (SHADE) have come to a stand still.’

That Mr. Sibetta was able to win back the seat even on an independent ticket is easy to see. He had impressed his constituents through his achievements during his previous term of office. This won him their confidence, which he still enjoyed five years after he had left the office. It is important to note that his success and that of his colleague (Mr. Luhana) in Lukulu East invalidated a claim by some MMD members that the UNIP withdrawal was a result of fear of losing the elections.

Some of the small party aspirants won through their impressive CVs. This is true of the winners of the Nalolo and Mongu Central Constituencies – Dr. Kasuka Mutukwa and Dr. Inonge Mbikusita Lewanika respectively. Not only are the two highly educated but they have impressive records of service both in the country and abroad as well. The credentials, coupled with their owners’ impeccable records, were bound to see the two win the seats they were contesting. This was the more so that a significant portion of voters in each of the constituencies, believe in giving their votes to aspirants they consider to be the best (Table 3), and that both these candidates had resources of their own for use in campaigns.

While ‘fortune’ may sound far-fetched as a determining factor of electoral success, this seems to have been at the core of the success that some of the opposition candidates achieved in the last elections. Facing a ruling party candidate, who allegedly was very unpopular for lack of performance during his term of office, one opposition candidate is said to have succeeded in getting elected; mainly because he was the only alternative person available. Fortune does not seem to have favoured some opposition members only. It appears to have facilitated the going to parliament of the ruling party’s unopposed candidate also. His MMD predecessor was allegedly a no show MP i.e. that he never visited his constituency. Had UNIP taken part in the elections, therefore, and put up a strong candidate, the result could probably have been different. This is the more so that the unopposed MP had made several unsuccessful attempts to get elected to Parliament before.

Another notable outcome of these elections was the total explipse of NP popularity in the province. For, while the party came with a bang by beating the ruling party in three crucial parliamentary by-elections in 1993, its fortunes begun to decline thereafter. The decline was portrayed by its loss of various Local Government by-elections and the Mwandi Parliamentary one. The party’s defeat in all the contested seats in the November, 1996 elections, therefore, seems to have marked the ceiling of its fame in that part of the country. This is the more so that the party had put up a good number of ‘good candidates’ in the race. These included their party’s Vice-President and one time Prime Minister, Mr. Daniel Lisulo; a retired Senior educationist and former District Governor; a degree holding – senior company employee and a retired Postal Management employee.

This loss of popularity is generally attributed to the replacement of Dr. Inonge Mbikusita Lewanika as party leader and the ‘failure’ of her successors to effectively run the organization. The late Baldwin Nkumbula allegedly failed to undertake scheduled visits to the province during his term as Party President, while Humphrey Mulemba could not provide assistance to party officials and cadres to facilitate their party’s campaigns.
II. The Presidential Election Results

One of the findings of these results was the authentication of the fact that President Chiluba was unpopular among the Lozi. This was shown by his aggregate poll of 40.50%, which, though the highest in the province, was far below those he got from other provinces (Table 10).

This percentage poll also portrays him as being less popular, than the party he leads; as the aggregate poll of the party’s candidates in the province is 47.79% (Table 11).

Another notable factor about the race is the impressive performance of Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika. His winning 27.68% of the votes when his party was less than two months old at the time of elections and coming second to the president is greatly fascinating. This is in view of the great campaign that Dean Mung’omba had put up, and his own (Lewanika’s) party’s inadequate resources to carry out a similar campaign. For these factors could have seen Mung’omba win second place.

While some people may explain this in ethnic terms i.e. that Lozi’s voted for him for being one of them, this kind of explanation appears to be an oversimplification. For, had this been the sole reason, he should have beaten the President as well. What seems more probable, therefore, is the factor of the fight he had put up in Parliament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Candidate</th>
<th>Central Copperbelt</th>
<th>Eastern Luapula</th>
<th>Lusaka</th>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>North-Western</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chakomboka C. M.</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>3.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chiluba F. J. T.</td>
<td>69.62</td>
<td>81.94</td>
<td>60.28</td>
<td>82.44</td>
<td>68.95</td>
<td>77.38</td>
<td>50.19</td>
<td>63.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbikusita A. Lewanika</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>95.17</strong></td>
<td><strong>94.90</strong></td>
<td><strong>94.13</strong></td>
<td><strong>96.51</strong></td>
<td><strong>93.99</strong></td>
<td><strong>96.16</strong></td>
<td><strong>96.15</strong></td>
<td><strong>94.74</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: Times of Zambia, 18/12/96.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Central Copperbelt</th>
<th>Eastern Luapula</th>
<th>Lusaka</th>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>North-Western</th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>National</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MMD</td>
<td>47.97</td>
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<td>58.90</td>
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<td>2.68</td>
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<td>AZ</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>Independents</td>
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<td>7.07</td>
<td>2.17</td>
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<td>9.48</td>
<td>17.02</td>
<td>8.09</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>96.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>95.77</strong></td>
<td><strong>95.11</strong></td>
<td><strong>97.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>95.25</strong></td>
<td><strong>96.23</strong></td>
<td><strong>96.95</strong></td>
<td><strong>95.89</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: Times of Zambia, 18/12/96.
in defence of democracy. Because this fight resulted in his expulsion from that institution, it gave him a heroic image, which may have prompted some people to consider him more worthy of their support than the other opposition contestants. Another possible explanation is the party’s use of the cultural dimension in their campaign meetings. It was reported that many Agenda for Zambia supporters in Mongu wore ‘misisi’ and ‘liziba’ – the traditional wear for women and men respectively. This made such meetings conspicuous and must certainly have attracted a good number of people to them; who in turn could have helped disseminate the messages they received.

The other surprises of this poll are the unexpectedly big number of votes Chakomboka obtained in the province, and Mulemba’s dismal performance. Chakomboka’s performance is surprising in so far as his party is more or less a ‘one man organization’ and that, therefore, he certainly lacked campaigners in the province under study. Mulemba’s is surprising because of the striking manner in which his party came upon the province’s political scene barely three years back. The reason for his poor performance is inherent in what has been said about his party’s loss of popularity in the parliamentary election results section of this paper. His alleged lack of support for party organizers was clearly articulated by one party official. At a closed meeting of party officials and National Party leaders (including Mulemba) this official allegedly told the leaders after they had requested for comments from them:

‘... We sometimes wonder whether our leader is the same Mulemba we knew (in reference to his leadership during the Second Republic) ... a formidable party organizer ... moving, organizing and getting results.... Where are the bicycles we were promised for party campaigns? How can we be expected to work wonders without resources?’

And in reply to a query by one of the party’s national executive leaders that it wasn’t money or vehicles that mattered in the work but commitment, he replied:

‘What commitment are we talking about? Are we not here ... this time of the day (it was night then). Isn’t this commitment?’

This official echoed what many others had told me concerning their conviction that had Inonge retained the leadership of their party, its popularity would have remained solid and that they would have swept all the seats in the province!

CONCLUSION

Since this study is three dimensional i.e. that it embraces three major issues (traditionalism, democracy and political participation), it is imperative that something be said (albeit briefly) on the findings relating to each of them in order to highlight them and/or their implications.

This study discovered three major things in respect of traditionalism. First, that the Lozi people are still largely attached to their traditional authority (the Lozi Royal
Establishment), second, their great attachment, notwithstanding, the majority of them would not accept a directive by the Royal Establishment to vote for candidates who are not of their own choice and thirdly, that both the Royal Establishment and the people are generally disenchanted with both the Government and party in power. The government’s failure to restore the abrogated ‘Barotseland Agreement’ emerged as the basic factor behind the Royal Establishment’s disenchantment, while its poor developmental performance seem to account for that of the ordinary people.

Manifested by the Royal Establishment’s April 1996 decision to support UNIP (the ruling party’s major contender for power) in the then awaited elections, and confirmed by the ruling party’s unimpressive performance in the actual polls (even with the absence of its major rival), this disillusionment appears to be of sufficient magnitude to warrant government’s proper attention. This is so for three reasons. The first is that one of its causes (the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement) reportedly roused emotions among petitioners from the province that made submissions concerning the subject to the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Commission. The second is that both the Mwanakatwe Commission and its predecessor, the Mvunga Commission, considered the Agreement as being complex and political and that it had better be resolved by an authority/authorities other than themselves—the Government and the Royal Establishment according to the Mwanakatwe one. The third is that the Royal Establishment has actually begun to externalise the dispute over the matter.

It is significant to note that emotionalism was found among petitioners who submitted to the Mwanakatwe Commission and not among those who did so to the Mvunga one five years previously; and that the Royal Establishment’s decision to externalise the dispute was taken about six months after the controversial elections. These factors seem to suggest growing impatience on the part of the grieved Lozis, as does the kind of language employed in the dispute’s externalising document. This being the case, the suggestion that the matter is significant enough to justify government’s proper attention appears plausible.

It is important to note too that a senior government official recently announced government’s intention to re-introduce ‘native authorities’ in the interest of devolution of power. The announcement was made by the Deputy-Minister for the Western Province at a public meeting in Sesheke District. Since the ‘Barotseland Agreement’ upheld the right of the people of the province to continue with the administration of their local affairs, it is to be seen whether this measure (if implemented) will amount to a full restoration of the ‘Agreement,’ and to an extension of all its provisions to the other provinces.

Such occurrences would, I believe, be greatly welcomed countrywide. Not only would they help restore Lozi confidence in the status-quo and thereby ensure continued harmony in the nation; but that they would most probably satisfy the desires of many other petitioners elsewhere in the country, who reportedly called for the establishment of a ‘Federal System of Government’ in the country—in their submissions to the Mwanakatwe Commission. For, by being allowed to run their local affairs, such people would have their desires fulfilled to a certain extent, even without a complete Federal structure of administration in place.

The issues of democracy and political participation are intricately linked and
hence will be discussed together. They are linked because the latter (political participation) is one of the basic elements, characteristics and/or requirements of the former (democracy). And since participation is itself dependent largely upon the existence of individual liberties and freedoms, the state of democracy in the province can be deduced from the findings of this study in respect of these things and other factors of relevance.

The people’s enjoyment of individual liberties and freedoms appears to be quite high; and so is their involvement in the electoral process. The 53.48% voter turnout in last year’s elections is a matter in point. The figure involved is undoubtedly quite high and the people it represents voted because they were free to exercise their right in this regard. Moreover, it is very probable that a significant number of those who did not vote were members of the ‘opposition alliance’, who likewise were exercising their right to stay away from the polls; as per their parties’ decision to do so. This two-pronged high degree of electoral participation (i.e. positively through voting and negatively through staying away as a way of protest) and the enjoyment of rights and freedoms that led to it, seem to correspondingly place the degree of democracy in the province to the same high level. This rating is further justified by the absence of various undemocratic tendencies that reportedly have taken place in other countries during election periods. These include the employment of ethnicity in election campaigns; coercion of voters and candidates, kidnappings of prospective candidates, prevention of aspiring candidates from launching their nomination papers and election associated ethnic or party clashes (Bard-Anders, 1993: 14-17).

Though commendable, these good features of democracy were mingled with and spoiled by the many undemocratic practices that were discovered by the study. These are issues of bribery, imposition of candidates, double voting, interference with opponents’ campaign meetings, delivery of insufficient ballot papers, etc. They were further marred by the relative inaccessibility of opposition candidates to electronic and print media as compared to the ruling party ones. For, in last year’s elections, governing party candidates (especially the president and those who happened to be ministers) had more access to these forms of media; and, consequently, had their candidatures much more greatly sold to the electorate than those of their opponents. This disadvantaged the opposition candidates, especially that many of them had no resources to enable them cover their constituencies in the short period that was allowed for campaigns.

All these factors combine to dilute the favourable rating of the province’s democratic experiences emanating from people’s electoral participation and their enjoyment of individual liberties; and make it difficult to make an overall rating of the phenomenon of democracy in this part of the country. This being the case, I am inclined to go along with part of the conclusion arrived at by researchers who studied the Kenyan elections of 1992 when they said:

‘... is problematic to categorise societies or political systems as either democratic or dictatorial. It is more fruitful to place a given society on a continuum between the two extremes...’
... societies may be more or less democratic at given points in time. Subsequently they may move progressively in either direction (Bard-Anders, 1993: 37).

I tend to go along with this kind of conclusion with regards to the rating of the province’s level of democracy during the 1996 election period. This to me was neither particularly high nor low. This is not because I have to put it between two extremes as suggested by the Kenyan Report, but because of the many good and many bad factors associated with its practice.

Having said this, may I end by requesting Government to examine the major weaknesses portrayed in the system and take measures that will ensure continued stability in the nation and lay for posterity a democratic foundation which will stand the test of time. This may be done through the use of ‘compromise’, since democracy is, as James Hadfield points out, based on compromise. The request is made on my conviction that governments are the bodies that are best suited to bring about compromises on matters that divide their individual nations and peoples. They do this by being flexible on matters that divide them as governments on the one hand and their opponents on the other; instead of being adamant owing to their (the governments’) possession of the instruments of force (the police and armed forces). It is important that our government revisit contentious issues like the abrogated ‘Barotseland Agreement’, the 1995 Land Act, the 1996 Constitution and the Nikuv Register to see if any compromises can be reached over them. This, I believe, would put an end to the controversies that these issues continue to generate and usher our nation fully united into the 21st century.

N.B. The reported antagonism between the Lozi Royal Establishment and MDD Government in the early election campaign period came to a complete end after the elections. It was replaced by an aura of unshakeable good will between the two groups, although the unpopularity of the government among the commonality appears to have taken an upward trend. The late Litunga enjoyed unprecedented care from the government from the time the rapprochement took place until his demise in July 2000, while the ruling party suffered defeats in three by election in the province as a manifestation of the continued disaffection of the ordinary people towards the ruling party.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This paper was written as part of “The 1996 Zambia Elections Project”, which was conducted by the Department of Political and Administrative Studies of the University of Zambia, and I would like to thank the Department for allowing me to publish it. I also wish to acknowledge and heartily thank: the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Royal Norwegian Embassy, the Royal Danish Embassy and the Embassy of Finland, for funding the project.

NOTES
(1) The name Lozi has generally been used to refer to all indigenous peoples of the Western Province (Malozi). It has also been used restrictively, however, as is sometimes the case, to refer to the descendants of the Luyi or Aluyi people who arrived in the province at the
end of the 17th century and founded what came to be known as the Luyi (Lozi) Kingdom—including their offshoots namely the Kwangwa, Kwandi, Mbowe, Makoma, Mwenyi, Nyengo, Imilangu, etc. The restricted usage was made to distinguish these people from other Lozi groupings such as the Mbunda or Nkoya, where this was necessary and an asterisk was put against the name to indicate this.

(2) These two former names will be used in some places where needed, particularly where the pre-colonial period is discussed.

(3) The power struggles were facilitated by the change from female rule to male rule at Lwambi when Notulu abdicated her throne out of anger. This was because some of the male rulers at Lwambi coveted the senior throne and tried to capture it upon the death of its occupant.

(4) Lilalo (sing. Silalo) were administrative divisions in the Lozi political system each of which comprised a group of villages.

(5) This protection was only limited by the convention that allowed the king to confiscate land which the owner could not utilize and give it to others who needed it.

(6) Performance of this institution in this manner, constituted a historical record of a man’s/woman’s possession of the land concerned; which could be cited by that person or his/her descendants in its defence should some people make claims to the same piece of land at whatever time thereafter.

(7) Contrary to some scholars who have mistakenly traced the commencement of canal making in Bulozi to the time of Mulambwa, it has been ascertained that the first such venture was carried out by the Paris Evangelical Society missionaries at the end of the 19th century, when King Lewanika was on the throne. (Njekwa Kamayoyo, 1984).

(8) The duration period of such labour was fixed at 12 days in a year during 1906.

(9) This invasion took place in the 1840s and resulted in the conquest of the Lozi and the establishment of Kololo rule which lasted until 1864.

(10) The longest periods of warfare experienced in the Kingdom previously were those fought by Ngalama against the Kwangwa and Kwandi breakaway groups and those of Ngombala which destroyed the Kabinga chieftaincy in Makoma and the Sitwamemba/Kambunji one in Nyengo. These were targeted, however, and did not affect the whole kingdom.

(11) An example of this is when the British gave away the Caprivi Strip (which was Loziland) to Germany, in a deal which they (the British) made with the latter on 1/7/90.

(12) Taxes were unwarranted because, much as though great amounts of money were obtained from Lozi tax payers, very little of it was used for the welfare of those who paid it.

(13) These powers are reflected in the Barotseland Agreement Document, where they were sought to be preserved. (Appendix 2)

(14) These designations were introduced at the founding of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland as a way of re-affirming the province’s special position by the colonizing power.

(15) These elections were the Legislative Council Elections of 1962, the Barotse National Council Elections of 1963 and the Self-Governing Elections of January, 1964.

(16) This party was initially led by the late Mufaya Mumbuna although most people wrongly regard it as having been founded by the late Mundia.

(17) The only Lozi who managed to win a post was Mr. Sikota Wina who had contested the position of Publicity Secretary.

(18) The overall result of these factors in the province was the humiliating defeat of UNIP in the 1968 General Elections and electorate’s 60% rejection of the government’s referendum proposition put before them during the same election.
(19) The nationalists’ arch enemy, Sir Roy Welensky is reported to have given the Royal Establishment backed BNP three Land Rovers and £200 cash for campaign purposes, and to have sent a public relations officer named George Addicott to help the party during the last month of the campaign. (See – Central African Mail, 23rd October 1962)

(20) Reasons for UNIP’s success include its support by Lozi intellectuals, the protectorate’s backwardness due to its negligence by the colonial administrators and UNIP’s promises of development for the area. For details, see Sumbwa, G.N., ‘UNIP and the politicization of the Rural Masses: The Example of Kalabo District: (Unpublished), pp. 19-29.

(21) The only feature of Local Government administration which appears to have been contradictorily dealt with in the document is that pertaining to land administration. (Appendix 2).

(22) King Lewanika is said to have executed a lot of people prior to his overthrow and banishment, and to have become completely changed into a good ruler after his restoration.

(23) While people acknowledged the prevalence of consumer goods since 1991 many regret the fact that these are normally found at District Headquarters and not in the remote areas of those districts. Some people in such areas, therefore, still complain of the problems of access to consumer goods especially those in places where they used to have NIEC stores but now have to walk 2 to 3 days to the District centres to buy salt and other necessities.

(24) All the three were MMD founder members: Dr. Inonge Lewanika, her brother, Mr. Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika and the late Mr. Arthur Wina.

(25) The groups included almost all opposition parties, major church organisations, the Law Association of Zambia, The Royal Foundation, the student bodies at the two universities, etc.

(26) Post. 17/11/96. It is surprising to note that the chiefs were making reference to tribal kingdoms when these no longer exist. What they seem to have expressed is the need for the Constitution to grant them greater political roles than they currently have.

(27) Informants on this issue showed displeasure about it saying that it was not consistent with democracy; with some of them deploring the fact that other government workers who are ruling party members are not subjected to similar threats even if they are politically active.

(28) The matter was first blamed on one of the MPs in the district in the 1980s and later on – upon the MMD government.

(29) The Speaker was probably making reference to the Litunga’s acceptance of the position of Central Committee Member during the Second Republic which many Lozis were not happy about.

(30) People reportedly came from all the districts of the province and that they guarded the Litunga’s capital for about 10 days.

(31) Testifying to this fact, one induna pointed out that appointments to traditional offices involved all members ‘even some of those in distant places’.

(32) Also known as ‘Nakatindi Road’ this road is the second tar road in the Western Province after the Lusaka-Mongu one. Its state is said to be probably the worst of all the tarred district roads in the country.

(33) The Deputy Minister of Works’ recent ultimatum to the road contractor to work on the Lusaka-Kaoma road to complete the worst parts of this road in a specified time is testimony to its poor state.

(34) While the clause in the Constitution bars people of foreign parentage from standing for the presidency, most people in the province regarded it as having been directed to Dr. Kaunda.

(35) Their structure went down to sections within villages/townships, which meant that party
messages could reach almost everyone in the community.

(36) An example of this is that of parliamentary aspirants who are said to have used their vehicles to go and campaign for Local Government aspirants in wards that were outside the constituencies where they themselves intended to stand.

(37) This was one of the major complaints of MMD party officials who said that the practice made their work extremely difficult.

(38) Election returns obtained from some FODEP officials.

(39) I was informed of this resolution by one of the party officials in the district. The resolution, she said, was made because of the candidates’ good performance during his previous term of office as MP (from 1988-91) which made people greatly desirous of having him back as their representative.

(40) References were made to MMD campaign teams known as ‘foot soldiers.’ These walked from village to village for propaganda purposes and were given fairly large sums of money (K70,000 for five in one instance) as well as ‘litenge’ and ‘T-Shirts’ for distribution to people attending their meetings.

(41) Besides the said K5 million ‘donation’, other notable things mentioned as having been given to people as bribery by the MMD in Sinanga District include: a grinding meal (which was given to the Nalolo Royal Establishment a week before elections), balls and jerseys to the secondary school and a K20 million grant to the same institution.

(42) The informant said he had the cards in his possession and that he was ready to produce them as evidence in court if the election result in the constituency were to be challenged. He also explained that the alleged ‘double voter’ revealed what he did after failing to get his promised reward for it.

(43) Mr. Kwalombota Mulonda is one example of someone who had stood for and won a seat in an election before. But this was in 1959 when he stood for a Legislative Council seat and thoroughly beat his only opponent (the late Mr. Mufaya Mumbuna) who stood on United Federal Party (UFP) ticket.

(44) Externalization of this dispute was in form of letters to the Security Council, the Commonwealth and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) requesting these bodies to intervene in it; in order to prevent it from developing into violence.

(45) The period between the dissolution of Parliament and the date of elections was about a month.

REFERENCES


- - - - - Accepted *November 9, 2000*

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APPENDIX 1.
Some privatized companies in western province.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF COMPANY</th>
<th>LABOUR FORCE</th>
<th>FORCED REDUNDANCIES</th>
<th>VOLUNTARY REDUNDANCIES</th>
<th>EMPLOYEES RETAINED</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1. INDECO Milling</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Mongu Mill)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lyambi Hotel</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mongu Dairy Farm</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ZNWMC</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Data for Mongu only)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Z/Cold Storage</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Zambia Privatization Agency (RPA) Records.

APPENDIX 2.

THE BAROTSELAND AGREEMENT 1964

Following talks in London between the British Government, the Government of Northern Rhodesia and The Litunga of Barotseland, an Agreement regarding the position of Barotseland within independent Northern Rhodesia was concluded at the Commonwealth Relations Office on 18th May, 1964. It is entitled “The Barotseland Agreement 1964”. It was signed by Dr. K.D. Kaunda, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, by Sir Mwanawina Lewanika III, K.B.E., Litunga of Barotseland and by the Right Honourable Duncan Sandys, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies, signifying the approval of Her Majesty’s Government.

The Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia undertook, on behalf of his Government, that the Agreement would be reaffirmed by the Government of Northern Rhodesia at independence.

The text of the Agreement is attached as the Appendix to this Paper on 19th May, 1964. This Agreement is made this eighteenth day of May 1964 between KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, on behalf of the Government of Northern Rhodesia of the one part and SIR MWANAWINA LEWANIKA THE THIRD, K.B.E., Litunga of Barotseland, acting on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, his Council, and the chiefs and people of Barotseland of the other part and is signed by the Right Honourable DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies, to signify the approval of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of the arrangements entered into between the parties to this Agreement and recorded therein:

Whereas it is proposed that Northern Rhodesia shall become an independent sovereign republic to be known as the Republic of Zambia;

And whereas it is the wish of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and of the Litunga of Barotseland, his Council and the chiefs and people of Barotseland that Northern Rhodesia should proceed to independence as one country and that all its peoples should be one nation;

And whereas, having regard to the fact that all treaties and other agreements subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Litunga of Barotseland will terminate when Northern Rhodesia becomes an
independent sovereign republic and Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will thereupon cease to have any responsibility for the government of Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, it is the wish of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and of the Litunga of Barotseland to enter into arrangements concerning the position of Barotseland as part of the Republic of Zambia to take the place of the treaties and other agreements hitherto subsisting between Her Majesty the Queen and the Litunga of Barotseland.

And whereas on the sixteenth day of April 1964 a provisional agreement was concluded at Lusaka with this purpose and it is the desire of the Government of Northern Rhodesia and the Litunga, acting after consultation with his Council, to conclude a permanent agreement with this purpose.

Now This Agreement Winesseth and it is hereby agreed between the said Kenneth David Kaunda, Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, on behalf of the government of Northern Rhodesia and Sir Mwanawina Lewanika the Third, K.B.E., Litunga of Barotseland on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, his Council and the chiefs and people of Barotseland as follows:–

1. Citation and Commencement

This Agreement may be cited as the Barotseland Agreement 1964 and shall come into force on the day on which Northern Rhodesia, including Barotseland, becomes the independent sovereign Republic of Zambia.

2. The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia

Shall include the provisions agreed upon for inclusion therein at the Constitutional Conference held in London in May 1964 relating to:–

(1) the protection of human rights and fundamental freedom of the individual;
(2) the judiciary; and
(3) the public service, and those provisions shall have full force and effect in Barotseland.

3. Administration of Justice

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the people of Barotseland shall be accorded the same rights of access to the High Court of the Republic of Zambia as are accorded to other citizens of the Republic under the laws for the time being in force in the Republic and a judge or judges of the High Court selected from among the judges who normally sit in Lusaka shall regularly proceed on circuit in Barotseland at such intervals as the due administration of justice may require.
(2) The people of Barotseland shall be accorded the same rights of appeal from decisions of the courts of the Republic of Zambia as are accorded to other citizens of the Republic under the laws for the time being in force in the Republic.

4. The Litunga and His Council

(1) The Government of the Republic of Zambia will accord recognition as such to the person who is for the time being the Litunga of Barotseland under the customary law of Barotseland.
(2) The Litunga of Barotseland, acting after consultation with his Council as constituted for the time being under the customary law of Barotseland, shall be the principal local
authority for the government and administration of Barotseland.

(3) The Litunga of Barotseland, acting after consultation with his Council, shall be autho-

rised and empowered to make laws for Barotseland in relation to the following matters,

that is to say:–

(a) the Litungaship.

(b) the authority at present known as the Barotse Native Government (which shall

thereafter be known as the Barotse Government);

(c) the authorities at present known as Barotse Native Authorities;

(d) the courts at present known as Barotse Native Courts;

(e) the status of members of the Litungs's Council;

(f) matters relating to local government;

(g) land;

(h) forests,

(i) traditional and customary matters relating to Barotseland alone;

(j) fishing;

(k) control of hunting;

(l) game preservation;

(m) control of bush fires;

(n) the institution at present known as the Barotse Native Treasury;

(o) the supply of beer,

(p) reservation of trees for canoes;

(q) local taxation and matters relating thereto; and

(r) Barotse local festivals.

5. Land

(1) In relation to land in Barotseland the arrangements at out in the annex hereto shall

have effect.

(2) In particular, the Litunga of Barotseland and his council shall continue to have the

powers hitherto enjoyed by them in respect of land matters under customary law and

practice.

(3) The courts at present known as the Barotse Native Courts shall have original jurisdic-

tion (to the exclusion of any other court in the Republic of Zambia) in respect of mat-

ters concerning rights over interests in land in Barotseland to the extent that those

matters are governed by the customary law of Barotseland.

Provided that nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the jurisdiction

and powers of the High Court of the Republic of Zambia in relation to writs for orders

of the kind at present known as prerogative writs of orders.

(4) Save with the leave of the court at present known as the Saa-Sikalo Kuta, no appeal

shall lie from any decision of the courts at present known as the Barotse Native Courts

given in Exercise of the jurisdiction referred to in paragraph (3) of this article to the

High Court of the Republic of Zambia.

(5) Civil servants

All public officers of the Government of the Republic of Zambia who may from time
to time be stationed in Barotseland shall be officers serving on permanent and pension-

able terms.

(6) Financial responsibility

The Government of the Republic of Zambia shall have the same general responsibil-

ity for providing financial support for the administration and economic development of

Barotseland as it has for other parts of the Republic and shall ensure that, in discharge
of this responsibility, Barotseland is treated fairly and equitably in relation to other parts of the Republic.

(7) Implementation

The Government of the Republic of Zambia shall take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that the laws for the time being in force in the Republic are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.

(8) Interpretation

Any question concerning the interpretation of this Agreement may be referred by the government of the Republic of Zambia to the High Court of the Republic for consideration (in which case the opinion thereon of the Courts shall be communicated to that Government and to the Litunga of Barotseland and his Council) and any such question shall be so referred if the Litunga, acting after consultation with his Council, so requests.

(9) Revocation

The therein before-recited Agreement of the sixteenth day of April 1964 is hereby revoked.

In witness whereof the parties hereto have of hereunto act their hands in the presence of—

(Signed)
E.D. HONE
Governor of Northern Rhodesia

(Signed)
K.D. KAUNDA
Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia

(Signed)
RICHARD HORNBY
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies

(Signed)
MWANAWINA LEWANIKA III,
K.B.E. Litunga of Barotseland

(Signed)
IMENDA SIBANDI
Ngambela of Barotseland

Signed by the Right Honourable Duncan Sandys in the presence of—

(Signed)
DUNCAN SANDYS
Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies

ANNEX TO THIS AGREEMENT

1. The Litunga and National Council of Barotseland have always worked in close cooperation with the Central Government over land matters in the past, have agreed that the Central Government should use land required for public purpose, have adopted the same procedures as apply to leases and rights of occupancy in the Reserves and Trust land areas, where applicable. At the same time, the administration of land rights in Barotseland under customary law and practice has been under the control of the Litunga and National Council in much the same way as customary land rights are dealt with in the Reserves and Trust Land areas.
2. In these circumstances it is agreed that the Litunga should continue to have the greatest measure of responsibility for administering land matters in Barotseland. It is however necessary to examine the position of land in Barotseland against the background of responsibility for the territory.

3. The Barotse memorandum has indicated that Barotseland should become an integral part of Northern Rhodesia. In these circumstances the Northern Rhodesia Government will assume certain responsibilities and to carry these out they will have to have certain powers. So far as land is concerned, apart from confirmation of wide powers to the Litunga over customary matters, the position is as follows:

   (1) The Northern Rhodesia Government does not wish to derogate from any of the powers exercised by the Litunga and Council in respect of land matters under customary law and practice.

   (2) The Northern Rhodesia Government would like to ensure that the provision of public services and the possibility of economic development in Barotseland are not hampered by special formalities.

   (3) The Northern Rhodesia Government recognises and agrees that full consultation should take place with the Litunga and Council before any land in Barotseland is used for public purposes or in the general interests of economic development.

4. The position regarding land in Barotseland in an independent Northern Rhodesia should, therefore, be as follows:

   (1) There should be the same system for land administration for the whole of Northern Rhodesia including Barotseland, that is, the Government Lands Department should be responsible for professional advice and services with regard to land alienation in all parts of Northern Rhodesia and that the same form of document should be used for grants of land

      (i) for Government purposes

      (ii) for non-Government and non-customary purposes. The necessary preparation of the title documents should be done by the Government Lands Department.

   (2) The Litunga and National Council of Barotseland will be charged with the responsibility for administering Barotse customary land law within Barotseland.