<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY : AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE TARKABHASA OF MOKSAKARAGUPTA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>KAJIYAMA, YUICHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>京都大学文学部研究紀要 = Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University (1966), 10: 1-173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Date</td>
<td>1966-03-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URL</td>
<td><a href="http://hdl.handle.net/2433/72933">http://hdl.handle.net/2433/72933</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Departmental Bulletin Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textversion</td>
<td>publisher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AN INTRODUCTION
TO
BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE
TARKABHĀṢĀ OF MOKṢĀKARAGUPTA

BY
YUICHI KAJIYAMA
CONTENTS

1. Introduction ................................................................. p. 1
2. Abbreviations ................................................................. p. 15
3. Contents of the Tarkabhāṣā .................................................. p. 19
4. Translation with Annotations ..............................................
   Chapter I: Indeterminate knowledge .................................... p. 23
   Chapter II: Determinate knowledge ..................................... p. 63
   Chapter III: Syllogism and polemics .................................. p. 86
5. Appendix ....................................................................... p. 151
6. Sanskrit Index .................................................................... p. 159
INTRODUCTION

1 The Tarkabhāṣā (The Language of Logic): The present work is an annotated translation of the Tarkabhāṣā (TBh) of Mokṣākaragupta who wrote it some time between 1050-1202 A.D. This TBh should be distinguished from two other works bearing the same name, viz. the Tarkabhāṣā of Keśavamīśra and the Jaina-tarkabhāṣā of Yaśovijaya, though these three share the same character of being a compendium of the system of a particular Indian philosophical school. While the latter two texts are devoted to the Naiyāyika and the Jaina philosophy respectively, Mokṣākaragupta’s TBh forms a brief but excellent introduction to Buddhist philosophy including epistemology and logic. This is the earliest of the three texts and seems to have set an example for the other two.

Apart from great works on Buddhist logic and epistemology such as those by Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrimitra etc., we know, so far as Sanskrit originals are available, three compendiums which systematically describe bauddhānyāya, dividing it into the three chapters of pratyakṣa, svārthānumāna, and parārthānumāna: Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyābindu (NB) with Dharmottara’s Tīkā (NBT), Vidyākaraśānti’s Tarkasopāna (TSop), and our TBh. The latter two works of course owe much to NB and NBT, but they have their own merits of incorporating later developments of Buddhist philosophy which were not known to Dharmottara. Most parts of NBT are concerned with the explanation of formal logic and epistemology viewed from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika, omitting elucidations of other topics which are very important in Buddhist philosophy in general. TSop is a small book which is so much indebted to Dharmottara that it looks like a digest of NBT, and in places where it goes beyond the latter it probably owes much to TBh. Compared with these two works, TBh is far richer in information, a large portion of which has remained unknown to the scholarly world.

This quality of TBh is due to the fact that Mokṣākara based his work on many texts which were not utilized by Dharmottara or Vidyākaraśānti.
He refers to most of the important works of Dharmakirti and their commentaries, and cites many passages from Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti. The third chapter of his work may be called an abridgement of the theories of Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti, and this fact is valuable to us, since TBh forms a good introduction to the works of the said two scholars which have not been well studied as yet.

To illustrate the said character of our text, it may not be irrelevant here to refer to some of the important theories discussed by Mokṣākara-gupta. In § 4 where he establishes the Buddhist theory that valid cognition is of two kinds, indeterminate (pratyakṣa) and determinate knowledge (anumāna), he enters into the criticism of other means of knowledge maintained by different schools of Indian philosophy, i.e. śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti and abhāva, and criticises also the Carvaka's view that pratyakṣa alone is the means of valid knowledge. In this discussion his main source is Ratnakirti's Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa. For the refutation of the connection of the word and the thing meant by it, Mokṣākara adopts the same criticism of connection which was put forward by Dharmakirti in his Sambandhaparikṣā (§ 4.2). When he discusses the Buddhist attitude towards the vexed problem of whether the validity of knowledge is known by itself independently, or dependently on another proof attesting it (svaḷaḥ prāmāṇyam or paraḷaḥ), he follows Śāntiraksita and Manorathananandin in saying that neither of the two principles should be applied to knowledge in general, some kinds of knowledge being known to be valid by themselves and others by another proof (§ 2.4). Special importance is attached by Mokṣākara-gupta to the theory of self-consciousness (svasaṅvedana), which he discusses in detail, quoting from Dharmakirti, Prajñākaragupta, and Śāntiraksita and criticising the objections of Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Trilocana (§ 6.2).

A traditional doctrine of Buddhist logic says that the object of indeterminate knowledge is the extreme particular (svalakṣaṇa). But this theory entailed a difficult problem as to how universal concomitance or pervasion (vyāpti), which forms the basis of inference and which is the relationship between two universals, can be grasped by pratyakṣa.

i) The following illustrations are taken out of the content of the present work, and for a detailed discussion and information the reader is referred to the section indicated by § 4, etc.
Following Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti, our author answers the question by saying that a universal can (also) be an object of *pratyakṣa*. For this new interpretation, he takes advantage of the theory of two kinds of exclusion (*vyavaccheda*), which was originally expounded by Dharmakirti in relation to another problem. An affirmative proposition ‘*x* is *y*’ may be interpreted in two ways by putting on either *x* or *y* a restriction or stress which is expressed in Sanskrit by the particle *eva*. When the proposition ‘A particular is the object of *pratyakṣa*’ is construed by *anyavyavaccheda*, it means ‘A particular alone is the object of *pratyakṣa*’; but when construed by *ayogavyavaccheda* the same sentence means ‘A particular is rightly included among the objects of *pratyakṣa*’. Once a universal was permitted to be grasped by indeterminate knowledge, it came to be classified under a universal of an individual which is produced by the accumulation of many moments of the momentary stream of a thing and which may be exemplified by the idea of ‘this’, and a universal of a class which denotes all the members of a class, say, jar. These two universals are respectively named *ūrdvavatilakṣāṇa* and *tiryaglakṣāṇa-sāmānya*. This classification is made by Jñānaśrimitra as well as Ratnakirti, but seems to have originated from Māṇikyanandin, the Jain author of the *Parikṣāmukhasūtra*, if he can be dated in the 9th century A.D. (§ 7.1).

Just as an affirmative proposition is construed in two ways, a negative proposition is also interpreted in two ways, this time by understanding the negation as of a term (*paryudāsa*) and as of a proposition (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) (cf. n. 62). A proposition ‘*x* is not *y*’ means ‘*x* is a non-*y* or *z*’ when the negation is understood as *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*; but if it is construed as *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, the same proposition means only ‘It is false that *x* is *y*’ without allowing a positive interpretation. Among Buddhists, this theory of two kinds of negation was applied to philosophy first by Mādhyamikas such as Bhāvaviveka. Buddhist logicians followed them in adopting it for the explanation of their particular doctrines. According to Buddhist logic the non-cognition of a thing is nothing but the cognition of the other things contained in the range of one and the same cognition. That we do not see a jar here means that we see here things other than the jar. This is an example of *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* being applied to the explanation of non-cognition (§ 13). The
theory of *apoha* (discrimination) which was propounded by Dignāga and Dharmakirti had found various interpretations by the time of Mokṣākara-gupta, who mentions three: *nivṛttyapohavāda, vidhivāda* and *apohaviśiṣṭavidhivāda*. The latter two were made possible by applying wholly or partly *paryudāsapratīṣedha to anyāpoha* (negation of other things) (§ 26).

In the second chapter dealing with formal logic, Mokṣākaragupta follows mainly NB and NBT, though not without new information. The most important of the latter may be his classification of negative inference into 16 formulae. Dharmakirti himself classified negative inference into 4 kinds with 4 subordinate forms in PV, 3 kinds in HB and 11 kinds in NB. The classification into 16 is found in the works of Durvekamiśra, Mokṣākaragupta and Vidyākaraśānti. Durveka, the Brāhmaṇa commentator on NBT, did know the classification into 16, but it is unlikely that he borrowed it from our author, since he is usually supposed to have been contemporary with Jñāṇāsrimitra who was older than Mokṣākaragupta by more than two generations. Vidyākaraśānti, the author of TSop probably owes the same to our author. We are not informed of the person who first proposed this classification, although we have a vague clue through which we might be permitted to ascribe it to Jñāṇāsrimitra (§ 13.5).

Another important piece of information we get from TBh II consists of two theories of how to determine a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*). Jñāṇāsrimitra was of the opinion that a causal relation is ascertained by three cognitions - one perception and two non-perceptions or one non-perception and two perceptions - and criticised Dharmottara who proclaimed that at least five cognitions are necessary for the determination of a causal relation. Mokṣākara refers to these two theories without showing a bias towards either of them (§ 11.3).

In the third chapter Mokṣākaragupta discusses various topics which form important problems of Buddhist philosophy: the proof of universal momentariness (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*) (§ 16.1); the refutation of the existence of God (*iśvarasādhanadūsana*) (§ 20. 1-2; § 28-28.1); the problem of solipsism (*saṁtānāntara*) (§ 20. 2. 4); the problem of how to ascertain the universal concomitance of two terms and two theories about it, viz. *antarvyāpti* and *bahirvyāpti* which are respectively represented by Ratnākaraśānti and Jñāṇāsrimitra (§ 22); the definitions and illustrations
of prasāṅga, prasaṅgaviparyaya and viparyayabuddhakapramāṇa, the
syllogistic forms which played important roles in Buddhist polemics in
the later period (§ 24); the problem of the import of the word (apoha),
of which our author clearly distinguishes between three interpretations
held by Dignāga and Dharmakirti, Śāntiraksita, and Jñānaśrīmitra
(§ 26); the refutation of recognition (pratyabhijñā) (§ 28.2); the proof
of two kinds of omniscient beings (sarvajñā and sarvasarvajñā)(§ 29-29.1);
the proof of succession of lives (§ 29.2) and so forth. Vācaspatimisra, as
well as his teacher Trilocana, appears often as an opponent in these
discussions. Following the method of Dharmakirti in PV, Mokṣākaragupta
inserted these topics as illustrations of particular logical rules, fallacies
and confutations, and he bases his opinions mostly on Jñānaśrīmitra
and Ratnakirti.

At the end of the third chapter, our author briefly reproduces the
main theories of the four Buddhist schools, Vaibhāśika, Sautrāntika,
Yogācārin and Mādhyamika (§ 30-33). This portion is particularly
interesting and important, since we do not have many descriptions of the
same kind in other Buddhist texts and since it became a model when
Guṇaratna (and probably Mādhava) wrote a summary of Buddhist doc-
trines in the Tarkarahasyadipikā (and the Sarvadarśanasamgraha).
Mokṣākaragupta’s representation of the theories of the four schools are
closely related also to the same kind of summary in the Jñānasūrasamuc-
caya, falsely ascribed to Āryadeva, and its commentary by Bodhibhadra.
The verses 21, 22a-b, 23, 25, 26a-b and 27 of the Jñānasūrasamuccaya
are found in TBh too. And Bodhibhadra’s review of sākāra-vāda and
nirākāra-vāda of the Yogācārins finds a counterpart in TBh § 32.1. Though
our author does not enter into a detailed discussion of the important
schisms among Yogācārins, he seems to have been well aware of the
sākāra-vāda of Jñānaśrīmitra and the nirākāra-vāda of Ratnakaraśānti
(§ 32.1).

TBh was counted among ten great works of Buddhist philosophy
enumerated by Guṇaratnaii who evidently owed much to Mokṣākaragupta
when writing the portion of the Bauddhadarśana in the Tarkarahasya-
dipikā. R. Iyengar points out another reference to our text in an un-
published Jaina work, the Nyāyamanidipikā, a commentary on the Prat-

ii) TRD 47, 20; Iyengar’s preface to M. iv.
meyaratnamālā of Anantavirya. Malliśeṇa quotes the passages of TBh on universal momentariness, the succession of lives and other problems in his Syādvādamaṇjiṇarī. As stated above, TSo and the Jñānasāra-samuccayanibandhana of Bodhibhadra have much to do with our text, though we are not sure if these two Buddhist authors are posterior to Mokṣākaragupta.

2 Date of the Author: In the colophon of TBh Mokṣākaragupta is mentioned as a resident of the Mahājagaddhala-vihāra. We know from substantial evidence that the Jagaddhala (or Jagaddala) Vihāra existed in Varendri, the paternal land of the Pāla dynasty, which might be placed so as to include the junction of the present Rājshāhi, Bogra and Malda of Bengal and an unknown amount of territory to the north. But the implication of the colophon is only this, further presumptions read in it being uncertain. The Vihāra is sometimes said to have

---

iii) M Preface iv.
iv) See n. 235, 374, 382 and 383.
v) śrimanmahājagaddhalavihārīyamahāpaṇḍitabhikṣumokṣākaraguptaviracitāyām tarkabhāṣāyām parārthānumānaparichchedaṃ samāptasyām. G has -rājayagaddhala- for mahājagaddhala.
vi) RC III, 7: mandrāṇāṁ sthitimūḍhāṁ jagaddalamaḥvīhāravācītāram, dadhatāṁ lokēsam api mahātātadīritorumahāmānum. which Majumdar translates: "(Varendra) -which had elephants of the Mandra type imported (into its forests) -where in the great monastery at Jagaddala kindly love for all was found accumulated -which country bore (in its heart) the image of (Bodhisattva) Lokesa -and whose great glory was still more increased (or pronounced) by (the presence of) the great (heads of monasteries) and the (images of) Tārā (the Buddhist goddess)". This is among 27 verses (III, 2-28) in which the poet gives a glowing account of Varendra (cf. Intro. xxxi).
vii) SR Intro. xxxvii. n. 6.
viii) Cf. SR Intro. xxxvii. n. 8. Haraprasad Sāstri, R. D. Banerjee, Rāhula Sāṃkhyā-āyana, etc. ascribe the construction of the Jagaddala to Rāmapāla. E. Krishnamacharya, following Haraprasad Sāstri, states (G Bhūmikā. 1): ayaṁ hi rājajagaddhalavīhāraḥ uttara-vahgeṣu varendradēse gaṅgākaratolayaśaṁgamaṇasamādhītī rāmāvatinagare rāmapālenā rājñā pratiṣṭhāpitaḥ. As Majumdar points out (RC xxxii). H. Sāstri confounded the verses of RC describing Varendra and those describing Rāmapāla, the capital founded by Rāmapāla. This seems to have led many scholars to think that Rāmapāla constructed the Jagaddala-vihāra in Rāmapāla. In fact, however, RC says that the Vihāra was in Varendra and not that it was in Rāmapāta, nor that it was founded by Rāmapāla.

Another source which led Rāhula Sāṃkhyā-āyana to make the reference to Jagaddala having been built in the seventh year of Rāmapāla’s reign is the colophon of Jagaddalavīhāra’s Bhagavatāyamānusārīṇī viśākhā (Cordier Cat. Mdo, XV) which runs in Peking Reprint Edition no. 5209: mi yi bdag po ramaṇalas sa skyŏh mdsad paṭi gnas kyi mu tig phreṅ pa ni dpal ldan rgyal po daggattar gnas par byed pa bdag gis rnam bsdod ḡi byas so... dpal ldan ha rgyal skyŏh gis rgyal srid mdsad paṭi to ldan pa la dgun zla ḡhrig poṭi tshes bī la dpal byaṅ chub chen poṭi lha khaṅ du bris paṭo. This may be rendered: This
been established by Rāmapāla (c. 1100 A.D.), the 14th king of the Pala dynasty, after his recovery of Varendri which had been once lost. This information, however, is not trustworthy, though a possibility of the construction of the Vihāra by Rāmapāla may not be totally excluded. Varendri was existent long before and after this king, and there is no positive evidence for the theory mentioned above. Such being the case, we are not certain of the termini of the Vihāra, and hence of the date of Mokṣākaragupta.

In the absence of external evidence, we have to rely on internal data for determining the date of our author. Considering the many scholars to whom Mokṣākaragupta refers and who cite from him, we can safely place him between Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti on the one hand and Malliśeṇa on the other. In 1292 A.D. Malliśeṇa wrote his Syādvādamañjarī, in which he cites several times passages from TBh, referring twice to our author by name. The three Buddhist logicians named above from whom our author quotes passages so profusely are more or less associated with Dipaṅkaraśrijñāna (Atiśa) who left the Vikramaśila Vihāra in 1040 A.D. and entered Tibet in 1042 A.D.

To begin with, Jñānaśrimitra seems to have been a younger contemporary of Ratnākaraśānti, since he cites passages from the latter's work. vyākhyā was made by me, a resident of Srirajajagattala, which is the necklace of the land protected by King Rāmapāla... It was transcribed at the Sri-Mahābodhi temple on the fourth day of the month of Pauṣa in the seventh year of the coronation of Sri-Mānapāla. I think it is impossible to derive from this colophon the conclusion that the Jagaddala Vihāra was built by Rāmapāla. After all, what we know from these sources is no more than this: The Jagaddala Vihāra was existent in Varendri, and flourished under Rāmapāla too. Rāmapāla's date is also a vexed problem, on which R. D. Banerjee and R. C. Majumdar had exchanged a long series of discussions. But for our present purpose, it is enough if we follow Kosambi and Gokhale in taking A. D. 1100 as a fair date in Rāmapāla's reign.

ix) Vidyabhushana (A History of Indian Logic) places Mokṣākaragupta at 1100 A.D., Krishnamacharya between c. 1100-1200, and Iyengar at 1110. None of these datings is based on evidence, though they seem to have been inferred from the date of Rāmapāla. Among other scholars who are close in time to Mokṣākaragupta, we may mention Sucaritamiśrā who is criticised by Jñānaśrī and Ratnakirti. Manorathandin whom our author seems to follow in a few discussions and who completed his com. on PV before 1200 A.D., Durvekamiśrā to whom Mokṣākaragupta seems to owe a few theories, Bodhibhadra, and Vidyākaraśānti who was probably indebted to our author. But the dates of all these scholars are not fixed beyond doubt, and cannot be taken into account for determining the date of our author.

x) Malliśeṇa states in the colophon of SVM that he completed the work in 1214 Śaka = 1292 A. D. (cf. SVM Intro. xiii).
Prajñāpāramitopadesa in his Sākārasiddhiśāstra\textsuperscript{xi}. Both are enumerated among the teachers of Atiśa. Ratnakīrti made the summaries of Jñānaśrīmitra’s works and was refuted by Udayana in the Ālmatattvaviveka (ATV) together with his master\textsuperscript{xii}. Ratnakīrti is, therefore, most probably a direct disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra, and may have been younger than the latter at least by one generation. About these three Buddhists and their contemporaries, we may collect a good amount of information from Tibetan sources; but the Tibetan tradition is such that the more we learn from it, the more we become confused. Therefore, we should be satisfied with the unanimous opinion that Jñānaśrīmitra was an elder contemporary of Atiśa\textsuperscript{xiii}.

Almost all the works of Jñānaśrīmitra contain abundant citations from Vācaspatimiśra, especially from his Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā (NVT)\textsuperscript{xiv}. S. Dasgupta, E. Frauwallner and A. Thakur argued from different materials to the same conclusion that Vācaspatimiśra should be placed after Jayantabhaṭṭa, not before as had been so long believed\textsuperscript{xv}. P. Hacker established the date of Jayanta’s Nyāyamaṇjarī as about 890 A.D. on the basis of substantial evidence that he was in the court of Śaṅkaravar-

\textsuperscript{xii) JNA Intro. 34-36 ; RNA Intro. 21-22.}
\textsuperscript{xiii) Cf. Bhattacharya 53. When Tibetan monks came to Vikramaśila to invite Atiśa to their country, they found that Ratnakīrti was among the eminent pandits under Atiśa. Atiśa, receiving the invitation, acted according to the instruction of Jñānaśrī. Sometime later when Naropa came on his last visit to Vikramaśila, “he leaned on the right arm of Atiśa while Jñānaśrīmitra helped him with his left arm”. This information is derived from S. C. Das’s Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow (Journal of Buddhist Text Society, I. i., 1893, 7 ff.) But some other pieces of information contradict the last story; the biographer of Naropa, for instance, dates him in 1016–1100 A. D. which means that Naropa was younger than Atiśa, let alone Jñānaśrīmitra (cf. H. V. Guenther, The Life and Teaching of Naropa, Intro.). So far as Jñānaśrīmitra is concerned, however, Blue Annals, Tāranātha and other sources agree in enumerating him together with Ratnākaraśānti among the teachers of Atiśa. SR lxxviii introduces Jñānaśrīmitra, a poet whose two verses are included in SR as “perhaps identical with the younger contemporary of Atiśa, Dipanīkara (Tār. p. 241)”. But this is a mistake on the part of the editor of SR, since Tāranātha says in the page referred to by him: Jñānaśrīmitra ist... der Lehrer, dem Sri Atiśa zu grossen Dank verpflichtet war. Now it is almost certain that the poet is the same as Jñānaśrīmitra, the philosopher.

\textsuperscript{xiv) Cf. JNA Intro. 21 ; Index. Vācaspati. Tātparyāṭikākāra.}
\textsuperscript{xv) Dasgupta. II. 107 (1932) ; Frauwallner. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nyāya. WZKM. 43. S. 266–277 (1937) ; RNA Intro. 21.
man of Kaśmir who ruled 883-902 A. D.xvi Thakur holds the same, though he seems not to have seen Hacker's article.xvii This discovery, however, entailed another problem, the date of Vācaspatimiśra himself who had been usually placed around 841 A. D. on the basis of the date 898 which is given in the manuscripts of his Nyāyasūcinibandha (NSN) and which is construed as referring to Vikrama Saṁvat. Hacker, D. Bhattacharya and Thakur solve this question by taking the date 898 as of Śaka Saṁvat and accordingly placing Vācaspati at 976 A. D.xviii Considering this date of Vācaspatimiśra and the Tibetan information that Jñānaśrimitra was an elder contemporary of Atiśa (982-1055 A. D.) we may place the activity of Jñānaśrimitra in c. 980-1030 A. D. and that of Ratnakirti in c. 1000-1050 A. D.

There is, however, information which might contradict the date of Jñānaśrimitra as given just above. As is well known, one of the manuscripts of Udayana's Lakṣaṇāvali bears the date 906 Śaka (984 A. D.). ATV in which Udayana criticises most of the works of Jñānaśrimitra and some of Ratnakirti's is certainly the oldest of his major works, though we are not sure if it was written before his two smaller tracts, Lakṣaṇāvali and Lakṣaṇamālā.xix Thus, ATV must be placed before 984 A. D. or at latest at a date soon after it. It then follows that Jñānaśrimitra wrote most of his works in a very short period between 976 or 980 and c. 984, which is very unlikely. This assumption becomes absolutely impossible when we trust the tradition that in ATV Udayana referred to Ratnakirti, who must have made the summaries of his master's works at least a generation after his master wrote them.xx

---


xvii) RNA Intro. 21.

xviii) Hacker, op. cit., 163; Bhattacharya, op. cit. 29, 54 etc. (1958); RNA Intro. 2, 3 with n. 2.

xix) Bhattacharya 4-5; Frauwallner, Jñānaśrīri, WZKM Bd. 38. 231 with A. 1 (1931): Chronological order of Udayana's works is: ATV, Kusumāṇjali, Nyāyaparīśiṣṭa, Tātparyaparīśuddhi, Kīrāṇavali. Two small works, Lakṣaṇāvali and Lakṣaṇamālā were, according to Bhattacharya, written after Tātparyaparīśuddhi, from which they borrow benedictive verses. In the above mentioned work, Frauwallner placed Ratnakirti at c. 950 and his master Jñānaśrīri in the first half of 10th cent. A. D. For an argument against this see n. 333 below.

xx) According to Śaṅkaramiśra, a commentator on ATV. Udayana refuted in ATV Ratnakirti's Citrāvibaitasiddhi (cf. Bhattacharya 18); Thakur says on the basis of a passage in ATV that Udayana seems to have been aware of the relationship between Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti (JNA Intro. 31).
We may suppose that Vācaspatimisra had already written his masterpiece, NVT, and the Nyāyaśāstra, both of which were the objects of Jñānaśrīmitra’s refutation, earlier than 976 A.D., say, by about 950 A.D. This may push back the beginning of the activity of Jñānaśrīmitra by 30 years and make it possible to insert him and Ratnakirti in between Vācaspati and Udayana. But we can assume with equal weight that Vācaspati must have written NVT together with NSN, which is a supplement to the former.\textsuperscript{xxi} Bhattacharya enumerates many factors which are inconsistent with the supposition which places the activity of Vācaspati and Jñānaśrī at so early a date as 950 A.D. Is the date 984 A.D. in which Udayana is said to have written the Lakṣaṇāvali so certain as to disprove the Tibetan tradition that Jñānaśrīmitra was an older contemporary of Atiśa?

Hacker does not touch the date of Udayana, appreciating that the latter gives the date 906 Śaka with a clear reference to the era. But Bhattacharya and Thakur are of the opinion that the date, which is written only in a single manuscript dated so late as 1708 Sāntvat, should be reconsidered as the date of Vācaspati was. And Bhattacharya actually proposes 1025-1100 A.D. for Udayana’s life.\textsuperscript{xxii} Bhattacharya’s proposal is based mainly on two traditions: the Tibetan one relating to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakirti to which we have referred above, and the other concerning the debate between Udayana and the father of Śriharṣa whose date can be known with a fair certainty.\textsuperscript{xxiii} Bhattacharya’s prolonged argument seems to lack incontestable evidence, but it is persuasive enough at least to make us doubt the date given in the manuscript of the Lakṣaṇāvali. And when Udayana’s date is in the balance, we should derive the most natural conclusion from the date of Vācaspatimisra, which is now agreed to by many scholars, and we may return to our former suggestion in assessing Jñānaśrīmitra’s activity as 980-1030 and that of Ratnakirti as 1,000-1050 A.D.

To come back to Moksākara-gupta, he may thus be placed between

\textsuperscript{xxi} This is maintained by Bhattacharya, 29.
\textsuperscript{xxii} Bhattacharya 54.
\textsuperscript{xxiii} Bhattacharya, 49-50. This event is stated by Bhagiratha, a commentator of the 18th century on the Naiṣadha. Śriharṣa’s father Śrihiśa had an academic contest with Udayana. In other words Udayana was older than Śriharṣa by only one generation. Bhattacharya thinks that the debate took place probably in the decade 1075-85 A.D.
1050 and 1292 A.D. It is almost certain that the Jagaddhala Vihāra was finally destroyed by the sack of the Muslims in 1202 A.D. when Śākyaśrī bhadra of Kaşmir is said to have fled, on seeing the devastation of the Vikramaśila, to Jagaddala of Oḍīviṣa, at last entering Tibet in 1204 A.D. We are not absolutely sure if this Jagaddala of Oḍīviṣa is in reality identical with the Jagaddhala Vihāra of Bengal, as is supposed by scholars. Apart from it, however, Cordier Catalogue, Rgyud XXVI, 50 and Mdo XXVII, 8 mention Dānasila and Vibhūticandra, who entered Tibet also at the very beginning of the 13th century, as of Varendra-jagaddala and Jagaddalavihāra respectively, both of which must be understood as our Jagaddhala Vihāra itself. Hence we have to assume that the Vihāra existed until it was destroyed in 1202 A.D. Although it is very natural to think that Buddhist activities dwindled rapidly under the Senas, the Vaiṣṇavas, who had overwhelmed the Pālas by about 1150 A.D., we are not sure that the Senas did persecute Buddhists or that the Vihāra perished with the Pālas. Until the Tibetan information mentioned immediately above is disproved, therefore, we should not put back the date of the Vihāra or that of Mokṣākaragupta. Nor can the fact that he does not refer to Udayana indicate with certainty that he lived before Udayana. Thus, until we get other evidence, we cannot narrow the duration of time 1050-1202 A.D. within which Mokṣākaragupta’s activity must fall.

3 The Text: The Sanskrit text of TBh was edited twice: once by Embar Krishnamacharya as Vol. XCIV of the Gaekwad’s Oriental Series (G), and secondly by H. R. Rangaswami iyengar as a part of the Tarkabhāṣā and Vādasthāna published in Mysore in 1952 (M). The manuscripts used by both the editors are not perfect. G omits many passages found in M, and especially in the first few pages it is unreliable owing to the corruption of the Mss. utilised. According to iyengar, three leaves are missing out of the Mss. of the Mysore Oriental Library on which M is based. In general, however, M is a far better edition than G, and agrees well with the Tibetan translation except in some details. The Tibetan translation Rto gņeq skad is listed in the Tohoku Catalogue

xxv Cf. e. g. SR xxxvii, n. 7. But we are not absolutely sure that the Jagaddalavihāra and Jagaddala of Oḍīviṣa are the same. B. B. Basu, for example, refers to a place named Jagaddala in Orissa which is different from the Jagaddalavihāra of Bengal (Basu. Archaeological Survey Reports of Mayurbhanj).
as no. 4246, in the *Catalogue of Peking Reprint Edition* as no. 5762, and in *Cordier Catalogue* as Mdo CXII, 28. This is the largest and complete text, complementing the lacunae of the Sanskrit text.

The following translation is made from M in principle; but whenever the better reading is found in G or T, it is adopted with the necessary notification; the lacunae in the Sanskrit text are filled up by translating the corresponding portions of the Tibetan. Sectioning and titling of the sections are made by the translator; in order to make the context of the translation clearer, supplementary words are inserted in brackets; Sanskrit words equivalent to the preceding English translation or English words corresponding to the Sanskrit words used in the translation are given in parentheses when necessary; in footnotes, numbers refer to the pages and lines of the texts concerned in principle, but with s., k., or v. they refer to the number of sutra or verse; in the footnote, when a citation from another text is marked by the preceding =, it is exactly identical with the concerned passage in TBh, and when not so marked, the reader is asked to compare both. The translator believes that TBh, presenting rich information in brief and lucid language, could be used at least as the basis of a dictionary of Buddhist logical terminology which he is attempting. In view of this, he has tried in footnotes to trace back the citation in TBh to the original and to supply the theory discussed by Mokṣākara-gupta with a brief survey of the tradition behind it, though the range of his search is limited mainly to Sanskrit editions. Although he does not imagine that he has fully succeeded, it is hoped that the present work with detailed notes and commentaries could serve as a handbook of Buddhist philosophy.

During his stay in London in 1962, the translator read and discussed some portions of Chap. III of TBh with Professor John Brough of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, many of whose valuable suggestions are incorporated into the present work. Especially when reading § 20. 2.4 in which our text, Sanskrit as well as Tibetan, is far from perfect, his analysis and partial rendering proved to be extremely helpful. The translator expresses his sincere gratitude. Of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, the translator has derived information from the works of Professor M. Hattori of Kyoto University (the part on epistemology) and Professor H. Kitagawa of Nagoya University (the
part on logic). Prof. Kitagawa's work in its final form was published just as the present work was completed for the press; Prof. Hattori's work is to be published in the *Harvard Oriental Series*, but the translator could refer to the typescripts which were made available to him by the kindness of the author. Professor Y. Ojihara has been ready to help the translator whenever the latter approached him with questions, especially those concerning Sanskrit grammar. The translator acknowledges his indebtedness to all these scholars. Thanks are also due to Mr. Peter Challis, who read through the English translation and helped the translator revise it.
ABBREVIATIONS

AK = L’Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu, tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin.
AYV = Hemacandra’s Anyayogavyaccheda-dvātrimśikā, included in SVM.
Bhattacharya = D. Bhattacharya. History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā.
Bhattacharya = Ślokavārttikaṭākā (Śarkarikā) of Bhaṭṭaputra-Jayamśira, ed. Kunhan Rāja.
Blue Annals = G. N. Roerich. The Blue Annals (Deb-ther shon-po).
Dasgupta = S. Dasgupta. A History of Indian Philosophy.
Fragment; Randle. Fragment = H. N. Randle. Fragments from Diānāgā.
G = Tarkabhaṭṭa of Mokṣākaragupta, ed. Embar Krishnamacharya. with a Skt. commentary by the editor. GOS no. XCIV.
Gnoli = PV Chap. I. with Dharmakirti’s Svavṛttī.
HB = Hetubindu of Dharmakirti, a Skt. re-construction included in HBT & the Tib. edition (Peking Reprint ed. no. 5712).
HBT = Hetubindutiṇīka of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi. GOS CXIII.
IBK = Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyū or Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies.
Kitagawa = Hidenori Kitagawa, A Study of Indian Classical Logic-Dignāga’s System.
MIK = Miscellanea Indologiae Kiotiensia.
Mookerjee = Satkari Mookerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux.
NB & NBT = Nyāyabindu of Dharmakirti with Nyāyabindutiṇīka of Dharmottara, ed. T. Stcherbatsky. Bibliotheca Buddhica VII.
NBh = Nyāyabhāṣya, See NS.
NBTT = Nyāyabinduṭikāṭippaṇī, ed. T. Stcherbatsky, Bib. Bud. XI.
NKan = Nyāyakaṇḍikā of Vācaspatimīśāra. Panḍit New Series Vol. XXVI.
Parikṣāmukhasūtra. of Māṇikyanandin. included in PKM.
Prasannapada = (Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec) la Prasannapada Commentaire de Candrakirti (Bib. Bud.), ed. de la Vallée Poussin.
PS, PSV = Pramāṇasamuccaya & -vṛtti. Peking Reprint Edition Nos. 5700, 5701 (V = Vasudrarakṣita’s tr.), 5702 (K = Kaṇakavarman’s tr.)
PV = Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakirti. For Chap. 1 (Śvārthānūmāna) R. Gnoli’s ed (SOR XXIII) is used : For Chaps. II (Pramāṇasiddhi), III (Pratyakṣa) & IV (Parārthānūmāna) Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya, ed. Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana (Tib. Skt. works Series. 1) is used.
PVBh = Pramāṇavārttika-bhāṣya or -alambikāra of Prajñākārabhagavanta. ed. Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana.
Randle = H. N. Randle, Indian logic in the early schools.
RC = The Rāmacarita of Sandhyākaraṇanandin, ed & tr. R. C. Majumdar & others. 1939.
Sambandhaparikṣā = Dharmakirti’s Sambandhaparikṣā by E. Frauwallner. WZKM Bd. 41. Śāstradipikā = Śāstradipikā of Pārthaśārthīthiśāra. ed. Laxman Shastri Drāvida. Chowkamba Skt. Series. No. 188.
Siddhi = L. de la Vallée Poussin. La Siddhi de Hiuān-Tsang.
SR = The Subhāṣitaratnakośa. ed. Kosambi and Gokhale. HOS 42.
Tāranātha = A. Schiefner, Tāranātha’s Geschichte des Buddhismus.
TBh = Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākāragupta.
TRD = (Shaddarśanasamuchchaya by Hari-bhadra with) Guṇaratna’s Com. Tarkaraḥṣayadipikā, ed. L. Suali. Bib. Ind. CLXVII.
TS & TSP = Tatvavāṅgraha with the com. (Pañjikā) of Kamalāśīla. ed. E. Krishnamacharya. GOS No. XXXI.
TSop = Tarkasopana of Vidyākaraṇānti. in G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part 1
(SOR IX).
Virśatīkā = Viṁśatīkā Vijñāptimātratāsidhīḥ, ed. S. Lévi.
Viśālāmalavati = Viśālāmalavati nāma Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā by Jinendrabuddhi.
VP = The Vākyapadiya by Bhartrihari
(Brahmakāṇḍa), ed. Śrīyanārāyaṇa Śūkla. Kashi Skt. Series. 124.
WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.
WZKSO = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.
## CONTENTS OF THE TARKABHĀŚĀ

### Chapter 1. Indeterminate Knowledge

**Prefatory verse §1.** p.23

Valid cognition defined and discussed: *pramāṇaḥ sahyajñānam apūrvagocaraṃ* §2. p.23

Function of valid cognition and the meaning of *prāpaktva* §2.1. p.24

The logical difficulty arising from universal momentariness is solved §2.2. p.25

Is auditory knowledge valid? The meaning of *arthakriyāsthiti* explained §2.3. p.26

Is the validity of knowledge dependent on other knowledge or not? §2.4. p.27

Apūrvagocara explained §2.5. p.28

Sense-organ is not a means of valid knowledge §2.6. p.28

Classification of valid cognition §3. p.29

Valid knowledge is of only two kinds §4. p.30

Refutation of the Cārvāka’s view of *pramāṇa* §4.1. p.31

Refutation of verbal testimony (*śabda*) §4.2. p.32

Refutation of identification (*upamāṇa*) §4.3. p.35

Refutation of presumption (*arthāpatti*) §4.4. p.38

Refutation of non-existence (*abhāva*) §4.5. p.38

Indeterminate knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) defined and discussed; *kalpanāpoḍham* explained §5. p.40

*Abhrānta* explained §5.1. p.43

Classification of indeterminate knowledge: sense-perception §6. p.44

Mental perception §6.1. p.45

Self-consciousness §6.2. p.47

Mystic intuition of a seer §6.3. p.53

Questions regarding meditation and emancipation answered §6.3.1. p.54

Object of indeterminate knowledge §7. p.56

That the particular is the object of indeterminate knowledge must be construed by *ayogovayavaccheda* and not by *anayogovayavaccheda* §7.1. p.56

Object of valid knowledge is twofold: *grāhya* and *adhyavaseya* §7.1.1. p.58

Two kinds of universals: *urdhvatālaksāna* and *tiryaglaksāna* as the object of *sādhana-* and *vyāptigrāhaka-pratyakṣa* respectively §7.1.2. p.58

Object of determinate knowledge is also twofold §7.1.3. p.59

Refutation of the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika §7.2. p.59

Identity of the cause and effect of cognition §8. p.60

Knowledge is necessarily endowed with the image of its object (*sākārajñāna-vāda*) §8.1. p.61

### Chapter II. Inference for oneself

Classification of determinate knowledge or inference §9. p.63

Function or object of inference: different opinions §9.1. p.64

The three characteristics of a logical mark; *pakṣadharmatā* §10. p.65

*Anvaya* §10.1. p.67

*Vyatireka* §10.2. p.69

Different opinions as to why both *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are necessary §10.3. p.70

Logical mark is of only three kinds §11. p.72

Logical mark as effect §11.1. p.72

Formal statement of an inference or a
syllogism is two-membered; refutation of the five-membered syllogism of the Naiyāyika § 11.2. p.72
How to establish a causal relation § 11.3. p.74
Logical mark of essential identity § 12. p.76
Logical mark of non-cognition § 13. p.77
Non-cognition establishes not absence itself but practical activities concerning absence § 13.1. p.78
Non-cognition is of the nature either of identity or of causality § 13.2. p.79
Significance of the qualifier upalabdhi-laksanāprāpta § 13.3. p.80
Non-cognition refers only to present and past experience § 13.4. p.81
Classification of negative inference into 16 formulae § 13.5. p.81

Chapter III. Inference for others

Inference for others defined § 14. p.86
Two kinds of syllogism: method of agreement and that of difference § 15. p.86
Syllogism by the method of agreement and with a logical mark of identity § 16. p.86
Proof of universal momentariness § 16.1. p.87
Recognition (pratyabhijña) is merely constructive imagination § 16.2. p.88
Four kinds of the syllogism based on identity: nirviśeṣa-prayoga § 16.3. p.89
Saviśeṣa-prayoga § 16.3.1. p.90
Bhinnaviśeṣa-prayoga § 16.3.2. p.91
Prayuktabhinnaviśeṣa-prayoga § 16.3.3. p.92
Syllogism by the method of difference and with a logical mark of identity § 17. p.92
Syllogism by the method of agreement and with a logical mark of causality § 18. p.93
Syllogism by the method of difference and with a logical mark of causality § 18.1. p.94

Syllogism of negation by the method of agreement § 19. p.94
Syllogism of negation by the method of difference § 19.1. p.94
Pervasion (vyāpti) explained in relation to the two syllogistic methods § 20. p.95
The Naiyāyika's proof of the existence of God as an illustration of untrue vyāpti § 20.1. p.95
Its refutation § 20.2. p.98
Trilocana's objection rejected § 20.2.1. p.100
Vyatireka (negative pervasion) cannot be established by mere non-perception § 20.2.2. p.104
Vācaspatimīśra's objection rejected § 20.2.3. p.105
The problem of solipsism discussed § 20.2.4. p.106
Other fallacies of the proof of God are pointed out § 20.2.5. p.108
The relation of amaya and vyatireka § 21. p.111
Antarvyāpti and bahirvyāpti; how to determine a vyāpti § 22. p.111
Untrue vyāpti effects the fallacy of anāikāntikatava § 23. p.113
Reasoning to an undesired conclusion (prasāṅga) defined § 24. p.114
Prasāṅga, prasāṅgaviparyaya and sādhya-viparyayabādhakapramāṇa illustrated § 24.1. p.114
Function of prasāṅga § 24.3. p.117
Conflation (dūṣaṇa) defined; vaiyarthya, asāamarthyā, atiprasāṅga etc. are not different from the fallacies of asiddhā- viruddha- and anāikāntikāhetu § 25. p.118
Conflation of āśrayāsiddhahetu illustrated by the refutation of ātman § 25.1. p.119
Conflation of svarūpāsiddhi; untrue vyāpti is not different from anāikāntikāktava § 25.2. p.121
The theory of apoha; vidhiavāda and niyṛtyapahavāda are both criticised and the theory of apohavisistāvidhi is established § 26. p.122
Refutation of a universal § 27. p.126
Refutation of God as the permanent agent § 28.
The permanent cannot produce an effect gradually § 28.1. p. 131
Refutation of recognition appended § 28.2 p. 132

*Karman* or the mind is the sole cause of the world § 28.3. p. 134

The existence of two kinds of omniscient persons proved: 1) Person who knows the absolute truth (*sarvajña*) § 29. p. 134
2) All-knowing person (*sarvasarvajña*) § 29.1. p. 136

Proof of the succession of lives § 29.2. p. 137

The doctrine of the *Vaibhāṣika* § 30 p. 139

The doctrine of the *Sautrāntika*: *sākāra-jñānavāda* and the proof of the external reality § 31. p. 139

Refutation of the soul § 31.1. p. 140

Refutation of ether, time, direction and the mind § 31.2. p. 142

Refutation of earth, water, fire and air § 31.3. p. 143

The doctrine of the *Yogācāra* § 32. p. 145

*Sākāra-vāda* and *nirākāra-vāda* of the *Yogācāra* § 32.1. p. 148

The doctrine of the *Mādhyamika* § 33. p. 148
THE LANGUAGE OF LOGIC

Chapter 1. Indeterminate knowledge (pratyakṣa)

1. Prefatory verse. (1.2) Having done reverence to the master, the lord of the world, I [here begin to] elucidate the language of logic in order that [even] students of little intelligence may learn the thought of Dharmakīrti.

2. Valid cognition defined. (1.4) Since those who act with deliberation in the world, desirous [for some object], follow the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) which are able to make us attain all human aims, the means of valid knowledge is to be first discussed.

(1.6) The means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) is true knowledge (saṁyagjñāna) referring to an object not known before. [It is called] pramāṇa since by means of it an object is measured. However, it is not different from true knowledge itself, because it is free from the fault of uncertainty (samdeha) and erroneousness (viparyāsa). In the world, knowledge not disagreeing [with experience] (avisamvāda) is called true knowledge. And this non-disagreement is not found in uncertain know-

1. As stated by the editor in G 1. n. 1 the first few pages of this edition are based on the very defective manuscripts, and the parenthesized words are not those of the author of TBh. Until p. 4 of G, I disregard the variant readings found in it except at important places.

2. According to RC III. v. 7, an image of the Bodhisattva Lokesa (probably the same as Avalokiteśvara) was placed at the center of the city of Varendri, where Mokṣākaragupta resided in a monastery called Jagaddhala.

3. Cf. NB s. 1: saṁyagjñānapūrvaśāra pasyṛṣarthasiddhir iti tad vṛtta-pādyate: NBT 3. 23: arthakriyārthibhiḥ cārthakriyāsamarthaprāptinsteadtaṁ jñānam mṛgyate yac ca tair mṛgyate tada śāstre vicāryate.

4. PVV 3. n. 2: pramāṇoḥ saṁyagjñānam apūrvaocaram iti laksāṇam.

5. The Buddhist theory that the means and the result of cognition are one and the same is dealt with in § 8. See also PS I. v. 8 c-d: savyāpāpratitavat pramāṇaḥ phalaṁ eva sat. (Hattori. Part II. Section 1. n. 55); PV III. v. 308 a-b: sa ca tasyātmabhūtaih tena nārthāntaraṁ phalam; NB I. s. 18: tad eva ca pratyakṣaṁ jñānaṁ pramāṇaphalam; PVBh 23. 5: pramāṇoḥ phalaṁ nānyat pramāṇaṁ na phalaṁ param, etc.; TS v. 1344-1349.

6. NBT 3. 5: avisamvādakaṁ jñānāṁ saṁyagjñānam; PV II. v. 1: pramāṇaṁ avisaṁvādijñānam.
ledge as e.g. the knowledge [which cannot determine its object] to be either a man or a post, nor in erroneous knowledge as the knowledge of water seen in a desert. ‘Referring to an object [not yet known] (apūrvagocara) means that the object of it [=valid knowledge] has not been experienced before, gocara (range) denoting an object (viṣaya) such as a jar. Knowledge which has been produced by it [=an object] and which is capable of making us attain the object is the means of valid knowledge.

2.1. Function of valid cognition. (1.13) [The following objection may be raised:] “Knowledge is the maker (kartṛ) [of an action], a person [possessing the knowledge] the agent (prayojya), and a thing the object (karman). But how can you call knowledge a pramāṇa if sometimes it does not [actually] make a man reach [an object] and thus is unable to cause him to attain it’”

['The author:] We reply. We do not mean that a person is forcibly caused to act by knowledge as in the way of trampling on the neck, but that determination in the form ‘the essential quality of this thing is such and not otherwise’ is to be produced [by knowledge]; and if it is produced by knowledge, this much [of function] is called the validity of cognition, compatible [with experience]. As for a person possessing knowledge, he may actually take action towards the object because of a particular need (prayojana), or may not act owing to the lack of the need. And the object may also be snatched away by a yogin or a devil [who makes it unattainable]. But how is knowledge affected [through such
hindrances against actual attainment of the object? 11

2.2. Logical difficulty arising from universal momentariness is solved. (2.4) [The opponent:] “The validity of cognition is [according to you] testified by its agreeing with experience (avisaṁvādakatva), and the agreement with experience is proved by the attainment of the object seen. We cannot, however, attain the same thing which we have seen, because of its momentariness (kṣanikatva) [i.e. the thing seen is different from the thing reached]. Furthermore, what is seen is the colour-form (rūpa) [of an object], but what is reached is the tangibility (spraśṭavya) [of the object]. Thus, one thing is seen and another is reached. Accordingly what you reach is not the thing that you have seen. How then does this cognition become valid?”

[The author:] This argument is untenable. For even if we reach what is in reality different [from the thing we have seen], we still get the logical imagination (adhyavasāya) of identity ‘I reach the very same object which I have seen’; and this is meant by the expression ‘attainment of what has been apprehended’ (pratitapraṇa). On the other hand, the knowledge of water derived from a mirage etc. is definitely invalid because it cannot make us attain this [adhyavasāya]. 12

[The opponent:] “Is it not that apart from the attainment of efficient operation 13 (arthakriyā) we cannot ascertain that this [knowledge] is capable of causing to reach and that [knowledge] is not? And the difference between a valid and an invalid knowledge cannot be determined by [perceiving] the mere origination of knowledge. Therefore, how can it [i.e. knowledge determining the essential quality of an object] be valid knowledge?”

[The author:] There is not this fault [in our theory]. It is true that such a distinction cannot be determined by the origination of knowledge in general; yet we can point out how one is distinguished [from the other]

11. For a similar argument cf. NBT 3, 8: pravartakatvam api prayātiṁśayapradarsakam eva, na hi puruṣaṁ haṁḥḥ pravartayitum śakoti vijnānam. See also E. Frauwallner, Dharmottarā Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, WZKM 42, 251.

12. NBT 4, 8–11: nanu deśāniyatam ṛkāraṇiyatam ca prāpaśītum śakyam, yatkalāṁ tu pariccānnaṁ tathākalāṁ na śakṣaṁ prāpaśītum, nōcyate yasmin eva kāle pariciddyate tasmān eva kāle prāpaśītavam iti. anyo hi dārānąkalā ’nyaś ca prāptikālaṁ, kim tu yatkalāṁ pariccānnaṁ tad eva prāpaṇyam. abhedadhyavasīyaś cā saṁhānaṅgam eva kāle draśṭavyam iti.

when we get the knowledge specific\textsuperscript{14} to an object. For instance, one who gets a dull cognition may be unable to determine the validity of knowledge at the moment of its origination, but he determines [the validity of his knowledge of fire or water] through perceiving efficient operation such as burning, cooking, immersion in water, \textsuperscript{14}... bathing, drinking, ...\textsuperscript{14} emergence, etc. when he sees them afar, or through perceiving rising smoke etc. One who gets a sharp cognition, on the other hand, determines it not through the attainment of efficient operation, but only by the sharper perception (\textit{pa\text{\v{t}}utarapratyak\text{s}a}).

2.3. The meaning of \textit{arthakriyāsthitī} explained (2.20) [The opponent may raise another question:] "If the validity of cognition is defined to be agreement [with actual experience], then how can an auditory knowledge (\textit{sva\text{\v{t}}ra\text{\v{s}a}}) which by its nature does not cause [the hearer actually to] reach the object he understands, be valid?" \textsuperscript{15}

[The author:] This is untenable. For we mean that the validity of cognition is the apprehension of the essential quality (\textit{svarūpa}) of an object; and this is possible without the actual attainment of efficient operation referring to an external object. This is expressed [by Dharmakirti in PV 1.1 reading:]

"Non-disagreeing knowledge is valid cognition; non-disagreement [here] means the existence of efficient operation."

[and the subsequent verse].\textsuperscript{16} In the case of the sound [of a word], hearing is the existence of efficient operation, since the purpose of sound is fulfilled if it is simply heard, just as the existence of efficient operation consists in the simple act of seeing in the cases of [the perceptions of] the sun, moon, cloud and sky. [This is meant by a Buddhist logician] when he says:

"The apprehension of the essential quality of an object is here

\textsuperscript{14} Tp, n, and a Skt. Mss (cf. G 2, n. 2) have, instead of \textit{jñānāviseṣa, snānapānajñānāviseṣa} = \textit{sniinaPīnajnīnaveṣa} = \textit{ses paśi khrus dahn btun} (Read \textit{btun}) \textit{pa dahn} (Read \textit{paśi}) khyad \textit{par}..., and omit snānapāna out of the enumeration of the examples in the next line.

\textsuperscript{15} The problem is treated as a \textit{pūrṇapakṣa} of PV II. v. 1 c-d (see n. 16 below) by almost all commentators on PV. See e.g. PVBh 4, 17-18: \ldots \textit{śabdaviṣaye tu jñāne na dāh-pākādyarthakriyā, svataḥ \textit{parataś cārthakriyā'bhavat}... .

\textsuperscript{16} PV II. v. 1-2: \textit{prāmāṇya\textit{vis\text{\v{a}}m\textit{vādadi jñānam arthakriyāṣṭhitī, vis\text{\v{a}}m\text{\v{a}}dananm sābde \textquoteleft \textquoteleft py abhi\text{\v{r}}i\text{\v{y}}a\text{\v{a}}m\textit{dī} vṛti} vāk\text{\v{t}}r\text{\v{y}}āp\text{\v{a}}r\text{\v{a}}vīṣayo \textit{yōri} buddhau prakāśate, prāmāṇya\textit{m tatra śabdasya nārthatattvam\text{\v{a}}nibhandhanam.}
admitted as the existence of [efficient] operation.”’”

2.4. Is the validity of knowledge dependent on other knowledge or not? (3.7) However, when cognizing fire, water, etc. for the first time, a reasonable person wishing for effective operation proceeds to them, starting from the mere uncertain knowledge about the efficiency [of the object].

... Even if he is not clearly conscious that he has the doubt, [the situation is not different,] since the uncertainty which is attached [to his undertaking] can be by no means removed owing to the absence of a positive (sādhaka) or negative proof (bādhaka)...

Therefore [the problem] has been settled: one acts for an object by virtue of his obtaining only sharper perception, which, as soon as it is obtained, apprehends [by intuition] the customary efficiency [of the object]. But one who gets merely the dull cognition [of an object] begins to act after he has inferred the same [efficiency]. Thus, the validity of indeterminate knowledge [or direct perception] is established by itself (svatah prāmānyam) [in the case of sharper one], but by another cognition (paratah) in some cases [in which the cognizer is unable to confirm the efficiency of an object at the first moment of the cognition]. As for the knowledge of a yogin (yogijnāna) and self-consciousness (svaśāntvadana), the validity is established by themselves. As for inference which is by nature certain, its validity is confirmed by itself.19

---

17. Probably this is a verse by Prajñākaragupta. PVBh 5, 21 (v. 9) : jñeyasvarūpasaṃsiddhir eva tatra kriyā matā, citre’pi dṛṣṭamātreyā phalāṃ parisamāptimat.

18. T gal te de la ḍhi lta buḥi the tshom med par ḍjug (par ḍjug omitted in d) du chug kyaṅ, ḍon kyaṅ sgrub par byed pa dahn gnod par byed paḥi tshad ma med paḥi phyir ro, gaṅ gṣuṅs pa, the tshom ḍbyuṅ (ḥgyur, d. n.) ba gaṅ gis bzlog (zlog d. n) par byed, ces so. My tr. follows M. I am reluctant to regard samsayo bhavan kena vāyate as a citation as T and G do. nor have I so far identified it.

19. Contextually the discussion in § 2.4 directly follows that in § 2.2 (Our text in § 2.2-2.4 may have some confusion). Both the sections deal with the problem of whether the validity of cognition is intrinsically proved or not (svatah prāmānyam or paratah prā-). Buddhist attitude towards the problem is most clearly stated by Kamalaśila: He enumerates under TS v. 2811 four possible theories regarding the problem, viz. 1) both validity and non-validity are established intrinsically; 2) they are both proved through external cognition; 3) validity is proved intrinsically and non-validity by external cognition; 4) validity is proved by external cognition and non-validity intrinsically (TSP 745, 3-5). After a detailed examination he concludes: The Buddhist does not follow any one of these four theories, but holds that the validity of a cognition is proved sometimes intrinsically and another time by another cognition, there being no definite principle (TSP 811, 17-18: na hi bauddhair eṣāṁ caturṇām ekatamo’pi paśco ‘bhiṣṭo ‘niyamaṇapakṣasyaśtatvāt). The Bud-
2.5. Apūrvagocara explained. (3.16) The following is implied in the [discussion made above]: Knowledge which occurs of an object for the first time is alone a valid cognition, all other knowledge which occurs later regarding the same object being excluded. For the latter is not valid because it grasps what has been once grasped as e.g. in the case of the determinate knowledge (savikalpakaṁ jñānam) in the form ‘This is a jar’, which we, having seen a jar by means of indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpakaṁ jñānam), get later with regard to the very same object, and which is accordingly of the nature of remembrance; or again, if we, having once obtained inferential knowledge ‘Here there is fire’ through the perception of smoke, get again, a moment later, the inferential knowledge ‘Here there is fire’ regarding the same place, [this latter knowledge is not valid because it is not probative].

2.6. Sense-organs are not the means of valid knowledge. (4.5) When it is said that the means of valid knowledge is true knowledge, things such as sense-organs which are by nature insentient are by implication (sāmartyāt) denied to be the means of valid knowledge, because they are incapable of ascertaining [the object]. Determining operation (paricchedakatva) is the function of a knower (boddhṛtvā), and this is innate only in knowledge. How then can it be the nature of such things as sense-organs which are by nature deprived of consciousness?

dhist logician divides sense-perception into two kinds: 1) perception of which the object has been repeatedly cognized by us, and of which the particular nature, i.e. the efficiency, is discerned as soon as we get it. The validity of perception is in this case proved by itself. 2) But when we are not accustomed to an object, we get perception of which the validity is uncertain; then we need another cognition, perception representing the effective action of the object or inference, in order to determine the validity of the first perception; then its validity is proved by external cognition. The problem is easily solved in the case of mānasa-pratyakṣa, yogi-jñāna, svasaṃvedana or inference, since these kinds of knowledge do not depend on an external object and are by nature intrinsically determinate. This problem is also treated by all the commentators on PV II, 1. For a brief but useful explanation see PVV 3, 3f. b.-4. 8 to which the description in TBh is very similar. See also TS v. 2966, 2974-2976, with TSP.

20. n. 8 above.

21. PV II, v. 3: ...dhi pramāṇatā, pravṛttes tatpradhānātvād dheyopādeyavastumī. Mokṣākara interprets this verse in § 2.5 and 2.6. TS v. 2029; TSop 281, 6-19 refutes the Vai-bhāṣākṣa who asserts the sense-organ to be the knower as follows: The Vai-bhāṣākṣa considers the sense-organ as knower (draṣṭṛ), thinking that if knowledge—which is not a resisting substance—were the knower, it would grasp even a concealed object. But this is untenable, you could say that knowledge would grasp even a concealed thing since nothing would hinder its movement, only if we asserted that knowledge travels to an object to grasp it.
3. Classification of the valid knowledge. (4.9) This [valid cognition] is twofold: indeterminate (pratyākṣa) and determinate cognition (anumāṇa).22 Pratyākṣa is [a tatpurusa compound which can be analysed into] ākṣam pratigata-23 i.e. ‘connected with or depending on the sense-organ’, ākṣa here standing for indriya (sense-organs) called eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin. Knowledge brought about by them is named indeterminate cognition [or direct perception].

[The opponent:] “If indeterminate knowledge is that depending on sense-organs, the three kinds of knowledge, mental perception (mānasa-pratyākṣa), [self-consciousness (svasamvedana) and the knowledge of a seer (yogipratyākṣa)], which are to be soon dealt with, would not be indeterminate, since they are not produced from sense-organs.”24

[The author:] We reply to this. When we say ‘connected with the sense-organ’, it is simply the etymological definition (vyutpattinimitta) of the word pratyākṣa. The definition of the usage of the word pratyākṣa

But we say that knowledge grasps an image with which it is endowed. Moreover, an object at an inaccessible place has no resemblance with knowledge. How then can it be grasped by knowledge? Again, if the sense-organ were the knower, an object separated by glass etc. could not be grasped, since your doctrine tells that ten kinds of material dhātus [to which the sense-organ belongs] are resisting substances [cf. AK I. v. 29]. You may contend: “Why is it said in the scripture that colour-form is grasped by the eyes?” We reply to this: This teaching is a metaphorical one.

22. PS I. k. 2 a-b (=PVBh 169. 3) : pratyākṣam anumāṇam ca pramāṇe (Hattori. II. 1. n. 11); NB s. 2-3 : dvividham sahyaggñānam, pratyākṣam anumāṇam ca.
23. NBT 6. 2-4 : pratyākṣam iti, pratigatam āśīram ākṣam. atyādayaḥ krāntādyarthre dvitiyayeti samāsah. prāptāpamālyām gatisamāsese paravālīṅgagapratιṣedhād abhidheyavālīṅge sati sarvalīṅgāḥ pratyākṣaṣābdhāḥ siddhāḥ. This explanation is almost verbally quoted in TSop 276. 2-6. Mośikākara presupposes this grammatical interpretation given by Dharmottara. though he does not cite it. ‘Pratyākṣa- is a compound word which may be analysed into ākṣam (Pāṇ. sū. 3. 4. 223) pratigata-, pratigata- meaning āśīra-, i.e. ‘connected with or depending on the senses’. [That is to say, it is a tatpurusa belonging to the group gati-samāsa taught in sū 2. 2. 18]. However, it is formed according to the rule [in Bh. ad 2. 2. 18 vt. 4] : atyādayaḥ krāntādyaarthre dvitiyāyā (prefixes like ati- etc. in the sense of (ati-) krānta- etc. can enter into composition with [their complement] in the accusative case). [If it is a tatpurusa, pratyākṣa would agree in gender with that of the last member, ākṣam, as taught in sū 2. 4. 26, and would be always of the neuter gender. But it is not so, for the agreement of the gender of a tatpurusa with its last member is denied [by 2. 4. 26 vt.] in compounds whose first members are prāpta- āpanna-, or alan- and ‘gati samāsa’]. Thus, the gender of the word pratyākṣa (as described at the beginning of Bh. ad 2. 2. 29) agrees with the subject to be related, and it is established as an adjective taking all the three genders.
24. NBT 6. 6-7.
['in its particular signification'] (pravrttinimitta) is to be understood as 'direct apprehension' (sākṣātkārita) according to its conventional sense (rūḍhiṣaśāta), just as [we understand not only 'mud-born' but also a species of lotus when we hear the word] paṇkaja. Thus it is established that self-consciousness and the others are also denoted by the term praty- aksa, because they directly apprehend knowledge as the content of self-consciousness and the others.25

(4.18) By māna [of anumāna] is meant that an object is measured by this means. The [prefix] anu- is in the sense of 'later' (paścāt). Thus, determinate knowledge or inference (anumāna) means 'subsequent measure'. That is to say, 'after' having grasped a logical mark (liṅga or probans) and having remembered the connection between the mark and that which possesses the mark (liṅgin, probandum), we get, regarding the concerned locus (dharmin) such as a mountain, knowledge which refers to an object not directly perceived. This knowledge is meant by the term 'inference'.26 Such [usage of the word in its particular signification] is to be understood according to the conventional sense [of the word].

4. Valid knowledge is of only two kinds. (5.3) By the word 'twofold' are refuted the different opinions which [classify valid knowledge into] one, three, four, five, and six kinds. That is to say, the Cārvāka recognizes only one valid cognition, i.e. perception; the Śāṅkhya perception, inference and verbal testimony (śābda); the Naiyāyika perception, inference, identification (upamāna), and verbal testimony; the Prabhakara perception, inference, verbal testimony, identification and presumption or postulation (arthāpatti); the [Bhāṭṭa-] Mimāṃsaka perception, inference, verbal testimony, identification, presumption and non-existence (abhāva).27

We have enumerated indeterminate and determinate knowledge when it has been already understood that there are two valid cognitions by the

25. NBT 6, 4-6; TSop 276, 6-8.
26. NBT 6, 10-13.
27. This description of various theories on the classification of pramāṇa is quoted with slight variations in TSop 277, 4-10. TSop 277, 9-10 abhāvo hi pratyaksam śabdaś ca pramāṇam iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ seems to be confused, and it can be bettered by emending into abhāvo'pi mimāṃsakānām. pratyaksam śabdaś ca pramāṇam iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ (cf. the following passage in TBh). In this connection a verse in Mānameyodaya 8 is interesting: cārvākās tāvad ekaṁ dvitayaṁ api punar buddhavaiseṣikau dvau bhasarvajñāś ca sākhyaḥ tritayam udāyanādyāḥ ca tuṣṭākāḥ vadanti. prāHuḥ prabhākaraḥ pāṇcakam api ca vayaṁ te'pi vedānta-ṣākṣāṁ saṃkṣiṇiś tu aṣṭakam abhidādiḥ saṃbhavaitihayogāt.
word 'twofold'. The reason for this is to reject [the theory of] twofold cognition with different members. For the Vaiyākaraṇa says that twofold valid knowledge consists of perception and verbal testimony.28

4.1. Refutation of the Cārvāka's view of pramāṇa. (5.12) First of all, we assert that the Cārvāka has necessarily to admit the validity of inference. For he (1) advances the definition of perception [which is the same as inference proving the identity of pratyakṣa and pramāṇa] in order to teach others [the characteristic common to valid perceptions and that common to false perceptions]. (2) Other people's thought is not perceptible but is to be inferred through its effect such as the operation of their body and words. From this, it follows that when he [says he] understands another person's thought, he is forced to admit the inference based on the logical mark of an effect. Again, (3) when he denies the existence of another world, he actually has resort to a proof called negation (anupalambha) [which is inferential knowledge]. Therefore, how can the Cārvāka be sane when he argues by means of inferential knowledge, while saying that inference is not valid knowledge.29

[From the fact that you, the Cārvākas, establish the common nature of valid knowledge and that of invalid knowledge, that you understand the thought of another person, and that you negate something, it follows that [inference which is]] a pramāṇa other than perception exists.30

28. For the Vaiyākaraṇa's refutation of inference as valid knowledge see Vākyapadīya. I. v. 32-34. They are cited for criticism's sake in TS v. 1460-1462. Cf. Mookerjee 366-367. G adds here an oft quoted verse of Dharmakirti: pramāṇetarasaṁsanyasthītīr anyaśāhīyo gateḥ, pramāṇāntarasadbhāvaḥ pratiśedhāc ca kasyacit. This verse, originally found in PVn Peking ed. Ce 251, b 6 ff., is quoted in Ratnakirti's Pramāṇāntarbhāva-prakaraṇa (RNA 90. 2-3). It is also cited in SDS II. 19. 38-39; PKM 180. 5; 324. 4; NVV l. 386. 2 etc. In § 4 Mokṣākara follows the argument of Ratnakirti; so it is quite possible that as in G he actually quoted this verse from Ratnakirti. But G misplaces the verse, since it is meant for proving the existence of inference against the Cārvāka who admits only perception as valid cognition and accordingly should be brought under § 4. 1.

29. Our author closely follows the argument of Ratnakirti. RNA 89, 25-29: na ca cārvāko'py anumānam anavasthāpya sthātuḥ prabhavati, vāyān twentyakaṭāraṇāt. taccāṣṭre hi pratyakṣetasāṃsanyayoḥ pramāṇetaravidhānaḥ lakṣaṇaprasyayanato vidhātavyam. tac ca lakṣaṇaḥ pratyakṣe dharmanī lakṣye prāmāṇye pratyetaye svaibhavo hetuḥ. parabuddhipratipattau ca kādyādyāyapāraḥ kāryahetuḥ. paralokapratipśedhe ca dṛṣyānupalambho 'hāgarikṣya iti katham anumānāpalāpah. ... See also SDS 18. 25-19. 40; TS v. 1456-1459 gives the Cārvāka's criticism of inference which is refuted in the following verses by Śaṅkīrakṣita. But this refutation is made in a way different from that in our text.

30. n. 28 above.
4.2. **Refutation of verbal testimony.** (6.1) Knowledge derived from verbal testimony could be admitted as valid only if it agreed with the external object; and this agreement (avisaṁvādatva) is not possible without a relationship (sambandha). There is not, however, any relation between the word and the external object. The reason is as follows: If there were a relationship between the word and the thing-meant, it would be either identity (tādātmya) or causality (tadutpatti). Of these, an identical relationship does not anyhow exist between the word and the thing-meant, since the two are manifested as completely different [from each other]. For unity (ekatva) is called identity. And if unity were to be admitted even between two differently manifested things, a cow and a horse would be one thing. Nor is a causal relationship [possible between the word and the thing-meant], since neither concomitance in agreement (anvaya) nor in difference (vyatireka) is observed [between them]. You cannot, therefore, assert that there is a causal connection between the two. For we see a jar, etc. being produced out of a lump of clay, a stick, water, a potter, and a wheel without [depending on] the operation of words, and a word for its part is produced only through the palate, etc. operated by the mere will of a man, even when there is no external object.32

(6.12) If there were, apart from identity and causality, another real relationship33 marked by the verbal expression and its meaning between the word and the thing-meant, then it would follow that when a word is spoken, even one34 who does not know the verbal convention can under-

---

31. Verbal testimony is advocated mainly by the Mimāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas. The first half of the author’s criticism (§ 4.2) is directed to the Mimāṃsakas who regard the Vedic injunction as a means of valid knowledge, and the last half (§ 4.2.1) to the Naiyāyikas who define verbal testimony as the words of a reliable person. Our author follows Ratnakirti’s discussion in RNA 92 ff.


33. M, T vāstavah; G svabhāvikaḥ.

34. M, T pruṣasya; G pramāṭuḥ.
stand the definite meaning by virtue of the natural capacity (yogyatā)\textsuperscript{35} [of a word], just as he apprehends a jar, etc.\textsuperscript{36} when it is lighted up by a lamp. But such is not the case, since, for example, a man who has newly arrived from the Nālikera (Nicobar) islands does not understand any meaning from the word agni when he hears it.\textsuperscript{37}

(6.17) [The opponent may contend:] “The word is born\textsuperscript{38} with such a nature that it is able to denote such and such an object according to such and such an agreement.” But this is untenable, because there is no evidence for this argument, for any agreement (saṃketa) can be applied to anything, and accordingly we do not know if someone really means what he says or another thing.\textsuperscript{39}

(7.2) Or, admitting that there is a connection other [than identity and causality], we should ask by what connection this [connection] is connected with the two [i.e. the word and the thing-meant]. If you propose that it is by another connection which is the fourth [entity], we should ask by what connection the fourth is connected with the [other three] entities. If you produce the fifth, the same question would be asked again with regard to the fifth. Thus, there being an infinite regress (anavasthā), the last is never established, which makes all the preceding ones illegitimate.\textsuperscript{40}

(7.6) Or if\textsuperscript{41} you say that the connection of the word and the thing-
meant is possible without being connected [by another connection], this is not correct. How can a thing which is not connected [with another] be a connecting link itself, as in the case of a piece of cloth with regard to a jar. [The opponent may contend:] “It should be said that a connection is by nature such that it connects others without requiring another connection.”42 [The author:] This is untenable. No objection (uttara) may be raised when the nature [of a thing] is established by a proof as when a nature such as burning is [established by a proof] as belonging only to fire and not to other things such as ether. On the contrary, we, in spite of our scrutiny, do not find any justification for the establishment of a connection. You should not contend that the word, having by nature an expressive capacity (śabdaśakti), never deviates from the thing-meant determined by it. For if the word ‘jar’ denotes by nature the category (padārtha) which, having a conch-shaped neck, is able to hold water, then how can it denote a horse and other things when depending on another agreement and the particular will of a speaker. It will indeed be impossible for a seed of rice, which is produced by its own causes with the nature of yielding its shoot, to give birth to an ass, even if it is understood according to another agreement.43

4.2.1 (7.19) It is also not acceptable that the words spoken by trustworthy persons44 are a means of valid knowledge, since trustworthiness is impossible to be ascertained. The state of being emancipated from all faults (kṣipadoṣatva) is called trustworthiness (āptatva). Emancipation from all faults refers to a certain state belonging to another person’s mind. And this is hardly visible [i.e. determinable], since we see [sometimes] that physical and lingual actions [supposed] to be the logical mark45 [through which we infer the trustworthiness of the concerned person] occur46 in persons who are not [really trustworthy]. When it is usual that a man

42. M. sambaddhānātī; G=T sambadhnātīti.
43. RNA 93, 16-20: atha svahetubhir evāyam idyās teṣāṁ svabhāvo datto yena te saṁkhetaniśeṣasahāyā eva kam api artham avabodhayanti. na tarhi saṁkhetaparāryttau padārthāntaravṛttaṁ bhaveyuk, yadi ky ayam agnihoraśabdaḥ saṁkhetāpeko yugaviśeṣapratipādakah, katavyaḥ saṁkhetāyati. na hi kṣītyādyapekṣēna bijena svahetor akkurajanaśabhadvēnātampamnaṁ rāśabhaḥ śākyo janayitum, tathā śabdopī yadarthapratipādananiyatas tam eva prakāśayet.
44. NS 1. 1. 7 : ēptopadesāḥ śabdaḥ.
45. M kāyavāgyāpāraśikāryaśasya kāryaśasya tu. G kāyavāgyāpāraśya kāryaśasya tu.
46. M=T vṛtitdarṣanāt ; G saṁdarsanāt.
having passions pretends to be free from passions, how can you ascertain trustworthiness? 47

4.2.2 (8.4) Since the validity of the words of the Veda is negated through our refutation of a connection [between the word and the thing-meant], we do not deal with it separately. [The opponent may ask:] “If so, how about all verbal usage in the world which is not to be doubted?” [The author:] It is not hurt at all, because [the words convey their meaning] by virtue of the desire of a speaker [who expresses himself] according to such and such an agreement. It is said:

The words are to refer to the mere intention of a speaker [and not to the external object meant by it].48

4.3. Refutation of identification. (8.9) The Naiyāyika explains49 identification (upamāna) as follows: “Suppose that there is a man, operator of identification, who knows a cow but not a gavaya, and that he is directed by his master to go to a forest to bring a gavaya. Not acquainted with the object denoted by the word gavaya, he asks an inhabitant of a forest or50 another man who knows it: My friend, what is a gavaya like? And the latter answers: A gavaya is like a cow. Now the servant, when he is in a forest, gets the knowledge of the resemblance (sārūpyajñāna) of a gavaya [to a cow] which, being assisted by the remembrance of the object suggested by the analogical expression (atidesaśvyākhyātamsmaranāsahākārin),51 produces the comprehension (pratipatti) that this is the very object designated by the word gavaya; here the knowledge of resemblance, being the agent (kartṛ), is a means of knowledge, and the

47. RNA 94. 11-13: āptaprajñatasya punar vacanasya...na pṛamāṇyam upagantuḥ śakyate, paracittavṛttinām asakyanīścayatvenāptavāparijñānāt.


49. NBh, NV and NVT ad NS 1.1.6. There is difference of opinion on what is the means of knowledge in the case of upamāna between NBh and NV-NVT (cf. Jhā’s note 2 in NS 28). Mokṣakara, as well as Ratnakirti, reproduces here the view of Vācaspatimisra that in identification sārūpyajñāna (the knowledge of the similarity, say, of a gavaya with a cow) is the pramāṇa, which being aided by the atidesaśmaranā produces the pramiti in the form ‘This object is what is named gavaya’ (cf. NVT 169, 5ff.: pīṇḍasya hi gavaya śadavācyutāṁ purusottidesaśvyākhyāsamaraṇasahākārināḥ pratyakṣaṁ gavayagatād gosāḍhiyāt prajñānān tena prajñāpratya iti pramāṇavyāpāraḥ prajñāpāram uktam iti.)

50. Insert vā between anyah and tajjñāṁ (cf. n. 52 below).

51. M atidesa; G ēptātidesa; T bstan pa =ādeśa.
comprehension [produced by it] is its effect (phala).”  

[The author:] This is untenable. For the validity of any kind of knowledge must be pervaded (vyāpta) by the state of having its object. But in this case, in spite of a careful investigation, we do not find the object. For it is said [by you] that the connection of the designation [with the thing designated] (samākhyaśambandha) is the object (viṣaya) of this [identification]. But such a connection is not existent in reality. For if it is [by nature] visible, its [presence] is negated by the actual non-perception of it, and if, on the contrary, it is invisible, we do not see any justification for establishing its existence.

9.3 Furthermore, is this connection existent separately from the two terms which are connected or not? If it is separate, it should be explained by what connection the two terms are connected [with the connection itself]. If you here imagine another connection, then an infinite regress would follow. Or, if it is not separate [from the two connected terms], then you should admit the existence of the two connected things alone, but not anything which is called a designating connection (samākhya). If you again say that the connection [here] means [a separate entity which] produces the idea of the connected, it is not reasonable. For the idea that these two are connected originates from the two connected things by virtue of their own causes, and is not able to win over a relationship

---

52. RNA 91, 20-25: ayam asya praṇācaḥ, yaḥ pratipattā gam jānāti na gavayam. ādiśīta ca svāminā gacchārayaḥ gavayam ānayāsmād iti. gavayasyabavādayam artham ajānāno vanacaram anyān vā tajjñānām prājñāvān. bhūtāḥ kidāśo gavaya iti. tenā cādīsitaḥ yathā gautathā gavaya iti. tasya śrutātideśavākyasya kasyāḥcid aranyām upagatasyātideśavākyārthakaraṇaṇāh sakṣiṣṭhahākārāḥ yad gavayasyāṣūṣyojāñanaḥ tat prathamaḥ evāsaḥ gavayaśabāvācyo 'rtha iti pratipattīn prastūvanam upāmanah pramāṇam iti.

53. M sampasyiima... G paśyāmaḥ.

54. NBh 20, 3: samākhysambandhapratippattir upamānārtha ity āha; NVT 169. 15: samākhysambandhapratippattir upamānārthaḥ phalam. RNA 95, 25: tathā hi samākhysambandhaḥ tasya viṣayo varṇyate, sa ca paramārthato nāsti. The meaning of the Buddhist criticism here is as follows: sārūpyajñāna is, as Vācaspati himself says, none other than pratyakṣa, atideśasmaranā is the same as āptopadesa or śabda, and the last characteristic particular to upamāna, samākhysambandha, is not existent in reality, because as already refuted in § 4.2, sambandha in general is not admitted. For a similar criticism by Dignāga see Randle, 317.

55. RNA 95, 26-27: sa hi sambandhāḥ sambandhibhyāṁ bhinnas 'bhinnas vā, yadi bhinnas tadā tayer iti kutaḥ, na ca sambandhāntarād iti vaktvayam, tad api kathāṁ teṣām iti cintāyāṁ anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ (cf. n. 40 above too). RNA 96, 1-2: athābhinnas, tadā sambandhānaṇa eva kevalav iti na samākhyaśambandho nāma, yaḥ kaścid upamānasya viṣayaḥ syāt.
which is another entity.  

4.3.1. (9.11) In the same way, the validity of [identification] described by the Mimamsaka is also to be repudiated. For an object qualified by resemblance (sādṛśyaviśiṣṭaḥ pinḍah) or resemblance qualified by object-ness (pinḍaviśiṣṭam sādṛśyam) is proposed by them as the object of identification. However, resemblance separate from the things similar cannot be established, just because there is no proof for knowing it. That is to say, if resemblance which is separate from the similar things is visible, then [the existence of] it is eclipsed by the non-perception of a perceptible object (drśyānupalambhgrasta). And if it is an invisible entity, how then can it be established even by inference, since we do not find any logical mark which is necessarily connected with it? On the other hand, the idea of resemblance can be produced by an object resembling [another] which is so produced by its own causes as to give rise to the idea. You are unable to establish [an entity called resemblance] through the idea of [resemblance].

The opponent may contend that resemblance is established by means of identification, [but not vice versa]. But this is untenable, because the opponent school speculates that the relation of qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) and qualificand (viśeṣya) found only between two similar bodily objects which have been established by a proof other [than identification] holds good as the object of identification. How then can resemblance alone be established by identification?  

56. RNA 95, 31-96, 1: ayam anayoḥ sambandhaḥ sambaddhav etav iti tu buddhiḥ svahetubalāt sambaddhavastudvayād api sambhāvyamānā na sambandham ākṣeptum prabhavatī. tasmān na bhinnasambandhasiddhiḥ. (Read samākhyaśambandho ṅāma instead of samākhya nāma sambandhaḥ in M 9, 6-7).

57. M=T tadā; G tad api.

58. RNA 95, 1-17: tatāḥ hi sādṛśyaviśiṣṭoḥ pinḍah pinḍaviśiṣṭaḥ vā sādṛśyam upamānasya viṣayō varṇyate, na sādṛśavastuvatiriktaḥ sādṛśyaṁ vyavasthāpayitaḥ śakyaṁ pramāṇena-pratitatvat, namu sādṛ śyaṁ vastu dvārām eva, yada āha, sādṛśyasya ca vastutvaṁ na śakyaṁ apabāditum, bhūyo 'vyavāsāmānyayo ājñyantarasya tat. (ct. SV Upamāṇa, v. 18) iti. atryo-cyate, yadi sādṛśavastuvatīrkhtaḥ sādṛśyaṁ vyavasthāpayitaḥ śakyaṁ pramāṇena-pratitatvat, namu sādṛśyaṁ vastu dvārām eva, yada āha, sādṛśyasya ca vastutvaṁ na śakyaṁ apabāditum, bhūyo 'vyavāsāmānyayo ājñyantarasya tat. pratyayasa tu suahetos tathotpamena sādṛśavastunāpi kriyamāṇo ghätaṁ evāti na sādṛśyaṁ uttāpayitaṁ prabhavati. upamānapramānavālaḥ eva sādṛśyasiddhir iti cet, na, pramaṇantarasaiddhiḥ eva sādṛśyapinḍayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasyopamānāvisayatvat, kathāḥ sādṛśyamātasyāpy-pamānāt siddhiḥ. tataḥ ca sādṛśyasyasiddhar na tadāviśiṣṭoḥ pinḍah pinḍaviśiṣṭaḥ vā sādṛśyam upamānasya viṣayāḥ.
4.4. Refutation of presumption. (10.5) Presumption or postulation (arthāpatti) is not accepted as a separate means of valid knowledge. Presumption is defined: Presumption is the supposition of a thing without which another thing apprehended by a proof, perception or else, would become unintelligible.

The following should be considered here: If the thing perceived by a means of valid knowledge is connected with the unseen, supposed thing through either the relation characterised by identity or that characterised by causality, then this is knowledge produced either from a logical mark of identity or from a logical mark of causality; it follows that the [so-called] presumption is none other than inference. Or, if there is no such connection, then presumption cannot be a means of valid knowledge, just because there is no necessary connection as in the case of understanding a piece of cloth from a jar.

4.5. Refutation of non-existence. (10.13) By no means do we cognize the essential quality of the [so-called] non-existence (abhiiva). How then can it be a pramāṇa? [Defining non-existence] the Mimāṁsaka says: “The non-production of [the five] means of valid knowledge beginning with perception is [itself] a means of valid knowledge called non-existence.”

What do you here mean by ‘non-production’? Is it 1) the mere negation of the proposition ‘knowledge is produced’ (prasajyavrtti)? Or 2) does it mean something positive, being construed as the negation of a term (paryudāsavrtti)? If something positive is meant, is it 2. a) an

---

59. Mimāṁsābhāṣya, 12, 4-5: arthāpātir api drṣṭaḥ śruta vārtho 'nyathā nōpapadyata ity arthakalpanā; NBh ad NS 2.2.1.: yatrābhidhiyamāne'rthe yo'nyo'rthaḥ prasajyate so 'rthāpattīḥ; SV Arthāpatti, v. 1: pramāṇaśaṅkhaṭvijñāto yatattvātī bhavat, adṛṣṭāṁ kalpayed anyaṁ sārthāpātītī udāhṛtā. RNA 91, 27-29: pratyakṣādibhiḥ ṣaṅbhīḥ pramāṇaṁ prasiddha yo'rthaḥ sa yena vīna na yujyate tasyārthaya kalpanam arthāpattītī iti.

60. RNA 96, 16-25: atra vicāryate, yasyārthasya darśanād yo'rthaḥ parikalpyate tayor yadi pratibandho'asti tadārthāpāttītī anumānam eva...anyathā tēna vīna nōpapadyata ity ahrkād anyo na brūyāt, ghaṭaṇṭavat...tatra svabhāvapratiśṭhita śvabhāvavahetujayaiva sārthāpattiḥ. dupatpatti pratibandhe kāryāliṅgajñaiva.


62. J. F. Staal gives an excellent logistic interpretation of the two kinds of negation, paryudāsa- and prasajya-pratiśedha as classified by the Mimāṁsakas and grammarians (cf.
insentient thing (jaḍarūpa) or 2. b) a form of knowledge? If it is a form of knowledge, 2. b. 1) is it knowledge in general (jñānamātra) or 2. b. 2) the knowledge of a positive thing related to one and the same knowledge [which grasps non-existence] (ekajñānasāmasargavastuno jñānam)?

Among these, 1) the negation of a proposition (prasajyārūpo’bhāvaḥ) is not appropriate. How can the mere negation devoid of [further] function possess the ability of discrimination (paricchedakatva) or of producing

Negation and the law of contradiction in Indian thought: a comparative study, BSOAS xxv, L 1962). A verse in the Mimāṁsāyāyaprakāśa expresses their main doctrine: paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatṛottarapadena nañ. pratiṣedhaḥ sa vijñeyah kriyayā saha yatara nañ. Staal’s tr. (ibid. 58): ‘Exclusion (paryudāsa) is to be understood where the negative (is connected) with the next word; prohibition (pratiṣedha) is to be understood where the negative (is connected) with the verb(al ending)’. An almost identical verse (having prasajyapratiṣedhas tu for pratiṣedhaḥ sa vijñeyah) is quoted in grammar (ibid. 59). In the field of Buddhist philosophy, it is Bhāvaviveka (-570 A. D.) who first made the distinction between the two kinds of negation in order to clarify the absolutist standpoint of the Mādhyamika philosophy. Cf. My Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa (1. Kapitel) WZKSO Bd. VII. S. 48. Avalokitavrata, a commentator on the Prajñāpradīpa, quotes an interesting verse explaining this distinction (ibid. 48, n. 11): ḍagag pa don gyis bstan pa dañ. tshig geig sgrub par byed pa dañ. de ldan rañ tshig mi ston pa, ma yin gzan pa gzan yin no. Dr. E. Steinckelner of Vienna was kind enough to inform me of the existence of Arcata’s elucidation of the two kinds of negation in HBT; and on examining it, I found in HBT 171, 4 ff. a Sanskrit passage which is in sense parallel to the Tibetan verse cited above. This reads: yatra vidīheḥ prādhānyam pratiṣedho ‘ṛthagṛhitāḥ vidhiḥbāḥ svapadena nācyate ekavikyatā ca tatra paryudāsavyttitā... prasajyapratiṣedhaḥ puṇar etaviparito mantavyaḥ, tatra hi pratiṣedhasya vidhiḥ arthād ganyate vākyabheraḥ svapadena naḥ pratiṣedhabhāḥ sambadhyate. ‘In [a compound word or proposition] where the mode of paryudāsa (the negation of a term) is applied the main motive is affirmation, negation is understood by implication alone, the object to be affirmed is not expressed by its own word, and the negation means the same sense as the affirmative proposition derived from it, [e.g. ‘He is a non-brāhmaṇa’ is the same in sense as ‘He is a kṣatriya’]... prasajyapratiṣedha (the negation of a proposition) is to be considered as opposite to this, i.e. in the case of (prasajyapratiṣedha) the main motive is negation, affirmation is understood by implication, [the negation] conveys a different sense from the affirmative proposition related to it. [e.g. ‘They do not look at the sun’ conveys a different meaning from ‘They look at the sun’] and the object to be negated, being expressed by its own word, is connected with the negative’. In his exposition Arcata refers also to the fact that in paryudāsa the negative is related only to subanta or nominal inflected forms, whereas in prasajya it is related to tinanta or verbal inflected forms. For a detailed exposition see my article ‘仏教哲学における命題解釈—evaの意味制限機能’ (Analysis of a proposition by Buddhist philosophers with special reference to the particle eva restricting the meaning of a sentence) in Dr. Ensho Kanakura Commemoration Volume. This distinction is applied by Arcata to the Buddhist theory of non-cognition (anupalabdhi), which should be understood as the cognition of other things (anyopalabdhi), the negation being construed as paryudāsa. Mokṣākara discusses the same in § 13.
knowledge (jñānajanakata)? Thus, no one will have resort to it. Paññita Cakracūḍāmāṇi says in this connection:

Non-existence is not apprehension of any object, nor a cause of knowledge; How can it be known [as a means of knowledge]?

2. a) [What is meant by non-existence] cannot be an insentient thing, because an insentient thing has no discriminating function. We have not anywhere seen nor heard that insentient things such as a cart discriminate a jar.

2.b.1) Nor can it be knowledge in general, for in this case it would follow that Mt. Sumeru, Śāṅkha, the future emperor, and a demon, though inaccessible in space, time and essence, are [known to be] absent by means of the proof of non-existence as knowledge in general [when in reality these things cannot be judged to be either existent or non-existent].

2.b.2) If again non-existence here means the knowledge of a positive thing such as a piece of ground forming a part of the same knowledge [which grasps the non-existence of a jar], then it is in essence a particular kind of perception (pratyakṣaḥviśeṣa), though given another name ‘non-existence’. Then there should be no difference of opinion [between you and us].

Thus it has been established that the means of valid knowledge is twofold and only twofold, viz. indeterminate and determinate knowledge.

5. Indeterminate knowledge defined and discussed. Among these, indeterminate knowledge is devoid of fictional constructs or deter-

---

63. M=T (de sgrub par byed pa ma yin no): na tat pratipadyate; G tat pratipadyate.

64. The words of Cakracūḍāmāṇi are cited also in the passage of Ratnakirti (see 1. 7 in n. 65 below), though he does not mention him by name. So far I have not identified the words. nor do I know who Cakracūḍāmāṇi is.

65. RNA 97, 20-98, 1 : atha vābhaṇa-prāmāṇya-vasvarūpam eva nirūpyatām. kah pūṇaḥ prā- māṇaḥbhāvāntābhāhimation bhavatām, kim prasajavytī prámaṇaḥnātipattimātram. atha vā paryuddāvytī bhāvantaram. vastvantaram api jāṭarūpaṁ jñānaṇāraµā vā. jñānaṇāraµā api jñānamātrakam ekajñānasāṃsargavigastujñānaṁ vēti saµ vikālpaḥ, tatra na tāvam nīcītirūpa 'bhāvo yujjate, sa khalu nikihalāsaktivikalatayā na kiṃcit. ya ca na kīṃcit tathā kāthām abhāvam paricchindayāt, tadviṣayā vā jñānaṁ janayet. pratītām vā tathā kathām iti sarvam andhakāraṇ-tanam, yad āhuḥ: "na hy abhāvo kasyacyti pratiḥpattiḥ pratiḥpihitetur vā tasyādi kathāṁ pratiḥpattār" iti. nāpi vastvantarātāpakṣe jāṭarūpo 'bhāvo saṁgacchate. tasyābhāvvalaṃkṣaṇaprameyao paricchindābhāvo, paricchindasya jñānadharmatvatā, nāpi jñānamātravābhāvo'bhāvo vaktavyaḥ, desākālasābhāvāsavāpyakṣasāyasyādi tato'bhāvaprasaṅgat. tadekaḥapi jñānamātratvaṁ tasyā. atihaikajñānaṁsāṃsargavigastujñānaṁvābhāvot vānumanyate tadāhābhāvapramāṇaḥpratijñāyat, pratyakṣaḥviśeṣasyaivābhāvanāmakaranaṁ, tasya ācāmābhir dṛṣyānuupalabhābhākyasādhanatvena svīkṛṭatvaḥ.
mining factors (kalpanā) and unerring (abhrānta). The determining factor consists of comprehending [an object] in association with a word-sound (śabda) or internal notion (or inarticulate representation, antarjālpa), while linking together the preceding and subsequent moments [of the momentary object]. This may be illustrated by a clever man’s comprehension in the form ‘This is a jar’, the comprehension of a baby, dumb person or animal in the form of internal notion or reflection (parāmarśa). In this connection the following is said [by Dharmakīrti]:

Determination is the cognition of a representation which is capable of being associated with words.

(12.3) [It may be asked:] ‘‘How do you ascertain that a baby, a dumb person etc. have determinate knowledge (kalpanājñāna) in the form of inarticulate representation?’’ [We infer it] from the effects of determining factors such as taking what is desired and avoiding what is not desired. And such effects are perceived in a baby and a dumb person, who indeed claim what they want and abandon what they do not.

By pointing out that the knowledge of a baby, dumb person etc. contains fictional constructs it is taught that even simple perception (ālocaṇajñāna) said by Kumārilabhaṭṭa (to be indeterminate knowledge) is determinate.

(12.8) [The opponent:] ‘‘Why is knowledge associated with constructs or by nature erring not indeterminate knowledge?’’ [The author:] It is not, because it is well known to all scholars that indeterminate know-

---

66. PS I. k. 3c: pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham (Hattori, II. 1, n. 25); NB I. s. 4: tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhṛntam; PV III. v. 123 a-b: pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham pra- tyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati.
67. PS I. k. 3d: nāmajātyādiyajanā (Hattori, II. 1. n. 26); =NB I. s. 5: abhilāpasah-sargayogyapratibhsapratitiḥ kalpanā. NBT under this sūtra interprets the word yogya as denoting not only explicit connection with a name but also a baby’s notion which is not connected with a clear name.
68. M=T; G vikalpākāryasyeṣṭaniṣṭopādānaparīhitārasyādayāt.
69. The present argument is followed by Vidyākara’santi in TSop 278, 6 ff.
70. SV Pratyakṣa, v. 112: asti hy ālocaṇajñānaḥ prathamaḥ nirvikalpakam, bālamū-kādiwiṣṇasadṛṣṭaḥ mugdharastujam. Cf. Randle, 120, n. 2: There is a primary intuitive apprehension, an unqualified perception, arising from the mere real, -like the apprehension of infants and the dumb. See also Dasgupta, I, 378. The verse is cited also in TSop 280, 1-2.
71. M=T pratyakṣaṃ na syād iti cen na; G na pramāṇam iti cet.
72. M=T prasiddham; G sammatam.

— 41 —
ledge is knowledge directly intuiting the real nature\textsuperscript{73} of an object. For knowledge grasping an object is the effect of the object, and the object which is grasped is the cause of the knowledge, as is said \textsuperscript{74} [by Dharmakirti]:

How can a [momentary] thing which is at a different time [from that of the indeterminate cognition grasping it] be an object of the indeterminate cognition? We reply: Philosophers recognize that the essence of a sense-object consists in its being a cause capable of leaving its image in the knowledge. On the contrary], determinate knowledge is produced from the past impression alone even when there is no [corresponding] object. Being neither positively nor negatively concomitant with the external object (anwayavyatirekābhāvāt), how can it be an effect of an object? For if $x$ can exist without $y$, then $x$ is not the effect of $y$. Otherwise the unwarrantable consequences (atiprasaṅga) would follow. If determinate knowledge were produced out of an object, then an object such as a jar could be seen just because of that knowledge; it would mean that even a blind person could see a colour-form. But such is not the case. Therefore it is said:

Determinate knowledge has no function of intuiting an object, since the object is not manifested in verbal knowledge as in indeterminate perception.\textsuperscript{75}

The present argument serves to repudiate the following opinion stated by another scholar\textsuperscript{76} [i.e. Bhartrhari]:\textsuperscript{77}

"There is in this world no cognition which is not followed by a word; All knowledge appears as if penetrated by words."

\textsuperscript{73} Gartham; M artharūpaṃ; but T don gyi ṛaḥ gi ṅo bo=arthasvarūpaṃ, which is best.

\textsuperscript{74} =PV III, v. 248 =PVn Derge ed. 158, b 1: bhinnakālaṁ kathāṁ grāhyam iti cet grāhyatāṁ viduṣḥ, hetutvam eva yuktiṁ jñānākārārpanakṣamam. Cf. Stcherbatsky, II, 360; Mookerjee, 338. G and T of our present text omit the part bhinnakālaṁ kathāṁ grāhyam iti.

\textsuperscript{75} sābdyaṁ buddhāvin arthasya pratyakṣa īva pratibhāsābhāvāt nāsti kalpanāyā artha-

sākṣātkarītvam. Not identified.

\textsuperscript{76} M 13, n. 2 and G yad uktaṁ sāmkhyena, but T yad uktaṁ pareṇa.

\textsuperscript{77} =VP I, v. 123: na sośti pratyayo loke yaḥ sābdānugamād ṛte, anuadaḥṁ īva jñānam sarvaṁ sābdena bhāsate. The verse is often quoted by Buddhist logicians for criticism's sake (cf. TSP 68, 8; 70, 13; TSoP 279, etc). bhāsate being sometimes replaced by jāyate or vidyate.
For example, while [the word ‘jar’] is pronounced with regard to a jar placed before us, other knowledge concerning a piece of ground etc. close to the jar is experienced as well, though they are not referred to by the pronounced word." In such a case we do not find the association with a word. This is [testified by the rule that] two concepts (vikapa) cannot occur at the same time.

5. 1. Abhrînta explained. (13.13) Erring knowledge (bhrântaṁ jñānam) is also unable to intuit [the reality of] its object. For ‘erring’ means to be opposite to the real thing capable of effective operation. The nature of a real thing capable of effective operation is determined in space, time and form. Then, how can it be intuited by erring knowledge whose content is falsely presented? As Ācārya (Dharmakirtī) says:

Indeterminate perception is knowledge which is not affected by illusion produced through the darkness of the eyes, rapid motion, travelling on a boat, a violent blow or other causes.

By this, the following are referred to: One suffering from jaundice, seeing a white shell, gets the knowledge presenting itself as yellow; One gets the knowledge presenting itself as a circle while seeing a fire-brand being swung in a circular motion; one who is sitting on a boat in motion gets the erroneous knowledge of running trees; when one is severely hit in vulnerable parts of the body, we get the knowledge presenting itself as a flaming post; all [the erroneous knowledge referred to] is not [valid indeterminate] perception.

[The following objection may be raised:] “If such [erroneous] cognition is not valid indeterminate knowledge, how do you explain the fact that we [sometimes] reach a real object even through erroneous knowledge

78. TSop 278, 15–16: avyāptendriyasya darśanavat buddhau sabdenāpratibāsanaṁ arthārūpasya. (...Since the form of an object is not manifested in consciousness in association with the word as when we see unconsciously objects for which our sense-organ is not operating with attention.)

79. G=T sabānugamo; M sabānugato; M 13. n. 3 tadanugamo.

80. =NB I, s. 6: (tayā rañitm) timirāsabhramanaṁavyānasamśobhādyaṁhitabhramam jñānam pratyakṣam. NBT explains each of the instances mentioned here and Mokṣākara reproduces it.

81. G omits jñānam.

82. G=T (bskor ba) bhramad-alātādau; M bhramād.

83. M caladvyākṣadibhṛantiṁjñānam; T šī la sogs pa g’yo bar ḭar sin paḥi śes pa=caldvyākṣadibhājīṁjñānam; G bhramadyākṣadibhājīṁ.

84. M jvalat-; G prajvalat-.
of it?” [The author:] Some scholars [such as Dharmottara, Śāntiraksīta etc.] replying to this question, say that we do not reach the [corresponding] object through erroneous cognition, but only through another [valid cognition].85

6. **Classification of indeterminate knowledge**: sense-perception. (14.5)

This is fourfold, 86viz., sense-perception (*indriyajñāna*), mental perception (*mānasa*), self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*) and the cognition of a yogin (*yogijñāna*).

Sense-perception is [cognition] which, being produced87 depending on the five senses beginning with the eyes, has as its object the five external things such as colour and so on. Among them, visual perception has as its object a colour-form; auditory perception has as its object a sound; olfactory perception has as its object smell; gustatory perception has as its object taste; tactual perception has as its object a tangible thing. The designation ‘sense-perception’ is made after the specific cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) [of this perception] as in the cases of ‘the sound of a kettle-drum (*bherisabda*)’ and ‘the shoot of barley (*yavāṅkura*)’.87a

This kind of indeterminate cognition is regarded as a means of valid knowledge only as to the object of which it produces [a moment later] the determinate knowledge corresponding to the sensation, for the validity

85. Our author makes a mere mention of a difficult problem regarding the qualifier *abhrāntam* in Dharmakīrti’s definition of *pratyakṣa*, without going further into a detailed discussion. The qualifier is added by Dharmakīrti to the definition of Dignāga *pratyakṣaḥ kalpanāpoḍham*. It is known from TS k. 1324 and TSP that there were some Buddhist logicians who regarded the qualifier redundant and misleading. They argued that erroneous perception sometimes makes us reach the object, as the knowledge of a yellow shell does, and that this is the reason why Dignāga did not qualify perception by *abhrāntam*. The argument is presupposed when Dharmottara says (NBT 7.5 ff.): *tato (=gacchadṛṣṭādaśanād) hi pratyttena vṛṣaṃātttam avāpyata iti saṃvāda-katvāt saṃyagyijñānaḥ kalpanāpoḍhatvāc ca pratyakṣam iti syād āśaḥkā, tanniveśtyartham abhrāntagrahaṇam... yadi mītyājñānaṁ kathāḥ tato vṛṣaṃāptir iti cet. na tato vṛṣaṃāptih, nānāsāgāmi hi vṛṣaḥ tena paricchināḥ, ekadeśaniyataś ca vṛṣo'vāpyate. tato yaddesā gacchadṛṣṭo dṛṣṭas taddeśo nāvāpyate, yaddesaś ca vāpyate sa na dṛṣṭa iti. na tasmāt kāścid artho vāpyate, jñānāntarād eva tu vṛṣaṃādir artho vāpyate, ity evam abhrāntagrahaṇaḥ vipratipattinirāśārtham. Vinitadeva tried to understand abhrānta as meaning *avisamviḍakam*: and Dharmottara and Śāntiraksīta (TS v. 1325-1327) repudiate this view. For a useful and interesting exposition of the problem see Mookerjee, 276-281. See also Stcherbatsky, II. 17. n. 3.

86. =NB I, s. 7: *tac caturvīdhām*.
87. *M utpadayamāna ; G utpanna-
87a. NBT 10, 4: *indriyasya jñānam indriyajñānam, indriyāśritam yat tat pratyakṣam; PS I. k. 4a-b: asādhāraṇaḥ hetutvād akṣais tad vyapadiṣyate* (Hattori, II. 1. n. 32).
in the sense of the empirical truth (sāṁvyavahārikaḥ pramāṇa) is here referred to.\(^{88}\)

6.1. **Mental perception.** (14.14) Mānase\(^{89}\) or mental perception is the product of a sense-perception which forms its immediately preceding homogeneous cause, and which cooperates with the immediately succeeding facsimile [i.e. the second moment] of its proper object.\(^{90}\)

The words ‘its proper (sva)’ refers to a sense-perception, ‘its proper object’ referring to an external object such as a jar. [The compound word] svaviṣayānantara is construed as svaviṣayānantaraḥ [viṣayah], i.e., the immediately succeeding facsimile of its proper object, and refers to the second moment of a jar etc. which is different from the original object of the sense-perception. ‘Cooperating with it’ (tena sahakāriṇā) means [the sense-perception] concurs with it [i.e. the second moment of the object]. This sense-perception is the material cause (upādāṇa) [of the mental perception] and called samanantarapratyaya (the cause which immediately precedes, and is similar to, its effect, i.e. the next moment of the cause). What is produced from this is called mental perception.

(15.1) By this [definition of mental perception] are refuted the objections raised by others, viz. 1) that [mental perception is not valid knowledge, since] it cognizes what has already been cognized [by sense-perception]\(^{91}\); 2) that [if, on the other hand, it is supposed to cognize the external object without the mediacy of sense-perception] the blind, the deaf etc. could not exist; 3) that the knowledge of a yogin would also be a mental perception; and 4) that it is not commonly recognized (avyaya-
For, since [mental perception] cognizes the second moment [which is different from the first moment of the object cognized by the sense-perception, the first objection] that mental perception grasps what has been once grasped is rejected.

A mental perception is produced by virtue of sense-perception, while the blind etc. do not have the respective sense-perception which is cognizant of the object such as colour etc. How then can they have a mental perception produced by it [i.e. sense-perception]? Therefore, our theory is not liable to the fault that the blind and others would not exist.

By putting [into the definition] the determinant ['produced from'] the immediately preceding homogeneous cause (samanantarapratyaya), the possibility of the false conclusion that the knowledge of a yogin\(^93\) would be identical with mental perception is removed. It is well known that the word samanantarapratyaya in the sense of its conventional usage (rūḍhyā) means [the immediately preceding knowledge as] the material cause [of the succeeding], when both of them occur in the same personality (sāntāna). Thus, when [the mental perception belonging to] the mind of an ordinary person is supposed to be identical with the knowledge of a yogin, the content of which belongs to a personality different from that of the cognizer [the yogin himself], the designation samanantarapratyaya could not be used here.

Neither is it tenable that [mental perception] is not commonly recognized, for mental perception, pertaining to extremely subtle duration of time, cannot be observed by ordinary people. Moreover, we do not in fact recognize it as part of the convention (vyavahāra). Mental perception\(^94\) is indeed testified by the sacred text of Buddhism (āgama), but there is no [logical] justification for it. The Blessed One said:

92. The first two of the four kinds of criticisms are ascribed to Kumārilabhaṭṭa by the author of NBTT (26. 12-27. 2): tat pariḥ kumārilādibhir lakṣaṇam ajānadbhir dūṣītam. tan manojñānām yadindriyaviññānaviṣaye pravartate tādā gṛhitagrāhitayā ‘pramāṇam. athānviṣaye pravartate, vyavahite pratyakṣaṁ bhavat kiṁ tanmanovijñānam indriyasavyapekṣāṁ syāṁ nirāpekṣāṁ vā. indriyasavyapekṣāte satindriyaviññānam eva. nirāpekṣāte vānindriyasyādī manovijñānāṁ pratyakṣāṁ syād ity andhabadhīrādyabhāvacodyah kṛtam. See also TSop 281, 19-24: yad api kumārilādibhir uktam... Our author follows fairly faithfully the discussion of Dharmottara, who enumerates and answers the first three objections explicitly and the fourth implicitly.

93. Insert yogijñānasya between M 15. 7 -viśeṣāṇena and mānasa.

94. Read mānasa- instead of M 15. 12 gānasa-.
Colour-form is cognized, Oh monks, by twofold cognition, the visual perception and the mental perception induced by it.\textsuperscript{95}

[The opponent: ] "What is the use of explaining what is not applicable to common discourse?" [The author: ] If mental perception fits in with such a definition as made above, there is no [logical] fault found. Thus the testimony of the sacred text is shown to be impeccable. This is the purpose [of admitting mental perception] as a species of indeterminate knowledge.

6.2. Self-consciousness. (15.18) All cognitions (citta) and feelings (caitta) are self-cognizant;\textsuperscript{96} this is called self-consciousness (svasamvedana).\textsuperscript{97} Cognition [or consciousness in general] is knowledge grasping the object in its general aspect. Feeling or mental activity stands for what occurs in the mind; it cognizes specific aspects of the object and is characterised by pleasure, pain or indifference.\textsuperscript{98}

Self-consciousness is that form [of cognition] by which the self of all cognitions and feelings is cognized; it is called [a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and unerring, because its nature consists in direct intuition of the nature of itself.

(16.4) Against this, some opponents raise the objection: "[The theory of] self-consciousness of cognitions and feelings is not tenable, because the action [of a thing] towards its own self is a contradiction. For instance, a dancing boy, no matter how well-trained he may be, cannot climb up his own shoulder; the blade of a sword, however sharp it may be, does not cut itself; a body of fire, though vehemently burning, cannot burn itself. Likewise, how can the cognition or feeling feel itself? The relation of the feeler and the felt (vedyavedakahāva) is none other than the relation of the agent and the object (karmakaribhāva). And the object and the

\textsuperscript{95} M grhṇate; G grhyate; kadācit is omitted in G. T. Cf. NBTT 26. 10-11: dvābhyaṁ bhikṣavo rūpaṁ dṛṣṭate caṅsurvijñānena tadākṛṣṭena manoviññānenāti tadāgamasidhaṁ manoviññānam...

\textsuperscript{96} =NB I. s. 10: sarvacittacaittānāṁ atmasamvedanam. See n. 90 above.

\textsuperscript{97} T omits svasamvedanam.

\textsuperscript{98} Read -upekṣā instead of -apekṣā- in M. This passage of Mokṣākara is verbally cited in TRD 40. 2-3. Cf. NBT 11, 5: cittam arthamātragrāhi caitā viṣeṣavasthāgrāhīnāḥ sukhādayaḥ; Prasannapadā 65. 2-3: arthamātradarśanaṁ caitasya vyāpāro’rthaviveśadarśanaṁ caitasānāṁ; tatrārthadṛṣṭir viññānaṁ tadviñese tu caitasāḥ, ity abhyupagamati. For details see AK i, 30, n. 3; Siddhi, I. 296; Prasannapadā, 65, n. 3; Stcherbatsky II, 29; Mookerjee 319-320, etc.
agent in it are well established by common sense to be always distinct from each other as e.g. a tree and a carpenter."

[The author:] We reply to this: The relation of the feeler and the felt in consciousness is not considered as object-agent relation, but as the relation of the determinant and the determinable (vyavasthāpya-vyavasthā-paka-bhāva). As a lamp illuminates itself, so is also knowledge considered to know itself, since it is, quite differently from insentient things (jaḍapadārtha), produced by its own cause with the nature of self-luminosity. In this connection [Śāntirakṣita] says:

Knowledge is by nature opposed to insentient matter; this immateriality is nothing but the self-consciousness of knowledge. The self-consciousness of knowledge is not to be analysed into action and its agent, since knowledge, being a single unity without compartments, cannot be divided into the three parts [viz. the knower, the known and the knowing]. The Alamkārakāra [Prajñākaragupta] also says:

The agent, the object [and the means] are mere fictional constructs and not [existent in] reality; it is explained that the self touches itself by means of itself.

(17.4) On the other hand, it is not possible for cognition and feelings to be illuminated by another cognition. For firstly it cannot be said that cognition and feelings are illumined by another cognition which occurs...
at the same time as they do, because [between them] there is no relation of the benefitting and the benefitted (upakāryopakārabhāva) just as in the case of the right and the left horns of a cow. Nor [can they be illumined] by another cognition existing at a different time, because the former or that which is to be illumined, has disappeared [when the latter takes place] because of the momentariness [(of all things)].

Furthermore, if knowledge were not self-cognizant, then we would not be able to state \[\text{the judgment}\] that the object is known, because of the accepted principle that cognition the qualifier of which is not cognized does not occur in \[\text{an object, which is}\] the qualificand. For \[\text{in cognition}\] the object is the qualificand; the state of being known is the qualifier. And ‘known’ means ‘qualified by knowledge’. If knowledge itself is not apprehended through its self-luminosity, how then can the object qualified by the knowledge be apprehended? It is logically impossible that we cognize a stick-holder without cognizing the stick.

(17.13) Trilocana\[107\] raised the following objection:

“Just as colour-form as the object of the visual sense is cognized even when the visual organ itself is not cognized, just so will it be possible for the object to be known even if the knowledge is not perceived itself.”

---

104. G places here the Alāṃkārakāra’s verse parokṣaṁ yadi tat... which appears in M 18, 15-16. This argument of Mokṣikara is cited almost verbatim in TSop 282, 15-20. The Mīmāṃsaka theory that knowledge is cognized by another cognition is refuted in almost all the logical works of Buddhists, see e.g.: PS I, k. 12: jñānāntareṇaḥuḥhave niṣṭhā tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ, viśayāntaraśaṃcāras tathā na syāt sa cēṣyate (Hattori. II. 1, n. 77-80); PV III, v. 513-521, which is followed by TS k. 2023-2028 and TSP on them. But the argument of our author here is in a different way

105. G has vyāpadeśe after iti (M 17.6).

106. nāgṛhitaviśeṣanābuddhir viṣeṣey varūte. Not identified, but the verse or its variant is often quoted in various texts with regard to discussions of various subjects. E.g. SV Apoha., v. 88c-d: viṣeṣyabuddhir iṣṭēha na cājñāte viṣeṣane, on which Bhaṭṭaputrajyamiśra comments: na ca pratyayaṁsye bhāvarūpe pohe tadviśeṣavastuprattitir yuktā, nāgṛhitaviśeṣanā viśiṣte buddhir utpadyate... This verse of SV is concerned with the refutation of the Buddhist theory of apoha, in which the negation of the opposite of the meaning of a word is considered to be the qualifier, the qualificand being the object of the word; SVK II, 122, 2-3: jñānaviśiṣṭā hi jñātate, sā katham ajñāte viṣeṣaṁ jñāyate; PKM 210, 6-7; 473, 13-14, etc.: nāgṛhitaviśeṣanā viṣeṣey buddhīḥ; NVV I, 503, 27; PVV 211, n. 3 etc. Mokṣikara cites this verse considering it to mean the same as the famous verse of Dharmakirti: apratyaṅko-palamahasya nārtadhṛṣṭīḥ prasiddhyati (cf. M 18, 13).

107. Trilocana, the teacher of Vācaspatimisrā is one of the important opponents of Jñānāsrmītra, Ratnakirti and our author. For detailed information of him see JNA Intro. 20; A. Thakur, The Nyāyamañjari of Gurn Trilocana. JBRSLI. 4. 507 ff.; Mookerjee, 15.
[The author]:] This is also not well-founded because [the example] is not applicable to the present subject. For the qualifier of colour is not the eyes, but visual knowledge (cakṣuṣvinījñāna). When visual knowledge is not cognized itself, how can colour be cognized? Thus our criticism is not nullified.\textsuperscript{108}

(18.1) \textsuperscript{109}Kumārilabhaṭṭa, in order to teach the imperceptibility (par-okṣatva) of knowledge, says as follows: "The existence of the senses is established since otherwise [i.e. without their existence] the manifestation (prakāśa) of colour and other [objects] remains inexplicable; in the same way, the existence of knowledge is established [as the cause of the cognizedness in the object (jñātatā) through inference]. The Mimāṃsābhāṣya relevant to this problem runs: No one [directly] cognizes his own knowledge when an object is not cognized; the existence of knowledge is inferred when an object is not cognized. [Therefore, knowledge is not directly perceived.]]\textsuperscript{110} And the [Śloka-]vārttika says on this point:

The existence of knowledge [is inferred] by virtue of the cogni-
Cognizedness here means the manifestation (prākatya) of an object. But this theory is not correct. For, 1. a) if this manifestation, being an independent entity, becomes visible in the form of the object, it would be insentient (jāda) and your theory then would fall to the ground since an insentient thing cannot become visible. 1. b) Or, if it exists as a thing different from the object, it would again be insentient, and your theory would be untenable since such a thing would not become visible by itself. 1. c) Thirdly, if it is made visible by another manifestation, an infinite regress would follow, since the second manifestation would also require the third, and so forth to infinity. 2) If, on the contrary, manifestation is the essential quality of knowledge, it would also be imperceptible just like knowledge. In either case cognizedness is unintelligible. Therefore it is necessary to state that knowledge is by nature self-cognizing.

Moreover, self-consciousness is established by our own experience. How then can it be denied? In connection with this [Dharmakirti] says:

If cognition were itself not perceived, perception of an object is never possible. The author of the [Pramāṇavārttika-] Alāmkāra [Prajñākaragupta] also

111. tasya jñānam tu jñātatāvaśāt. Despite of our author's mention by name, this is not found in SV Śrīnīva. But see SVK ad SV Śrīnīva. v. 32 (II, 107, 18-20) : ye tu viṣayavitivrūpasāriḥ buddhasaṃvidvam atiṣṭhante teṣām asiddhaḥ sahopalambhāniyamaḥ. sadaiva hi viṣayasaṃvedanottarakālam eva saṁvid upalabhya, yathāḥ: pūrvaḥ saṁghhyate paścāj jñānaṁ taj jñātatāvaśāt. Cf. Šabara in n. 110 above. The knowledge of an object and of the cognition do not occur simultaneously. The object is always known before, and the cognition is inferred afterwards from the cognizedness, which, being a separate entity produced by the activity of the cognition, inheres in the object. See also Stcherbatsky II. 355, n. 1.

112. NK, 302,7 : bhāttramāṁśakās tu jñāta iti pratitisiddho jñānajanyo viṣayasamavetaḥ prākaṭyoṣparamām atiriktpadārthaviśeṣaḥ... ity āhaḥ. This is taken from the Mulamatuhealthānāthī tatvavacānamiṣyākyāh, but well corresponds to our author's argument.

113. Read prākaṭyasāpya instead of M 18, 10 prākaṭyasāpya.


115. This half-verse originally occurs in PVn. Td, 166 a7 : dmigs pa m dön sum ma yin na, de (Read. dön) m dön rab tu ḡrub mi ḡgyur. Being one of the most famous verses of Dharmakirti, it is quoted in many texts. Buddhist, Brāhmaṇical as well as Jaina. See e.g., TSP 401, 4 : apratyaśkopalambhasya nārthadayṭṭhaḥ prasidhayati; JNA. 478, 7 ; TS v. 2074 : aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavāṭṭhaḥ prasidhayati is an apparent modification.
If knowledge is imperceptible, how can it be possible for [an object] to be known? Who can define the nature of what is imperceptible?

(18.17) [The opponent:] “If all knowledge is aware of itself by self-consciousness, determinate knowledge such as ‘This is a jar’, etc. would become indeterminate. Again, how cannot [erroneous] knowledge such as [the cognition of] a yellow shell, etc. be correct knowledge?”

[The author:] We reply. Even determinate knowledge is indeterminate as such. The judgment ‘This is a jar’ is determinative of the external object alone, but not of itself. [Regarding this point, Dharmakīrti] said:

The knowledge which apprehends the thing meant by a word is determinative of the thing alone; but the nature [of the knowledge itself] is not identical with the object of the word. In its nature all [knowledge] is [not conceptual, but] intuitive.117

Likewise, erroneous knowledge is in itself non-erroneous, since it is manifested in the form of self-illumination (svaprākāsāraśeṇa). It is said to be erring simply because it has a wrong object, as is said as follows:

Every knowledge is correct in itself, but it may be erring in relation to [the external object which is] another.118

Thus it is to be maintained that whatever is manifested is manifested because it is so produced out of its own causes; otherwise manifestation

---


117. =PV III, v. 288: śabdārthāgrāhi yad yatra taj jñāṇam tatra kalpaṇā. svarūpaḥ ca na śabdārthas tatrādhyakṣam ato'khitam. artham and abhilāṣam in M should be accordingly corrected into -arthas and akhilam. Cf. PVBh 331, 19-20: kalpanāpi svasaṅkālita istā nārthe vikalpanāt, svarūpaḥ te vikalpaṁ āparokṣatvāprāsiddhihaṁ. The first half of this verse is identical with PS I, k. 7a-b (Hattori, II. 1, n. 51). M. reads jñānaṁ tat for taj jñānaṁ.

118. svarūpe sarvam abhrāntam pararūpe viparyayaṁ. Not identified, but see PVBh 331, 13-14: svarūpe tad eva spaṭākhaṁ arthas tu na tatha. tataḥ svarūpe tan nirvikalpakam, arthe tat savikalpakam iti smaraṇam. arthasamaṇam svarūpaḥ pratyakṣaṁ, kuta etat. svarūpe tad abhrāntam arthe bhrāntam iti. G resumes its course here (cf. n. 109) with the following passage, at the end of which the verse of Śāntiraksita that appeared in M 16, 15-16 is placed: prakāśakaśa vvadīder yady ami prakāśante tadā svahetor eva prakāśasvabhāva utpannah santa iti suṅkartavyam. In M prakāśaśiddheḥ and prakāśasvabhāvoḥ are found instead of the underlined words respectively and prakāśaṁ is inserted between santa and iti. G seems better in these respects.
would remain inexplicable.\footnote{118}

6.3. Mystic intuition of a seer. (19.10) The mystic intuition of a seer (yogijñāna) is the knowledge that is produced on the termination of intensive meditation on a true object.\footnote{119} This is also [a species of indeterminate knowledge]. Yoga (meditation) here is samādhī (concentration)\footnote{120} and it is characterised by intent attention of the mind on one object (cittaikāgratā). This is the same as wisdom (prajñā) discerning the truth of all things. Yōgin (a seer) is so called because he is possessed of yoga. The knowledge of a yogin is indeterminate knowledge. What kind of knowledge is it?\footnote{120a} It is explained as what is produced after the termination of intensive meditation (bhāvanāprakārṣaparyantarā) on a true object (bhūtārtha). ‘True object’ is an object compatible with valid knowledge. Meditation practice (bhāvanā) means to imagine (samāropā) [an object] repeatedly in the mind. The knowledge which is produced on the termination of the intensive meditation on the truth is devoid of determining factors (kalpanāpoḍha) and non-erroneous. The true object is the fourfold noble truth (caturāryyasatyā) named pain, the causes [of pain], the extinction [of pain] and the way to the extinction (duḥkha-samudaya-nirṇodha-mārga). We should understand the five groups (pañca-skandha) in the manner that they are by nature momentary (kṣaṇīka), void (śūnya), soulless (niratmaka), painful, and so forth. And this truth
should be known to be compatible with inferential knowledge such as ‘Whatever is existent is momentary’ and others [which are to be fully discussed in Chapter III].

6.3.1. Questions regarding meditation and emancipation answered.\(^{122}\)

(20.1) [The opponent] raises the following questions: 1) Meditation is [concerned with] fictional constructs (\textit{vikalpa}); fictional constructs refer to unreal objects. How then can a real thing vividly manifest itself [in the meditation]? 2) How can \textit{yogiijnāna} which is by nature] conceptual attain indeterminateness? 3) How can the mind which is momentary be fixed upon one object? 4) [When the mind is momentary] by whom and how is the superiority (\textit{viśeṣa}) [of the seer in comparison with common people] attained? 5) How can a man who has a body be emancipated (\textit{mukta}) through detachment from passions (\textit{rāga}) and so forth? [Thus, your theory of yogic intuition] is not intelligible in all these respects.”

(20.5) [The author:] Our reply is this: 1) Although fictional constructs are [primarily] concerned with an imaginary object (\textit{avastuviśaya}), it indirectly envisions (\textit{adhyavasyati})\(^{123}\) [the form of] an actual object. This is the reason why actual things are manifested vividly in this [yogic intuition] because of meditation.

2) We do not say that a fictional construct [or determinate knowledge] is identical with indeterminate knowledge, but that indeterminate knowledge is produced from determinate knowledge [through \textit{adhyavasāya}]. Furthermore, it is well established by direct experience (\textit{anubhavasiddha}) that the non-conceptual vision manifests itself to one who constantly meditates [on the object], as in the case of love, sorrow\(^{124}\), etc. Indeed there is no irrelevance whatsoever in such an experience (\textit{drśṭa}).

\(^{122}\) G omits the whole section corresponding to M 20.1-21.7 (§ 6.3.1).

\(^{123}\) The author deals with the Buddhist theory of \textit{adhyavasāya} in § 7.1.1.

\(^{124}\) T omits \textit{kāmasokādivat}. Cf. PV III, v. 283: \textit{kāmasokabhayonmād/acaurasvapnād/ypa-plutoḥ, abhūtān api paśyanti pūrale/vasthātān iva}. The simile of a lover to whom the figure of his beloved is clearly manifested is a favourite corroborative example of \textit{yogiijnāna}. Jiñānasrimitra (JNA 323.3-5) formulates the following syllogism to prove the possibility of \textit{yogiijnāna}: \textit{yad yad bhāvyate tat tad bhāvanāprakāraṇyante sputābhāvam saṁbhavati, yathā kāmukasya kāmīṇyākāraḥ; bhāvyante ca paramapuruṣārthīnā kṣaṇikatve nairātmyādayo vastudharmaḥ} (Whatever is meditated on possibly manifests itself clearly at the end of intensive meditation, as the figure of a beloved girl appears to her lover; real teachings such as the non-existence of the soul proved from universal momentariness are meditated upon by one who seeks for the supreme good of human being.) The theory is applied also to the proof of a Buddha’s omniscience. which is a kind of \textit{yogiijnāna} (cf. § 29).
3) Momentary as the mind may be, it is called ‘fixed on one object’ when it is intent on grasping [the object] during all the period consisting of a series of homogeneous [mental] moments (sajātiyakṣaneṣu).

4) As for the superiority [of the seer, we must say that] it can be produced just because of the momentariness [of the mind] and not because of permanency [i.e. non-momentariness], since it is not feasible that a permanent thing is increased with additional qualities (atiṣaya). Regarding this [Dharmakīrti] says:

A thing whose essential nature never perishes is called ‘permanent’ by the wise. Who can destroy the [permanent] capacity or non-capacity abiding by nature as such in a thing, which, due to its eternalness, is incurable [i.e. unchangeable]?

5) You have said: “A man who has a body is liable to happiness and unhappiness due to favour and disfavour shown to him. It is therefore not possible that he is emancipated by virtue of renouncing passions, etc. while he still has a body.” But this is untenable. For it is not the body, but nescience (avidyā) which is the cause of passions, etc., this nescience being wrong conception, the nature of which consists of the four kinds of delusions (viparyāsa), viz., imagining what is impermanent as permanent, what is not the self as the self, what is painful as pleasant, and what is impure as pure. From this [nescience] originates thirst (trṣṇā) for pleasurable objects. To him who regards the self (ātman) as eternal, the causes of longings for pleasure will be his own belongings (ātmiya). Attachment to these [belongings] is passion, and with the latter are connected hatred (dveṣa) and other [defilements]. Thus, it is nescience, but not the body that is the root of passion etc. How is one who has got rid of nescience bound to passion etc. even if he has a body? Therefore, even while living with a body those who have no passion can accomplish emancipation—which is characterised by the abandonment of all the attachment—when he is freed from nescience. Thus it has been

125. =PV II. v. 205 a-b: nityam tam ātur vidvāhso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati. M reads yatsvabhāvo instead of yaḥ svabhāvo.
126. =PV III. v. 22: tasya saktir asaktir vā yaḥ svabhāvāna saṁsthitā, nityatvād acikitsasya-sya kas tāṁ kṣapayitum kṣamāḥ. M has acikitsasya for acikitsasya.
127. T bdag rtag par mthon ba kho naḥo, bde ba mthon par ḍod po la sogs paḥ rgyu yah bdag gi bar ḍgyur ro (=ātmānām nityaḥ paḥyati, sukhābhikāḥkṣaṇādihetur ātmiyaḥ syāt). Tr. follows M. but omits sukha of sukhahetur.
fully established.

7. Object of indeterminate knowledge. (21.8) It is to be known that the fourfold indeterminate knowledge has as its object the particular (śvalakṣaṇa). The particular here means the unique characteristic of a reality which is determined in space, time and form (desakālākāraniyata). The following is meant by this statement: [To take the example of] a jar, its particular characteristics may be described as follows: it is capable of containing water etc.; is manifested before us as particularly determined in space, time and form; is free from ideas (dharma), impermanence and others; and, as object of our purposive action (pravṛtti), is distinct from things both of the same and of a different class (sajātiyavijātiyavyāvṛtta).129

7.1. Ayogavyavaccheda and anyayogavyavaccheda. (21.13)130 [The opponent:] “If only the particular can be the object of indeterminate knowledge, and not the universal (sāmānya), how then can you grasp by indeterminate knowledge the pervasion (vyāpti) between the two universals of smoke and fire?”131

[The author:] There is no fault of this kind, because what we mean is that the particular is really one of the objects of that [indeterminate

---

128. =NB I. s. 12; tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam. PS I. k. 2a-c: pratyakṣam anumānaḥ ca pramāṇe lakṣaṇadhyayam. prameyam... (Hattori. II. 1, n. 11, 13); PSV on it: svalakṣaṇaviṣayaḥ (hi) pratyakṣam sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ (=PVBh 169, 9-10) (Hattori. II. 1, n. 14).

129. NB T. 12, 14 ff.: tasya catvaridhaprattyakṣasya viṣayo bodhavyaḥ svalakṣaṇam, svam asādhāraṇaḥ lakṣaṇaḥ tatvāḥ svalakṣaṇaḥ. vastuno hy asādhāraṇaḥ ca tatvāṁ asti sāmānyam ca. yad asādhāraṇaḥ pratyakṣaṇgrāhyam....


131. This criticism is reproduced as of Trilocana in JNA 161, 17-23: trilocana tv aha. pratyakṣānepalambhayor viṣeṣaviṣayatvāt kathaṁ tāḥbhāṁ śāmāṇyaḥ sambandhaptitaḥ... Trilocana's argument is in brief as follows: Perception and non-cognition, having by nature only the particular as their object, cannot comprehend the relation between two universals. The Buddhist contention that the relation of the absence of fire with the absence of smoke is understood does not hold good. Because such a relation is not an object of perception which cognizes only the particular; nor is it understood by inference, because inference presupposes perception. Moreover, there is no relation between two concepts which are merely discrimination from the opposite (Read vyāptītyoḥ). Buddhists may contend that a concept occurring just after perception envisages by logical imagination the determinate form of the object, though actually every moment of the object is different from another. But this is untenable, since, according to Buddhists, a reality never becomes an object of conceptual knowledge, always remaining imperceptible to it. The criticism is cited verbatim also in RNA 99, 13-23.
knowledge] (svalakṣaṇaṁ tasya viṣaya eva), the non-connection [of the former with the latter] being negated (ayogavyavaccheda), and not that the particular alone is its object (svalakṣaṇam eva tasya viṣayaḥ), all other [than the particular] being excluded (anyayogavyavaccheda)\textsuperscript{132}. What

\textsuperscript{132} The theory of two or three kinds of vyavaccheda was first propounded by Dharmakirti, and maintained throughout the subsequent development of Buddhist logic. It was applied to various problems of logic as often as the theory of prasajya- and paryudāsa-pratīṣedha. In fact, the theory of vyavaccheda is concerned with the restriction of the meaning of an affirmative proposition, or more precisely, the affirmative relation of two terms, while the theory of two kinds of pratīṣedha is for the purpose of restricting the meaning of a negative proposition. (About the latter see n. 62 above.) The original verses stating the theory of vyavaccheda occur in PV IV, v. 190-192 and PVn II (Peking ed. 266, b3-5), and are cited verbatim in TRD 35, 11-17: ayogam yogam aparair atyantiiyogam eva ca, vyavacchinatti dharmasya nīpāto vyatirecakaḥ, viśeṣāviśeṣyābhīyāḥ kriyayā ca sahādītāḥ, vivakṣāto 'prayogo'pi tasyārtho'yaḥ pratiyate, vyavacchedaphalāṁ vāyaṁ yatas caitro dhanur-,
dharaḥ, pārtha dhanurdharo nilaṁ sarojam iti vā yathā. The particle eva, which implies the significance of separation, restricts the relation of two terms [or of a proposition] in three ways: (1) When it is stated with the qualifier, the non-connection of the qualifier [with the qualificand] is negated; (2) when it is stated with the qualificand, the connection of all qualities other [than the stated qualifier] with the qualificand is negated; (3) when it is stated with the verb, the absolute non-connection of two terms is negated, i.e. the possibility of the connection of the two terms in some cases is admitted. The examples are: (1) Caitro dhanurdhara eva (Caitra is an archer), meaning that Caitra is surely one of the many archers—this is called ayogavyavaccheda, since the force of the particle negates simply the disconnection of Caitra and archery; (2) pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ (Partha alone is the archer), meaning that only Partha is worthy of being called an archer, all the others being unworthy of the appellation—this is anyayogavyavaccheda; (3) nilaṁ sarojam saṁbhavaty eva (There are some lotus blooms which are blue), showing the possibility of the existence of blue lotus—this is atyantiiyogavyavaccheda. Any of these meanings is understood in any proposition through the intention of the speaker even if the particle is not actually applied, for the expression of a sentence is the effect of separation (intended by the speaker).

Dharmottara in PVnT (Peking ed. 216, b8 ff.) gives another example which is adopted by Jānāśrimitra (JNA 206, 6 ff.) as well as Ratnakirti (RNA 55, 6–9): eṣa panthāḥ śrughnam upatiṣṭhate. This may be restricted by any of the three vyavacchedas according as we put eva with eṣa panthāḥ, śrughnam and upatiṣṭhate respectively: This way alone leads to Śrughna; this way surely, i.e. without break, leads to Śrughna; it is possible that this way also leads to Śrughna. Dharmakirti's discussion on vyavaccheda cited above is made regarding the relation of p and h (pakṣadharma), while Jānāsri and Ratnakirti give the example of a way to Śrughna with regard to the theory of apoha. Ratnakirti interprets also the theory of vyāpti by means of vyavaccheda (RNA 70, 7–10; Mookerjee, 10–12). Jānāśrimitra makes use of the same for solving a difficulty in establishing a causal relation in his Kāraṇakāraṇabhāvāsvadī (JNA 321, 12–13): sāmaṇgarakeśayāniṣasya cchede draiva-vyapēkṣayā, yogatāyām ayogasya siddho'nyantāṁ ca karmāṇi. On this verse he comments: When by the word 'fire' we mean as a whole the entire things [fire, fuel, moisture etc.] (sāmagri) implied by it. that much alone is [the cause of smoke] (sa eva kāraṇam) and
then follows is that the universal can be its object as well.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{7.1.1 Grāhya and adhyavaseya.} (21.18) The object of valid cognition is indeed twofold: the directly apprehended (\textit{grāhya}) and the indirectly determined (\textit{adhyavaseya}). Of these, the directly apprehended object of indeterminate knowledge is the single moment of the individual characteristic that is seen.\textsuperscript{134} The indirectly determined (or envisaged) object is the universal which is manifested when the determining factor (\textit{vikalpa}) occurs following indeterminate cognition.\textsuperscript{135}

\textbf{7.1.2 ūrdhvatālakṣaṇam and tiryaglakṣaṇam sāmānyam.} (22.2) This universal is again twofold: the concept of an individual (\textit{ūrdhvatālakṣaṇam}, lit. vertical universal) and the concept of a class (\textit{tiryaglakṣaṇam}, lit. horizontal universal). Of these, the universal of an individual is constructed through the accumulation of a series of moments of an individual

\small
\begin{enumerate}
\item in this case the relation involved is \textit{anyayogavyaccheda}. When only the substance of fire is meant and also when cause-ness means fitness or latent force (\textit{yogyatā}), then (\textit{fire}) is fit to be [one of] the causes [of smoke] (\textit{dahanaḥ kāraṇam eva}). This is \textit{ayogavyavaccheda}. When furthermore an actual action is meant, (it means that fire) actually can be [a cause] (\textit{dahanaḥ kāraṇaḥ bhavaty eva}). In this case the relation of \textit{atyantāyogavyavaccheda} is admitted. (For details see my Trikāpaścācārānta– Development of the Buddhist theory on the determination of causality, MIK Nos. 4–5, 1 ff. and the additional note in 15).
\item From these explanations it is clear that 1) in \textit{anyayogavyavaccheda} the qualificand and the qualifier completely pervade each other or are coextensive, 2) that in \textit{ayogavyavaccheda} the qualifier pervades the qualificand, or the qualifier is of wider extension than the qualificand, and 3) that in \textit{atyantāyogavyavaccheda} only some part of the qualificand is pervaded by some part of the qualifier. The theory appears in various texts of other Indian schools as well, though they are probably indebted to Buddhist logicians for it. See e.g. \textit{Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgini}, ed. Thākuraṃprasādaśarma, 25, 8–12; 26, 3–5; 26, 15–20 etc. NK s. v. \textit{eva}.
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{133} Ratnakirti, following JNA 166, 11–21, replies to the criticism by Trilocana referred to in n. 131 above as follows: \textit{trilocanacodye' pī brūmaḥ, yadi pratyaḵṣaṇaṁ svalaṅkaṇaṁ vavisaṁy ity ayogavyacchedenōcyate tadā siddhāṣṭānaṁ.} anyayogavyavacchedaś tv asiddhāḥ, \textit{pratyakṣaṁ mānādīsaṅvajñaṁ ग्रह्यवास्यव्याब्धेन विषयव्यवहित्यातित्रक्रमं.} yād dhī yatra jñāne pratiṁbhaśate tad grāhyam, yatra yatāḥ pravartate tad adhyavaseymb. tatra \textit{pratyakṣaṇaḥ svalaṅkaṇaḥ grāhyam, adhyavaseyaḥ tu sāmānyam atadṛṣṭaṁ śāntiṁvāt salakṣaṇamātṛātmakam.} amānāṣa tu viparītyaḥ (RNA 102, 8–13). Mokṣākara argues after this passage of Ratnakirti here and in §7.1.3. below.

\textsuperscript{134} T de la mhon sum gyi gzuḥ bya ni snan bzin paḥi skad cig gcig go (=tatra pratyaḵṣaṇaḥ pratibhāṣamānaḥ kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ). eko grāhyaḥ in M should be kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ. Cf. also NBT 12, 18: \textit{pratyakṣaṇaḥ hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyah}.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{135} NBT 12. 16 ff.: \textit{devitdho hi viṣayaḥ pramāṇasya, grāhyāḥ ca yad ākāram utpadyate, prāpaṇiyah ca yam adhyavaseyati. anyo hi grāhyāḥ 'nyaś ca dāhyavaseyaḥ, pratyakṣaṇaḥ hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ, adhyavaseyas tu pratyakṣaṇabalotpannena nācayena saṁtāna eva. saṁtāna eva ca pratyakṣaṇaḥ prāpaṇiyah, kṣaṇasya prāpayitum aśakyatvāt.} See also Intro. of the \textit{Pramāṇa-pūrttikā}, ed. Malvaniya.
object, say a jar, which is distinguished from the others of the same
class;136 and this universal is the object of the perception ascertaining
[an object] (sādhana-pratyaṅga). The universal of a class comprises [as
the members] all the individuals [belonging to one class] which are dis­
tinguished from [those of] other classes; this universal is the object of
the perception grasping pervasion (vyāptigrāhaka-pratyaṅga).137

7.1.3 Object of determinate knowledge is also twofold. (22.6) [The
opposite process is taken by] determinate knowledge, to which the uni­
versal (sāmānya) is the directly apprehended object (grāhyya) and the
indirectly apprehended object (adhyāvasāya) is the particular (svalaṅkaṇa).

7.2. Refutation of the six categories. (22.7)138 By the instruction
that the object of indeterminate knowledge is the particular, it is implied
that the six categories (padārtha)139 maintained by other schools [viz.
the Naiyāyika and the Vaiṣeṣika] are not its objects. [The six kinds of
categories, viz.,] substance as the composite whole of an individual object
(avayavīdravya), quality (guṇa), motion (karman), universal (sāmānya),
ultimate specifier (viṣeṣa) and inherence (samavāya), are not manifested
(pratibaṣa) in indeterminate cognition. What is not manifested cannot
be its object, because otherwise unwarrantable consequences would follow
(atipraśaṅgā). For, while perceiving a jar, etc. we do not cognize a
single substance as the ‘whole’ apart from parts such as the front, the

136. T rtgs mthun pa (daṅ rtgs mi mthun pa la sogs pa gcig kho na) la skad cig ma du
ma tshogs paśni spyi ni. . . . The parenthesized portion must be omitted.
137. JNA 166, 16 ff.: tatra sādhana-pratyakṣam tadaivāṛthakriyyārthinaḥ kṣaṇavikāse 'pi
saṁtānāpekṣaya saṁmāṇavaisaṁyam. vyāptigraha-prakaraṇe punar ekavakvidariśane 'pi sarva-
sa-jātiya-vyaktivaiśatyotenā saṁmāṇavaisaṁyam. See also RNA 102, 13-17. In another place Rat-
nakirti gives the name ārdha and tiryak (RNA 136, 2-3): yathārthdhaḥ indriyapratyakṣa-
taḥ kṣaṇabhede pratite 'py avidyāvaśād ekatvādhyavasāyāḥ. tathā tiryakvīvaiśmvedana-pra-
tyakṣaṇākārābhede 'dhigate'py avidyāvaśād eva bhedāvaśāyāḥ. . . . Our author inherits the
designations from Ratnakirti. However, the same designations appear in Maṇikyanandin’s
Paṇikṣaṁukhasutra (Chap. IV, s. 3: sāmānyam dvedhā, tiryagūrdhvātaḥbhedā) as well as
PKM 466, 20 ff. If Maṇikyanandin is, as generally accepted, dated in 9th cent. it follows
that Ratnakirti is indebted to him for the classification. Prabhācandra is dated by Mahend-
dur Kumar in 980-1065, which almost concides with the date of Ratnakirti.
138. G resumes its discourse here with a slightly different statement: etena yad
uktam pareṇa śatpadārthāḥ pratyakṣeṇa paricchidyante ca pratyakṣasya viśayā iti tan
mirastam.
139. As for the problem of a suitable English tr. of the word padārtha, see K. H. Potter,
The Paṇḍārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇam. Intro. and the counter-argument by J. Brough in BSOAS.
XXII, 1. 161
back etc. The supreme lord of logic (Nyāyaparameśvara, i.e. Dharmakirti?) says in this connection:

Only parts placed closely [together] are seen as they are, but another entity which is their possessor and which itself consists of no parts [i.e. a composite whole] is not apprehended.\footnote{HBT 106, 25-26: bhāgā eva ca bhāsante sannivṛtās tathā tathā, tadvān kaścit punar naiva nirbhāgaḥ pratibhāsate. M. however, reads hi instead of ca, and tadvān naeva punaḥ kaścit vibhāgaḥ sampratīyatate in c-d. Vibhāga in M must be corrected into nirbhāga. since the latter reading is given in M 66, 15-16 (§31.3) where the same verse appears again. The first half of this verse is cited in NVV I, 468.8. Mokṣākara ascribes this verse to Nyāyaparameśvara, which is the epithet used for Dhamakirti in TSop 304, 21-22; HBT seems to quote this verse from some other work; and it is most likely that this is a verse of Dharmakirti, though I have not so far identified it.}

It should be understood that a similar criticism may be directed towards the other categories, quality, motion, etc.\footnote{Detailed criticism of these categories is made again in M 64, 10 ff. (§31. 1-31. 3).}

8. Identity of the cause and the effect of cognition. (22.17)\footnote{It is now necessary to collect and rearrange theories scattered in the various places of our text in order to understand the whole process of perception as interpreted by the Sautrāntika. Indeterminate sensation—which alone is really worthy of the name pratyakṣa has as its object a unique moment of an extra-mental objet (§7). This pure sensation is, as Mookerjee says (344,8 ff.), “a simple, homogeneous, unitary cognition, in which the subject and the object, perception and perceptual matter, are not distinguished but given in a lump” (cf. §8). But pure sensation as such has no practical utility unless and until it is made determinate, although indeterminateness is the only criterion to distinguish perception from logical imagination or inference. Thus it is proposed that pure sensation has the power to produce determinate knowledge, and that if it does not so, it cannot be called valid (§6). This determinate knowledge produced from pure sensation is twofold: the image or concept of an object and the consciousness or understanding of the object (§8). This dichotomy is not real, but fictional constructs, which are made determinate through the negation of others. The image of blue is determined as such because it is distinguished from the non-blue; consciousness is also likewise determined (§8). The distinction of the means and the effect of cognition is made only in this realm of determinate knowledge, though in reality there is no distinction at all. But the opponent here questions how the means and the effect can be separately established in one and the same cognition (§8; 6.2). The Buddhist reply to this is that the distinction of the determinat and the determinable can be made in one and the same cognition, since the relation between the determinat and the determinable is different from the relation of the actor and the object of an action (§6.2). This reply is given by Dharmottara in his com. on NB I, s. 2 which is parallel to §8 of our text. while our author has already given it in the section dealing with svasaṃvedana (§6.2). The theory of the generative efficiency of indeterminate knowledge makes it possible that perception has also a universal as its object, although this is said only in the realm of practical utility (§7.1-7.2).}
is knowing (jñāna) which brings about as its effect (phalabhūta) the act (kriyā) in the form of knowledge (pramitrūpa). What is in your theory to be regarded as [the resultant content of] knowledge (pramiti) in relation to which the knowing as the cause (janayaj jñānam) is called the instrument of knowledge?"  

[The author:] The right answer to this question is as follows: From an object such as blue is produced twofold [determinate] knowledge: one is the image or concept of blue (nilākāra), the other consists of the consciousness of blue (nilabodhasvabhāva). The knowledge consisting of the image of blue is [determined as] distinct (vyāvṛttyā) from the image of non-blue, and is regarded as the instrument of knowledge. The knowledge consisting in the consciousness of blue is also [determined as] distinct from the consciousness of non-blue, and is the knowledge as resultant (pramiti). This is the same as the effect [of cognition]. Concerning this, [Dharmakirti] says:

This resemblance (sārūpya) [of the mental image] to its [extra-mental] object is the instrument of knowledge; the understanding (adhigati) of the object is the effect of cognition.

However, the distinction as such has been set up by conceptual analysis (vikalpapratyaya). In reality (paramārthalas) there is no distinction, as is said [by Dharmakirti]:

The indeterminate knowing is none other than the effect of cognition.

8.1. Knowledge is necessarily endowed with an image (sākārajñāna).

(23.7) Knowledge must be considered as endowed with the image of...
If knowledge is not admitted as having an image, it is not possible to establish objects separately from one another, since such knowledge without the imprint [left by each object] would remain the same on cognizing all objects.\(^{148}\)

8.2. (23.9) Again, some scholars hold that the preceding knowledge is the cognitive instrument (\textit{pramāṇa}) while the subsequent knowledge is

\begin{quote}
\textit{samvedanain bhavati nanyasya.}
\end{quote}

The \textit{sākāra-śāstra} is maintained by the Śāṅkhya, Vedanta as well as the Sautrāntika-buddha. The theory, in Mookerjee's words (77), “holds that knowledge of external reality is made possible by virtue of the objective reality leaving an impress of its likeness on the mirror of consciousness.” Refer to the verse \textit{bhinnakiilain katham grihyam iti eet ...} in n. 74 above. The \textit{niriikiiraviida} is maintained by the Nyāyavaśeśika, Mīmāṃsaka, Jaina, and the Vaibhāṣika-buddha, and “the theory maintains that our consciousness is clear like a clean slate and does not depart an inch from its intrinsic purity even when it apprehends the external reality. Consciousness is an amorphous substance and remains so in all its activities. It is like light and reveals the object with its form and qualities without undergoing any morphological articulation in its constitution.” Cf. TSP 564, 8-9: \ldots\textit{anākāra-śāstraḥ, yasyēdaṁ darśanam, ākāra-vān bāhyo 'rtho nīrākāra buddhir iti. TS v. 1999}, as well as TSP, enumerates for criticism's sake three kinds of epistemological attitudes regarding the relation of knowledge and its object: \textit{Nīrākāra-śāstra} (\textit{anirbhāsa-jānānāvāda}) according to which an object is cognized by knowledge not endowed with the image of the object; \textit{sākāra-śāstra} (\textit{samirbhāsa-jānānāvāda})—the object is cognized by the knowledge having its image; \textit{anyanirbhāsa-jānānāvāda}—the object is cognized by knowledge which is endowed with an image different from that of the object.

All the four schools of Buddhism can be classified from the perspective of \textit{ākāra-śāstra}. The Vaibhāṣika is regarded as \textit{nīrākāra-śāstra} while the Sautrāntika and the Vījñānavādin are \textit{sākāra-śāstra}. When the knowledge of a Buddha or emancipated person is concerned, the Vījñānavādin as well as the Mādhyamika are again divided into both parties. Our author comes to deal with this division of the Vījñānavādin in §32.1 (M 69, 11 ff.) and I will give a detailed note on that occasion. For the general classification of the Buddhist schools into either of the two parties see TRD 46-47, where the Vaibhāṣika is represented as saying: \textit{nīrākāra bodho'rthasahābhāvy ekasāmagrāvyadhinas tatrārthe pramāṇam}; the Sautrāntika an Vījñānavādin; \textit{sākāra bodhaḥ pramāṇam}; and the Mādhyamika: \textit{svapnopamaḥ pramāṇāprameyavāḥ prabhāgaḥ, muktis tu śāntātātyaḥ}; kecāt tu mādhyamikāḥ svasthaṁ jñānam ākūṭ. SD 46, 368-371: \textit{artho jñānānīvito vaibhāṣīkeṇa bahu manyate, sautrāntikena pratyakṣagrāhyo'rtho na bahir mataḥ. ākārasahitā buddhir yogācāraya sammata, kevalāṁ saheivaṁ svasthaṁ manyante madhyamāḥ punaḥ.} Similar verses are found also in TRD 47. Here, a group of the Mādhyamikas who maintain pure consciousness independent of \textit{ākāra} seems to represent \textit{nīrākāra-śāstra}. 

--- 62 ---
the effect of the cognition (pramāṇaphala). But this is untenable. For the preceding knowledge cannot be a pramāṇa\textsuperscript{149} because the subsequent knowledge which is supposed to be the pramāṇaphala is then not yet produced. When the [so-called] resultant knowledge is produced, the preceding knowledge, being momentary, has already disappeared. How can it be a pramāṇa, even if it has an object such as a jar? Nor can the one of [two cognitions existing at the same time be called the effect [of the other], since between them is not found the relation of the benefitting and the benefitted (upakāryopakārakatva) as in the case of the right and left horns of a cow.

8.3. \textsuperscript{150} ...Therefore, there is in the level of the highest truth (paramārthatas) no difference between the instrumental cognition and the resultant cognition; the difference which, being brought about by conceptual distinction [from their opposite] (vyāvrttiśīra), is established in determinate knowledge as simply imaginary (kālpanika).\textsuperscript{150}

Here ends the chapter on indeterminate knowledge of the Tarkabhāṣā.

Chapter II. Inference for oneself (svārthānumāna).

9. Classification of determinate knowledge. (24.2) Determinate knowledge or inference is twofold: that for oneself and that for others.\textsuperscript{151} [Inference] which is made for one's own sake is inference for oneself (svārtham anumānam); this consists in [inferential] knowledge [of a person who infers]. Having seen [a logical mark] smoke, etc. in its locus (dharmin), say a mountain, a person who infers gets the knowledge of fire [existing on the mountain]. By means of this knowledge he himself comes to comprehend the object which is not directly perceived (parokṣa), but nothing more is aimed at. This is why it is called inference for one's own sake.

[Inference] which is made for others is inference for others. This inference for others (parārthānumāna) consists of words. Since the statement expressing a logical mark satisfying the three characteristics (tri-

\textsuperscript{149} Insert na pramānam after tạojjñānam. It is attested by G, T.

\textsuperscript{150} G, T omit §8.3.

\textsuperscript{151} NB II, s. 1-2: anumānaṁ dvidhā, svārthāṁ parārthāṁ ca. PS II, k. 1a-b: anumānaṁ dvidhā, svārthāṁ trirūpāṁ liṅgato'rhadyāh (Cited in PVV Appendix 524. 1) (Kitagawa, 74, n. 7).
rupaliṅga\(^{152}\) leads others to, i.e. causes others to know \([\text{what is not directly perceived}]\), the statement is also meant by the word anumāṇa through the metaphorical use (upacāra) of the word\(^{152}\), just as the expression 'Clarified butter is life' (āyur ghṛtam).

9.1. Function of inference. (24.8) Of these, the knowledge which is, in reference to the object of inference (anumeya), produced by the logical mark having the triple characteristic is the inference for oneself.\(^{153}\)\(^{\text{[The following is meant:}]}\) From the logical mark (\(h\)) which has the triple characteristic, knowledge is obtained by the inferring person in regard to the object of inference [i.e. the fact that locus \(p\) is qualified by \(s\)]\(^{154}\) which is not directly perceived. This knowledge is the inference for oneself.

However, some are of the opinion that [inference is] to determine the necessary concomitance (aviniibhiiva) of the probandum (\(s\)) [with the probans (\(h\))] as connected (also) with the particular locus (\(p.\) dharmiviśeṣa).\(^{155}\)

Others are of the opinion that [inference is] to determine indirectly the existence of [the probandum (\(s\)) such as] fire.\(^{156}\)

---

\(^{152}\) NBT 17.6: parārthānumāṇāṁ sabātmakam. svārthānumāṇāṁ tu jñānātmakam; NB III. s. 1-2: trirūpaliṅgākhyaṇāṁ parārthānumāṇāṁ. kāraṇe kāryopacārāt; TSoP 296.6-7: anumāṇakāraṇe trirūpaliṅge kāryasyānumāṇasyopacārāt samāropāt yathā naṅvalodakah pādaroga iti.

\(^{153}\) NB II. s. 3: tatra trirūpāl liṅgād yad anumeye jñāṇāṁ tad anumāṇam. Cf. n. 151.

\(^{154}\) Anumeya here means the conclusion to be proved, the collection of pakṣadharmin (\(p\)) and sādhyadharma (\(s\)), or to be more precise, \(p\) qualified by \(s\). Cf. DP 90.22: anumeya dharmadharṁisamudāyāḥ. Hereafter I use the sign \(p\) for pakṣadharmin=sādhyadharmin, the locus or substratum of inference, illustrated here by a mountain; \(s\) for sādhyadharma, the quality to be inferred or probandum, illustrated here by fire; \(h\) for hetu=liṅga=sādhanadharm= pakṣadharma, the logical mark or the probans, illustrated here by smoke. It is necessary because the Skt. terms for them are multivalent and must be determined in one sense according to the context. The word anumeya is used in three senses: 1) It means \(p\) when used in relation to the definition of the probans; 2) the collection of \(p\) and \(s\), or \(p\) qualified by \(s\) when used in relation to the understanding of the subject-matter of inference; 3) and \(s\) when a vyāpti (pervasion between the probans and the probandum) is to be determined. Cf. NBT 20.16-17: hetulakaṇe niścetavye dharmy anumeyah. anyatra tu sādhyaprati-pattikāle samudāyo'numeyah, vyāptiniścayakāle tu dharmo'numeyah iti. The present passage in our text is concerned with the understanding of the object or the subject-matter of inference, so anumeya is here used in the second sense of the word.

\(^{155}\) M dharmaviśeṣa, but G. T read dharmaviśeṣa, which is supported by the context. See n. 156.

\(^{156}\) Dignāga introduces and refutes two theories regarding the problem of what is the subject-matter of an inference in PS II. k. 8-11. The Skt. text is preserved in NVT 152.11 ff. which is cited here together with Vācaspati's introducing remark: atra dignāgena
10. Three characteristics of the logical mark: pakṣadharma. (24. 13) Now the triple characteristic possessed by the logical mark is to be explained.\textsuperscript{157}

1) Its \textit{[h's] definite (niścitam) presence in all [the members of the class of] the locus (p) of inference [as well as in other classes].}\textsuperscript{158}

\textit{Anumeya}\textsuperscript{159} here means the locus of inference (\textit{dharmin}) such as a

\textit{dhūmād agnirūpadharmāntarānumānam agnideśayeḥ sambandhānumānam ca duṣāryavāgni- visiṣṭadeśānumānam samarthitam, tatha cāha, kecid dharmāntaraṁ meyaṁ liṅgasāvyabhicārataḥ, saṁbandhāṁ kecid ichchanti siddhatvād dharmadharmioḥ (k. 8). liṅgaṁ dharme praśiddham cet kim anyat tena miyate, atha dharmini, tasyaiva kim arthaṁ nānumeyata (k. 9). saṁbandhe 'pi duṣayaṁ nāsti, saṣṭhi śrūyeta tadvat, avācyo, 'nugṛhitatvān. na cāsaṁ liṅgasāṁ-gataḥ (k. 10). liṅgasāvyabhicāras tu dharmeṇyatra drṣyate, tatra praśiddhaṁ tadyuktaṁ dharminoṁ gamaviṣyati (k. 11). These verses are translated and interpreted by several modern scholars, among whom are: Randle, Fragment F (18-21); Mookerjee, 349-355; Kitagawa, 103-110. It is clear that the two views reproduced by our author correspond to the two views criticised by Dignāga. Uddyotakara as well as Vācaspatimisra in their turn criticise Dignāga's view that \textit{anumeya} is p qualified by s. But our author does not go farther into a detailed controversy.

Dignāga states the three characteristics of the logical mark in PS II, k. 5c-d: \textit{anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāśitaṁsatī} (Fragment H; Kitagawa, 96). Dharmakīrti's definition of the logical mark in PV I. v. 1 is \textit{pakṣadharmaṁ tadaṁśena vyāptō hetuḥ.} This is borrowed from Dignāga's stanza: \textit{grāhyadharmas tadaṁśena vyāptō hetuḥ,} which was probably contained in his lost work \textit{Hetumakha} (cf. Frauwallner. Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung, WZKSO III, 164; Gnoli, 1, n. 10). In this verse of Dharmakīrti, \textit{pakṣadharma} represent the first characteristic, and \textit{vyāpti} between \textit{h} and \textit{s} (=\textit{tadamsa}) both the second and the third. But Mokṣākara follows Dharmakīrti's statement in NB.

NB II, s. 5: \textit{liṅgasānumeyo sattvam eva (niścitam).} In NB the word \textit{niścitam} is stated at the end of II, s. 7, and Dhmottara says that it must be read with II, s. 5 and 6 as well. p here stands for all the members of the class of \textit{p}. When read as a proper name or a definite individual, it may be regarded as a unit class.

\textit{Anumeya} in this context means \textit{p}. Cf. NB II, s. 8: \textit{anumeyo 'tra jīḥāsitaṁviśeṣo dharmi.} (\textit{Anumeya} here stands for the dharmin whose determinant or property it is wanted to know.) When he explained the first characteristic of the \textit{liṅga}, \textit{anumeye'śtitā}, in PS ad PS II, k. 5c-d (n. 157 above). Dignāga defined \textit{anumeya} as \textit{dharmaṁ viśeṣo dharmy anumeyah} (Fragment 4: Kitagawa. 96). This definition was rather confusing, since \textit{anumeya} here must be in its first sense, i.e. \textit{p}, while Dignāga's definition is more suggestive of the second, \textit{p} qualified by \textit{s}. Commentators on PS were conscious of this difficulty. Jinendra-buddhī (Viśālomalavati, Peking. 106, a5-7), for instance, introduces a criticism of some people, who, classifying the usage of the word \textit{anumeya} into the above three, say that the existence of \textit{s} is not yet known when a logical mark is perceived, and that \textit{p} therefore cannot be qualified by \textit{s} at that time. Jinendrabuddhī, therefore, interprets Dignāga's definition as meaning \textit{jīḥāsitaṁdharmaviśeṣo dharmi}, as Dharmakīrti does. However, it is not that Dignāga was unconscious of this problem, for he answers it, not in Chap. II, but in Chap. III. PSV, just before PS III, k. 10 (Kitagawa. 151) introduces an opponent who contends that \textit{sādhana} should not be called \textit{pakṣadharma} (the property of \textit{p}) as Dignāga
mountain etc. A logical mark must really (eva) subsist in it. This is one of the three characteristics [of a logical mark] and is named pakṣa-dharmatā [h’s being a property of s]. The word sattvam (presence) is employed to guard against the fallacy of an illegitimate h (asiddha). For instance, in the inference ‘Sound is impermanent because of visibility’, visibility (h) which means to be an object of the visual organ, does not truly exist in p or sound.

By the particle eva the fallacy of h’s non-existence in part [i.e. some members] of p is rejected. For instance, the Digambara Jaina formulates the syllogism ‘Trees have consciousness because they sleep’. By sleeping here is meant the state of shrivelled leaves; but this is not found in all trees.

The word niścītam (definitely) is employed in order to reject the fallacy of h’s dubious reality (saṃdīghāśiddha). For instance, [the following inference is to be rejected:] ‘Here there is fire because of the existence of a mass of [smoke-like] elements which, however, is suspected to be vapour’.

The significance of the word eva being placed [not before] but after

---
the word *sattvam*\(^{162}\) is to reject the fallacy of *h* subsisting only in *p* (*asādhārana*). For instance, ‘Sound is impermanent because of its audibility’\(^{163}\) [is an inconclusive inference, because the *h*, audibility, is an exclusive property of sound].

10.1. **Anvaya.** (25.7) [The second characteristic is] defined as follows:

2) Its definite presence only in things similar to *p* [*sapakṣa* i.e. the members of the class of *s*].\(^{164}\)

What is homogeneous to *p* is called the co-members of *p* (*sapakṣa*), that is to say, objects in the examples (*dṛṣṭāntadharmin*) similar to *p* [in respect of being a member of *s*]\(^{165}\). Thus, the second character named *anvaya* (positive pervasion) is that *h* must be present only in the members of the class of *s*.

In this definition too, the word *sattvam* (presence) aims at precluding

\(^{162}\) Note that *eva* here represents *ayogayavaccheda* (n. 132), i.e. it is not meant that *h* must subsist only in *p*, but that *h* must truly subsist in *p* as in other things. This restriction is to exclude the fallacy of *asādhāraṇahetu*. If the definition is interpreted in the sense of *anyayogayavaccheda*, *p* and *h* would completely pervade each other, i.e. would be coextensive, and this necessitates *asādhāraṇānaikāntikatva*. Cf. NBT 19, 9-10: *yadi hy anumeyya eva sattvam iti kuryāc chrāyanatvam eva hetvā syāt*. Inference in such a case is prohibited in the logic of Dignāga and Dharmakirti, though later Buddhist logicians like Ratnākaraśānti remove the prohibition (n. 301 below). But the interpretation by the theory of *vyavaheeda* is inapplicable to the second characteristic of the *hetu*. See n. 169 below.

\(^{163}\) NBT 19, 6-10. The author follows Dharmottara in all the three illustrations. See also NB III, s. 69; 71-73.

\(^{164}\) =NB II, s. 6: *sapakṣa eva sattvam* (*niścitam*).

\(^{165}\) NB II, s. 9: *sādhyadharmasāmānyena samāno’rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ*. *Sapakṣa* must be understood as a *karmadhāravya*-compound standing for *samānaḥ pakṣaḥ*, *sa*- being the substitute for *samāna* according to Pāṇini sū. 6.3.84 (*samānasya chhandasya amūrdhaprabhātyuddarkeṣu*). For this rule is to be interpreted by *yogavibhiṣga*, i.e. by dividing its wording into two parts. *samānasya* and the rest—the first part, ‘*samānasya saḥ (uttarapade)*’ (under the recurrence of *saḥ* 6.3. 78 and *uttarapade* 6. 3. 1.) meaning that (in classical Sanskrit *sa* is substituted for the word *samāna*—used as the prior member of a compound). Again, *pakṣa* is used in the metaphorical sense (*upaścāra*) of the word and means *arthā* (thing). Thus, *sapakṣa* or *samānaḥ pakṣaḥ* comes to signify a thing which is similar to *p* by the common possession of *s*. *Sapakṣa* should not be understood as a *bahuvrihi*-compound meaning that which possesses a *samānaḥ pakṣa*. This is, according to DP, just because Dharmakirti himself defines *sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa* as follows in *PVn*: *sādhyadharmasāmānyena samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣas tadāhāvā’ sapakṣaḥ*, and according to *TSop*, because if it is a *bahubrihi*-compound, not the similarity of *pakṣa* to *sapakṣa*, but only the similarity of *pakṣa* to *sapakṣa* is expressed, which is however untenable, since then *sapakṣa* remains unexplained (cf. DP 97-98; *TSop* 288. 12-20).
the fallacy of the incompatible *hetu* as, for instance, in the inference that sound is permanent because of its being a product (*kṛṭakatva*) as a jar.\textsuperscript{166} For product-ness is pervaded (*vyāpta*) not by permanency but by non-permanency which is incompatible [*vipakṣa* or anti-*pakṣa*] with permanency.\textsuperscript{167}

The word *eva* (only) is to preclude the non-exclusive (*sādhāraṇa-*) *hetu* as in the inference ‘Sound is permanent because it is an object of cognition as a jar’.\textsuperscript{168} The words ‘being an object of cognition’ (*prameyatva*) mean [i.e. is inclusive of] ‘being the content of a fictional construct’ (*vikalpaviśayikṛtatva*), but this is found in everything, in a member of the class of *s* (*sapakṣa*) such as ether as well as in a member of the class of not-*s* (*vipakṣa*) such as a jar. This is why the mark is called ‘non-exclusive’.

That the particle *eva* is placed before the word *sattvam* means that *h* pervading not all the members but some of the members of the class of *s* can be valid [as well]. For instance, the *hetu* ‘produced immediately after human effort’ (*prayatnānāntariyakatva*) can be valid in the inference, ‘Sound is impermanent, because it is produced immediately after human effort’. [Sound is] similar to a jar [insofar as both are produced by effort and impermanent], but not totally to lightning [which is impermanent but not produced by effort; but this fact that *h* is found only in some of the members of *s* does not prevent *h* from being valid].\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{166} NB III, s. 86.

\textsuperscript{167} The term *viruddha* or *virodha* denotes the contrary as well as the contradictory. Likewise, *vipakṣa* means anti-*pakṣa*; the *vipakṣa* of ‘permanency’ is ‘non-permanency’ but at the same time it means a member or the members of the class of the non-permanent.

\textsuperscript{168} NB III, s. 69.

\textsuperscript{169} The two terms *h* and *s* in a pervasion may be related either by *anyayoga-vyavaccheda* in this case *h* and *s* pervade each other (*samavyāpti*) or by *ayogavyavaccheda* in this case *s* pervades *h* (*asamavyāpti*). The definition of the second characteristic of the liṅga, *sapakṣa eva sattvam*, shows in its expression that the relationship involved is *anyayogavyavaccheda*. And if the theory of vyavaccheda is to be strictly observed, the definition excludes *asamavyāpti*. However, this is exactly opposite to the statement of Dharmottara as well as our author that *eva* placed before *sattvam* effects the recognition as valid of *prayatnānāntariyakatva*, an example of *asamavyāpti*. Dharmottara tries to overcome the difficulty saying: If *eva* is placed after *sattvam*, then we would get *sapakṣe sattvam eva yasya sa hetuḥ*, which would effect the exclusion of *prayatnānāntariyakatva* from the realm of valid *hetu*. But this argument is not persuasive, since the changed sentence can also be construed by *ayogavyavaccheda*, so as to recognize *asamavyāpti*. A right answer must be to say that *sapakṣe sattvam* should be construed in two ways; *sapakṣa eva sattvam* and *sapakṣe sattvam eva*, since the relationship involved in the second characteristic should not be determined as either of *ayoga*- and *anyayoga-vyavaccheda*. 

---

166. NB III, s. 86.

167. The term *viruddha* or *virodha* denotes the contrary as well as the contradictory. Likewise, *vipakṣa* means anti-*pakṣa*; the *vipakṣa* of ‘permanency’ is ‘non-permanency’ but at the same time it means a member or the members of the class of the non-permanent.

168. NB III, s. 69.

169. The two terms *h* and *s* in a pervasion may be related either by *anyayoga-vyavaccheda* in this case *h* and *s* pervade each other (*samavyāpti*) or by *ayogavyavaccheda* in this case *s* pervades *h* (*asamavyāpti*). The definition of the second characteristic of the liṅga, *sapakṣa eva sattvam*, shows in its expression that the relationship involved is *anyayogavyavaccheda*. And if the theory of vyavaccheda is to be strictly observed, the definition excludes *asamavyāpti*. However, this is exactly opposite to the statement of Dharmottara as well as our author that *eva* placed before *sattvam* effects the recognition as valid of *prayatnānāntariyakatva*, an example of *asamavyāpti*. Dharmottara tries to overcome the difficulty saying: If *eva* is placed after *sattvam*, then we would get *sapakṣe sattvam eva yasya sa hetuḥ*, which would effect the exclusion of *prayatnānāntariyakatva* from the realm of valid *hetu*. But this argument is not persuasive, since the changed sentence can also be construed by *ayogavyavaccheda*, so as to recognize *asamavyāpti*. A right answer must be to say that *sapakṣe sattvam* should be construed in two ways; *sapakṣa eva sattvam* and *sapakṣe sattvam eva*, since the relationship involved in the second characteristic should not be determined as either of *ayoga*- and *anyayoga-vyavaccheda*. 

---
The employment of the word 'definite' is to preclude a dubious anvaya as in the following inference: 'This man is not omniscient because he speaks as any other person does'. For we never know if, in any person as a member of the class of s, speaker-ness is pervaded by non-omniscience or not.

10.2. Vyatireka. (26.1) [The third characteristic of the logical mark is:]

3) Its definite, absolute absence in the anti-pakṣa [vipakṣa i.e. any member of the class incompatible with s].

What is not the co-member of p [i.e. the member of the class incompatible with s] is the vipakṣa. The absolute absence of h in that is definite. This is the third characteristic of the logical mark named vyatireka (negative pervasion).

10.2.1. (26.2) In this definition too, the incompatible (viruddha-) hetu is precluded by the word 'absence' (asattvam), an incompatible hetu being illustrated by the inference 'Sound is permanent because of productness as a jar'. The hetu here is incompatible because it is found [not in the sapakṣa] but in the vipakṣa.

10.2.2. (26.4) The word 'absolute' (eva) aims at precluding the non-exclusive hetu which occurs in part of the vipakṣa as in the inference 'Sound is produced immediately after human effort because of non-permanency as a jar'. In this case s (śādhyā=śādhyadharmā) is 'being produced immediately after human effort'. The hetu, non-permanency, however, is found in some of the vipakṣa [i.e. what is not produced by human effort] such as lightning etc., and not found in others of the vipakṣa such as ether etc. Therefore, this mark should necessarily be rejected.

10.2.3. (26.8) If the particle eva were placed before the word asattvam, the passage would mean that a hetu which is absent only in the [totality of the] vipakṣa is valid, with the absurd corollary that 'being produced immediately after human effort' is not a valid hetu because it is not found even in some of the sapakṣa. This is the reason

170. NB III, s. 71 (and 96.)
171. NB II, s. 7: asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam.
172. NB II, s. 10 (first half): na sapakṣo'sapakṣoḥ.
173. NB III, s. 85–86. G, T omit this exemplification.
why [the particle eva] is not placed [before asattvam].…175

10.2.4. (26.11) The employment of the word ‘definite’ is to preclude the fallacious hetu whose non-occurrence in the vipakṣa is doubtful (ṣaṁdīg-dhaviṇḍavāyāṛṭti). [This fallacy] may be illustrated in the following: ‘This man is not free from desire, because he speaks, as a man on the highway;176 for all the cases in which ‘being not free from desire’ is absent are the cases in which ‘speaker-ness’ is also absent, like a piece of rock’.177 [This inference is wrong, because] though both the qualities are excluded from a piece of stone, yet we do not know whether speaker-ness is absent from a piece of stone due to the absence of the state of being free from desire, or it is so simply by nature. Thus, this is a case of inconclusiveness (anākāntika) due to a dubious negative pervasion.

10.2.5. (26.17) By the particle eva (absolute) placed after the word asattvam (absence) is precluded [a logical mark] which occurs in part of the vipakṣa (vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti). For instance, ‘Sound is produced immediately after human effort because of non-permanency’178 [is an invalid inference because the hetu] ‘non-permanency’ does not occur [in some of] the vipakṣa, say ether, but occurs in [others of the vipakṣa] such as lightning. Thus, it is a fallacious hetu which occurs in part of the vipakṣa.179

10.3. Different opinions as to why both anvaya and vyatireka are necessary. (27.1) [The opponent:] ‘When h's presence only in the sapakṣa is stated, h's absence in the vipakṣa is understood by implication (sāmarthyāt). Then, why are both [the characteristics] taken up?’180

175. Missing in G. T. This is another verbatim citation from NBT 20, 1–3.
176. T śiṃ rt|a ūṇ|a pañ|i skyes bu ( = rathya-puruṣa), but M. G rathya-puruṣa.
177. NB III, s. 71 (and 96.)
178. NB III, s. 69 with NBT.
179. The exemplifications in §10.2.1 and 10.2.2 and the whole passage of §10.2.3 are missing in G. T. ( Cf. n. 173–174 above). The exemplifications in §§10.2.2 and 10.2.3 are the verbal quotations from NBT ad NB II. s. 7 while those in 10.2.1 and 10.2.4 are not found in the same place of NBT, although they are mentioned in NB III. The vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti (§10.2.5) and the sādhāraṇa (§10.2.2) are one and the same fallacy; the former name is adopted by Mokṣākara in §10.2.5 and the latter by Dharmottara. The illustration is the same in both. It means either §10.2.2 or 10.2.5 is redundant. §10.2.5 is more succinct than the passage in NBT, while §10.2.2 is the exact citation of the latter. It is therefore likely that §10.2.2 and 10.2.3 are later interpolations. Mokṣākara himself seems not to have given illustrations to all fallacious hetus, as we see in §§10.2.1.4. and 5.
180. NBT 20, 5–6: naṃ ca sapakṣa eva sattvam ity ukte vipakṣa 'sattvam evōti ganyata eva, tat kimartham punar ubhayor upādānah kṛtām….
The logicians of olden times (pürvarṛddhāḥ) [i.e. Dignāga and others] said that both the second and third characteristics are stated in order to determine the nature of vipakṣa. They were in fact of the opinion that the vipakṣa is of three kinds, viz., the simple absence of s (śādhyābhāvanātra), what is just different from s (śādhyād anyaḥ) and what is against s (śādhyena saha viruddhaḥ).

181. PS III. k. 19-20c (Peking ed. 7, a8-b1): de las gzan daḥ de ḥgal ba, gnis paḥaḥ mi mthun phyogs ma yin, glan tshigs med daḥ ḥgal ba las, rnam par good par that bar ḥgyur. de phyir mthun phyogs med pa nīd. de ltar mthshan nīd la geig kyān, du mahi don ni rtogs par rigs. (Neither what is different from sapakṣa, nor what is against it is vipakṣa. For if the former were vipakṣa, nothing could be a hetu, and if the latter were vipakṣa) it would follow that it separates (from the probandum) only what is against it. Therefore, (vipakṣa must be defined as) what is not the sapakṣa. When it is defined in this way, we know various objects (correctly) even (through the third characteristic of the logical mark) alone.) This is explained in PSV on the same kārikās as follows. Product-ness exists not only in what is impermanent, but also in what is different from it, say, the painful. Thus, if vipakṣa is defined as what is different (anya) from the sapakṣa, a valid logical mark like product-ness would be invalid, since it would be found in the vipakṣa. To avoid this difficulty, one may define vipakṣa as what is against (viruddha) the sapakṣa; in this case, however, it may exclude what is incompatible with s, but not what is contrary to s. For example, when fire (h) proves the existence of heat (s) in a place (p), if the vipakṣa is considered to be what is against heat, i.e. cold, h’s non-existence in vipakṣa, the third condition of the logical mark, would not exclude the existence of fire in what is neither hot nor cold; this would make the inference inconclusive. Therefore, Dignāga proposes that vipakṣa must be defined as what is not (abhiiva) the sapakṣa. I owe the information to Kitagawa, 179-183. Kitagawa calls the reader’s attention to the fact that contradiction is here referred to by the word abhāva. According to the same author (Kitagawa, 179, n. 321) however, Jinendrabuddhi’s Ūtka on PSV gives an interpretation different from this original theory on vipakṣa held by Dignāga in PSV as well as Nyāyamukha. He changed the order of words in the passage which he commented and complemented words which were not existent in the passage so that Dignāga’s verses may mean what is in effect identical with Dharmakirti’s theory of vipakṣa found in NB II, s. 10. Here, Dharmakirti first defines vipakṣa as not-sapakṣa (n. 172 above), which means that which lacks s ( Cf. DP 98, 18). And then he classifies vipakṣa into three kinds, viz. tato’anyaḥ, tadviruddhaḥ, and tadbhāvaḥ. tadbhāva is in the form of prasajya-pratīṣedha and constitutes the basic idea of vipakṣa, representing the absence of sapakṣa directly, while other two are those which are affirmed through the negation (paryudasta) and represent the absence of sapakṣa only indirectly. In other words, tadbhāva or the contradictory of s connotes those different from s and those contrary to it. Thus, all the three kinds are the species of vipakṣa. This interpretation is fairly different from Dignāga’s theory. Mokṣākara-gupta, when he describes that vipakṣa is of three kinds, refers to Dharmakirti. Dharmottara and Jinendrabuddhi (or Dignāga as represented by Jinendrabuddhi). The designation pūrvarṛddha, however, most likely refers to Dignāga. It may be also possible that he refers to all of these logicians, neglecting the difference of opinion between them.
Some people are of the following opinion: It is for determining the appropriate kind of the formal statement of inference (prayoga); that is to say, either the formal statement with a positive pervasion (anvayaprayoga) or that with a negative pervasion (vyatirekaprayoga), so far as it is a pervasion having logical necessity, should be alone made, but not both together.\textsuperscript{182}

Other people are of the opinion that it is for indicating that there are two possible forms of inference: one with a positive example (sādharmyaprayoga) and the other with a negative example (vaidharmyap).\textsuperscript{183}

11. Logical mark is of only three kinds. (27.8) The logical mark endowed with [the above-named] three characteristics is of three and only three kinds.\textsuperscript{183}

Those [logical marks] which have the three characteristics are meant by the words trirūpaṇi liṅgāni. They are of three kinds. 1) The mark as the effect [of s] (kārya) has the threefold characteristic; 2) the mark identical in essence [with s] (svabhāva) has the threefold characteristic; 3) the mark as the non-cognition [of s] (anupalabdhi) has the threefold characteristic.\textsuperscript{184} Sādhana (probans), jñāpaka (what makes known), hetu (logical ground), vyāpya (the pervaded) are all the synonyms of liṅga (logical mark).

11.1. Logical mark as effect. (27.11) [Among these three kinds] a logical mark as effect is illustrated: (vyāpti) Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen; (pakṣadhammatā) here there is smoke; [therefore, here there is fire].

11.2. The syllogism consists of two members. (27.12) The statement of an inference (sādhanavāka) of the Buddhists consists of two members, respectively called vyāpti [the pervasion between h and s] and pakṣadhammatā [h’s presence in p].\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{182}. NBT 20, 6-7 : anvayo vyatireko vā niyamavān eva prayoktavyo nānyathāti darśayitum dvayor api upādānāṁ kṛtam.... From this we see that one necessary pervasion alone is enough for an inference and that even the two combined together, if not strictly applied, do not lead to a conclusion. NBT gives an illustration of the latter case.

\textsuperscript{183}. =NB II, s. 11 : trirūpaṇi ca triyā eva liṅgāni.

\textsuperscript{184}. NB II, s. 12 : anupalabdhiḥ svabhāvakāryam ētti ; NBT 21, 18-19 : pratiṣedhayasya sādhasyaṇupalabdhis trirūpā, vidheyasya sādhasya svabhāvas trirūpāḥ, kāryaṁ ca.

\textsuperscript{185}. The inference for others or the statement of an inference consists in the statement of a logical mark endowed with the three characteristics. The pakṣa or pratiṣñā (thesis) does not express any of them and is not regarded as a necessary member of the
Other schools, however, assert that the statement of an inference consists of five members, viz., *pratijñā* (thesis), *hetu* (logical ground), *dṛṣṭānta* (corroborative example), *upanaya* (application) and *nigamana* (conclusion), an example brought forward being as follows: Here there is fire; because of smoke; wherever there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen; the present case is like this; therefore there is fire here.\(^{186}\)

But this is not reasonable. We cannot understand a probandum through the mere statement of a thesis having nothing to do with logical necessity or connection (*sambandha*). As for the non-existence of the connection (*sambandha*), we have already discussed it on the occasion when we refuted the connection between the word and the thing-meant \(\text{[§ 4.2]}\);\(^ {187}\) so we do not repeat it here. It is of no use to state a ground putting it into the ablative case, when the thesis is refuted as above. Apart from a ground, an explanatory example and an application serve nothing. How can a conclusion, which is no more than the repetition of the thesis, be possible in a case where there is no thesis. Thus, all \(\text{[the syllogism. This Buddhist theory is first maintained by Dignāga in PS III, k. 1 : gṣan gi yon gyi don gyi rjes dpag ni, raḥ gis mthoh don gsal byed yin. de la dpag bya bstan pa ni, gah phyir rtags kyi yul don yin. (The inference for others is to make express the thing which is seen by oneself [or a logical mark with the three characteristics]; in this case the statement of *anumeya* is only for indicating the range of the logical mark.) (Cf. Fragment 1 : *parārbhānumānaṁ tu svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśakaṁ*; Kitagawa. 126-128). PSV says on this verse that the fault of incomplete statement (*nyūnatā*) occurs only when any of the three characteristics is not stated, while the non-statement of *anumeya*. or *pratijñā*, does not affect the above-named condition of inference for others (Cf. Kitagawa. 128). In Nyāyamukha Dignāga says : I refute the theory of these logicians who consider the thesis, the application and the conclusion as separate members of the syllogism (Cf. Tucci’s tr. 45; Stcherbatsky, I. 281). The assertion in PSV above is followed by Dharmakirti in PV IV, v. 23 : *aruddāv api pakṣasya siddher apratibandhataḥ, triṣu anyatamarūpaśayaivadṛkṣītīr nyūnatīditā* (Since [the probandum] is proved through compatibility even when the *pakṣa* is not stated, the fault of incomplete statement is pointed out only when any of the three characteristics is not stated.) In NB III, s. 36 he says : *dvayor api anayoḥ prayoge nāvaiyaḥ pakṣāniṣṭeṣaḥ*. See also TS v. 1430 : *pratiṭhādīvaco’py anyaiḥ parārtham iti varṇyate, aśādhanabhūtatvāt pratiṭhānapayogini, etc. The Buddhist discussion on the two-membered syllogism is briefly summarized also in TSoP 299,3-27.\(^ {186}\) NS 1.1.32 : *pratijñāḥetidāharaṇopanayamiganām āvatāvahāḥ.*

\(^{187}\) TS v. 1431 : *asambandhān na sākṣāt dhī să yuktārthopāpādikā, asaktasūcanān nāpi pāramāparīyaṇaṃ yaḥyate.* TSP 419.8 : *śabdamārthaṃ arthaṃ saha sambandhāhavān na tāvat sākṣāt uṣpayyate, nāpi hetuvačanavat pāramāparīyaṇaṃ, saktasamācakvatād iti.* Kamalasila here refers to PV IV v. 16-17a-b : *tat pakṣāvacanāṁ vaktur abhirāpyaniwedane... (cakrur in GOS ed. must be corrected into vaktur-..)*
members] are shattered to pieces. 188

11.3. How to establish a causal relation. (28.2) This logical mark as effect (kāryahetu) is classified into three kinds because of the variety of the term related to it (viṣaya): 1) When fire and the like are the object to be proved, smoke and the like are to be determined [as the effect] by means of the three kinds of cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (trivibhupratyakṣānupalambha). 189 2) When [the function of] the visual organ etc. is the object to be proved, knowledge [visual and other] is to be determined [as the effect] through the fact that the effect occurs occasionally [i.e. only when the organ functions] (kādācitkakāryotpāda). 3) When the colour etc. [of a citron etc.] is the object to be proved, the taste etc. is to be determined [as the logical mark as effect] through both being dependent [for their production] on one and the same set of causes, as [we infer] the colour of a citron from its taste. 190 In this last case, the preceding colour is the material cause in relation to the colour to be produced, and the [preceding] taste [which is the material cause of the subsequent taste, necessarily cooperates with the preceding colour] as the auxiliary cause (sahakārikārana) [for the production of the subsequent colour]. This is the logical [relation] involved in the production

188. M. sarvam āmūlaṁ viśirṇam (All is fundamentally shattered); G sarvam ālāna-viśirṇam; T bead zin pa good paño (as useless as to cut what has been cut). My tr. follows G. There is partial parallelism between our text and TSP. In TS v. 1434, the opponent questions: How is the establishment of saPakāṣṇa etc. possible when the thesis is not formulated? (If saPakāṣṇa etc. is not established) there will be no triple characteristic, which depends for its determination on saPakāṣṇa. Upon this objection Kamalasīla comments: asati hi pratijñānirdeśe tadapekṣānibandhanam...trairūyaṃ api nāstīti sarvam ālānaviśirṇam syād iti. This is of course the opponent’s objection against the Buddhist’s omission of pratijñā. Mokṣākara’s expression, however, has something to do with this passage. He seems to take advantage of the expression, making a reverse use of it for attacking the opponent. It is not impossible that the original manuscript reads ālānaviśirṇam for ālānavist(ik)ṣṇam in the present edition of TSP. For a detailed exposition of the two-membered syllogism see Mookerjee, 356-365.

189. The theory will be dealt with again in §22 (M 47). See n. 305 too.

190. M 28.7 inserts na rūpād rasānumānam after...rasād rūpānumānam, but G as well as T omits it. We can infer taste from colour as well as colour from taste. G. T must be followed in this case. But this should not be taken as a universally applicable rule, for although we can infer cinders from smoke, we cannot infer smoke from cinders, because the relation involves the problem of time. The cinders perceived at present does not necessarily lead to the knowledge of the present smoke, since it may have already disappeared. However, so far as the taste and colour of a citron is concerned, we can infer either one from the other.
of the lump [of a citron] at the subsequent moment from that at the preceding moment. 191 [We infer from the present taste of a citron its material cause, which necessarily cooperates with the material cause of the colour, which in turn has necessarily produced the present colour. The knowledge of the present colour is implied in the process of the inference of the cause of the taste from its effect.]

[The opponent:] "What difference is there between the material cause and the auxiliary cause when both are identical insofar as they equally conform to the concomitance with the effect positively as well as negatively?"

[The author:] The following is the right answer: When $x$ is produced due to the transformation of $y$ in one and the same stream of a [momentary] entity, $y$ is the material cause, prior in time, of $x$. The conditions which cause a particular quality to arise in the stream [of an entity] different [from those of the conditions] are the auxiliary cause. 192 In relation to a rice shoot to be produced, for instance, a seed of rice is the material cause, and soil, water etc. are the auxiliary cause of the [shoot].

191. The theory is propounded by Dharmakirti in PV I, v. 9: ekasāmagryadhinasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ, hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat. This is an oft quoted verse (TSP 417, 24 quotes it, but GOS ed. reads the first half wrongly. Cf Kunst. 58 with n. 1.; NVV II, 197, 2–3, etc.) TS v. 1424–1425 explains the inference of the proximity of the asterism Rohiṇi from the rise of the Kṛttikā as a case of inference by kāryahetu. TSP comments on them reducing the case to ekasāmagryadhiṇatva. But the most useful exposition of the theory is Dharmakirti's own vṛtti on PV I, v. 9 (Gnoli. 7, 16–19; Mookerjee and Nagasaki 36). Inferring colour from taste when both are the co-products of the selfsame set of causes, we actually infer a cause endowed with the causal efficiency (hetudharma) from the effect. The cause of taste which produces the next moment of taste is at the same time the auxiliary condition cooperating with the material cause of colour; this material cause, being actually exercising its causal efficiency, is surely to produce colour. Thus, while we infer the cause of taste from its effect, i.e. the present taste, we come to determine the present colour, with whose cause the cause of taste must have been cooperating. When we infer cinders from smoke, the procedure is the same. Cinders are produced by their material cause, fuel; fire is the auxiliary cause which cooperates with fuel for the production of cinders. We infer fire from smoke, and it involves the knowledge of fuel; the fuel, being actually exercising its causal efficiency, leads to the knowledge of cinders.

192. HBT 94, 26–95, 9: syād etat. sarvesaḥ awayayatiḥrekaḥ anvaidhyate tadā... kuto 'yam bhedaḥ–ihopādānabhāvenādām uṇahyate, anayatra tu sahakārībhāveneti?...tasmād ava- sthaḥ'bhede'pi yad ekaḥāraḥparāmarśapravayaniḥbandhanatyā svasaṁtatiḥpatitakāryaprasūtini- mittaḥ tad upādānakāraṇam, yat saṁtāntare prāgavasthāpekeṣaviṣayodayanibhandhanaḥ tat sahakārikāraṇam.
Thus, the logical mark as effect has been established to be a probans (gamaka) because of the causal relation.

12. Logical mark of essential identity. (28.16) [The logical mark representing] essential identity is [defined] as follows: The nature of its itself is said [by Dharmakirti to be] the h of the quality to be proved (s) when the latter depends for its existence on the existence of that (h) alone; the probans thus defined is to be understood as the essential nature of the quality to be proved. For example, in the inference ‘This can be called a tree, because it can be called a simśapā’, ‘this’ stands for p, i.e. a thing being seen in front [of the inferring person]; ‘because it can be called a simśapā’ refers to h. What is the meaning of ‘because it can be called a simśapā’? It means the applicability of the designation [simśapā which connotes] particular branches, leaves, colour and form. The applicability of the designation ‘tree’ is s.

[The opponent:] ‘If two things are identical, they cannot be related to each other by] the relation of probans and probandum, because [in this case both of them] would be [one and the same] part of the thesis.’

[The author:] The objection is untenable. It is true that both are not different in reality. But there may be a person who, seeing a certain thing, applies the name simśapā which he learnt once, but does not identify it with the name ‘tree’, since he imagines [through the name simśapā not the essential qualities of the tree, but] something else [say, tallness] owing to confusion. Such a person may be now persuaded by means of this inference based on identity. Therefore, even if they are one in reality, they appear distinct when they occur in conceptual knowledge which depends on distinction from others (vyāvrīti). This is the reason why [this kind of inference] is not incompatible with the relation of probans and probandum.

---

193. svabhāvo yathā is omitted in G, T. The definition is repeated twice in T, the whole passage running as follows: svabhāvah svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme hetuḥ, hetusattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme yo hetur ucyate sa tasya sādhyasya dharmasya svabhāvo bodhavyaḥ.  
194. NB II, s. 16: svabhāvah svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme hetuḥ.  
195. This example is explained more lucidly by Dharmottara in NBT on NB II, s. 17.  
196. T rnam par rog paññi blo tha snad la grub pa... (=vyavahārasiddhavikalpabuddha...) for vikalpabuddha in M.  
197. This refers to the Buddhist theory of apoha (discrimination) which is discussed in §26.
13. **Logical mark of non-cognition.** (29.10) ['The logical mark of'] non-cognition is illustrated: In this place there is no jar, because it is not cognized though it is by nature perceptible.\(^{198}\) ‘Perceptible by nature (upalabdhi-lakṣaṇapraśāptā)’ means ‘to be seen’ (drśya). [Question:] How can a non-existent thing be perceptible? [Answer:] When a place and other things are being cognized by one and the same sense-perception, if a jar were present, it would be necessarily perceived.\(^{199}\) That is to say, it is hypothetically supposed as perceptible on the ground that all the other conditions for [its] perception are present.\(^{200}\) But we do not mean [a jar is] actually perceived.

‘Because it is not cognized’ is न. And this is ascertained by means of the [actually present] objects comprised in one and the same cognition [by which a jar, if it existed, would be also perceived] (ekajñāna-saṁsarga-pādārīthā) or the knowledge of the objects comprised in one and the same cognition (ekajñāna-saṁsarga-pādārthopalamba);\(^{201}\) thus, these two, standing in the relation of agent and object (karma-kārtr-bhāva), are each called non-cognition in the mode of [the affirmation of what is excluded through] the negation of a term (paryudāsavṛtti). But [this non-cognition] should not be understood in the mode of the negation of a proposition (prasaṭya-prātiśedha), which means no more than the privation of perception.\(^{202}\) For if

---

\(^{198}\) NB II, s. 13: tatān upalabdhir yathā, na pradeśaniśeke kvacid ghaṭa upalabdhi-lakṣaṇapraśāptasyād upalabdhir iti. See also NBT on it.

\(^{199}\) HB (Reconstruction), 64,27–65,2: yatra yasmin upalabhyamāne niyamena yaśyōpalabdhiḥ sa tataṃśriṣṭaḥ, ekajñāna-saṁsargat tayoḥ sator naikarupanyatā pratipattir, asambhavāt.

\(^{200}\) NB II, s. 14: upalabdhi-lakṣaṇapraśāptir upalambha-pratyayāntarasākalyam svabhava-viśeṣa ca. See also NBT on it.

\(^{201}\) NBT 22, 15 ff.: tasmāt sa eva ghaṭadviviktapradesās tadālambaraṁ ca jñānam drśyānumalambhaniścayahetutvād drśyānumalambha ucyate... tato vastv abhy upalambha ucyate tajjñānaṁ ca. darśananiyuttinātram tu swayam aniscitavāt agamam; HB (Reconstruction), 65, 7–9: ...uktam atra yathā paryudāsavṛttiḥ pekṣātāḥ tadavikto arthas tajjñānaṁ vabhāvo 'upalabdhiḥ cācāya iti, na pratīśedhamātram, tasya sādhanaśiddhī abhāvavyāhāráśiddhitraṣaṅgāt, tasyāsāṁṣṛṣṭaṁ pāṣaṁ bhāvaśiddhir eva-parasyābhāvaśiddhir iti anyabhāvo'pi tadabhaḥ iti vyapādiṣyate.

\(^{202}\) For the general usage of paryudāsa- and prasaṭya-prātiśedha see n. 62 above. Regarding the passage that concerns us now cf. HBT 171, 1–4: ...tadvad upalabdhir eva upalabdhir mantatayā. naṁ ahaḥ prātiśedhaviśayaatvā kathaṁ bhāvaśiyātīti cē, aha, paryudāsavṛttyeti. paryudāsaṇa prātiśedhaviśayārthasya varjanena yā visiṣṭe 'rīhe vṛtti tayoḥ, naṁ aṁcikha-prātiśedhasya bhāvaśiyātāt... The non-cognition of a pot must not be understood as the simple absence of cognition, the negation being construed by prasaṭya-prātiśedha, but as the cognition of things other than the pot, esp. the cognition of the locus, the
so, it is itself not anything whatsoever; and how can it become a pro-
bans? Nor is it the knowledge of other things in general which are
different from the object to be denied, for in this case [the absurdity]
would follow that the perception of the colour of an orange means the
negation of its taste. Therefore, it is settled that either of the two things
distinguished in the way characterised above from what is to be negated,
i.e. its locus or the knowledge of the locus, is called non-cognition [though
it is in fact a positive cognition].

13.1. Non-cognition establishes not absence itself, but practical ac-
tivities concerning absence. (30.1) This is the reason why absence (abhāva)
itself is not proved [by a negative inference], for the absence [of a jar]
can be established by the mere perception cognizing the place without
a jar. But [the logical mark of] non-cognition is aimed at establishing
practical activities concerning absence (abhāvatavahāra) [in order to
convince] a stupefied person [of the absence of a certain thing]. For
example, it is well known in the Sāṁkhya [thought] that the three pri-
mordial qualities beginning with rajas are [permanently] existent; a cer-
tain follower [of the school] actually makes ordinary activities concerning
absent things owing to their non-cognition; he, however, is so much in-
culcated in the doctrine of his own school proclaiming the existence of
every thing at every place that he confusedly does not now judge the

equation being construed by paryudāsapratishedha. But this affirmation of the locus can
be divided into two modes: when it is understood in relation to the subject of the cogni-
tion (karyadharmapakṣe) it means the knowledge of the locus; when it is understood in
relation to the object (karmadharmapakṣe) it means the locus itself. According to HBT
174, 6 ff.; 176, 3 ff., the former is meant for refuting the view of Īśvarasena who regards
anupalabdhī as the mere absence of cognition, while the latter is aimed at criticising
Kumārilabhaṭṭa, who thinks that a negative judgment is formed in the mind when the
locus is cognized and the object to be negated is remembered, and that this knowledge of
absence is purely due to a mental activity without being conditioned by a sense-organ.
Cf. SV Abhāva., v. 11 & 27; Mookerjee, 415. Though not concerning non-cognition, but
cognition, PV 1, 4, 9-11 teaches the same: tathā hi sattvam uupalabdhir eva vastuvyogyatāla-
κṣanā tadāśrayā vā jñānapraṇayā (cf. Mookerjee & Nagasaki, 23); PV 505, 26-27: yadi
hy uupalabdhīḥ karmadharmas tadālpalabhyamānatāṣṭatvam, atha karyadharmo jñānam...; HB
(Reconstruction), 64, 24-26: atra uupalabdhīḥ uupalabdhamānadharmatve tajjñānam uupalab-
ḍhīḥ... uupalabhyamānadharmatve svaviṣayavijñānajanaayogyatālakṣaṇo vijayaśvabhāvo bhavati
; PVBh, 633, 4-6; HBT 171, 16ff.; HBT 174, 19-21; TSop 289, 18-21. However, the distinc-
tion takes place only in our constructive thought, and in reality what is perceived and its
cognition are one and the same thing.

203. NBT 28, 18 ff.: atra evabhaśv na sādhvyāḥ svabhāvamupalabdheḥ siddhatvāt.
absence [of a jar] in one particular place or another even though the jar is not actually perceived. To this man three kinds of convincing activities (vyavahāra) are to be demonstrated by means of non-cognition: the physical activity consists in moving about the place without hesitation; the verbal activity consists in [the statement] that there is no jar; the mental activity is the internal thought (antarjalpa) of the same judgment.

13.2. Non-cognition is of the nature either of identity or of causality. (30.9) When considered from its objective mode (karmadharmapakte) [i.e. as the locus without a jar], non-cognition [h] should be understood to stand in the relation of identity with s. However, when

---

204. According to Dharmakirti the non-existence of the object of negation is established by perception alone, but the inferential function of negation consists in persuading an ignorant person who will not recognize the absence of an object. PV I, v. 3, Svavṛtti (4, 18-5, 1): ...abhāyopalabdhā'napalabdhīsiddhīr iti pratyakṣasiddhā 'napalabdhī, tathāḥ-yasattaya 'sattā kiṁ na sidhyatī. yādā punar evaṁvidhānapalabdhīr evasātām asattā, tādā siddhe 'pi viśaye mohād viśayino 'saṁjñānasabdavyavahārān aṇaptipadyāmāno viśayapradarśaneno samaye pravartyate....; PV IV, v. 263 c-d: ity ajñānāyaikanupākhyo-dāḥṣṭā matāḥ: PVV on it: 'asāmabd abhāvaḥ paśyata 'py avyavaharato 'śaṁjñāna muṇḍhasya jñānāyatābhāvavayavahārāyaika svabhāvānapalambhodāḥṣṭārī matāḥ. PVBh gives the example of a foolish follower of the Sāṁkhya (633, 16-17): yo vā sāṁkhya 'tyantavimūḍhaḥ sarvān sarvatra vidyata ity āgraḥavān, tasyāḥ śaṁjñāna pratityartham eka svabhāvānapalabdhiḥ....

According to Dharmakirti, therefore, what is negated by the inference of negation is the subjective function, i.e. knowledge, verbal expression, or doubt regarding an object falsely imagined as existent. Cf. PV IV, v. 264: viśayāsattvās tatra viśayi pratitiṣṭhyate, jñānābhāvahānasadhakeḥ yathā 'dāhād āpaviṇaḥ. These arguments are made regarding svabhāvānapalabdhi, the principal form of negation. But when negation is classified into three, i.e. svabhāvānapalabdhi, kāraṇānapalabdhi and vyāpākānapalabdhi, the latter two are said to prove either abhāva itself or the abhāvavayavahāra, while the first is concerned only with abhāvavayavahāra, and not with abhāva itself. Cf. HBT, 174, 26-28: kāraṇavyāpākānapalabdhi abhāvam abhāvavayavahāram ca sādhayaḥ, svabhāvānapalabdhis tu abhāvavayavahāram eva. This is because when we infer the absence of smoke (effect) and a simśāpa (the pervader) from the non-cognition of fire (its cause) and that of trees (the pervader respectively), we prove not only the negative activities concerning them but also their absence itself, while in the case of the direct negation of a perceptible object, its absence itself is proved by perception alone without needing inference.

205. PV I, v. 3a-b and Svavṛtti: apravṛttīḥ pramāṇāṁ apravṛttīprakāśitaḥ (v. 3a-b). anupalabdhīḥ sajjñānasabdavyavahārapratipadyādhaḥāla, upalabdhīpūrvakavatvam teṣām iti....; NBT 29, 22-23: vyāpāraṁ darśayaḥ. abhāvasya vyavahāro nāstīty evamākāraṁ jñānam. śabāṣ caivaṁkāra, niḥsāṅkham gamanāgamanalakṣaṇaḥ ca pravṛttīḥ kāyikābhāvavayavahāraḥ; HBT 174, 28-30: abhāvavayavahāraṁ ca jñānābhāvahānaprajñāpravṛttīlakṣaṇāḥ, tatra nāsti aviṣṭa bhāṣa ity evamākāraṁ jñānam, evaṁvidhāvatvabhidhāyakāṁ cābhādānāṁ niḥsāṅkasya ca tatra pradeśe gamanāgamanalakṣaṇāḥ pravṛttī tīti.

seen from the subjective mode (kārtṛdharmapakṣe) [i.e. as the knowledge of the locus without a jar, the relation between non-cognition and s] is that of causality. For it has been said above that the locus without a jar or the knowledge of the locus is non-cognition. [The s] ‘a jar’s fitness to be judged as non-existent’ (asad vyavahārayogyatva), is the essential nature (svabhāva)\textsuperscript{207} of it [i.e. the locus without a jar]. But the knowledge [of the locus without a jar] is an effect of the locus itself, [and in the case where h is the knowledge, we infer from an effect to the cause].

(30.14) [The opponent:] “If there are in non-cognition two kinds of relationship, identical and causal, how is [the probans of] non-cognition differentiated from those of identity and causality?”

[The author:] The difference is made purely because of [the difference between] negation and affirmation, but not in reality. This is declared by Ācārya [Dharmakirti] as follows:

Among [the three kinds of logical marks] the two [i.e. the identical and causal marks] are for establishing the existence of real entities, the other one [i.e. the mark of non-cognition] is the probans for negation.\textsuperscript{208}

13.3. Significance of upalabdhilaksanaprāpta. (30.7) The qualifier of non-cognition ‘being by nature perceptible’ means, [besides that all conditions for perception must be present] that the mere non-occurrence of cognition regarding objects which are inaccessible in space, time and essence, does not establish practical activities referring to the negation [of the object concerned]; such objects are illustrated by Mt. Sumeru [which is spatially inaccessible], the future emperor Śaṅkha [who is inaccessible in time] and a ghost [which is inaccessible in essence].\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{207} M inserts na kāryam after svabhāvaḥ.

\textsuperscript{208} =NB II, 19: atra dvau vastuśādhanau, ekaḥ pratiśedhahetuḥ.

\textsuperscript{209} NB II, s. 14 (see n. 200 above); NBT on NB II, s. 15; NB II, s. 28: anyathā cānapalabdhilaksanaprāptēsu deśaḥstvaḥbhāvasvāpaśrātēsu ātmapratyakṣanīvṛttēr abhāvaniścaḥyābāvīt: see NBT on it too. In PV I, v. 3 Dharmakirti classifies non-cognition into two kinds, viz. the non-cognition of an imperceptible thing or the mere non-operation of cognitive means and the non-cognition of a perceptible object. In the Svavrtti on it he states that these two non-cognitions have the same effect of negating the practical activities referring to an object wrongly supposed to be existent, although the former leads to the result through the absence of the proof, while the latter through the presence of the counter-proof; i.e. the former through doubt while the latter through the definite knowledge of absence. One cannot be sure of the existence of an imperceptible object, say, a ghost, so its existence is neither denied nor asserted. And owing to this doubt one negates the posi-
13.4. Non-cognition refers only to present and past experience. (30.20)
This non-cognition can be a means of valid knowledge with regard to a present experience as well as to a past experience the details of which are still vivid in our memory. With regard to a future experience, however, non-cognition is itself doubtful and accordingly cannot be a means of valid knowledge.

210··-We have before said that this non-cognition proves activities referring to the absence of an object, but not absence itself, because the latter is established by perception [without requiring inference].···210

Regarding [these two problems] the Nyāyāvāda [Dharmakirti] says as follows :211

Non-cognition, i.e. the fact that perception does not occur to an observer with regard to a past object which he keeps in clear memory-impression or a present object, establishes practical activities referring to the absence of the object.

13.5. Classification of negative inference. (31.7) [Sometimes, however,] we are to negate a thing which is situated at a remote place and inaccessible and to which the non-cognition of an ex hypothesi perceptible object is not directly applicable. Then, the non-perception of an effect and other [indirect forms of negative inference] are applied. Thus we get sixteen forms [of non-cognition as probans] because of the variety of applied formulae.212

(1) Firstly the non-cognition of an entity itself (svabhāvānupalabdhi) is illustrated: 'Here there is no smoke, because it, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived.' In this formula its own existence (svabhāva) of smoke, the thing to be denied, is not perceived.213

(2) Non-cognition of an effect (kāryānupalabdhi): 'The actually
efficient (aprati̊baddhasāmarthyā, lit., whose efficiency is not impeded) causes producing smoke do not occur here, because there is no smoke. The presence of the causes of smoke [i.e., fire combined with wet fuel] is to be negated, and their effect is smoke which is not perceived here.214

(3) Non-cognition of a cause (kāraṇānupalabdhi): ‘There is no smoke here, because there is no fire.’ The presence of smoke is to be negated; its cause is fire which is here not perceived.215

(4) Non-cognition of a pervader (vyāpakānupalabdhi): ‘There is no asoka tree here, because there are no trees here.’ The presence of an asoka tree is to be negated: the tree is its pervader which is here not perceived.216

(5) Perception of something incompatible with the presence [of what is to be negated] (svabhi̊ivaviruddhopalabdhi): ‘Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is fire here.’ Fire is incompatible with the essence of the sensation of cold which is to be negated; fire is here perceived.217

(6) Perception of what is incompatible with an effect (kāryaviruddhopalabdhi): ‘Here there are no actually efficient causes of the sensation of cold, because there is fire here.’ A cause, only when it has reached

---

214. kāryānupalabdhir yathā, nāhāpråtibaddhasāmarthyāni dhūmakāraṇāni santi, dhūma-bhāvāt.=NB II, s. 33; TSoP 290, No. 4. As said above, this formula appears for the first time in NB. But Dharmakirti already gave a hint for its possibility in PV when he said that the production of an effect is inferred from the totality of its causes, and that in this case the probans and the probandum stand in the relation of essential identity and not in that of causality; since the production of the effect in this case does not need any other condition (PV I, v. 7; hetunā yāḥ samagreṇa kāryatpā home'yate, arthāntarāna-pēkṣatvāt sa svabhāvo 'navarṇitaḥ). If we can infer an effect from the totality of its causes on the ground of essential identity, we are permitted also to infer the absence of the causes from the absence of their effect, under the following two conditions: 1) we infer from the absence of an effect only the absence of its causes existing at the last moment of their momentary stream, since they alone are ascertained to be unimpeded in their efficiency and thus may be called the totality of causes. All the other preceding moments of the causes may have been impeded in efficiency and may not bring about the effect. Thus we cannot infer the former’s absence from the latter’s absence. We are not sure that there was no fire yesterday, even if we do not see smoke today. 2) This formula is applied only when the cause is not visible itself. If seen, it can be negated by the first form of anupalabdhi. Cf. NBT 31, 10–13.

215. kāraṇānupalabdhir yathā, nāsty atra dhūmaḥ dahanābhāvāt.=NB II, s. 40; TSoP 290, No. 2.

216. vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā, nātra śīnśapā vyākṣābhaavāt.=NB II, s. 34; TSoP 290, No. 3.

217. svabhi̊ivaviruddhopalabdhir yathā, nātra śītasparśah. vahneḥ=NB II, 35; TSoP 290 No. 5.
the last situation (antyadaśāprāpta) [of its own flux, i.e. the moment immediately preceding the production of the effect], produces its effect, but not a cause unconditioned. This is the reason why the qualifier [‘actually efficient’ (apratibaddhasāmarthya)] is stated. [The existence of] the causes of cold are to be denied; their effect is cold; what is incompatible with it is [the presence of] fire, which is here perceived. 218

(7) Perception of something incompatible with a cause (kāraṇavirudh-dhopalabdhi): ‘He betrays no symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold], because he is near fire of a particular kind [i.e. efficient enough to dispel cold]. Symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold] are to be negated; their cause is cold; what is incompatible with this is efficient fire which is here perceived. 219

(8) Perception of what is incompatible with a pervader (vyāpaka-virudh-dhopalabdhi): ‘Here there is no sensation of freezing, because there is fire here.’ The sensation of freezing is to be negated; its pervader is cold; what is incompatible with this is efficient fire which is here perceived. 220

(9) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with the essence [of what is to be negated] (svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhi): ‘Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is smoke here.’ The sensation of cold is to be negated; what is incompatible with the essence of it is fire; smoke is the latter’s effect and is here perceived. 221

(10) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with the effect [of what is negated] (kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhi): ‘Here there are no actually efficient causes of cold, because here there is smoke. ‘The causes of cold are to be negated; their effect is cold; with this fire is incompatible; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived. 222

(11) Perception of an effect of something incompatible with the causes

218. kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhi yathā, nēḥapratibaddhasāmarthyāni śitakāraṇāni santi, vahneḥ =NB II, s. 38; TSop 290, No. 8.
219. kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi yathā, nāsyā romaharṣādiviśeṣāḥ santi, sannihitadahana-naśīyeśtvāt=NB II, s. 41; TSop 290, No. 6.
220. vyāpaka-viruddhakāryopalabdhi yathā, nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dahanāt=NB II, s. 39; TSop 290, No. 7.
221. svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhi yathā, nātra śītasparśaḥ, dhūmāt=NB II, s. 36; TSop 291, No. 13.
222. kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhi yathā, nēḥapratibaddhasāmarthyāni śitakāraṇāni santi dhūmāt=TSop 292, No. 16; this form is lacking in NB.
[of what is to be negated] (kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi): ‘In this place there is no one who betrays the sensation [of cold] connected with symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold], because here there is smoke.’ Particular symptoms such as bristling [specially caused by cold]²²³ are to be negated; their cause is cold; what is incompatible with this is fire; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived.²²⁴

(12) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with a pervader [of what is to be negated] (vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi): ‘Here there is no sensation of freezing because here there is smoke.’ The sensation of freezing is to be negated; its pervader is cold; with this fire is incompatible; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived²²⁵

(13) Perception of what is pervaded by something incompatible with the existence [of what is to be negated] (svabhāvaviruddhavīptopalabdhi): ‘Here there is no fire because of the sensation of freezing.’ Fire is to be negated; cold is incompatible with the existence of fire; The sensation of freezing which is here perceived is pervaded by cold.²²⁶

²²³. G. T romaharṣādiviśeṣāgām instead of M. 32. 19 romaharṣādisparśaviśeṣāgām.
²²⁴. kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi yathā, na romaharṣādiviśeṣayuktasparśavān ayam pradeśo. dhūmāt=NB II, s. 42; TSoP 291, No. 14.
²²⁵. vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā, nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dhūmāt=TSop 292, No. 15; this is lacking in NB.
²²⁶. svabhāvaviruddhavīptopalabdhir yathā, nātra vāhni tuṣārasparśāt=NB II, s. 37; TSoP 291, No. 9. Dharmakīrti’s illustration of this formula in NB, na dhruvabāhi bhūta-syāpī bhāvasya vināśo. hetvanārāpekaśanāt, offers a complication as it is related to the vexed problem of momentariness. Mokṣākara avoids it here, and takes another illustration which is quite easy to understand. The Buddhist theory of universal momentariness, which is hinted here by Dharmakīrti, is dealt with in §16 by our author. Stcherbatsky, in II, 92 as well as in I, 378, fails to understands the implication of the above mentioned inference of Dharmakīrti, partly because of the vagueness of Dharmottara’s commentary, and thinks “This is the argument of the realists against the Buddhist theory of instantaneous existence or constant evanescence”. He quotes in I, 92, n. 1 Rgyal tshab who correctly interprets this argument as a prasaṅga, but Stcherbatsky seems not to have properly understood Rgyal tshab. Durvekamisra in DP 133, 5-6 interprets this inference as viruddhavīptopalabdhiprasaṅga, pointing out that the word api in the sūtra means that this must be taken as a prasaṅgasādhana (reductio ad absurdum, see §24). In fact the inference is Dharmakīrti’s own argument in the form of reductio ad absurdum made against the Naiyāyikas, who recognize on the one hand the necessary connection between kṛtakatva and anityatā, and on the other explain anityatā as destruction by means of a special cause other than the own nature of a thing. If a produced thing, say, a jar, depends for its destruction on a special cause such as a shock by a hammer, its destruction
(14) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the
effect [of the object of negation] (kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi): ‘Here
there are no actually efficient causes of fire because of the sensation of
freezing.’ The causes of fire are to be negated; fire is their effect; cold
is incompatible with fire; the sensation of freezing which is here perceived
is pervaded by cold.227

(15) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the
cause [of the object of negation] (kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi): ‘Here
there is no smoke because of the sensation of freezing.’ Smoke is to be
negated; its cause is fire; what is incompatible with fire is cold; the sensa­
tion of freezing, which is perceived here, is pervaded by cold.228

(16) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the
pervader [of the object of negation] (vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi):
‘This is not permanent because it produces the effect only occasionally
(kadācītākārārtvā).’ Permanency is to be negated; changelessness
(niratīsayatva) is the pervader of permanency; changeableness (sātīsayatva)
is incompatible with it; ‘occasionally producing the effect’ which is here
perceived, is pervaded by changeableness.229

(33.16) It is to be understood that these fifteen formulae beginning
with the [second] kāryānupalabdhi are essentially identical with the [first]
svabhāvānapalabdhi [and are derived from the latter]. Further subordinate
forms may be enumerated according to the various circumstances of application (prayuktibheda).

cannot be due to the inherent nature of a jar; therefore destruction is not of neces­
sity or constant. Thus, aniyaṭā is not the essential nature of produced things, i.e. there
is no identical, necessary connection between aniyaṭā and kṛtakatvā. This inconsistency
in the theory of the Naiyāyika is criticised by this prasākga. It is also untenable that
non-produced or permanent things the destruction of which is not admitted have the charac­
ter of aniyaṭā; this is also meant by the word api in the sūtra.

Dharmakirti discusses this criticism of the Naiyāyika in PV I. v. 194–195 and HB
(cf. Peking, 339, b6 ff.; Reconstruction 55, 2–7); Arcaṭa minutely and precisely interprets
it in HBT 57–61. Dharmakirti and probably Dharmottara either did not enter into
detailed explanation of the implication of the inference in question, since they are here
concerned with the formula of negative inference.

227. kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nēḥāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni vahnikāraṇāni
santi, tuṣārasparśat=TSop 291, No. 12; NB lacks this.

228. kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nātra dhumas tuṣārasparśat=TSop 291, No.
10; NB lacks this.

229. vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nāyān nityaḥ, kadācītākārārtvāt=TSop
291, No. 11; NB lacks this.
Of these, the svabhāvānupalambha, [the first and principal form of negation] establishes not the absence of an object, but the applicability of negative activities (asadavyavahārayogyatva) because the absence is proved by the perception itself. All the others establish the applicability of negative activity as well as the absence of an object, since they have as their object things not directly perceived [but indirectly inferred] (parokṣa).  

Here ends the chapter on inference for oneself of the Tarkabhāṣā.

Chapter III. Inference for others (parārthānumāna)

14. Inference for others defined. (34.6) Inference for others (parārthānumāna) is the statement of a logical mark having the [above mentioned] three characteristics. A formal argument stating the three characteristics, which are respectively called anuvyaya (positive pervasion), vyatireka (negative pervasion) and pakṣadharma (the fact that h is a property of s) is metaphorically (upacārāḥ) called inference [for others or syllogism].

15. Two kinds of syllogism. (34.9) This [inference for others] is of two kinds: syllogism formulated by the method of agreement (sādharma-vat) and that formulated by the method of difference (vaidharmyavat). Agreement [or homogeneity] here is the similarity between the locus of a probandum (sādhyadharmin=p) and the locus of its instance (dṛṣṭāntadharmin=dp) with regard to the presence of the logical mark [in them]. A syllogism comprising this agreement is called ‘formal proof by the method of agreement’ (sādharma-vat sādhanavākyam). Difference [or heterogeneity] is the dissimilarity between p and dp with regard to the presence of h [i.e., h is present in p while it is not present in dp]. A syllogism comprising this difference is called ‘formal proof by the method of difference’ (vaidharmyavat sādhanavākyam).

16. Illustration of svabhāvahetoḥ sādharma-vān prayogaḥ. (34.13)
Of these, a syllogism by the method of agreement formulated with a logical mark of identity (svabhāvahetūḥ sādharmyavān prayogah) may be illustrated by interpreting the Buddha's teaching 'All that is produced is momentary' in view of the Sautrāntika doctrine. What is produced (sāṃskṛta) means all things that have originated as results of the causes and conditions aggregated together. They are said to be momentary (kṣanika) as they exist only for the moment in which they are produced.

16.1 Proof of universal momentariness. (34.18) Now we see that all things such as a jar etc. are destroyed by conjunction with a hammer etc. If the essential nature (svārūpa), by which a jar etc. in its last moment perishes, is existent in the [same thing] when it is just produced, then it should perish immediately after its production because of that [essential nature]. Therefore all things are evidently momentary.

(35.2) It may be contended that a thing is given by its own causes such an essential nature that it perishes after staying for a certain period of time. [But it is not reasonable, because] if so, a thing would not perish even when it is hit by a hammer, but continue to exist again for the given period of time, since such is its essential nature; again this may be the case [when it receives another shock of a hammer, and thus it follows that] it would never perish. Therefore, if a thing were produced so as to stay for two moments, it would, at the second moment just as at the first, stay for another two moments due to its being durable for two moments. In this way it would not cease to exist at the third moment because it has even then the same nature.

(35.9) [Another opponent] may contend: "A thing is so made by its own cause as to be durable; but it may be forcibly destroyed by an incompatible thing such as a hammer and the rest". This is not correct. How is it reasonable that the destruction of a thing is caused by an incompatible power, while the same thing does not perish because of its being permanent. For this is as unreasonable as to say that Devadatta is dead while he is living. In other words, if it perishes, how can you say that it is produced by its causes so as to be imperishable? For you cannot say that an immortal quality dies. We hold, therefore, that a thing is produced by its own cause to be perishable, because perishing can be by no means connected with an imperishable thing, while the disappearance of a thing is actually experienced. Thus, it perishes at the
very moment of its birth. In this way the theory of momentary destruc-
tion [of every thing] (kṣaṇaṁkṣayitva) has been proved. We may for-
mulate [the discussion made above] into the following syllogism: 233

Whatever is by nature perishable perishes immediately [after its
birth as e.g. a jar at the last moment of its existence];

Material objects etc. are by nature perishable at the time of their
birth;

[Therefore, material] objects etc. perish immediately after their
birth];

[This syllogism is] formulated with a logical mark of identity.

16.2 Recognition is merely constructive imagination. (36.1) “If
things are perishing at every moment, how is our recognition (pra-
tyabhijñā) in the form ‘This is the very same as that’ possible?” To
this our reply is this: [This is said] because every moment [of the flux
of a thing] is produced so as to be very similar to the immediately preced-
ing moment and because our nescience (avidyā) continues to exist. At
the very moment when a thing perishes, another at the next moment
which is similar to it is born. In this way the difference in form
[between the two moments] is neglected; and the flux of moments is
not interrupted by non-existence. Consequently an ordinary person gets,
by means of constructive imagination (adhyāvasāya), the idea of identity
(abheda) that this is the same as that in spite of the actual difference
[of the two moments]. We know by experience that one easily gets an
idea of this being the same as that regarding completely different things
such as grass, hair etc. which, having been once cut off, grow again
(lūnapunarjātakusakesādi) 234. Why cannot the same kind of imagination
occur in the present case? We have thus proved that what is produced
is all momentary 235.

233. T sbyor ba yāḥ śkar ltar bya ste=pratyogaḥ punar pūrvavat kartavyaḥ. G ayam
instead of punar in M.

234. This is a stock-example of Buddhist logicians meant for the refutation of re-
cognition. See for example, PV Bh 144. 3; RNA 84. 3. The refutation of recognition is
dealt with by our author in § 28.2. Ratnakirti gives a systematic exposition of the problem
(RNA 106-112).

235. Our author’s argument in § 16, 1-2 is a brief extract from the highly developed
Buddhist theory of the momentary destruction of all things (kṣaṇabhaṅga). He seems to
owe his argument here, directly or indirectly, to Kāraṇakagomin who demonstrates a similar
discussion commenting on PV I. v. 195 (v. 197 in Kitab Mahal ed) and Svavṛtī (cf. Karṇa-
16.3 Nirviṣeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.9) The syllogism set forth above is of the formula with a simple, identical logical mark (nirviṣeṣaṇasya svabhāvahetoh prayogah). The same formula with a simple, identical logical mark is illustrated by another syllogism:

All that exists is impermanent (yat sat tat sarvam anityam) as e.g. a jar;

Dharmakirti discusses the problem of kṣaṇabhaṅga in PV I. v. 193-196, and more extensively in HB II. Arcaṭa’s commentary on HB II is a valuable dissertation on the problem. His separate work Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśiddhi is not extant. Durvekamisra wrote another Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga which is also lost now, but his commentary Alokā on HBT is published together with HBT. Dharmottara’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśiddhi is preserved in Tibetan translation with its commentary by Muktākalaśa; the Tib. text of Dharmottara’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśiddhi is edited and translated by Frauwallner (WZKM 42. 217-258). Śāntirakṣita and Kamalāśila discuss the same problem in the Sthirabhāvaparikṣā of TS and TSP. Jñānāsirimitra wrote a large article Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśāstra (JNA. 1-159) which is the most important work on this theory; and this work was abridged by his student Ratnakiti in his Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgaśiddhi (RNA 62-88). The latter wrote another article, Sthirasiddhidītā (RNA 101-121). Ratnakaraśānti discusses logical problems concerning the proof of kṣaṇabhaṅga in his Antavyāptiṣamarthana (SBNT 103-114; the text is translated into Japanese by me in Bukkyō Shigaku 仏教史学 VIII. no. 4, 21-40 「ラトナーカラシュニティの論理学書」). The theories appearing in TS, TSP, Ratnakiri’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśiddhi and Ratnakaraśānti’s work are explained by Mookerjee (cf. the first three chapters of his Universal Elux).

236. PV I. v. 186: upādhibhedāpekaśa vā svabhāva kevala’t’ta vā, ucye tādhyaśādhyārthaṁ nāše kāryatvavatvatvavat. Here Dharmakirti classifies svabhāvahetu into two kinds. a) kevala- (illustrated by sat) and b) upādhibhedāpekaśa- (ill. by kārya=kṛtyaka); but he mentions c) svabhāva-vādūtadharmanivṛti (ill. utpattimā) in his Sāvyrītī. In NB III. s. 11-15 too, the above-named three kinds are enumerated. The idea of this classification is clear: The logical identity of the probandum and the probans does not mean the total sameness of both, but the sameness in essence. And this sameness in essence may be sometimes pure and simple as in the case of existence and impermanence, which do not permit the interference of any third entity; and another time it is understood together with a contingent, third entity which the probans necessarily presupposes, as in the case of product-ness and impermanence. Product-ness presupposes a cause. Dharmakirti regards this third thing as a upādhi (contingent condition). But once this main classification is stated, one is tempted to subordinate. From existence we derive the idea of origination (utpatti) which Dharmakirti considers a particular property belonging to the existent itself (svabhāva-vādūtadharmanivṛti), i.e. this origination is not the third thing separate from the existent, but a part of it. According to Dharmottara and other commentators this particular property, origination, is obtained through logical imagination in which one contrasts it to non-origination. Thus, this case is added in the list as a subdivision of a) (corresponding to No. 2 of NB & TBh). Concerning b) Dharmakirti says
These things cognized by valid knowledge⁴⁺⁷ all exist;  
[Therefore these things are all impermanent]²²⁸.
Another syllogism proving that the Vedas are human products can 
be formulated with [the same] identical mark :
Any verbal statement is a human product as e. g. the verbal state­
ment of a passer-by²³⁹;
The Vedic injunction ‘One who wants rebirth in heaven should per­
form the fire-sacrifice’ is a verbal statement ;
[Therefore the Vedic injunction is a human product.]

16.3.1 Savišeśaṇa-prayoga. (36.16) A syllogism of the formula with 
a qualified identical mark (savišeśana-prayoga) is next shown :
All that have origin is impermanent (yad yad utpattimat tat sarvam 
anityam) as e. g. a jar;
Sound has origin ;
[Therefore sound is impermanent.]
Those things which are excluded from [the class of] what has no origin 
are called having origin. When we, saying ‘the origination of a thing’, 
mean that this distinct [aspect] (vyāvṛtti) is a different thing [from 
‘existence’] since it excludes other distinct [aspects incompatible with it] 
(vyāvṛtyantara vyavaccheda), then the identical mark [i. e. existence] is 
qualified by a property [having origin] which, though actually identical

that the idea of product necessarily presupposes the idea of cause, though the cause is 
not manifestly expressed. Dharmottara thinks in NBT on NB III, s. 15 that this presup­
posed third entity, cause, may be expressed by its own word as in the case of pratyaya­ 
abheddahetvā or may not be so expressed as in the case of kṛtakatva, and that the 
presence and the absence of the actual usage of the word ‘cause’ do not change the 
significance. Therefore he concludes that the syllogistic form of svabhāvahetu is three­
fold, viz. 1) suddha=a) = nirvišeṣaṇa of TBh, 2) avyatiriktavišeṣaṇa or savišeṣaṇa and 3) 
vyatiriktavišeṣaṇa or bhinnavišeṣaṇa. Manorathanandin, commenting on PV I. v. 186 (III. v. 
185 in Patna ed.) gives a similar exposition and classifies into suddha, abhinnavišeṣaṇa 
and bhinnavišeṣaṇa. TSoP follows Dharmottara. It seems to be Mokṣākaragupta alone 
who enumerates as the fourth the case of pratyayabheddahetvā, giving to this the name 
prayuktabhinnavišeṣaṇa. This cannot be a merit of his, because he gave only a separate 
name to what was actually recognized by Dharmakirti and his commentators.

²³⁷. G pramāṇapratītāḥ padarthāḥ instead of pramāṇapratītāḥ in M; T, agreeing 
with G. reads iṣhay mas rīg paḥ doḥ po.
²³⁸. NB III, s. 11 : yat sat tat sarvam anityaḥ yathā ghaṭādir iti sūdhasya svabhāva­ 
hetoḥ prayogyāḥ ; and NBT.
²³⁹. The Tibetan translator may have had in his manuscript rathya-puruṣa instead of 
rathya-puruṣa in M. G. as T reads : sīn rta ḷon pa or one who rides a cart.
16.3.2 Bhinnaviśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.20) The formula with an identical mark qualified by an contingent property (bhinnaviśeṣaṇasya [svabhāvaheṭoh] prayogaḥ) is next illustrated:

Whatever is produced is impermanent (yat kṛtakam tad anityam)

as a jar;

Sound is a product;

[Therefore sound is impermanent.]

One may object: ‘You may call an expression such as ‘one who possesses a brindled cow’ a usage of a contingent property. However, in the word ‘product’ we do not recognize any such word signifying a contingent property as we find in the word ‘a brindled cow’ [possessed by a person]. Thus, how can you call [the probans kṛtaka] an example of contingent property?’ We reply: A thing which depends for its own origination on the operation of other things [i.e. its causes] is called a product. Therefore, the word ‘product’ connotes the nature of depending on the operation of others; this is why we call it ‘qualified

240. NB III, s. 12: yad upattiṃ tat anityam iti svabhāvabhūtadharmabhedenā svabhāvasya prayogaḥ. Mokṣākara follows Dharmottara in explaining the formula, but perhaps with a misunderstanding. Commenting on the word bheda, Dharmottara says: anutpānebhyo hi vyāvṛttim āśrityātpanno bhāva ucyate saiva vyāvṛttir yadā vyāvṛttyantaraamirapekṣā vaktum izyate tadā vyatirekīvina nirdiśyate bhāvasyātprattir iti. According to Durvekamīśra (DP 158, 6–8), the probans, what is originated, is so judged in view of the distinction from, or the exclusion of, what is not originated such as ether. But the question may be put forward: if a thing is called what is originated in contrast to what is not originated, why do you use the expression ‘it has origination’ (utpattir asya=utpattimat)? Answer: When we express this distinction without regard to other distinctions such as magnitude (mahattva), [i.e. when we limit our contrast only to that of origination and non-origination], we must say ‘it has origination’. This is the meaning of the passage of NBT. However, Mokṣākara’s interpretation runs (36. 17 ff.): anutpānebhyo vyāvṛtta bhāva utpāna ucyate, yadā saiva vyāvṛttir vyāvṛttyantarayavacchedena vyatirikācyate bhāvasyātprattir iti tadā kalpitena bhedena svabhāvabhuṭaṇḍharmeṇa viśiṣṭaḥ,... In this passage vyāvṛttyantarā is used in a sense different from that in NBT. It is neither a misprint nor a mistake on the part of the editor since T is quite parallel. Our author uses the term as denoting anutpāna, and if it is made unconsciously, he misinterprets Dharmottara.

241. NB III, s. 13: yat kṛtakam tad anityam ity upādhibhedeṇa. NBT 45, 17–19 illustrates the differences between the three kinds of expressions, śuddha, avyatiriktena viśeṣanena viśiṣṭaḥ and vyatiriktena viśeṣanena viśiṣṭaḥ by the example of Devadatta: Devadatta may be referred to by the name Devadatta itself; he may be called the long-eared; he may be called the owner of a brindled cow.

242. Read bhinnaviśeṣaṇa for bhinnāseṣaṇa in M.
by a contingent property\textsuperscript{243}.

16.3.3 Prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (37.7) The formula with an identical mark manifestly expressing a contingent qualifier (Prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇasya svabhāvasya prayogāḥ) is illustrated lastly\textsuperscript{244}.

Whatever is variable according to a change in its cause is a product (yaḥ prayayabhedabhedi sa kṛtakaḥ) as smoke;
Sound is variable according to a change in its cause;
[Therefore, sound is a product.]

Pratyaya means kāraṇa (cause). A thing which is subject to change according as its cause varies, is here meant by the word prayayabhedabhedin. It means that an effect is big when its cause is big, and is small if the cause is small. The word prayayabhedabhedin which manifestly expresses a contingent qualifier is here used; this is why the formula is called prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa.

Various kinds of the identical mark have been shown above in order to remove misunderstanding [about the logical mark of identity], that is to say, in order to teach that if different properties are imagined [of a logical mark], the fact of an identical mark being used remains the same.

17. Illustration of svabhāvahetor vaidharmyavān prayogāḥ. (37.16) A syllogism by the method of difference formulated with a logical mark of identity (svabhāvahetor vaidharmyavān prayogāḥ) is next illustrated:

1. Whatever is not immediately destructible at a given time is not of a perishable nature at that time as e. g. ether\textsuperscript{245};
Those things beginning with matter are, however, perishable at the time of their birth;
[Therefore, those beginning with matter are immediately destructible at the time of their birth.]

In a syllogism with a negative vyāpti, [i. e. that by the method of difference] (vyatirekaprayoga=vaidharmyavān prayogāḥ) the negation of

\textsuperscript{243} The same objection is raised in NBT 45, 20-21 and the reply forms NB III, s. 14 : āpekṣīta-parasyāpyāpyo kī bāvāḥ svabhāvaniśpatau kṛtaka iti.

\textsuperscript{244} NB III, s. 15 : evam prayayabhedabhediteṇādyaḥ draṣṭavyāḥ. As said in n. 236, NBT as well as NB regards this as a special case of the third formula (bhinnaviśeṣaṇa), while our author takes it out as the fourth.

\textsuperscript{245} T : gaḥ daḥ gaḥ... de daḥ de... (=yat yad...tat tad...) instead of yad yadā...tat tadā... in M.
the probandum is pervaded by the negation of the probans, and accord-
ingly the absence of the probandum is definitely known in the absence
of the probans. In the same way we can formulate [the remaining forms
of svabhāvahetu] by the method of difference.

2. Wherever there is no momentariness there is also no existence
(yatra kṣaṇikatvāṁ nāsti tatra sattvam api nāsti) as e.g. in a
flower in the sky;
However, sound is existent;
[Therefore sound is momentary].

2.a Wherever there is no impermanence recognized, there is no ori-
gination as in the hair of a tortoise;
Sound has origination;
[Therefore, sound is impermanent.]

3. Wherever there is no impermanence there is no product-ness as
in a rabbit’s horns;
Sound is a product;
[Therefore sound is impermanent.]

4. Wherever there is no product-ness there is no variation con-
comitant with the variation in its cause as in ether;
Sound is variable together with the change in its cause;
[Therefore, sound is a product.]

18. Illustration of kāryahetū sādharman vān prayogāḥ. (38.8) A
syllogism by the method of agreement formulated with a logical mark of
causality is next illustrated.

Wherever there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen;
Here there is smoke;
[Therefore, here there is fire.]
An effect should be applied as a probans for proving its cause, the
probandum, only when the relation of a cause and an effect has been
[beforehand] established through perception and non-perception (pratya-

---

246. These illustrations of vaidyārayatprayogā correspond, as I number, to those
four forms discussed in §16.3 in relation to sādharman vātprayogā of svabhāvahetu. NB III,
s. 26: asaty anityatve nāsti satvam utpattimattvāṁ kṛtakatvāṁ vā, saṁś ca śabda utpattimān
kṛtakā vēti svabhāvahetoḥ prayogāḥ.

247. NB III. s. 23: kāryahetoḥ api prayogāḥ, yatra dhūmas tatāgnir yathā mahānasādau,
asti cēha dhūma iti.
18.1 Illustration of vaidharmya-prayoga. (38.11) A syllogism by the method of difference (vaidharmya-prayoga) [formulated with a logical mark of causality]:

Where there is no fire, there is no smoke as in a great tank;
However, here there is smoke;
[Therefore, here there is fire.] 249

19. Illustration of a syllogism of negation by the method of agreement. (38.12) A syllogism of negation formulated by the method of agreement (anupalabdheḥ sādharmyavān prayogah), which is aimed at denying the existence of a composite whole (avayavin):

A thing which, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived in a place, is to be judged as not existing in that place as the horns on the head of a man;
The composite whole [of a jar] which is asserted by the opponent to be perceptible is not perceived in the aggregated parts meant by the word ‘jar’;
[Therefore, a composite whole does not exist in a jar.] 250

19.1 Illustration of a syllogism of negation by the method of difference. (38.12) A syllogism of negation formulated by the method of difference (anupalabdher vaidharmyavān prayogah):

A thing existent as perceptible by nature is necessarily perceived as a particular object of blue etc. which is admitted as perceptible251;

In this particular place252 we do not perceive a jar, although it is existent as perceptible by nature;

248. NBT 49, 11–12: yathā mahānāsādāv iti, mahānāśādau hi pratyakṣānapalambhābhāhyāḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvātmāvinabhāvo niścitaḥ. See also NB III. s. 24: ihāpi siddha eva kāryakāraṇabhāve kāraṇe sādhye kāryahetur vaktavyaḥ. The Buddhist theory of the establishment of a causal relation by pratyakṣānapalambha will be soon dealt with again in § 22.
249. NB III. s. 27: asaty agnau na bhavaty eva dhūmaḥ, atra cāsti dhūma iti kāryahetoh prayogah.
250. NB III. s. 9: yad upalabdhiḥlakṣaṇapṛāptāḥ san nōpalabhyaḥ so 'sadyavakaharaviṣa-yāḥ siddhāḥ, yathānaḥ kāsīd dṛṣṭāḥ śasaviṣānādīḥ. nōpalabhyaḥ ca kvacit pradeśaviṣeṣa upalabdhiḥlakṣaṇapṛāptāḥ ghaṭaḥ iti.
251. T shon po la sogs pa'i khyad par mthon sum 'nid du mthon par ḫod=drṣyatvedā-bhimatanādiviṣaḥ instead of nālādiviṣaḥ of M.
252. T phyogs kyi khyad par ḫi na =īha pradeśaviṣeṣa as we read in G.
Therefore, there is no jar in this place.  

20. Pervasion explained in relation to the two syllogistic forms. (38.20) It should be understood that while the probans (śādhanā) is pervaded by the probandum (śādhyā) in all the syllogism (śādhanavākyā) formulated by the method of agreement, the non-existence of the probandum (śādhyābhāva) is pervaded by the non-existence of the probans (śādhanābhāva) in the syllogism by the method of difference. Either the statement of the necessary existence (niyatatva) of the probans in the probandum or that of the necessary non-existence of the probandum in the non-existence of the probans is called ‘pervasion’ (vyāpti). Therefore when the pervasion [between the two terms] is established by means of valid knowledge, there should be no shade of doubt that the probandum might not exist in the same locus (dharmin) in which the probans exists.

20.1. The Naiyāyika’s proof of the existence of God as an illustration of untrue vyāpti. (39.6) However, doubt arises inevitably when a universal (sarvopasanābhāravati) vyāpti is not established by means of valid knowledge as, for instance, in the case of the inference from an effect which is aimed at proving the existence of God (īśvara). That is to say, they [i.e. the Naiyāyikas] state the following proof:  

253. NB III, s. 25 : vaidharmavataḥ prayogah, yat sad upalabdhiḥakaṣapaṇapraptam tad upalabdhyata eva, yathā niḷadiviṣeṣaḥ, na caivaṁ ihāṇalabdhiḥkaṣapaṇapraptasya sata upalabdhir gaṇaṇasyetti anupalabdhiprayogah.  

254. G. T have ca. which is dropped in M.  

255. The Buddhist campaign against the theism of the Naiyāyika was started by Dharmakirti in PV II v. 10–29; commentators on PV including Prajñākaragupta further developed their criticism of theism. Śāntirakṣita and Kamalāśila devoted a chapter for the refutation of God in TS and TSP (TS v. 46–93). Śāntideva and Prajñākaramati deal with the problem in BCA and BCAP IX, v. 119–126. The theistic argument of the Naiyāyika which forms the object of criticism for these Buddhists seems to be set forth by Aviddhaṅkaṇa, Uddyotakara, Praśastamati etc. as named in TSP. In the latest period of Indian Buddhism, Jñānaśrimitra wrote a lengthy dissertation Īśvaravādādhikāra (JNA 233–322), which consisted of Pūrvapakṣasaṃkṣepa, Īśvaradūṣaṇa and Vārttikasaṃplaktvyākhyāna. The last chapter consists of three sections and is an elaborate commentary on the seven verses of Dharmakirti, viz. PV II, v. 10–16. Ratnakirti made a résumé of Jñānaśri’s Īśvaravādādhikāra. It is incorporated in RNA 29–52 under the title Īśvarasādhanādūṣaṇa. Mokṣākara, as usual, follows the latter two authors when he criticises the Naiyāyika’s theism in the following text. The opponents of these three Buddhists are mainly Śāṅkara, Narasimha, Trilocana, Vācaspatimisra, Vittoka, etc. (RNA 35–36). Vācaspatimisra demonstrates his own theistic argument in NVT 953. 1 ff. (ad NS 4, 1, 21). Following Ratnakirti, Mokṣākara introduces Vācaspati’s theory of the classification of the existent things in the world into three kinds, his syllogism proving the existence of God, etc. But Buddhist criticism is logical and centers around Vācaspati’s theory of vyāpti, which is found mainly in NVT 138. 25–140. 15 (see n. 270).
‘We are able to prove the existence of the omniscient God, whether or not an omniscient lord [i.e. Buddha] really exists. For the existent in the world is of three kinds:256 1) Some things such as a jar etc. which have been definitely produced by an agent (niścitatarkṛka); 2) some things such as ether (vyomāṇa) etc. which definitely have no agent (niścitaṁritvīrtti); 3) and the third group of things such as the earth etc. the existence of whose agents is doubted. There is no class of things other than the above [three]257. [Thus, our syllogism may be formulated as follows :]

Those which are classified as things the existence of whose agents is uncertain, trees in a forest whose origination we can actually see or the earth etc. which have remained very long since their creation, and so on, must be all considered to have an intelligent agent as their creator (buddhimatkṛṭka);

Because they are effects (kāryavatā);

For example a jar.258

The probans [of this inference] is not illegitimate (aśiddha), because the

256. T omits trayāḥ khalu.
257. JNA 233, 15-16: trayo hi bhāvarāṣayaḥ, buddhimatkṛṭkās ca ghaṭādāyaḥ; akartṛkāś cākāśādayaḥ; saṃdigdhaṁkarṭikās ca bhūḍhārādayaḥ. RNA 39, 25-28: nanu vyākṣādayaḥ paṭākṣādayaḥ paṭākṣīrtaḥ, kathāṁ tair vyabhicāraḥ. trividiḥo hi bhāvarāṣiḥ, saṃdigdhaṁkarṭikā yathā vyākṣādīḥ; prasiddhaṁkarṭikā yathā ghaṭādīḥ; akartṛkā yathākāśādīḥ, tatra prasiddhaṁkarṭikā ghaṭādau pratyakṣāṁ nupalambhāḥ bhāvyāḥ vyāptīm adāya saṁdehaṁ padē kṛtyam upaśaṁkṛtya buddhismān anumāyate.... This latter passage is parallel to that in JNA 284, 21-24. Cf. NVT 953, 1 ff.: etavād abhipretam aśāryasya, trayo hi khalu bhāva jagati bhavanti, prasiddhaṁcetanakartṛkāḥ yathā prasiddhātyāganoparaśādayaḥ, prasiddhātyāganoparivedaṁ yathā paramāvyākṣādayaḥ, saṃdigdhaṁcetanakartṛkāḥ yathā tanutarumahādhārayaḥ. 258. JNA 233, 6-10: iha pratyavasthānam anuṣṭām, vīvadāśādhibhātāṁ bhūḍhārādā buddhimagartṛpūrvakam, kāryatvāt; yad yat kāryaṁ tad buddhimatkṛṭpūrvakāṁ dṛṣṭāṁ yathā ghaṭāḥ; kāryaṁ cādāṁ bhūḍhārādā; tasmād buddhimatpūrvakam iti, na cādāṁ aśiddām, bauddhāśāyāṁ vīvadāśādhibhātāṁ cādāṁ vīvādāśādhibhātāṁ nāpi vīvadāśādhibhātāḥ, sāpāke bhāvaḥ, na cānākāntikām, kvacī aṭī kārye buddhidād adhiṣṭhānāvyabhācārāsyā dāsāyāt uṣāyaṭvāt.... Cf. NVT 953, 5ff.: vīvādāśādhibhāsā tārūrathūrādāyaḥ upādānābhījñakartṛkā utpaṭtiṁmatṭvā, acetaṁpādānsvād vā, yat utpaṭṭimad acetaṁpādānakaṁ vā tät sarvāṁ upādānābhījñapūrvakāṁ yathā prasādādāt, tathā ca vīvādāśādhibhāsāt tamutarumahādhārayaḥ, tāṁ tathātāḥ, na cāiṣām utpaṭṭimadtvām aśiddham....A similar syllogism is quoted in RNA 29, 13-17. RNA 36, 14-19 ascribes the same kind of syllogism to Vācaspati: tathā ca vācaṣṭhāṁ prāmaṇāyaṁ, vīvādāśādhibhāsāt bhūḍhārāṇaṁ upādānābhījñakartṛkāḥ; kāryatvāt; yad yat kāryaṁ tat tad upādānābhījñakartṛkāṁ.... Similar inferences meant for proving the existence of God are proposed by many Naiyāyikas and quoted by Ratnakirti in his Iśvārasādhanadāśa. The inference with kāryatvā as the probans is the most representative argument of the Naiyāyika.
effect-ness of all [these] things is established by valid knowledge. Nor is it incompatible (viruddha), since it is present in the sapakṣa. Nor is it inconclusive (anaikāntika), because there is a proof contradicting the opposite of the assertion to be proved (sādhyaviparyaye bādhaṅkapra-
mānasadbhāvā) [i.e. we can argue by the following reductio ad absurdum to prove the vyāpti:]

We cognize by a mental perception accompanied by repeated past experience (bhūyodarśanahāyena mānasapratyakṣena)²⁵⁹ [the pervasion] that an effect (kārya) [say, a jar] is always produced through the agency of a potter who is endowed with intelligence (buddhimat). If [on the contrary] a thing could come into existence without [being mediated by some] intelligent [agent], then it [e.g. a jar] might sometimes not be produced even when the intelligent agent [e.g. a potter] intends [to make it]. [But this is absurd], because an effect cannot even once arise without its cause. Therefore, we should in no case suppose that a thing can

---
²⁵⁹. T mañ du mthon baḥi rgyu can gyi yid daḥ mhons sum gyis....=bhūyodarśanani-bhanamānasena prayākṣaṇa ca.... T seems to understand mānasapratyakṣa as a dvandva compound, which is wrong. Krishnamacharya condemned the same word as a mistake on the part of Mokṣākara, and suggested a correction into alaukikapratyakṣa (G. Tikī, 77, 20 ff.: atra mānasenāti viśeṣaṇam prāmādikām....). He could be right, if Mokṣākara introduces here the theory of the syncretic school of Nyāyavyāsāṅka. However, Mokṣākara, following Ratnakirti, refers to Trilocana and Vācaspatimīśra of the Naiyāyika and Kumārila and Sucaritamīśra (Kāśīkākāra) of the Mīmāṃsākā, who all maintain that a universal concomitance is grasped by perception helped by repeated past experience. RNA 42, 3–5: bhūyodarśanagamyā hi uyāptiḥ sāmānyadharmanāy (SV Anu. v. 12a-b) iti pra-siddham eva. asyāyaṃ arthaḥ kāśīkākāreṇa vyākyātaḥ : prācīnānekaḍarśanajānitaśaṃkārasya-ḥāye caram [dārṣane] cetaṣi ca kākāśi ḍhāmasyādgniyānaśaṃbhāvāvatam.... (SVK III, 16, 14–15): RNA, 42. 10–11: trilocanena punar āyam arthaḥ kathitaḥ, bhūyodarśanahāyena manasā tajjātiyānāṃ sambandho grhitō bhavati. ato dhūmo 'guṇam na vyabhicarati. tadevyabhicāre'py upādhirahitāḥ sambandham atikṛmēt. hetor vipākṣaśaṃkānivartaḥ pramāṇaṃ upalabdhi-lakṣaṇaprāptopādhirahansyapāyetaḥr anupalambhākhyāṇaṃ prayākṣaṃ eva. tataḥ siddhāḥ svābhāvikāḥ sambandhaḥ tathāḥpūti svamataḥ vyavasthāpitam ātī (cf. n. 270 below). ; RNA 42, 15: vācaspaṁtipīdām uktaṁ, abhijātamanibhidhettavavād bhūyodarśanajānitaśaṃkārasaṁbhāyam indriya- eva dhāmānām bahyādibhiḥ svābhāvikasambandhagṛhiḥ yuktam (NVT 140, 5–6). These three passages are quoted again in RNA (Vyāptimārga), 99, 11–12; 99, 20–21; 100, 22–24. Vācaspati does not agree with Trilocana and say that svābhāvikasambandha is grasped either indriyapratyakṣa or other means of valid knowledge according to circumstances, when it is produced through bhūyodarśana. At least the theory of Trilocana and Sucaritamīśra completely identical with what Ratnakirti and Mokṣākara say. inasmuch as they admit that universal concomitance is grasped by mental perception helped by repeated past experience. Therefore our text in M needs no correction.
be an effect and at the same time not produced by an intelligent agent."260.

20.2. Refutation. (40.5) To this the following reply can be made:
All philosophers agree that in every case a probans proves its probandum if and only if the pervasive relation (vyāpti) between the probans and the probandum has been established by valid knowledge generalising [all the cases of the probans and probandum] (sarvopasainhāreṇa pramāṇena).261.
Now, if the vyāpti [in your syllogism] is grasped between [an effect in general and] an intelligent being who is qualified by having a visible body (drṣyaśariraviśiṣṭa-buddhimat-), then this probans, just as the probans prameyatva (being an object of cognition), is inconclusive owing to non-exclusiveness (sādhāraṇānāikāntika), because we find growing grass, which is not endowed with the said probandum [i.e. is not produced by a visible intelligent agent], is also an effect.262

(40.10) You cannot contend that [our criticism is irrelevant, as] the very grass etc. is comprised in p [of the above said inference]. For an object clearly deviating from the vyāpti (vyabhicāraviśaya) cannot be put forward as p, since there is a rule [set forth by Dharmakīrti]263: A

---

260. Jñānaśrimitra reproduces five kinds of viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa which the Naiyāyika proposes in order to substantiate the vyāpti 'an effect is produced by an intelligent agent'. Of these five, the first is parallel to what Mokṣakara refers to here. See JNA 237, 22-238. 3: yathā saugatānāṁ citrabhānō rucanām yadī citrabhānam antareṇa kāraṇaṃ tādhi dhūnam deśāntere kālaṇte vā jāyeta; dṛṣṭayor apanī deśāntaḥ ca citrabhānōḥ sakṛd apanī āttasatāṁ labheta, yasmān na tadābhāve bhavitās tatākāryaṇyāmāna yuktāḥ, atiprasaṅgāt; tataḥ ca tādṛṣṭasya sarvasvaparāddhādhetuvaṁ na tatāḥ sakṛd apanī jāyeta. bhavitā ca, tasmān nātajajanyām tādṛṣṭam iti viparyaye bādhakapramāṇavātīya pratibandhasādhīḥ. tathādṛṣṭam apanī yadi kīcchid buddhamadādiṣṭhānaṁ antarāntaṁ ayaṁ pramāṇo 'pi kāryam upajayeta, hantā na tarhi sakṛd apanī buddhimataḥ kumbhakārader utpadyeta. bhavitā ca, tatas tajajanyām ity ekāṁ bādhakāṃ pramāṇam.

261. T bsugb par bya ba dañ sgrub par byed pa gañ zag gi khyad par thams cad ņe bar sdbus pañi tshad mas grub pa... Gañ zag gi khyad par should be read: gañ dag gi khyab pa. Tn has khyab for khyad.

262. RNA 39, 21-24, kim drṣyaśaritropādhinā buddhimamātreṇa vyāptir ghyate, āho svid drṣyaśaritropādhīvidhureṇa drṣyādṛṣyasādhāraṇeneti vikalpau. yady ādyāḥ pākṣaḥ, tadā tathābhātāsādhīyaṁ antareṇāpy utpadyamāne vitapādau kāryavadarśanat prameyatvādīvad sād-hāraṇānāikāntiko hetuḥ. As for the fallacy of sād-hāraṇānāikāntika illustrated by the probans prameyatva see § 10.1 and n. 168.

263. PV IV v. 91: amiśiddhāḥ pramāṇābhyāḥ sa cōpagama īṣyate, saṃvidghe hetuvaçanād vyasto hetor anāsrayaḥ. utpagama in this verse means pākṣa. M has vyakto instead of vyasto. But T bsal, PV, the same verse cited in JNA (244. 3), that in RNA (39.4 f. b.), etc. agree to vyasto. In the inference in question, the p. grass, is seen by valid perception not to have an intelligent agent with a visible body. Since grass is clearly rejected as belonging to the class of s by perception, it is absurd to try to prove by inference that it has an intelligent agent with a visible body as its cause, i.e. that it belongs to the class of s.
probans is stated only concerning a p which is not yet ascertained [to be s or non-s]; and what has been rejected [to be s by other valid knowledge] should not be [put forward as] the locus of the probans.

(40.13) [The opponent may object:] ‘‘We see smoke without [seeing] fire on a mountain which is not climbable. Thus, it is easy to point out the same deviation in the case of [a mountain put forward as the locus of] smoke’’. This is not correct. Such a mountain is qualified to be an object which is doubtful [of having fire] (saṃdīghaṁśaya) [and fit to be made a p], just because fire cannot be seen on the mountain as it is not climbable. In the problem under question, however, you want to grasp the vyāpti [between an effect] and ‘‘having an intelligent agent with a visible body’’, [and yet we do not perceive the agent, who, if he existed, would be seen]; therefore, it is rightly said that the existence of an intelligent agent is contradicted by the non-perception of a perceptible object (dṛṣyānapalambha).

(40.18) Or otherwise, if you construe the vyāpti as that [between an effect] and an [intelligent agent] whose body is invisible or an intelligent agent in general, we cannot ascertain the negative vyāpti of such a probandum as an invisible one or an intelligent one in general by means of the non-perception of a perceptible object. Thus, yours is a fallacious probans named saṃdīghahīpākṣavyāvṛtiṇa. For in this case the vyāpti between the non-existence of the probandum and the non-existence of the probans is not available because [the probandum itself] is not established.

264. RNA 39, 25ff.: nāma vyāptāyaḥ pakṣikṛtah, katham tair vyabhiṣicāraḥ...yat āha, na saḍhyaṁśa vyabhiṣicāra ity ayuktam etat. na hi vyabhiṣicāraṁśaya eva pakṣo (Read so instead of pakṣo) bhavitum arhati, saṃdīghāṁ hetvamāné vyastu hetor anāśraya iti nyāyāt. vyabhiṣicāraṁśaya tāḥ ca ṇṛṣṇaṇiroppādher buddhimmantrāsya tṛṇādyutpattau dṛṣyānapalambhena pratiṣiptatvāt... This is a citation from JNA 284, 21–285, 1.

265. For asakṛyāna parvate T has skyed (p. bskyed) par mi nus pa la la (Even some places which are unable to give rise to [fire]). But here arohana must be taken in the sense of climbing.

266. Read with G and T adṛṣyāśārinṛṇa for dṛṣya- in M.

267. For this fallacy see §10.2.4.

268. M has ākāśadāyau between sādhanaḥbhāvasya and asiddhatvena; but better to omit it. Concerning our author's argument in this paragraph. cf. RNA 40, 2ff.: atha vyabhicāramacatārās trividhabhāvardūavyāvaśāvasthāpanārthāṁ ca viṭapādau prayākṣāṇapratikṣiptena dṛṣyādyāsadhāraṇena buddhimmantrārthaḥ vyāptir avagamyata iti dviṣyāḥ sahmukṣaḥ. tada viṭa-pādau buddhimmantrārthaḥ sambhāvanvamātavrāt na sādhaṇānaikāntiākāśṣam brūmāḥ. kihu tārhi vyāptigrahanyakāle dṛṣyādyāsadhāraṇasya buddhimmantrārasya sādyasya dṛṣyātayā dṛṣyānapalambhena vyatirekāśiddhē vyāptē abhāvāt saṃdīghaḥ [-vipakṣa-] vyāvṛtiṣātavam acakṣmahe....
[to be real]. In this connection the revered master Jñānaśrimitra says:

If you, in order to remove [the fallacy that] effect-ness, is found in the vipakṣa [i.e. in what has not a visible intelligent agent as its cause], imagine an invisible agent, how can you establish the vyāpti, since it is deprived of confirmation by the negative vyāpti?

Or, if you, hoping to establish the negative vyāpti, rely on a visible agent, then [h, effect-ness] is clearly seen in the vipakṣa, because grass etc. grows without it [i.e. the operation of a visible agent].

20.2.1. Trilocana’s objection rejected. (41.7) Trilocana said as follows: "Just as smoke etc. is connected with fire etc. by the intrinsic

269. Jñānaśrimitrapādaśā is found only in M. The first half of this verse can be certainly ascribed to him since it occurs in JNA 285, 7-8, but the second half cannot be traced in JNA. It is Ratnakirti who put these two halves together as the summary of his preceding argument, and it is likely that the second half is a product of Ratnakirti himself.

RNA 41, 9-12: kāryatvasya vipakṣavyāptihataye sambhāvyale 'tīndriyāh kartā ced vayārakāsiddhīvidhurā vyāptiḥ kathāṃ siddhyati. dyāyo 'tāḥ vayārakāsiddhīhapadesatā kartā samāsriyate tattvāgatā pi taddā tṛṇādīkam iti vyaktāṃ vipakṣekṣaṇam. M has tadyagena vinā instead of tattvāgatā pi taddā in RNA and G. Tc-d: ci ste idag pa ḫegrub paṭi yid kyis bltar mi ruḥ baḥ byed pa po brten par bya ba yin na, de daḥ idan pa la yāḥ deṇī rīṣa la sosg paṇa ḫes pa bsal bar mi mthuḥ phyogs la mthoḥ baḥo. Mi and deṇī should be omitted; de daḥ idan pa should be read de daḥ mi idan pa; gsal bar is better than bsal bar.

270. In §20.2 the Buddhist criticised the Naiyāyika’s argument, pointing out that the vyāpti between ‘effect’ and ‘intelligent agent’ does not represent a valid causal relation. But the Naiyāyika contends that it is not only causality but the intrinsic relation of a thing with another which forms valid vyāpti. Vacaspati on NS 1.1.5 refutes the Buddhist theory of vyāpti that invariable concomitance is determined not by mere perception and non-perception but by the principle of causality or essential identity (cf. PV I. v. 31: kāryakāraṇabhāvāḥ vā svabhāvāḥ vā nīyāmakāt, avinābhāvaniyamāv darṣaṇān na na darṣaṇāt). After criticising the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika view of vyāpti, he proposes the intrinsic relation (svabhāvikasambandha) as the criterion of vyāpti, and says that this intrinsic relation is grasped by sense-perception or other pramāṇas helped by past repeated experience of perception and non-perception (cf. n. 259 above). In RNA 41, 17 ff. Ratnakirti summarises this argument of Vacaspati and introduces it as a pūrvaṇakṣa. Mokṣākara here presupposes the same pūrvaṇakṣa, though he ascribes it to Trilocana. the guru of Vacaspati.

Vacaspati’s argument may be recapitulated as follows: ‘effect-ness’ is a probans not because it is perceived in the sapakṣa and not in the vipakṣa, but because it possesses a svabhāvika relationship with ‘intelligent agent’. This svabhāvika relationship is understood by perception in the sapakṣa and non-perception in the vipakṣa in such a manner as we explain in the following. Thus, mentioning perception and non-perception in connection with the svabhāvika relation is also not irrelevant. If it is ascertained that x is related with y by a svabhāvikasambandha, x is the probans and y the probandum. For instance, the relation of smoke with fire is svabhāvika, but that of fire with smoke is not, because fire without smoke can be seen as in the case of red-hot iron. Fire is connected with smoke — 100 —
relationship (svābhāvikāḥ sambandhaḥ), just so is ‘being an effect’ related with ‘an intelligent agent’, for in this case no limiting condition (upādhi) [of the relation] is found, nor is any case of deviation [from the relationship] (vyabhicāra) experienced’.271

But this is not correct, for by the word upādhi is meant some other thing by the dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if x needs z in order to be related with y, this z is called upādhi]. This ‘other thing’, however, is not always perceptible; and it may be existent, though invisible owing to its inaccessibility in place, time or nature. Therefore, there may be an upādhi even in the relation of smoke with fire, and yet it may not be seen. Thus, how can it be ascertained as absent just because it is not cognized?

(41.14) The other reason proposed [by Trilocana], ‘because no deviation is experienced’ is not established because it is doubtful. Even if we do not see deviation repeatedly owing to the lack of other conditions only when it is connected with wet fuel. Thus, when fire is related to smoke, the relation is limited by a contingent condition (upādhi), i.e. wet fuel, and it is not by nature. On the other hand, the relation of smoke with fire is intrinsically necessary because no limiting condition is found here, since no case of deviation is seen, and because we cannot harbour doubt about what is not experienced. You cannot suspect the validity of the intrinsic relation by imposing a limiting condition which is imagined simply because there is neither proof nor disproof and which is actually imperceptible by nature. That is nothing but excessive doubt (sānkāpiśāci). Therefore, if we do not find a limiting condition in spite of our effort to do so, then we come to know that no limiting condition is existent. And we can ascertain the intrinsic nature of the relation.

271. As explained above, svābhāvikasambandha is a term used by Trilocana and Vacaspati as meaning an intrinsic, necessary relation of a thing with another, its antonym being aupādhika- or sopādhika-sambandha. Ratnakirti’s representation corresponding to the passage that concerns us now runs: (RNA 42, 18-19) svābhāvikas tu dhūmādaivā vahnayādibhiḥ sambandhaiḥ tadupādher anupalabhuyāmanāvatāt, kvacid vyabhicārayādārsanāt iti tvayaiśasya lakṣaṇam uktam. This passage is identical with NVT 139, 2-3, where, however, Vacaspati adds as the third reason anupalabhyamānasyaḥ (vyabhicārayaḥ) kalpanānapaṭatēḥ (cf. n. 270 above. Ratnakirti’s summary of Vacaspati’s argument). Buddhist reply to this reads (RNA 42, 20-23): etac cāsiddham, yata upādiḥsadbena svato ’rthāntaram evapecchaṇīyaṁ abhidhātavyam. na cārthāntaraṁ drṣṭatāniyatam. adṛśyasyaḥ deśakalasavahāvavipraṇaṣṭaṁ sambhavat. tataḥ ca dhūmāsyaḥ hutāśena saha sambhante syād upādiḥ. na cōpa bhayaṁ yata iti katham adārśanāṁ nāstī eva yataḥ svābhāvikasambhavādiḥ....

The traditional definition of upādiḥ by the Naiyāyika after Udayana is: sādhvyayāpā-kate sati sādhanasyāpakāḥ. (That which is not a pervader of s, while it is a pervader of k.) Vacaspati, however, explains upādiḥ by the illustration of wet fuel (NVT 138, 2 f.b.-139,2=RNA 41, 20-22. See n. 270 above). The definition of upādiḥ in RNA and TBh arthāntaraṁ kimecid apekṣaṇīyaṁ is based on this explanation of Vacaspati and perhaps his teacher Trilocana, though it is not verbally found in NVT.
[for its cognition], we cannot negate [the possibility of deviation] in all the cases$^{272}$. This much [of scrutiny] is not to be blamed for transgressing the established custom of logicians ($prāmāṇikalokayātra$)$^{273}$, for the logician enjoins that doubt should be harboured about anything which is lacking a proof (sādhaka) or disproof (bādhaka). And even if we doubt in such a way, we would not fall into [the fault of] abstaining from action in all cases, for action is possible from doubt as much as from valid knowledge$^{274}$.

(42.2) ['The opponent says:']$^{275}$ ‘Just as Buddhists call a thing an effect and another a cause, but not everything, despite the fact that all things are not different in respect of their individuality, just so we also maintain that a particular thing such as smoke etc. is connected by an intrinsic relation with [another such as] fire, but not everything [with

272. RNA 42, 27–29: kvacīd vyabhirāasyādārāsanād iti tu yād uktam tat pratyuktam eva, adṛṣṭasyāpy upādheḥ sambhāvyamāṇatvād, vyabhirāsya ca pratyayāntaravaihulayadārāsanēṃ 'pi niśedhum aśakyatēt... The passage recurs with slight differences in RNA 102, 30–33.

273. Vācaspati argues (RNA 38, 11–13 =100, 10–11 =NVT 139, 9–11): tasmāt prāmāṇikalokayo'ram anupālayatā yathādārāsanāṃ sākhaniyam, na to adṛṣṭam api. viśeṣaṃṣyāpeko hi saṃśaya nāṃṣyta bhavati, na ca smṛtir anamūbhūtacare bhavati. The Buddhist replies to it (RNA 43, 1 ff.): na ca taitāvatā prāmāṇikalokayo'ratikramaḥ. prāmāṇikair eva sādhakabādhakapramāṇābhāve nyāyaṃprāptasya saṃśayasya vihitavēt.

274. Vācaspati argues in NVT 139, 6–7=RNA 38, 9–10: Excessive suspicion, if it is given an opportunity beyond the limit of the world of knowledge, will move about at liberty and will not be checked anywhere. Thus, one will not take action in any matter (nāyam kvacī pravarteta), for all things may be somehow thrown into doubt. See also NVT 139, 21–140.1: dhūmavīśeṣasya tu vīnāh vahmy anupālambhād, upādhibhedasya ca dṛṣṭyamānasya kalpaniyām pramāṇābhāvād, viśeṣaṃṣyāpekoḥ sa ca saṃśayasyaṇupālambhāpūrve anupādā. utpāde ca tīrthasāṃśyāt praksāvatprāptvatsyacchedat saṃbhāvikāḥ sambandhāvadārāyate. Raṅnakirti replies to this (RNA 43, 2–3): na ca sarvatrāprāptitprasāṅkaḥ, pramāṇāḥ arthaṃ saṃśayēc ca pravṛttīt upapateḥ.

275. Replying to Buddhist logicians, Vācaspati argues that kāryaṇa is a probans only because it is related to its probandum by svābhāvikasambandha (cf. n. 270 above). Buddhist logicians, criticising this theory, argues (NVT 139, 11–14 =RNA 41, 29–31= RNA 100, 16–18): If one thing is connected by svābhāvikasambandha with another which is not the former’s cause, it would follow that everything is by nature (svabhāvataḥ) connected with any other; and everything would be inferred from everything. Or on the contrary, if one thing is connected with another because the former is an effect of the latter, why is everything not an effect of any other, since all things are similar in their individuality (anyato). Thus, if [i.e. svābhāvikasambandha] necessarily entails the fault of over-application (atītprasāṅga). To this Vācaspati replies: na bhūvāsvabhāvāḥ parya-nuyojjāḥ, tasmād anyato-viśeṣaḥ priccēd eva kāraṇāḥ kāryaḥ ca kīcicī. It is this passage that appears in our text 42, 2–5 in a slightly different form. Mokṣākara ascribes it to Trilocana.
any other’.

(42.5) This is untenable. Is svābhāvikasambandha established by a proof (pramāṇa) so that your assertion may be correct, just as the causal relation that a thing called smoke is dependent on fire is established through a proof? Again, what is the meaning of svābhāvikasambandha? There may be three alternative interpretations [of the word]: 1) self-born (svato bhūtah); 2) Born out of its cause (svahetor bhūtah); 3) Born without causes (ahetuka). Among them, however, the first alternative is unreasonable, because it is incongruent that a thing acts upon itself. Nor is the second tenable, because [by asserting it,] you would come to accept the causal relation (tadutpattisambandha) [which the Buddhist holds]. If the third is maintained, the theory of svābhāvikasambandha would be extremely irrational, as it is not determined in place, time, and nature.

(42.12) Again, a vyāpti is not established by the mere existence of an example (drśṭānta), be it that in agreement or in difference, because otherwise such a relationship would be recognized even between a camel and an ass which happen to be together by accident. Therefore, an instance which is called a corroborative example is applied to a probans in order to recall the proof establishing the necessary relation [of two things], which, once cognized, has been forgotten; but you cannot take up a case of mere accidental proximity (svasaṁnīdirhimātra) [as a corroborative example]. For, returning to ‘ether’ [which is the instance in difference of your syllogism], it is not known in this case that the absence of the probans [i.e. ‘not being an effect’] is necessitated by the absence of the probandum [i.e. ‘not having an intelligent agent as cause’] because we find in ether not only the absence of an intelligent agent but also the

276. In NVT 139, 15-16 as well as RNA 43, 5-6, the reply of Vācaspati cited above is criticised: You cannot say that the essential nature of a thing is not to be questioned. For the same indisputableness of the nature of a thing (Read svabhāvānanuyoga) could be maintained even when things other than effects and causes are supposed to be connected by nature.... Ratnakirti continues his criticism and comes to say (43. 16-20): kim ca svābhāvikasambandha iti ko’rtaha. kim svato bhūtah, svahetuto bhūto, ahetuko vēti trayaḥ paksāḥ, na tāvād ādyāḥ paksāḥ, svātmanāh kārtiravrodhāt. dvityāpakṣe tu tadutpattir eva sambandho mukhāntareṇa svikṛta iti na kaścid vivādāḥ. ahetukatve tu deśakālasvabhāvaniyamābhāvaprasahgad īty asahgataḥ svabhāvikāḥ sambandhāḥ.

277. asahgah in M is a misprint for asahgataḥ.

278. Read vyāptı asiddhiḥ instead of vyāptisiddhiḥ in M. according to T (khyab pa grub pa ma yin te) and G.
absence of a not-intelligent cause\textsuperscript{279}. What is the thing which necessitates by its own absence the absence of ‘effect-ness’? This is the question to be solved in order to establish the negative vyāpti (vyatireka), viz., the absence of the probans necessitated by the absence of the probandum. [But it is not known from your example.] You may contend: “We see\textsuperscript{280} the positive vyāpti between effect-ness and an intelligent agent in the case of a jar; and this makes us know that in the case of ether too the absence of effect-ness is due to the absence of an intelligent agent alone”. But this is not tenable. For the relation between the two [i.e. ‘effect’ and ‘intelligent agent’], be it that of identity (tādātmya), or causality (tadutpatti) or of intrinsic nature (svābhāvika), has not yet been established by a proof beforehand\textsuperscript{281}.

20.2.2. Vyatireka cannot be established by mere non-perception. (43.5) Furthermore, a negative vyāpti is not established only by non-perception (adarśanamātra). For, by saying that \( h \) is not cognized in the vipakṣa, we mean the absence of the knowledge cognizing it [i.e. \( h \) in the vipakṣa]. And a cognition is the effect of its object, since there is a universal rule that what is not a cause is not an object of cognition. However, we cannot infer the absence of a cause from the absence of its effect, since fire without smoke can [sometimes] be perceived. Your argument [that there is no object when there is no cognition] may be valid if the presence of an object were pervaded by the presence of its cognition; but this vyāpti is an utter impossibility, because, otherwise, it would follow that everyone is omniscient (sarvadarśin). Thus, the negative vyāpti cannot be proved only by non-perception. In this connection the following is said:

Non-perception of [\( h \) in] all the sapakṣa means the uncertainty [of the vyāpti]; non-perception of [\( h \) in] one member of the sapakṣa alone [when \( h \) is seen in others of the sapakṣa] means a deviation [from the vyāpti];

For even a seed that is covered by soil or submerged in water is

\textsuperscript{279.} M acetanasya kāraṇasya niṣṭhir nāsty eva makes no sense here. G and T (sems pa med paḥi vgyu yaṅ ydog pa yod pa kho na ste) agree to the reading niṣṭhir asty eva.

\textsuperscript{280.} T rjes su ḥgro ba ma mthon ba las (aṃvyādarśanād)... ma must be omitted. G 24. 4-5 must be read according to the footnote 1.

\textsuperscript{281.} G sambandhaḥ pramāṇato na prasādhita ity uktam. T agrees with M.
apparently seen to be absent\(^{282}\).

20.2.3. Vācaspatimisra’s objection refuted. (43.15) Vācaspatimisra said: ‘Doubt is [wavering knowledge] in which the memory of the details [of an object] is lacking. Therefore, it is customary to doubt when we see an object, [but not when we do not see an object at all.]’\(^{283}\)

To this we reply: That principle is not universally applicable. We will argue, however, having hypothetically admitted it. \(^{284}\) Seen from your point of view, ‘cognizability’ (\(prameyatva\)), ‘smokiness’ (\(dhūmatva\)) and ‘being an effect’ (\(kāryatva\)) are all of the same kind, inasmuch as they all have the common quality of ‘being deprived of the relations of identity (\(tādātmya\)) and causality (\(tadutpatti\)), [since you do not accept these two relations]. Among these, \(prameyatva\) has been shown to have the fault of deviation; and this makes us throw doubt upon the other two. Thus it is that we doubt what we see\(^{285}\).

(44.3) Thus, [the Naiyāyika’s syllogism for proving the existence of...
God] cannot escape the criticism that the probans has the fallacy of saṁdiśāvāsanīvṛttikavā (h’s exclusion from the viśāṣa being doubted); and this is a valid confutation (saddūṣana). He [Vācaspati] however, objected: “Our probans is not fallacious, and is not to be refuted. By pointing out [a fallacy in it], you have fallen into a position of defeat (nigrahasthāna) called ‘blaming what is not fallacious’ (adoṣodbhāvana’).”

But, contending in this way, the disputant [Vācaspati] has been contradicted by his own doctrine of a position of defeat called ‘refuting what should not be refuted’ (niranuyojyāṇuyoga). We should not pay any more attention to this pitiable person (devaṁ priyam).

20.2.4. The problem of solipsism discussed. The objection

286. G asaddoṣodbhāvana; T skyon ma yin pa brjod pa seems to agree with M.
287. NS 5, 2, 22: anigrahasthāne nigrahasthānābhivyāya niranuyojyāṇuyogam.
288. RNA 39, 13f.: tad evam viśāṣa ‘darsanamātṛena hetor vyāsitākāśādhe saṁdiśāvāsanīvṛttikavāṁ nāma hetudūṣṣāṇaṁ durvāram eva. ata evāsāyānāya dōṣodbhāvanāṁ nāma nigrahasthānam iti yad anēāvadītam tad api saśvadyam. pratyutkām hetau saśvāṇe pārihartaye nāyam hetuduṣṭo na pārihartavyo ’ṣya cūpyañyāya dōṣodbhāvanāṁ nāma nigrahasthānam iti bruvann ayam eva tapasvī svamatena niranuyojyāṇuyogalakṣāṇena nigrahasthānena nīgrhyata iti kṛpaṁ arhati.

289. § 20.2.4 is entirely lacking in G and partially preserved in M, in which the meaning is not very clear: only T has maintained the whole section. Whether the existence of the minds of other persons can be inferred or not is a vexed problem in Buddhist philosophy, since the radical idealism of the Vijñānavādin easily leads to solipsism, while the Sautrāntika as bāhyārthavādin used to criticise the former for solipsism. However, the Vijñānavādin does not always hold solipsism. In fact, he recognizes the existence of other people’s minds in the sense of saṁvṛtisātya, i.e. he thinks that the existence of other persons’ minds as representations of one’s own mind is established in the domain of logic; but in his epistemology, which is a radical empiricism, he says that all things are representations of one’s own mind, and that therefore the existence of another personality independent of one’s own cannot be proved in the sense of paramārtha. Thus, it is often found that one and the same Vijñānavādin proves sometimes the existence of saṁvṛtisātya and another time disproves it. Ratnakirti wrote Saṁvṛtisātyaraduṣṭa in which he demolished the opponent’s inference of other people’s minds from the standpoint of paramārtha; but in his Iśvarasādhanadūṣṭa, in which he argues from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika or the saṁvṛtisātya of the Vijñānavāda, he says that the inference of the existence of saṁvṛtisātya is logically valid, whereas the inference of the existence of God is not. Regarding this double attitude toward the problem, see Introduction to my paper ‘Buddhist solipsism—a free translation of Ratnakirti’s Saṁvṛtisātyaraduṣṭa’ (IBK Vol. XIII. no. 1, pp. 9–24). In the Tibetan version of § 20.2.4 Moṣkṣākara follows Ratnakirti as asserting that saṁvṛtisātya exists.

Moṣkṣākara’s argument found in T is merely a digest of Ratnakirti’s discussion and can be reconstructed by the light of the latter’s passages in RNA. The Tibetan is once restored into Skt. by Iyengar in M Appendix III. But we can better it now that RNA is published. The Tibetan text and a Skt. reconstruction. The fragments
may be raised: “If vyāpti—since it is grasped by direct perception and non-perception—were a relation which holds between universals related as cause and effect only when both are perceptible, as in the example of the universals ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’, then one could not infer the existence of other personalities, since the mind of another person, being invisible by

in M are retained so far as they are identical with T. My tr. is based on T in principle.

Tibetan: ṭo na blitar ruḥ baḥi me daḥ du ba ṣpyi dag gi bāṁ du blitar (p. n. ltar) ruḥ baḥi bdag niḥ kḥo naḥi hbras ba daṁ rgyu ṣpyi dag niḥ kḥyab pa mḥon sum (daḥ) (Read so instead of gyis) (d. ni) dmigs pa las yin na deḥi tshe gāṇ gys (n. gyis) sems ḍjes su dpag pa ṭams te. gāṇ gyi sems ni bltar mi ruḥ ba niḥ kyi kḥyab pa ḍḥsīn paḥi ḍus na nān ḍu ḍḥus pa ma yin paḥi ḍhyīr ru ṭo ṭe na ma yin te. gaḥ gī ḍhyīr ruḥ riḥ pa ni de ḍer kḥyab pa ḍḥsīn pa ṭo ṭe. raḥ daḥ gāṇ gyi ṭgyuḍ du ṭo baḥi ruḥ riḥ pa ṭasam la ṭītוס (d. ṭlos) pa na. gāṇ gyi sems kḥyab blitar ruḥ ba ṭasam niḥ kḥyab ṭyrī ṭo. yaḥ na blitar ruḥ baḥi lus daḥ ḍbyer med par ḍhyaḥ pa ḍḥid kyi ḍhyīr gāṇ gyi sems ḍkaḥ blitar ruḥ ba niḥ do. de ltar ṭaḥaḥ ṭydṛ ṭe pa ni gaḥ gis ḍḥi yaḥ blitar ruḥ bar ṭgyuṛ ba ṭdaḥ paḥi ṭmḥon sum ṭasam gyi ṭlo de ṭldan pa ṭasam mām. ṭsā-tha-ra ṭṣṭī-tra ṭa ṭsogs pa thun mok paḥi me ṭasam ṭspoyd yul du ṭrgis pa yaḥ ma yin te. deḥi ḍhyīr blitar ruḥ ba kḥo naḥi mes du ba la ṭkḥyab pa ṭgrub po ṭāḥ gṇas so. raḥ daḥ gāṇ gyi ṭgyuḍ la ṭasum mok pa blitar mi ruḥ baḥi sems ṭasam gyis ṭmḥon sum ṭisys blitar ruḥ ba ṭg′yo bo la ṭsogs pa la ṭkḥyab pa ṭḥsīn pa (p. inserts mi ṭbyed pa) mi ṭrgis paḥi ḍhyīr ṭo ṭṣes ḍkuḥ brjod pa (mi) (Inserted by the translator) byaḥo (gyis) don gṇas pa la ni. raḥ daḥ (n. ṭdaḥ) gāṇ gyi ṭgyuḍ thun mok paḥi sems ṭasam ni raḥ gi ṭno ṭos blitar mi ruḥ ba niḥ daḥ yaḥ. blitar ruḥ baḥi lus daḥ ṭhan cṅ ṭshogs gī ṭpā ṭcḥrel paḥi ḍhyīr ṭo. ṭrnam par ḍbyer med par ḍhyaḥ paḥi raḥ daḥ gāṇ gyi ṭgyuḍ thun mok paḥi sems ṭasam ni ṭg′yo bo la ṭsogs pa ṭkḥyab (p. n. d. ṭkḥyad) par ḍbyed pa ṭrogs so. de ltar blitar ruḥ baḥi bdag niḥ ṭam blitar ruḥ ba ṭdaḥ ṭrnam par ḍbyer (d. ṭbye ba) med par ḍhyaḥ paḥi ṭhos po ṭgṇis ni ṭhaḥaḥ ṭṃaḥ ṭiḥ tu ṭgsal baḥi ṭmḥon sum ṭis ṭgrub pa ṭdaḥ kḥyab pa ṭḥsīn pa yaḥ ṭte. de ṭlt a ṭn ṭid mok par ṭbyas (p. n. d. ṭma ṭyas) pa ṭdaḥ ṭldan pa blitar (Inserted by the translator) mi ruḥ ba ṭaḥ thun mok paḥi sems ṭasam gyis ni ma yin no ṭē ṭs pa ṭṛgyuḍ (p. ṭṛgyu) gāṇ gyi ṭṛjes su ṭdpag par ṭrogs so. deḥi ḍhyīr gal te ṭmḥon sum daḥ ni ṭmogs pa ṭaḥ gṇas kḥyab pa ṭḥsīn pa deḥi ṭsche blitar ruḥ ba kḥo ṭnās blitar ruḥ ba ṭaḥo ṭē ṭrī ṭs ṭrgis paḥo. (Td 355. b-356a ; p 384a-b ; n 397b)

Sanskrit restoration: nānu yādi drṣṭyāṅgādhiḥamāsāmayaḥ prātyakṣāṇuṣṭamahato uṣṭis. tadda saṁtāntarānāmāṇānaḥ na syāt (T lit. pariccāttānāmāṇākaṭiyāḥ) pariccāttayādṛṣṭyātmakatayaḥ vyāptigrahaṇābhāle' nantarbhāvad iti cēn na. svasaṃvēdanāniḥ hi tatra vyāptigrāhakaham. svapaṃcāttānāgatavasvavedanamārtāpe-kṣayāḥ pariccāttayādīḥ dṛṣṭayeḥāt. atha dṛṣṭyaśaṁreṇa sahaṁvinibhāgavarticītuvaḥ pariccāttaḥādī dṛṣṭayeḥam. na 'caivaṃ ṭvāvahārikendriyapratyakṣamādṛśasya bhuddhīmanmatraḥ jāṭharacitra-sādhāraṇāṁ vahnimātraḥ vā gocare yujyate, yenāsyāpī dṛṣṭyaḥ syāt; tasmād ṭṛṣṇaiva vahnimā dhāmyasā vyāptisidhāḥ iti sthitam; svapaṃcāttānasādāḥārāṇāḥ pariccāttaḥādī pratyakṣeṇa dṛṣṭya-cālanādāḥ vyāptigrahaṇāḥ na yuktam’ iti api vācyam. bāhyaḥrasthitah hi svapaṃcāttāna-sādāḥāraṇāḥ cīnmaṭrasya svāraṇeṇa dṛṣṭayeḥ 'pi dṛṣṭyaśaṁreṇa sahaṁvāgamagripratibhānāmḥḥḥḥḥ; avinibhāgarvic ca svapaṃcāttānasādāḥāraṇāḥ cīnmaṭrasyāṃ kampāḍe vyāpakaḥ adhi-gaṃyate. tadb evāḥ dṛṣṭyaṁnaḥ svapaṃcāttānasādāḥāraṇāḥ cīnmaṭrasya vā padārthadāyaḥ vā vyāvahārikapuṣṭapratyakṣakṣataḥ saddhīḥ vyāptigrāhāḥ ca. na tu tathāḥvaṁvāṅkṛtāḥvyāsāsādāḥāraṇacīnmaṭraśyāṭi saṁtāntarānāmāṇānam uciḥam. tasmād yādi pratyakṣaṇuṣṭamabhābhātyāḥ vyāptigrāhkas taddā dṛṣṭyaiva dṛṣṭyaśyāṭi nīyāḥ. (Cf. RNA 40.3 f. b.-1 f. b.; 139. 6-9 ; 138.8 f. b.-4 ; 40. 1f.b-41.7).
nature, is not comprised [in the situation] at the time when the \textit{vyāpti} is [said to be] grasped”.

But this is not acceptable, for in this situation self-consciousness is the factor which brings about the knowledge of the \textit{vyāpti} ; because, on the basis of self-consciousness in general, located in one’s own and in another’s personality, the mind of another person is [in this sense] visible. Or alternatively, the mind of another person is ‘visible’ because it always occurs in conjunction with a visible body.

Nor is the following objection tenable: “If this were so, an intelligent being in general, or fire in general common to the fire of digestion or of a picture, would properly come within the range of normal sensory perception in general, so as to be visible ; [and this is obviously not so]. Therefore, \textit{vyāpti} is established only between visible fire and smoke, and it is not valid to assert by direct perception a \textit{vyāpti} between the motions [of a body] which are visible and non-visible minds common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others, [since this rests on an illicit extrapolation from data visible to sense-perception]”.

[This argument is not correct] because, although a mind in general common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others is by nature invisible, it is related to a visible body so as to form a single unity, so far as we admit the existence of the external object. And such a mind in general as occurs inseparably [with a visible external object], though common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others, is known to be the pervader of the motions [of a body]. Thus, two objects, when they are by nature visible or occur inseparably with a visible thing, are established by clear normal perception; and the \textit{vyāpti} between them is also grasped. But this does not hold good when a mind in general common even to invisible persons is concerned, since it is deprived of the said relation [to a visible body]. After all, therefore, another personality can be inferred. It is in this sense that the rule is set forth that a \textit{vyāpti}, when it is grasped by direct perception and non-perception, holds good only between two visible things.

20.2.5. \textbf{Other fallacies of the proof of God are pointed out.} (45.1) Again, if your reasoning is aimed at proving that [an effect] presupposes [as its cause] an intelligent being in general, the proof is to be criticised for asserting the obvious (\textit{siddhasādhanatā}). [For we admit that all ef-
fects are produced by actions, which are caused by the mind."

Alternatively if the precedent existence of the intelligent agent who is qualified by uniqueness, permanence, omniscience and other qualities, is to be proved, the *vyāpti* between the probans ‘effect’ and the probandum ‘[the intelligent agent] qualified by such special qualities’ cannot be established in the locus of your corroborative instance [e.g. a jar] by means of any valid cognition, [for a potter is not omniscient etc.]. Thus, your reasoning is inconclusive (*anaikāntikatva*)

(45.5) You may contend: “We grasp the *vyāpti* [between h and s] referring to [an intelligent being] in general, and then prove the existence of [the intelligent being qualified by] the particular qualities on the basis of h [effect] being found in p [trees, earth etc.] (*pakṣadharmaṭa*).” But this is not allowed. You may establish by virtue of *pakṣadharmaṭa* the specific qualities belonging to s only when h does not fail to occur in p together with the qualities. For example, from smoke is inferred a general quality of fire, ‘its occurrence on a mountain’

Thus, your reasoning is inconclusive (*anaikāntikatva*)290.

C 45.5) You may contend: “We grasp the *vyāpti* [between hand s] referring to [an intelligent being] in general, and then prove the existence of [the intelligent being qualified by] the particular qualities on the basis of *p* [trees, earth etc.] (*pakṣadharmaṭa*).” But this is not allowed. You may establish by virtue of *pakṣadharmaṭa* the specific qualities belonging to s only when h does not fail to occur in p together with the qualities. For example, from smoke is inferred a general quality of fire, ‘its occurrence on a mountain’

Thus, your reasoning is inconclusive (*anaikāntikatva*)290.

290. RNA 30, 15-16 : *nanu buddhimatpūrvakatve sādhya siddhasādhanaṃ, abhimagatam hi paresāṃ api karmajataṃ kāryajātasya, karmṛṣaḥ ca cetanātmakatvāt cetanāhetukatvāt va; taddhetukatvaḥ ca jagataḥ.* At the beginning of his *Īśvarasādhana śastra* Ratnakirti profusely cites arguments from the *Nyāyaśāstra*; for the passage which concerns us now see N Kan 212, 14ff. Mokṣākara’s discussion in § 20.2.6 which is closely related to RNA has much to do with N Kan too. See also RNA 30, 16–17: *sarvajñānapūrvakatve tu sādhya vyāptih swapne’pi nāpalabdāhā, dṛṣṭāntaḥ ca sādhyaḥinaḥ, kulādānām asarvajñātevat;* 49, 14ff.: *yad etat kāryatvaḥ sādhanaṃ kim anena viśvasya buddhimantrapurūṣavakatvaḥ sādhyaśate, āho svad ekatavibhutvasaṃvivajñatvanyatvādī diguṇavāśitaḥ buddhimatpūrvakatvam. prathama-pakṣe siddhasādhanaṃ, devi tiye tu vyāptih abhāvādanaikāntikatvā.

291. M *parvaladēśaṃvitā, but G parvalaiikadesavēttīte and T (n, p) dper na du ba laś du baḥi phyogs su hjug pa ŋid kyi me bzin no (=dhūmasaḥ dhūmaḥdēśaṃvitātvasaḥ...* Tp has la laḥi instead of las du bahi, but it is misleading.

292. M *tārṇatāṃ antaraṇādi parvate dhāmadarśanāt; G... api pāryate dhūmasya sambhavāḥ; T sīh gi la mo laḥs buḥ ba ŋid las.

293. This paragraph is an abbreviation of RNA 30, 22–31.5 which consists of citations from N Kan (*sāmānyamātra vyāptā api antaraḥvāvita viśeṣasya sāmānyasya pakṣadharmaṭāvaseṇa sādhyaḥdharmīnḥ anumāṇād viśeṣaviśeṣam anumāṇāḥ bhavaṇeva...* and The Buddhist reply to it). See also RNA 49, 17ff.: *nanu sāmānyena vyāptau pratītyām api pakṣadharmaṭābalad viśeṣaviśeṣaḥ...* and Ratnakirti’s reply to it.
(45.13) Omniscience cannot be proved even by [supposing the agent’s] being perfectly conversant with [the nature,] materials, [auxiliary causes, recipients, objects to be given etc. of the world] \(\text{(upādānādyabhijñatva)}^{294}\). It might be proved if the uniqueness [of the intelligent being] were beforehand established, which is, however, not the case\(^{295}\). For ‘effect’ is made possible even by the ‘previous existence of plural agents’ as e.g. an ant-hill is made by a number of insects. If you mean by the probandum that an ant-hill also presupposes the supervision of God, then how can you set forth as the corroborative instance a jar, which according to you would also presuppose the unique, omniscient God [and which would be a part of \(p\)]? Or else, how can you deprive a potter of his agent-ness which is actually experienced? How again can you remove the cause-ness of the insects which is also well known? You may not assume that if there are many agents there would be differences of opinion [which may hinder producing an effect], just because we actually see [an ant-hill being made by many insects]\(^{296}\).

(46.1)\(^{297}\)····Therefore, it is settled that the universal \(\text{vyāpti}\) between the probans and the probandum must be shown in reference to the locus of the corroborative instance through the means of valid knowledge.····\(^{297}\)

(46.3)\(^{298}\)····Moreover, when the probandum is the intelligent being who is permanent, unique and omniscient, your [probans] is incompatible (\text{viruddha}). For ‘effect’ is actually pervaded by ‘having intelligent agents who are imperfect, plural and of imperfect knowledge.’ The kind of probans proving that which is incompatible with the probandum is called ‘incompatible \text{hetu}’ ; and your probans proves what is incompatible with the probandum.····\(^{298}\)

(46.6)\(^{299}\)····So much for our treatise demonstrating the criticisms of

\(^{294}\) RNA 49, 28 ff. [Opponent:] \(\text{yady evaṁ suśvarūpopādānopakaraṇasahākpradānaprāyojanābhijñāna eva kartā sādhyate, svarūpam iha ca devaṇukaṁ kāryam; upādānam iha paraṁāṣṭāticatvaḥ; upakaraṇaṁ samastakṣetraṁsastraavyādhiṁdharman; saṁkṣetraṇam kṣetrajñāḥ, yām ayaṁ bhagavān svakarmabhir abhipraiti; prayojanaṁ sukhadūkhopahphoghaṁ kṣetrajñānām, evaṁbhūte buddhimaṁ sādhye kutaṁ siddhasādhanam, na cāyaṁpi.} \(\text{... Ratnakirti’s reply follows in 50, 19 ff. See also RNA 29, 8–9; NKan 210, and Vācaspati’s syllogism in n. 258 above.}

\(^{295}\) RNA 51, 10 : \(\text{ekakartur na siddhaṁ tu sarvajñatvaṁ kimāśrayam.}

\(^{296}\) RNA 32, 23–25 : \(\text{ekasya kartur abhiśve bahūnāṁ vyāhatamanasāṁ svātāntreṇa paras-paravidrohaṇa mithāḥ svānukālaḥbhūpyāṇavarodhaṇa yugapakāryānyutpattiḥ, utpannasya vā vilopādiprasaṅgaḥ syād iti, ekatee tu siddhe sarvajñatāsiddhir avirodhi.}

\(^{297}\) 298, 299. G has 298 before 297 and omits 299. T agrees with M.
God which had incidentally become a topic.  

21. Relation of anvaya and vyatireka. (46.8) [Objection : ] “In the syllogism by the method of agreement the anvaya alone is stated, but not the vyatireka; and in the syllogism by the method of difference the vyatireka alone is stated, but not the anvaya. How then can you say that the three characteristics of the probans are stated by [each of] these two syllogisms?”

[Answer : ] This is not a fault. For even when a syllogism is formulated by the method of agreement, the vyatireka is also understood by implication. And on the other hand, if the vyatireka is not grasped, the error (viparyaya) must be pointed out by supposing that the probans is not absent even when the probandum is absent. If so, even the anvaya would be invalid, because it is implied that the probandum is not present even when the probans is present. In the same way, when a syllogism is formulated by the method of difference the anvaya is also understood by implication. For if the anvaya is not grasped in this case, the error must be pointed out by supposing that the probandum may not be present even when the probans is; and this renders even the vyatireka invalid, since it is implied that the probans is present even in the absence of the probandum. Thus both the syllogisms manifest in effect the three characteristics of the probans; and there is no fault [in our theory].

22. Antarvyāpti and bahirvyāpti. (47.1) Now, the following summary is given in order to make two problems easily understood: In what locus is vyāpti between h (sadhana) and s (sādhyā) grasped? By what proof is it grasped?

Regarding the vyāpti between ‘existence’ (sattva), h as essential nature (svabhāvahetu), and ‘momentariness’ (kṣaṇikatva) some logicians are of the opinion that it is to be grasped in p (sādhyadharmin) itself; they maintain the theory of intrinsic pervasion (antarvyāpti).

300. This problem is discussed in NB III s. 28-32 and NBT. (NBT 51. 1-2): nanu ca sādharmyavati vyatireko nōktaḥ, vaidharmyavati cānvayaḥ; tat katham etat trirūpalīghākhyānam ity āha. (NB III. s. 28) sādharmyenaḥ api hi prayogeśrīthād vaidharmyagatīḥ.... tathā vaidharmyenaḥpy anvayagatīḥ; (s. 31) asati tasmin sādhyaḥbhāve hetvabhāvasyaṇḍhēḥ....

301. So far as I know, Ratnakarasanti is the only Buddhist logician who openly pronounced the theory of intrinsic determination of universal concomitance (antarvyāptivāda). He wrote the Antarvyāptisamarthāna (SBNT 103-114), maintaining that the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is grasped in p itself by means of viparyaya-bădha-kapramāya (cf. § 24.1). He discarded the necessity of a corroborative example and said
Others hold that the same *vyāpti* is to be grasped in *dp* (*dṛṣṭāntadharmin*), say, a jar, by means of reasoning to an undesired conclusion (*prasāṅga*) and its reduction into a normal syllogism (*prasāṅgaviparyaya*); they maintain the theory of extrinsic pervasion (*bahirvyāpti*)

As for *hetus* as essential nature other than that of ‘existence’, *hetus* as effect and *hetus* as non-cognition, the *vyāpti* is to be grasped in *d*.

"[To be more precise] the *vyāpti* between ‘aśoka tree’ and its probandum ‘to be called a tree’ is grasped in reference to a corroborative instance by means of perception and non-perception (*pratyakṣanupalambhā*); the *vyāpti* between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is grasped by two proofs, *prasāṅga* and *prasāṅgaviparyaya*, or by the proof which refutes the opposite of the assertion to be proved and which is aimed at excluding successive and simultaneous action [the pervader of effective action or existence] from [what is not momentary, i.e. the permanent] (*śādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇena kramayau gapadyanivṛttitalakṣanena*). This *vipakṣa* taken as the locus [of the *śādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, i.e. what is not momentary] is not definite as to its reality, and is regarded as real when considered to be established by self-consciousness and as unreal when considered to be just imaginary.

that asādhāraṇaikāntika, which necessarily follows in such an inference is not a *hetvābhāsa* for clever persons who do not rely on external examples for determining *vyāpi*. Mookerijee gives an excellent exposition of the theory, see 24 ff. My Japanese translation of the Antarvyāptisamarthana is available in Bukkyō Shigaku.* (仏教史学) Vol. VIII, no. 4, 219–238 (ラトナーカラーシャンティの論理学書).

302. Buddhist logicians in general maintain *bahirvyāptivāda*; at the later stage of Buddhist logic Jānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti asserted it in contrast to *antarvyāptivāda* held by Ratnākaraśānti. The former two logicians recognized the necessity of a corroborative example even in the inference of the Buddhist theory of universal momentariness, though they are not so far from Ratnākaraśānti inasmuch as they also rely on *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa* when determining the *vyāpti* between existence and momentariness. See Jānaśrimitra, *Kṣaṇabhāṅgaśādhyāya*; Ratnakirti’s digest of it, *Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi*, of which a detailed exposition is supplied by Mookerjee, 1–83. *prasāṅga*, *prasāṅgaviparyaya*, and *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa* are illustrated in § 24.1, where our author again follows Ratnakirti.

303. See § 24. 1.

304. The *p* of the *viparyayabādhakapramāṇa* formulated by Buddhist logicians (cf. § 24.1), viz. ‘the permanent’, is not real for Buddhists. Thus, the inference necessarily contains the fallacy of *asiddhi*. The Naiyāyika vehemently attacked this point and Ratnakirti in RNA 78 ff. tries to prove that even the idea of ‘the permanent’ has a kind of reality and can be put forward as the subject of a proposition. The discussion is interpreted in Mookerjee 24 ff. See also my paper ラトナーカラーシャンティの論理学書と内発律論の生成 (鎌本博士頌寿記念仏教史学論集 264–270.) But our author here seems to refer also to the theory of the Sākāravijnānavādī *yogacāri* who admits that every content of self-consciousness is real.
The *vyāpti* between ‘smoke’, *h* as effect, and ‘fire’ is grasped in a *dp* such as a kitchen; and it is grasped by means of threefold cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (*trividhapratyakṣāṇupalambha*) [according to some], or by fivefold cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (*pañcavidhapratyakṣāṇupalambha*) [according to others]\(^{305}\).

The *vyāpti* between ‘non-perception’ and ‘to be called non-existent’ is grasped by the perception [of things other than the denied object].

As for other cases, be they *h* as essential nature or as effect, we should grasp the *vyāpti* by making appropriate deductions according to the nature of a case.

23. **Untrue vyāpti effects the fallacy of anaikāntikatva.** (47.19)

When *vyāpti* is not definite, the probans has the fallacy of inconclusiveness. And this [inconclusive probans] is threefold: inconclusive due to *h* being subsistent only in *p* (asādhāraṇānaikāntika); inconclusive due to *h* being non-exclusive (sādhaṅnaṇānaikāntika); inconclusive due to *h*’s non-occurrence in the *vipakṣa* being doubtful (samādhihavipakṣavyāvṛttiaka)\(^{306}\). Of these, an asādhaṅnaṇānaikāntika [*-hetu*] is illustrated: [This] living body

\(^{305}\) In the Buddhist logic, causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), which together with identity (*svabhāva*) forms the two principles of valid pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the probans and the probandum, is said to be inductively understood through positive and negative perception (*pratyakṣāṇupalambha*). *Pratyakṣāṇupalambha* here means the observation of the concomitance in agreement, as well as in difference, of a cause and an effect. The theory was first propounded by Dharmakīrti and was maintained throughout the subsequent development of Indian Buddhist logic. However, Dharmakīrti did not definitely prescribe how many times cognitions are required as indispensable for determining a causal relation. Hence, the logicians following him came to hold different opinions on this point. The causal relation of fire and smoke, for instance, can be ascertained if we observe that smoke, which has not been there, occurs when fire has appeared. And that when the fire has gone, the smoke disappears as well. In this illustration we can count one prior non-perception of smoke, two successive perceptions (fire and smoke), and two successive non-perceptions (no fire and no smoke). Thus, some of Buddhist logicians, such as Dharmottara, asserted that all five of these cognitions are indispensable. Others such as Jñānaśrīmitra, however, thought that either 1) one prior non-perception of fire and smoke as a unit, followed by two successive perceptions, or 2) one perception grasping fire and smoke together and followed by two successive non-perceptions can severally determine a causal relation without requiring all five, for either group contains in itself both perception and non-perception which respectively prove the concomitance in agreement and that in difference. Thus, in this theory the number of indispensable cognitions is reduced to three.


\(^{306}\) See § 10; 10. 2. 4 with notes.
is endowed with a soul, because it has breathing and other characteristics like another living body and unlike a jar. We are not certain if this proban [breath] is pervaded by a soul in the case of another living body; and we are also not certain if in the case of a vipakṣa, jar, breathing is not found exactly because it has no soul; however, it is somehow found in p, this living body. For these reasons, it is called an exclusive, inconclusive hetu307. Another illustration of asādhāraṇa: Sound is impermanent because it is audible like a jar and unlike ether [where a homologous example is not available, since a jar is not audible]. Sādhāraṇānānakāntika [-hetu] is illustrated308: Sound is permanent, because it is an object of cognition like a jar and unlike ether. Saṁdīghavipaṅkṣavyāvṛttika [-hetu] is illustrated: He must be black, because he is a son of that man as other sons of that man who are actually seen.

24. Prasaṅga defined. (48.11) We have said before that the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is to be understood by prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya. What is here meant by prasaṅga? Prasaṅga is reasoning for bringing out an absurd conclusion which is undesirable to the opponent by means of a statement based on a vyāpti established by proof (pramāṇapraśiddhavyāptikena vākyena parasyānistāpādanāya praśaṅjanaṁ prasaṅgah)309.

24.1. Illustrations of prasaṅga, prasaṅgaviparyaya, and sādhyavipar-
yayābādhaka-pramāṇa. (Td. 358, a 2) For example, if a jar [at the present moment) were admitted to maintain one and the same nature that subsisted in the past and will continue to do so in the future, then we could point out [the absurdity] that it is [at the present moment] capable of producing the effects belonging to the past and future [moments of

dah ma ḍhōṣ paḥi dus kyi ḍhōṣ paḥi don bya ba (d. adds dah) da ltar gyi dus su mi byed do ḍesa (p. 387a) khyab par byed pa mi dmigs paḥo. ḍhrel pa las nus pa med paḥi skad cig pa ni ḍhig go ḍesa pa thal bar ḍhgyur ba dah thal ba las bzlog paḥi tshad ma dag gis yod pa niid la skad cig pa niid kyi(-s) khyab pa ḍhgrub po. bsgrub par bya ba las bzlog pa (p. la) gnod pa can gyi tshad mas sam ḍesa pa de brjod par bya ste. gaḥ ἔἰg rii ḍhgyis ḍhbras bu byed pa niid dah ḍim pa ma yin par ḍhbras bu byed pa niid du yod pa ma yin pa de ni don bya ba nus pa ma yin te, ḍeper na nam mkaḥi padma ḍzin; skad cig ma yin par yaḥ ἔἰg rii ḍhbras bu byed pa niid ḍan. ḍim ma yin par ḍhbras bu byed pa niid dag yod pa ma yin no ḍesa pa khyab byed mi dmigs paḥi mtiṣan niid can bzlog pa la gnod pa can gyi tshad mas, skad cig ma yin pa niid las khyab pa (p. omits pa) byed rim dah cig car bzlog pa ḍesog ḍzin paḥi. don bya ba byed pa niid kyi mtiṣan niid can yod pa ma niid skad cig pa ḍala baa med do (Read skad cig pa la ḍala ḍaḥo), (Td. 358 b) de nas skad cig pa niid kyis khyab po ḍes yod pa niid la skad cig pa niid kyis khyab pa ḍhgrub po ḍes paḥo.

Sanskrit translation: yathā ghaṭādīnāḥ1 atīṭānāga-talabāyāḥ svāra-phāikyābhya-upagame 'tīṭānāgata-kālah-bhāyār-thāryā-kārītvaprasaḥ-ja na nam. tathā hi, yad yadā yat-kriyāsamartabham tat tatā (tatl)t karoty eva, yathā (antya)3 karaṇa-sāmagra ṣvākṛyam; atīṭānāgata-kālahbhāyī- kārīyana-samartabhaḥ cāyaṁ ghaṭā vartamaṇa-kāle 'piṣ svabhāva-hetuprasaḥ-ghā. na karoti ca viṣyāyaḥ, yad yadā yan na karoti na tat tatā tatra samartabham. yathā śālyakurum akuruṇa krodraḥ śālyaṅkure; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamaṇākāle1 atīṭānāgata-kālahbhāyikāyam iti vyāpākunupalabdhīḥ, sambandhaḥ asamartakaṁ niṣaṁta iti4 prasaṃgapa rasāṅgagaviṣyāyaḥ bhyaṁ pramāṇabhyāṁ sattvasya kṣaṇikatavena vyāpīṣid hiṣhyati.

sādhya-viṣyāyābādha-kṛimāṇa-vētī uktam tad ucyatam, yat kramikāyakārīyakramikāyakārīyasya ca na bhavati na tad arthakriyāśaṃtarthāṁ, yathā vyoma-padaṁ; na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramikāyakārītvākramikāyakārīvite iti vyāpakunupalabdhikāṣaṇa-viṣyāyābāda-kṛimāṇa-kṣaṇikakrtaṇa5 śvāyaḥ kramayugapadāyaṁ vinivartaya iti vinivartaya-mānaḥ (vyāpyam) arthakārītvālakaṇṣaṇasaṁtavān kṣaṇi ke śvāmāya; tataḥ6 kṣaṇikatavena vyāpīṣid hiṣhyati tattva-kṣaṇikatavaṁyor vyāpīṣidhiṣhyatīti.

Notes: (1) grub pa la sogs pa rnam lit. means siddhādīnām which Iyengar restores. But siddha or prasiddha (things well known) is very unlikely though not absolutely impossible. 1 assume this is a mistake for bhum pa due to the orthographical similarity, though no Tibetan ed. gives this reading. (2) T drops tat. Cf. RNA 63, 14-17 : yad yadā yaj janana-vyavahārāyogam tat tatā tat janayatv eva, yathāntyā karaṇa-sāmargrī svakṛyam; atitānāgata-kṣaṇa-kālahbhāyikāyam janayavahārāyogam cāyaṁ ghaṭo vartamaṇābhāvīkārīyakaṁ sa kalakriyātikramakaṁ 'piṣ svabhāva-hetuprasaḥ-ghā. (3) T omits antya, which, however, is very important in this context. (4) RNA 64, 8-11 : yad yadā yan na karoti na tat tatā tatra samarthya-vyavahārāyogam, yathā śālyaṅkurum akuruṇa krodraḥ śālyaṅkure; na karoti caiṣa ghaṭo vartamaṇa-kṣaṇabhāvīkārīyakaṁ samartakaṁ sa kalakriyātikramakaṁ 'piṣ svabhāva-hetuprasaḥ-ghā. (5) RNA 77, 11-12 : yasya kramaṁ-ārama na vidyete na tasyārthāyāsātmayaḥ. yathā śasatri-śaṇasa; na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramaṁ-ārama-āyitvā iti vyāpakunupalabdhīḥ bhināti samarthakaṁ sa samarthakaṁ. (6) RNA 77, 11-12 : yasya kramaṁ-ārama na vidyete na tasyārthāyāsātmayaḥ. yathā śasatri-śaṇasa; na vidyete cākṣaṇikasya kramaṁ-ārama-āyitvā iti vyāpakunupalabdhīḥ. Iyengar : yat kramikāyakārī akramikāyakārī ca na bhavati na tat arthakārīyasamartabham. yathā vyoma-padaṁ;
the jar]. For [it is inferred in the following way]:

Whatever is capable of a certain action at a certain time, does make that [action] at that time, as e.g. the totality of cause and conditions at its last moment is capable of producing its own effect;

[According to the Naiyāyika], this jar is capable even at the present moment of producing the effects belonging to the past and future time;

[Therefore, this jar should produce the effects of the past and future, which is absurd].

This is a *prasāṅga* formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. The (*prasāṅga*-*) *viparyaya* can be formulated by adopting ‘not producing’ [as *h*]:

Whatever does not produce a certain effect at a certain moment is incapable of producing that effect at that time as e.g. a grain seed which cannot produce a rice-shoot is incapable of producing a rice [-shoot];

This jar does not produce at the present moment the effects belonging to the past and future;

[Therefore, it is incapable of producing them, i.e. not permanent].

We have said that [the same vyāpti is proved] also by the *sādhyaviṃśaya-bāḍhakapramāṇa*. This is to be stated:

Whatever does not possess causal efficiency in succession or in simultaneity, is not capable of causal action as e.g. the sky-lotus;

What is not momentary does not possess causal efficiency in succession and in simultaneity;

[Therefore, it is not capable of causal action, i.e. not existent].

---

310. *Prasāṅga*, *prasāṅgainīṃśaya* and *viṃśayābāḍhakapramāṇa* are used in order to establish the *vyāpti* of another independent syllogism (*svatantraprayoga*). In our present context the independent inference concerned is: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ; sāntaḥ cāṁ viśāḍapadibhūtah padārthah*. Thus, the *vyāpti* to be proved by *prasāṅga* is: whatever exists is momentary. We have to keep in mind that since Dharmakīrti’s time, Buddhist logicians had defined ‘existence’ as ‘being making effective action’ (*arthakriyā-kāraṇa*). Hence, the concerned *vyāpti* can be proved by refuting that the non-momentary or permanent has no effective action; *arthakriyā-kāraṇa* is the pervader of *sāttva* (existence).
This is an inference sublating the opposite of the assertion to be proved (sādhya
dīpa parsatvādyābādha), formulated according to the formula of vyā-
pakānupalabdhi.\textsuperscript{311} Through this inference is excluded the pervader \textsuperscript{311} (of
‘existence’), ‘succession and non-succession’ from the non-momentary:
and so ‘existence’ defined as ‘being causally efficient’ (arthakriyākārītva),
[the pervaded], which is also excluded from the non-momentary, neces-
sarily rests with the momentary; therefore ‘existence’ is pervaded by
‘momentariness’. Thus, the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’
has been established.

24.2. (48.15) [Another example of prasaṅga is seen when] we deduce
the plurality of a universal, when it is admitted [by the opponent] that
a single universal (sāmānya) abides in many individuals. For the inference
is formulated as follows:

Whatever abides in many things [at the same time] must be plural,
as e. g. the fruits of the fan-palm contained in many vessels;

A universal is said to abide in many;

[The absurdity that] follows is: Therefore, a universal must be plural.
[You have to admit this absurd conclusion], or if you do not admit it,
you may not assert the occurrence of a universal in many individuals.

24.3. Function of prasaṅga. (49.1) [objection: ] “This inference
called prasaṅga cannot be a valid means of proof since [h in this case]
does not possess the three characteristics [of the valid probans]\textsuperscript{312}. How
can you argue by means of it?”\textsuperscript{313} [Answer: ] Prasaṅga is used in
the same way as one term of a vyāpti\textsuperscript{314} is stated in order to recollect

\textsuperscript{311} For vyāpakānupalabdhi see n. 212 and 216 above.

\textsuperscript{312} M nanu yady etat prasaṅgākhyānām sādhanaṁ pramāṇaṁ na bhāvati trairūpyābhāvāt.
trairūpyābhāvāt omitted in G, T; prasaṅgākhyānām sādhanaṁ omitted in G.

\textsuperscript{313} In Indian logic the validity of hypothetical inference had long been disapproved both
by the Naiyāyika and the earlier Buddhist school of logic. The three characteristics of a
logical mark are possible only of catagorical inference or what is called sutantrānumāna
(independent inference). In prasaṅga-anumāna, which is hypothetical destructive inference,
h’s subsistence in p is not real to one who formulates the prasaṅga, and breaches the first
characteristic, which causes the fallacy of asiddhi. The conclusion deduced is evidently
false to one who infers, which is not allowed in the case of independent inference. The
Naiyāyika, who called this form of inference tarka, classified it under false knowledge,
though they admitted its value as complementary means of an independent inference.
Later Buddhist logicians, however, came to recognize prasaṅga as a valid inference.

\textsuperscript{314} M vyāpyaikadeśa-, but G, T vyāpyekadeśa.
the vyāpti itself. It is said [by Dharmakirti] : \[315\]

Prasāṅga may be applied to show that when two terms are necessarily connected, the absence of one of them [viz., the absence of the pervader, necessarily] implies the absence of the other [the pervaded]. The meaning of this half-verse is as follows: When the universal concomitance between the pervaded and the pervader is admitted, if the pervader is not recognized [in a certain locus], the existence of the pervaded is also not allowed there. In other words, when the pervaded is recognized, the pervader is to be necessarily recognized.

25. Confutation. (49.7) According to the rule, when a debater has stated a proof, the opponent is to make a confutation (dūṣaṇa) of it. Confutation consists in pointing out the fallacy due to any illegitimate, incompatible or inconclusive hetu as defined [by Dharmakirti]:

Confutation is pointing out the defect [of an inference] \[316\].

[Objection:] "If Confutation consists of pointing out these [three kinds of fallacies] alone, where are others such as useless argument (vaiyarthya), inefficient argument (asāmarthya), unwarranted stretch of a rule (atiprasāṅga) etc. included?"

[Answer:] They are included in the same three fallacies. Of these, the useless argument can be included in the 'asiddha'. For a probans is said to be a quality of \(p\) which is not yet determined [as to its relation to the probandum] (samādgdhasādhyadharma) ; and when useless argument is made of a certain thing, the probans fails to conform to the [above mentioned] definition of a probans, 'being a quality of \(p\) which is not yet determined [as to its relation to the probandum]'. Thus it can be called [a sort of] asiddhi, \[317\]... [because the essential characteristic of a probans is not existent in this case].... \[317\] The following is said [by Dharmakirti in connection with this] \[318\]

A probans is stated concerning only a \(p\) which is not yet ascertained [to be \(s\) or non-\(s\)] ; and what has been rejected [to be \(s\) by other

315. PV IV, v. 12c-d : prasaṅgo dvayasambandhād ekābhāve 'nyahānaye. Rāhula Sankrītyāyana reads prasaṅge for prasaṅgo, but the latter is given in a foot-note. G ekāpāye for ekābhāve. but T, M ekābhāve.

316. NB III, s. 138 : dūṣaṇāni nyūnatādyuktiḥ. According to III, s. 139 and NBT on it, any of the three kinds of fallacies, viz., asiddha-, viruddha- and anaikāntika-hetu is meant by nyūnatā.

317. Found only in M.

318. See § 20. 2 and n. 263.
valid knowledge] should not be [put forward as] the locus of the probans, viz., p.
Inefficient argument, on the other hand, is included in the fallacious probans which is illegitimate by itself (svarūpāsiddhi). For the essence of a probans is the efficiency of the probans, and because [the lack of efficiency] means the unreality of the probans (hetor avastutva).

The Unwarranted stretch of a rule should be included in the ‘an-aikāntika’, since [in it h] is connected even with the vipakṣa, stretching itself beyond the quality to be proved (sādhyadhārma).

25.1. Refutation of ātman. (50.1) The confutation of h whose locus is unreal (āśrayāsiddhahetu)319 takes place when a p, in which [a debater] starts to prove [the existence of] s, turns out to be sublated by another proof, as is the case with [the inference] ‘The soul (ātman) is ubiquitous, because it has the quality to be perceived everywhere’320. [This can be confuted as follows:] Since Buddhists do not admit the reality of the soul itself, how then can it be established that it has the quality to be perceived in every place?

For this is said by the heretic: ‘There exists another substance called ātman, which is separate from things such as a body and which is the actor of good and evil deeds (suḥbhāsubhakarkartṛ), the enjoyer of their results (tatphalabhoktṛ), permanent (nitya) and ubiquitous (vyāpin)321. Although it pervades the whole world, it is yet said that a living body, which is admitted322 as a receptacle [of the soul’s] experience [of pleasure and pain] (upabhogāyatana), is possessed of the soul’323.

But this is not tenable, since there is no proof for establishing [the existence of] the soul. For the soul is not apprehended by sense-perception, because [the five kinds of sense-] perceptions beginning with the visual have the five kinds of objects, colour etc., which are determined to their

319. M. G. āśrayāsiddhir hetor duṣaṇam. T griz ma grub pa rtags kyi skyon no =āśrayāsiddhir hetor (or āśrayāsiddhahetor) duṣaṇ. Āśrayāsiddhahetor duṣaṇam may be better.
320. NB III, s. 67 : dharmyasiddhiiv apy asiddho, yathā sarvagata ātmēti sādhye sarvatropalabhyamānagunatvatvam.
321. TS v. 171-172 : anye punar ihātmānām icchādinaṁ samāśrayam. suvah 'cidrūpam ichchanti nityāṁ sarvagataṁ tathā. sukhāsubhāhāṁ kartāraṁ karmāṇāṁ tatphalasya ca, bhoktārham cetanāyogoc cetanāṁ na svarūpataḥ. This represents the theory of ātman expounded by the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika.
322. M inserts paren before parigṛhitam, but it should be omitted as in G, T.
323. NBh ad NS 1. 1. 9 : tasya (=ātmano) bhogāyatanaṁ śariram.
respective [senses, and the soul is not the object of any of these five sense-perceptions]. [Nor is the soul the object of] ego-consciousness (ahaṁpratyaya) which is none other than mental perception (mānasa) [as defined by the Naiyāyika]. Since this has as its object the body and others [but not the soul]\(^{324}\), ego-consciousness occurs in the form of ‘I am fair’, ‘I am big’, ‘I go’ and so on; and in this connection the Alaṁkārakāra [Prajñākaragupta] said\(^{325}\):

The knowledge of ‘I’ pertains to the parts of the body or sense-organs, since [our knowledge in the form of] ‘I am one-eyed’, ‘I am happy’, ‘I am fair’, takes place because of the experience of the receptacle common [to these conditions].

And there cannot be such qualities as fair complexion or bigness apart from the body of a person; nor is the action of going, which is connected with a bodily substance, reasonably ascribed to the ubiquitous and formless soul. Nor can this [idea of soul] be applied [to the body] in the secondary sense of the word (bhākta), just as the idea of a lion is [figuratively] applied to a boy, since [if so,] it follows that this is after all false identification (skhaladyātti)\(^{326}\).

\(^{51.1}\) [The existence of the soul] is not known by inference either, since we do not find a logical mark as effect or essential nature [for the proof]. Firstly, a logical mark as effect is not found because nothing is causally related to the soul, since this, being always beyond our perception, lacks the definite presence in a particular place, time and form\(^{327}\), while a causal relation is to be established by [the clear perception of]...

\(^{324}\) While the Vaiśeṣika holds that ātman is not perceptible, but only inferable, the Naiyāyika thinks that the jivātman is an object of mānasapratyakṣa. Cf. NK s. v. ātmā; TS v. 212: anyāḥ pratyakṣasiddhatvam ātmanāḥ parikalpitam. svasaṁvedyo hy ahaṁkāras tasyātmā niśayo mataḥ. TSP ascribes this theory of the perceptibility of ātman to Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta, etc. We have to note that mānasapratyakṣa of the Naiyāyika is quite different from that of the Buddhist.

\(^{325}\) =PVBh 368, 20 (III. v. 744): aham ity api yaj jñānam tuc charirendriyātmavit, aham kāṇasa sukha gaurā samānādhrāvedanat. M reads aṅga-, G and T aṁśa- instead of ātma-. For a similar argument see TS v. 214 with TSP.

\(^{326}\) TSP 90, 21 ff.: tatas ca yad uktam uddyotakaraṇaprabhṛtyibhiḥ, upebhogayatane sārire 'yam ātmapacāraḥ, yathāṃkāle bhytaye rājā brūte ya evaṁ sa evaṁ me bhytaye iti, tad apiśaṁ bhavati. tathā hi yady ayaṁ gauṇaḥ syat tadā skhaladyātī bhavet, na hi loke sīṃhām, mūryavakāyor mukhyāpitarāyor deyor api sīṁha ity askhaliḥ buddhir bhavati....

\(^{327}\) M desāvalākārayatirekavikalena; G desākālayatirekavikalena; T yul daṅ dus daṅ rnam pa bral baḥt = desāvalākārayatirekavikalena. My tr. here follows T.
the concomitance in agreement as well as in difference [between two terms]. Secondly no logical mark as essential nature is available just because the existence of the entity (dharmin) [which is to be called a soul and to which a logical mark is to belong] is itself not established. And there is no third logical mark [admitted by us].

You may propose another kind of probans to be pervaded by the probandum [or the soul], but how can the probans be pervaded by the latter, when this is not at all existent? Furthermore, we should ask if this soul is a conscious being or an unconscious being. If it is a conscious being and a permanent entity, it would necessarily follow that the eyes and other sense-organs are useless. If, on the other hand, it is an impermanent conscious being, then you have merely given the name ātman to knowledge; and there should be no difference of opinion between us. Or, if the soul is unconscious and invisible, then the fact that it is not perceived does not permit its existence. Thus, the non-existence of the soul is proved beyond objection. Therefore, all things that are products are without ātman.

25.2. Confutation of svarūpāsiddha; untrue vyāpti is not different from anaikāntika. (51.13) A probans which is fallacious owing to its own unreality (svarūpāsiddha) is also called illegitimate (asiddha) as in the case of [the inference] 'sound is impermanent, because it is visible'.

[Objection:] Why do you not mention [the disclosure of] the illegitimacy (asiddhi) of a vyāpti as a kind of confutation, when it renders what the opponent wants to prove impossible?

[Answer:] It is not mentioned separately, since it is understood by the confutation of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). For vyāpti cannot be grasped between two particulars (svalaksana), because a particular, which is determined in place, time and form, has no common aspect with other particulars. Instead, vyāpti should be grasped only between a probans and a probandum represented as universals. And in this case too, if the probans is not known as pervaded by the probandum, it is in fact inconclusive since the probandum may not be present when the probans

---

328. For a similar discussion see TS v. 207-209 with TSP.
329. G abodhasvarūpo'dṛṣyaś ca, though M as well as T reads abodhasvarūpo dṛṣyaś ca.
330. NB III, s. 60 : yathā, anityaḥ śabdā iti sādhye cākṣṣaṇatvam ubhayāsiddham.
331. M deśakālākāramiyatatvendpy....; api is omitted in G. T.
26. The theory of apoha. (52.3) [The following objection may be raised:] "The universals (sāmānya) are indeed not accepted [by you Buddhists];332 how then can you grasp a universally applicable (sarvopāsārmāraṇati) vyāpti between a probans and a probandum that are universals?"

[Answer:] There is no such a fault [in our theory]. Buddhists do not admit such a universal as that which others wrongly imagine, since it is sublated by valid knowledge. We do not, however, deny [the universal] called apoha (discrimination) which is defined as the negation of the opposite (anyavyāvṛtti) and which is well known in our verbal usage (vyavahāra).

[Objection:] “What is this apoha? [It may be interpreted in the following three senses:]

1) An external object such as a jar as conceptually determined (yathādhayavāsyāyam) is called apoha, the term being understood as when we say ‘the other or the dissimilar is discriminated from this’;

2) Or apoha may mean the mental image (buddhyākāra) as it manifests itself (yathāpratibhāsam), the term being understood as in ‘the dissimilar is discriminated or made distinct in this mental image’;

3) Apoha, when taken as the negation of a proposition (prasajyarrūpa), may actually mean the mere absence [without implying the affirmation of the opposite] (nivṛttiṃatra), apoha being understood as negating (apohana).333

332. T ḍho na khyed la ci ma grub pa ma yin nam. Ci here must be a mistake for spyi. Then, this passage may mean nanu bhavatāṁ sāmānyaṃ aprasiddham. M. G nanu sāmānyaṃ ced aprasiddham. Iyengar’s footnote 1 in M 52 is unreliable.

333. Our author reproduces these three kinds of wrong interpretations of apoha, following the pūrṇapakṣa in Ratnakirti’s Apohasiddhi (RNA 53. 2-4) : nanu ko’yam apohā nāma. kim idam anyasmād apohyate, asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin vānyad apohyate iti vṛuttayā vyāśāvṛttaih bhāyam eva vivāsītam ; buddhyākāra vā ; yādī vāpohanam apoha ity anya- vṛttitānītra iti trayaḥ pakṣāh. Professor Frauwallner once wrote (WZKM Bd. 38, 231, 17 ff.) : ‘Ratnakirti scheint nämlich in seiner Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi Udayana nicht zu kennen... Dagegen schliesst sich der pūrṇapakṣa der Apohasiddhi (SBNT S. 1-3, 4) [=RNA 53, 2-24] eng an eine Stelle aus Udayanas Ātmatattvavivekaḥ an (B. I., S. 278, 1 ff.), und ein grösserer Absatz ist fast wörtlich daraus übernommen (S. 1, 15-2, 11 [=RNA 53, 9-16] =S. 279, 17-282, 5). Der Ātmatattvavivekaḥ, Udayanas ältestes Werk, ist also aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach zwischen Ratnakirti’s Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi und Apohasiddhi verfasst’. This observation, together with others, led Frauwallner to the following conclusion:
And if \([\text{apoha}, \text{i. e. negation}]\) means affirmation \([\text{of a positive entity}]\) \([\text{vidhi}]\) as conceptually determined, then it indeed comes to mean the same as an object \([\text{viṣaya}]\) \([\text{which renders the designation apoha meaningless; and the other two interpretations are also untenable}]\)\(^{334}\)."

\[\text{Answer : [These three interpretations are] not [acceptable]. [By apoha] we mean the affirmation \([\text{of a positive entity}]\) qualified by discrimination \([\text{apohavisīṣṭo vidhiḥ}]\)\(^{335}\). However, those who stress affirmation \([\text{vidhivādin}]\) think that after we have known the cow, we consequently determine the discrimination of the essence of the cow from that of the non-cow; those who stress the negative function of apoha \([\text{nivṛtty-}\]

\(^{334}\) JNA 202, 13-14: \text{tena na kaścid upayogāḥ, apohanāmāṇaḥ vidhier eva vivakṣitātvat, na ca nāmāntararkaranē vasūnaḥ svarūpaparāvṛttiḥ...} \text{The other two interpretations are also refuted by the opponent in JNA 202-203 and RNA 53, 5-8. The argument is, in brief, as follows: The first two meanings of apoha signify affirmation, which renders the use of the name apoha (negation) useless; the third is absurd, since in our cognitive experience we get a positive idea, say, fire in a mountain, and not the mere negation 'there is no non-fire'.'

\(^{335}\) RNA 54, 1-2: \text{atṛabhidhiyate, nāsmābhir apohaśabdenevidhier eva kevalo 'bhite-}

---

(232, 21 ff.) "Ratnakirti muss daher ein älterer Zeitgenosse Udayanas sein. Wir werden infolgedessen nicht fehlgehen, wenn wir seine Blütezeit um 950 ansetzen. Damit ist aber auch die Zeit seines Lehrers Jāṇaśrī bestimmt. Er muss in der ersten Hälfte des X. Jahrhunderts gelebt haben und der Höhepunkt seines Wirkens dürfte ungefähr in das Jahr 925 fallen". This insight of Frauwallner which was once so significant, however, must be corrected, now as we have the edition of Jāṇaśrimitra's works which were then unknown to Frauwallner. The pūrva-pākṣa of Ratnakirti’s Apohasiddhi is in fact an abbreviation of that of Jāṇaśrimitra’s Apohaprakaraṇa (JNA 201-202). The three kinds of wrong interpretations of apoha, which we have seen in RNA as well as TBh, are found in JNA 202, 12-24 ; the passage beginning with atha yady api nivṛttiḥ ahaṁ pratyemiti na vikalpāḥ, which Ratnakirti quotes and whose authorship Frauwallner ascribed to Udayana, is originally cited by Jāṇaśrimitra (JNA 201, 17-202, 1). Since I think no one would dare to say that Jāṇaśrimitra is indebted to Udayana for these passages, we have to infer that Ratnakirti, Mokṣākara and Udayana owe these to Jāṇaśrimitra who in his turn must have cited these from an author unknown to us.

For the Buddhist theory of apoha readers are referred to E. Frauwallner's Beiträge zur Apohalehre, a German translation from the Tibetan text of the portion treating apoha in PV I (WZKM Bd. 37, 39, 40 and 42) and of the Apohaprakaraṇa of Dharmottara (Bd. 44) ; Mookerjee’s exposition in his Universal Flux 107-139 ; Dharmakirti’s elucidation is now available in Skt. original, being included in Gnoli’s edition of PV I ; Śāntirākṣita’s view of apoha, as well as Kamalaśīla’s, is found in TS and TSP, Šabdārthaparikṣā. Among other Sanskrit texts containing apohavāda, the most important are JNA 201-232, Apohaprakaraṇa and RNA 53-61, Apohasadhi. 

---

- 123 -
apohavādins) are of the opinion that we first know the discrimination of the dissimilar thing and then consequently confirm the thing which is discriminated from others, viz. the cow. Thus [both the interpretations] are wrong. For at the time of judgment we do not experience an order of comprehension in which [negation or affirmation] occurs first. In fact it is not the case that one, having understood the affirmation, later confirms the negation by implication (arthāpattīlāḥ), or that one, having understood the negation, later confirms what is discriminated [from the dissimilar]. Therefore, we say that the very understanding of the cow is the same as the understanding of what is discriminated from the dissimilar.

(53.3) Although it is pointed out that the word denoting discrimination from the dissimilar is not clearly expressed through the word ‘cow’ which is actually pronounced, we do not remain unconscious of the discrimination of the dissimilar which is the qualifier [of the cow]. For the word ‘cow’ is applied by verbal agreement to the thing that is discriminated from the non-cow. Just as on hearing the word indivara on which we are agreed to mean the blue lotus, we unavoidably represent blueness at the very moment336 we understand the lotus, just so on hearing the word ‘cow’ denoting in verbal agreement the thing that is discriminated from the non-cow, we unavoidably represent the negation of the non-cow at the same time as we understand the cow, since the former is the qualifier of the latter. To cite direct perception as another instance, its function of grasping the mere non-existence in the form of prasājyapratiṣedha is none other than its function of generating the concept of non-existence; in the same way, of the affirmative concept, its function representing the likeness [of its object]337 is said to be the same as the grasping of the non-existence [of the dissimilar]. Otherwise, If the discrimination of other things is not comprehended even when the meaning of the word ‘cow’ is known, how then does a person who so knows begin to look after a cow, leaving aside other animals? It would then follow that a man who has been commanded to tether a cow may tether horses

---

336. G, T tatākā eva; M tulyakālam eva. but the manuscript of M seems to agree with G, T (cf. M 53, n. 2).
337. T rjes su mthun pa rjes su sgrub pa ḡbyin par nus pa =avurupānuṣṭhānadānaśakti (cf. RNA 54, 13).
too\textsuperscript{338}. Thus, it has been settled that the external object is placed in [i.e. superimposed as] the content of the word through logical construction (\textit{adhyavasāya}), but not through the manifest perception of the discrete nature (\textit{svalakṣaṇa}) [of the object]. This is attested by the fact that the discrete nature of an individual thing as determined in a particular situation, i.e. in place, time and form, is not manifested [in the word] as it is in direct perception\textsuperscript{339}. Concerning this the supreme lord of logic (\textit{nyāyaparameśvara}) [\textit{Dharmakirti}] said:

Unless one’s visual organ operates, the object [of a word] does not become visible in his knowledge by [simply hearing] the word; it is not as in visual perception\textsuperscript{340}.

(54.3) Moreover, if a thing discrete and distinct (\textit{svalakṣaṇātma- vastu-}) formed the content of a word, it would be entirely comprehended [when the word is heard]; this renders both the affirmative and negative usage [of the word] impossible. For when the object is present, [the statement] that it is is useless and [the statement] that it is not is incoherent; and when the object is not present, it is useless to say that it is not, and it is incoherent to say that it is. But [in practice] we use the words ‘it is’ and so forth. Therefore, it is settled that a word does not signify a
particular entity. 

(54.8) [Object: ] “Just as you, having grasped a jar as a particular, later apply another means of valid knowledge [i.e., inference] to the same object in order to determine [other qualities of it such as] momentariness, just so even if we have by the word ‘tree’ apprehended an element of it ‘tree-ness’, we may again use the word ‘exist’ in order to determine ‘existence’ as another element [of the tree]."

[Answer: ] This is untenable. Since direct perception is indeterminate by nature, we apply another means of knowledge [even after we have perceived] an object with a nature with which we are not well acquainted. In the case of conceptual knowledge (vikalpa) which is itself determinate, however, if the nature [of an object] is once grasped, there remains nothing else to be grasped by another means of knowledge.

27. Refutation of a universal. (54.15) We do not find any proof to establish the existence of a universal (sāmānya) which is conceived by others as inherent in many individuals (anekavyaktisamaveta), visible (drṣya), single (eka) and permanent (nitya). Therefore, it is not correct to maintain the existence [of a universal]. For when we experience an individual (uyakti) such as a cow, no single dependent (anuyāyin) [to be called a universal] other than the characteristics of the individual consisting of a [peculiar] colour and form appears in our perception, just because such a thing is not directly experienced.

Nor is it reasonable to imagine the existence of a universal because it is otherwise inexplicable (anyathānupapatti) that we get an idea reflecting on one [class-] form immediately after we perceive the particular

341. RNA 56, 6-9: kim ca svalakṣaṇātmanī vastuni vācyār sarvātmanā pratipateḥ vidhi-niśedhayor ayogah. tasya hi saddhāveśṭiti vyartham, nāṣṭīty asamartham; asadbhāve tu nāṣṭīty vyartham, astīty asamartham, astīti cāstīyādipadaprayogah.

342. The same kind of objection is quoted as of Kumārila in RNA 56, 20-21=JNA 212, 20-21: yac cōktāṁ kaumārilaṅ, sabhāgatvād eva vastuṇa na sādharānyadoṣaḥ. vykṣataṁ hy anirdhāritabhāvābhāvāṁ śabdād avagamyate, tayor anyataṁ ṣabdāntaravagatena sambhādyata iti.... But Mokṣākara’s passage is more akin to RNA 56, 28-57, 5: nanu vykṣaśābede na vykṣatvāṁśe coditā sattvādyaṁśaniścayanārtham astyādipadaprayoga iti cet. nirakāśate na pratyakṣasamadhiyagatasva svalakṣaṇasva kāvakāśaṁ padāntarēṇa dhammāntaraveliniśedhayōḥ pramāṇāntareṇa va. prayākeṣe ‘pi pramāṇāntarārpekeṣaṇaḥ drṣṭīti cet, bhavatu tasyāniścayādhatvād anabhāvastasvarūpiṇīṣye; vikalpas tu svaṁ niścayātmaḥ yatra grāhi latra kim aparēna.... (cf. JNA 212, 25 ff. too).

313. NK s. v. sāmānya: sāmānyam nityam ekaṁ syuḍ anekasamanāyi ca; SBNT 94, 3: vyūpakaṁ nityam ekaṁ ca sāmānyam yāṁ prakalpitaṁ....
characteristic [of an individual]. For this idea may arise indirectly (paramparayā)\textsuperscript{344} from individuals with generative efficiency effected by their own causes [so as to give rise to an idea]. Though individuals are all different from one another, some alone are capable of generating [a certain class-idea], but not all; in this way, a relation of cause and effect [between individuals and a class-idea] is cognized by perception and non-perception, and cannot be violated. And in fact we experience that such efficiency belongs only to some individuals, though all are equally discrete and distinct (bhedāvīšeṣa), as [only] the Cocculus cordifolius (guḍūci), neemb etc. are effective as anti-febrile [and not others]. Concerning this [Dharmakirti] said:

Some things, though they are distinct and discrete, are determined by nature to bring out one and the same effect such as the same judgment, the cognition of one object and so forth, just as a sense-organ, [an object, light, attention, a soul and their contact bring out one cognition of colour, though they are distinct]\textsuperscript{345}.

Furthermore, we may ask a question: We admit [for the sake of argument] that a universal [say cow-ness] is distinguished from all other dissimilars; but how is it inherent only in individual [members] of [the class of] cow even when they are as much distinct and discrete as other individuals, and how can it generate the same form of mental image

\textsuperscript{344} Mookerjee, 90: "The contention of the Naiyāyika that ideas of universals arise immediately on the operation of the sense-object contact is not true, because such ideas are conceptual in character and conceptual thoughts can emerge only after the name-relations are remembered. First of all, there is the sensuous presentation immediate and direct and divested of all foreign reference. Secondly, a mental energising towards the recalling of the verbal association; thirdly, the remembrance of the name. So the mind has travelled far away from the immediate datum of presentation and the idea of the class-character arises only after a series of psychical operations, which have little bearing on the immediate objective datum".

\textsuperscript{345} The first half of this verse is omitted in G, T. PV I. v. 73-74 : ekapratyavamarśārthajñānādyekārthasaḍadhane, bhede 'pi niyatāḥ kecit svabhāvenḍriyādiyaḥ. yathāṭṛṣayāviṣayālokamananaskārā atmendriyāmanoṛthatatsaṃnirā śa 'satya api tadbhāvaṁyate sāmānye rūpaṁ vyāhānam ekaṁ janayanti, evaṁ śīṃśapādāyā pi bhedaḥ parasparānanuvaye pi prakṛtyai vaikam ekākāraṁ pratyabhijñānaṁ janayanti anyāṁ va yathāpratyaṁ vahanagyādikāṁ kāśṭhaśādyāṁ arthākriyāṁ, na tu bhedaśe pi jalādayaḥ, śrotrādi vā rūpādiyānere. jvarādiśāmane kāścit saha pratyekam eva vā; dṛṣṭā yathā vauśadhyaya nānāte 'pi na cāparāḥ. yathā va guḍūciṇayaktyādayaḥ saha pratyekam vā jvarādiśamananakṣaṭaṁ ekaṁ kāryam kurvanti. na ca tatra sāmānyam apekṣante, bhede 'pi tatprakṛtiṣṇāt, na tadaviṣeṣe 'pi dadhitrapus-ādayaḥ... Also see TS v. 723-726 ; Frauwallner, Beiträge zur Aphalelehre, WZKM Bd. 39, S. 264.
(buddhi) in relation to them [i.e. individual cows] and them alone?  

And the opponent may reply that it happens so by nature (svabhāvena). But this [reply] lacks a proof. On the other hand, when we explain the phenomenon on the basis of their essential nature (svabhāva), it is well established by proof for us and is supported by logic.

(55.17) Similarly, the opponent proposes another syllogism in order to prove [the existence of] a class (jāti):

“A distinct knowledge (vīśiṣṭabuddhi) is invariably connected (nāntariyaka) with the cognition of a qualifier (vīṣeṣāna), as the knowledge of a stick-holder (daṇḍin);

The knowledge ‘This is a cow’ is a distinct knowledge;

[Therefore, it is invariably connected with a qualifier, the class of cow.]

This syllogism is in sense based on the principle of causality [since distinct knowledge is an effect of the cognition of a qualifier].”

We reply: Is the probandum here the invariable connection of the distinct knowledge with the cognition of a separate qualifier or its invariable connection with the perception of a qualifier in general? If the first alternative is maintained, it is sublated by perception, since neither [the qualified nor the qualifier] is [separately] manifested in indeterminate perception which grasps the total reality as a whole. Moreover, distinct knowledge set forth as the probans of [the existence of] a universal\(^\text{347}\) contains the fallacy of inconclusiveness, since distinct knowledge is acquired even without the cognition of a qualifier separate from the qualified, as we know that this jar has its own form or that cowness\(^\text{348}\) is a universal. If on the other hand the second alternative is maintained, it only proves what is obvious (siddhasādhana) as one asserts that a jar has its own form, since [even Buddhists] admit the relation of the qualifier and the qualified as derived from the imagined

---

346. G kim ca sarvato vijātiyad vyāsṛtampi sāmānye kim iti bhedāviseṣe'pi govyaktiṣv eva samavetām tatraiva caikākārām pratitiṁ janayati. M reads sarvagate (which is unfit) for sarvato. inserts tat sāmānyam before tatraiva and has buddhim instead of pratitim. T seems to omit ca after tatraiva; otherwise it agrees with M.

347. Both M and G wrongly have vīśiṣṭabuddhitvaṁ ca sāmānyam ity anākhāntiko hetuḥ. T khyad par can gyi blo ūnid kyaṅ spyi la gtan tshigs ma ūnes pa yin te=vīśiṣṭabuddhitvaṁ ca sāmānye 'naikāntiko hetuḥ. See Ratnakirti’s passage in n. 350.

348. Read gotvaṁ for gotva in M 56, 6.
difference, and use such an expression as ‘This thing has the universal of a cow’\(^{349}\). For, in fact, the judgment ‘This is a cow’ is made by virtue of the cognition of what is discriminated from the non-cow. Thus, the universal cannot be established by this inference either\(^{350}\).

Since in this way the universal imagined by others does not withstand scrutiny, the following has been settled: The universal, which is merely an entity distinguished from the dissimilars and which is designated by the word ‘discrimination’ (\textit{apoha}), forms part of our verbal convention according to our logical construction; this is quite immune from faults.

(56.14) The following syllogism should also be formulated in order to refute the universal:\(^{351}\)

When a thing, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived at a given place, it is the object to be judged as absent then and there, as horns on the head of a horse;

The universal, in spite of [your supposition that] it is by nature perceptible, is not perceived in the particulars which are actually seen;

[Therefore, it is not existent.]

This is formulated on the ground of the non-cognition of an entity itself (\textit{svabhāvānapalabdhi}).

No assumption of the fallacy of illegitimacy (\textit{asiddhi}) can be made [concerning this inference], since, in spite of a thorough examination, we do not find anywhere [a universal which is] the second entity following

---

\(^{349}\) T. G \textit{vyavāhārakāraṇam} \textit{kṛtvā} for \textit{bhedam upādāya}. \textit{T spāṣṭatvāt (gsal ba ⁷išś) for \(-\)syāṣṭatvāt.}

\(^{350}\) \textit{Mokṣākara} verbally follows RNA 59, 21-60, 3: \textit{athēdam jātiprasādhakam anumānam abhidhiyate. yadviśiṣṭajñānaṁ tadviśeṣaṇagrahaṇānāntariyakam, yathā daṇḍijñānam; viśiṣṭajñānaṁ ēkāṁ gaur ayam ity arthaḥ kāryaheṭuḥ, viśeṣaṇānubhavākāryam hi dṛṣṭaṁ viśiṣṭabuddhiḥ siddhāti. atrānyogā, viśiṣṭabuddher bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇānāntariyakatavaṁ vā sādhyaṁ viśeṣaṇamātārānubhavanāntariyakatvaṁ vā. prathamaṇkṣaṇe pakṣasya pratyaķṣabādha sādhanāvadhānam anavakhāsayati. vastugrāhiṇoḥ pratyaķṣasābhyaptārthāsābhāvāt. viśiṣṭabuddhīnāṁ ca sāmānyahetur anaikāntikaḥ, bhinnaviśeṣaṇagrahaṇam antareṇāpi darśanāt, yathā svarūpāvān ghaṭaḥ, gotavāṁ sāmānyam iti vā, dvitiyapakṣe tu siddhasādhanam, svarūpāvān ghaṭa ity āyāvat gotvajātmanāṁ pañcāṁ iti parikalpitaṁ bhedam upādāya viśeṣaṇāviśeṣayābhāvāvyāṣṭaṁ avyāṣṭatvaṁ agogavārtyāntābhavabhāvāntvād gaur ayam iti vyavāhārasya.}

\(^{351}\) \textit{Mokṣākara} owes this inference to \textit{Paṇḍita} Āśoka. Cf. \textit{Sāmānyadūṣaṇādikprāśītā}, SBNT 97, 8-11: \textit{yat yad upalabdhiḥkāraṇapsāːṁ san nāpalaḥkiyate tat tad asad iti prekṣāvadēbhīr vyavahārāyantam yathāmbhorāmbhorah; nāpalaḥkiyate cūpalaḥkāraṇapsāːṁ sāmānyam kućid apiṭvā svabhāvānapalabdhiḥ. The same logic, however, is applied by Buddhists to the negation of \textit{avayavīn}, see e. g. TSP 188, 5 ff.
[a particular], independent of the particular entity characterised by colour and form. Nor is it tenable that it is, in spite of its invisibility, established by perception as in the case of knowledge. For, while knowledge, though not grasped by visual cognition, is established by the proof of self-consciousness (svasaññvedana), this universal, being a quality of an object of the senses (arthadharma), should be grasped by visual cognition. And in fact the opponent admits its perceptibility. Thus the universal fictitiously conceived by the opponent does not withstand scrutiny; only an entity which is [by logical construction] discriminated from others is said to be a universal. And it is settled that all things that are products are void of such a universal as is imagined by others.

28. Refutation of God as the permanent agent. (57.7) It should not be understood that [all produced things] are made by some intelligent being. For if there were an operator of this world, he would be either a permanent being or an impermanent one. Of these, first, he cannot be permanent, because when the operator is active permanently, the creation, preservation and destruction [of the world] would certainly occur simultaneously. The very nature by which he is [said to be] the operator of preservation and destruction should continue to be present in him even at the time of creation, and accordingly he would at the very time [of creation] effect preservation and destruction. It may be contended that he will not act so because he lacks auxiliary causes (sahakārin), but this is not correct. For he is never dissociated from permanent auxiliary causes which are always present with him; and again he is never dissociated from impermanent auxiliary causes, since these must be dependent on him for their origination. Therefore, it would follow that he effects all [the three kinds of operations] at the same time.

(57.17) [The opponent: ] "There is not such a fault, since God is endowed with intelligence. For an agent deprived of intelligence may effect simultaneously all the works which are caused by its presence alone. An intelligent being, on the other hand, need not work when he does not wish, though he is always capable of doing so. Why then is he criticised?"  

Answer: He is to be criticised in this way: These wishes are also

---

352. For a similar argument see BCAP 258, 22-30; TSP ad TS v. 87.
353. A similar objection is ascribed to Uddyotakara in TSP 55, 4-8.
caused by his own existence alone; and why does he not work? You
may contented that although he is efficient by his own existence, he has
such a nature that he does not work without being given contingent powers
which are defined as auxiliary causes. But this objection has no sense
at all, since in the same way one can show you a conclusion that a woman],
who is by birth a barren woman, is also a mother.

(58.6) [The opponent:] "An effect indeed has such a nature that
it is not produced merely by the efficiency [of an operative cause], but
comes into existence after having depended on auxiliary causes too; [so,
you should not criticise as above]".

[The author:] This is not correct. For efficiency will necessarily
produce its effect without expecting the help of auxiliary causes, because
otherwise it would be just inefficient.

28.1. The permanent cannot produce an effect gradually. (58.9)
Again it is not correct that a permanent [agent such as God] produces an
effect gradually (kramaṣa), since it does not require [anything else for
its action]. Regarding this, Dharmakirti whose name is celebrated all
over the world said:

Successful [change] cannot occur to the permanent, since this is
independent [of other causes], and since this remains the same self
at both times whether it is doing an action or not doing it.

By this it is refuted that the permanent such as a soul or momentary
things such as a jar etc. produce an effect gradually. And in
this argument there is no fault of incompatibility with perception, since
we cannot grasp the permanent by indeterminate cognition. For indeter-
minate cognition that is momentary cannot perceive what is not mo-

354. G as well as T inserts na before karoti.

355. TSP ad TS v. 87 (54, 23–25): syād etāt, nēśvara eva kevalaṁ kāraṇam api tu
dharmādisahakārikāraṇāntaram apeekṣya karoti, nimittakāraṇatvād īśvarasya, tena dharmadeh
kāraṇāntarasya vaikalyād avikalakāraṇatvam asiddham iti; BCAP ad BCA IX. 125 a (259,
17–23).

356. M dharmakirtiḥ; G and T have only kirtiḥ. PV II, v. 268 b–269 a: niyasya
nirapekṣatvāt kramopattir viruddhyate, kriyāyam akrīyāyaṁ ca kriyā ca sadṛṣṭātmanāḥ. T of
TBh agrees with this verse completely; but M and G change viruddhyate into na yujyate and
kriyā ca into kālayoḥ ca.

357. M, T read: ātmādaṁ akṣaṇikānāṁ ghaṭādinaṁ kṣaṇikānāṁ ca kramaṇaṁ kāraka-
ṛṇaṁ pratyyaktam. G niyānaṁ ātmādaṁ akṣaṇikānāṁ (ca) ghaṭādinaṁ,... is unintelligible.
A momentary thing cannot operates for many moments in order to produce an effect
gradually.
mentary. The non-momentary [or the permanent] indeed means what operates for many moments; and how can it be grasped by indeterminate cognition which lasts only for a moment? What resided in the past or will reside in the future does not manifest itself at the present time, for otherwise it would follow that it belongs to the present. Or it would follow that the termini of the birth and destruction [of the present thing] are manifested. Therefore, indeterminate cognition is not able to grasp a thing which pervades the past and future time.

28.2. Refutation of recognition. (59.3) The same argument serves to explain that recognition (pratyabhijñāna) is not of the nature of indeterminate cognition. Indeterminate cognition is indeed [defined as] intuitive knowledge (sākṣātkāri jñānam); and what resided in the past is not to be put before the eyes, but only to be remembered. Indeterminate cognition, on the other hand, is not of the nature of remembrance (smṛti).

The following objection may be raised: "While remembrance is that which does not intuit the present state of a thing, how can that [recognition] which is intent upon intuiting it [=the present state] be called remembrance? Regarding this, Kumārilabhaṭṭa said:

Remembrance takes place in the form '[I remember]' that', pertaining only to what has been cognized before; recognition, on the other hand, is in the form '[This is the same as that]', and is quite different [from remembrance]."

[The Author:] If so, recognition would have a twofold nature, that of remembrance and that of grasping, and is not of the nature of grasping alone, since what is remembered cannot be grasped and what is grasped cannot be remembered. However, it is impossible that there are remembrance and grasping in one cognition, because these two are incompatible with each other. No sane person can contend that we grasp [a thing] by the same function of [knowledge] by which we remember;
and if you say that grasping is made by a function different [from that
of remembrance], there cannot be both remembrance and grasping in
one [cognition]361. Even if this [possibility] were admitted, it would
mean that [the knowledge] has at the same time the nature of pratyakṣa
and that of non-pratyakṣa, and not that it is only of the nature of
pratyakṣa, for pratyakṣa cannot occur in an object which is being
remembered362. Therefore, the knowledge of [the so-called] recognition is
simply erroneous, because it has no proper object. [Our argument may be
formulated into] the following syllogism:

The knowledge of recognition has in reality not a single object as in
the case of grass which, having been once cut, grows again;
‘This blue [thing'] is the same as that' is the knowledge of recogni-
tion;

[Therefore, it has not a single object].

This is a negative inference derived from the cognition of what is
pervaded by a thing incompatible with the denied object (viruddhayāptop-
apalabdhi). Since oneness and plurality are incompatible with each other,
two perceptions respectively pertaining to the one and the other are also
mutually incompatible. Thus, the knowledge of recognition is pervaded
by ‘having plural objects’ which is incompatible with ‘having a single
object’, as the logic explained above shows. Accordingly recognition does
not sublate our inference of momentariness.

(60.6) Again, it cannot be contended that [recognition] pertains
to a single object because, when hair and other things are recognized, it has the
universal [of hair etc.] as object. For in fact it is only particular hairs
that are recognized. If, on the contrary, a universal is recognized, we
would [acquire the knowledge that] this hair-ness is the same as that,
and not that this hair is the same as that [as we actually recognize].
Therefore, when one object is concerned, the occurrence of the knowledge
of recognition, be it successive or simultaneous, is incongruent; and you

361. M rūpāntareṇa caikasya smarāṇagrahaṇe na syātām, but G rūpāntareṇa grahaṇe na
ekasya smarāṇagrahaṇe syātām; T seems to read rūpāntareṇa grahaṇena. I follow G.

362. I follow G : bhāve'pi pratyakṣāpratyakṣatvāṁ syāt, na tu pratyakṣatvāṁ eva, smarya-
māne pratyakṣāyogāt. M : bhāve'pi pratyakṣāpratyakṣe syātām, na tu smaryamaṇe pratyakṣaṁ
evā pratyakṣāyogāt; T agrees with M, though it has pratyakṣāpratyakṣe for pratyakṣāpra-
by mistake. M and T may be understood as meaning'... and not that there is only praty-
akṣa when an object is being remembered, since this cannot be pratyakṣa'.
should not suspect the possibility of [the probans of our inference] being incompatible or inconclusive. Nor can you say that the very recognition determines the singleness of the object, since it is just the object of the present examination. Thus, it has been settled that there is no permanent agent.

28.3. Karman or the mind is the sole cause of the world. (60.12)

[The Opponent:] ‘If the permanent agent is not the [supreme] cause of the world, what then is the cause of it?’

[The Author:] Actions of sentient beings, called good or evil, [form the instrumental cause of the world,] as is said [in the following]:

The mind alone produces the world of sentient beings as well as that of inanimate things in all their various aspects; for all the universe is said to have been produced by actions, and no actions are possible apart from the mind.

Employing the view of the Vaibhāṣika school the omniscient Buddha said:

Ether and the two kinds of cessation [i.e. that due to wisdom and that not due to wisdom], these three are the non-produced which are eternal;

all produced things are momentary, devoid of ātman, and have no creator [other than karman].

29. The existence of an omnicient person proved. (61.3) ‘It may be fitting for you to adduce the words of the omniscient one if and only if the existence of the latter is established. What proof do you put forward?

363. See n. 234 above.


365. M Vaibhāṣikam āśritya : G=T vaibhāṣikam āśritya. The expression of course means that the Vaibhāṣika understands the Buddha as teaching the following.

366. ākāśāṁ dvau nirodhau ca nityaṁ trasyam asaṁskṛtaṁ, saṁskṛtaṁ kṣaṇikaṁ sarvam ātmaśūnyam akartākam. The first half is omitted in G. The verse is identical with JSS v. 21 (Yamaguchi, 292: nam mkaḥ ḷgog pa gdirs dag dañ, ḷdus ma byas gsum po ni riag, ḷdus byas ḷdag gis kun stoh la, byed pa po med skad cig ma.) Cf. AK I, v. 5 ff.: anāsrayā mārgasātyāṁ trividhāṁ cāpy asaṁskṛtaṁ. ākāśāṁ dvau nirodhau ca tatrākāśam anāvṛtyāḥ....

Regarding akartākā, on which Bodhibhadra comments that there is no agent other than karman, see Abhidharmaśāftsāslasheskṛta-ad AK IV, v. 1 (de la Vallée Poussin, IV, 1: Ce n'est pas Dieu qui la fait intelligemment... La variété du monde nait des actes des être vivants.) Two kinds of nirodha means pratisaṁkhya- and apratisaṁkhya-nirodha.
for the existence of an omniscient one?"

We answer:

A quality of the mind, when brought about by repeated meditation which is made ardently, incessantly and for a long time, can be manifested clearly, as e.g. the figure of a girl [is clearly manifested] to her lover;

The mental images having the four noble truths as objects are also the qualities of the mind produced by the practice as described above;

[Therefore, they can be manifested clearly.]

This is an inference formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. [Regarding this inference] you may not suspect the fallacy of illegitimacy (asiddha-) either in respect of the locus of h or in respect of h itself. The p [of this inference, i.e.] the mental images which are brought under conceptual knowledge and which have the four noble truths as their objects, and h, a quality of the mind in general, are [real and legitimate] since they are both the contents of everyone's self-consciousness (pratyātmavedyatva). Nor is this [hetu] incompatible, because it is present in a lover as a sapakṣa. Nor is it inconclusive, for we can establish by means of perception and non-perception a universally applicable causal relation between a mental quality accompanied by repeated meditation, as cause, and its vivid manifestation as effect, just as between a potter and a jar; and once this relation is established, it is also established that the probans 'a mental quality accompanied by repeated meditation' is pervaded by [the probandum] 'fitness for manifesting itself clearly'367.

[The procedure of grasping the causal relation in question is as follows:] The locus (adhikaraṇa) of the vyāpti in question is the figure of a girl occurring in [the mind of] a man who is in love with her. (1) We do not see the manifestation [of the figure] before it has become a quality of [the lover's] mind through earnest, incessant and prolonged meditation upon it [anupalabdhi No. 1]; (2) later we come to see the meditation [by him] [upalabdhi No. 2]; (3) and then we see the clear manifestation [of her figure] [upalabdhi No. 3]. Thus the causal relation between clear manifestation and the mental image produced by repeated medita-

tion is established by three cognitions consisting of perception and non-perception (trividhāpratyakṣānupalambha). And from this we know the universal vyāpti [between the probans and the probandum in question]. Therefore, there being no fallacy of inconclusiveness, our hetu is faultless.

29.1. Proof of the existence of an all-knowing person. (62.4)

[The opponent:] "By the inference stated above you may indeed prove [the possible existence of] an omniscient being (sarvajña) who is meant to be a person intuiting the images of the four noble truths, from the fact that he intuit the images of the four noble truths; but you cannot establish one who intuit everything without restriction (aviśeṣena sarvadharmanākṣātkārin). Therefore, to prove this, you have to state another inference".

[The Author:] We will answer:

368. This section consists of verbatim citations from RNA 1, 16-21 and 3, 12-19: yo yaḥ sādaranirantaradirghakālaḥbhyāsahitaḥcetogunāḥ sa sarvāḥ sāyutābhāvyayogyaḥ, yathā yuvutākāraḥ kāmīnāḥ pūrṇasyaḥ; yathoktābhyaśasahitacetoṣuṣāḥ cāmi caturāryasatyavibhayā ākārā iti svabhāvo hetuḥ, tatra na tavād āśrayavāraṇa hetudvāraṇa vāśiddhisambhavanā, saṃkalparūpānāṁ caturāryasatyakāraṇāṁ cetoguṇamātrasya ca hetuḥ pratyātmavedvatat..., na caiva niruddha hetuḥ, sapakṣe kāminy ākāre sambhavat, na cānākiṃtaṇa, abhyaśasahitace
togunāṣphutāpratibhāsayaḥ kāyakāraṇayogasvāt hatakumbhakārayor iva sarvopāṣadhikāreyor praty-
ākṣāṇupalambhatoḥ kāyakāraṇabhāvaśiddhā abhyaśasahitacetoṣasvasa sādhanasya sātya-
pratibhāsahārikarāṇayogayatāya vyāptisiddheḥ, tathā hi, vyāptyadhikaraṇe kāmāttraśarticī viva-
tyākāre sādaranirantaradirghakālaḥbhyāsahitaḥcetoṣuṣāḥ pūrṇāṃ anupalabhīḥ sātyābhāyas, paścād abhyaśasamvedanāṁ sātyābhāvasamvedanāṁ iti. trividhāpratyakṣānupalampāthasādhyāḥ kāyakāraṇabhāvaḥ sātyābhāvasādhyāsāgacavacitākārayor iyaṃ upaṣamām sarvopāṣadāhāra-
vati vyāptiḥ, ato'naikāntikatāpy asambhavinty anarasyo hetuḥ. For trividhāpratyakṣānupalampā-
tha see n. 305.

369. At the beginning of Sarvajñāsaiddhi (RNA 1, 9-14) Ratnakirti quotes PV II, v. 33 in which Dharmakirti declares that he means by the supreme source of knowledge one who knows the truths regarding what are to be abandoned and what are to be acquired together with their means, but not one who merely knows everything (heyopādeyatattvasyā sābhyaotpāyasya vedakaḥ, yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iśto na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ). Ratnakirti calls this supreme source of knowledge sarvajñā and a knower of everything sarvasarvajña. For Buddhists following Dharmakirti sarvajña is more important than sarvasarvajña. And Ratnakirti says that his inference beginning with yo yaḥ sādaranirantaradirghakālaḥbhyāsahitaḥcetoṣuṣaḥ... (which Mokṣākara cites in § 29) is meant for proving sarvajña, and not sarvasarvajña. He continues to say, however, that he will quench the thirsty desire of common people for the proof of the existence of a sarvasarvajña, and he formulates an inference proving it in RNA 28. 10 ff. Thus, we have to bear in mind that there are two kinds of omniscient beings. Mokṣākara deals with sarvajña in § 29 and sarvasarvajña in § 29. 1.
Words agreeing with a proof and having a definite object presuppose directly or indirectly the knowledge intuining that object, as e.g. the words ‘fire burns’;
The words ‘all produced things are momentary’ also agree with a proof and have definite objects;
[Therefore, the words presuppose the knowledge intuining all things, i.e. there must be an all-knowing person.]

[This inference] is in content based on the principle of causality.

It has not the fallacy of illegitimacy (asiddhi), since we prove the momentary destruction of all things and accordingly these words are true. Nor is [the probans] incompatible, since it is present in the sapakṣa. Nor is it inconclusive, since, though words in general may be preceded by doubt or error, we know by perception and non-perception that the words agreeing with a proof and having a definite object are directly or indirectly preceded by the knowledge intuining that object. If this were not admitted, all the probans as effect would be annihilated, since even smoke etc. would not have their cause.

29.2. Proof of the succession of lives. (62.17) The following objection may be raised: “Conceptual ideas which are meditated upon would be manifested only after a long time expressible in terms of a succession of many lives. But what proof do you adduce in order to establish a succession of lives (bhavaparamparā)?”

We answer:

[A moment of] the mind is necessarily joined together with (prati-
saindhatte) another [viz. the next moment of] the mind, as the present moment of mind;

That belonging to the moment of death is also a [moment of the] mind;

Therefore, it necessarily engenders another moment of the mind.374

This is an inference] formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. There is no deviation [from the vyāpti of this inference] even in the case of the last moment of the mind of an arhat (arhaccaramacittta). For it is known only from a Buddhist tradition (āgama) that [an arhat, having destroyed all passions, does not receive another life after his death];375 and [some Buddhists are of the opinion that even the last moment of the mind of an arhat] engenders another mind free from passions;376 moreover, the probans [of this inference] implies the qualification ‘so long as [the mind is accompanied by passions]’. Thus is proved the existence of the future lives. It is commonly said that all people enter into religious practices (abhyāsa) such as austerity, liberality,

374. A similar argument is found in TS v. 1899 and TSP: maranākṣaṇāvijñānaṁ svopadevyodayakṣamam. rāginśo hinasahgatvāt pūrvavijñānavat tathā. yat sarāgatā cittāṁ tat svopādeya-cittāntara-vadhānasamarthāṁ sarāgatvāt pūrvavasthācittavat; sarāgatāṁ ca maraṇa-cittāṁ iti svabhāvahetūḥ.

In this inference h is not a mind in general, but the mind beset with passions; this is implied in Mokṣākara’s inference, since he says: hetoh klesa sati viśeṣaṇāpekṣaṇāt. Malliṇēṇa cites this inference of our author for the sake of criticism, ascribing it to Mokṣākara (SVM 123, 18-20 : yac ca mokṣākara-guptena yac cittāṁ tāc cīttāntaraḥ pratisam-dhāte yathēdānīhāvānāṁ cīttāṁ. cīttāṁ ca maraṇakālābhāvīti bhava-paramparāsiddhaye pramānam uktāḥ tad vyartham....

375. Cf. E. Krishnamacharya’s commentary in G 98-99. In TS, the Lokāyata formulates a syllogism which denies the next life (TS v. 1863) saying that a mind at death and beset with desires does not engender another moment of the mind because it is also a mind at death, just as the last moment of the mind of an arhat. To this replies TS v. 1916, pointing out that the opponent cannot adopt the Buddhist doctrine that the last moment of the mind of an arhat does not engender another moment of the mind. For if he presupposes a Buddhist doctrine for his inference, he has to admit another Buddhist doctrine, that of the next life too. Mokṣākara’s expression tasyāgamamātrapratisam-dhatte yathēdānīhāvānāṁ cīttāṁ. cīttāṁ ca maraṇa-kālābhāvīti bhava-paramparamparāsiddhaye pramānam uktāḥ tad vyartham....

376. TS v. 1917-1918 and TSP say that some of the Mahāyāna Buddhists, say, the Mādhyamikas, are of the opinion that Buddhas reside neither in nirvāṇa nor in saṁsāra. This means that the last moment of the mind of Buddhas engenders another free from passions.

377. See n. 374 above. M hetoh klesa sati viśeṣaṇa..., but G, T...klesa satiti viśeṣaṇa..... which is better.
learning etc. (because of the impressions caused by) their practices in former lives. And in order to establish this, we will formulate a proof:

Every [moment of the] mind is preceded by another [moment of the] mind, as the present moment of the mind;
That belonging to the time of birth is also a [moment of the] mind;
[Therefore, it is also preceded by another, viz. a past mind].
This inference is based on a logical mark as effect378.

30. The doctrine of the Vaibhaśika. (60.10) [The opponent: ]
"Is emancipation not possible by intuiting the truth? And the truth is unique as [Dharmakirti himself] says:
Emancipation is [accomplished by] seeing emptiness;
all other religious practices are for that purpose379.
How then can there be two kinds of omniscient beings [i.e. sarvajña and sarvasarvajña] and also different schools among Buddhists?"
[The author: ] This is not to be confuted, because the Blessed One [or the Buddha] taught all these [different doctrines] in order to introduce sentient beings [of different capacities] into truths. Thus, the Vaibhaśika holds:

Ether and two kinds of cessation, these three are the non-produced which are eternal;
All produced things are momentary, devoid of ātman, and have no creator [other than karman]380.
381...[Although the knowledge born out of sense-organs has not the form [of atoms], the assemblage of atoms appears as an existent.] ...

31. The doctrine of the Sautrāntika. (63.17) The Sautrāntika holds the following theory: All that is manifested in the form of blue etc. is knowledge, and not an external object (bāhyo’rthaḥ), since an insentient

378. TS v. 1897 : tasmāt tatrādvijñānāṁ svapādānabalodbhavam ; vijnānāvatādihetubhya idāniśtāncittavat, and TSP.
379. PV II. v. 254 : sā (=samśkāradhākkhātā) ca naḥ pratayotoptattāḥ sā nairāmyadvṛg-
āsrayaḥ, muktis tu śunyatādṛśīs tadarthāḥ śeṣabhāvanāḥ. Our text seems to cite the last half of this verse. M as well as G has muktis tu śunyatādṛśīs tadarthāśeṣabhāvanā, but T (stoṇ pa ṇid lta bas grol bar ḣgyur, bsgoms pa lhag ma de don yin) agrees with PV.
380. See n. 366.
381. This verse which is found only in T is also identical in sense with the first half of JSS v. 22 (Yamaguchi, 292) : mig las skye blo rnam med cin, mthon sum rig pa rdul gyi tshogs, blo dahn yes bya kha che yi. bye brag smra baḥi gsuḥ du bṣad. (The last half means: This is said to be the theory of the wise Vaibhaśikas of Kashmir).
(jaḍa) thing is not able to become visible (prakāśa). Concerning this it is said:

The range of the senses [i.e. the external reality] (indriyagocara) is not perceptible itself, though it gives rise to the knowledge with the form of it [or the objective reality].

The author of the [Pramāṇavārttika-] Alāṅkāra, [Prajñākaragupta] says too:

If a blue thing is perceived, how can it be said to be external [to the knowledge]?

If a blue thing is not perceived, how can it be said to be external?

[The opponent:] ‘If that which is visible is none other than knowledge, how then do you know that there is an external reality?’

[The author:] The proof of an external reality is made through [the following reasoning] by the method of difference (vyatireka): Indeed, forms such as blue do not become visible at every place and every time; nor are they possible even when we suppose that they occur only because of our own material cause (upādāna=samanantarapratyaya), since, if so, it remains inexplicable why they occur pertaining only to a definite object. Therefore, we can ascertain that there must be, apart from the immediately preceding moment of our own consciousness (samanantarapratyaya), something which is a cause of these [visible forms] and by virtue of which [the representations of forms] occur only at some place and sometimes. This ‘something’ is the external reality.

31.1. Refutation of the soul. (64.9) However, this external reality

---

382. svākāra[jānajanakā dṛṣṭyā nendriyagocarāḥ. This is identical with JSS v. 23 a-b: mātā ba dhaṅ poṛi yuṁ min te, āes pa ranm pa bcaṣ pa skye (Yamaguchi, 296). T of TBh translates it: raṅ rpmn ca āes skyed byed pa. dhaṅ poṛi spyod yul saṅh ruṅ min. This verse is quoted in SVM 110. 18, in which -jaṇa- is changed into -buddhi-.


384. M. G svopādānamātrabalabhāvitve sati; T raṅ gi īe bar len pa tsam las āes par saṅh ba niid du gyur na yah=svopādānamātrabalapratibhāsīte sati.

385. About the sākāraavāda of the Sautrāntika see n. 148 above. For a similar and more detailed description of the epistemology of this school see SDS 33, 220–38, 271. Jadunatha Sinha gives a good account of it in his Indian Realism Chap. II. Kanakura also collects and translates into Japanese the accounts of the Sautrāntika theory as appear in non-Buddhist works (E. Kanakura. Gekyo no Bunken ni mieru Kyobu-setsu, Studies in Indology and Buddhology, presented in honour of Prof. S. Yamaguchi on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, pp. 55–68).

386. G kaṅ punar; M=T na punar....
is neither a composite whole (avayavini), nor any of quality (guṇa) and
the other categories conceived by other schools as depending on sub-
stances (dravyāśrayin), nor any of the nine kinds of substances including
atoms (paramāṇu).

Of these, neither quality nor the others [i.e. karman, sāmānya, and
viśeṣa] are [the external reality], since their existence is negated through
the negation of the substance [which forms their substratum]. And since
[the relation called] inherence (samavāya) cannot possibly exist when there
is no substance in which [quality etc. is said to] be inherent, we do not
care for a separate criticism of this [inherence] here387. Substance is of
nine kinds, i.e., earth (prthivi), water (āpas), fire (tejas), air (vāyu), ether
(ākāśa), time (kāla), direction (diś), soul (ātman) and mind (manas).

(64.14) Firstly, the following inference may be formulated for the
negation of the soul:

Knowledge which occurs occasionally is necessarily preceded by an
occasionally existent cause, as e.g. the knowledge of lightning.
The consciousness of the self (ahamkārajñāna) occurs only occa­sio-
nally,
[Therefore, it is preceded by, or has as its object, an occasionally ex­
istent cause, and not a permanent thing such as a soul].

This inference is in sense based on the principle of causality. The pro-
bans has no fallacy of illegitimacy, since the presence of knowledge-ness
[h] in self-consciousness (ahamkāra), p, is established by perception. Nor
is the qualifier ‘occasionally existent’ illegitimate, because actually we are
not always conscious of ourselves. It is not incompatible, since we see it
in the sapakṣa: nor is it inconclusive, since the vyāpti between the occa­sio-
nally occurring knowledge and the occasionally occurring cause of it is as
well attested by perception and non-perception as that between smoke and
fire. If otherwise occasional knowledge occurs because of a non-occasional
cause, the absurdity would follow that it does not occur because of an
occasional cause. If [you contend that it has] not a definite cause, it is
tantamount to saying that it has no cause at all. If none the less this
inference is said to be inconclusive, even a well known probans such as
smoke [for the proof of fire] would be inconclusive too, because we see
no difference between them. Or, we may say, if the consciousness of the

387. G duṣaṇam api, but M. T tadduṣaṇam atra....
self is preceded by a non-occasional cause, it would occur continually, which is obviously not the case. For a cause must be by nature functioning; what is not functioning can be called a cause only figuratively; and what is functioning and what is not are not identical. If they were identical, then even that which is functioning would become that which is not functioning, since it could have the nature of that [which is not functioning]. Moreover, if the consciousness of the self were [constantly] produced by a non-occasional cause, other knowledge would necessarily occur together with it [which is not permissible to the opponent389], since [a non-occasional, or a permanent cause is] a self-contained totality [depending on nothing else] (avyagrasāmagrika) [and should occur always]. You may contend that a soul is not the cause, but the object of the consciousness of the self. But we say ‘No’. There cannot be an object [of knowledge] which is not a cause [of knowledge], since otherwise everything could be its object (atiprasaṅgāt).

31.2. Refutation of ether, time, direction and the mind. (65.13) As to the problem whether or not there is any real entity called ether, we say there is not. For at a place where there is already a resisting substance (sapratigham dravyam), ether does not make room [for it]; and at a place where there is nothing, room [for a thing] is made by virtue of the very absence [without the intervention of ether]. Where then will ether make room? Inasmuch as [the essential function of] ether is said to consist in making room (avakāśapraṇa), if ether were existent, there should be room at all times, at all places and by all means; but this is not the case. Therefore, we comprehend that there is no ether. This refutation, however, is made from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣikā393.

(66.1) Others [like the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas] hold that ether has sound as its quality; besides, it [=ether] is said to be a single entity. [But this is untenable, since] if so, no sounds, depending on the common substratum, could be heard separately. Thus, a sound sup-

388. G=T upacārikākāraṇatvāt; M upacārataḥ kāraṇatvāt.
389. G kurvato'py utpattiḥ, but M=T kurvato'py akurvadrūpīpattiḥ.
390. In connection with this, perhaps we should recall NS 1. 1. 16: yugapajjñāṇamut-pattir manaso liṅgam.
391. M tā nāsti vā. tā must be omitted.
392. vā in M 65. 15 and 16 are omitted in G, T.
393. Read Vaibhāṣika. instead of vaimāṣika.
posed to have occurred at a distant place would be heard as loud as that at a close place; or otherwise there should be the necessary corollary\(^{394}\) that if a distant sound is not heard, a close sound would not be heard either. Again, direction as well as time is also held to be a single unity. This entails that the notion of ‘east’ and ‘before’ (\textit{pūrva}) as well as ‘west’ and ‘after’ (\textit{apara}) is impossible. The same logic may be applied to \([\text{the proof that}]\) the mind (\textit{manas}) cannot be permanent. For, the present opponent infers the existence of a mind on the ground that \([\text{two or more pieces of}]\) knowledge do not in reality occur simultaneously \([\text{and that this fact is due to the existence of a separate entity called mind which mediates between the soul and knowledge}]\(^{395}\). \([\text{But this is against our experience}]\) for we experience plural knowledge simultaneously as when we see many girls dancing. And if the mind is permanent\(^{396}\), then it is not correct to maintain that plural knowledge \([\text{occurs successively}]\). Therefore there is no mind either.

31.3. \textbf{Refutation of earth, water, fire and air.} (66.10) \([\text{The substances of}]\) earth and the rest are still left \([\text{to be examined}]\). They are regarded \([\text{by the opponent}]\) to be of two kinds according as they are seen as a composite whole (\textit{avayavin}) or as the component atoms (\textit{paramāṇu}).\(^{397}\) Of these, a composite whole such as a jar is known to have been made up of atoms through a definite process of formation beginning with the combination of two atoms, etc.; but we \([\text{have refuted it}]\) saying that the

\(^{394}\) G \textit{anaikāntikaḥ}, but M = T \textit{ekāntaḥ}.

\(^{395}\) See n. 390 above.

\(^{396}\) \textit{nityam} omitted in G, T. In this case the sentence may be translated : If there will be a mind, then \([\text{the simultaneous occurrence of}]\) plural knowledge \([\text{which we experience, for instance, when seeing dancing girls}]\) will not be possible. Mokṣākara might mean this, but if so, the permanency of a mind referred to at 66, 5 would remain unrefuted, though the singleness of it could be refuted. TS v. 632 (\textit{nitye tu manasi praṭāpah pratyayā yaugapadyataḥ. tena hetur iha prokto bhavatīṣṭavighāṭakṛty}) as well as the verses cited in G 203. 7-11 \([\text{of which the source is not mentioned by Krishnamacharya}]\) refutes the permanency of a mind, saying that if a mind is permanent, plural knowledge would occur simultaneously. Thus, if we read \textit{nityam} of M 66. 7 we must understand the sentence to mean : If a mind is permanent, then plural knowledge would not occur successively; or dropping \textit{na} in M 66, 8 we should read : If a mind is permanent, then plural knowledge would occur simultaneously, which contradicts your theory.

\(^{397}\) Of the nine substances, the first four, viz. earth, water, fire, and air are permanent when seen as atoms, and impermanent as effects made of atoms; ether, time and direction are single, permanent and ubiquitous; the soul is permanent and ubiquitous; the mind is permanent. Cf. NK 370, 20-23; TS v. 550, etc.
non-perception of that [composite whole] which is [said to be] by nature perceptible does sublate [its existence]. \(^3^9^8\) [The following objection may be raised:] "Without the composite whole, how is this [jar] manifested as a single entity?" To this we have already replied [quoting the verse of Dharmakirti]:\(^3^9^9\)

Only parts placed closely [together] are seen as they are, but another entity which is their possessor and which itself consists of no parts [i.e. a composite whole] is not apprehended.

[The opponent:] "What is meant by the manifestation of parts?"

[The Sautrāntika:] It is simply the manifestation of atoms, which, being placed in different directions are piled together (samcita).

[The opponent:] "If so, why did Dharmottara say that grossness (sthaulya) is the quality of the manifested (pratibhāsadharma)\(^4^0^0\) [and not the quality of the real]?"

[The Sautrāntika:] The significance of the words is as follows: An [external] reality (artha) is not known itself, because it is said that the knowledge of an [external] reality is possible only in the secondary sense.\(^4^0^1\) Therefore, this manifestation of blue etc. is perceived as pervading different spots; the very manifestation is none other than the manifestation of grossness [and there is no separate, gross entity].

(67.2) To the Vaiśeṣikas it is atoms that make up the composite whole; according to the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas, atoms [when united together] come directly into the range of perception; according to the Sautrāntikas [however, they are not perceptible themselves, but] are just liable to leave an impress of their own forms [in our knowledge]. But these atoms are not existent at all according to the theory of the Yogācāras.

\(^3^9^8\) See § 7. 2.

\(^3^9^9\) See § 7. 2 and n. 140. Ttha dad pa thugs ne bar gnas pa rnam zhi kho na de lta de lta sna th ste, de da b (n. dba) ldan pa kha zhi kho na sna de sny bu bya med par rtags par khyur ro. The Tibetan translator seems not to have realised that this is the same verse as that in M 22, 14 (§ 7.2) where he gives a different translation. In the present translation he missed out na in the last half.

\(^4^0^0\) pratibhāsadharmaḥ sthaulyam, not identified. But a similar passage is found in DP 43, 8-10: ekajñaṇagṛihyaś tatātṛiṣṭā baḥavaḥ paramāṇaṇaḥ śtrāla ātī. ekāyaḥ śtrāla ātī tu tathābhātapatrībhāṣāśrayaṇa vyavasthāpyamānatvāt pratibhāsadharma ity ucyate. na vastudharmāḥ pratyekam aparasmādānāt iti.

\(^4^0^1\) bhāktaṁ syād arthavādayam. Not identified.
32. The doctrine of the Yogācāra school. (67.5) [The Yogācārin's argument for the refutation of atoms is as follows:] A single atom can never be established, for when an atom is placed in the middle, surrounded by [other] atoms existing over, below, and on the four sides of it, it would necessarily have six parts [thus the argument for the alleged indivisibility of an atom falls to the ground]. For [if it is an indivisible entity] the same atom in the middle which is in contact with another atom in the front is not able to be in contact with another at the back, since the former two atoms would necessarily occupy one and the same spot. 402...In the same way, if the atom at the back is in the same spot [in which the middle and front atoms are placed], then the middle atom alone could be in contact with it. 402 Even when there is no direct contact [between atoms], if they face each other, it will come to the same thing. Thus, a bodily object would be reduced to the size of an atom [which is absurd].

(67.13) Or we can examine the problem as follows: 403...What is visible cannot consist of one [atom] as is understood by the examination stated immediately above; 403 nor can it consist of many [atoms] since one atom is not united with another. 404 That is to say, if this [atom] has parts, how can it be an atom [which must be indivisible]? Or if it has no parts, all bodily objects, say a mountain or the earth, would be reduced to the size of an atom, because conjoined atoms, being wholly united, all occupy one and the same spot. Therefore it is necessary to admit that two atoms [i.e. that in the front and that at the back] are distinct in existence from each other. And just as they are [distinct], just so are those conjoined atoms at the upper, lower, southern and northern part distinct in existence from one another. Thus, it will be a necessary corollary that an atom is six-sided (ṣadāṁśatā), as is said by [Vasubandhu] as follows:

If an atom were conjoined with six other atoms simultaneously, it would be six-sided; if six atoms occupied the same spot, a bodily

---145---

402. G evam ca sa pūrṇaparamāṇusahitasaṁbhāvo'parah paramāṇum pratyāśited yadi so 'pi tatra syāt; T de llar mi rdul phra rab šar ma daḥ ne bāḥi raḥ bāṅ de rdur phra rab ma rtogs pas gal te ḡgyur na de yaḥ der ḡgyur ro. Both G and T seem to be defective. I follow M.

403. Omitted in G.

404. T rdul phra rab kyi (n. inserts cha) šas la (p. d. las) rdul phra rab mi dmigs paḥi phyir ro. I follow M. G.
object would be of the size of an atom. And when an atom is not established, a number [of atoms] are also not established; thus there are no atoms at all.

(68.6) [The opponent:] ‘If there is no external object, what is this cognized image (pratibhāsa) related to?’

[The Yogacārin:] The image of our cognition occurs because of our untrue, latent seeds of representation [which have been stored in subconsciousness] since the beginningless past (anādīvitathavāsanā), and is seen [as if external], though it has nothing [external] as its object. Thus: the image of our cognition will have an object only if there existed an external reality to be referred to. But this [external reality] must be either a composite whole or the accumulated atoms. But both the contentions have been refuted by the proof contradicting them which we have stated just above, and have no more reality than a day-lotus in the sky. Concerning this the following is said:

There is no composite whole, nor are atoms real; the image of cognition has no object, but resembles experiences in a dream.

Knowledge in a dream is known to have no [external] object; and there is no difference between the experience in a dream and that in a state of waking, since both are seen to be the same in every respect. Knowledge, when it has not acquired a different feature from the knowledge having no [external] object, is not able to experience what is related to an [external] object. [This argument may be formulated into the following

---


406. Detailed refutation of paramāṣu by the Yogacārins is found in various texts such as Viṃśatikā; Dignāga’s Ālambanaparikṣārttī; TS Bāhyārtha-parikṣārtī v. 1967–1998.

407. M=G vitata, but T ji ina ba bhin ma Yin paḥī = vitatha.

408. G sambhāvyate (made possible); M=T lakṣyate.

409. na sann avayavi nāma na santi paramāṇavaḥ. pratibhāso nirālambaḥ svapnānubha­vasaṃnibhaḥ. The first half is missing in G, T, and M has san nāvayavi which must be corrected into sann avayavi. The source is not identified, but this verse is again identical with JSS v. 25 (Yamaguchi, 302): cha sas can kṣa bya ba ciṅ, phra rab rdul rnam med pa daṅ, so sor snaṅ ba dmigs med daṅ, ūams su myok ba rmi lam ḥdra. Here, however, the last bāda reads ‘experience resembles a dream’.

410. G dvitiyam; M dvitiyam jñānam; T dvitiyam ākāśakeśadarśanaṃ. Ākāśakeśa, a hair in the sky, is the illusion of a hair floating in the sky seen by a man with diseased eyes, and is used as a simile of a cognition which occurs without depending on an external reality.

---

146---
syllogism:

Knowledge, which is not different from the knowledge having no external object, has no external object, as the second cognition [of a hair in the sky] is not different from the first cognition of it.

The knowledge in a state of waking, the present subject of controversy, is not different from the knowledge in a dream [which has no external object].

[Therefore it has no external object].

(69.2) [The opponent:] “If there is no external thing, then what is the ultimate reality?”

[The Yogācārin:] The ultimate reality is the pure consciousness without manifoldness which is freed from stains beginning with the bifurcation of cognitum and cognizer (grāhyagrāhakādikālāṅkānaṅkitaṁ niśprapañcacaviṃnānamātram), as is expressed in [the following verse:]...

Consciousness freed from cognitum and cognizer is the ultimate reality.

Again, the following is said [by Dharmakirti:]

[Excepting knowledge itself], there is nothing to be experienced by knowledge, and [likewise] it has no experience other [than self-experience]; since knowledge is deprived of cognitum and cognizer, it is illuminated by itself.

The Blessed One said too:

External objects are not existent as ignorant people imagine; the mind, urged by the latent seeds of representation, takes the form of the external thing.

---

411. M paramārthasat; G. T sat.
412. grāhyagrāhakānirnuktaṁ vijñānaṁ paramārthasat. This is identical with JSS v. 26 a-b (Yamaguchi, 302): guñña daḥ ṣāśin ta laś grol baḥi raṃ saṃ daḥ poḥi don du yod. A very similar verse is found in JNA 435, 9: grāhyagrāhakovaidhuryād vijñānaṁ paramārthasat, ekānekāvyogena vijñānasāyādi śūnyāṭā.
413. PV III, v. 328: nāṃyo’nubhāvatas tenā (= jñāṇena) sti tasya nāṃbhavasaḥpah. tasyu-pi tulyacodyatvatvād sayaṁ saiva prakāśate, which is changed by our author into nāṃyo ’nubhāvō buddhādāsti tasya nāṃbhavasaḥpah, grāhyagrāhakovaidhuryād sayaṁ saiva prakāśate. This change is followed by Vādirājasūri (NVV I. 317, 19), Hemacandra (AYV I. 41, 1-2), Madhava (SDS 31, 196-197) and Guṇaratna (TRD 40, 13-14).
414. bāḥyo na vidyate hy artho yathā bālabāvār vikalpyate, vāsanālūṭhitam cittam arthābhāsāṁ pravartate. Lākṣāvatārasūtra. Nanjio ed. 285, 4-5, where vāsanā lūṭitum is given for vāsanālūṭhitam.
32.1. Sākāravāda and nirākāravāda of the Yogācārins. (69.11) Concerning this point, some [Yogācārins, i.e. Sākārajñānavādins] maintain the following: All this that is commonly known to be existent as the body or the object [of its activity] is none other than knowledge. And since this knowledge is conscious only of itself, we conclude that there is neither cognitum nor cognizer for anyone; through logical construction (kalpanā), however, appears the relation of cognitum and cognizer. Therefore, the truth consists in the knowledge which, though having [various] images (ākāra),\textsuperscript{415} is freed from the imaginary relation of cognitum and cognizer.

Others [i.e. Nirākārajñānavādīnaḥ Yogācārinah] however, argue as follows: The essence of knowledge is not stained by the specks of any images and resembles a pure crystal [or the clear sky of an autumnal midday].\textsuperscript{416} Those images of cognition (ākāra) are indeed not real and become perceptible by being shown by nescience (avidyā). Therefore the cognized is not existent in reality; and since the cognized is not existent,\textsuperscript{417} the quality of cognizer, which is ascribed to knowledge in relation to the [cognized], also does not exist.\textsuperscript{418}

33. The doctrine of the Mādhyamika. (69.19) According to the view of the Mādhyamikas, however, even that knowledge [which is admitted as real by the Yogācārins] is not in reality existent, since it cannot withstand scrutiny. For in the world they say that what is endowed with independent essence (svabhāva) is ultimately real. But when examined, that [knowledge] cannot have an independent essence, be this single or plural [i.e. uniform or variegated],\textsuperscript{419} since it does not withstand the ex-

\textsuperscript{415}. Read sākārām instead of M 69, 15 sākāra. This word is missing in G, T, but has a very important significance.

\textsuperscript{416}. The second simile is found only in T: ston ka dri ma med paññāñ phyed kyi nam mkhaṅ lla bu.

\textsuperscript{417}. M, G grāhyābhāvāt; T rnam pa thams cad du de med paññā phyir=sarvathā tad-abhāvāt.

\textsuperscript{418}. See Appendix II.

\textsuperscript{419}. M pūrvavācārāsahvatāt; T gcig paññām du ma rnam par dpyad pa śhār bjod paññā phyir ro (since we have before stated the examination of singleness and plurality); G omits it totally. The author refers to the negation of the existence of an atom as well as atoms, which is demonstrated at the beginning of the present section. A more elaborate argument of the Mādhyamika against the existence of cognition is found in PV III, v. 209-210: cīrāvābhaśeṣy artheṣu yady ekataṁ na vaṣyate, saiva tāvat kathāḥ buddhir ekā cīrāvābhāsīmi. idam vastubalāyātmakat vadandyate vipaścitaṁ, yathā yathārthāṁ cintyante viśryante tathā tathā. When a controversy as to how cognition which is by nature

--- 148 ---
amination which is stated above [regarding atoms]. Concerning this, the following is said: 420

To the wise, that knowledge [which the Vijñānavādins admit as real] is also not ultimately real, since it, as the sky-lotus, is deprived of single or plural essence.

The revered Dharmakirti said too: 421

An essential form by which things are defined does not in truth exist; because single or plural essence is not present in these things.

In the same way, the following is said by the author of the [Pramāṇavārttika-] Alamkāra [Prajñākaragupta]:

When neither conceptual knowledge nor the other [i.e. indeterminate perception] has validity, who is then to blame even if everything is shattered? 422

In the sense of the highest truth, there is no difference between the fettered and the emancipated, since no difference appears to those who see that all things are equal. 423

The syllogism [for the proof] also runs as follows:

A thing of which the essential quality is determined neither as single nor as plural is not ultimately real, as e.g. the sky-lotus;

Knowledge has not an essential quality either single or plural;

[Therefore, it is not ultimately real].

single can grasp its object having plural aspects is going on. the Madhyamika enters into the arena and argues that after all cognition is not ultimately real because we cannot determine cognition to be either single or plural, which means it has no svabhāva, and that therefore the Madhyamika's doctrine of universal emptiness is superior to the Vijñānavāda. The same argument is abbreviated by Jñānāśrimitra at the beginning of the Śākārasiddhiśāstra (JNA 367, 22-368, 5).

420. nēṣṭān tad api dhīrāṇām vijñānaṁ pāramārthikam. ekānekasvabhāvena viyogād ga-ganābjavat. This is again identical with JSS v. 27 (Yamaguchi, 315) : rnam šes dam paḥi don ldan pa, de yaḥ bṛtan rnam mi ḥdod de. gcig daṅ du maḥi rāṅ bzin daṅ. bral phyir nam mkhaṭi paṅma bāṅ.

421. =PV III. v. 360 : bhāvā yena nirūpyante tad rūpaṁ nāsti tattvataḥ. yasmād ekam anekam ca rūpaṁ teṣāṁ na vidyate. In our text ca and teṣām are changed into u and teṣṭu respectively.

422. =PVBh 382.24-25 (III. v. 107) : yadā tu na vikalpasya na cāṇyaśya pramāṇatā, tadā viśīryaṁye 'pi sarvasmin ko'parādyahatū.

423. =PVBh 382.8 (III. v. 902) : baddhamuktādibheda'pi naivāsti paramārthataḥ, bheda hi nātvaḥbhāty eva sarvatva samadarśinām. Mokṣākara changes naivāsti into na cātti. For baddhamuktā, G has bandhamukta- and T budhasvapna-(sad daṅ rmi lam sogs).
This inference is based on the principle of the non-perception of the per-vader [of the probans] (vyāpakānupalābdhi). Firstly, this is not an illegitimate probans, since it is quite manifest that an essential quality, single or plural, cannot be possessed by knowledge with an image, just as it is not by an external thing. For the object, concerning which ordinary people talk of the external thing, is none other than cognition itself to those who maintain [that the world is merely] knowledge with various images (sākāravādin). Therefore, the [argument], which, against [the view of ordinary] people, contradicts externally existent things plays the same role of a contradictor also concerning the internally existent. A gross object is not admitted as consisting of one atom or many atoms. And this image which [according to you] consists of knowledge may be a single gross image or plural images divisible into many atoms [of knowledge]; but in either case you cannot avoid the [same kind of] criticism [as was] made against the assertion of [the reality of] external objects.

The distinguished Bodhisattva [Śāntiraksita] said in the Madhyamakālāṃkāra:

If knowledge were admitted [by you to consist of parts] as many as the number of [its variegated] forms, then it would be difficult [for you] to avert the same kind of criticism which is made regarding [the reality of] atoms.424

424. M=T...tato yat tasya bahirbhave bādhaḥkaṁ tad evāntarbhāve'pi bādhaḥkaṁ. na hi sthūlam ekam anekāḥ ca paramāṇurūpam apiṣyate. G tato yat tasya bahirbhave bhāvabādhaḥkaṁ tad evāntarbhāve'ptī bādhaḥkaṁ hī...paramāṇurūpam apiṣyate. I follow M, but G is not different from it in sense.

425. M vijñānatmakānām ayam ākāro, but G. T (rnam par śes paḥi bdag ūṇid du gyur paḥi rnam pa ḍhi... vijñānatmakās cāyam ākāro....) The latter reading is definitely better. About vijñānatmaka- paramāṇu- and sthūla see for instance RNA 123, 4ff.

426. This is inserted between bhinnah and ubhayathāpi (M 91, 3) only in T: dbu ma rgyan du bdag ūṇid chen po bo-dhi-sa-twa yis, ci ste rnam paḥi graḥs bāin du rnam par śes pa khas len na, de tshe rdul phraḥ ḍryar gyur paḥi ḍpyad pa ḍhi la ḍbyung par ḍkaḥ. śes gsusḥ so. Iyengar gives his own restoration into Skt. in M 93. 13–16, which is not very faithful to the Tibetan especially in the last half of the verse. The verse is a verbatim quotation from Madhyamakālāṃkārakārikā v. 47 (Peking ed. 50, b4). Śāntiraksita’s own interpretation of it is found in Madhyamakālāṃkārasyānti. Peking ed. 62, b7–63, a5: gal te bar med par gnas paḥi rdul phra raḥ kho bo rnamgs litar rings mthun paḥi rnam par śes pa mah po ḍhi dag kyaḥ ḍbyun na, deḥi tshe rdul phra ḍbyung par ḍpyad pa ci ḍhyā bas ṣhaṛ byas pa de ḍhyā ba ūṇid rnam par śes pa rnamgs la ḍbyung par ḍkaḥ bar ḍgyur te.... Then he gives his criticism of atoms which is very similar to the passage we met in M 67, 7–12. It is quite likely that this portion is a later interpolation. and so I have translated it after the present Skt. sentence is finished.

— 150 —
For that is not [meant merely as] a criticism relating to external things but also as applicable to what is not [external.]

The objection that a contradiction pertaining to a bodily object (mūrti) is not [applicable] to a bodiless [image] consisting of knowledge is also not cogent. For even knowledge, inasmuch as it is [maintained to be] endowed with a form, has a shape, since this image pervading a certain space is none other than a shape (mūrti).

Here ends the chapter ‘Inference for others’ of the Tarkabhāṣā written by the Buddhist monk Mokṣākaragupta, great doctor of the monastery of Jagaddhala.

By the merit I have gained by writing this Tarkabhāṣā may all people in this world attain Buddhahood!

APPENDIX

Appendix I=n.212. Buddhist logicians set forth various kinds of the classification of negative inference (cf. the diagram). Dharmakirti himself classified it into four kinds with four subordinate forms (PV I, v. 4 and Svavṛtti), three kinds (HB), and eleven kinds (NB). The four basic kinds proposed in PV I, v. 4 are: 1) viruddhasiddhi = svabhāvaniruddhupalabdhi (illustrated by na śītaśparśo ‘tragneḥ’); 2) viruddhakāryasiddhi = svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (na śītaśparśo ‘tra dhūmāt’); 3) hetvasiddhi = kāraṇānupalabdhi (nātra dhūmo ‘nag-neḥ’); 4) drṣṭyamanore asiddhi = svabhāvanupalabdhi (nātra dhūmo ‘nupalabdheḥ’). However, in his Svavṛtti on the same verse Dharmakirti actually enumerated six forms, adding a derivative form to each 1) and 4), viz., 1a) vyāpakaviruddhasiddhi = vyāpakaviruddhupalabdhi (na tuśīrāsparśo ‘tragneḥ’); 4a) vyāpakasvabhāvasiddhi = vyāpakānapaladbhi (nātra śīṁsapa evaśābhat). Furthermore, in PV I, v. 5 he adds 3a) tadviruddhanimittasyopalabdhiḥ = kāraṇaviruddhupaladbhi (nāsyā rohomarśādiviśeṣāḥ santi saṁnihitādahanaviśeṣayat), and in the Svavṛtti on it he gives 3b) kāraṇaviruddhakāryopaladbhi (6, 15-16: etena tatkāryād api tadviruddhakāryābhāvagatīr uktā veditavyā yathā na rohomarśādiviśeṣayuktaś aparopayavān
ayam pradeśo dhūmāt). Thus he concludes that non-cognition is eightfold due to the variety of application or syllogistic argument (6, 18: ...iyam prayogabhād aṣṭadhānupalabdhiḥ). These eight formulae correspond in the order of our enumeration to Nos. 5, 9, 3, 1, 8, 4, 7, 11 of Mokṣākara’s classification respectively. It is to be noted that kāryānapalabdhi and its three subordinate forms (Nos. 2, 6, 10, 14 in TBh) are totally missing in PV.

In HB Dharmakirti proposes a classification into three kinds, viz., kāraṇānapalabdhi, vyāpakaṇupalabdhi and svabhāvānapalabdhi (HBT 202, 15 ff.; HB Reconstruction, 68, 12-13). These three formulae form the principle which underlies the classification in PV, for kāraṇānapalabdhi can subsume Nos. 3, 3a, and 3b in PV, vyāpakaṇupalabdhi Nos. 4a, 1a, and svabhāvānapalabdhi Nos. 4, 1, and 2. Arcaṭa, when commenting on HB followed Dharmakirti’s classification into three, but at the same time he enumerates at another place (6, 5-6) four kinds of anupalabdhi, viz., the above-named three forms of HB with viruddhavidhi as the fourth.

In NB Dharmakirti gives more derivative forms than in PV, the total amounting to 11. The three new forms added in NB are: No. 6 viruddhavyāptopalabdhi as a subordinate form of svabhāvānapalabdhi, No. 2 kāryānapalabdhi and its derivative No. 7 kāryaviruddhānapalabdhi. Kāryānapalabdhi appears in NB for the first time; adding this to the three forms in HB, we get four forms which seem to offer the basic principle for the classification of negation. In NB, however, Dharmakirti does not explain his principle, nor does Dharmottara in his com. on NB.

What we have referred to just above form Mokṣākara’s principle of classification. He takes up svabhāva-, kārya-, kāraṇa- and vyāpaka-anupalabdhi as the four basic forms. Dharmakirti in NB has already given four forms related to svabhāva (Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6) and this suggests that three subordinate forms may be enumerated under each of the four basic forms, although Dharmakirti himself actually gave only one subordinate form under kāryānapalabdhi, two under kāraṇānapalabdhi and one under vyāpakaṇupalabdhi. Now Mokṣākara formally gives three subordinate forms to each of the four basic forms, adding as the result five forms which lacked in NB. Thus, the total number becomes 16. TSop followed TBh in classifying anupalabdhi into 16 forms, though the order of enumeration is a little different between the two.

Durvekāmūrī, the commentator on NBT clearly knew the classification into 16. He says in DP 124, 15 that negation is to be regarded as of 16 kinds (...śodālapakārēti tu draṣṭavyam) and in DP 140, 10 ff. that 11 forms enumerated in NB and NBT are a synecdoche (upalakaśa) since more forms may be added. Saying so, he enumerates three more forms: vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (No. 12 of TBh), kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (No. 10) and vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi (No. 16), illustrating each of them by the same inference as in TBh. And then, he says (DP 141, 1-2) that there are some people who add another two forms, viz. kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi (No. 14 of TBh) and kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi (No. 15), giving again the same illustrations as in TBh. Thus, Durveka himself classified negation into 14 forms and at the same time knew that the classification into 16 was made by some people.

The problem is: Who are some people referred to by Durveka? So far as we know, the classification into 16 forms is clearly described only in TBh and TSop, both of which seem to be posterior to DP. According to the editor of DP, Durvekāmūrī is a pupil of Jitārī, who was a teacher of Atiśa. That is to say, Durveka is a contemporary of Jñāna-ārīmitra, who preceded Mokṣākara by more than two generations. Therefore, Durveka cannot refer to Mokṣākara as well as Vidyākaraśānti, the author of TSop. It is most likely, therefore, that the classification of negation into 16 kinds existed before Mokṣākara. Jñāna-ārīmitra mentions vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi, which is admitted by Durveka and
### Classification of anupalabdhi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TBh</th>
<th>PV</th>
<th>HB</th>
<th>NB ; NBT</th>
<th>DP</th>
<th>Tsop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 svabhāva-anupalabdhi</td>
<td>4 drṣyātmanor asiddhi</td>
<td>3 svabhāva-anup.</td>
<td>1 svabhāva-anup. (s. II, 32)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 svabhāva-viruddha-upalabdhi</td>
<td>1 viruddha-siddhi</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 svabhāva-viruddha-upa. (II, 35)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 svabhāva-viruddha-kārṣya-upa.</td>
<td>2 viruddha-kārṣya-siddhi</td>
<td>5 viruddha-kārṣya-upa. (II, 36)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 svabhāva-viruddha-vyāpta-upa.</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 viruddha-vyāpta-upa. (II, 37)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 kārṣya-anupalabdhi</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 kārṣya-viruddha-upa. (II, 33)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 kārṣya-viruddha-upa.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 kārṣya-viruddha-kārṣya-upa.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 kārṣya-viruddha-kārṣya-upa. (II, 38)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 kārṣya-viruddha-vyāpta-upa.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 kārṣya-viruddha-vyāpta-upa.</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 kārṣya-anupalabdhi</td>
<td>3 hetv-asiddhi</td>
<td>1 kārṣya-anup.</td>
<td>9 kārṣya-anup. (II, 40)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 kārṣya-viruddha-upa.</td>
<td>3a tad-viruddha-nimittasya-upalabdhi</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 kārṣya-viruddha-upa. (II, 41)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 kārṣya-viruddha-kārṣya-upa.</td>
<td>3b kārṣya-viruddha-kārṣya-upa.</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 kārṣya-viruddha-kārṣya-upa. (II, 42)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 kārṣya-viruddha-vyāpta-upa.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 kārṣya-viruddha-vyāpta-upa.</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 vyāpaka-anupalabdhi</td>
<td>4a vyāpaka-svabhāva-asiddhi</td>
<td>2 vyāpaka-anup.</td>
<td>3 vyāpaka-anup. (II, 34)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 vyāpaka-viruddha-upa.</td>
<td>1a vyāpaka-viruddha-siddhi</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 vyāpaka-viruddha-upa. (II, 39)</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 vyāpaka-viruddha-kārṣya-upa.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 vyāpaka-viruddha-kārṣya-upa.</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 vyāpaka-viruddha-vyāpta-upa.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 vyāpaka-viruddha-vyāpta-upa.</td>
<td>ibid</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
corresponds to No. 12 of TBh (cf. JNA 190, 2), and this suggests that Jñānārāmī knew more forms than PV, NB and NBT, and that it is the group of logicians headed by him who first proposed the classification into 16 kinds. But I cannot produce further evidence for it.

Appendix II=n. 418. A similar description of the sākāra- and nirākāra-vijñānavāda of the Yogācārins appears in Bodhibhadra’s commentary on JSS. Peking ed., 51. b3 ff. which is translated into Japanese by Yamaguchi (308) :  

Tr.: Here the Yogācārins are of two kinds, [those who maintain that knowledge is] always (endowed [with images (sākāra)] and [those who maintain that knowledge in its absolute state is] without images (nirākāra). Of these, sākāra is propounded by Dignāga and his followers. They teach that the images of cognition belong to the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva), as is said (in the Alambanaparikṣā v. 6 as follows): “The object of cognition is the same as the internal image which appears as if it were externally existent...” They talk only of six kinds of cognitions. Nirākāra is taught by Ācārya Ārya Asaṅga and his followers. They maintain that the images of cognition belong to the represented nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) and are [as much false as] the hair seen by one suffering from partial blindness. It is said (in Mahāyānasamgraha, ed. Lamotte, Chap. II. 14b. c=VIII. 20. c): “If the object of cognition is established as an external reality there would not be non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajñana); without it Buddhahood cannot be attained”. And again (Mahāyānasamgraha, Chap. II. 14b. f=VIII. 20. f): “Where non-conceptual knowledge occurs, all objects never appear; therefore one must understand the non-existence of the object. Since it is not existent, the content of cognition is also not existent”. They talk of eight kinds of cognition; but some say there is only one kind [of cognition]. This theory of one kind [of cognition] is maintained also by some of the Sākāravādins.

In continuation to n. 148 above, I will give here a brief description of the development of the sākāra- and nirākāra-vāda in Mahāyāna Buddhism. According to Ratnākarasānti (see the quotation from his Prajñāpāramitopadeśa below), the Mādhyamikas as well as the Yogācārins are each divided into two groups, one maintaining sākāravāda and the other holding nirākāravāda. But the most important development is that among the Yogācārins. The Sautrāntikas thought that what we perceive is not an external reality itself, the existence of which can be known only by inference, but the impress or image which is left by the external reality upon our consciousness. The Yogācārins advanced a step farther and said that the external reality is not existent at all and that the world is none other than our ideas which are the sole reality. Therefore, to the Yogācārins, the image of cognition is the representation of our mind: and this necessarily implies that a cognition is always endowed with an image which is represented by our mind. Thus all the Yogācārins must be sākāravādins so far as the cognition of common people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to an emancipated person, who is supposed to
have acquired nirvikalpakajñāna or non-conceptual, supermundane knowledge. Some Yogācārins thought that knowledge of an emancipated person is free from the fetter of cognitum and cognizer and accordingly is clear like a pure crystal without specks. And they thought this clear, imageless knowledge is the essence of cognition, regarding images as false, unreal specks born from our vāsana. This is the essential of the nirākārajñānavāda held by some of the Yogācārins. But others from the same school criticised this theory saying that what is not real can be never manifested, since otherwise a sort of the unfavourable doctrine of asatkhyāti would follow. Every cognition, so long as it is knowledge, must have an image, and there is no harm in that an emancipated person’s knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking. This is the essential point of the sākārājñānavāda of the Yogācārins.

What I have depicted above is the fairly later aspect of the controversy regarding sākāra and nirākāra, and must have been developed after Dharmakirti and reached its final phase at the time of Ratnakarasānti and Jñānaśrimitra. Jñānaśrimitra, a sākāra-vāadin, owes much of his theory to Prajñākaraagupta and Dharmakirti, while Ratnakarasānti, a nirākāra-vāadin, seems to be akin to Śāntiraksita. We are not sure of characteristics of the controversy before Dharmakirti. In various places of his books, however, Yamaguchi says that Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakirti, etc. represented the sākāravāda, and Guṇamati, Sthiramati, etc. the nirākāravāda. His opinion seems to be mainly based on the above passage of Bodhibhadra’s and Hsüan-chuang’s description of different theories of the Vijñānavādins in the Vijñāntimātratātāśādhi with K’uei-chi’s com. As well known, however, the information given by this Chinese source is not always parallel with what we know from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources such as the writings of Sthiramati, and it must be accepted only with reserves. None the less, I think that the controversy ascribed to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati by the Chinese tradition is equivalent in principle to the controversy of sākāra and nirākāra that is known from Sanskrit sources. As for the difference between Dharmapāla and Sthiramati as informed of by Hsüan-chuang and his direct disciple, Frauwallner gives the best survey.


Frauwaller's opinion that the origine of Dharmapāla's theory is traced back to Asaṅga is different from the description of Bodhibhadra who ascribes the nirākaravāda to the same Asaṅga, if Dharmapāla is accepted as a genuine sākāra-vādin. Apart from the controversy of early Yogācārin's, ājñānaśīra and Ratnakirti represent the sākāra-vāda while Ratnākaraśānti the nirākaravāda in the latest stage of Indian Yogācāra school - in this connection it is interesting to remember that Īśānaśīri and Ratnakara held different opinions also on bahir- and antar-vyāpita-vāda, which may suggest opposition in general between these two great scholars. Fortunately, the controversy between Īśānaśīri and Ratnakara is attested by rich materials.

PPU, 161. a5-161. b4: de bas na chos thams cad sems tsam dañ, rnam par šes pa tsam dañ, gsal ba tsam yin pas rnam par rig pañi gzuh ba phyi rol gi yon yod pa ma yin pas, rnam par rig pa rnam bspar kyang ḫdiša pañi rah bāzin du yod pa ma yin te. ḫdi gņis ni yid kyi muñ par brjod pañi phyir chos thams cad kyi kun tu brjod pañi rah bāzin yin no. gañ l brjod še na, don med par yah kun tu brjod pañi ḫo bo niž la mīon par žen pañi bag chags las skyes pañi don du snah bañi yah dag pa ma yin pañi kun tu rthog pa de ni chos rnam kyi gšan gyi dbañ gi ū bo bo niž dañ ḫkhrul pa dañ, phyin ci log dañ, log pañi šes pa yah yin no. ḫdi ltar deñi gzuh ba dañ ḫdiša pañi rnam pa ni ḫkhrul pa dañ bsld pañi dbañ ḫbañ žig gis snah bas brdṣun pañi phyir, yah dag pa ma yin pañi kun tu rthog pa de la de skud ces bya ste, deñi rah bāzin de ni yah dag pa ma yin pañi yah dag pa niž gšan yin še na, gsal ba tsam mo. de niž kyi na rnam pa de ni ḫkhrul pañi mṭshan ma dañ. spros pañi mṭshan ma šes bya bar brjod de. ḫkhrul pañi dmigs pa yin pañi phyir ro. gņis kyi mṭshan šes kyang bya ste, gņis ltar snah bañi phyir ro. spros pañi mṭshan med (Read ma) thams cad ḫṣig rten las ḫdas pañi ye šes la ḫgag par ḫgyur la. des na de ni ma ḫkhrul pa dañ yah dag pañi ye šes su yah dag brjod do. de niž kyi phyir de yah yōns su ḫrub pañi ho bo niž yin te.

Tr.: Therefore, all things are the mere mind, the mere knowledge and the mere illumination. An external reality which is said to be grasped by cognition is not existent; and accordingly the cognition is also not existent as having the nature of cognizer. These two (i.e. cognition and cognizer) are the expression (abhiliipa) of the thinking (manas) and as such belong to the represented nature (parikalpita-vābhiiva) of things. Where are they represented? [They are represented in] the wrong representation (abhūtaparikalpa) which appears pretending to be external things and which is born from the latent seeds of representation (viṣanā). Which are attached to (constructing) represented images where there are no (external) realities. This abhūtaparikalpa is the dependent nature (paratantra-vābhiiva) of things, and is false, perverted and erroneous knowledge. For its aspects of cognition and cognizer are both unreal, since they appear only because of falsity (bhṛant) and confusion (viplava). This is why it is said that [the two are represented] in the wrong representation. Their nature is not real. What then is reality? The pure illumination (prākāśa) alone is real. Thus, it is said, the images (ākāra)
(of cognition) are marked by falsity (bhrāntinimitta), marked by manifoldness (prapañcanimitta). It is because they are objects of false (cognition). They are also called twofold form, because they appear as two (i.e. cognitum and cognizer). All manifold marks are destroyed when one gets supermundane knowledge (lokottarajñāna). So this is rightly called real knowledge. This is the very reason why it is the accomplished nature (parinīpannasvabhāva).

This passage of Ratnakara is cited as a purvapakṣa by Jñānānātīmitra in JNA 368, 6-10, though the Tib. translation deviates from the Skt. from time to time:

\[ bhavatviiit}iim biidhaniid alikatvam, prakiisamiitram tu sat yam imiiyalJ, tadiitmavedanasya bhriintatviiyogena pratyak~atviit. prakiisasya prakiisa eva nijam rupam iti na tat tasya viplavopanitam, yena tadvedanam bhrāntiṣyät, nilam tu rūpāntaratvīt viplavopanitam api syād iti syāt tadvedanam bhrāntih. tato'sti niilau biidhakasydvatiiro na prakāṣe.... \]

PPU Peking ed., 168, a4ff.: rnal ḷbyor spyd pa pa daḥ, dbu ma pa śes pa rnam pa daḥ beas par smra ba kha eic na re, shon po daḥ gsal ba dag brdsun pa daḥ brdsun pa ma yin par gyur na, chos ḷgal ba niid kyis na deḥi bdag tu ḷḥad par mi ḷgyur la, deḥi bdag niid ma yin na yah shon po la sogs pa gsal bar mi ḷgyur na shon po la sogs pa ni gsal ba yin te. sgro (ma) btags paḥi ḷhos por gyur paḥi gsal ba las ḷzan ma yin paḥi ḷphyir shon po la sogs pa ni sgro ma btags paḥi ḷhos por gyur ba yin ſes zer te. de dag gi ḷtar na gsal ba thams cad phyin ci ma log paḥi raḥ gi ḷo bo myoh baḥi ḷphyir, thams cad ḷḥkhrul pa med par ḷgyur ro. des na sens can thams cad rtag tu grol bar ḷgyur la, rtag tu yah dag par rdsogs paḥi saḥs ḷgyus niid du ḷgyur ro....

Tr.: Some of the sākāraṣṭhāvādins of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika school say as follows: "If (as the nirākāraṣṭhādin maintains, the image of cognition) such as blue is unreal and the illumination (of cognition) is real, they, being incompatible entities, could not be identical; and if (blue) would not be identical with the illumination, blue could not be illuminated (i.e. could not become visible). But it is a fact that blue is seen. Then, (i.e. if they were identical) blue, etc. would not be imagined things, since it is not different from the illumination which is not imaginary.'" (Answer) If it is as they say, all cognitions
would know the correct nature (of things); this would result in that there are no false cognitions at all. Thus, all people would be always emancipated, i.e. all would be perfectly enlightened ones. . . .

This discussion continues longer, and the Sanskrit parallel to the portion of the answer is found in JNA 387, 8–23 and RNA 129, 1–12: 

\[ \text{tathā hi sarvair eva prakāśair aviparitārthaśvarūpaparīkṣanād bhrānter atyantam abhāvāḥ syāt, tataḥ ca sarvasattvāḥ sadaiva sahyaksambuddhā bhaveyuh...} \]

I refrain from quoting farther, though parallels may be increased more, since this is not a place to enter into a detailed account of the controversy.
SANSKRIT INDEX

In the following Indices free numbers refer to pages; numbers in the roman numerals preceded by n. refer to Notes of Introduction; numbers in the arabic numerals preceded by § and n. refer to Sections and Notes of Translation. Index 3 (Proper names) includes names and epithets of: authors and titles of Sanskrit works, places, schools, and a few Tibetan and Chinese persons and works.

1. Verses

akṣais tad vyapadiśāyate n. 87a
ajñātārthaprakāśo vā n. 8
atyantāyogam eva ca n. 132
atha dharmiṇi tasyaiva n. 156
'darśanān na na darśanāt n. 270
aduṣṭākaraṇārabdham n. 8
adṛṣṭam kalpayed anyam n. 59
adṛṣṭāpi api sattvataḥ n. 282
anāśrayā mārgasatyaṃ n. 366
anipiddhaḥ pramanābhyām n. 263
'niṣṭhā tatrāpi hi srṃṭhil n. 104
(ā-)niṣṭhāsaktēḥ srṃṭādivat n. 8
anukātv api pakṣasya n. 185
anukīrti nyūnatōditat n. 185
(a-)nipākhyodāḥṛtir matā n. 204
anumānām dvidhā svārtham n. 151
anumeṣṭaḥ tattulye n. 156
anuvidhām iva prakāśatvam n. 205
apratyākṣasiddhayatvam n. 106, 115
apravṛttih prakāśam n. 205
apravṛttiḥ prakāśam n. 366
akarasahita buddhir n. 148
akasarv dvau nirodha ca n. 366
'ardhānāḥ parikalpitam n. 324
ātmanāḥ prakāśakam n. 110
ātmaśūnyam akartṛkam n. 366
ātmanām ātmanaiḥvātma n. 103
iti cet grāhāyatiṃ viduḥ n. 74
ity ajñāajñānāpanāyika- n. 204
idaṁ vastubālayātām n. 419
idāniṁṭanācittavat n. 378
iam evātusāṃvittir n. 101
iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanat n. 117
undrśām vā prakāśatvam n. 110
ucyate sādhyaśiddhyartham n. 236
upādhiḥbhedāpekṣo vā n. 236
ekapratyayamarṣārtha- n. 345
ekasāmagraṣhadhisya n. 191
ekasyānamśārūpasya n. 102
ekā citrāvabhāsini n. 419
ekānekeviyogena n. 412
ekānekeviyvāhavena n. 420
ekābhāve-nyāhānaye n. 315
eva tatra kriyā matā n. 17
kāḥ sambandho'navasthā ca n. 40
kathaḥ bhāyaḥ mām ucyate n. 383
karta ced vyatiśekasiddhivīrtur vyāptih kathaḥ sidhyatā n. 269
karma cītām avadhūya na cāsti n. 364
karmajanāh locāvicītryam n. 364
karmajanā hi jagaḥ uktaṃ aśeṣam n. 364 kalpanāpi svasaṃvītāvāv n. 117
kalpitaḥ karmakarṭādiḥ n. 103
kas tāh kṣapayitūth kṣamaḥ n. 126
kāmaśokahayonmāda- n. 124
kāryakāraṇabāhavā vā n. 270
kāryatvasya vipaṃṣavṛttihataye sambhā-
2. Technical Terms

akartka n. 275, 366
akramikaryakaritva n. 309
aksanika n. 309, 357
aghitavişesañabuddhi n. 106
acikitsa n. 125
atidesa n. 49
atidesaväkyärthasmaran-tra § 4.3
atidesasmaratla n. 54
atiprasaṅga § 5, 7.2, 25, 31.1; n. 260, 204, 275
ayantayogavaccheda n. 132
adarśanamātra § 20.2.2; n. 282, 288
adosodbhāvana § 20.2.3; n. 288
adhi karana § 29, 6.3.1
adhyakṣa n. 117
adhyavasaya § 2.2, 6.3.1, 7.1.3, 16.2, 26; n. 12, 88, 123, 137, 339
adhyavaseya § 20.2.3; n. 288
adhikaratra § 29, 6.3.1
adhyavaseya § 7.1.1; n. 133, 135
anadigatarthagantu n. 8
anavasteha § 4.2; n. 40
anavasthapraṣaṅga n. 55
anakāravādin n. 148
anādīnāmātra § 20.2.2; n. 282, 288
anupaladhi § 11, 29; n. 62, 184, 198, 202, 205
anupaladbhuprayoga n. 253
anupaladbhavaidharmyavān prayaṅg § 19.1
anupaladbhersādharmyavān prayaṅga § 19
anupalambha § 4.1; n. 201, 259
anubhavasiddha § 6.3.1
anumāna § 3, 9; n. 110
anumeyaya § 9.1, 10; n. 153, 154, 156, 157, 159, 162
anumeyeśṭita n. 159
anuyāya § 27
anekānta (⊥-⊥-⊥) § 10.2.4, 20.1, 20.2.5, 23, 25, 25.2; n. 258, 290, 350, 368, 372
anākāntikahetu n. 316
antarjala § 5, 13.1
antarvayati n. 301, 418 (p. 156)
antyadāśāprāpta § 13.5
andhabadhirādyabhāvacodya n. 92
anyathānupapatti § 27
anyayogavaccheda § 7.1; n. 132, 133, 162, 169
anyayāvṛtti § 26
anyayāvṛttimātra n. 333, 335
anyāpoḍha n. 338
anyāpohā n. 338
anyāpohāsiṣṭo vidhiḥ n. 335
anyopaladhi n. 62, 204
anyaya § 4.2, 10.1, 10.3, 14, 21; n. 280, 300
anyayaprayoga § 10.3
apūrvagacara § 1, 2.5; n. 4, 8
apoha § 26, 27; n. 106, 132, 197, 333, 334, 335, 338
apohana § 26
apohāsiṣṭo vidhiḥ § 26
apratibaddhasāmartya § 13.5; n. 214, 218, 222, 227
apratisamkhyaṅirodha n. 366
apratyakṣopalambha n. 106, 115
aprasiddhopalambha n. 115
abhāva § 4, 4.5, 13.1; n. 27, 61, 65, 181, 203, 205
abhāvavahāra § 13.1; n. 201, 204, 205, 211
abhinnāśesaṇa n. 236
abhīpṛaya n. 187
abhilāpa n. 418 (p. 156)
abhilāpasamsargayogya n. 67
abhūtapiṅkalpa n. 418 (p. 156)
abheda § 16.2
abhīyāsa § 29.2
abhīyupāya n. 369
abhṛanta § 5, 5.1; n. 66, 85, 118
ayogavaccheda § 7.1; n. 132, 133, 162, 169
arthakriyā n. 3, 15, 16, 345
arthakriyākārītva § 24.1; n. 309, 310
arthakriyāsāmartya n. 309
arthakriyāśthiti § 2.3; n. 13
arthādharma § 27
arthamātragrāhin n. 98
arthaviṣeṣadarśana n. 98
arthasaṅkṣātkārītva n. 75
arthasārūpya n. 145, 148
arthāpatti § 4, 4.4; 26; n. 59, 60
arthābhāsa n. 414
arthaccaramacitta § 29.2
alika n. 418 (p. 157)
alaukikapratītya n. 259
avakāśapraṣṭa § 31.2
avayava n. 186
viṣṇu §3
viśin §3
lūnapunjājatukāsakēśādi §16.2
lokēśā n. vi
lokottarajēṣā n. 418 (p. 157)
laukikāgradharma n. 119
vastudharma n. 400
vastusādhana n. 208
vākyabheda n. 62
vāyu §31.1
vāsanā n. 414, 418 (p. 156)
vikalpa §6.3.1, 7.1.1, 26; n. 65, 68, 342, 422
vikalpanā n. 117
vikalpaṇāṅka n. 88
vikalppratyaya §8; n. 144
vikalpbuddhi n. 196
vikalpotpattisakti n. 88
vijētiyāvṛtti n. 333
vijēśāvāda n. 419
vijēśāntakaparamānū n. 425
vidhī §26; n. 62, 334, 335
vidhinimesha n. 341, 342
vipāka §10.1, 10.2, 10.2.1, 10.2.2, 10.2.4.
vipākāśaikaśaśśāvṛtti §10.2.5; n. 179
vipāryayana n. 118, 309
vipāryayābhādhaṇapramāṇa n. 301, 302, 304, 310
vipāryayē bhūdhaṇapramāṇa - n. 260
vīpāryāśa §1, 6.3.1
vīplava n. 418 (p. 156)
vīplavopanīta n. 418 (p. 157)
vibhūṭa n. 290
vibhrama n. 80
vimāraśa n. 283
viruddha §20.2.5, 20.1; n. 167, 258, 368
viruddhakāryasiddhi n. 212
viruddhdavidhi n. 212
viruddhdhaṇaśāpabaldbhi n. 212
viruddhdhāpapratyakṣa §7.1; n. 240
vyākṣa §10.2.1; n. 316
virodha n. 99, 167, 372
viṣēṣṭa-buddhi §27
viṣēṣṭa-jñāna n. 350
viṣēṣa §6.3.1, 7.2, 31.1
viṣēṣaṇa §4.3.1, 27; n. 106, 241, 350
viṣēṣaṇaviṣēṣaya n. 132
viṣēṣaṇaviṣēṣyabhāva n. 58, 350
viṣēṣaṃśrtyaṃyakṣa n. 273, 274, 283
viṣēṣapekṣa n. 283
viṣēṣaya §4.3.1; n. 106
viṣaya §1, 4.3, 7.1, 11.3, 26
viṣayantarasaṃcāra n. 104
vedyavadakābhāva §6.2
vaidharmayaprakṛtya §10.3, 18.1
vaidharmavat §15; n. 232, 300
vaidharmavatadātyuṣaya §246
vyakti §27
vyātirīkta-viṣēṣaṇa n. 236
vyātiṣṭa §4.2, 10.2, 10.3, 14, 20.2.1.
20.2.2, 21, 31; n. 269, 282, 300
vyātirekāprakṛtya §10.3, 17
vyātirekāsiddhi n. 268, 288
vyātirekāca n. 132
vyābhicāra §20.2.1; n. 258, 259, 264, 268.
271, 272, 285
vyābhicāravīṣēṣaṇa §20.2
vyāvacchēda n. 132, 169
vyāvacchedaphala n. 132
vyāvasthāpaka n. 144
vyāvasthāpanahetu n. 144
vyāvasthāpya n. 144
vyāvasthāpyavasthāpakahāva §6.2; n.
99
vyāvahāra §6.1, 13.1, 26; n. 88, 196, 205
vyāvahārīkapatupratyakṣa n. 239
vyāpaka n. 309, 342
vyāpakāvṛtya dhūkāryopalabdhi §13.5; n.
212, 225
vyāpakāvṛtya dhūvāyopalabdhi §13.5; n.
212, 229
vyāpakāvṛtya dhūhasiddhi n. 212
vyāpakāvṛtya dhūpalabdhi §13.5; n. 212, 220
vyāpakasvabhāvāsiddhi n. 212
vyāpakānumalabdhi §24.1, 33; n. 32, 204.
212, 216, 309, 311
vyāpya §25.1
vyāpta §4.3, 10.1; n. 157
vyāptigrahākāryopratyakṣa §7.1.2
vyāpya §11; n. 309
vyāṛṛti §8, 12, 16.3.1; n. 240
vyāṛṛtikṛta §8.3
vyāṛṛttyantāravayavacchēda §16.3.1
vyutpattī n. 333
vyutpattinimitta §3
vyuman §20.1
śāṅka n. 283
śāṅkāpiśāci n. 270
śabda §5; n. 15, 16, 27, 32, 35, 44, 48.
54, 77, 78, 117, 187, 340
śabdaśakta §4.2
sādhyena saha viruddhaḥ § 10.3
sāmānyā § 7.1, 7.1.3, 7.2, 24.2, 26, 27, 31.1; n. 28, 58, 128, 131, 133, 137, 293, 289, 343, 345, 346, 351
sārūpya § 8; n. 52, 144
sārūpyajñāna § 4.3; n. 49, 54
siddhasādhana § 27; n. 133, 294, 290, 350
siddhāsādhanañā § 20.2.5
subanta n. 62
sopādhisthasambandha n. 271
skhaladvṛtti § 25.1; n. 326
sthila n. 400, 424
sthautyā § 31.3; n. 400
sphuṭapratibhāsa n. 367, 368
sphuṭjābha n. 124, 368
sphuṭibhāva n. 368
smaraṇa n. 118, 360
smaraṇagrahaṇa n. 361
sāmāñ, n. 104, 273
sāmityupasthāna n. 119
svataḥ prāmāṇyam § 2.4; n. 19
svatantraprayoga n. 310
svatantrānumāna n. 313
svadṛṣṭīarthaprakāśaṅka n. 185
svapraκāśa § 6.2; n. 99
svabhāva $§ 11, 13.2, 13.5, 27, 33; n. 43, 125, 126, 184, 193, 194, 236, 270, 305, 419
svabhāvapratibhānda n. 60
svabhāvabhuṭādharmanvīśeṣa n. 236
svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalaḥdhi n. 212, 221
svabhāvaviruddhahavyāpalaḥdhi § 13.5; n. 226
svabhāvaviruddhopalaḥdhi § 13.5; n. 212, 217
svabhāvahetuprastaraḥga $§ 17, 22; n. 60, 236, 246, 374
svabhāvavipaṇapalaḥdhi § 13.5, 27; n. 203, 212, 213, 351
svabhāvavipaṇapalambha § 13.5; n. 204
svabhāvahetuprastaraḥga n. 309
svabhāvahetorvaidharmyavānprayoga $§ 17
svabhāvahetoḥprayoga n. 246
svabhāvahetoḥsādharmanyavānprayoga $§ 16
svabhāvo hetuḥ n. 29, 368
svsarūpa § 2.3, 16.1; n. 294
svsarūpāsiddha § 25, 25.2
svalakṣaṇa $§ 7, 7.1, 7.1.3, 25.2, 26; n. 128, 129, 133, 339, 341, 342
svasāṁvitti n. 90, 102, 117
svasāṁvedana $§ 2.4, 3, 6, 6.2, 27; n. 19, 97, 99, 289
svasāṁvedanaḥpāhga n. 418 (p.155)
svasāṁvedya n. 324
svabhāvika $§ 20.2.1; n. 33
svabhāvikasambandha § 20.2.1; n. 259, 270, 271, 275, 276
svabhāvikah sambandha $§ 20.2.1; n. 259, 274
svārtha n. 151
svāṛtham anumānam $§ 9
svāṛthānāma n. 152
hetu § 10.1, 10.2.1, 10.2.2, 10.2.3, 11, 11.2, 20.2.5, 25, 29
hetudūṣaṇa n. 288
hetudoga n. 288
hetudharma n. 191
hetvabhāsa n. 301
heyoṇḍeyatattva n. 369

3. Proper Names

Atiśa 7-10; n. xiii; n. 212
Anantavirya 6
Antarvyaśītaśamarthana n. 235, 301
Anyayogavacchedadvātiṛhiṃṣikā 15; n. 413
Apoḥapakṛakaṅa n. 333
Apoḥasiddhi n. 333
Abhidharmakośa 15; n. 21, 98, 119, 364, 366
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya n. 366
Arcaṇa 15; n. 62, 212, 226, 235
Alankārakāra $§ 6.2, 25.1
Avalokītavṛata n. 62
Aviddhakarṣa n. 255
Āśaṅga n. 419 (p. 154-6)
Ācāra (=Dharmakirtī) § 5.1
Ātmātattvaviveka 8, 9, 15; n. xix, xx; n. 333
Āryadeva 5, 15
Ālambanaparikṣa n. 418 (p. 154)
Vṛtti n. 406
Īśvaradūṣaṇa n. 255
Īśvaravādādhiḥkāra n. 255
Īśvarasādhanaśaṇa 4; n. 255, 258, 286, 290
Īśvarasena n. 202
Udayana 8–11, 15; n. xix, xx, xxiii; n. 99, 271, 333
Uddyotakara 16; n. 156, 255, 324, 326, 353
Oḍvīga 11; n. xxv
Kaṇḍakavarmān 16
Kamalaśīla 16; n. 19, 187, 188, 235, 255, 333
Kaṇṭakagomin 15; n. 235
Kāryakāraṇabhāvaśiddhi n. 132, 305
Kāśīkākāra n. 259
Kirāṇāvali n. xix
K‘uei-chi n. 418 (p. 155)
Kumārilabhāṭṭa 2; § 6.2, 28.2; n. 61, 92, 202, 259, 342
Kēśavamīśra 1
Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi n. 11, 235, 302, 309, 333
Kṣaṇabhaṅgadhyāya n. 235, 302
Guṇamatī 418 (p. 155)
Guṇaratna 5, 16; n. 413
Gautama 16
Cakracūrāmaṭi § 4.5; n. 64
Candrakīrti 16
Carvaka 2; § 4, 4.1; n. 27-29
Citradvaitasiddhi n. xx
Jagaddalaniway n. viii
Jagaddhala. Jagadd(h)ala-vihāra, Jagattala 6, 11; n. v, vii, xxv; § 33; n. 2
Jayanta-bhaṅga 8; n. xvi
Jinendrabuddhi 17; n. 159, 181
Jaina 1, 3, 5; n. 148
Jaina-tarkabhāṣa 1
Jānaśrī. -mitra 1-5, 7-10; n. xi, xiii, xix, xx; § 20.2; n. 107, 124, 132, 212, 235, 255, 260, 269, 302, 305, 333, 338, 418 (p. 155-7), 419
Jānaśarasamuccaya 5, 15; n. 366, 381, 382, 418 (p. 154), 420
Jānaśarasamuccayanibandhana 6, 15
Tarkabhāṣa by Kēśavamīśra 1
Tarkarahasyādipika 5, 16; n. ii; n. 98, 132, 148, 413
Tarkasopana 1, 4, 16; n. 9, 21, 23, 25, 27, 69, 77, 78, 104, 114, 140, 148, 152, 165, 185, 202, 212-223, 225-229, 236
Tātptyāṭākākāra n. xiv
Tārānātha n. xiii, xxiv; 16
Trilocana 2.5; § 6.2, 20.2; n. 107, 131, 133, 255, 259, 270, 271, 275
Dānaśila 11
Digambara-Jaina § 10
Dignāga 4, 5, 16; n. 54, 85, 156, 157, 159, 181, 185, 338, 406, 418 (p. 154-5)
Dipāṅkaraśrījñāna 7; n. xiii
Durveka. -miśra 4, 15; n. ix; n. 212, 226, 235, 240
Deb-ther sion-po 15
Dharmapāla n. 418 (p. 155-6)
Dharmottara 1, 4, 15; § 31.3; n. 11, 23, 85, 132, 142, 169, 179, 195, 226, 236, 240, 305, 307, 333
Dharmottarapradīpa 15; n. 148, 165, 212, 226, 400
Narasimha n. 255
Naropa n. xiii
Nālikera § 4.2
Nāyaṇakaśikā 16; n. 290, 293, 294
Nāyakaśumāṇjali n. xix
Nāyakakośa 16; n. 112, 324, 343, 397
Nāyakarāmacūrava § 26, 7.2
Nāyaparāśiṣṭa n. xix
Nāyabuddhītikā 1, 4, 15; n. 6, 7, 11, 12, 23-26, 67, 80, 85, 87a, 88, 98, 99, 119, 129, 134, 135, 143, 144, 152, 162, 163, 174, 175, 178-180, 182, 184, 193, 200, 201, 203, 205, 209, 214, 232, 236, 238, 240, 241, 243, 244, 248, 300, 316
Nāyabuddhītikātīpāpanī 16; n. 88, 92, 95
Nāyabuddhīṣṭha 15; n. 49, 54, 59, 323
Nāyamaṇḍiṣṭha 8; n. 107
Nāyamaṇḍipīkā 5
Nāyamukha n. 181, 185
Nāyavādīn § 13.4
Nāyavārttika 16; n. 49
Nāyavārttikatātṛtyāṭākāra 8, 10, 16; n. 49, 54, 156, 255, 257-259, 271, 273-276

— 171 —
ERRATA

Read *samyagjñāna* instead of *samyag-* in p. 23, l. 12; n. 3, 4, 6, 22, 85.

Read *purato* 'vasthitān instead of *vasthatān* in n. 124 (l. 2).