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SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EVERYDAY CONVERSATIONS AMONG THE IGUI

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ABSTRACT
Several samples of IGui conversations were analyzed to examine basic methodological issues. The analysis on the logic of irony and implication reveals that a principle-centered understanding of the conversation such as Gricean theory is not sufficient. The organization of interaction in social context is especially important. The formalization of conversational interaction is defined as a systematic differentiation into complimentary roles of speaker and hearer and their alternation in relatively a long cycle, which realizes a particular patterning of the turn-taking. In contrast, frank argument is well-characterized by an immediate-reflexive responsiveness. By applying these concepts to actual social relationships, the model of joking-avoidance relationship is reconsidered.

Key Words: Conversation analysis; Cooperative principle; Turn-taking; Joking; Affines.

INTRODUCTION
Since 1987, I have recorded and transcribed various everyday conversations among the IGui San at the Xade Settlement in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, Botswana (Sugawara, 1991). This paper examines some methodological issues to analyze conversation in the ethnographic context, as well as to outline some of the results. Within the anthropological discipline, attempts to articulate the microanalysis of the everyday conversation with ethnographic exploration are still very rare. One of the few exceptions is the work by M. Moerman who applied ethnomethodological analysis to the study of talking among Thai villagers. A great disappointment at most ethnographies lacking concrete data on "actual speech events" led him to claim that "for ethnography, there is no richer ore than everyday conversation" (Moerman, 1988: 18).

Agreeing with this claim, I intend to fortify the ground for comparing the organization of the "lifeworld" lived by the IGui with ours, so as to integrate the two directions of anthropological exploration, i. e., understanding behavior as experienced by the people themselves in specific cultural contexts on the one hand, and developing the theory which helps to elucidate the universal features of human social interaction on the other (cf. Sugawara, 1990). In this paper I cannot present complete transcriptions of all the conversation samples. I shall merely present the summarized results from the analysis of several samples to provide the methodological prospect for the full demonstration of the data in the near future.
METHODS FOR COLLECTING AND ANALYZING THE DATA

The |Gui and ||Gana, or Central San, have especially adapted to the harsh dry environment of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Botswana. Eco-anthropological studies have been carried out by Tanaka (1980) and by Silberbauer (1981) on the people living in the Xade area, located in the mid western part of the Reserve. Since 1979, the government has prompted the people in this area to settle around the !Koi!kom borehole.

The conversations were collected in 3 periods of 3-4 months each; from August to November in 1987 and 1989, and from September to December 1992. Almost every morning, I participated in the gatherings of the people in either the camp where I stayed or neighboring camps, and recorded the conversation with a directional microphone connected with an audiocassette tape recorder. Word by word transcription was made possible by using an electric device that repeats 4 seconds of sound memorized in an IC. Every evening (from about 4 to 6 o’clock), two |Gui male assistants listened to the replayed data, which I had fully transcribed, and explained to me the background knowledge and context as well as meaning of words and sentences. As they knew neither English nor Setswana, all explanations and interpretations were given in |Gui language. Based on these explanations all the transcriptions were translated into Japanese. The translations were re-examined and corrected, according to the outcome of a linguistic investigation undertaken by H. Nakagawa since 1992 (Nakagawa, 1993). Below, the fragments of conversation thus transcribed, interpreted, and translated shall be designated as “samples.”

Twenty-seven samples, with a total duration of 14,255 seconds (ca 4 hours) were analyzed in the first period (1987), and 53 samples of 25,317 seconds (ca 7 hours) in the second (1989). In 1992, I collected 38 samples, of which about one-third (13) also included visual records obtained by VTR camera, but neither the calculation of total duration nor the analysis of gesticulation and body movement have yet been completed.

LOGIC OF CONVERSATION AND INFERENCE OF THE IMPLICATION

The analysis of everyday conversation in ethnographic context is expected to enable us to directly compare “our” way of understanding utterances, with that of those who dwell in a different ‘paradigm’ (cf. Tambiah, 1990). In other words, if human beings share any universal cognitive process of recognizing the world, it is very probable that this process can be ascertained by comparing cross-culturally how participants in conversation communicate with each other.

I. Grician Maxims of Conversation

The most relevant to the above argument is the theoretical model, proposed by P. Grice, which explains the logical devices of inference operated by participants. Grice assumed that human conversation was organized by cooperative
efforts of the participants to make their conversational contribution “such as is required ... by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange” (Grice, 1975: 45). Grice called the general principle of such efforts the Cooperative Principle (CP), where people behaved in accordance with the following maxims classified into 4 categories; Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. The most relevant to this paper is the first maxim of Quality (abbreviated to Q1 below): Do not say what you believe to be false.

Grice’s focus was put not so much on the empirical question of how often people in any culture observe these maxims, as on demonstrating the deductive process through which the hearer (abbreviated to H below) infers what was implied by the speaker (abbreviated to S below). Grice coined the term ‘implicature’ which is worked out from a set of specific data given in the present conversation. The process through which H deduces an implicature ([I]) can be summarized as follows. For example, to H, some utterance from S sounds as if S violated some of the above maxims. But on the premise that S must be observing CP, H assumes that S implied {I}, where the violation becomes superficial. H concludes that S implied [I].

In the following section, I shall examine to what degree such kind of “Western” theory is valid for understanding the process of communication in the IGui conversation.

II. The Logic of Irony

In a hut owned by a young couple, KE and bi*1, 9 men and women, including the couple, gathered and chatted. A young married woman, na, a little older than bi, had been talking for a long time to KE. The following is an excerpt from this long talk by na. (For the transcript notation, see Appendix 1.)

Case 1*2 about 11:30 a.m., 13 November 1987

na: (preceding passages omitted) In this way I - we (f. dl. exc.) let ts (a Iiga woman) jump [for fear]. She went a long way, carrying [a bag of] ruutu (maize flour for infants) and bearing [her big] belly. I said, “Surely you will not give birth to the child.” [Her] husband was going ahead, with her following him and carrying [the bag] on her head. I said, “Surely you are not carrying yours on your head; Are you carrying on your head the ruutu of your elder kinswomen?” She said, “No, mine is here.” I said, “You correctly answer and speak Iiga language.” And then I said, “Carry the ruutu on your head, and go away. Tomorrow we (f. dl. inc.) will meet each other.”

(I Gui transcription is in Appendix 2.)

Background: Several months before this sample was recorded, na went to the !Koikom borehole to draw water together with bi who had recently become pregnant. At the borehole, a young Iiga woman, ts, and her kinswomen of about the same generation teased bi about her early pregnancy. Arguing with them, na pulled bi away from the surrounding people and took her home. A few days before the present conversation, na witnessed at the clinic ts with her big belly receiving a rationed bag of specially fortified maize flour (ruutu) for infants*3.
Since ts actually was big-bellied and was seen receiving maize flour for infants, it was evident that ts was pregnant. However, na talked as if she assumed ts was not pregnant. Thus na seemed to violate Q11. We can easily discern an ironical effect caused by this apparent violation, since the simplest rhetorical device of irony is to represent the inverse of any real matter (cf. Sugeno, 1985: 22). This observation leads us to expect that the IGui sense of irony might share similar logical basis of inferring the implicature with ours. This interpretation shall be re-examined afterwards.

III. Understanding Roundabout Expressions for Begging

The following sample was not mechanically recorded, but one I recorded in my notebook immediately after a short conversation between I (SG) and a middle-aged woman, ga.

**Case 2** about 9:00 a.m., 20 September 1992

(The asterisked IGui words are annotated in the immediately following parentheses.)

**ga1** We are now going out to gather ‘Ikaa’.*

(*The word ‘Ikaa’ is a vernacular name of a plant species, *Coccinia rehmannii* Cogn., with an edible root, and classified in the category of “major food” for IGui and II Gana [Tanaka, 1980: 56, 174].)

**SG1** You ‘II?oreeha’*? (*the perfect form of ‘II?oee’ below)

**ga2** ‘Ee’*? (*Pardon?)

**SG2** Will you ‘II?oee’*?

(*gather and stay in the bush overnight)

**ga3** No, we will ‘!?o6’*.

(*gather, forage)

(To another middle-aged woman, nk, sitting near)

I just said, “I’m hungry. Give me maize flour.”

But, he asked me whether I will ‘II?oee’.

**SG3** Then are you begging me for maize flour?

**ga4** ‘Aii’* (*Yes)

(I reluctantly stood up to go to my hut, and came back with a 1 kg bag of maize flour. Then, I gave it to ga.)

In my fieldnotes I wrote the following comments: “Considering ‘Ikaa’ is fibrous and badtasting, it was evident that ga actually was not setting out to gather ‘Ikaa’ and that her real intention was to beg me for food. But, as I was so stupid as to take her at her words, I embarrassed her.” This primary interpretation is in accordance with the deductive device of implicature formalized in the above section. If the hearer (H) assumes that the speaker (S) is begging for food, the apparent violation of Q11 turns out to be only superficial*4. H arrives at the implicature that S is begging him for food.

But this interpretation is incomplete, because, in fact, IGui women sometimes do go and gather ‘Ikaa’. From the strategic view point of S, who intends to beg, if H does not immediately discern the apparent falsity of S’s statement, then her attempt risks failure. Thus, S has to present not only the statement but a clue to ensure that H easily realizes the falsity. Even if S does not deliberately proffer
such a clue, H can find it in the situational context of the statement. In fact, this interaction between ga and I occurred at about 9 o'clock. According to K. Imamura, the foraging activity of IGui women most frequently started around 8-9 o'clock when they departed from their camp for gathering plant food (Imamura, 1992). Furthermore, although ga and the other women said they were going to gather 'Ikaa,' they did not show any sign of departing. Thus the statement was superficial and incongruent with the whole context in which it arose (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986). Thus, H could have discerned that Q11 was violated, and deduced the correct implicature through some inference.

But a serious difficulty remained in the ‘distance’ of inference between discerning that ga had violated Q11 and concluding that she was begging. This inference process is open to criticism that it required quite a logical leap. Among others, if the conjecture that she was begging for food in a roundabout way was correct, then why didn’t ga say so? Saying that she was gathering ‘Ikaa,’ although superficially, ga violated other maxims concerning Quantity, Relation, and Manner. Having recourse to the inference guided by CP, it is not easy to find the ultimate reason for these violations.

Still the social relationship between ga and I may serve as another clue. J. Leach claimed that CP was not sufficient for the pragmatic understanding of English utterance. His point was that only when we asssumed that CP interacted with the secondary Principle of Politeness (PP), can we correctly interpret actual utterance (Leach, 1983). Could it then be supposed that ga dared not say, “Give me food,” because of her reserve to the rich stranger?

After all, a suspicion may be raised that this kind of too convoluted a model of inference is no more than a retrospective rationalization, which does not at all reflect the actual process of moment-moment understanding in reality. Not only CP was insufficient for realistic understanding of implicature, the introduction of supllimentary principle, PP, may seem too ad hoc a procedure. If the whole range of understanding of implicature were explainable by only two principles, CP and PP, then could these principles be regarded as sufficient in providing a comprehensive ground for pragmatic theory of conversation? This is surely not the case.

Let us return to the question of understanding ironical effect. It was very easily concluded in Case 1 that the utterance by na could be regarded as irony just because it represented the inverse of reality. But this interpretation may be insufficient. If an implicature of an utterance is merely an inverse of literal meaning, does such a mechanical inversion deserve to be called irony? For an irony to effectively “sting” the hearer, the hearer needs to have rightly interprete the specific context in each occasion. One of the possible interpretation for Case 1 may be as follows: I (speaker, na) know that you (hearer, ts) teased a young girl about her early pregnancy. Then I have a good reason to suppose that you, about the same age as that girl, won’t be pregnant, since teasing is on the premise that the matter did not hold true for the teaser.

Thus, the ironical implication in na’s utterance had to be based on her assumption that the hearer should behave according to some kind of principle, which I very tentatively call “the principle of consistency.” In other words, for the hearer
to recognize the irony in an utterance, the hearer needs to be aware of the expectations toward oneself. If this expectation is not noticed by the hearer, the irony would end in “misfire” (cf. Austin, 1960).

I will not insist that the “principle of consistency” does exist. The purpose of my argument is to demonstrate that a correct understanding of an implicature cannot be guaranteed simply by supplementing CP with PP. Granted that participants in conversation try to understand each other’s utterance according to some tacit principle, there must be other principles which make logical deduction plausible, every time we encounter a more or less novel context. As far as the maxims of Quality are concerned, the advantage of Gricean theory lies at least in suggesting that an obviously false statement effectively heightens the hearer’s attention. In this respect, it is very probable that |Gui conversation shares some common ground with “our’s.” But this ground cannot be reduced to some definite set of logical devices.

The most essential question is why the models of inference outlined stray farther away from the reality of experience the more they are elaborated. I would claim that it is because Gricean theory, concentrating only on the understanding of “molecular” sentence, ignores the dynamics of interaction. If I had been an “ideal” hearer in the conversation with ga, how should I behaved? Immediately sensing ga’s implication of begging, should I have fetched a bag of maize flour? This would have been quite an improbable course of interaction. I sense that an immediate understanding of implicature should have been followed by a specific tactical transaction.

What is more significant than the actual speech sentence with apparent falsity, is the problematics that would inevitably be introduced into the interaction by the sentence. Because at such a moment, not only the hearer but also the speaker would begin to search for relevant behavioral options, exploring the context and relationship in which both parties are embedded. Herein lies the most important subject for the analysis of conversation: elucidating the organization of interaction in the context of social relationship. This subject shall be investigated below.

CONVERSATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

Many studies of “conversation analysis” in American culture have paid special attention to the process of turn-taking through which the most basic pattern of human interaction is thought to be organized. In this section, I shall examine how the patterns of turn-taking are correlated with the social relationship between participants. Even in the relatively small-scale society of the |Gui, the range of social relationships is, of course, almost infinite. Thus it is necessary to focus on some distinct category of relationship, in order to prevent the analysis from unlimited diversification. Fortunately, among the |Gui and other KhoiSan foragers, there is a simple and dichotomous relationship of joking-avoidance (Barnard, 1992). In the following, I shall compare two samples as exemplifications of either an avoidance or joking relationship.
I. “Reserved” Behavior in Conversations between Affines

The first example is a dyadic conversation of 960 seconds (16 minutes) observed between a middle-aged man (SK) and an old woman (ug). In the following description, the roman figures represent the clusters of successive speech sentences (defined more rigidly below) by SK or ug. Each of these clusters shall be designated as an Extended Turn (ET).

**Case 3** about 8:10-8:25 a.m., 14 October 1989

Background: SK’s daughter (ek) had married ug’s son (ZB) from Menoatse, about 120 km southeast of Xade one and a half years ago. The new couple had chosen uxorilocal residence; i.e., ZB and ek lived in the hut neighboring the wife’s parents. Since the marriage, the groom’s mother, ug, also lived in another camp in Xade. That morning, ug visited SK to tell him that she was leaving Xade for her homeland, Menoatse. The content of each ET is quite briefly summarized as follows:

**ugI:** I have come here to bid you good-by. I won’t go suddenly like a young child. After a while I will come back. I’m always worried about ZB and my other children.

**SKI:** The offspring always worry their parents. I’m also worried about my children. Both my wife and I get on well with your son. I myself had deprived you of him. I’m thinking that when ‘bara’ (the season when melons ripen; from about January to March) comes, I will send them (mf. dl.: ZB + ek) to your homeland. It is not good that your husband has not yet seen the “girl (ek)”. But, though I always talk with them (mf. dl.) about these things, they never listen to me.

**ugII:** My offspring do not listen to their affines. If we ‘Taape’ (the term referring to the |Gui people living around Menoatse) give birth to children, they are so much unreasonable as are their parents.

**SKII:** I always tell them to go to your homeland, and to see your husband.

**ugIII:** ZB’s elder brother hitched a ride in a car and went ahead of me. He said, “I’m not going to hunt with my younger brother, because I’m departing now. I will stay there for a while, and come back. And then I will take my brother and his wife to our homeland. Today I can neither say good-by to my affines nor rub the skin rope anymore.”

**SKIII:** Among my sons living with us here, only the eldest is nice. His younger brother bothers me. Anyway, your husband might die before he sees the girl with whom his son got married.

**ugIV:** My husband said to my son, “Oh, you’ve argued with your people, and are you leaving now?” Long time ago, after a lion attacked a horse, the men set an iron trap. That lion, with its leg broken by the trap, walked around dragging it. Since my son witnessed the scene, his leg became bad. After many years, a man who was able to cure the leg by cutting the skin, said, “The malady was because he was terrified by the lion with its leg broken by an iron trap long time ago, so that his leg became ill.” As the people let my husband know this diagnosis, he said to his son, “That’s terrible! You have to leave this land.” Before, I also felt afflicted at the
death of a baby. I cried and ran. But, since this is an old matter, let us forget it.

SKIV: That’s right. By the way, he (ZB) seems to feel unhappy with me.

ugV: Though he can deal with things skillfully, it takes time for him to be frank with people.

SKV: He seems to feel unhappy with me.

ugVI: He is in no position to be that way. If he were crazy, he would not sit blankly but quarrel badly with you. By the way, he made a hunting bag, but didn’t go to Ghanzi Craft*5 to sell it. Your daughter (ek), blaming him for his idleness, sold it herself. His elder brother begged her for the money she earned, but was refused. Then he begged his younger sister for money, but was snubbed. This is how they behave. They lack the heart. All of my offspring are quite stupid.

The organizational features of the above case are made distinct, when they are contrasted with the turn-taking system proposed by Sacks et al. (1974/1978). According to this theory, the most basic component unit constructing a speech turn (Component I) can be defined as the projection of possible completion. In English conversation various unit-types, such as word, phrase, clause, and sentence, can be used to construct a turn. Practically, in transcribing the IGui conversation, this unit can be identified as the “prosodic unit” (Kendon, 1980) which ends in falling intonation and is usually separated from the following unit with a short duration of silence.

The moment when the possible completion is realized constitutes a “transition-relevance place” (TRP). Sacks et al. postulated that at any TRP, the next turn was allocated according to a basic set of rules that can be briefly summarized as follows:

Rule 1: (a) If the current speaker selects the next speaker, the party so selected has the right and obligation to take the next turn, (b) unless the technique a) is used, self-selection for the next speaker may be instituted, and (c) unless the techniques a)-b) are used, the current speaker may continue. Rule 2: If 1 (c) prevails, the Rule 1-set reapplies at the next TRP.

The most conspicuous feature in the temporal organization of the dyadic conversation in Case 3 is that two kinds of phase alternated through the whole transaction (Fig. 1). The first was an ET-holding phase by either participant, and the second ET-transition phase from one participant to another. During the ET-holding phase by one party, the other party quite frequently made agreeable responses, i. e., backchannel, such as ‘Ai:,’ ‘Ee:,’ ‘Ehe:,’ and ‘Nh:.’ The predominant behavioral sequence in this phase was that the speaker applied Rule 1 (c) and Rule 2 recursively, while the hearer restrained him/herself from invoking Rule 1 (b), i. e., self-selection.

In contrast, during the ET-transition phase, the typical strategy of the previous hearer was a rather abrupt self-selection after displaying quite cooperative behavior such as repeating or eagerly agreeing with the speaker’s foregoing utterance (for example; see Appendix 3) . This feature of “abruptness” may strongly correlate with the stereotypical nature of the conversational topic.
Figure 1. Temporal organization of conversational interaction between a middle-aged man, SK, and an old woman, ug. Of the total duration of 960 seconds, the last part of 40 seconds was omitted from the figure. The duration was divided into 92 segments of 10 seconds. The graph represents the number of seconds in each segment where each party uttered any speech sentence other than agreeable response, or back-channel. The small arrows, "→" and "←", shows the approximate place of back-channel by ug and SK, respectively. The sign "x" indicates the silence of about 1 second.
Namely, this encounter served to re-ascertain the affinal tie between SK and ug, which arose from the social fact that the former’s daughter had married the latter’s son. According to this social context, “the stupidity of our offspring,” for example, was a very adequate topic for the current purpose of transaction. If this was true, it is not surprising that the hearer could easily and accurately predict the point when the speaker’s foregoing ET was about to be punctuated.

Rule 1 (a), in which the current speaker selects the next, was never invoked throughout both ET-holding and ET-transition phases. This was the most outstanding characteristic of this interaction. This conversation was organized by the working consensus of both parties to exclude the most primary of the various behavioral options concerning turn-taking. In other words, a kind of inhibition by both parties produced quite an ordered pattern of turn-taking, where the complimentary roles of speaker and hearer were distinctly differentiated, and alternated in relatively a long cycle. I shall designate such a systematic patterning of turn-taking as ‘formalization’ of conversational interaction.

II. The Exchange of Accusation between Young Adult and Adolescent Men

The essential feature of formalization would be made clearer when it is contrasted with an opposite course of interaction. The following sample, with a total duration of 842 seconds, was heard among a gathering of four young adults and adolescent men. The whole sample can be divided into three successive stages.

Case 4 about 9:00 a.m., 19 August 1989

In Stage I, a young married man, KE, boasted of his skill in horseback riding, the essential technique in equestrian hunting (Osaki, 1984), while another young married man, KR, objected that KE was still unskilled, compared with other mature equestrian hunters such as SH (KE’s kinsman and co-resident) and GB (an excellent Gana hunter). In Stage II, although KR, standing near the conversation circle and whittling a stick with a knife, never spoke, KE still talked about the techniques of horse-back riding. His point was that the harder one flogged the horse, the more quickly it would overtake game. An unmarried adolescent man, KA, objected that the horse would not so easily obey the rider’s command. In Stage III, KA blamed KE for breaking a promise, while KE refuted this accusation. The point of each party is summarized as follows:

KA: You promised to borrow a horse from SH, your co-resident, and lend it to me. I intended to go hunting on that horse together with you. So I served you much beer, which I had asked my father to brew, in return for the horse. Although you, SH, and his younger brother drank all the beer, you left me and went hunting.

KE: On the day of our promised hunt, you were indulging in dice. I was waiting for you for so long that I grew tired of waiting. You treated me like a young child. Do not think that you can order me around as if I were a child.

In Stage II KA shouted at KE, “Why are you objecting? (‘iixosa tsi kua ≠nue’)” The essence of this interaction seems to be condensed in this phrase. The primary meaning of the verb ‘≠nue’ is “not to admit (what other says).” Connected with a
suffix, ‘-ku,’ which means mutuality, ‘+ nue-ku’ means “quarrel with each other.”

In Stage I KR consistently objected to KE’s boast. In Stage II KA and KE was always critical of each other’s opinion concerning the techniques for horseback riding. In both stages, both parties kept denying the truth value of the propositional content of each other’s “assertive” speech act (Searl, 1979; Nofsinger, 1991). However, in Stage III the “illocutionary force” (Austin, 1962) operated on a different level from the former stages, so that “expressive” speech act targeted each other’s past behavior which was unfavorable for the speaker. Thus “adjacency pairs” (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973) of accusation-denial predominated.

The striking feature of temporal organization in Case 4 was that there occurred quite frequent overlaps (Beattie, 1982) or simultaneous discourse (for example; see Appendix 4). This suggests that, in marked contrast with Case 3, both parties were far from respectful toward each other’s ET. It is a matter of course that this kind of rapid exchange of attacks can allow neither long silence nor opportunity for the speaker to invoke Rule 1 (c) which provides that the current speaker may continue after a duration of silence. Thus each turn can be regarded as an immediate-reflexive response to the other’s previous turn. In contrast with Case 3 where adjacency pairs were seldom observed except in evaluation-approval pairs, Case 4 was basically composed of successive chains of adjacency pairs. Namely, each turn is a denial of or objection to the other’s previous turn.

Apart from “denial” which is the specific feature to this context, it is necessary to examine more general characteristics pointed out above; immediate-reflexive responsiveness (abbreviated as IRR below). Turning to our everyday experience, it is evident that IRR is the most fundamental nature of “ordinary” conversation. Usually, informal conversation goes on through the quick exchange of turns, each immediately responding to the previous within a very short range of time. If the purpose of conversation is so specified, for example in negotiation, as to exert some illocutionary force over the other party, then IRR produces a verbal “fight” in which “forces” clash.

In contrast, the formalized nature which predominated in Case 3 could be produced by the consensus of both parties to inhibit IRR. I would like to assume IRR to be potentially omnipresent in human conversation. If so, the inhibition of this potential is made possible by some kind of skill which in turn is established through social maturity.

III. Reconsidering Joking-Avoidance Relationships

G. Siberbauer enumerated 4 sets of proper behavior for an avoidance/respect relationship, the second of which included a directive that one should be “careful not to swear ... in the obvious hearing of those in an avoidance relationship” (Siberbauer, 1981: 143). Similarly, Tanaka characterized the joking relationship as follows: “People in a joking relationship behave very freely toward each other. They may talk freely, exchanging the most vulgar stories and jokes, ...” (Tanaka, 1980: 105).
Relying on these characterizations, we are tempted to conclude that the formalized interaction observed in Case 3 exemplifies the reserved behavior proper for an avoidance/respect relationship, while the exchange of blame-and-denial in Case 4 is allowed by joking relationship between young adult/adolescent partners. We have to attest to this hypothesis by applying the principle of “congruent triangle” proposed by Silberbauer to the relationships between the participants. This principle postulates that “any individual has the same type of relationship with a third person as does his joking partner” (Silberbauer, 1981: 144)*6.

Applying this principle to Cases 3-4, SK and ug must have a joking relationship with each other, while KE must be in avoidance relationships with both KR and KA*7 (Fig. 2). Following the principle of congruent triangle, we have to conclude that Case 3 between joking partners, while Case 4 was between those who avoided and respected each other. This conclusion is sharply opposed to the hypothesis derived from the analysis of actual speech events. What is the reason for this contradiction?

The idea that social relationships can be categorized according to such principles as the congruent triangle is based on the premise that inter-personal behavior is definitely governed by some norms which exists in a super-organic domain beyond any voluntary choice by each person. The language system, especially its grammar, is often regarded as the embodiment of such norms. However, any ‘relationship’ should originally have been deduced from many observations on locally contextualized everyday interactions. It is perverse to equate a norm of relationship which is more or less artificially constructed with some kind of template that molds human behavior into a rigid pattern.

One may argue that if the observations are thorough, the norms of relationships deduced can have a high validity for predicting and/or interpreting the actual behavioral pattern. Even if we were to admit this optimistic empiricism, it remains an open question whether this norm is consciously perceived and followed by the people themselves, or it merely represents some statistical disposition which, in its nature, allows a wide range of exceptions for pragmatic use.

In the final section, I shall propose my own view to the above question. Here, a more preliminary problem has to be examined. So far as the dichotomous norm of the joking-avoidance relationship is concerned, in order to fulfill the prerequisite of thorough and careful observations, it is indispensable to present at least several records of naturally occurring speech events, which can typically exemplify the very behavior that is most appropriate for the label of “joking” or
“respect.” It is very curious that principal ethnographies describing joking-avoidance relationship among San peoples lack those data (Marshall, 1976; Tanaka, 1980; Silberbauer, 1981).

The fact that the features of conversational organization in the actual speech events of Cases 3-4 contradict the norm of the relationship predicted by the congruency principle casts doubt on the validity of Silberbauer’s claim that “[t]he congruency principle also operates in the extension of the relationship network through a chain of ‘kin-of-kin’” (Silberbauer, 1981: 145). In this respect, Tanaka is more cautious in claiming that “[s]ince...awareness of kinship extends only to close relatives, the joking and avoidance relationships also seldom extend beyond the bound of kinship” (Tanaka, 1980: 105).

As will be discussed below, my point is that joking and avoidance are not dichotomous concepts nor are complimentary to each other at the same level. The formalization of conversation was quite empirically defined as a systematic patterning of the turn-taking system. This organization does not allow the participants to make any immediate objection to another party. Such is the embodiment of an interactional sense which prompts the !Gui people in such a way as is appropriately labeled ‘reservation’ in the Western folk-concept concerning interpersonal attitudes. But we cannot define ‘joking’ in the same way as we define ‘reservation.’ Further argument on this point is left to the final section.

Then, why is it necessary for the !Gui to mark some kind of relationship by ‘reserved behavior’? Here we need to take recourse in the emic categories of relationship, the most important of which is affines, ‘?ui-ri’ (mf. pl.; ‘?ui-na’ in objective case).*8 The term ‘?ui’ is also used as a transitive verb, which means ‘behave as in-law toward’ someone. The following sample, a dialogue between SK and his wife, nk, illuminates the peculiar connotation of this term.

**Case 5** about 9:30 a.m., 11 October 1992
Background: Recently this couple’s son-in-law, ZB, went equestrian hunting in a team, and killed a big antelope. Although ZB ate the meat at a make-shift camp in the hunting area, he did not bring any meat back to home. Thus, SK and nk were complaining about their son-in-law’s failure to share the meat. In line SK1, ‘!Kaiko’ is synonymous with ‘Taape’ in Case 3, referring to the !Gui people living around Menoatse. In line nk3, nk said that there was no real “man” among those from Menoatse.

| SK1 | [I’m always behaving as in-law toward ‘!Kaiko,’ and feel sad.] |
| nk1 | (Well, for his making ((pain)), he will stand on my hard sand. (-) He will persistently behave as in-law in vain toward me. |
| SK2 | He always neglect the children (mf. pl.), |
| nk2 | [(although [he] is father to · · · )) |
| SK3 | [Is it] man’s [doing]? (+) They (m. pl.) ate [the meat], as you (mf. pl.) know. |
| nk3 | (Man is absent there. |

(*!Gui transcription is in Appendix 5.)
In this sample, the verb ‘lui’ appeared twice in lines SK1-nk1. In line SK1, “behaving as in-law toward” is a translation of ‘luyaaha’ which is a perfect or present progressive form of ‘lui.’ “[B]ehave as in-law in vain toward” in line nk1 is more complicated. This is a translation of ‘luyallkhae,’ a transitive verb compounded of ‘lui’ and an intransitive verb ‘lkhie’ that means “be perplexed.” The informant explained the situation where “P ‘luya-lkhae[-s] Q” as follows; once P has treated badly his/her in-law, Q, the latter will have a persistent antipathy against P, however eagerly P may flatter Q afterwards. The sentence, “[H]e will stand on my hard sand,” in line nk1 is an idiomatic expression, which also means that “I will not open my heart to him forever.”

This sample, which was collected about three years after Case 3, strongly suggests that a serious conflict has been latent in the relationship between this couple, SK and nk, and their in-laws, such as ZB and his mother, ug.*9 More generally, it is the affinal relationship that is most vulnerable to the potential for “social tensions and rivalries” (Tanaka, 1980: 106; discussed in more detail below). Just by this reason, the interaction between affines has to be marked by means of formalization which effectively serves to prevent immediate objection from becoming actualized.

DISCUSSION

Here, I will discuss the correlation between “social relationship” and “conversational organization.” Social relationship cannot be regarded as a template which molds everyday interpersonal behavior into a pre-determined pattern. Rather, each time we have an encounter with the other people, we are prompted to behave appropriately within local context in which our relationship with the other is perceived. This orientation toward adequacy has two possible directions: formalization versus immediate-reflexive responsiveness. According to the specific arrangement of socio-econo-cultural constructions, each society has some marked categories of relationships, the perception of which tends to be so stable that the participants can easily attain a working consensus for formalization. Our folk-concept of ‘reservation’ is a psychological synonym for this organizational feature.

However, it is misleading to assume one-to-one correspondence between our other folk-concept, joking, and immediate-reflexive responsiveness (IRR). In lGui conversation, the most distinctive organizational feature which embodies IRR is the frequent occurrence of simultaneous utterances, or overlaps. But we cannot make use of this feature as a behavioral index which corresponds to some definite category of relationship. Elsewhere I described a heated argument recorded in 1987, between two old men, KK and SM, the focus of which was the “bridewealth” (‘kema’). Here SM, having entered into an extra-marital sexual relationship with KK’s niece (his dead brother’s daughter), wanted to marry her and take her away from her husband. Trying to thwart SM’s attempt, KK accused him of not being able to pay the bridewealth. In this conversation, overlaps occurred quite frequently (Sugawara, 1990: 99-100). Although the exchange
of accusation in Case 4 can be regarded as a harmless verbal mock fight between young men. It is impossible to call the serious argument between KK and SM as “joking.” In sum, while “joking” is an extreme form of IRR in which an exaggerated “gesture” of denial is made prominent, the same responsiveness has to be more or less activated in “serious” argument.

Tanaka’s following comment, in spite of its seemingly functionalist bias, is quite relevant to this point: “The joking relationship, by permitting free exercise of any selfish acts and the airing of complaints and dissatisfactions, provides a valid and harmless outlet for emotions which might create social tensions and rivalries if allowed to build up to the exploding point” (Tanaka, 1980: 106). Thus “joking” is contiguous with “the airing of complaints and dissatisfactions.” We can not distinguish the former from the latter, only by analyzing the temporal organization of conversation. In other words, a “key” transformed by some kind of meta-communication from the “primary framework” (Goffman, 1974), i.e., ordinary conversation, joking is continuous with the social domain of “unmarkedness.”

In this paper, criticizing the Grician theory, I have pointed out that a principle-centered understanding of everyday conversation is insufficient in that it neglects the dynamics of face-to-face interaction in social context. I also examined the theory of joking-avoidance relationships by correlating the temporal organization of conversation with the quality of social relationship between participants. This exploration revealed again the insufficiency of the principle-centered view to social relationships, the most representative of which is the “congruent triangle,” which supposes that interpersonal behavior or attitude is molded by definite sets of dictates.

Due to limited space, there remain a number of questions unsolved, only two of which shall be pointed out below. First, the examination of the concept of “joking” drew our attention to the importance of meta-communication which serves to transform ordinary conversation into an exaggerated gesture of denial. What are the conditions under which this kind of meta-communication is successfully attained?

The second issue concerns the validity of the turn-taking system. In this paper, I have hypothesized that the turn-taking system deduced from American conversation analyses is applicable to the IGui conversation. However, it is worth special attention that prolonged simultaneous discourses, or overlaps, predicted to be very rare or, if possible, ephemeral by the theory, are quite common in the IGui conversation. I believe this direction of research may lead to radically deconstruct what is presumed to be the primary nature of human conversation; that is, only one speaker takes a speech turn at a time. I hope to investigate these problems in near future.

NOTES

*1 Abbreviated names of males and females are represented by two capital letters and by two small small letters, respectively.
Elsewhere I have analyzed other segments of the same sample from a different point of view (Sugawara, 1990: 101-102).

On the rationing of maize flour by the government, see an article by Tanaka (1987).

For convenience, the following argument assumes the situation with a female speaker and a male hearer.

Ghanzi Craft, set up in 1983 as the reorganization of Botswana Craft, is a nonprofit enterprise which provides the people with the opportunity to earn cash income through the sale of their folk crafts (Tanaka, 1991).

Although Silberbauer does not specify the relationship between ego and ego’s avoidance partner’s avoidance partner, his diagram does not include any triangle composed only of avoidance relationships. Thus, we can postulate that ego’s avoidance partner’s avoidance partner has a joking relationship with ego.

In Case 3 SK has an avoidance relationship with his son-in-law, and the latter has the same relationship with his mother ug. In Case 4 a younger sister of KA’s mother, ga, is married with KE. Thus, KE has a joking relationship with ga, who has an avoidance relationship with her son, KA. Since KA and KR are cross-cousins, they have a joking relationship with each other (cf. Ono, this volume). Therefore, KE also must have an avoidance relationship with KR.

When connected with a suffix indicating gender, ‘?ui-bi’ (‘?ui-ma’ in objective case) and ‘?ui-si’ (‘?ui-sa’) mean male affines such as father-, son-, and brother-in-law, or female affines such as mother-, daughter-, and sister-in-law, respectively.

In another sample recorded on 4 November 1989, nk told a co-resident woman, ga, the following story. Immediately after the marriage between ZB and ek, it had been said that ZB’s kinswoman criticized nk for her unskillful ceremonial incisions she made on the groom’s belly. ZB also agreed with this criticism. Hearing this in the rumor, nk was so displeased that she decided to “wrap her grudge tightly with a piece of steenbok skin for a long time.” Generally, at a marriage ceremony, a kinswoman of the bride makes ceremonial incisions on the couple’s forehead, both shoulders, and about where the liver is. The groom and the bride rub their blood on the other’s incision. Thus, in |Gui language holding a marriage ceremony is idiomatically called ‘mixing the blood’ (‘?ao-sa ||qx’ael|qx’are’).

REFERENCES


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Appendix

1. Transcript notation

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“” quotation of other’s or speaker’s own discourse by direct narration
   overlapping utterances

(-) short duration of silence, nearly 0.5 seconds
(+) duration of silence, nearly 1 second
[ ] agreeable response, or backchannel, which is not counted as an isolated turn
   • • • gramatically incomplete ending of a speech sentence
   - - hesitant continuation or restart
   ((•••)) utterance which could not be recovered
   ((koam)) IGui transcription, ‘koam,’ is uncertain
   ((heard)) uncertain translation, corresponding to the above uncertainty in transcription

The following notations are only in English translations:
[ ] supplimented translation
( ) explanation by the author
m., f., mf. gender of pronoun or noun: male, female, and common, respectively
pl., dl. form of pronoun or noun: plural and dual, respectively
inc., exc. inclusive and exclusive form of the first person pronoun, respectively
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2. IGui Transcription of Case 1


3. Transcription of a segment from Case 3 conversation

3.1. English translation

|SK1| (preceding passages omitted) And arriving [there, they will] see one mother. |
|ug| [Nh:] Then staying [there for a while, they will] return and come to see another mother. (-) They (mf dl.: ZB + ek) look like this. [ug: Nh:] In this way, [I have] told [them] a good many times. [ug: Nh:] But, the children (mf. pl.) do not listen. [ug: Nh:] |

|SK2| Those (mf. dl.) of this age. |
|SK3| Those of this age. |
|SK4| Yes |

|SK5| And then, therefore, I • • • |
|ug| nh - - nh - - nh - - Those whom I gave birth to will not listen to [what] affines [tell]. |

|SK6| Yes. |
|SK7| You (mf. pl.) have a [bad] nature. |

|ug| And [they] don’t listen at all. (Succeeding passages omitted) |
3.2. |Gui Transcription


ug1 lne: kuri-gyi-ri
SK2 lne: kuri-gyi-ri
ug2 lne: kuri-gyi-ri
SK3 lne: kuri-gyi-ri
ug3 lne: kuri ka lne: gyi-ri
SK4 (Eh:)
SK5 Caa heh, xo ka cire ...
SK6 Eh:
ug5 Taa ?itse Taape ya kx’o kua ɨ̀kọ̀ a ka lne-na ?abaha ka, cia ?abaha - (ri koam-chema
SK7 (?ico kx’oo
ug6 Ya koam-chema kx’ai

3.3. Explanation

This segment corresponds to the ET-transition phase from SK1 to ugII. The most striking is the process from ug1 to ug3, in which both participants repeatedly echoed each other’s utterance. Just after this quite cooperative interaction, ug interrupted SK’s ongoing speech which had not been completed by uttering nonsemantic sound particles (nh - nh -). Then ug proposed a new point concerning her offspring and, more generally, ‘Taape.’ Thus this process from SK5 to ug5 exemplifies rather an abrupt self-selection by ug.

4. Examples of overlaps in Case 4 conversation

4.1. English translation

Segment 1

KE (preceding passages omitted) Since I dislike dice, I arrived at there, entered there, and arriving at the camp of Kareepe (a Kgalagadi man)’s parents’, [I] drank, drank, drank the beer, and was waiting, waiting, waiting, waiting for you in vain, and gave up and - - [returned to my] camp, where I rested, waiting, waiting, waiting, waiting for you →

KA (Enter [the hut and] rest!)
KE → in vain, so that [I] gave up and, when the sun set, [I] departed.
KA (Rest!)

Segment 2

KE (preceding passages omitted) When Xara (younger brother of SH) said, “Where is the horse?” Hey, I’m talking and saying to you (m. pl.), I said, “Because [they are] the owner, they (m. pl.) have just refused [to lend] the horse.” How must I say?

KA Say, “[I’ll] go home.” I - - I - - I heard [from someone saying,] “Just now KE has come. He said, ‘I will go home to catch the horses.’ ”

KE Do you think that I am a child? I’m not a young child, but an adult.
KE → I’m not a young child!

Segment 3

KE (preceding passages omitted) Thus, even though a person (m.) [does not give] me beer, my heart is nice.

KA (Wai : : : :)
KE → Thus, even though he doesn’t give me his money ...
KA (((((.................................)))) bind the ropes, clothes. You must not, even when you find a person’s beer, promise anymore.
KE  [I did] not promise, not promise.
KA  You won't be able to drink +Kaa (KE's father)'s beer.
    I - - I - - [I ...]
KE  You all never see; I am a man.

4.2. IGui transcription

Segment 1
KE  Aa ci daisu-sa tsxaâ, cire asi sii, aaxo +kaâ ya, Kareeepe-m îlkoo-xan î?ae-owa haâ
    kua hâci khari-sa kx'aa kx'aa kx'aa ya, îlkao +kee +kee +kee +kee ya tobooxa
    ya, î?ae-siwa kx'o cu ci ilkao +kee +kere
    [ +kee+kere +kee+kere +kee+kere +kee+kere ] +kee+kere →
KA  → +kee+kere [((... ...))]
    KE  [(... ...)] tobooxa kx'o kaka îkam +khee cire ['!koô
    KA  Cuâ ha !

Segment 2
KE  Xara-bi kx'o meê, “maâ bee?” ka, cia îlkî ilkao îlkî boori a meê, cire meê, “Gyia
    ke elleko îne bee-mka para*. Maaca ka da meê?
KA  îlleko ca meê, e ci - - ci - - ci - - cire ya
    [((koam))] “neeka Kerooha (KE)-bi kx'o aa. ’Cire aa, →
KE  Tsam ki ?an cire ki îkoâ, cire îkoâ gyina chema, →
KA  → īlleko ya sii bee-zi si”
KE  → īlleko ya sii bee-zi si

*The word ‘para’ is borrowed from Setswana, which approximately corresponds to a IGui
word ‘îkhii’ (refuse).

Segment 3
KA  Wai : :
KE  [Kahore abi ki ki am mari ka cia hâc ka]
KA  [((...... (((...... ))) )] !gui-zi !kheâ, +kaâ -zi ?i.
    Cua: ilkao xa-m (keresí) khari-sa khoe-mka moô mo haci xosa kao.
KE  cua kao, cua kao
KA  +îKaa-mka cua ilkao xa kx'aa.
    Cire - - cire - - [cire •••
KE  Cua ilkao ueha moô, cire khoe-bi.

5. IGui transcription of the Case 5 conversation

SK1  [!Kaiko-ma cia îlkî ?uyaaha ya choô-sa koam.
SK2  Kina am ([choô-sa khana]) ts'aô-sa.
SK3  Am îlkî cua îkoâ-na +#an.
    [((hana ?abaha)]
SK2  ciacida ya cire si khana îkhiyaaha.
SK3  Kx'aoko-m ?e kua. (+)
    îlkî ki [hana kx'oo ca ico maâha.
nk3  Kx'aoko qx'ori khoa aaxo?a.