AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY: AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE TARKABHASA OF MOKSAKARAGUPTA

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AN INTRODUCTION
TO
BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE
TARKABHĀṢĀ OF MOKṢĀKARAGUPTA

BY
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INTRODUCTION

1 The Tarkabhāṣā (The Language of Logic): The present work is an annotated translation of the *Tarkabhāṣā* (TBh) of Mokṣākaragupta who wrote it some time between 1050-1202 A.D. This TBh should be distinguished from two other works bearing the same name, viz. the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Keśavamīśra and the *Jaina-tarkabhāṣā* of Yaśovijaya, though these three share the same character of being a compendium of the system of a particular Indian philosophical school. While the latter two texts are devoted to the Naiyāyika and the Jaina philosophy respectively, Mokṣākaragupta’s TBh forms a brief but excellent introduction to Buddhist philosophy including epistemology and logic. This is the earliest of the three texts and seems to have set an example for the other two.

Apart from great works on Buddhist logic and epistemology such as those by Dharmakīrti, Prajinākaragupta, Jñānaśrimitra etc., we know, so far as Sanskrit originals are available, three compendiums which systematically describe *bauddhanyāya*, dividing it into the three chapters of *pratyakṣa*, *svārthānumāna*, and *parārthānumāna*: Dharmakīrti’s *Nyāyābindu* (NB) with Dharmottara’s *Ṭīkā* (NBT), Vidyākaraśānti’s *Tarkasopāna* (TSop), and our TBh. The latter two works of course owe much to NB and NBT, but they have their own merits of incorporating later developments of Buddhist philosophy which were not known to Dharmottara. Most parts of NBT are concerned with the explanation of formal logic and epistemology viewed from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika, omitting elucidations of other topics which are very important in Buddhist philosophy in general. TSop is a small book which is so much indebted to Dharmottara that it looks like a digest of NBT, and in places where it goes beyond the latter it probably owes much to TBh. Compared with these two works, TBh is far richer in information, a large portion of which has remained unknown to the scholarly world.

This quality of TBh is due to the fact that Mokṣākara based his work on many texts which were not utilized by Dharmottara or Vidyākaraśānti.
He refers to most of the important works of Dharmakirti and their commentaries, and cites many passages from Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti. The third chapter of his work may be called an abridgement of the theories of Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti, and this fact is valuable to us, since TBh forms a good introduction to the works of the said two scholars which have not been well studied as yet.

To illustrate the said character of our text, it may not be irrelevant here to refer to some of the important theories discussed by Mokṣākara-gupta1. In § 4 where he establishes the Buddhist theory that valid cognition is of two kinds, indeterminate (pratyakṣa) and determinate knowledge (anumāna), he enters into the criticism of other means of knowledge maintained by different schools of Indian philosophy, i. e. śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti and abhāva, and criticises also the Carvaka’s view that pratyakṣa alone is the means of valid knowledge. In this discussion his main source is Ratnakirti’s Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa. For the refutation of the connection of the word and the thing meant by it, Mokṣākara adopts the same criticism of connection which was put forward by Dharmakirti in his Sambandhaparikṣā (§ 4.2). When he discusses the Buddhist attitude towards the vexed problem of whether the validity of knowledge is known by itself independently, or dependently on another proof attesting it (svaḷaḥ prāmāṇyam or paraḷaḥ), he follows Śāntiraksita and Manorathanandin in saying that neither of the two principles should be applied to knowledge in general, some kinds of knowledge being known to be valid by themselves and others by another proof (§ 2.4). Special importance is attached by Mokṣākara-gupta to the theory of self-consciousness (svasaṁvedana), which he discusses in detail, quoting from Dharmakirti, Prajñākaragupta, and Śāntiraksita and criticising the objections of Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Trilocana (§ 6.2).

A traditional doctrine of Buddhist logic says that the object of indeterminate knowledge is the extreme particular (svaḷaṅga). But this theory entailed a difficult problem as to how universal concomitance or pervasion (vyāpti), which forms the basis of inference and which is the relationship between two universals, can be grasped by pratyakṣa.

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i) The following illustrations are taken out of the content of the present work, and for a detailed discussion and information the reader is referred to the section indicated by § 4, etc.
Following Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti, our author answers the question by saying that a universal can (also) be an object of pratyakṣa. For this new interpretation, he takes advantage of the theory of two kinds of exclusion (vyavaccheda), which was originally expounded by Dharmakirti in relation to another problem. An affirmative proposition ‘$x$ is $y$’ may be interpreted in two ways by putting on either $x$ or $y$ a restriction or stress which is expressed in Sanskrit by the particle eva. When the proposition ‘A particular is the object of pratyakṣa’ is construed by anyayogavaccheda, it means ‘A particular alone is the object of pratyakṣa’; but when construed by ayogavaccheda the same sentence means ‘A particular is rightly included among the objects of pratyakṣa’.

Once a universal was permitted to be grasped by indeterminate knowledge, it came to be classified under a universal of an individual which is produced by the accumulation of many moments of the momentary stream of a thing and which may be exemplified by the idea of ‘this’, and a universal of a class which denotes all the members of a class, say, jar. These two universals are respectively named ūrdhvatilākṣaṇa- and tiryaglakṣaṇa-sāmānya. This classification is made by Jñānaśrimitra as well as Ratnakirti, but seems to have originated from Māṇikyanandin, the Jaina author of the Parīkṣāmukhasūtra, if he can be dated in the 9th century A.D. (§ 7.1).

Just as an affirmative proposition is construed in two ways, a negative proposition is also interpreted in two ways, this time by understanding the negation as of a term (paryudāsa-) and as of a proposition (prasajya-pratiśedha) (cf. n. 62). A proposition ‘$x$ is not $y$’ means ‘$x$ is a non-$y$ or $z$’ when the negation is understood as paryudāsapraṭiśedha; but if it is construed as prasajya-pratiśedha, the same proposition means only ‘It is false that $x$ is $y$’ without allowing a positive interpretation. Among Buddhists, this theory of two kinds of negation was applied to philosophy first by Mādhyanikas such as Bhāvaviveka. Buddhist logicians followed them in adopting it for the explanation of their particular doctrines. According to Buddhist logic the non-cognition of a thing is nothing but the cognition of the other things contained in the range of one and the same cognition. That we do not see a jar here means that we see here things other than the jar. This is an example of paryudāsapraṭiśedha being applied to the explanation of non-cognition (§ 13).
theory of *apoha* (discrimination) which was propounded by Dignāga and Dharmakirti had found various interpretations by the time of Mokṣākara-gupta, who mentions three: *nivṛttyapohavāda, vidhivāda* and *apohaviśisṭāvidhivāda*. The latter two were made possible by applying wholly or partly *panyudāsapratisedha* to *anyāpoha* (negation of other things) (§ 26).

In the second chapter dealing with formal logic, Mokṣākara-gupta follows mainly NB and NBT, though not without new information. The most important of the latter may be his classification of negative inference into 16 formulae. Dharmakirti himself classified negative inference into 4 kinds with 4 subordinate forms in PV, 3 kinds in HB and 11 kinds in NB. The classification into 16 is found in the works of Durvekamisra, Mokṣākara-gupta and Vidyākaraśānti. Durveka, the Brāhmaṇa commentator on NBT, did know the classification into 16, but it is unlikely that he borrowed it from our author, since he is usually supposed to have been contemporary with Jñānaśrimitra who was older than Mokṣākara-gupta by more than two generations. Vidyākaraśānti, the author of TSop probably owes the same to our author. We are not informed of the person who first proposed this classification, although we have a vague clue through which we might be permitted to ascribe it to Jñānaśrimitra (§ 13.5).

Another important piece of information we get from TBh II consists of two theories of how to determine a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*). Jñānaśrimitra was of the opinion that a causal relation is ascertained by three cognitions - one perception and two non-perceptions or one non-perception and two perceptions - and criticised Dharmottara who proclaimed that at least five cognitions are necessary for the determination of a causal relation. Mokṣākara refers to these two theories without showing a bias towards either of them (§ 11.3).

In the third chapter Mokṣākara-gupta discusses various topics which form important problems of Buddhist philosophy: the proof of universal momentariness (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*) (§ 16.1); the refutation of the existence of God (*iśvarasādhanadūsana*) (§ 20. 1-2; § 28-28.1) ; the problem of solipsism (*samāntāntara*) (§ 20. 2. 4) ; the problem of how to ascertain the universal concomitance of two terms and two theories about it, viz. *antarvyaśti* and *bahirvyaśti* which are respectively represented by Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrimitra (§ 22); the definitions and illustrations
of prasaṅga, prasaṅgaviparyaya and viparyayabuddhapramāṇa, the syllogistic forms which played important roles in Buddhist polemics in the later period (§ 24); the problem of the import of the word (apoha), of which our author clearly distinguishes between three interpretations held by Dignāga and Dharmakirti, Śāntirakṣita, and Jñānaśrimitra (§ 26); the refutation of recognition (pratyabhijñā) (§ 28.2); the proof of two kinds of omniscient beings (sarvajña and sarvasarvajña)(§ 29-29.1); the proof of succession of lives (§ 29.2) and so forth. Vācaspatimisra, as well as his teacher Trilocana, appears often as an opponent in these discussions. Following the method of Dharmakirti in PV, Mokṣākaragupta inserted these topics as illustrations of particular logical rules, fallacies and confutations, and he bases his opinions mostly on Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti.

At the end of the third chapter, our author briefly reproduces the main theories of the four Buddhist schools, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārin and Mādhyamika (§ 30-33). This portion is particularly interesting and important, since we do not have many descriptions of the same kind in other Buddhist texts and since it became a model when Guṇaratna (and probably Mādava) wrote a summary of Buddhist doctrines in the Tarkarahasyadipikā (and the Sarvadarśanasamgraha). Mokṣākaragupta’s representation of the theories of the four schools are closely related also to the same kind of summary in the Jñānasūrasamuccaya, falsely ascribed to Āryadeva, and its commentary by Bodhibhadra. The verses 21, 22a-b, 23, 25, 26a-b and 27 of the Jñānasūrasamuccaya are found in TBh too. And Bodhibhadra’s review of sākāravāda and nirākāravāda of the Yogācārins finds a counterpart in TBh § 32.1. Though our author does not enter into a detailed discussion of the important schisms among Yogācārins, he seems to have been well aware of the sākāravāda of Jñānaśrimitra and the nirākāravāda of Ratnakaraśānti (§ 32.1).

TBh was counted among ten great works of Buddhist philosophy enumerated by Guṇaratnaii who evidently owed much to Mokṣākaragupta when writing the portion of the Bauddhadarśana in the Tarkarahasyadipikā. R. Iyengar points out another reference to our text in an unpublished Jaina work, the Nyāyamanidipikā, a commentary on the Pra-

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ii) TRD 47, 20; Iyengar’s preface to M. iv.
meyaratnamālā of Anantaviryaiii. Malliśena quotes the passages of TBh on universal momentariness, the succession of lives and other problems in his Syādvādamaṇjariiv. As stated above, TSop and the Jñānasārasamuuccayanibandhana of Bodhibhadra have much to do with our text, though we are not sure if these two Buddhist authors are posterior to Moksākaragupta.

2 Date of the Author: In the colophon of TBh Mokṣākaragupta is mentioned as a resident of the Mahājagaddhala-vihāra. We know from substantial evidencevi that the Jagaddhala (or Jagaddala) Vihāra existed in Varendri, the paternal land of the Pala dynasty, which might be placed so as to include the junction of the present Rājshāhi, Bogra and Malda of Bengal and an unknown amount of territory to the northvii. But the implication of the colophon is only this, further presumptions read in it being uncertainviii. The Vihāra is sometimes said to have

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iii) M Preface iv.
iv) See n. 235, 374, 382 and 383.
v) śrimanmahājagaddhalavihārīyanamahāpaṇḍitabhikṣumokṣākaraguptaviracitāyāṁ tarkabhāṣāyāṁ parārthānamānaparicheḍaḥ samāptaḥ. G has -rājajagaddhala- for mahājagaddhala-
vii) RC III, 7: mandrāṇāṁ sthitimūḍhāṁ jagaddalamahāvihārācitarāgām, dadhatiṁ lokēsam api mahattāroditorumahimāṃṣam, which Majumdar translates: "(Varendrī) -which had elephants of the Mandra type imported (into its forests) -where in the great monastery at Jagaddala kindly love for all was found accumulated -which country bore (in its heart) the image of (Bodhisattva) Lokesa -and whose great glory was still more increased (or pronounced) by (the presence of) the great (heads of monasteries) and the (images of) Tārā (the Buddhist goddess)". This is among 27 verses (III, 2-28) in which the poet gives a glowing account of Varendra (cf. Intro. xxxi).


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been established by Rāmapāla (c. 1100 A.D.), the 14th king of the Pala dynasty, after his recovery of Varendri which had been once lost. This information, however, is not trustworthy, though a possibility of the construction of the Vihāra by Rāmapāla may not be totally excluded. Varendri was existent long before and after this king, and there is no positive evidence for the theory mentioned above. Such being the case, we are not certain of the termini of the Vihāra, and hence of the date of Mokṣākaragupta.

In the absence of external evidence, we have to rely on internal data for determining the date of our author. Considering the many scholars to whom Mokṣākaragupta refers and who cite from him, we can safely place him between Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti on the one hand and Malliśēṇa on the other. In 1292 A.D. Malliśēṇa wrote his Šyādvādanaṁjari, in which he cites several times passages from TBh, referring twice to our author by name. The three Buddhist logicians named above from whom our author quotes passages so profusely are more or less associated with Dipamkaraśrijñāna (Atiśa) who left the Vikramāśila Vihāra in 1040 A.D. and entered Tibet in 1042 A.D.

To begin with, Jñānaśrimitra seems to have been a younger contemporary of Ratnākaraśānti, since he cites passages from the latter's vyākhyā was made by me, a resident of Srirajajagattala, which is the necklace of the land protected by King Rāmapāla... It was transcribed at the Sri-Mahābodhi temple on the fourth day of the month of Pauṣa in the seventh year of the coronation of Sri-Manālapāla. I think it is impossible to derive from this colophon the conclusion that the Jagaddala Vihāra was built by Rāmapāla. After all, what we know from these sources is no more than this: The Jagaddala Vihāra was existent in Varendri, and flourished under Rāmapāla too. Rāmapāla’s date is also a vexed problem, on which R. D. Banerjee and R. C. Majumdar had exchanged a long series of discussions. But for our present purpose, it is enough if we follow Kosambi and Gokhale in taking A. D. 1100 as a fair date in Rāmapāla’s reign.

ix) Vidyabhushana (A History of Indian Logic) places Mokṣākaragupta at 1100 A.D., Krishnamacharya between c. 1100-1200, and Iyengar at 1110. None of these datings is based on evidence, though they seem to have been inferred from the date of Rāmapāla. Among other scholars who are close in time to Mokṣākaragupta, we may mention Sucaritamiśra who is criticised by Jñānaśrī and Ratnakirti. Manorathandin whom our author seems to follow in a few discussions and who completed his com. on PV before 1200 A.D., Durvekamiśra to whom Mokṣākaragupta seems to owe a few theories, Bodhibhadra, and Vidyākaraśānti who was probably indebted to our author. But the dates of all these scholars are not fixed beyond doubt, and cannot be taken into account for determining the date of our author.

x) Malliśēṇa states in the colophon of SVM that he completed the work in 1214 Śaka = 1292 A. D. (cf. SVM Intro. xiii).
Prajñāpāramitopadeśa in his Sākārasiddhiśāstra\textsuperscript{xi}. Both are enumerated among the teachers of Atiśa. Ratnakīrti made the summaries of Jñānaśrīmitra's works and was refuted by Udayana in the Āṭmatattvaviveka (ATV) together with his master\textsuperscript{xii}. Ratnakīrti is, therefore, most probably a direct disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra, and may have been younger than the latter at least by one generation. About these three Buddhists and their contemporaries, we may collect a good amount of information from Tibetan sources; but the Tibetan tradition is such that the more we learn from it, the more we become confused. Therefore, we should be satisfied with the unanimous opinion that Jñānaśrīmitra was an elder contemporary of Atiśa\textsuperscript{xiii}.

Almost all the works of Jñānaśrīmitra contain abundant citations from Vācaspatimisra, especially from his Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā (NVT)\textsuperscript{xiv}. S. Dasgupta, E. Frauwallner and A. Thakur argued from different materials to the same conclusion that Vācaspatimisra should be placed after Jayantabhaṭṭa, not before as had been so long believed\textsuperscript{xv}. P. Hacker established the date of Jayanta's Nyāyamaṇḍari as about 890 A.D. on the basis of substantial evidence that he was in the court of Śaṅkaravar-
man of Kaśmir who ruled 883-902 A. D. Thakur holds the same, though he seems not to have seen Hacker’s article. This discovery, however, entailed another problem, the date of Vācaspatimiśra himself who had been usually placed around 841 A. D. on the basis of the date 898 which is given in the manuscripts of his Nyāyasūcinibandha (NSN) and which is construed as referring to Vikrama Śaivism. Hacker, D. Bhattacharya and Thakur solve this question by taking the date 898 as of Śaka Śaivism and accordingly placing Vācaspati at 976 A. D. Considering this date of Vācaspatimiśra and the Tibetan information that Jñānaśrimitra was an elder contemporary of Atiśa (982-1055 A. D.) we may place the activity of Jñānaśrimitra in c. 980-1030 A. D. and that of Ratnakirti in c. 1000-1050 A. D.

There is, however, information which might contradict the date of Jñānaśrimitra as given just above. As is well known, one of the manuscripts of Udayana’s Lakṣaṇāvali bears the date 906 Śaka (984 A. D.). ATV in which Udayana criticises most of the works of Jñānaśrimitra and some of Ratnakirti’s is certainly the oldest of his major works, though we are not sure if it was written before his two smaller tracts, Lakṣaṇāvali and Lakṣaṇamālā. Thus, ATV must be placed before 984 A. D. or at latest at a date soon after it. It then follows that Jñānaśrimitra wrote most of his works in a very short period between 976 or 980 and c. 984, which is very unlikely. This assumption becomes absolutely impossible when we trust the tradition that in ATV Udayana referred to Ratnakirti, who must have made the summaries of his master’s works at least a generation after his master wrote them.

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xvii) RNA Intro. 21.

xviii) Hacker, op. cit., 163; Bhattacharya, op. cit. 29, 54 etc. (1958); RNA Intro. 2, 3 with n. 2.

xix) Bhattacharya 4-5; Frauwallner, Jñānaśr, WZKM Bd. 38. 231 with A. 1 (1931); Chronological order of Udayana’s works is: ATV, Kusumāṇjali, Nyāyaaparīśśa, Tatparya- pariśuddhi, Kirāṇāvali. Two small works, Lakṣaṇāvali and Lakṣaṇamālā were, according to Bhattacharya, written after Tatparya pariśuddhi, from which they borrow benedictive verses. In the above mentioned work, Frauwallner placed Ratnakirti at c. 950 and his master Jñānaśrī in the first half of 10th cent. A. D. For an argument against this see n. 333 below.

xx) According to Śaṅkaramśrā, a commentator on ATV, Udayana refuted in ATV Ratnakirti’s Citrāvaitasiddhi (cf. Bhattacharya 18); Thakur says on the basis of a passage in ATV that Udayana seems to have been aware of the relationship between Jñānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti (JNA Intro. 31).
We may suppose that Vācaspatimisra had already written his masterpiece, NVT, and the Nyāyakaṇṭikā, both of which were the objects of Jñānaśrīmitra’s refutation, earlier than 976 A.D., say, by about 950 A.D. This may push back the beginning of the activity of Jñānaśrīmitra by 30 years and make it possible to insert him and Ratnakirti in between Vācaspati and Udayana. But we can assume with equal weight that Vācaspati must have written NVT together with NSN, which is a supplement to the former.\textsuperscript{xxi} Bhattacharya enumerates many factors which are inconsistent with the supposition which places the activity of Vācaspati and Jñānaśrī at so early a date as 950 A.D. Is the date 984 A.D. in which Udayana is said to have written the Laksanāvali so certain as to disprove the Tibetan tradition that Jñānaśrīmitra was an older contemporary of Atiśa? Hacker does not touch the date of Udayana, appreciating that the latter gives the date 906 Śaka with a clear reference to the era. But Bhattacharya and Thakur are of the opinion that the date, which is written only in a single manuscript dated so late as 1708 Sāṁvat, should be reconsidered as the date of Vācaspati was. And Bhattacharya actually proposes 1025-1100 A.D. for Udayana’s life.\textsuperscript{xxii} Bhattacharya’s proposal is based mainly on two traditions: the Tibetan one relating to Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakirti to which we have referred above, and the other concerning the debate between Udayana and the father of Śrīharṣa whose date can be known with a fair certainty.\textsuperscript{xxiii} Bhattacharya’s prolonged argument seems to lack incontestable evidence, but it is persuasive enough at least to make us doubt the date given in the manuscript of the Laksanāvali. And when Udayana’s date is in the balance, we should derive the most natural conclusion from the date of Vācaspatimisra, which is now agreed to by many scholars, and we may return to our former suggestion in assessing Jñānaśrīmitra’s activity as 980-1030 and that of Ratnakirti as 1,000-1050 A.D.

To come back to Moksākara-gupta, he may thus be placed between

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{xxi} This is maintained by Bhattacharya, 29.
\item \textsuperscript{xxii} Bhattacharya 54.
\item \textsuperscript{xxiii} Bhattacharya, 49-50. This event is stated by Bhagiratha, a commentator of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century on the Naṣadha. Śrīharṣa’s father Śrīhira had an academic contest with Udayana. In other words Udayana was older than Śrīharṣa by only one generation. Bhattacharya thinks that the debate took place probably in the decade 1075-85 A.D.
\end{itemize}
1050 and 1292 A.D. It is almost certain that the Jagaddhala Vihāra was finally destroyed by the sack of the Muslims in 1202 A.D. when Śākyasrībhadra of Kaśmir is said to have fled, on seeing the devastation of the Vikramaśila, to Jagaddala of Oḍīviṣa, at last entering Tibet in 1204 A.D.\textsuperscript{xxiv} We are not absolutely sure if this Jagaddala of Oḍīviṣa is in reality identical with the Jagaddhala Vihāra of Bengal, as is supposed by scholars.\textsuperscript{xxv} Apart from it, however, Cordier Catalogue, Rgyud XXVI, 50 and Mdo XXVII, 8 mention Dānāśila and Vibhūticandra, who entered Tibet also at the very beginning of the 13th century, as of Varendra-jagaddala and Jagaddalavihāra respectively, both of which must be understood as our Jagaddhala Vihāra itself. Hence we have to assume that the Vihāra existed until it was destroyed in 1202 A.D. Although it is very natural to think that Buddhist activities dwindled rapidly under the Senas, the Vaiśīṣavas, who had overwhelmed the Pālas by about 1150 A.D., we are not sure that the Senas did persecute Buddhists or that the Vihāra perished with the Pālas. Until the Tibetan information mentioned immediately above is disproved, therefore, we should not put back the date of the Vihāra or that of Moksākaragupta. Nor can the fact that he does not refer to Udayana indicate with certainty that he lived before Udayana. Thus, until we get other evidence, we cannot narrow the duration of time 1050-1202 A.D. within which Moksākaragupta’s activity must fall.

3 The Text: The Sanskrit text of TBh was edited twice: once by Embar Krishnamacharya as Vol. XCIV of the \textit{Gaekwad’s Oriental Series} (G), and secondly by H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar as a part of the \textit{Tarkabhūṣāṇa and Vādasthiṇa} published in Mysore in 1952 (M). The manuscripts used by both the editors are not perfect. G omits many passages found in M, and especially in the first few pages it is unreliable owing to the corruption of the Mss. utilized. According to Iyengar, three leaves are missing out of the Mss. of the Mysore Oriental Library on which M is based. In general, however, M is a far better edition than G, and agrees well with the Tibetan translation except in some details. The Tibetan translation \textit{Rtoṅ geñ bi skad} is listed in the \textit{Tohoku Catalogue}
as no. 4246, in the *Catalogue of Peking Reprint Edition* as no. 5762, and in *Cordier Catalogue* as Mdo CXII, 28. This is the largest and complete text, complementing the lacunae of the Sanskrit text.

The following translation is made from M in principle; but whenever the better reading is found in G or T, it is adopted with the necessary notification; the lacunae in the Sanskrit text are filled up by translating the corresponding portions of the Tibetan. Sectioning and titling of the sections are made by the translator; in order to make the context of the translation clearer, supplementary words are inserted in brackets; Sanskrit words equivalent to the preceding English translation or English words corresponding to the Sanskrit words used in the translation are given in parentheses when necessary; in footnotes, numbers refer to the pages and lines of the texts concerned in principle, but with s., k., or v. they refer to the number of sūtra or verse; in the footnote, when a citation from another text is marked by the preceding =, it is exactly identical with the concerned passage in TBh, and when not so marked, the reader is asked to compare both. The translator believes that TBh, presenting rich information in brief and lucid language, could be used at least as the basis of a dictionary of Buddhist logical terminology which he is attempting. In view of this, he has tried in footnotes to trace back the citation in TBh to the original and to supply the theory discussed by Mokṣākara-gupta with a brief survey of the tradition behind it, though the range of his search is limited mainly to Sanskrit editions. Although he does not imagine that he has fully succeeded, it is hoped that the present work with detailed notes and commentaries could serve as a handbook of Buddhist philosophy.

During his stay in London in 1962, the translator read and discussed some portions of Chap. III of TBh with Professor John Brough of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, many of whose valuable suggestions are incorporated into the present work. Especially when reading § 20.2.4 in which our text, Sanskrit as well as Tibetan, is far from perfect, his analysis and partial rendering proved to be extremely helpful. The translator expresses his sincere gratitude. Of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, the translator has derived information from the works of Professor M. Hattori of Kyoto University (the part on epistemology) and Professor H. Kitagawa of Nagoya University (the
part on logic). Prof. Kitagawa's work in its final form was published just as the present work was completed for the press; Prof. Hattori's work is to be published in the *Harvard Oriental Series*, but the translator could refer to the typescripts which were made available to him by the kindness of the author. Professor Y. Ojihara has been ready to help the translator whenever the latter approached him with questions, especially those concerning Sanskrit grammar. The translator acknowledges his indebtedness to all these scholars. Thanks are also due to Mr. Peter Challis, who read through the English translation and helped the translator revise it.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYV</td>
<td>Hemacandra’s Anyayogavyacchedadvātrimśikā, included in SVM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhattacharya</td>
<td>D. Bhattacharya, History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhattaputra</td>
<td>Ślokavārttikāṭikā (Śarkarikā) of Bhaṭṭaputra-Jayamātra. ed. Kunhan Rāja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Annals</td>
<td>G. N. Roerich, The Blue Annals (Deb-ther shon-po).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasgupta</td>
<td>S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragment</td>
<td>H. N. Randle, Fragments from Diānīgā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Mokṣākaraṇagupta, ed. Embār Krishnamācharya. with a Skt. commentary by the editor. GOS no. XCIV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gnoli</td>
<td>PV Chap. I. with Dharmakīrtī’s Sva-vṛtī.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB</td>
<td>Hetubindu of Dharmakīrtī. a Skt. reconstruction included in HBT &amp; the Tib. edition (Peking Reprint ed. no. 5712).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBT</td>
<td>Hetubinduṭikā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa. ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi, GOS CXIII.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBK</td>
<td>Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyū or Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBRs</td>
<td>Journal of the Bihar Research Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitagawa</td>
<td>Hidenori Kitagawa, A Study of Indian Classical Logic-Dignāga’s System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunst</td>
<td>Arnold Kunst, Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṅgraha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mookerjee</td>
<td>Satkari Mookerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB &amp; NBT</td>
<td>Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrtī with Nyāyabinduṭikā of Dharmottara. ed. T. Stcherbatsky, Bibliotheca Buddhica VII.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBh</td>
<td>Nyāyabhāṣya. See NS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NKan=Nyayakaṭāka of Vācaspatimiśra. Paṇḍit New Series Vol. XXVI.
Parikṣāṃkutasūtra, of Māṇikyanandin. included in PKM.
Prasannapada = (MUlamadhyamakakarikas de Nagarjuna avec) la Prasannapada Commentaire de Candrakirti (Bib. Bud.), ed. de la Vallée Poussin.
PS, PSV=Pramāṇasamuccaya & -vṛtṛi. Peking Reprint Edition Nos. 5700. 5701 (V = Vasudrarakṣita’s tr.). 5702 (K = Kaṇaka-varman’s tr.)
PV=Pramāṇavārttikā of Dharmakirti. For Chap. 1 (Śvārthānumāna) R. Gnoli’s ed (SOR XXIII) is used ; For Chaps. II (Pramāṇasiddhi), III (Pratyakṣa) & IV (Parārthānumāna) Pramāṇavārttikabhaṣyam, ed. Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana (Tib. Skt. works Series. 1) is used.
PVBh=Pramāṇavārttikā-bhaṣya or -ālamkāra of Prajñākaragupta, ed. Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana.
PVV=Pramāṇavārttikavrṛti of Manorathanda, ed. Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana. 1937.
Randle=H. N. Randle, Indian logic in the early schools.
RC(The Rāmacarita of Sandhyākaranandin, ed & tr. R. C. Majumdar & others. 1939.
Sambandhaparikṣā=Dharmaṅkirti’s Sambandhaparikṣā by E. Frauwallner. WZKM Bd. 41.
Siddhi=L. de la Vallée Poussin. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang.
SR=The Subhāṣitaratnakośa. ed. Kosambi and Gokhale. HOS 42.
Taranātha=A. Schiefner, Tāranātha’s Geschichte des Buddhismus.
T Bh=Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta.
TRD=(Shaddarṣānasamuchchaya by Hari-bhadra with) Guṇaratna’s Com. Tarka-hasayadipikā, ed. L. Suall. Bib. Ind. CLXVII.
TS & TSP=Tattvasaṅgraha with the com. (Paṇjiṣka) of Kamalāśīla, ed. E. Krishnamacharya. GOS No. XXXI.
TSop=Tarkasopana of Vidyākaraśānti. in G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part 1
(SOR IX).

Virhsatika = Viṁśatikā Viṁśaptimātratāsidhaḥ, ed. S. Lévi.


VP = The Vākyapadiya by Bhartrihari (Brahmakāṇḍa), ed. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śukla.

Kashi Skt. Series. 124.

WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.

WZKSO = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.
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THE LANGUAGE OF LOGIC

Chapter 1. Indeterminate knowledge (pratyakṣa)

1. Prefatory verse. (1.2) Having done reverence to the master, the lord of the world, I [here begin to] elucidate the language of logic in order that [even] students of little intelligence may learn the thought of Dharmakirti.

2. Valid cognition defined. (1.4) Since those who act with deliberation in the world, desirous [for some object], follow the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) which are able to make us attain all human aims, the means of valid knowledge is to be first discussed.

(1.6) The means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) is true knowledge (saṃyag-jñāna) referring to an object not known before. [It is called] pramāṇa since by means of it an object is measured. However, it is not different from true knowledge itself, because it is free from the fault of uncertainty (saṁdeha) and erroneousness (viparyāsa). In the world, knowledge not disagreeing [with experience] (avisamvādaka) is called true knowledge. And this non-disagreement is not found in uncertain know-

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1. As stated by the editor in G 1, n. 1 the first few pages of this edition are based on the very defective manuscripts. and the parenthesized words are not those of the author of TBh. Until p. 4 of G, I disregard the variant readings found in it except at important places.

2. According to RC III. v. 7, an image of the Bodhisattva Lokeśa (probably the same as Avalokiteśvara) was placed at the center of the city of Varendri, where Mokṣākara-gupta resided in a monastery called Jagaddhala.

3. Cf. NB s. 1: saṃyag-jñānapūrvvakā sarvāṣṭrasaṅghasiddhir iti tad vuyāpādyate; NBT 3. 23: arthakriyāarthibhiṣ ca rāthakriyāsamarthaprapāṁśinīमā jñānā<y>ṃ mṛgyate ya ca tair mṛgyate tad eva śāstre vicāryate.

4. PVV 3. n. 2: pramāṇaḥ saṃyag-jñānam apūrvagocaram iti laṅkṣaṇam.

5. The Buddhist theory that the means and the result of cognition are one and the same is dealt with in § 8. See also PS I. v. 8 c-d: saṃyāpiṣṭapratitavat pramāṇaḥ phalam eva sat. (Hattori. Part II. Section 1. n. 55); PV III. v. 308 a-b: sā ca tasyātmabhūtaiva tena nārthāntaraṃ phalam; NB I. s. 18: tad eva ca pratyakṣaṃ jñānāṃ pramāṇaṃ phalam; PVBh 23. 5: pramāṇatathā phalam nāyata pramāṇāṃ na phalāt param, etc.; TS v. 1344-1349.

6. NBT 3. 5: avisamvādakāṃ jñānaṃ saṃyag-jñānam; PV II. v. 1: pramāṇaṃ avisamvādijñānam.
ledge as e.g. the knowledge [which cannot determine its object] to be either a man or a post, nor in erroneous knowledge as the knowledge of water seen in a desert.7 ‘Referring to an object [not yet known] (apūrvagocara)8 means that the object of it [=valid knowledge] has not been experienced before, gocara (range) denoting an object (viṣaya) such as a jar. Knowledge which has been produced by it [=an object] and which is capable of making us attain9 the object is the means of valid knowledge.

2.1. Function of valid cognition. (1.13) [The following objection may be raised:] “Knowledge is the maker (kārtṛ) [of an action], a person [possessing the knowledge] the agent (prayojya), and a thing the object (karman). But how can you call knowledge a pramāṇa if sometimes it does not [actually] make a man reach [an object] and thus is unable to cause him to attain it”

[The author:] We reply. We do not mean that a person is forcibly caused to act by knowledge as in the way of trampling on the neck,10 but that determination in the form ‘the essential quality of this thing is such and not otherwise’ is to be produced [by knowledge]; and if it is produced by knowledge, this much [of function] is called the validity of cognition, compatible [with experience]. As for a person possessing knowledge, he may actually take action towards the object because of a particular need (prayojana), or may not act owing to the lack of the need. And the object may also be snatched away by a yogin or a devil [who makes it unattainable]. But how is knowledge affected [through such

7. NBT 3, 18: ābhāyām pramāṇābhyām anyena jñānena pradarśito’rthaḥ kaścid atyaṅtaviṣparyastah, yathā maricikāsū jalam, sa cāsaṭṭvā prāptaṁ aṣāyakaḥ, kaścid aniyato bhāvabhāvayoḥ yathā saṁśayaṁārthaḥ.

8. Apūrvagocaram or anadhigatārthagantṛ is the qualification given to the pramāṇa by the Mimāṃsaka and the Buddhist. Stcherbatsky, II, 372, n. 6; PS I, k. 2d-3 b: na ca punah punar abhijnāne’niṣṭhāśaktikā śrīvidivat=PVBh 242, 29 (Hattori, II, n. 1: 20: 22); PV II, v. 3: gṛhitagṛhaṇāṅṅī nṛṣṭam sāhaṁ vat; v. 5 a: ajñātārthāprakāśo vā; PVBh 21, 12 f. b.: tatātārthavijñānāṁ nṛṣṭaṁ bādhavarjitaṁ, adevaśakāraśaraśadhaṁ pramāṇaṁ lokasammatam. Dhammottara explains the theory in NBT 3, 10 ff.: ata evaṇadhigataviṣayayaḥ pramāṇam... tato ‘dhigataviṣayam apramāṇam. Ratnakirti defines pramāṇa (RNA 90, 7): pramāṇayaḥ ca pramāṇāntavāygritamcātpravṛttivijñātāteśaṁ tatprāpane saktiḥ. Cf. n. 4 above.

9. For the expression prāpanayogya see PVBh 22, 8-7 f. b.: prāpakaṅvāt pramāṇam iti cet. na, prāpanayogaye vāvā pramāṇasya; Tṣop 275, 10-12: prāpanam api prāpakaṅvam tadvayhyata ca.

10. T mgrin pa nas bkug pa (Td pa’i) tshul du (in the way of pulling a person by the neck.
hindrances against actual attainment of the object]?

2.2. Logical difficulty arising from universal momentariness is solved. (2.4) [The opponent:] "The validity of cognition is [according to you] testified by its agreeing with experience (avisainvādakatva), and the agreement with experience is proved by the attainment of the object seen. We cannot, however, attain the same thing which we have seen, because of its momentariness (kṣanikatva) [i.e. the thing seen is different from the thing reached]. Furthermore, what is seen is the colour-form (rūpa) [of an object], but what is reached is the tangibility (spraṣṭavya) [of the object]. Thus, one thing is seen and another is reached. Accordingly what you reach is not the thing that you have seen. How then does this cognition become valid?"

[The author: This argument is] untenable. For even if we reach what is in reality different [from the thing we have seen], we still get the logical imagination (adhyavasāya) of identity ‘I reach the very same object which I have seen’; and this is meant by the expression ‘attainment of what has been apprehended’ (pratitaprapaṇa). On the other hand, the knowledge of water derived from a mirage etc. is definitely invalid because it cannot make us attain this [adhyavasāya].

[The opponent:] "Is it not that apart from the attainment of efficient operation13 (arthakriyā) we cannot ascertain that this [knowledge] is capable of causing to reach and that [knowledge] is not? And the difference between a valid and an invalid knowledge cannot be determined by [perceiving] the mere origination of knowledge. Therefore, how can it [i.e. knowledge determining the essential quality of an object] be valid knowledge?"

[The author:] There is not this fault [in our theory]. It is true that such a distinction cannot be determined by the origination of knowledge in general; yet we can point out how one is distinguished [from the other]

11. For a similar argument cf. NBT 3, 8: pravartakatvam api pravṛttinīśayapradarśakam eva, na hi puruṣaḥ hātāt pravartayitum śakoti vijñānam. See also E. Frauwallner, Dharmottaras Kṣāṇaḥbhāṅgasiddhi, WZKM 42, 251.

12. NBT 4, 8-11: nanu deśaniyatam ākāraṇiyataḥ ca prāpayitum śakyam, yatkālaḥ tu paricchinnah tathākālaḥ na śakyaṁ prāpayitum. nācyate yasmin eva kāle parichidyate taṁmin eva kāle prāpayitavyam iti. anyo hi darśanaḥ kālo 'nyaś ca prāptikālaḥ, kim tu yatkālaḥ paricchinnah tad eva prāpaṇyam. abhedādhyavasāyāc ca saṁhārangatam etsaṁvatvam draśṭavyam iti.

when we get the knowledge specific [to an object]. For instance, one who gets a dull cognition may be unable to determine the validity of knowledge at the moment of its origination, but he determines [the validity of his knowledge of fire or water] through perceiving efficient operation such as burning, cooking, immersion in water, bathing, drinking, etc. when he sees them afar, or through perceiving rising smoke etc. One who gets a sharp cognition, on the other hand, determines it not through the attainment of efficient operation, but only by the sharper perception (paṭutaraṇapratyakṣa).

2.3. The meaning of arthakriyāsthiti explained (2.20) [The opponent may raise another question:] "If the validity of cognition is defined to be agreement [with actual experience], then how can an auditory knowledge (śrātrañāna), which by its nature does not cause [the hearer actually to] reach the object he understands, be valid?" [The author:] This is untenable. For we mean that the validity of cognition is the apprehension of the essential quality (svarūpa) of an object; and this is possible without the actual attainment of efficient operation referring to an external object. This is expressed [by Dharma-kirti in PV 1.1 reading:] "Non-disagreeing knowledge is valid cognition; non-disagreement [here] means the existence of efficient operation." [and the subsequent verse]. In the case of the sound [of a word], hearing is the existence of efficient operation, since the purpose of sound is fulfilled if it is simply heard, just as the existence of efficient operation consists in the simple act of seeing in the cases of [the perceptions of] the sun, moon, cloud and sky. [This is meant by a Buddhist logician] when he says:

"The apprehension of the essential quality of an object is here

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14. Tp, n, and a Skt. Mss (cf. G 2, n. 2) have, instead of jñānaviṣēṣa, snānapānapājñānaviṣēṣa- =Āśe ṣaḥi khrus daḥ bāe (Read bāe) pa daḥ (Read pahi) khyad par..., and omit snānapāna out of the enumeration of the examples in the next line.

15. The problem is treated as a pūrvaṇaṇa of PV II. v. 1 c-d (see n. 16 below) by almost all commentators on PV. See e.g. PVBh 4, 17-18: śabdaviṣaye tu jñāne na dāha-pākadyarthakhriyā, svataḥ parataś cārthakhriyā'bhāvāt...

admitted as the existence of [efficient] operation."17

2.4. Is the validity of knowledge dependent on other knowledge or not? (3.7) However, when cognizing fire, water, etc. for the first time, a reasonable person wishing for effective operation proceeds to them, starting from the mere uncertain knowledge about the efficiency of the object. 18... Even if he is not clearly conscious that he has the doubt, [the situation is not different,] since the uncertainty which is attached [to his undertaking] can be by no means removed owing to the absence of a positive (sādhaka) or negative proof (bādhaka) 18...

Therefore [the problem] has been settled: one acts for an object by virtue of his obtaining only sharper perception, which, as soon as it is obtained, apprehends [by intuition] the customary efficiency of the object. But one who gets merely the dull cognition [of an object] begins to act after he has inferred the same [efficiency]. Thus, the validity of indeterminate knowledge [or direct perception] is established by itself (svataḥ prāmānya) [in the case of sharper one], but by another cognition (parataḥ) in some cases [in which the cognizer is unable to confirm the efficiency of an object at the first moment of the cognition]. As for the knowledge of a yogin (yogijnāna) and self-consciousness (svasaṁvedana), the validity is established by themselves. As for inference which is by nature certain, its validity is confirmed by itself.19

17. Probably this is a verse by Prajñākaragupta. PVBh 5, 21 (v. 9): jñeyasvarūpasaṁ-siddhir eva tatra kriyā matā, citre'pi dṛṣṭamātreṇa phalaṁ parisamāṇam.

18. T gal te de la īdi lta buḥi the tshom med par ḥjug (par ḥjug omitted in d) du chug kyan. ḍon kyan sgrab par byed pa daṅ gnod par byed paḥi tshad ma med paḥi phyir ro. gaṅ gshis pa, the tshom ḥbyuṅ (ḥgyur, d. n.) ba gaṅ gis bzlog (zlog d. n) par byed, ces so. My tr. follows M. I am reluctant to regard samsayo bhavan kena vāryate as a citation as T and G do. nor have I so far identified it.

19. Contextually the discussion in §2.4 directly follows that in §2.2 (Our text in §2.2-2.4 may have some confusion). Both the sections deal with the problem of whether the validity of cognition is intrinsically proved or not (svataḥ prāmānya or parataḥ prá-). Buddhist attitude towards the problem is most clearly stated by Kamalaśīla: He enumerates under TS v. 2811 four possible theories regarding the problem, viz. 1) both validity and non-validity are established intrinsically: 2) they are both proved through external cognition: 3) validity is proved intrinsically and non-validity by external cognition: 4) validity is proved by external cognition and non-validity intrinsically (TSP 745, 3-5). After a detailed examination he concludes: The Buddhist does not follow any one of these four theories, but holds that the validity of a cognition is proved sometimes intrinsically and another time by another cognition, there being no definite principle (TSP 811, 17-18: na hi buddhair eṣāṁ caturṇāṁ ekatamo'pi pakṣo 'bhīṣṭo 'niyama-pakṣasyaśṭatvāt). The Bud-
2.5. Apūrvagocara explained. (3.16) The following is implied in the discussion made above: Knowledge which occurs of an object for the first time is alone a valid cognition, all other knowledge which occurs later regarding the same object being excluded. For the latter is not valid because it grasps what has been once grasped as e.g. in the case of the determinate knowledge (savikalpakaṁ jñānam) in the form ‘This is a jar’, which we, having seen a jar by means of indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpakaṁ jñānam), get later with regard to the very same object, and which is accordingly of the nature of remembrance; or again, if we, having once obtained inferential knowledge ‘Here there is fire’ through the perception of smoke, get again, a moment later, the inferential knowledge ‘Here there is fire’ regarding the same place, [this latter knowledge is not valid because it is not probative]. 20

2.6. Sense-organs are not the means of valid knowledge. (4.5) When it is said that the means of valid knowledge is true knowledge, things such as sense-organs which are by nature insentient are by implication (sāmarthyaḥ) denied to be the means of valid knowledge, because they are incapable of ascertaining [the object]. Determining operation (paricchedakatva) is the function of a knower (boddhṛtvā), and this is innate only in knowledge. How then can it be the nature of such things as sense-organs which are by nature deprived of consciousness? 21
dhist logician divides sense-perception into two kinds: 1) perception of which the object has been repeatedly cognized by us, and of which the particular nature, i.e. the efficiency, is discerned as soon as we get it. The validity of perception is in this case proved by itself. 2) But when we are not accustomed to an object, we get perception of which the validity is uncertain; then we need another cognition, perception representing the effective action of the object or inference, in order to determine the validity of the first perception; then its validity is proved by external cognition. The problem is easily solved in the case of mānasā-pratyakṣa, yogi-jñāna, svasahvedana or inference, since these kinds of knowledge do not depend on an external object and are by nature intrinsically determinate. This problem is also treated by all the commentators on PV II, 1. For a brief but useful explanation see PVV 3, 3f. b.-4, 8 to which the description in TBh is very similar. See also TS v. 2966, 2974-2976, with TSP.

20. n. 8 above.
21. PV II. v. 3: ...dhi pramāṇatā, pravṛttes tatpradhānataē dheyopādeyaavastumi. Mokṣākara interprets this verse in § 2.5 and 2.6. TS v. 2029; TSop 281, 6-19 refutes the Vaiśbhaṣika who asserts the sense-organ to be the knower as follows: The Vaiśbhaṣika considers the sense-organ as knower (draṣṭṛ), thinking that if knowledge—which is not a resisting substance—were the knower, it would grasp even a concealed object. But this is untenable, you could say that knowledge would grasp even a concealed thing since nothing would hinder its movement, only if we asserted that knowledge travels to an object to grasp it.
3. Classification of the valid knowledge. (4.9) This [valid cognition] is twofold: indeterminate (pratyakṣa) and determinate cognition (anumāṇa).²² Pratyakṣa is [a tatpuruṣa compound which can be analysed into] aksaṁ pratigata-²³ i. e. 'connected with or depending on the sense-organ', aksa here standing for indriya (sense-organs) called eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin. Knowledge brought about by them is named indeterminate cognition [or direct perception].

[The opponent:] "If indeterminate knowledge is that depending on sense-organs, the three kinds of knowledge, mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa), [self-consciousness (svaśamvedana) and the knowledge of a seer (yogipratyakṣa)], which are to be soon dealt with, would not be indeterminate, since they are not produced from sense-organs."²⁴

[The author:] We reply to this. When we say 'connected with the sense-organ', it is simply the etymological definition (vyutpattinimitta) of the word pratyakṣa. The definition of the usage of the word pratyakṣa

But we say that knowledge grasps an image with which it is endowed. Moreover, an object at an inaccessible place has no resemblance with knowledge. How then can it be grasped by knowledge? Again, if the sense-organ were the knower, an object separated by glass etc. could not be grasped, since your doctrine tells that ten kinds of material dhātus [to which the sense-organ belongs] are resisting substances [cf. AK I. v. 29]. You may contend: "Why is it said in the scripture that colour-form is grasped by the eyes?"

We reply to this: This teaching is a metaphorical one.

²². PS I. k. 2 a-b (=PVBh 169. 3) : pratyakṣam anumāṇam ca pramaṇe (Hattori. II. 1. n. 11); NB s. 2-3: dvividhaṁ sahyagjñānam, pratyakṣam anumāṇam ca.
²³. NBT 6. 2-4: pratyakṣam iti, pratigatam āśritam aksaṁ. atyādayaḥ kṛṇādyarthe dvitiyayati samāsah. prātpānamālam gatisāmeṣu paravālīngapratisedhād abhidhayavālīnge sati sarvalīṅgaḥ pratyakṣasābdaḥ siddhaḥ. This explanation is almost verbally quoted in TSop 276. 2-6. Moṣṭikākara presupposes this grammatical interpretation given by Dharmottara. though he does not cite it. 'Pratyakṣa- is a compound word which may be analysed into aksaṁ (Paṅ. sū. 3. 4. 223) pratigata-, pratigata- meaning āśrita-, i.e. 'connected with or depending on the senses'. [That is to say, it is a tatpuruṣa belonging to the group gati-samāsa taught in sū 2. 2. 18]. However, it is formed according to the rule [in Bh. ad 2. 2. 18 vt. 4]: atyādayaḥ kṛṇādyarthe dvitiyayā (prefixes like ati- etc. in the sense of (ati-) kṛṇa- etc. can enter into composition with [their complement] in the accusative case). [If it is a tatpuruṣa, pratyakṣa would agree in gender with that of the last member, aksam, as taught in sū 2. 4. 26, and would be always of the neuter gender. But it is not so. for the agreement of the gender of a tatpuruṣa with its last member is denied [by 2. 4. 26 vt.] in compounds whose first members are prāpta- āpanna-, or alam- and 'gati samāsa'. Thus, the gender of the word pratyakṣa (as described at the beginning of Bh. ad 2. 2. 29) agrees with the subject to be related, and it is established as an adjective taking all the three genders.

²⁴. NBT 6. 6-7.
[in its particular signification] (*pravrttinimitta*) is to be understood as 'direct apprehension' (*sāksātkārita*) according to its conventional sense (*rūḍhivasāt*), just as [we understand not only 'mud-born' but also a species of lotus when we hear the word] *pañkaja*. Thus it is established that self-consciousness and the others are also denoted by the term *praty-akṣa*, because they directly apprehend knowledge as the content of self-consciousness and the others.25

(4.18) By *māna* [of *anumāna*] is meant that an object is measured by this means. The [*prefix*] *anu-* is in the sense of 'later' (*paścāt*). Thus, determinate knowledge or inference (*anumāna*) means 'subsequent measure'. That is to say, 'after' having grasped a logical mark (*liṅga* or probans) and having remembered the connection between the mark and that which possesses the mark (*liṅgin*, probandum), we get, regarding the concerned locus (*dharmin*) such as a mountain, knowledge which refers to an object not directly perceived. This knowledge is meant by the term 'inference'.26 Such [*usage of the word in its particular signification*] is to be understood according to the conventional sense [of the word].

4. **Valid knowledge is of only two kinds.** (5.3) By the word 'two-fold' are refuted the different opinions which [classify valid knowledge into] one, three, four, five, and six kinds. That is to say, the Ĉārvāka recognizes only one valid cognition, i.e. perception; the Śāṅkhya perception, inference and verbal testimony (*śābda*); the Naiyāyika perception, inference, identification (*uṭpamāṇa*), and verbal testimony; the Prabhākara perception, inference, verbal testimony, identification and presumption or postulation (*arthāpatti*); the [*Bhaṭṭa-]*) Mimāṃsaka perception, inference, verbal testimony, identification, presumption and non-existence (*abhāva*).27

We have enumerated indeterminate and determinate knowledge when it has been already understood that there are two valid cognitions by the

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25. NBT 6, 4-6; TSop 276, 6-8.
26. NBT 6, 10-13.
27. This description of various theories on the classification of *pramāṇa* is quoted with slight variations in TSop 277, 4-10. TSop 277, 9-10 *abhāvo hi pratyakṣaṁ śabdaṁ ca pramāṇam iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ* seems to be confused, and it can be bettered by emending into *abhāvo'pi mimāṃsakānām. pratyakṣam śabdaṁ ca pramāṇam iti vaiyākaraṇāḥ* (cf. the following passage in TBh). In this connection a verse in *Mānāmeyodaya* 8 is interesting: ċārvākā svād ekaṁ dvitayam api punar buddhavaisēsikau dvau bhasavaihās ca sāṅkhyaś tritayam udayanāyāti catuṣkām vadanti. prāhuḥ prabhākaraḥ pañcakam api ca vayaṁ telpi vedāntaviṇāḥ śatkāṁ purāṇikāṁ te aṣṭakam abhidadhīre sambhavaitihyayōgāt.
word ‘twofold’. The reason for this is to reject [the theory of] twofold cognition with different members. For the Vaiyākaraṇa says that twofold valid knowledge consists of perception and verbal testimony.\(^{28}\)

4.1. Refutation of the Cārvāka’s view of pramāṇa. (5.12) First of all, we assert that the Cārvāka has necessarily to admit the validity of inference. For he (1) advances the definition of perception [which is the same as inference proving the identity of pratyakṣa and pramāṇa] in order to teach others [the characteristic common to valid perceptions and that common to false perceptions]. (2) Other people’s thought is not perceptible but is to be inferred through its effect such as the operation of their body and words. From this, it follows that when he [says he] understands another person’s thought, he is forced to admit the inference based on the logical mark of an effect. Again, (3) when he denies the existence of another world, he actually has resort to a proof called negation (anupalambha) [which is inferential knowledge]. Therefore, how can the Cārvāka be sane when he argues by means of inferential knowledge, while saying that inference is not valid knowledge.\(^{29}\)

[From the fact that you, the Cārvākas, establish the common nature of valid knowledge and that of invalid knowledge, that you understand the thought of another person, and that you negate something, it follows that [inference which is] a pramāṇa other than perception exists.]\(^{30}\)

\(^{28}\) For the Vaiyākaraṇa’s refutation of inference as valid knowledge see Vākyapadīya, I, v. 32-34. They are cited for criticism’s sake in TS v. 1460-1462. Cf. Mookerjee 386-387. G adds here an oft quoted verse of Dharmakirti: pramāṇetarāsāṁyastīhitī anyashhiyogate, pramāṇāntarasadbhāvaḥ pratisedhāc ca kasyacit. This verse, originally found in PVn Peking ed. Ce 251, b 6 ff., is quoted in Ratnakirti’s Pramāṇāntarbhāva-prakaraṇa (RNA 90.2-3). It is also cited in SDS II, 19, 38-39; PKM 180. 5; 324. 4; NVV 1, 386, 2 etc. In § 4 Mokṣākara follows the argument of Ratnakirti; so it is quite possible that as in G he actually quoted this verse from Ratnakirti. But G misplaces the verse, since it is meant for proving the existence of inference against the Cārvāka who admits only perception as valid cognition and accordingly should be brought under § 4. 1.

\(^{29}\) Our author closely follows the argument of Ratnakirti. RNA 89, 25-29: na ca cārvākoḍpy anumānam anavasthāpya sthātuḥ prabhavati, vyāpātṛayakaraṇatāḥ, taccāstre hi pratyakṣetarsāmāṇyayoḥ pramāṇetaravidhānāḥ lakṣaṇapraṇayaṇato vidhātavyam, tac ca lakṣaṇaḥ pratyakṣe dharmiṣi lakṣye prāmāṇye pratyetave svabhāvo hetuḥ, parabuddhipratiṣedhau ca kāyādyāvyāpāraḥ kāryahetuḥ, paralokapratīṣedhe ca dyāṇupalambhaḥ ‘kṣitārthataḥ iti katham anumāṇāpadāpāḥ. ... See also SDS 18, 25-19, 40; TS v. 1456-1459 gives the Cārvāka’s criticism of inference which is refuted in the following verses by Śāntirākṣita. But this refutation is made in a way different from that in our text.

\(^{30}\) n. 28 above.
4.2. Refutation of verbal testimony. (6.1) Knowledge derived from verbal testimony could be admitted as valid only if it agreed with the external object; and this agreement \((avisānivādakatva)\) is not possible without a relationship \((sambandha)\). There is not, however, any relation between the word and the external object. The reason is as follows: If there were a relationship between the word and the thing-meant, it would be either identity \((tādātmya)\) or causality \((tadutpatti)\). Of these, an identical relationship does not anyhow exist between the word and the thing-meant, since the two are manifested as completely different [from each other]. For unity \((ekatva)\) is called identity. And if unity were to be admitted even between two differently manifested things, a cow and a horse would be one thing. Nor is a causal relationship [possible between the word and the thing-meant], since neither concomitance in agreement \((anvaya)\) nor in difference \((vyatireka)\) is observed [between them]. You cannot, therefore, assert that there is a causal connection between the two. For we see a jar, etc. being produced out of a lump of clay, a stick, water, a potter, and a wheel without [depending on] the operation of words, and a word for its part is produced only through the palate, etc. operated by the mere will of a man, even when there is no external object.32

(6.12) If there were, apart from identity and causality, another real relationship33 marked by the verbal expression and its meaning between the word and the thing-meant, then it would follow that when a word is spoken, even one34 who does not know the verbal convention can under-

31. Verbal testimony is advocated mainly by the Mimāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas. The first half of the author's criticism (§ 4.2) is directed to the Mimāṃsakas who regard the Vedic injunction as a means of valid knowledge, and the last half (§ 4.2.1) to the Naiyāyikas who define verbal testimony as the words of a reliable person. Our author follows Ratnakirti's discussion in RNA 92 ff.

32. RNA 92.11-19: codanāyās tāvad bāhyे'rtthe pratibandhābhāvān na prāmāṇyam. pravayaḥ, yasya yatra pratibandho nāsti na tasya tatra prāmāṇyam. yathā dahane pratibaddha-sya rāsabhasya, apratibaddhāḥ ca bahirarthe vaidikāḥ šabdā iti vyāpakāmupalabdhiḥ. na tāvad ayaṁ asiddho hetuḥ, śabdānāṁ vastutaḥ pratibandhābhāvāt. pratibandhābhāvāt hi pratibandhāḥ, na ca sā nirbandhanā, sarveṣāṁ sarvatra pratibandhāsvabhāvātāpraśaṅgāt. nibandhānaṁ cūsāṁ tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṁ anyyan nopaśabhyate. atatsvabhāvasyatauduttatteś ca tattvopratibandhāsvabhāvātāt. na hi śabdānāṁ bahirarthasvabhāvātātī bhinnopratibaddhāvātāt. nāpi śabdā bahirarthād upajāyante, artham antareṇḍri puruṣasyācchāpratibandhāvaṁ śabdasyoṭpādadārasanāt.

33. M. T vāstavaḥ; G svābhāvikaḥ.

34. M. T puruṣasya; G pramāṇaḥ.
stand the definite meaning by virtue of the natural capacity (*yogyatā*)\(^{35}\) [of a word], just as he apprehends a jar, etc.\(^{36}\) when it is lighted up by a lamp. But such is not the case, since, for example, a man who has newly arrived from the Nālikera (Nicobar) islands does not understand any meaning from the word *agni* when he hears it.\(^{37}\)

(6.17) [The opponent may contend:] “The word is born\(^{38}\) with such a nature that it is able to denote such and such an object according to such and such an agreement.” But this is untenable, because there is no evidence for this argument, for any agreement (*saṁketa*) can be applied to anything, and accordingly we do not know if someone really means what he says or another thing.\(^{39}\)

(7.2) Or, admitting that there is a connection other [than identity and causality], we should ask by what connection this [connection] is connected with the two [i.e. the word and the thing-meant]. If you propose that it is by another connection which is the fourth [entity], we should ask by what connection the fourth is connected with the [other three] entities. If you produce the fifth, the same question would be asked again with regard to the fifth. Thus, there being an infinite regress (*anavasthā*), the last is never established, which makes all the preceding ones illegitimate.\(^{40}\)

(7.6) Or if\(^{41}\) you say that the connection of the word and the thing-

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35. RNA 92, 20-23: *namu yogatayāiva kiṁcit pratibaddhavabhāvam upalabhyaṁ, yathā caṣṭurindriyaṁ rūpe, caṣṭuḥ khalu vyāpāryamāṇaṁ rūpaṁ evāpalambarṇati, tathāvaidvā dice ṣaṁbāṛās tādāṁyaṣaṣṭattpattivivṛtā pūre yogyatāṁṣaḥṇendriyaṁ arthāṁ bodhaष्यति।

36. M, T ghaṣṭādi-; G ghaṣṭaṣṭādi-.  

37. RNA 93, 24-27: *tariḥ vacyāvācakalakṛ̣ṇaṁ ṣaṁbāṛātyoḥ sambandho bhaviṣyaṁ... iti etc, namu tasya vāstavaṁ ‘ṣaṁketavidyoḥ arthaḥpratipāṭtir bhavaṁ ity uktam....

38. M jāyate; G jātaḥ.  

39. RNA 93, 21-24: *atha tattatsaṁketa-pekeṣas tadartha-pratyanayoga evaṁ jāta ity ucyate, tad api na prastutopayogi, na hy evam asya prāmāṇyam avatīṣṭhate. yadā hi saṁketenāpuraṣṭha-pratipādanam api sambhāvyata eva, tadā na sakyam upa威尔paitum kim ayam abhimatsayaivārthasya dyotaka na viti.

40. The following argument seems to originate from Dharmakirti’s Sambandhapaṁśa v. 4: dva desa kābhisambandhit saṁbhandho yadi taddvayoḥ, kāḥ saṁbhandho ‘na vaṣṭha ca na saṁbhandhāntvā tathā (Frauwallner translates: Wenn die beiden [verbundenen Dinge] durch die Verbindung mit einem einzigen [Ding] verbunden sind, welche Verbindung besteht dann bei den beiden? Ferner (ergibt sich) eine endlose Reihe. Auf diese Weise kann es keine Erkenntnis einer Verbindung geben.) Frauwallner, Dharmakirti’s Sambandhaparikṣā. WZKM Bd. 41. 264, 270 and 280.

41. M=T (ci ste) atha; G artha.
meant is possible without being connected [by another connection], this is not correct. How can a thing which is not connected [with another] be a connecting link itself, as in the case of a piece of cloth with regard to a jar. [The opponent may contend:] "It should be said that a connection is by nature such that it connects others without requiring another connection." [The author:] This is untenable. No objection (uttara) may be raised when the nature [of a thing] is established by a proof as when a nature such as burning is [established by a proof] as belonging only to fire and not to other things such as ether. On the contrary, we, in spite of our scrutiny, do not find any justification for the establishment of a connection. You should not contend that the word, having by nature an expressive capacity (śabdasakti), never deviates from the thing-meant determined by it. For if the word 'jar' denotes by nature the category (padārtha) which, having a conch-shaped neck, is able to hold water, then how can it denote a horse and other things when depending on another agreement and the particular will of a speaker. It will indeed be impossible for a seed of rice, which is produced by its own causes with the nature of yielding its shoot, to give birth to an ass, even if it is understood according to another agreement.43

4.2.1 (7.19) It is also not acceptable that the words spoken by trustworthy persons44 are a means of valid knowledge, since trustworthiness is impossible to be ascertained. The state of being emancipated from all faults (kṣīṇadōsatva) is called trustworthiness (āptatva). Emancipation from all faults refers to a certain state belonging to another person's mind. And this is hardly visible [i.e. determinable], since we see [sometimes] that physical and lingual actions [supposed] to be the logical mark45 [through which we infer the trustworthiness of the concerned person] occur46 in persons who are not [really trustworthy]. When it is usual that a man

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42. M. sambadhñāti; G=T sambadhñātīti.
43. RNA 93, 16-20: atha svahetubhir evāyam idyās teṣāṁ svabhāvo datto yena te saukketaniśeṣūsahāyā eva kam api arham avabadhayanti. na tarhi saukketaparāṣāt pavārthāntaravṛttaḥ bhaveyuk, yadi hy ayam agnihotrasaṅghaḥ saukketāpeko yugaviśeṣupratipādakaḥ, kathāḥ saukketaṇyayenārthāntaraṁ pratipādayati. na hi kṣiṣtyādyapekṣaṇa bijena svahetor aṅkurajananasvabhāvenātpammanaṁ rāsahāḥ śaṅkyo janayitum, tathā śabḍop yadarthapratipādananīyatas tam eva prakāśayet.
44. NS 1. 1. 7: āptopadesāḥ śabḍaḥ.
45. M kāyavāgyaḥpārādikāryaliṅgasya; G kāyavāgyaḥpārasya kāryaliṅgasya tu.
46. M=T ivaṇītīdāsrāntāḥ; G saṁdarśanāt.
having passions pretends to be free from passions, how can you ascertain trustworthiness? 47

4.2.2 (8.4) Since the validity of the words of the Veda is negated through our refutation of a connection [between the word and the thing-meant], we do not deal with it separately. [The opponent may ask:] “If so, how about all verbal usage in the world which is not to be doubted?” [The author:] It is not hurt at all, because [the words convey their meaning] by virtue of the desire of a speaker [who expresses himself] according to such and such an agreement. It is said:

The words are to refer to the mere intention of a speaker [and not to the external object meant by it]. 48

4.3. Refutation of identification. (8.9) The Naiyāyika explains49 identification (upamāna) as follows: “Suppose that there is a man, operator of identification, who knows a cow but not a gavaya, and that he is directed by his master to go to a forest to bring a gavaya. Not acquainted with the object denoted by the word gavaya, he asks an inhabitant of a forest or50 another man who knows it: My friend, what is a gavaya like? And the latter answers: A gavaya is like a cow. Now the servant, when he is in a forest, gets the knowledge of the resemblance (sārūpyajñāna) of a gavaya [to a cow] which, being assisted by the remembrance of the object suggested by the analogical expression (atidesavākyārthasamarāṇasahakārīn),51 produces the comprehension (pratipatti) that this is the very object designated by the word gavaya; here the knowledge of resemblance, being the agent (kartṛ), is a means of knowledge, and the

47. RNA 94. 11-13: āpta-pranitasya punar vacanasya...na prāmāṇyam upagantarāt śakyate, paracittavṛttinām asakyanīścayatvenāpatavāparijñānat.
49. NBh, NV and NVT ad NS 1.1.6. There is difference of opinion on what is the means of knowledge in the case of upamāna between NBh and NV-NVT (cf. Jhā's note 2 in NS 28). Mokṣākara, as well as Ratnakirti, reproduces here the view of Vācaspatimiśra that in identification sārūpyajñāna (the knowledge of the similarity, say, of a gavaya with a cow) is the pramāṇa, which being aided by the atidesavākyārthasamarāṇasahakārīna produces the pratipatti in the form ‘This object is what is named gavaya’ (cf. NVT 169, 5ff.: piṅgasya hi gavayasyaśabdavācyatāṁ puruṣottideśavākyasamarāṇasahakārīṇaḥ pratīyakṣād gavayagatād gosādyāyāt prajñānena tena prajñāpayata iti pramāṇavāpārāh prajñāpayam uktam iti.)
50. Insert va between anyah and tajjñāṁ (cf. n. 52 below).
51. M atidesā; G ēptātidesā; T bstan pa =ādeśa.
comprehension \(\text{[produced by it]}\) is its effect \(\text{(phala)}\).\(^{52}\)

[The author:] This is untenable. For the validity of any kind of knowledge must be pervaded \(\text(vyāpta}\) by the state of having its object. But in this case, in spite of a careful investigation, we do not find\(^{53}\) the object. For it is said \[by you\] that the connection of the designation \[with the thing designated\] \(\text(samākhya-sambandha}\) is the object \(\text(viṣaya)}\) of this \[identification\].\(^{54}\) But such a connection is not existent in reality. For if it is \[by nature\] visible, its \[presence\] is negated by the actual non-perception of it, and if, on the contrary, it is invisible, we do not see any justification for establishing its existence.

(9.3) Furthermore, is this connection existent separately from the two terms which are connected or not? If it is separate, it should be explained by what connection the two terms are connected \[with the connection itself\]. If you here imagine another connection, then an infinite regress would follow. Or, if it is not separate \[from the two connected terms\], then you should admit the existence of the two connected things alone, but not anything which is called a designating connection \(\text(samākhya}\).\(^{55}\) If you again say that the connection \[here\] means \[a separate entity which\] produces the idea of the connected, it is not reasonable. For the idea that these two are connected originates from the two connected things by virtue of their own causes, and is not able to win over a relationship

\(^{52}\) RNA 91, 20-25: ayam asya praṇaṇaḥ, yaḥ pratipattā gām jānāti na gavyam, ēdiśāca svāminā gacchārayamy gavyam ānayāmād iti. gavyasyaśabdwāryam artham ajānāno vanecaram ananyā vā taṇjñām pratiśāvān. bhūtābh kādāśyo gavya iti. tena cādiśaṃ yathā gauṣ tathā gavya iti. tasya śrutātiśāvākyasya kasyāṃcīd aranyām upagatasyaśūcāvākyārtha-smaṇaṇasahakāri yaḍ gavyasāruṣyaṣaṃbhanaḥ tat prathamata evāsau gavyasyaśabdwācyo 'ṛtha iti pratipattim prastuvānam upamānaḥ pramāṇam iti.

\(^{53}\) M sampasyiima...  

\(^{54}\) NBh 20, 3: samākhya-sambandhapratipattir upamānārtha ity āha; NVT 169. 15: samākhya-sambandhapratipattir upamānārthaḥ phalam. RNA 95, 25: tathā hi samākhya-sambandhaḥ tasya viṣayo varṇyate, sa ca paramārthato nāsti. The meaning of the Buddhist criticism here is as follows: sāruṣyajñāṇa is, as Vācaspati himself says, none other than pratyakṣa, atidesaṁsmaronā is the same as āptopadesa or śabda, and the last characteristic particular to upamāna, samākhya-sambandha, is not existent in reality, because as already refuted in § 4.2. sambandha in general is not admitted. For a similar criticism by Dignāga see Randle, 317.

\(^{55}\) RNA 95, 26-27: sa hi sambandhaḥ sambandhābhīṃ kāhino 'bhinnō vā. yadi bhinnas tadā tāyor iti kutāḥ, na ca sambandhāntarād iti vaktavyam. tad api kathāḥ teṣām iti cintāyām anavasthāp practicesaḥ (cf. n. 40 above too). RNA 96, 1-2: athābhīminā, tadā sambandhinav eva kevalav iti na samākhya-sambandho nāma, yaḥ kaścid upamānasya viṣayaḥ syāt.
which is another entity.56

4.3.1. (9.11) In the same way, the validity of [identification] described by the Mimāṃsakas is also to be repudiated. For an object qualified by resemblance (sādṛṣyavisiṣṭaḥ pindiḥ) or resemblance qualified by object-ness (pindiḥvisiṣṭam sādṛṣyaḥ) is proposed by them as the object of identification. However, resemblance separate from the things similar cannot be established, just because there is no proof for knowing it. That is to say, if resemblance which is separate from the similar things is visible, then [the existence of] it is eclipsed by the non-perception of a perceptible object (drśyānupalambhagrasta). And if it is an invisible entity, how then57 can it be established even by inference, since we do not find any logical mark which is necessarily connected with it? On the other hand, the idea of resemblance can be produced by an object resembling [another] which is so produced by its own causes as to give rise to the idea. You are unable to establish [an entity called resemblance] through the idea of [resemblance].

The opponent may contend that resemblance is established by means of identification, [but not vice versa]. But this is untenable, because the opponent school speculates that the relation of qualifier (viṣeṣaṇa) and qualificand (viṣeṣya) found only between two similar bodily objects which have been established by a proof other [than identification] holds good as the object of identification. How then can resemblance alone be established by identification?58

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56. RNA 95, 31-96, 1: ayam anayoh sambandhaḥ sambaddhaḥ tav iti tu buddhiḥ svahetubalat sambaddhavastuvayād api sambhāvyamānā na sambdhānaḥ ākṣetputr prabhavati. tasmān na bhinnasambandhāsiddhiḥ. (Read samākhyaśambandho nāma instead of samākhya nāma sambandho in M 9, 6-7).

57. M=T tādā; G tad api.

58. RNA 95, 1-17: tathā hi sādṛṣyavisiṣṭoḥ pindiḥ pindiḥvisiṣṭoḥ vā sādṛṣyaḥ upamānasya viṣaya varṣyate, na sadṛṣavastuvatiriktaḥ sādṛṣyaḥ vyavasthāpayitum sakyate pramāṇena-pratitvat. namu sādṛṣyaḥ vastu durvāram eva, yad āha, sādṛṣyaṣya ca vastutvak na sakyam apabādhītum. bhūyo 'vyavasāmānyayogā jātīyataraṇyata tat. (cf. SV Upamāṇa, v. 18) iti. atrōcyate, yadi sadṛṣṭiriktam sādṛṣyaḥ vastu dṛṣyaḥ syat, tadā dṛṣyānupalambhagrastam eva... athādṛṣyaḥ tat sādṛṣyaḥ upayate, tathāpi tatra prasiddhāṅgābhāvād asiddham eva...sadṛṣya-pratyayas tu svahetos tathāhāpamena sadṛṣavastuudāpi kriyāmaṇaḥ ghaṭaṭa evāt na sādṛṣyaḥ utāphayitum prabhavati. upamāna-praṇāmābhālād eva sādṛṣyasiddhir iti eṣa, na. pramāṇantarasidd- dhyāy eva sādṛṣyaṇaḥ pratyayor viṣeṣaṇaḥviṣeṣyābhāvāsopamaṇāṇaiviṣayatvat. kathāḥ sādṛṣyaṃtrasyop- pamānāt siddhiḥ. tataḥ ca sādṛṣyasāsidhāḥ na tadaviṣṭaḥ pindiḥ pindiḥvisiṣṭaḥ vā sādṛṣyaḥ upamānasya viṣayaḥ.
4.4. Refutation of presumption. (10.5) Presumption or postulation
(arthāpatti) is not accepted as a separate means of valid knowledge.
Presumption is defined: Presumption is the supposition of a thing with­
out which another thing apprehended by a proof, perception or else, would
become unintelligible.

The following should be considered here: If the thing perceived by
a means of valid knowledge is connected with the unseen, supposed thing
through either the relation characterised by identity or that characterised
by causality, then this is knowledge produced either from a logical mark
of identity or from a logical mark of causality; it follows that the [so­
called] presumption is none other than inference. Or, if there is no such
connection, then presumption cannot be a means of valid knowledge,
just because there is no necessary connection as in the case of under­
standing a piece of cloth from a jar.

4.5. Refutation of non-existence. (10.13) By no means do we cognize
the essential quality of the [so-called] non-existence (abhāva).
How then
can it be a pramāṇa? [Defining non-existence] the Mimāṁsaka says:
“'The non-production of [the five] means of valid knowledge beginning
with perception is [itself] a means of valid knowledge called non-existence.'

What do you here mean by ‘non-production’? Is it 1) the mere nega­
tion of the proposition ‘knowledge is produced’ (prasajyavṛtti)? Or 2)
does it mean something positive, being construed as the negation of a
term (paryuddāsavṛtti)? If something positive is meant, is it 2. a) an

59. Mimāṁsābhāṣya, 12, 4-5: arthāpattir api dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nārpaḍayata
   ity arthakalpanā; NBh ad NS 2.2.1.: yatrābhidiḥyamāne'rthe yo'nyo'rthaḥ prasajyate so
   'rthāpattīḥ; SV Arthāpatti, v. 1: pramāṇaṣaṭhaśvijñāto yatrārtho nānyathā bhavet, adṛṣṭaḥ
   kalpaṇed anyāṃ sārthāpattīr udāḥṛtā. RNA 91, 27-29: pratyakṣādhibhi śābhīḥ pramāṇaḥ
   prasiddho yo'rthaḥ sa yena vinā na yujyate tasyārthasya kalpaṇam arthāpattīr iti...  
60. RNA 96, 16-25: atra vicāryate, yasyārthasaḥ darśanād yo'rthaḥ parikalpyate tayor
   yadi pratiḥandaḥ'asti tadārthāpattīr anumāṇam eva...anyathā tena vinā nārpaḍayata ity
   ahrikād anya na brūyat, ghaṭapaṭavat... tatra svabhāvapratibhandhe svabhāvaḥetujayaiva sārthā-
   pattiḥ. tadārthāpattipratibhandhe kāryaliḥgajayā.  
61. RNA 92, 1-9: pratyakṣaṁunumāṇādipramāṇapañcakābhāvastabhāvam abhāvakhyāṃ pramāṇam,
   prameyam ghaṭāvabhāvāḥ. nāṣṭha ghaṭādīti jñānaṃ ghaṭādyaḥbhāvālambhānuḥ phalam.
   yad āha kumāriliḥ: pratyakṣādhibhi anupattiḥ pramāṇapācaḥ ucyate, sātmano 'pariṇāma vā
   vijnānāṃ vyavastunī. (SV Abhāva, v. 11). pramāṇapañcakaḥ yatra vastutūpe na jāyate,
   vastusattvābhodhārthāṁ tatrābhāvapramāṇātā (SV Abhāva, v. 1) iti...  
62. J. F. Staal gives an excellent logistic interpretation of the two kinds of negation,
   paryuddā- and prasajya-pratīṣedha as classified by the Mimāṁsakas and grammarians (cf.
insentient thing (*jaḍarūpa*) or 2. b) a form of knowledge? If it is a form of knowledge, 2. b. 1) is it knowledge in general (*jñānamātra*) or 2. b. 2) the knowledge of a positive thing related to one and the same knowledge [which grasps non-existence] (*ekajñānasāṁsargivastuno jñānam*)?

Among these, 1) the negation of a proposition (*prasajyarūpo'bhāvaḥ*) is not appropriate. How can the mere negation devoid of [further] function possess the ability of discrimination (*paricchedakatvā*) or of producing


Staal’s tr. (ibid. 58): ‘Exclusion (*paryudāsa*) is to be understood where the negative (is connected) with the next word; prohibition (*pratīṣedha*) is to be understood where the negative (is connected) with the verb(al ending)’. An almost identical verse (having *prasajyapratiṣedhas tu for pratīṣedhaḥ sa viśeṣaḥ*) is quoted in grammar (ibid. 59). In the field of Buddhist philosophy, it is Bhāvaviveka (-570 A. D.) who first made the distinction between the two kinds of negation in order to clarify the absolutist standpoint of the Mādhyaṃkika philosophy. Cf. My Bhāvaviveka’s *Prajñāpradīpika* (1. Kapitel) WZKSO Bd. VII. S. 48. Avalokitavara, a commentator on the *Prajñāpradīpika*, quotes an interesting verse explaining this distinction (ibid. 48, n. 11):

Dr. E. Steinkellner of Vienna was kind enough to inform me of the existence of Arcata’s elucidation of the two kinds of negation in HBT; and on examining it, I found in HBT 171. 4 ff. a Sanskrit passage which is in sense parallel to the Tibetan verse cited above. This reads: *yatā vidheḥ prābhāyaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ ‘rthāryitaḥ viḍhiḥbhūḥ svapadena nāyate ekavikṛtyā ca tatra paryudāsyāyati... prasajyapratiṣedhaḥ punar etadviṃpito mantavyaḥ, tatra hi pratiṣedhasya viṣhāḥ arthād ganyate vākyabhṝṣṭaḥ svapadena naḥ pratīṣedhabhūḥ sambhāvyate.* ‘In (a compound word or proposition) where the mode of *paryudāsa* (the negation of a term) is applied the main motive is affirmation, negation is understood by implication alone, the object to be affirmed is not expressed by its own word, and the negation means the same sense as the affirmative proposition derived from it, [e.g. ‘He is a non-brāhmaṇa’ is the same in sense as ‘He is a kṣatriya’]... *prasajyapratiṣedha* (the negation of a proposition) is to be considered as opposite to this, i.e. in the case of (prasajyapratiṣedha) the main motive is negation, affirmation is understood by implication, (the negation) conveys a different sense from the affirmative proposition related to it. [e.g. ‘They do not look at the sun’ conveys a different meaning from ‘They look at the sun’] and the object to be negated, being expressed by its own word, is connected with the negative’. In his exposition Arcata refers also to the fact that in *paryudāsa* the negative is related only to *subanta* or nominal inflected forms, whereas in *prasajya* it is related to *tiṇanta* or verbal inflected forms. For a detailed exposition see my article ‘仏教哲学における命題解釈—evaの意味制限機能’ (*Analysis of a proposition by Buddhist philosophers with special reference to the particle eva restricting the meaning of a sentence*) in Dr. Enshō Kanakura Commemoration Volume. This distinction is applied by Arcata to the Buddhist theory of non-cognition (*amupalabdhi*), which should be understood as the cognition of other things (*anyopalabdhi*), the negation being construed as *paryudāsa*. Mokṣākara discusses the same in § 13.
knowledge (jnānajanakatva)? Thus, no one will have resort to it.63 Paññita Cakracūḍāmaṇi says in this connection:64

Non-existence is not apprehension of any object, nor a cause of knowledge; How can it be known [as a means of knowledge]?

2. a) [What is meant by non-existence] cannot be an sentient thing, because an insentient thing has no discriminating function. We have not anywhere seen nor heard that insentient things such as a cart discriminate a jar.

2.b.1) Nor can it be knowledge in general, for in this case it would follow that Mt. Sumeru, Śaṅkha, the future emperor, and a demon, though inaccessible in space, time and essence, are [known to be] absent by means of the proof of non-existence as knowledge in general [when in reality these things cannot be judged to be either existent or non-existent].

2.b.2) If again non-existence here means the knowledge of a positive thing such as a piece of ground forming a part of the same knowledge [which grasps the non-existence of a jar], then it is in essence a particular kind of perception (pratyakṣaṇaśeṣa), though given another name ‘non-existence’. Then there should be no difference of opinion [between you and us].65

Thus it has been established that the means of valid knowledge is twofold and only twofold, viz. indeterminate and determinate knowledge.

5. Indeterminate knowledge defined and discussed. (11.15) Among these, indeterminate knowledge is devoid of fictional constructs or deter-

63. M=T (de sgrub par byed pa ma yin no): na tat pratipadyate; G tat pratipadyate.
64. The words of Cakracūḍāmaṇi are cited also in the passage of Ratnakirti (see 1.7 in n. 65 below), though he does not mention him by name. So far I have not identified the words. nor do I know who Cakracūḍāmaṇi is.
65. RNA 97, 20-98, 1 : atha vibhāvaṇāṁyasvarūpam eva nirūpyatám. kaḥ punaḥ pramāṇābhaveṃbhikato bhavatām, kim prasajyavṛttayā pramāṇaṇupatiftamāram. atha vā paryudāṣyavṛttayā bhavatāram. vastvantaram api jādarūpaḥ jñānārūpaḥ vā. jñānārūpaḥ api jñānātmākram ekajñānaśaṃsargavastujñānaḥ vēti sa ṣad vikalpāḥ. tatra na tāvan niṣṭyirāpo 'bhavō yuyate. sa khalu nikhilaśaktiṇikatalayā na kīcit. yac ca na kīcit tat kāthām abhāvaṃ parīchindyaḥ, tadviṣayaḥ vā jñānaṃ janayet. pratītaṃ vā tat kāthām iti sarvam andhākāraṇaṃ, yād āhuḥ: "na hy abhāvaḥ kasyaṣci pratiṣṭhābh pratiṣṭhiṇhi vētur vā tasyaṣci kalāṇaḥ pratiṣṭihā" iti. nāpi vastvantaratāpīkṣe jādarūpaḥ bhāvaḥ sāṃgacchate. tasyābhāvaṃālaṃśaṃprameyaṃ parīchchedaḥbhāva, parīchedaśasya jñāṇaḥdhammaṃvatāḥ. nāpi jñānamātraṃvabhaṇo bhāvo vaktasyaḥ, desākālaṃvabhaṇoṣvapraṃṣṭasyaḥ tato bhāvaṃprasaṃgatāḥ. tadapekṣayiḥ jñānamātrotvati tasya. athaikajñānaśaṃsargavastujñānaḥ abhāvaṃ yamanyate taddastam abhāvaṃpratītyasāya, pratyakṣaṇaḥṣasyaṣyaivabhāvanāṃmakaraṇaḥ, tasya cāsmābhīr dṛṣṭyānupalambhākyasādhanatvena sviṣṭatvāt.
mining factors (kalpanā) and unerring (abhrānta). The determining factor consists of comprehending (an object) in association with a word-sound (śabda) or internal notion (or inarticulate representation, antarjalpa), while linking together the preceding and subsequent moments [of the momentary object]. This may be illustrated by a clever man’s comprehension in the form ‘This is a jar’, the comprehension of a baby, dumb person or animal in the form of internal notion or reflection (parāmarśa). In this connection the following is said [by Dharmakīrti]:

Determination is the cognition of a representation which is capable of being associated with words.

(12.3) [It may be asked:] ‘‘How do you ascertain that a baby, a dumb person etc. have determinate knowledge (kalpanāṇāṇa) in the form of inarticulate representation?’’ [We infer it] from the effects of determining factors such as taking what is desired and avoiding what is not desired. And such effects are perceived in a baby and a dumb person, who indeed claim what they want and abandon what they do not.

By pointing out that the knowledge of a baby, dumb person etc. contains fictional constructs it is taught that even simple perception (ālopanyajnana) said by Kumārilabhaṭṭa (to be indeterminate knowledge) is determinate.

(12.8) [The opponent:] ‘‘Why is knowledge associated with constructs or by nature erring not indeterminate knowledge?’’ [The author:] It is not, because it is well known to all scholars that indeterminate know-

66. PS I, k. 3c: pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham (Hattori, II. 1, n. 25); NB I, s. 4: tātra pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham abhāntam; PV III, v. 123 a-b: pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati.
67. PS I, k. 3d; nāmajātyādiyojanā (Hattori, II. 1, n. 26); = NB I, s. 5: abhilāpaṁ sarvacalpāpratibhāsapratitiḥ kalpanā. NBT under this sūtra interprets the word yogya as denoting not only explicit connection with a name but also a baby’s notion which is not connected with a clear name.
68. M=T; G vikalpakāryasyeṣṭāniṣṭopādānaparirhārasṛdayāt.
69. The present argument is followed by Vidyākaraśānti in TSop 278, 6 ff.
70. SV Pratyakṣa, v. 112: asti hy ālopanājināṁ prathamaṁ nirvikalpakam, bālamūkādiśāndrāṁ mugdharastum. Cf. Randle, 120, n. 2: There is a primary intuitive apprehension, an unqualified perception, arising from the mere real, –like the apprehension of infants and the dumb. See also Dasgupta, I, 378. The verse is cited also in TSop 280, 1-2.
71. M=T pratyakṣaṁ na syād iti cen na; G na pramāṇam iti cet.
72. M=T prasiddham; G sammatam.
ledge is knowledge directly intuining the real nature of an object. For knowledge grasping an object is the effect of the object, and the object which is grasped is the cause of the knowledge, as is said [by Dharmakirti]:

How can a [momentary] thing which is at a different time [from that of the indeterminate cognition grasping it] be an object of the indeterminate cognition? We reply: Philosophers recognize that the essence of a sense-object consists in its being a cause capable of leaving its image in the knowledge. [On the contrary], determinate knowledge is produced from the past impression alone even when there is no [corresponding] object. Being neither positively nor negatively concomitant with the external object (anwayavyatirekābhāvā), how can it be an effect of an object? For if \( x \) can exist without \( y \), then \( x \) is not the effect of \( y \). Otherwise the unwarrantable consequences (atiprasaṅga) would follow. If determinate knowledge were produced out of an object, then an object such as a jar could be seen just because of that knowledge; it would mean that even a blind person could see a colour-form. But such is not the case. Therefore it is said:

Determinate knowledge has no function of intuiting an object, since the object is not manifested in verbal knowledge as in indeterminate perception.

The present argument serves to repudiate the following opinion stated by another scholar [i.e. Bhartrhari]:

“‘There is in this world no cognition which is not followed by a word; All knowledge appears as if penetrated by words.’”

73. G artham; M artharūpam; but T don gyi raṅ gi ṇo bo=arthasvarūpam, which is best.

74. =PV III, v. 248 =PVn Derge ed. 158, b 1: bhinnakālaṁ kathāṁ grāhyam iti cet grāhyatāṁ viduḥ, hetu tvam eva yuṣṭijñā jñānākārārpanakṣamam. Cf. Stcherbatsky, II, 360; Mookerjee, 338. G and T of our present text omit the part bhinnakālaṁ kathāṁ grāhyam iti.

75. sābdyāṁ buddhāva arthasya pratayakṣa iva pratibhāsābhāvāt nāsti kalpaṇyā arthā-sāksātkāritvam. Not identified.

76. M 13, n. 2 and G yad uktaṁ sāṁkhyena, but T yad uktaṁ pareṇa.

77. =VP I, v. 123: na so’sti pratayayo loke yaḥ sābdānugamād ēte, anuwiddham iva jñānam sarvaṁ sābdena bhāṣate. The verse is often quoted by Buddhist logicians for criticism’s sake (cf. TSP 68, 8; 70, 13; TSop 279, etc). bhāṣate being sometimes replaced by jāyate or vidyate.
For example, while ['the word ‘jar’'] is pronounced with regard to a jar placed before us, other knowledge concerning a piece of ground etc. close to the jar is experienced as well, though they are not referred to by the pronounced word.\(^78\) In such a case we do not find the association with a word.\(^79\) This is [testified by the rule that] two concepts (vikapa) cannot occur at the same time.

5.1. **Abhiránta explained.** (13.13) Erring knowledge (bhrāntam jñānam) is also unable to intuit [the reality of] its object. For ‘erring’ means to be opposite to the real thing capable of effective operation. The nature of a real thing capable of effective operation is determined in space, time and form. Then, how can it be intuited by erring knowledge whose content is falsely presented? As Ācārya [Dharmakirti] says:

Indeterminate perception is knowledge which is not affected by illusion produced through the darkness of the eyes, rapid motion, travelling on a boat, a violent blow or other causes.\(^80\)

By this, the following are referred to: One suffering from jaundice, seeing a white shell, gets the knowledge presenting itself as yellow; One gets the knowledge\(^81\) presenting itself as a circle while seeing a fire-brand being swung\(^82\) in a circular motion; one who is sitting on a boat in motion gets the erroneous knowledge\(^81\) of running trees\(^83\); when one is severely hit in vulnerable parts of the body, we get the knowledge\(^81\) presenting itself as a flaming\(^84\) post; all [the erroneous knowledge referred to] is not [valid indeterminate] perception.

[The following objection may be raised:] ‘If such [erroneous] cognition is not valid indeterminate knowledge, how do you explain the fact that we [sometimes] reach a real object even through erroneous knowledge

\(^{78}\) TSop 278, 15-16: avyāptendriyasya darśanavād buddhau śabdenāpratibhāsanād arthārūpasya. (...Since the form of an object is not manifested in consciousness in association with the word as when we see unconsciously objects for which our sense-organ is not operating with attention.)

\(^{79}\) G=T śabdānugam; M śabdānugato; M 13, n. 3 tadanugam.

\(^{80}\) =NB I, s. 6: (tayā rahitaḥ) timirāsubhramanayānasamkhṣobhādyanāhitabhramanī ācārya pratyakṣam. NBT explains each of the instances mentioned here and Mokṣakāra reproduces it.

\(^{81}\) G omits jñānam.

\(^{82}\) G=T (bskor ba) bhramad-alātādau; M bhramād.

\(^{83}\) M caladvṛkṣādibhrāntijñānam; T śīl la sogs pa g'yo bar ḫ̣ḍsin paḥi śes pa = caladvṛkṣādibhrāntijñānam; G bhramadvṛkṣādigrāhi.

\(^{84}\) M jvalat-; G prajvalat.-
of it?" [The author:] Some scholars [such as Dharmottara, Śāntiraksita etc.] replying to this question, say that we do not reach the [corresponding] object through erroneous cognition, but only through another [valid cognition].

6. Classification of indeterminate knowledge: sense-perception. (14.5)

This is fourfold, viz., sense-perception (indriyajñāna), mental perception (māṇasa), self-consciousness (svasaṁvedana) and the cognition of a yogin (yogijñāna).

Sense-perception is [cognition] which, being produced depending on the five senses beginning with the eyes, has as its object the five external things such as colour and so on. Among them, visual perception has as its object a colour-form; auditory perception has as its object a sound; olfactory perception has as its object smell; gustatory perception has as its object taste; tactual perception has as its object a tangible thing. The designation ‘sense-perception’ is made after the specific cause (asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa) [of this perception] as in the cases of ‘the sound of a kettle-drum (bheriśabda)’ and ‘the shoot of barley (yavāṅkura).’

This kind of indeterminate cognition is regarded as a means of valid knowledge only as to the object of which it produces [a moment later] the determinate knowledge corresponding to the sensation, for the validity
in the sense of the empirical truth (sāṁvyavahārikapramāṇa) is here referred to. 88

6.1. Mental perception. (14.14) Mānase89 or mental perception is the product of a sense-perception which forms its immediately preceding homogeneous cause, and which cooperates with the immediately succeeding facsimile [i.e. the second moment] of its proper object. 90

The words ‘its proper (sva)’ refers to a sense-perception, ‘its proper object’ referring to an external object such as a jar. [The compound word] svaviśayānāntara is construed as svaviśayānāntaraḥ [viśayāḥ], i.e., the immediately succeeding facsimile of its proper object, and refers to the second moment of a jar etc. which is different from the original object of the sense-perception. ‘Cooperating with it’ (tena sahaṅkārinā) means [the sense-perception] concurs with it [i.e. the second moment of the object]. This sense-perception is the material cause (upādāna) [of the mental perception] and called samanantarapratyaya (the cause which immediately precedes, and is similar to, its effect, i.e. the next moment of the cause). What is produced from this is called mental perception.

(15.1) By this [definition of mental perception] are refuted the objections raised by others, viz. 1) that [mental perception is not valid knowledge, since] it cognizes what has already been cognized [by sense-perception]; 2) that [if, on the other hand, it is supposed to cognize the external object without the mediacy of sense-perception] the blind, the deaf etc. could not exist; 3) that the knowledge of a yogin would also be a mental perception; and 4) that it is not commonly recognized (avyava-

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88. NBT 16, 7-8: tasmād adhyāyasāyam kur vad eva prayākṣaṁ premāṇaṁ bhavati...; NBTT 31, 10-12: kiṁ cēndriyavijñānasya katham prāmāṇyaṁ. yadi svavyāpāraṁ karoti, svavyāpāraṁ tu svaviśayā vilāपajanakatvaṁ nāma; TS v. 1306 with TSP: avikalpam api jñānaṁ vikalpapattiśaktinat, niḥsṛgvyavahārāṅgaṁ tattvāreṇa bhavaty atah; Stcherbatsky II. 318; Mokerjee 314-315: The very validity of sense-perception depends on the generative efficiency of itself and it can be regarded as an efficient cause of knowledge only if it exercises a function, and this functioning is nothing but the generation of conceptual knowledge itself.

89. mānasam omitted in G, T.

90. =NB I. s. 9: svaviśayānāntara svaviśayāsahāriṃṇaṇeṇa samanantarapratyayaṇa janitaṁ tan manovijñānam. PS I. k. 6a-b (=PVBh 303, 23): mānasam cārtharaṅgādīśvaramvitth akalpiḥ. For a detailed exposition of mental perception and problems regarding it the reader is referred to Stcherbatsky II. 311-335; Mookerjee, 311-315; Hattori II, 1. n. 45-47.

91. Read grhitagrāhitvam andha- instead of -tvabhandha- in M.
For, since [mental perception] cognizes the second moment [which is different from the first moment of the object cognized by the sense-perception, the first objection] that mental perception grasps what has been once grasped is rejected.

A mental perception is produced by virtue of sense-perception, while the blind etc. do not have the respective sense-perception which is cognizant of the object such as colour etc. How then can they have a mental perception produced by it [i.e. sense-perception]? Therefore, our theory is not liable to the fault that the blind and others would not exist.

By putting [into the definition] the determinant ['produced from'] the immediately preceding homogeneous cause (samanantarapratyaya), the possibility of the false conclusion that the knowledge of a yogin would be identical with mental perception is removed. It is well known that the word samanantarapratyaya in the sense of its conventional usage (vīdhyā) means [the immediately preceding knowledge as] the material cause [of the succeeding], when both of them occur in the same personality (sāntāna). Thus, when [the mental perception belonging to] the mind of an ordinary person is supposed to be identical with the knowledge of a yogin, the content of which belongs to a personality different from that of the cognizer [the yogin himself], the designation samanantarapratyaya could not be used here.

Neither is it tenable that [mental perception] is not commonly recognized, for mental perception, pertaining to extremely subtle duration of time, cannot be observed by ordinary people. Moreover, we do not in fact recognize it as part of the convention (vyavahāra). Mental perception is indeed testified by the sacred text of Buddhism (āgama), but there is no [logical] justification for it. The Blessed One said:

92. The first two of the four kinds of criticisms are ascribed to Kumārlabhaṭṭa by the author of NBTT (26.12-27.2): tat paraḥ kumārlabhaṭṭibhir lakṣaṇām ajānadbhir dūṣitam. tan manojñānām yadhindriyavijnānaviśaye pravartate tadā gṛhitagrāhītā yā 'pramāṇam, athānyaaviśaye pravartate, vyavahite pratyakṣaṁ bhavat kiṁ tanmanovijñānam indriyasaṁyakeṣaṁ syān nirāpeṣaṁ vā, indriyasanyakeṣaṁ satindriyavijnānam eva, nirāpeṣaṁ vānindriyasya vapi manovijñānam pratyakṣaṁ syād iṣy anahabhadhirādyabhāsvacodyaṁ kṛtam. See also TSop 281, 19-25: yad api kumārlabhaṭṭibhir uktam... Our author follows fairly faithfully the discussion of Dharmaṭtara, who enumerates and answers the first three objections explicitly and the fourth implicitly.

93. Insert yogiḥjñānasya between M 15. 7. -viśeṣaṇena and mānasā.

94. Read mānasā- instead of M 15. 12 gānasā-.
Colour-form is cognized, Oh monks, by twofold cognition, the visual perception and the mental perception induced by it.\footnote{M grhyate; G grhyate; kadācit is omitted in G. T. Cf. NBTT 26. 10-11: dvābhyaṁ bhikṣava rūpaṁ dṛṣṭate caṅṣurviṃśāt vartena tadākrṣṭena manovijñānenaṁ tataṃgaṁasidhāṁ manovijñānāṁ...}

[The opponent:] “What is the use of explaining what is not applicable to common discourse?” [The author:] If mental perception fits in with such a definition as made above, there is no [logical] fault found. Thus the testimony of the sacred text is shown to be impeccable. This is the purpose [of admitting mental perception] as a species of indeterminate knowledge.

6.2. Self-consciousness. (15.18) All cognitions (citta) and feelings (caitta) are self-cognizant;\footnote{=NB I. s. 10: sarvacittacaitātānāṁ utmasāḥvedanāṁ. See n. 90 above.} this is called self-consciousness (svasamvedana).\footnote{T omits svasamvedanam.} Cognition [or consciousness in general] is knowledge grasping the object in its general aspect. Feeling or mental activity stands for what occurs in the mind; it cognizes specific aspects of the object and is characterised by pleasure, pain or indifference.\footnote{Read -upekṣa- instead of -apekṣa- in M. This passage of Mokṣakara is verbally cited in TRD 40. 2-3. Cf. NBTT 11. 5: cittaṁ arthamaṅgrāṅkai caṅṭai rṣya-sāsthamāṅgrāṅkai sukha-dāyaḥ; Prasannapaṭā 65. 2-3: arthamaṅgrāṅkarāṁ cittasya vyāpārō rṣya-viṣeṣadārāṁ cittasāṁ; tatrārthaḥ śīr vijñāṇaṁ tadviśeṣe tu caṅṭasāḥ, ity abhyupagamā. For details see AK i, 30. n. 3; Siddhi, I. 296; Prasannapaṭā, 65. n. 3; Stcherbatsky II, 29; Mookerjee 319-320, etc.}

Self-consciousness is that form [of cognition] by which the self of all cognitions and feelings is cognized; it is called [a kind of] indeterminate knowledge free from fictional constructs and unerring, because its nature consists in direct intuition of the nature of itself.

(16.4) Against this, some opponents raise the objection: “[The theory of] self-consciousness of cognitions and feelings is not tenable, because the action [of a thing] towards its own self is a contradiction. For instance, a dancing boy, no matter how well-trained he may be, cannot climb up his own shoulder; the blade of a sword, however sharp it may be, does not cut itself; a body of fire, though vehemently burning, cannot burn itself. Likewise, how can the cognition or feeling feel itself? The relation of the feeler and the felt (vedyavedakabhāva) is none other than the relation of the agent and the object (karmakarībhāva). And the object and the
agent in it are well established by common sense to be always distinct from each other as e.g. a tree and a carpenter."

[The author:] We reply to this: The relation of the feeler and the felt in consciousness is not considered as object-agent relation, but as the relation of the determinant and the determinable (vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-bhāva).99 As a lamp illuminates itself, so is also knowledge considered to know itself, since it is, quite differently from insentient things (jaḍapadārtha), produced by its own cause with the nature of self-luminosity. In this connection [Śāntirakṣita] says:100

Knowledge is by nature opposed to insentient matter; this immateriality is nothing but the self-consciousness of knowledge.101

The self-consciousness of knowledge is not to be analysed into action and its agent, since knowledge, being a single unity without compartments, cannot be divided into the three parts [viz. the knower, the known and the knowing].102

The Alamkārakāra [Prajñākaragupta] also says:

The agent, the object [and the means] are mere fictional constructs and not [existent in] reality; it is explained that the self touches itself by means of itself.103

(17.4) On the other hand, it is not possible for cognition and feelings to be illuminated by another cognition. For firstly it cannot be said that cognition and feelings are illumined by another cognition which occurs

99. NBT 15, 18-21: na cātra janyayanakabhāvanibandhānaḥ sādhyaśādhanabhāvo yenaika-smin vāstumi virodhāḥ syāt, api tu vyavasthāpyaavyavasthāpakaḥbhāvena. tata ekasya vāstunāḥ kīmicī rūpaḥ prāmaṇaḥ kīmicī prāmaṇaphalaḥ na virudhyate. This passage is concerned with the problem of the identity of the prāmaṇa and the prāmaṇaphala, which is soon dealt with by our author as well. Udayana in his Pariṣuddhi reproduces the Sautrāntika theory that there are cases of cognition in which the logical antecedent and its consequence are included in the same concrete entity, examples being: svaprapakāśajñāna or svasaṃvedana in which the subject and the object are the same entity, and the judgment that an āsoka is a tree, in which the tree is not different from the āsoka (cf. Stcherbatsky, II, 375-376).

100. G yathāktaṁ nyāyavādinā instead of tathā cōktam in M. G places this verse at the very end of § 6.2.


102. =TS v. 2001: kriyākārakabhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu, ekasyādāṃśarūpasya traśātraṇyapapattitoḥ. This verse is given only in T.

103. =PVBh III, 369, 19 (v. 757): kalpitāḥ karmakartrādīḥ paramārtho na vidyate, ātmānam ātmamaivātmā nihantiti nirucyate.
at the same time as they do, because [between them] there is no relation of the benefitting and the benefitted (upakāryopakārabhāva) just as in the case of the right and the left horns of a cow. Nor [can they be illumined] by another cognition existing at a different time, because the former or that which is to be illumined, has disappeared [when the latter takes place] because of the momentariness [of all things].  

Furthermore, if knowledge were not self-cognizant, then we would not be able to state\(^{105}\) [the judgment] that the object is known, because of the accepted principle\(^{106}\) that cognition the qualifier of which is not cognized does not occur in [an object, which is] the qualificand. For [in cognition] the object is the qualificand; the state of being known is the qualifier. And ‘known’ means ‘qualified by knowledge’. If knowledge itself is not apprehended through its self-luminosity, how then can the object qualified by the knowledge be apprehended? It is logically impossible that we cognize a stick-holder without cognizing the stick.

(17.13) Trilocana\(^{107}\) raised the following objection:

“Just as colour-form as the object of the visual sense is cognized even when the visual organ itself is not cognized, just so will it be possible for the object to be known even if the knowledge is not perceived itself.”

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104. G places here the Alankārakāra’s verse parokṣaṁ yadi tat... which appears in M 18, 15-16. This argument of Mokṣikara is cited almost verbatim in TSop 282, 15-20. The Mīmāṃsaka theory that knowledge is cognized by another cognition is refuted in almost all the logical works of Buddhists. see e.g.: PS I, k. 12: jñānāntareṇaṁnubhave niṣṭhā tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ, viṣayāntarasaṁcāras tathā na syāt sa cēṣyate (Hattori, II. 1, n. 77-80); PV III, v. 513-521, which is followed by TS k. 2023-2028 and TSP on them. But the argument of our author here is in a different way

105. G has vyāpadeśa after iti (M 17.6).

106. nāgṛhitaviśeṣaṇabuddhir viśeye vartate. Not identified, but the verse or its variant is often quoted in various texts with regard to discussions of various subjects. E.g. SV Apoha., v. 88c-d: viṣeyabuddhir iṣṭēha na cājñāte viśeyane, on which Bhāṭṭaputrajāyamāra comments: na cāpratīyamāne ‘bhāvarūpe’pohe tatviṣṭāvaṁvastu pratītīr yuktā, nāgṛhitaviśeṣaṇā viṣiṣte buddhir utpadaye... This verse of SV is concerned with the refutation of the Buddhist theory of apoha, in which the negation of the opposite of the meaning of a word is considered to be the qualifier, the qualificand being the object of the word; SVK II, 122, 2-3: jñānaviṣiṣṭā hi jñātata, sā kathā ajñāte viśeṣaṇe jñātate; PKM 210, 6-7; 473, 13-14, etc.: nāgṛhitaviśeṣaṇā viśeṣye buddhiḥ; NVV I, 503, 27; PVV 211, n. 3 etc. Mokṣākara cites this verse considering it to mean the same as the famous verse of Dharmakirti: apratyakṣo-palambhasya nāṁdṛṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati (cf. M 18, 13).

107. Trilocana, the teacher of Vācaspātimiśra is one of the important opponents of Jñānāśrimitra, Ratnakirti and our author. For detailed information of him see JNA Intro. 20; A. Thakur, The Nyāyamañjadi of Gurn Trilocana. JBR XLI. 4. 507 ff.; Mookerjee, 15.
This is also not well-founded because [the example] is not applicable to the present subject. For the qualifier of colour is not the eyes, but visual knowledge (cakṣurvijñāna). When visual knowledge is not cognized itself, how can colour be cognized? Thus our criticism is not nullified.108

(18.1) 109Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, in order to teach the imperceptibility (parokṣatva) of knowledge, says as follows: “The existence of the senses is established since otherwise [i.e. without their existence] the manifestation (prakāśa) of colour and other [objects] remains inexplicable; in the same way, the existence of knowledge is established [as the cause of the cognizedness in the object (jñātātā) through inference]. The Mimāṁsābhāṣya relevant to this problem runs: No one [directly] cognizes his own knowledge when an object is not cognized; the existence of knowledge is inferred when an object is known. [Therefore, knowledge is not directly perceived.]]110 And the [Śloka-] vārttika says on this point:

The existence of knowledge [is inferred] by virtue of the cogni-

108. TS v. 2007-2008 with TSP; Mookerjee (321) writes on them: “The proposition of the realistic philosophers, i.e., the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas, that cognition makes known the object by keeping itself in the background like the sense-organ, has, therefore, no sense in it and contains a contradiction in terms. The analogy of the sense-organ is absolutely out of place, because it ignores a fundamental difference between cognition and the sense-organ. The sense-organ is the efficient cause, the causa essendi, of cognition, whereas cognition only reveals the object already in existence. It has no generative efficiency, it is what is termed a causa cognoscendi in regard to the object”. According to SV Śūnya. v. 65-67, the Mīmāṁsaka position in this problem is as follows: Fire which is the illuminator of a jar etc. is not illuminated itself. When fire is cognized, it is only a sense-organ which is the cognizer. The sense-organ is cognized by an idea, and this idea is cognized by another idea. SVK in the introductory commentary to these verses says (II. 120. 20 ff.): ajñāto jñāpakāhetuḥ kathaṁ jñāpayatīti nāyōḥ doṣaḥ. ajñātasyāpi cakṣuṣo jñānajananopalabdheḥ nam ca cakṣur aṅkurasya eva bijam jñānasya kāram evēti yuktam ajñātasyāpi janakatvam...

109. M 18.1-19.7 missing in G.

110. Mīmāṁsābhāṣya 11, 5-6: na hy ajñāte 'rthe kaścid buddhim upalabhate, jñāte tu anumāṇād avagacchati. tatra yaugapadyam anupapannam. SV Śūnya., v. 184-186a-b: evaṃtu cārthasahvitvā jñānaṁ nātmānam yechati. tēna prakāśakate'pi bodhāyeyat pratiyate. idṛṣaṁ vā prakāśatvām tasyārthānabhavātmakaṁ. na cātmaṁabhavo'sty asyety ātmano na prakāśakaṁ. sati prakāśakaṭte ca vyausthā dṛṣyaṁ yathā. rūpādau cakṣurādināṁ tathātāpi bhaviṣyanti. prakāśaṅkātvaṁ bhagyārthe śaktayabhavat tu nātmāni. These are cited in TS v. 2013-2016. See also Śastradīpikā 157. 13-15: jñānakriyā hi sakarmākā karmabhūte'rtre phalaṁ janayati pākāvidvat... tad eva ca phalaṁ kāryabhūtaṁ kārṇabhūtaṁ viñānam upakalpayatīti sidhyatā apratyakṣam api jñānam.
zedness (ज्ञातताः) [of the object]."\(^{11}\)

(18.5) [The author:] Cognizedness here means the manifestation (प्राकत्या) of an object.\(^{112}\) But this theory [of the Mimāṃsakas] is not correct. For, 1. a) if this manifestation, being [an independent entity] distinct from the knowledge, becomes visible in the form of the object, it would be insentient (जाल) and [your theory then would fall to the ground] since an insentient thing cannot become visible. 1. b) Or, if it exists as a thing different from the object, it would again be insentient, [and your theory would be untenable] since such a thing would not become visible by itself. 1. c) Thirdly, if it is made visible by another manifestation, an infinite regress would follow, [since the second manifestation would also require the third, and so forth to infinity]. 2) If, on the contrary, manifestation is the essential quality of knowledge, it would also\(^{113}\) be imperceptible [just like knowledge]. [In either case cognizedness is unintelligible]. Therefore it is necessary to state that knowledge is by nature self-cognizing.

Moreover, self-consciousness is established by our own experience. How then can it be denied?\(^{114}\) In connection with this [Dharmakīrti] says:

If cognition were itself not perceived, perception of an object is never possible.\(^{115}\)

The author of the [Pramāṇavārttika-] Alāmkāra [Prajñākaragupta] also

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111. tasya jñānaṁ tu jñātatvaṁstii. Despite of our author’s mention by name, this is not found in SV Śūnya. But see SVK ad SV Śūnya. v. 32 (II, 107, 18-20) : ye tu viṣayavṛti-परासारिवि बुध्दिशास्विवाम atiśhante teṣām aṣīddhaḥ sahapanambhanīyamaḥ. sadaiva hi viṣayasyaśvedanottarakālaṁ eva saṁvid upalabhyaṁ, yathāvaḥ: pūrvaṁ saṅgyhyate paścāj jñānaṁ taj jñātatvaṁstii. Cf. Śābara in n. 110 above. The knowledge of an object and of the cognition do not occur simultaneously. The object is always known before, and the cognition is inferred afterwards from the cognizedness, which, being a separate entity produced by the activity of the cognition, inheres in the object. See also Stcherbatsky II, 355. n. 1.

112. NK, 302,7: bhaṭṭānimāṁsaṁkās tu jñāta iti pratitisiddho jñānajanyo viṣayasamavetāḥ prākatyāparanāmā atiriktapadārthaviśeṣaḥ... ity āhūḥ. This is taken from the Mūlamatranāthi tattvacinātmaṇiyākhyā, but well corresponds to our author’s argument.

113. Read prākatyaśāpyati instead of M 18, 10 prākatyaśāpyati.


115. This half-verse originally occurs in PVn. Td, 166 a7 : dmigs pa mthon sum ma yin na, de (Read. don) mthon rab tu ḥgrub mi ḥgyur. Being one of the most famous verses of Dharmakīrti, it is quoted in many texts. Buddhist, Brāhmaṇical as well as Jaina. See e.g., TSP 401. 4: apratyaśopalamḥṣya nārthadyṣṭiḥ prasidhyati; JNA. 478, 7; TS v. 2074: aprasiddhopalamḥṣya nārthavṛtiḥ prasidhyati is an apparent modification.
If knowledge is imperceptible, how can it be possible for [an object] to be known? Who can define the nature of what is imperceptible?

(18.17) [The opponent:] “If all knowledge is aware of itself by self-consciousness, determinate knowledge such as ‘This is a jar’, etc. would become indeterminate. Again, how cannot [erroneous] knowledge such as [the cognition of] a yellow shell, etc. be correct knowledge?”

[The author:] We reply. Even determinate knowledge is indeterminate as such. The judgment ‘This is a jar’ is determinative of the external object alone, but not of itself. [Regarding this point, Dharmakīrti] said:

The knowledge which apprehends the thing meant by a word is determinative of the thing alone; but the nature [of the knowledge itself] is not identical with the object of the word. In its nature all [knowledge] is [not conceptual, but] intuitive.117

Likewise, erroneous knowledge is in itself non-erroneous, since it is manifested in the form of self-illumination (svaprākāśarūpena). It is said to be erring simply because it has a wrong object, as is said as follows:

Every knowledge is correct in itself, but it may be erring in relation to [the external object which is] another.118

Thus it is to be maintained that whatever is manifested is manifested because it is so produced out of its own causes; otherwise manifestation

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117. =PV III, v. 288: śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānam tatra kalpanā, svarūpaḥ ca na śabdārthas tatārdhayakṣam ato'khilam. artham and abhilaśam in M should be accordingly corrected into -arthas and akhilam. Cf. PVBh 331, 19-20: kalpanāpi svasaṅkritāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāti, svarūpasyāvikalpatvāḥ parokṣatvāprasiddhiḥ. The first half of this verse is identical with PS I, k. 7a-b (Hattori, II. 1. n. 51). M. reads jñānāṁ tat for taj jñānam.

118. svarūpe sarvam abhrāntam pararūpe viparyayaḥ. Not identified, but see PVBh 331, 13-14: svarūpaḥ tad eva spaṭākāraṁ arthas tu na tathā. tataḥ svarūpe tan nirvikalpakam, arthe tat savikalpakam iti smaraṇam, arthasena ṛṣyaḥ svarūpe pratyakṣaṁ, kuta etat, svarūpe tad abhrāntam arthe bhrāntam iti. G resumes its course here (cf. n. 109) with the following passage, at the end of which the verse of Śāntirākṣita that appeared in M 16, 15-16 is placed: prakāśaḥākāśātvisidher yady ami prakāśante tadā svahetor eva prakāśasabhbāvä utpannaḥ santa iti sukartiṣayam. In M prakāśāsiddher and prakāśasabhabāva are found instead of the underlined words respectively and prakāśanta is inserted between santa and iti. G seems better in these respects.
would remain inexplicable.\textsuperscript{118}

6.3. Mystic intuition of a seer. (19.10) The mystic intuition of a seer (\textit{yogijñāna}) is the knowledge that is produced on the termination of intensive meditation on a true object.\textsuperscript{119} This is also [a species of indeterminate knowledge]. \textit{Yoga} (meditation) here is \textit{samādhi} (concentration)\textsuperscript{120} and it is characterised by intent attention of the mind on one object (\textit{cittaikāgratā}). This is the same as wisdom (\textit{prajñā}) discerning the truth of all things. \textit{Yogin} (a seer) is so called because he is possessed of \textit{yoga}. The knowledge of a yogin is indeterminate knowledge. What kind of knowledge is it?\textsuperscript{120a} It is explained as what is produced after the termination of intensive meditation (\textit{bhāvanāprakārṣaparyanta}) on a true object (\textit{bhūtārtha}). ‘True object’ is an object compatible with valid knowledge. Meditation practice (\textit{bhāvanā}) means to imagine (\textit{samāropa}) [an object] repeatedly in the mind. The knowledge which is produced on the termination of the intensive meditation on the truth is devoid of determining factors (\textit{kalpaṇāpודha}) and non-erroneous. The true object is the fourfold noble truth (\textit{caturāryasatya}) named pain, the causes [of pain], the extinction [of pain] and the way to the extinction (\textit{duḥkha-samudaya-nirodha-mārga}). We should understand the five groups (\textit{pañca-skandha}) in the manner that they are by nature momentary (\textit{kṣaṇika}), void (\textit{śūnya}),\textsuperscript{121} soulless (\textit{mirātma}), painful, and so forth. And this truth

\textsuperscript{118} =NB I. s. 11 : bhūtārthabhāvanāprakārṣaparyantajām yogijñānām ekti, PS I. k. 6c-
d : yogināṁ gurunirdeśāvayatiḥbhirārthamārddyaḥ (Hattori. II. 1. n. 48) ; PV III. v. 282 : prāgaùktaṁ yogināṁ jñānām teṣām tad bhāvanāmayām, vidhūtačalanājālam spaṣṭam evadva-
bhāsate. NBT 12, 1-3 divides the meditation process into three stages : bhāvanāprakāraṇa in which a yogin’s vision begins to be clear ; prakārṣaparyantāvasthā, in which the yogin contemplates the object as though it were veiled by a thin cloud; yogināṁ pratyakṣam in which the object is perceived just as clearly as though it were a small grain on the palm of his hand. Mokṣākara follows this theory : \textit{Yogijñāna} realized in the third stage is produced immediately after the second. \textit{prakārṣaparyanta}, which in its turn follows the first. bhāvanāprakāraṇa. See Stcherbatsky, II. 31, n. 2: “According to Vinitadeva, p. 47, the bhāvanāprakāraṇa comprises 4 degrees, smṛty-upasthāna, uṣmagata, mūrdhan and kṣānti; the prakārṣaparyanta is the same as laukikāgradharma. About these so called nirvedhahāgya stages and the smṛty-upasthānas cp. AK VI. 14 ff. and VI 20 ff. After that comes the decisive moment, the meditating man suddenly acquires the faculty of transcendental intuition (\textit{yogipratyakṣa}), he changes completely, it is another pudgala, a saint, an ārya, a bodhisattva. . . .”

\textsuperscript{119} M, G yogaḥ samādhiḥ. T has \textit{rnan ḫbyor ni ḫin ḫi ḫsin daṅ ḫes rab bo (=yogaḥ samādhiḥ prajñā ca).

\textsuperscript{120} M 19. n. 1 \textit{aśuci}, but G. T \textit{śūnya}.

\textsuperscript{120a} G omits \textit{kidṛṣān} tad iti cet.

\textsuperscript{121} M 19, n. 1 \textit{aśuci}, but G. T \textit{śūnya}.
should be known to be compatible with inferential knowledge such as ‘Whatever is existent is momentary’ and others [which are to be fully discussed in Chapter III].

6.3.1. Questions regarding meditation and emancipation answered.\(^{122}\) (20.1) [The opponent] raises the following questions: 1) Meditation is [concerned with] fictional constructs (vikalpa); fictional constructs refer to unreal objects. How then can a real thing vividly manifest itself [in the meditation]? 2) How can [yogijñāna which is by nature] conceptual attain indeterminateness? 3) How can the mind which is momentary be fixed upon one object? 4) [When the mind is momentary] by whom and how is the superiority (viśeṣa) [of the seer in comparison with common people] attained? 5) How can a man who has a body be emancipated (mukta) through detachment from passions (rāga) and so forth? [Thus, your theory of yogic intuition] is not intelligible in all these respects.”

(20.5) [The author:] Our reply is this: 1) Although fictional constructs are [primarily] concerned with an imaginary object (avastuviṣaya), it indirectly envisages (adhyavasyati)\(^{123}\) [the form of] an actual object. This is the reason why actual things are manifested vividly in this [yogic intuition] because of meditation.

2) We do not say that a fictional construct [or determinate knowledge] is identical with indeterminate knowledge, but that indeterminate knowledge is produced from determinate knowledge [through adhyavasāya]. Furthermore, it is well established by direct experience (anubhavasiddha) that the non-conceptual vision manifests itself to one who constantly meditates [on the object], as in the case of love, sorrow\(^{124}\), etc. Indeed there is no irrelevance whatsoever in such an experience (drṣṭa).

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122. G omits the whole section corresponding to M 20.1–21.7 (§ 6.3.1).

123. The author deals with the Buddhist theory of adhyavasāya in § 7.1.1.

124. T omits kāmasokādivat. Cf. PV III, v. 283: kāmasokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplaṭuḥ, abhūtān api paśyanti purato’vasthātan iva. The simile of a lover to whom the figure of his beloved is clearly manifested is a favourite corroborative example of yogijñāna. Jñānasrimitra (JNA 323.3–5) formulates the following syllogism to prove the possibility of yogijñāna: yad yad bhāvyate tat tad bhāvanāprakāśaparyante sputābhavaṁ saṁbhavati, yathā kāmukasya kāmaryākaraḥ; bhāvyante ca paramapuruṣārthino kṣanikatere nairātmyādayo vastuvadharmāḥ (Whatever is meditated on possibly manifests itself clearly at the end of intensive meditation, as the figure of a beloved girl appears to her lover; real teachings such as the non-existence of the soul proved from universal momentariness are mediated upon by one who seeks for the supreme good of human being.) The theory is applied also to the proof of a Buddha’s omniscience. which is a kind of yogijñāna (cf. § 29).
3) Momentary as the mind may be, it is called ‘fixed on one object’
when it is intent on grasping [the object] during all the period consisting

4) As for the superiority [of the seer, we must say that] it can be
produced just because of the momentariness [of the mind] and not because
of permanency [i.e. non-momentariness], since it is not feasible that a
permanent thing is increased with additional qualities (atiśaya). Regarding
this [Dharmakīrti] says:

A thing whose essential nature never perishes is called ‘perma-
nent’ by the wise.125 Who can destroy the [permanent] capacity
or non-capacity abiding by nature as such in a thing, which, due
to its eternalness, is incurable [i.e. unchangeable]?126

5) You have said: “A man who has a body is liable to happiness
and unhappiness due to favour and disfavour shown to him. It is there-
fore not possible that he is emancipated by virtue of renouncing passions,
etc. while he still has a body.” But this is untenable. For it is not the
body, but nescience (avidyā) which is the cause of passions, etc., this
nescience being wrong conception, the nature of which consists of the
four kinds of delusions (viparyāsa), viz., imagining what is impermanent
as permanent, what is not the self as the self, what is painful as plea-
sant, and what is impure as pure. From this [nescience] originates
thirst (trṣṇā) for pleasurable objects. To him who regards the self (ātman)
as eternal, the causes of longings for pleasure will be his own belongings
(ātmiya).127 Attachment to these [belongings] is passion, and with the
latter are connected hatred (dveśa) and other [defilements]. Thus, it is
nescience, but not the body that is the root of passion etc. How is one
who has got rid of nescience bound to passion etc. even if he has a body?
Therefore, even while living with a body those who have no passion can
accomplish emancipation—which is characterised by the abandonment of
all the attachment—when he is freed from nescience. Thus it has been

125. =PV II. v. 205 a-b: nityam tam añur vidvānso yaḥ svabhāvo na nasyati. M reads
yatsvabhāvo instead of yaḥ svabhāvo.

126. =PV III. v. 22: tasya ñaktir aśaktir vā yaḥ svabhāvena saṁsthitā, nityatvād acikitsa-
śya kas tām kṣapayitaṁ kṣamaḥ. M has acikitsasya for acikitsasya.

127. T bdag rtag par mthon pa kho naḥo, bde ba mhton par ṣod pa la sog paḥ rgyu
yaḥ bdag gi bar ṣyur ro (=ātmānam nityam paṇyati, sukhābhikāñkṣaṇādihetur ātmiyāḥ
syat). Tr. follows M. but omits sukha of sukhahetur.
fully established.

7. **Object of indeterminate knowledge.** (21.8) Its object is the extremely particular characteristic.\footnote{128} It is to be known that the fourfold indeterminate knowledge has as its object the particular (svalakṣaṇa). The particular here means the unique characteristic of a reality which is determined in space, time and form (desākālākāraniyāta). The following is meant by this statement: [To take the example of] a jar, its particular characteristics may be described as follows: it is capable of containing water etc.; is manifested before us as particularly determined in space, time and form; is free from ideas (dharmas), impermanence and others; and, as object of our purposive action (pravṛtti), is distinct from things both of the same and of a different class (sajātiyaviśajjīvyāvṛtti).\footnote{129}

7.1. **Ayogavyavaccheda and anyayogavyavaccheda.** (21.13) The opponent: If only the particular can be the object of indeterminate knowledge, and not the universal (sāmānya), how then can you grasp by indeterminate knowledge the pervasion (vyāpti) between the two universals of smoke and fire?\footnote{130} The author: There is no fault of this kind, because what we mean is that the particular is really one of the objects of that [indeterminate

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\footnote{128} = NB I. s. 12: tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam. PS I. k. 2a–c: pratyakṣam anumānaḥ ca pramāṇe lakṣaṇadvayaṃ. prameyam... (Hattori. II. 1, n. 11. 13); PSV on it: svalakṣaṇa viṣayaḥ (hi) pratyakṣaḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇa viṣayādam anumānam iti pratipūdayiṣyāmaḥ (=PVBh 169. 9–10) (Hattori. II. 1, n. 14).

\footnote{129} NBT, 12. 14ff.: tasya caturvidhapratyakṣasya viṣaya bodhayaḥ svalakṣaṇaṃ, svam asādāraṇaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ tatvic svalakṣaṇaṃ. uṣṭuno hī asādāraṇaṃ ca tatvic asti sāmānyam ca. yad asādāraṇaṃ pratyakṣaṃgāryam....

\footnote{130} G omits §7.1 (M 21, 13–22, 7).

\footnote{131} This criticism is reproduced as of Trilocana in JNA 161, 17–23: trilocanaś tv āha. pratyakṣāneśupalambhayor viṣeṣaviṣayatvāt kathāṃ tābhyāṃ sāmānyayoḥ sambandhapratitīḥ... Trilocana’s argument is in brief as follows: Perception and non-cognition, having by nature only the particular as their object, cannot comprehend the relation between two universals. The Buddhist contention that the relation of the absence of fire with the absence of smoke is understood does not hold good. Because such a relation is not an object of perception which cognizes only the particular; nor is it understood by inference, because inference presupposes perception. Moreover, there is no relation between two concepts which are merely discrimination from the opposite (Read vyāpṛtyoḥ). Buddhists may contend that a concept occurring just after perception envisages by logical imagination the determinate form of the object, though actually every moment of the object is different from another. But this is untenable, since, according to Buddhists, a reality never becomes an object of conceptual knowledge, always remaining imperceptible to it. The criticism is cited verbatim also in RNA 99. 13–23.
knowledge] (svalaśanam tasya viśaya eva), the non-connection [of the former with the latter] being negated (ayogavyavaccheda), and not that the particular alone is its object (svalaśanam eva tasya viśayah), all other [than the particular] being excluded (anyayogavyavaccheda)\(^{132}\). What

132. The theory of two or three kinds of vyavaccheda was first propounded by Dharmakirti, and maintained throughout the subsequent development of Buddhist logic. It was applied to various problems of logic as often as the theory of prasaiya- and paryudāsa-pratiṣedha. In fact, the theory of vyavaccheda is concerned with the restriction of the meaning of an affirmative proposition, or more precisely, the affirmative relation of two terms, while the theory of two kinds of pratiṣedha is for the purpose of restricting the meaning of a negative proposition. (About the latter see n. 62 above.) The original verses stating the theory of vyavaccheda occur in PV IV, v. 190-192 and PVn II (Peking ed. 266, b3-5), and are cited verbatim in TRD 35, 11-17: ayogam yogam aparair atyantiiyogam eva ca, vyavacchinatti dharmasya nipāto vyatirecakaḥ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyābhyaṁ kriyayaḥ ca sahoditaḥ, vivakṣaṇo 'prayoge'pi tasyārtho'yan pratīyate. vyavacchedaphalāṁ vākṣyam yatās caityo dhamar‐dharaḥ, pārtha dhanurdharaḥ nilaṁ sarojam iti vā yathā. The particle eva, which implies the significance of separation, restricts the relation of two terms [or of a proposition] in three ways: (1) When it is stated with the qualifier, the non-connection of the qualifier [with the qualificand] is negated; (2) when it is stated with the qualificand, the connection of all qualities other [than the stated qualifier] with the qualificand is negated; (3) when it is stated with the verb, the absolute non-connection of two terms is negated, i.e. the possibility of the connection of the two terms in some cases is admitted. The examples are: (1) caityo dhanurdhara eva (Caitra is an archer), meaning that Caitra is surely one of the many archers—this is called ayogavyavaccheda, since the force of the particle negates simply the disconnection of Caitra and archery; (2) pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ (Partha alone is the archer), meaning that only Partha is worthy of being called an archer; all the others being unworthy of the appellation—this is anyayogavyavaccheda; (3) nilaṁ sarojam sambhatvati eva (There are some lotus blooms which are blue), showing the possibility of the existence of blue lotus—this is atyantiiyogavyavaccheda. Any of these meanings is understood in any proposition through the intention of the speaker even if the particle is not actually applied. For the expression of a sentence is the effect of separation (intended by the speaker).

Dharmottara in PVnT (Peking ed. 216, b8 ff.) gives another example which is adopted by Jīnāśārimitra (JNA 206, 6 ff.) as well as Ratnakirti (RNA 55, 6–9): eṣa panthāḥ śrūghnam upeṭiṣṭhate. This may be restricted by any of the three vyavacchedas according as we put eva with eṣa panthāḥ, śrūghnam and upeṭiṣṭhate respectively: This way alone leads to Śrūghna; this way surely, i.e. without break, leads to Śrūghna; it is possible that this way also leads to Śrūghna. Dharmakirti’s discussion on vyavaccheda cited above is made regarding the relation of p and h (pakṣadharma), while Jīnāsri and Ratnakirti give the example of a way to Śrūghna with regard to the theory of apoha. Ratnakirti interprets also the theory of vyāpti by means of vyavaccheda (RNA 70, 7–10; Mookerjee, 10–12). Jīnāśārimitra makes use of the same for solving a difficulty in establishing a causal relation in his Kāryakāraṇābhaavasiddhī (JNA 321, 12–13): sāmagrāpekṣāyānasya cchede drāvyavypaekṣayā, yogatāyāṁ ayogasya Siddha’tyantar ca karmoṁ. On this verse he comments: When by the word ‘fire’ we mean as a whole the entire things [fire, fuel, moisture etc.] (sāmagrī) implied by it, that much alone is [the cause of smoke] (sa eva kāraṇam) and
then follows is that the universal can be its object as well.\textsuperscript{133}

7.1.1 \textbf{Grāhya and adhyavaseya.} (21.18) The object of valid cognition is indeed twofold: the directly apprehended (grāhya) and the indirectly determined (adhyavaseya). Of these, the directly apprehended object of indeterminate knowledge is the single moment of the individual characteristic that is seen.\textsuperscript{134} The indirectly determined [or envisaged] object is the universal which is manifested when the determining factor (vikalpa) occurs following indeterminate cognition.\textsuperscript{135}

7.1.2 \textbf{ūrdhvatālakṣaṇam and tiryaglakṣaṇam sāmāṇyaṃ.} (22.2) This universal is again twofold: the concept of an individual (ūrdhvatālakṣaṇam, lit. vertical universal) and the concept of a class (tiryaglakṣaṇam, lit. horizontal universal). Of these, the universal of an individual is constructed through the accumulation of a series of moments of an individual

\begin{itemize}
  \item in this case the relation involved is \textit{anyayogavyaccheda}. When only the substance of fire is meant and also when cause-ness means fitness or latent force (yogatā), then [fire] is fit to be [one of] the causes [of smoke] (dahanāḥ kāraṇam eva). This is \textit{ayogavyavaccheda}. When furthermore an actual action is meant, [it means that fire] actually can be [a cause] (dahanāḥ kāraṇam bhavaty eva). In this case the relation of \textit{atyantāyogavyavaccheda} is admitted. (For details see my Trikāpaścakacintā– Development of the Buddhist theory on the determination of causality, MIK Nos. 4-5, 1 ff. and the additional note in 15). From these explanations it is clear that 1) in \textit{anyayogavyavaccheda} the qualificand and the qualifier completely pervade each other or are coextensive, 2) that in \textit{ayogavyavaccheda} the qualifier pervades the qualificand, or the qualifier is of wider extension than the qualificand, and 3) that in \textit{atyantāyogavyavaccheda} only some part of the qualifier is pervaded by some part of the qualifier. The theory appears in various texts of other Indian schools as well, though they are probably indebted to Buddhist logicians for it. See e.g. \textit{Saptabhaṅgitarāṅgiñī}, ed. Thākuraprasādaśāarma, 25, 8–12; 26, 3–5; 26, 15–20 etc. NK s. v. eva.

133. Ratnakirti, following JNA 166, 11-21, replies to the criticism by Trilocana referred to in n. 131 above as follows: trilocanacodye’pi brāhmaṇaḥ, yadi pratyakṣāḥ svalakṣaṇavishayam ity ayogavyacchedenōcyate tadā siddhasādhanaṃ. anyayogavyavacchedas tv asiddhaḥ, pratyakśāmānāśnaśavajñānāṃ grāhyavaseyabhedena viśayadvaśidhānātikramat. yad dhi yatra jñāne pratibhāsate tad grāhyam, yatra yataḥ pravartate tad adhyavaseyam. tatra pratyakṣāsyāḥ svalakṣaṇāḥ grāhyam, adhyavaseyāḥ tu sāmāṇyam atadṛṣvaparāṣṭvasvalakṣaṇamātrātmakam. anumāṇasya tu víparītyayāḥ (RNA 102, 8–13). Mokṣākara argues after this passage of Ratnakirti here and in §7.1.3. below.

134. T de la māṇi sum gzi bya ma smi bzin paḥi skad cing gic go (=tatra pratyakṣāsyāḥ prabhāsāmāṇaḥ kṣaṇa eko grāhyah). eko grāhyah in M should be kṣaṇa eko grāhyah. Cf. also NBT 12, 18: pratyakṣāsyā hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyah.

135. NBT 12. 16 ff.: devidehi hi viṣayah pramāṇasya, grāhyah ca yad ākāraṃ upadityate, prāpaṇīyasya ca yam adhvasasyati. anyo hi grāhya ’nyasā cādhvasasyah. pratyakṣāsyā hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyah. adhyavaseyās tu pratyakṣaḥbolotpamemā niścayena saṁtāna eva. saṁtāna eva ca pratyakṣāsyā prāpaṇīyah. kṣaṇasya prāpayaṃ asakyatvāt. See also Intro. of the Pramāṇa-vārttiṇī, ed. Malvaniya.
object, say a jar, which is distinguished from the others of the same class;¹³⁶ and this universal is the object of the perception ascertaining [an object] (sādhanapratyakṣa). The universal of a class comprises [as the members] all the individuals [belonging to one class] which are distinguished from [those of] other classes; this universal is the object of the perception grasping pervasion (vyāptigrāhakapratyakṣa).¹³⁷

7.1.3 Object of determinate knowledge is also twofold. (22.6) [The opposite process is taken by] determinate knowledge, to which the universal (sāmānya) is the directly apprehended object (grāhya) and the indirectly apprehended object (adhyavasāya) is the particular (svalakṣaṇa).

7.2. Refutation of the six categories. (22.7)¹³⁸ By the instruction that the object of indeterminate knowledge is the particular, it is implied that the six categories (padārtha)¹³⁹ maintained by other schools [viz. the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika] are not its objects. [The six kinds of categories, viz.] substance as the composite whole of an individual object (avayavidravya), quality (guṇa), motion (karman), universal (sāmānya), ultimate specifier (viśeṣa) and inherence (samavāya), are not manifested (pratibhāsa) in indeterminate cognition. What is not manifested cannot be its object, because otherwise unwarrantable consequences would follow (atiprasaṅgāt). For, while perceiving a jar, etc. we do not cognize a single substance as the ‘whole’ apart from parts such as the front, the

¹³⁶. T rigs mthun pa (daṅ rigs mi mthun pa la sogs pa gcig kho na) la skad cig ma du ma tshogs paḥi spyi ni.... The parenthesized portion must be omitted.
¹³⁷. JNA 166, 16 ff.: tatra sādhanapratyakṣaṁ tadaivārthakriyārthinaḥ kṣaṇavikśane 'pi samātanāpekṣāya sāmānyavisiṣṭayam. vyāptigrāhaṇaṇaṇāprakāraṇe punar ekavakātārāne 'pi sarvasajātíyavyaktiṣayatvena sāmānyavisiṣṭayam. See also RNA 102, 13-17. In another place Ratnakirti gives the name śūrdve and tiryak (RNA 136, 2-3): yathōrdvām indivyaṇapratayākaṇ taḥ kṣaṇabhede pratite 'py avidyāvasād ekatvādhyavasāyāḥ. tathā tiryakvasaṁvedanaṇapratayākaṇṭaṇādārābhede 'dhigate āpy avidyāvasād eva bhedāvasāyāḥ.... Our author inherits the designations from Ratnakirti. However, the same designations appear in Manikyanandin’s Parikṣāmukhasūtra (Chap. IV, s. 3: sāmānyavād dvedhā, tiryagūrdhvatābhedā) as well as PKM 466, 20 ff. If Manikyanandin is, as generally accepted, dated in 9th cent. it follows that Ratnakirti is indebted to him for the classification. Prabhācandra is dated by Mahendr Kumar in 980-1065, which almost coincides with the date of Ratnakirti.
¹³⁸. G resumes its discourse here with a slightly different statement: etena yad utkāṅ paśupaṛēṇa sataptārthāḥ pratyaṅkṣaṇa pariṇidhyante te ca pratyaṅkṣasya viṣayā iti tan nirāsram.
¹³⁹. As for the problem of a suitable English tr. of the word padārtha, see K. H. Potter, The Padārthatattvatvanirūpaṇam, Intro. and the counter-argument by J. Brough in BSOAS. XXII, 1. 161
back etc. The supreme lord of logic (Nyāyaparameśvara, i.e. Dharma-kirti?) says in this connection:

Only parts placed closely [together] are seen as they are, but another entity which is their possessor and which itself consists of no parts [i.e. a composite whole] is not apprehended. 140

It should be understood that a similar criticism may be directed towards [the other categories], quality, motion, etc. 141

8. Identity of the cause and the effect of cognition. (22.17) 142 [The opponent: ] "It is well known that pramāṇa [the instrument of knowledge] 

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140. =HBT 106, 25-26: bhāgā eva ca bhāsante sannivṛttās tathā tathā, tadvā kaścit punar naiva nirbhāgaḥ pratībhāsate. M. however, reads hi instead of ca, and tadvāna naiva punaḥ kaścid vibhāgaḥ saṁpratīyate in c-d. Vibhāga in M must be corrected into nirbhāga, since the latter reading is given in M 66. 15-16 (§31.3) where the same verse appears again. The first half of this verse is cited in NVV I, 468.8. Mokṣākara ascribes this verse to Nyāyaparameśvara, which is the epithet used for Dhamakirti in TSop 304, 21-22; HBT seems to quote this verse from some other work; and it is most likely that this is a verse of Dhamakirti, though I have not so far identified it.

141. Detailed criticism of these categories is made again in M 64, 10 ff. (§31.1-31.3).

142. It is now necessary to collect and rearrange theories scattered in the various places of our text in order to understand the whole process of perception as interpreted by the Sautrantika. Indeterminate sensation—which alone is really worthy of the name pratyakṣa has as its object a unique moment of an extra-mental objet (§7). This pure sensation is, as Mookerjee says (344,8 ff.), "a simple, homogeneous, unitary cognition, in which the subject and the object, perception and perceptual matter, are not distinguished but given in a lump" (cf. §8). But pure sensation as such has no practical utility unless and until it is made determinate, although indeterminateness is the only criterion to distinguish perception from logical imagination or inference. Thus it is proposed that pure sensation has the power to produce determinate knowledge, and that if it does not so, it cannot be called valid (§6). This determinate knowledge produced from pure sensation is twofold: the image or concept of an object and the consciousness or understanding of the object (§8). This dichotomy is not real, but fictional constructs, which are made determinate through the negation of others. The image of blue is determined as such because it is distinguished from the non-blue; consciousness is also likewise determined (§8). The distinction of the means and the effect of cognition is made only in this realm of determinate knowledge, though in reality there is no distinction at all. But the opponent here questions how the means and the effect can be separately established in one and the same cognition (§8; 6.2). The Buddhist reply to this is that the distinction of the determinant and the determinable can be made in one and the same cognition, since the relation between the determinant and the determinable is different from the relation of the actor and the object of an action (§6.2). This reply is given by Dharmottara in his com. on NB I, s. 2 which is parallel to §8 of our text, while our author has already given it in the section dealing with svasaṁvedana (§6.2). The theory of the generative efficiency of indeterminate knowledge makes it possible that perception has also a universal as its object, although this is said only in the realm of practical utility (§7.1-7.2).
is knowing (jñāna) which brings about as its effect (phalabhūta) the act (kriyā) in the form of knowledge (pramitirūpa). What is in your theory to be regarded as [the resultant content of] knowledge (pramiti) in relation to which the knowing as the cause (janayaj jñānam) is called the instrument of knowledge?" 143

[The author:] The right answer to this question is as follows: From an object such as blue is produced twofold [determinate] knowledge: one is the image or concept of blue (nilākāra), the other consists of the consciousness of blue (nilabodhasvabhāva). The knowledge consisting of the image of blue is [determined as] distinct (vyāvṛtti) from the image of non-blue, and is regarded as the instrument of knowledge. The knowledge consisting in the consciousness of blue is also [determined as] distinct from the consciousness of non-blue, and is the knowledge as resultant (pramiti). This is the same as the effect [of cognition].144 Concerning this, [Dharmakirti] says:

This resemblance (sārūpya) [of the mental image] to its [extra-mental] object is the instrument of knowledge; the understanding (adhigati) of the object is the effect of cognition.145

However, the distinction as such has been set up by conceptual analysis (vikalpa-pratyaya). In reality (paramārthalas) there is no distinction, as is said [by Dharmakirti]:

The indeterminate knowing is none other than the effect of cognition.146

8.1. Knowledge is necessarily endowed with an image (sākārajñāna). (23.7) 147

Knowledge must be considered as endowed with the image of

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143. NBT 15. 11-12: nanu ca jñānād avyatiriktaṁ sādṛśyam. tathā ca satī tad eva jñānam pramāṇam eva pramāṇaphalam. na caikam vastu sādhanaṁ sādhanaṁ cūpapadaya....

PV III. v. 319: kriyākāraṇayor aikyavirodha iti cet (asat. dharmabhedābhyaupagamād vastevabhinnam itṣyate.)

144. For an excellent exposition of this theory see Mookerjee 337-354. NBT 16. 3ff.: tasmād asārūpyavyāvṛttiyā sārūpyāṁ jñānasya vyavasthāpanahetūḥ. anilabodhavyāvṛttiyā ca nilabodharupatvaṁ vyavasthāpyam. vyavasthāpakaś ca vikalpapratyayaḥ pratya[kṣabalotpanno draṣṭavyaḥ....

145. =NB I. s. 20: arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam. The passage arthādhigatiḥ pramāṇapphalam which our Author ascribes to Dharmakirti is not found in NB, but NB I. s. 18-19 expresses the same meaning:... pramāṇaphalam arthapratitirūpatait.

146. =NB I. s. 18: tad eva ca pratyakṣaṁ jñānaṁ pramāṇaphalam; PS I. k. 8c-d: savyāpaṇaprakṣātātātāt pramāṇaḥ phalam eva sat (Hattori. II. 1, n. 55). PV III. v. 308a-b: sat (=arthādhigatiḥ) ca tasya (=jñānasya) ātmabhūtaiva tena nārthāntaram phalam.

147. Missing in G. T.
If knowledge is not admitted as having an image, it is not possible to establish objects separately from one another, since such knowledge without the imprint [left by each object] would remain the same on cognizing all objects.\footnote{DP 82, 24-26: \textquote{yadi jñānam arthasarūpam na syāt kiṁ tu nirākārāṁ bodhaikarūpaṁ tadānubhavaikarūpatayā tad aviśiṣṭaṁ sarvatra paricchedyatayā karmasthānaprāpte nilpitādāv iti nilasyāvākṣaṁ saṁvedanāṁ, idāṁ pitasyavītry anubhavasiddhaḥ pratikarmaviibhāgo hiyate;} TSp 284.2 f.b.–285.4: \textquote{atatarūpeṇa jñānenārtha vedaṁṇyogāt, tathā hi (yadā) vijñānam bodhamātrasaṁvedāram uṭpadyate, tadā nilasyēdām vedanāṁ pitasyēti pratikarmaviibhāga na syāt. yādṛśaṁ hi tan nile piṁcit \textquote{pi tādṛśaṁ vīti. arthasaṁturpe tu sati yasyaivaśāram anukaroti jñānam tatsaṁvedanāṁ bhavati nāṇyasya.}}

8.2. (23.9) Again, some scholars hold that the preceding knowledge is the cognitive instrument (\textit{pramāṇa}) while the subsequent knowledge is

\begin{verse}
\text{\textit{The sākāra-vāda} is maintained by the Śāṅkhya, Vedānta as well as the Sautrāntikabuddha. The theory, in Mookerjee's words (77), holds that knowledge of external reality is made possible by virtue of the objective reality leaving an impression of its likeness on the mirror of consciousness.}\quad \text{Refer to the verse bhinnakālaṁ kathaṁ grāhyam iti cet... in n. 74 above. The \textit{nirākāra-vāda} is maintained by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika, Mimāṁsaka, Jaina, and the Vaibhāṣika-buddha, and the theory maintains that our consciousness is clear like a clean slate and does not depart an inch from its intrinsic purity even when it apprehends the external reality. Consciousness is an amorphous substance and remains so in all its activities. It is like light and reveals the object with its form and qualities without undergoing any morphological articulation in its constitution.}\quad \text{Cf. TSp 564, 8-9: \ldots anākāra-vādaṁ, yasyādāṁ darśanam, ākāra-vān bāhyo \textquote{rtho nirākāra buddhir iti.} TS v. 1999, as well as TSP, enumerates for criticism's sake three kinds of epistemological attitudes regarding the relation of knowledge and its object: \textit{Nirākāra-vāda (anirbhāsa-jñānāvāda)} according to which an object is cognized by knowledge not endowed with the image of the object; \textit{sākāra-vāda (samirbhāsa-jñānāvāda)}– the object is cognized by the knowledge having its image; \textit{anyanirbhāsa-jñānāvāda}– the object is cognized by knowledge which is endowed with an image different from that of the object.}

All the four schools of Buddhism can be classified from the perspective of \textit{ākāra-vāda.} The Vaibhāṣika is regarded as \textit{nirākāra-vādin} while the Sautrāntika and the Vijnānavādin are \textit{sākāra-vādin.} When the knowledge of a Buddha or emancipated person is concerned, the Vijnānavādin as well as the Mādhyamika are again divided into both parties. Our author comes to deal with this division of the Vijnānavādin in § 32.1 (M 69, 11 ff.) and I will give a detailed note on that occasion. For the general classification of the Buddhist schools into either of the two parties see TRD 46–47, where the Vaibhāṣika is represented as saying: \textit{nirākāro bodho'rthasaṁhabhāvy ekasāmamagryadhinas tatārthe pramāṇam;} the Sautrāntika an\textit{i Vijnānavādin; sākāro bodhaḥ pramāṇam;} and the Mādhyamika: \textit{svaṁpapamasyaśāraṁ prameyōṁ prabhāgaḥ;} mukṣit tu śāyaṁtādṛśaṁ... kecit tu mādhyamikāṁ svasthaṁ jñānam āhūḥ. SDS 46, 368–371: \textquote{artho jñānānivita vaibhaśīkeṣaṁ bahu manyate, sautrāntikena pratyakṣaṁgrāhyo'rtho na bahir mataḥ. ākārasahitā buddhir yogācārasya sammatā, kevalaṁ saṁvedaṁ svasthaṁ manyante mādhyamāṁ punaḥ.} Similar verses are found also in TRD 47. Here, a group of the Mādhyamikas who maintain pure consciousness independent of \textit{ākāra} seems to represent \textit{nirākāra-vāda.}}

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\end{verse}
the effect of the cognition (pramānaphala). But this is untenable. For the preceding knowledge cannot be a pramāṇa149 because the subsequent knowledge which is supposed to be the pramānaphala is then not yet produced. When the [so-called] resultant knowledge is produced, the preceding knowledge, being momentary, has already disappeared. How can it be a pramāṇa, even if it has an object such as a jar? Nor can the one of [two cognitions existing at the same time be called the effect [of the other], since between them is not found the relation of the benefitting and the benefitted (upakāryopakārakatva) as in the case of the right and left horns of a cow.

8.3. 150 Therefore, there is in the level of the highest truth (paramārthatas) no difference between the instrumental cognition and the resultant cognition; the difference which, being brought about by conceptual distinction [from their opposite] (vyavṛtti kṛta), is established in determinate knowledge as simply imaginary (kālpanika).150

Here ends the chapter on indeterminate knowledge of the Tarkabhāṣā.

Chapter II. Inference for oneself (svārthānumāna).

9. Classification of determinate knowledge. (24.2) Determinate knowledge or inference is twofold: that for oneself and that for others.151 [Inference] which is made for one's own sake is inference for oneself (svārtham anumānam); this consists in [inferential] knowledge [of a person who infers]. Having seen [a logical mark] smoke, etc. in its locus (dharmin), say a mountain, a person who infers gets the knowledge of fire [existing on the mountain]. By means of this knowledge he himself comes to comprehend the object which is not directly perceived (parokṣa), but nothing more is aimed at. This is why it is called inference for one's own sake.

[Inference] which is made for others is inference for others. This inference for others (parārthānumāna) consists of words. Since the statement expressing a logical mark satisfying the three characteristics (tri-

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149. Insert na pramāṇam after tāsvājjhānam. It is attested by G, T.
150. G, T omit §8.3.
151. NB II, s. 1–2: anumānam dvidhā, svārthām parārthām ca. PS II, k. 1a–b: anumānam dvidhā, svārthām trirūpāl liṅgato rthadyaḥ (Cited in PVV Appendix 524. 1) (Kitagawa, 74, n. 7).
rupaliṅga) leads others to, i.e. causes others to know [what is not directly perceived], the statement is also meant by the word anumāṇa through the metaphorical use (upacāra) of the word\textsuperscript{152}, just as the expression ‘Clarified butter is life’ (āyur ghṛtam).

9.1. Function of inference. (24.8) Of these, the knowledge which is, in reference to the object of inference (anumeyya), produced by the logical mark having the triple characteristic is the inference for oneself. \textsuperscript{153}[The following is meant:] From the logical mark (h) which has the triple characteristic, knowledge is obtained by the inferring person in regard to the object of inference [i.e. the fact that locus p is qualified by s]\textsuperscript{154} which is not directly perceived. This knowledge is the inference for oneself.

However, some are of the opinion that [inference is] to determine the necessary concomitance (aviniibhāva) of the probandum (s) [with the probans (h)] as connected (also) with the particular locus (p. dharmiviśeṣa).\textsuperscript{155}

Others are of the opinion that [inference is] to determine indirectly the existence of [the probandum (s) such as] fire.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{152} NBT 17.6: parārthānumāṇaṁ sabdātmakam, svārthānumāṇaṁ tu jñānātmakam; NB III, s. 1-2: trirūpaliṅgākhyāṇaṁ parārthānumāṇam, kāraṇe kāryopacāraṁ; TŚop 296.6-7: anumāṇakāraṇe trirūpaliṅgē kārasyānumāṇasyopacārāt samāropāt yathā na dāvalodakām pādāroga iti.

\textsuperscript{153} NB II, s. 3: tatra trirūpāḥ liṅgad yad anumeyo jñānaṁ tad anumāṇam. Cf. n. 151.

\textsuperscript{154} Anumeyya here means the conclusion to be proved, the collection of pakṣadhārmin (p) and sādhyadharmā (s), or to be more precise, p qualified by s. Cf. DP 90.22: anumeyo dharmaśācārīsāmudāyaḥ. Hereafter I use the sign p for pakṣadhārmin=sādhyadharmā, the locus or substratum of inference, illustrated here by a mountain; s for sādhyadharmā, the quality to be inferred or probandum, illustrated here by fire; h for hetu=liṅga=sādhana-dharmā=pakṣadharmā, the logical mark or the probans, illustrated here by smoke. It is necessary because the Skt. terms for them are multivalent and must be determined in one sense according to the context. The word anumeyya is used in three senses: 1) It means p when used in relation to the definition of the probans; 2) the collection of p and s, or p qualified by s when used in relation to the understanding of the subject-matter of inference; 3) and s when a vyāpti (pervasion between the probans and the probandum) is to be determined. Cf. NBT 20, 16-17: hetulakṣaṇe niścetavye dharmy anumeyoḥ. anyatra tu sādhyaprati-pattikāle samudāyo'numeyoḥ, vyāptiniścayakāle tu dharma'numeyo iti. The present passage in our text is concerned with the understanding of the object or the subject-matter of inference, so anumeyya is here used in the second sense of the word.

\textsuperscript{155} M dharmaviśeṣa, but G, T read dharmaviśeṣa, which is supported by the context. See n. 156.

\textsuperscript{156} Dignāga introduces and refutes two theories regarding the problem of what is the subject-matter of an inference in PS II, k. 8-11. The Skt. text is preserved in NVT 152.11 ff. which is cited here together with Vācaspati’s introducing remark: \textit{atra dignāgena}
10. Three characteristics of the logical mark: pakṣadharma. (24. 13) Now the triple characteristic possessed by the logical mark is to be explained.\(^ {157} \)

1) Its \([h's]\) definite (niścitam) presence in all \( [\text{the members of the class of}] \) the locus \((p)\) of inference \([\text{as well as in other classes}].\(^ {158} \)

Anumeya\(^ {159} \) here means the locus of inference \((\text{dharmin})\) such as a

\[ dhūmād agnirūpadharmāntarānūmanām agnidēsayoḥ sambandhānūmanām ca duṣayitvāgni-
\text{viśiṣṭadesānūmanām samarthitam, tathā cāha, kecid dharmaṁtaraṁ mēyāṁ liṅga-
\text{syāyabhi-cāraṁ, saṁbhandhaṁ kecid icchanti siddhatvād dharmaṁhariṁoḥ (k. 8). liṅgaṁ dharmaṁ
\text{prasiddhaṁ cet kim anyat tēna mīyate, atha dharmaṁ, tasyaiva kim arthaṁ nānymeyatyā (k. 9). saṁbhandhe
\text{ṭi duṣayaṁ nāśti, saṣṭhi śṛṣyeta tadvati, avācyo, 'nugṛhitateṣān. na cāsaū liṅgaṁhari-
gataḥ (k. 10). liṅgaṁsyāyabhi-cāraṁ tu dharmeyānāyatra dṛśyate, tatra prasiddhaṁ tadyuktāṁ
dharmāṁgamatīyātī (k. 11). These verses are translated and interpreted by several
modern scholars, among whom are: Randle, Fragment F (18-21); Mookerjee, 349-355; Kitagawa, 103-110. It is clear that the two views reproduced by our author correspond to the
two views criticised by Dignāga. Uddyotakara as well as Vācaspattiśīra in their turn
criticise Dignāga's view that anumeya is \( p \) qualified by \( s \). But our author does not go
farther into a detailed controversy.\(^ {157} \)

157. Dignāga states the three characteristics of the logical mark in PS II, k. 5c-d: anumeyo 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāṣṭitaṁsatī (Fragment H; Kitagawa, 96). Dharmakīrtī's
definition of the logical mark in PV I. v. 1 is pakṣadharmaṁ tadaṁśena vyāpto hetuḥ. This
is borrowed from Dignāga's stanza: grāhyadharmaṁ tadaṁśena vyāpto hetuḥ, which was
probably contained in his lost work Hetumakha (cf. Frauwallner. Dignāga, sein Werk und
seine Entwicklung, WZKSO III, 164; Gnoli, 1, n. 10). In this verse of Dharmakīrtī, pakṣa-
dharmaṁ represent the first characteristic, and vyāpto between \( h \) and \( s ( = tadaṁśa) \) both
the second and the third. But Mokṣākara follows Dharmakīrtī's statement in NB.

158. NB II, s. 5: liṅgaṁsyānumeyo sattvam eva (niścitam). In NB the word niścitam is
stated at the end of II, s. 7, and Dhamottara says that it must be read with II, s. 5 and
6 as well. \( p \) here stands for all the members of the class of \( p \). When it is read as a
proper name or a definite individual, it may be regarded as an unit class.

159. Anumeya in this context means \( p \). Cf. NB II, s. 8: anumeyo 'tra jījhāśitaviśeṣo
dharmi. (Anumeya here stands for the dharmin whose determinant or property it is wanted
to know.) When he explained the first characteristic of the liṅga, anumeyo'stitā, in PSV
ad PS II, k. 5c-d (n. 157 above), Dignāga defined anumeya as dharmaviśeṣa dharmy anumeyak (Fragment 4; Kitagawa, 96). This definition was rather confusing, since anumeya here
must be in its first sense, i.e. \( p \), while Dignāga's definition is more suggestive of the
second, \( p \) qualified by \( s \). Commentators on PS were conscious of this difficulty. Jinendra-
buddhi (Viśālomalavati, Peking, 106, a5-7), for instance, introduces a criticism of some
people, who, classifying the usage of the word anumeya into the above three, say that
the existence of \( s \) is not yet known when a logical mark is perceived, and that \( p \) therefore
cannot be qualified by \( s \) at that time. Jinendrabuddhi, therefore, interprets Dignāga's
definition as meaning jījhāśitadharmaṁviśeṣo dharmi, as Dharmakīrtī does. However, it is
not that Dignāga was unconscious of this problem, for he answers it, not in Chap. II, but
in Chap. III. PSV, just before PS III, k. 10 (Kitagawa, 151) introduces an opponent who
contends that sādhana should not be called pakṣadharma (the property of \( p \)) as Dignāga
mountain etc. A logical mark must really (eva) subsist in it. This is one of the three characteristics [of a logical mark] and is named pakṣa-dharmatā [h’s being a property of s]. The word sattvam (presence) is employed to guard against the fallacy of an illegitimate h (asiddha).

For instance, in the inference ‘Sound is impermanent because of visibility’,160 visibility (h) which means to be an object of the visual organ, does not truly exist in p or sound.

By the particle eva the fallacy of h’s non-existence in part [i. e. some members] of p is rejected. For instance, the Digambara Jaina formulates the syllogism ‘Trees have consciousness because they sleep’. By sleeping here is meant the state of shrivelled leaves; but this is not found in all trees.

The word niścitam (definitely) is employed in order to reject the fallacy of h’s dubious reality (sāndigdhāsiddha). For instance, [the following inference is to be rejected :] ‘Here there is fire because of the existence of a mass of [smoke-like] elements which, however, is suspected to be vapour’.161

The significance of the word eva being placed [not before] but after

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160. NB III, s. 60: yathāniyāḥ śādha iti sādhye caṅkṣatvatam ubhayāsiddham.
161. NB III, s. 64: yathā bāṣpadibhāvena saṃdiḥyamāno bhūtasāṅghāto 'gnisiddhāv upadiśyamānaḥ sāndigdhāsiddhāḥ.

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does. This opponent is represented in PVBh 580. 12-14 as saying: nanu ca dharmadharma-
matratayopapamhiyamāno dharmāḥ sādhanaṁ, na pakṣadharmatayā, asti cātā pradeśe
vanagahanāda dhana iti dharmimātre pradarśanāt. na ca dharmimātraḥ pakṣo, na hi
dharmi sādhya, tasya siddhatvā, dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmy anumeya iti vacanāt. (Indeed.
sādhana is a property which, as a property in general, is brought into contact with a locus
in general, and not as the property of pakṣa, for it is shown in a locus in general, as
when we say : in this place, say, a forest, there is smoke. And a locus in general cannot
be called pakṣa, since a locus, being already established, is not to be proved, and since
you say that the subject-matter of an inference is the locus qualified by a property-to-be
proved.) Dignāga’s reply to this runs: samudāyārthasādhyaatvād dharmanātētha dharmiṇi,
amukhye’py ekadeśatvā tādhyatvam upacaryate (PS III, k. 10=PVBh 580, 16). That is to
say, according to Dignāga, the first sense of anumeya, i.e. p and the third sense, s –though
they are not the primary meaning of the word– are metaphorically said to be the object of
proof, since they constitute parts of the collection ‘p qualified by s’, which is to be proved.
In PVBh the opponent questions farther (580, 31): But in Dignāga’s definition ‘anu-
myea is p qualified by s’ there is no metaphorical usage found. And Prajñākara replies:
na, jijñāsitadharmaviśiṣṭa iti tatrābhiprāyāt. Dignāga’s intention in the definition of anumeya
in Chap II is that anumeya is p qualified by s which it is wanted to know. This is a kind of
metaphor because the dharma as the determinant of the dharmin is not yet proved.
This interpretation of Prajñākaragupta is parallel to that of Jinendrabuddhi mentioned
above. Both of them, of course, presuppose Dharmakirti’s interpretation in NB II, s. 8.
the word *sattvam* is to reject the fallacy of *h* subsisting only in *p* (*asādhāraṇa*). For instance, ‘Sound is impermanent because of its audibility’ [is an inconclusive inference, because the *h*, audibility, is an exclusive property of sound].

10.1. Anvaya. (25.7) [The second characteristic is] defined as follows:

2) Its definite presence only in things similar to *p* [*sapakṣa* i.e. the members of the class of *s*].

What is homogeneous to *p* is called the co-members of *p* (*sapakṣa*), that is to say, objects in the examples (*dṛṣṭāntadharmin*) similar to *p* [in respect of being a member of *s*]165. Thus, the second character named anvaya (positive pervasion) is that *h* must be present only in the members of the class of *s*.

In this definition too, the word *sattvam* (presence) aims at precluding

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162. Note that *eva* here represents *ayogavyaccheda* (n. 132), i.e. it is not meant that *h* must subsist only in *p*, but that *h* must truly subsist in *p* in all other things. This restriction is to exclude the fallacy of *asādhāraṇahetu*. If the definition is interpreted in the sense of *anyayogavyaccheda*, *p* and *h* would completely pervade each other, i.e. would be coextensive, and this necessitates *asādhāraṇaṇaikāntikatva*. Cf. NBT 19, 9-10: *yadi hy anumeyā eva sattvam iti kuryāc chrāṇapatvam eva hetuḥ syāt*. Inference in such a case is prohibited in the logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, though later Buddhist logicians like Ratnakaraśānti remove the prohibition (n. 301 below). But the interpretation by the theory of *vyaccheda* is inapplicable to the second characteristic of the *hetu*. See n. 169 below.

163. NBT 19, 6-10. The author follows Dharmottara in all the three illustrations. See also NB III, s. 69; 71-73.

164. =NB II, s. 6: *sapakṣa eva sattvam* (*niścitam*).

165. NB II, s. 9: *sādhyadharmasāmānyena samāno’rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ*. *Sapakṣa* must be understood as a *karmadhāraya*-compound standing for *samānaḥ pakṣaḥ*, *sa*- being the substitute for *samāna* according to Pāṇini sū. 6.3.84 (*samānasya cchandasya amūrdhāprabhṛtyudarkeśu*). For this rule is to be interpreted by *yogavibhāga*, i.e. by dividing its wording into two parts, *samānasya* and the rest—the first part, *"samānasya saḥ (uttarapade)"* (under the recurrence of *saḥ* 6. 3. 78 and *uttarapade* 6. 3. 1.) meaning that (in classical Sanskrit *sa* is substituted for the word *samāna*—used as the prior member of a compound). Again, *pakṣa* is used in the metaphoric sense (*upacāra*) of the word and means *arthā* (thing). Thus, *sapakṣa* or *samāṇaḥ pakṣaḥ* comes to signify a thing which is similar to *p* by the common possession of *s*. *Sapakṣa* should not be understood as a *bahubhrihi*-compound meaning that which possesses a *samānaḥ pakṣa*. This is, according to DP, just because Dharmakīrti himself defines *sapakṣa* and *asapakṣa* as follows in PVn: *sādhyadharmasāmānyena samānaḥ pakṣaḥ sapakṣaḥ tadābhāvo’sapakṣaḥ*, and according to TSop, because if it is a *bahubhrihi*-compound, not the similarity of *pakṣa* to *pakṣa*, but only the similarity of *pakṣa* to *sapakṣa* is expressed, which is however untenable, since then *sapakṣa* remains unexplained (cf. DP 97–98; TSop 288. 12–20).
the fallacy of the incompatible hetu as, for instance, in the inference that sound is permanent because of its being a product (kṛtakatva) as a jar. For product-ness is pervaded (vyāpta) not by permanency but by non-permanency which is incompatible [vipakṣa or anti-pakṣa] with permanency.

The word eva (only) is to preclude the non-exclusive (sādhāraṇa-) hetu as in the inference ‘Sound is permanent because it is an object of cognition as a jar’. The words ‘being an object of cognition’ (prameyatva) mean [i. e. is inclusive of] ‘being the content of a fictional construct’ (vikalpaviṣayikrītatva), but this is found in everything, in a member of the class of s (sapakṣa) such as ether as well as in a member of the class of not-s (vipakṣa) such as a jar. This is why the mark is called ‘non-exclusive’.

That the particle eva is placed before the word sattvam means that h pervading not all the members but some of the members of the class of s can be valid [as well]. For instance, the hetu ‘produced immediately after human effort’ (prayatnānantariyakatva) can be valid in the inference, ‘Sound is impermanent, because it is produced immediately after human effort’. [Sound is] similar to a jar [insofar as both are produced by effort and impermanent], but not totally to lightning [which is impermanent but not produced by effort; but this fact that h is found only in some of the members of s does not prevent h from being valid].

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166. NB III, s. 86.
167. The term viruddha or virodha denotes the contrary as well as the contradictory. Likewise, vipakṣa means anti-pakṣa; the vipakṣa of ‘permanency’ is ‘non-permanency’ but at the same time it means a member or the members of the class of the non-permanent.
168. NB III, s. 69.
169. The two terms h and s in a pervasion may be related either by anyayoga-vyavaccheda- in this case h and s pervade each other (samanyāpti)- or by ayogavyavaccheda- in this case s pervades h (asamanyāpti). The definition of the second characteristic of the liṅga, sapakṣa eva sattvaṃ, shows in its expression that the relationship involved is anyayogavyavaccheda. And if the theory of vyavaccheda is to be strictly observed, the definition excludes asamanyāpti. However, this is exactly opposite to the statement of Dharmottara as well as our author that eva placed before sattvam effects the recognition as valid of prayatnānantariyakatva, an example of asamanyāpti. Dharmottara tries to overcome the difficulty saying: If eva is placed after sattvam, then we would get sapakṣe sattvam eva yasya sa hetuḥ, which would effect the exclusion of prayatnānantariyakatva from the realm of valid hetu. But this argument is not persuasive, since the changed sentence can also be construed by ayogavyavaccheda, so as to recognize asamanyāpti. A right answer must be to say that sapakṣe sattvam should be construed in two ways, sapakṣa eva sattvam and sapakṣe sattvam eva, since the relationship involved in the second characteristic should not be determined as either of ayoga- and anyayoga-vyavaccheda.
The employment of the word 'definite' is to preclude a dubious anvaya as in the following inference: 'This man is not omniscient because he speaks as any other person does'.\(^{170}\) For we never know if, in any person as a member of the class of \(s\), speaker-ness is pervaded by non-omniscience or not.

10.2. Vyatireka. (26.1) [The third characteristic of the logical mark is :]

3) Its definite, absolute absence in the anti-pakṣa [vipakṣa i.e. any member of the class incompatible with \(s\)].\(^{171}\)

What is not the co-member of \(p\) [i.e. the member of the class incompatible with \(s\)] is the vipakṣa.\(^{172}\) The absolute absence of \(h\) in that is definite. This is the third characteristic of the logical mark named vyatireka (negative pervasion).

10.2.1. (26.2) In this definition too, the incompatible (viruddha-) hetu is precluded by the word 'absence' (asattvam),\(^{173}\) i.e. an incompatible hetu being illustrated by the inference 'Sound is permanent because of productness as a jar'. The hetu here is incompatible because it is found [not in the sapakṣa] but in the vipakṣa. \(...^{173}\)

10.2.2. (26.4) The word 'absolute' (eva) aims at precluding the non-exclusive hetu \(^{174}\) which occurs in part of the vipakṣa as in the inference 'Sound is produced immediately after human effort because of non-permanency as a jar'. In this case \(s\) (sādhyā=sādhyadharma) is 'being produced immediately after human effort'. The hetu, non-permanency, however, is found in some of the vipakṣa [i.e. what is not produced by human effort] such as lightning etc., and not found in others of the vipakṣa such as ether etc. Therefore, this mark should necessarily be rejected. \(...^{174}\)

10.2.3. (26.8) \(^{175}\) If the particle eva were placed before the word asattvam, the passage would mean that a hetu which is absent only in the [totality of the] vipakṣa is valid, with the absurd corollary that 'being produced immediately after human effort' is not a valid hetu because it is not found even in some of the sapakṣa. This is the reason

\(^{170}\) NB III, s. 71 (and 96.)

\(^{171}\) NB II, s. 7: asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam.

\(^{172}\) NB II, s. 10 (first half): na sapakṣo'sapakṣaḥ.

\(^{173}\) NB III, s. 85-86. G. T omit this exemplification.

\(^{174}\) Missing in G. T. The illustration is taken verbatim from NBT 19. 21-20. 1.
why [the particle *eva*] is not placed [before *asattvam*].

10.2.4. (26.11) The employment of the word ‘definite’ is to preclude the fallacious *hetu* whose non-occurrence in the *vipakṣa* is doubtful (*saṃdik-dhaviṃkṣavyāvṛttika*). [This fallacy] may be illustrated in the following: ‘This man is not free from desire, because he speaks, as a man on the highway’; for all the cases in which ‘being not free from desire’ is absent are the cases in which ‘speaker-ness’ is also absent, like a piece of rock’. [This inference is wrong, because] though both the qualities are excluded from a piece of stone, yet we do not know whether speaker-ness is absent from a piece of stone due to the absence of the state of being free from desire, or it is so simply by nature. Thus, this is a case of inconclusiveness (*anākāntika*) due to a dubious negative pervasion.

10.2.5. (26.17) By the particle *eva* (absolute) placed after the word *asattvam* (absence) is precluded [a logical mark] which occurs in part of the *vipakṣa* (*vipakṣaikadesavṛtta*). For instance, ‘Sound is produced immediately after human effort because of non-permanency’ is an invalid inference because the *hetu* ‘non-permanency’ does not occur [in some of] the *vipakṣa*, say ether, but occurs in [others of the *vipakṣa*] such as lightning. Thus, it is a fallacious *hetu* which occurs in part of the *vipakṣa*.

10.3. Different opinions as to why both anvaya and vyatireka are necessary. (27.1) [The opponent:] ‘*When h*’s presence only in the *sapakṣa* is stated, *h*’s absence in the *vipakṣa* is understood by implication (*sāmarthyāt*). Then, why are both [the characteristics] taken up?’

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175. Missing in G, T. This is another verbatim citation from NBT 20, 1-3.
176. T *śin rta žon pahi skyes bu (=rathyā-puruṣa)*, but M, G *rathyā-puruṣa*.
177. NB III, s. 71 (and 96.)
178. NB III, s. 69 with NBT.
179. The exemplifications in §10.2.1 and 10.2.2 and the whole passage of §10.2.3 are missing in G, T. (Cf. n. 173–174 above). The exemplifications in §10.2.2 and 10.2.3 are the verbal quotations from NBT ad NB II, s. 7 while those in 10.2.1 and 10.2.4 are not found in the same place of NBT. although they are mentioned in NB III. The *vipakṣaikadesavṛtta* (§10.2.5) and the *sādhāraṇa* (§10.2.2) are one and the same fallacy; the former name is adopted by Mokṣākara in §10.2.5 and the latter by Dharmottara. The illustration is the same in both. It means either §10.2.2 or 10.2.5 is redundant. §10.2.5 is more succinct than the passage in NBT, while §10.2.2 is the exact citation of the latter. It is therefore likely that §10.2.2 and 10.2.3 are later interpolations. Mokṣākara himself seems not to have given illustrations to all fallacious *hetus*, as we see in §10.2.1.4. and 5.
180. NBT 20, 5-6: *namu ca sapakṣa eva sattvam ity ukte vipakṣa 'sattvam eveti gamyata eva. tat kimarthāṁ punar ubhayor upādānaṁ kṛtam....*
The logicians of olden times (पुर्ववृद्धाह) [i.e. Dignāga and others] said that [both the second and third characteristics are stated] in order to determine [the nature of] vipakṣa. They were in fact of the opinion that the vipakṣa is of three kinds, viz., the simple absence of s (साध्याभवानत्रा), what is just different from s (साध्याद अन्याः) and what is against s (साध्येना सहा विरुद्धाः).181

181. PS III. k. 19-20c (Peking ed. 7, a8-b1): de las gzan daḥ de ḥgal ba, gñis paḥḥa mi mthun phyogs ma yin, glan tshigs med daḥ ḥgal ba las, rnam par good par thal bar ḥgyur. de phyir mthun phyogs med pa ḥnid, de ltar mthshan ḥnid la geig kyaḥ, du mahi don ni rtogs par rigs. (Neither what is different from sapakṣa, nor what is against it is vipakṣa. For [if the former were vipakṣa,] nothing could be a hetu, and [if the latter were vipakṣa] it would follow that it separates [from the probandum] only what is against it. Therefore, [vipakṣa must be defined as] what is not the sapakṣa. When it is defined in this way, we know various objects (correctly) even (through the third characteristic of the logical mark) alone.) This is explained in PSV on the same kārikās as follows. Productness exists not only in what is impermanent, but also in what is different from it, say, the painful. Thus, if vipakṣa is defined as what is different (anya) from the sapakṣa, a valid logical mark like product-ness would be invalid, since it would be found in the vipakṣa. To avoid this difficulty, one may define vipakṣa as what is against (विपक्ष) the sapakṣa; in this case, however, it may exclude what is incompatible with s, but not what is contrary to s. For example, when fire (ह) proves the existence of heat(s) in a place (प), if the vipakṣa is considered to be what is against heat, i.e. cold, h’s non-existence in vipakṣa, the third condition of the logical mark, would not exclude the existence of fire in what is neither hot nor cold; this would make the inference inconclusive. Therefore, Dignāga proposes that vipakṣa must be defined as what is not (अभव) the sapakṣa. I owe the information to Kitagawa, 179-183. Kitagawa calls the reader’s attention to the fact that contradiction is here referred to by the word abhāva. According to the same author (Kitagawa, 179, n. 321) however, Jinendrabuddhi’s Ṭīkā on PSV gives an interpretation different from this original theory on vipakṣa held by Dignāga in PSV as well as Nīṣyamukha. He changed the order of words in the passage which he commented and complemented words which were not existent in the passage so that Dignāga’s verses may mean what is in effect identical with Dharmakirti’s theory of vipakṣa found in NB II, s. 10. Here, Dharmakirti first defines vipakṣa as not-sapakṣa (n. 172 above), which means that which lacks s (Cf. DP 98, 18). And then he classifies vipakṣa into three kinds, viz. tato’anyaḥ, tadviruddhaḥ, and tadbhāvaḥ. tadbhāva is in the form of prasajya-pratिगेः and constitutes the basic idea of vipakṣa, representing the absence of sapakṣa directly, while other two are those which are affirmed through the negation (पर्युदस्ता) and represent the absence of sapakṣa only indirectly. In other words, tadbhāva or the contradictory of s connotes those different from s and those contrary to it. Thus, all the three kinds are the species of vipakṣa. This interpretation is fairly different from Dignāga’s theory. Mokṣākaraṇagupta, when he describes that vipakṣa is of three kinds, refers to Dharmakirti. Dharmottara and Jinendrabuddhi (or Dignāga as represented by Jinendrabuddhi). The designation पुर्ववृद्धाः, however, most likely refers to Dignāga. It may be also possible that he refers to all of these logicians, neglecting the difference of opinion between them.
Some people are of the following opinion: It is for determining the appropriate kind of the formal statement of inference (prayoga); that is to say, either the formal statement with a positive pervasion (anvayaprayoga) or that with a negative pervasion (vyatirekaprayoga), so far as it is a pervasion having logical necessity, should be alone made, but not both together.\footnote{182}

Other people are of the opinion that it is for indicating that there are two possible forms of inference: one with a positive example (sādharmyaprayoga) and the other with a negative example (vaidhmyap).

11. Logical mark is of only three kinds. (27.8) The logical mark endowed with [the above-named] three characteristics is of three and only three kinds.\footnote{183}

Those [logical marks] which have the three characteristics are meant by the words trirūpāṇi liṅgāṇi. They are of three kinds. 1) The mark as the effect [of s] (kārya) has the threefold characteristic; 2) the mark identical in essence [with s] (svabhāva) has the threefold characteristic; 3) the mark as the non-cognition [of s] (anupalabdhi) has the threefold characteristic.\footnote{184} Sādhana (probans), jñāpaka (what makes known), hetu (logical ground), vyāpya (the pervaded) are all the synonyms of liṅga (logical mark).

11.1. Logical mark as effect. (27.11) [Among these three kinds] a logical mark as effect is illustrated: (vyāpti) Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen; (pakṣadhartā) here there is smoke; [therefore, here there is fire].

11.2. The syllogism consists of two members. (27.12) The statement of an inference (sādhanaavākya) of the Buddhists consists of two members, respectively called vyāpti [the pervasion between h and s] and pakṣadhartā [h’s presence in p].\footnote{185}

\footnote{182. NBT 20, 6-7 : anvayo vyatireko va niyamavān eva prayokteyo nānyathēti darśayitum dvayor api upādānaṁ kṛtam.... From this we see that one necessary pervasion alone is enough for an inference and that even the two combined together, if not strictly applied, do not lead to a conclusion. NBT gives an illustration of the latter case.}

\footnote{183. =NB II, s. 11 : triṇāṁ ca triṇy eva liṅgāṁ.}

\footnote{184. NB II, s. 12 : anupalabdhīḥ svabhāvākāryaṁ ētti; NBT 21, 18-19 : pratīṣedhayasya sādhyasyānupalabdhīḥ trirūpāḥ, vidheyaśya sādhyasya svabhāvas trirūpāḥ, kāryaṁ ca.}

\footnote{185. The inference for others or the statement of an inference consists in the statement of a logical mark endowed with the three characteristics. The pakṣa or pratijñā (thesis) does not express any of them and is not regarded as a necessary member of the}
Other schools, however, assert that the statement of an inference consists of five members, viz., \textit{pratijñā} (thesis), \textit{hetu} (logical ground), \textit{dṛṣṭānta} (corroborative example), \textit{upanayā} (application) and \textit{nigamana} (conclusion), an example brought forward being as follows: Here there is fire; because of smoke; wherever there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen; the present case is like this; therefore there is fire here.\footnote{NS 1.1.32 : \textit{pratijñāḥhetutādāharaṇopanayanigamanān āvayavāh.}}

But this is not reasonable. We cannot understand a probandum through the mere statement of a thesis having nothing to do with logical necessity or connection (\textit{sambandha}). As for the non-existence of the connection (\textit{sambandha}), we have already discussed it on the occasion when we refuted the connection between the word and the thing-meant [\S 4.2];\footnote{TS v. 1431 : asambandhān na sākṣād dhī sā yuktārthopāpādikā, asaktasūcanān nāpi pāramāparyena yatvate. TSP 419.8 : labdānīm arthena saha sambandhābavān na tāvat sākṣād uṣṭvate, nāpi hetuacantarāmāparyena, saktaśamśucakavād iti. Kamālaśāla here refers to PV IV v. 16-17a-b : tāt pākṣavacanāṁ vaktur abhīprāyaniyedane.... (\textit{cakrur} in GOS ed. must be corrected into \textit{vaktur-}.)} so we do not repeat it here. It is of no use to state a ground putting it into the ablative case, when the thesis is refuted as above. Apart from a ground, an explanatory example and an application serve nothing. How can a conclusion, which is no more than the repetition of the thesis, be possible in a case where there is no thesis. Thus, all [the
11.3. **How to establish a causal relation.** (28.2) This logical mark as effect (kāryahetu) is classified into three kinds because of the variety of the term related to it (viśaya): 1) When fire and the like are the object to be proved, smoke and the like are to be determined [as the effect] by means of the three kinds of cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (trividhāpratyaksānupalambha).ⁱ¹⁹ 2) When [the function of] the visual organ etc. is the object to be proved, knowledge [visual and other] is to be determined [as the effect] through the fact that the effect occurs occasionally [i.e. only when the organ functions] (kādācītakāryotpāda). 3) When the colour etc. [of a citron etc.] is the object to be proved, the taste etc. is to be determined [as the logical mark as effect] through both being dependent [for their production] on one and the same set of causes, as [we infer] the colour of a citron from its taste.¹⁹⁰ In this last case, the preceding colour is the material cause in relation to the colour to be produced, and the [preceding] taste [which is the material cause of the subsequent taste, necessarily cooperates with the preceding colour] as the auxiliary cause (sahakārikāraṇa) [for the production of the subsequent colour]. This is the logical [relation] involved in the production

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¹⁸⁸. M. sarvam āmūlaṁ viśirṇam (All is fundamentally shattered); G sarvam ālūna-viśirṇam; T bead zin pa geod po (as useless as to cut what has been cut). My tr. follows G. There is partial parallelism between our text and TSP. In TS v. 1434, the opponent questions: How is the establishment of sapakṣa etc. possible when the thesis is not formulated? [If sapakṣa etc. is not established] there will be no triple characteristic, which depends for its determination on sapakṣa. Upon this objection Kamalaśīla comments: asati hi pratijñānirdeśe tadapekṣānibandhanam... traṅgaṁ api nāsāti sarvam ālūnavikīraṇam syād iti. This is of course the opponent’s objection against the Buddhist’s omission of pratijñā. Mokṣākara’s expression, however, has something to do with this passage. He seems to take advantage of the expression, making a reverse use of it for attacking the opponent. It is not impossible that the original manuscript reads ālūnaviśirṇam for ālūnaviṣti(ki?)rṇam in the present edition of TSP. For a detailed exposition of the two-membered syllogism see Mookerjee, 356-365.

¹⁸⁹. The theory will be dealt with again in §22 (M 47). See n. 305 too.

¹⁹⁰. M 28.7 inserts na rūpād rasānumānam after...rasād rūpānumānam, but G as well as T omits it. We can infer taste from colour as well as colour from taste. G, T must be followed in this case. But this should not be taken as a universally applicable rule, for although we can infer cinders from smoke, we cannot infer smoke from cinders, because the relation involves the problem of time. The cinders perceived at present does not necessarily lead to the knowledge of the present smoke, since it may have already disappeared. However, so far as the taste and colour of a citron is concerned, we can infer either one from the other.
of the lump [of a citron] at the subsequent moment from that at the preceding moment.\textsuperscript{191} [We infer from the present taste of a citron its material cause, which necessarily cooperates with the material cause of the colour, which in turn has necessarily produced the present colour. The knowledge of the present colour is implied in the process of the inference of the cause of the taste from its effect.]

[The opponent:] "What difference is there between the material cause and the auxiliary cause when both are identical insofar as they equally conform to the concomitance with the effect positively as well as negatively?"

[The author:] The following is the right answer: When $x$ is produced due to the transformation of $y$ in one and the same stream of a [momentary] entity, $y$ is the material cause, prior in time, of $x$. The conditions which cause a particular quality to arise in the stream [of an entity] different [from those of the conditions] are the auxiliary cause.\textsuperscript{192} In relation to a rice shoot to be produced, for instance, a seed of rice is the material cause, and soil, water etc. are the auxiliary cause of the [shoot].

\textsuperscript{191} The theory is propounded by Dharmakirti in PV I. v. 9: ekāsamagryadhinasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ, hetudharmānunāmanena dhūmendhanaviśikāvāvat. This is an oft quoted verse (TSP 417. 24 quotes it, but GOS ed. reads the first half wrongly. Cf Kunst. 58 with n. 1.; NVV II. 197. 2-3, etc.) TS v. 1424-1425 explains the inference of the proximity of the asterism Rohiṣi from the rise of the Kṛttikā as a case of inference by kāryahetu. TSP comments on them reducing the case to ekāsamagryadhinātva. But the most useful exposition of the theory is Dharmakirti’s own vṛtti on PV I. v. 9 (Gnoli. 7. 16-19; Mookerjee and Nagasaki 36). Inferring colour from taste when both are the co-products of the selfsame set of causes, we actually infer a cause endowed with the causal efficiency (hetudharma) from the effect. The cause of taste which produces the next moment of taste is at the same time the auxiliary condition cooperating with the material cause of colour; this material cause, being actually exercises its causal efficiency, is surely to produce colour. Thus, while we infer the cause of taste from its effect, i.e. the present taste, we come to determine the present colour, with whose cause the cause of taste must have been cooperating. When we infer cinders from smoke, the procedure is the same. Cinders are produced by their material cause, fuel; fire is the auxiliary cause which cooperates with fuel for the production of cinders. We infer fire from smoke, and it involves the knowledge of fuel; the fuel, being actually exercising its causal efficiency, leads to the knowledge of cinders.

\textsuperscript{192} HBT 94. 25-95. 9: syād etat. sarveśaṁ auyayavatirekāv anuvidehiyate tadā... kuto ’yāṁ bhedaḥ-īhōpādaḥabhāvenedām ubhayujyate, anyatra tu sahaṅkaribaḥśeneti?...tasmād ava- sthaḥ’bhede’pi yad ekāharaṇaṁṣarpāyayantībandhanātāya svasaṁtiṇiṣṭhitakāryaprasūtinimittāṇaḥ tad uṣṭādaṁkāraṇaḥ. yat saṁtiṇiṇare prāgavasthaḥpekṣaṁviṣeṣdayānbandhanām tat sahaṅkarikaṁraṇam.
Thus, the logical mark as effect has been established to be a probans (gamaka) because of the causal relation.

12. Logical mark of essential identity. (28.16) [The logical mark representing essential identity is defined as follows:193 The nature of s itself is said by Dharmakirti to be the h of the quality to be proved (s) when the latter depends for its existence on the existence of that (h) alone;194 the probans thus defined is to be understood as the essential nature of the quality to be proved. For example, in the inference ‘This can be called a tree, because it can be called a simśapā’, ‘this’ stands for p, i.e. a thing being seen in front [of the inferring person]; ‘because it can be called a simśapā’ refers to h. What is the meaning of ‘because it can be called a simśapā’? It means the applicability of the designation [simśapā which connotes] particular branches, leaves, colour and form. The applicability of the designation ‘tree’ is s.

[The opponent:] ‘If two things are identical, they cannot be related to each other by] the relation of probans and probandum, because [in this case both of them] would be [one and the same] part of the thesis.”

[The author:] The objection is untenable. It is true that both are not different in reality. But there may be a person who, seeing a certain thing, applies the name simśapā which he learnt once, but does not identify it with the name ‘tree’, since he imagines [through the name simśapā not the essential qualities of the tree, but] something else [say, tallness] owing to confusion. Such a person may be now persuaded by means of this inference based on identity.195 Therefore, even if they are one in reality, they appear distinct when they occur in conceptual knowledge196 which depends on distinction from others (vyāvṛtti).197 This is the reason why [this kind of inference] is not incompatible with the relation of probans and probandum.

193. svabhāvo yathā is omitted in G, T. The definition is repeated twice in T, the whole passage running as follows: svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme hetuḥ, hetusattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme yo hetur ucyate sa tasya sādhyasya dharmasya svabhāvo boddhavyaḥ.
194. NB II, s. 16: svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme hetuḥ.
195. This example is explained more lucidly by Dharmottara in NBT on NB II, s. 17.
196. T rnam par rtog paḥi blo tha snaă la grub pa... (=vyavahārasiddhavikalpabuddhau ... ) for vikalpabuddhau in M.
197. This refers to the Buddhist theory of apoha (discrimination) which is discussed in § 26.
13. Logical mark of non-cognition. (29.10) [The logical mark of] non-cognition is illustrated: In this place there is no jar, because it is not cognized though it is by nature perceptible.198 ‘Perceptible by nature (upalabdhiśaṃsaprāptā)’ means ‘to be seen’ (drśya). [Question:] How can a non-existent thing be perceptible? [Answer:] When a place and other things are being cognized by one and the same sense-perception, if a jar were present, it would be necessarily perceived.199 That is to say, it is hypothetically supposed as perceptible on the ground that all the other conditions for [its] perception are present.200 But we do not mean [a jar is] actually perceived.

‘Because it is not cognized’ is h. And this is ascertained by means of the [actually present] objects comprised in one and the same cognition [by which a jar, if it existed, would be also perceived] (ekajñānasāṁsargipadārtha) or the knowledge of the objects comprised in one and the same cognition (ekajñānasāṁsargipadārthopalambha);201 thus, these two, standing in the relation of agent and object (karmakartrbhāva), are each called non-cognition in the mode of [the affirmation of what is excluded through] the negation of a term (paryudāsuṣṭti). But [this non-cognition] should not be understood in the mode of the negation of a proposition (prasajya-suṣṭti), which means no more than the privation of perception.202 For if

198. NB II, s. 13: tatramupaladbhir yathā, na pradeśamivaśe kvacid ghaṭa upalabdhiśaṃsaprāptasyādupaladbhir iti. See also NBT on it.
199. HB (Reconstruction), 64,27-65,2 : yatra yasmīn upalabhyamāne niyamena yasyoṣpa­labdhīḥ sa tatsamāraṇāḥ, ekajñānasāṁsargāt tayoḥ sato naikarāṇāniyatāt pratipattir, asa­mbhavāt.
200. NB II, s. 14 ; upalabdhiśaṃsaprāptir upalambhapratyayāntarasākalyanā svabhāva­viśeṣāḥ ca. See also NBT on it.
201. NBT 22, 15 ff.: tasmāt sa eva ghaṭaviviktaprādeśas tadālabhamāḥ ca jñānaḥ drśyānapalambhaniścayāhetutvād drśyānapalambha ucya...tato vāsti abhyupalambha ucya... tajjñānāḥ ca. darśananirvātītātra tu suyam aniscitavāt agamakam; HB (Reconstruction), 65, 7-9 : ...uktam atra yathā paryudāśeṣeyā pekṣāteḥ tadevikto arthas tajjñānam vābhāvo 'upalabdhiḥ cacyata iti, na pratīṣṭhahantam, tasya saṅkhyāsiddhi abhāvavahārasiddhipras­ahgāt, tasyāsāṃsṛṣṭāpasya bhāvasiddhir evaṣābhāvasiddhir iti anyabhāvo'pi tabābhāva iti vyapādiṣṭye.
202. For the general usage of paryudāsa- and prasajya-pratīṣṭha see n. 62 above. Regarding the passage that concerns us now cf. HBT 171, 1-4 : ...tadvad upalabhādhir evaupalabdhir mantavyā. naṁḥ pratiṣṭhahaviṣayatāt kathāḥ bhāvahaviṣayati ca, aha, pary­udāṣeṣeyāti. paryudāsaṇa pratiṣṭhāhastasya varjyamānaḥ yā viśiṣṭe 'ṛite vṛttiḥ tasya, naṁḥ āgyhita-pratiṣṭhāhasya bhāvahaviṣayatā... The non-cognition of a pot must not be understood as the simple absence of cognition, the negation being construed by prasajya-pratīṣṭha, but as the cognition of things other than the pot, esp. the cognition of the locus, the
so, it is itself not anything whatsoever; and how can it become a pro-
bans? Nor is it the knowledge of other things in general which are
different from the object to be denied, for in this case [the absurdity]
would follow that the perception of the colour of an orange means the
negation of its taste. Therefore, it is settled that either of the two things
distinguished in the way characterised above from what is to be negated,
i.e. its locus or the knowledge of the locus, is called non-cognition [though
it is in fact a positive cognition].

13.1. **Non-cognition establishes not absence itself, but practical ac-
tivities concerning absence.** (30.1) This is the reason why absence (abhāva)
itself is not proved [by a negative inference], for the absence [of a
jar] can be established by the mere perception cognizing the place without
a jar. But [the logical mark of] non-cognition is aimed at establishing
practical activities concerning absence (abhāvavayavāhāra) [in order to
convince] a stupefied person [of the absence of a certain thing]. For
example, it is well known in the Śāṅkhya [thought] that the three pri-
modal qualities beginning with rajas are [permanently] existent; a cer-
tain follower [of the school] actually makes ordinary activities concerning
absent things owing to their non-cognition; he, however, is so much in-
culcated in the doctrine of his own school proclaiming the existence of
every thing at every place that he confusedly does not now judge the

negation being construed by paryudāsapratīṣedha. But this affirmation of the locus can
be divided into two modes: when it is understood in relation to the subject of the cogni-
tion (kāryādyānānātya) it means the knowledge of the locus; when it is understood in
relation to the object (karmādyānānātya) it means the locus itself. According to HBT
174, 6 ff.; 176, 3 ff., the former is meant for refuting the view of Īśvarasena who regards
anupalabdhi as the mere absence of cognition, while the latter is aimed at criticising
Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, who thinks that a negative judgment is formed in the mind when the
locus is cognized and the object to be negated is remembered, and that this knowledge of
absence is purely due to a mental activity without being conditioned by a sense-organ.
Cf. SV Abhāva., v. 11 & 27; Mookerjee, 415. Though not concerning non-cognition, but
cognition, PV 1, 4, 9-11 teaches the same: tathā hi sattvam uPaLadbhi eva vastuvyogatālāka-
ṇāna tadāśrayā vā jñānaprayātiṣṭhitāḥ (cf. Mookerjee & Nagasaki, 23); PVV 505, 26-27: yadi
hy upalabdhiḥ karmadharma tadānte bhavānānātya, etaḥ kāryādyānānātya jñānām;...; HB
(Reconstruction), 64, 24-26: atra upalabdhiḥ upalabdhmanāndharmate tuṣyānām upalabd-
hiḥ... upalabdhaniṣṭhātā veśāyavijñānajananasanyogatālakṣaṇo viśaya svabhāvam bhavati ;
PVBh, 633, 4-6; HBT 171, 16ff.; HBT 174, 19-21; TSop 289, 18-21. However, the distinc-
tion takes place only in our constructive thought, and in reality what is perceived and its
cognition are one and the same thing.

203. NBT 28, 18 ff.: ati evabhāvo na sādhyak svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ siddhatvat.
absence [of a jar] in one particular place or another even though the jar is not actually perceived. To this man three kinds of convincing activities (vyavahāra) are to be demonstrated by means of non-cognition: the physical activity consists in moving about the place without hesitation; the verbal activity consists in [the statement] that there is no jar; the mental activity is the internal thought (antarjalpa) of the same judgment.

13.2. Non-cognition is of the nature either of identity or of causality. (30.9) When considered from its objective mode (karmadharmanapakṣe) [i.e. as the locus without a jar], non-cognition [h] should be understood to stand in the relation of identity with s. However, when

204. According to Dharmakirti the non-existence of the object of negation is established by perception alone, but the inferential function of negation consists in persuading an ignorant person who will not recognize the absence of an object. PV I, v. 3, Svavṛtti (4, 18-5, 1) ...

205. PV I, v. 3a-b and Svavṛtti: apravṛtti āpravṛtthi pramaṇanām āpravṛtti phalasati (v. 3a-b). ānapalabdhiḥ sajñānaśabdyavayahārapratipadyāhāla, ānapalabdhiḥpavravakatvā teṣām iti ....; NBT 29, 22-23: vyāpāram darśayati. abhāvasya vyavahāro nāstīty evamākāram jñānam. śabdaś caivamākāro, niśaṅkhām gamaṇāgamalakṣaṇo ca pravṛttiḥ kāyikoḥbhāvavayavahāraḥ; HBT 174, 28-30: abhāvavayavahāraś ca jñānābhidhiṇapraatipalaksanāḥ. tatra nāstī oṣṭa ghaṭa ity evamākāroḥ jñānam, evamākhavastvabhāddhayakāh cābhādhiṇānām niśaṅkasya ca tatra pradeśe gamaṇāgamalakṣaṇo pravṛtti iti.

seen from the subjective mode (kartrṛdharmapakṣa) [i.e. as the knowledge of the locus without a jar, the relation between non-cognition and s] is that of causality. For it has been said above that the locus without a jar or the knowledge of the locus is non-cognition. [The s] 'a jar's fitness to be judged as non-existent' (asadyavahārayogyatva), is the essential nature (svabhāva)207 of it [i.e. the locus without a jar]. But the knowledge [of the locus without a jar] is an effect of the locus itself, [and in the case where h is the knowledge, we infer from an effect to the cause].

(30.14) [The opponent:] ‘If there are in non-cognition two kinds of relationship, identical and causal, how is [the probans of] non-cognition differentiated from those of identity and causality?’

[The author:] The difference is made purely because of [the difference between] negation and affirmation, but not in reality. This is declared by Ācārya [Dharmakirti] as follows:

Among [the three kinds of logical marks] the two [i.e. the identical and causal marks] are for establishing the existence of real entities, the other one [i.e. the mark of non-cognition] is the probans for negation.208

13.3. Significance of upalabdhilaksanaprāpta. (30.7) The qualifier of non-cognition ‘being by nature perceptible’ means, [besides that all conditions for perception must be present] that the mere non-occurrence of cognition regarding objects which are inaccessible in space, time and essence, does not establish practical activities referring to the negation [of the object concerned]; such objects are illustrated by Mt. Sumeru [which is spatially inaccessible], the future emperor Śāṅkha [who is inaccessible in time] and a ghost [which is inaccessible in essence].209

207. M inserts na kāryam after svabhāvaḥ.
208. =NB II, 19: atra dvau vastusādhanau, ekaḥ pratiśedhahetuḥ.
209. NB II, s. 14 (see n. 200 above); NBT on NB II, s. 15; NB II, s. 28: anyathā cānupalabdhilaksanaprāptaśu desahālasvabhāvaviṇaprakṛtyev ātmaprtyakṣanivṛttier abhāvanī-ścayābhāviti: see NBT on it too. In PV I, v. 3 Dharmakirti classifies non-cognition into two kinds, viz. the non-cognition of an imperceptible thing or the mere non-operation of cognitive means and the non-cognition of a perceptible object. In the Svavṛtti on it he states that these two non-cognitions have the same effect of negating the practical activities referring to an object wrongly supposed to be existent, although the former leads to the result through the absence of the proof, while the latter through the presence of the counter-proof; i.e. the former through doubt while the latter through the definite knowledge of absence. One cannot be sure of the existence of an imperceptible object, say, a ghost, so its existence is neither denied nor asserted. And owing to this doubt one negates the posi-
13.4. Non-cognition refers only to present and past experience. (30.20) This non-cognition can be a means of valid knowledge with regard to a present experience as well as to a past experience the details of which are still vivid in our memory. With regard to a future experience, however, non-cognition is itself doubtful and accordingly cannot be a means of valid knowledge.

210...[We have before said that this non-cognition proves activities referring to the absence of an object, but not absence itself, because the latter is established by perception [without requiring inference].]...210

Regarding [these two problems] the Nyāyavāda[Dharmakīrti] says as follows:211

Non-cognition, i.e. the fact that perception does not occur to an observer with regard to a past object which he keeps in clear memory-impression or a present object, establishes practical activities referring to the absence of the object.

13.5. Classification of negative inference. (31.7) [Sometimes, however,] we are to negate a thing which is situated at a remote place and inaccessible and to which the non-cognition of an ex hypothesi perceptible object is not directly applicable. Then, the non-perception of an effect and other [indirect forms of negative inference] are applied. Thus we get sixteen forms [of non-cognition as probans] because of the variety of applied formulae.212

(1) Firstly the non-cognition of an entity itself (svabhāvānupalabdhi) is illustrated: ‘Here there is no smoke, because it, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived.’ In this formula its own existence (svabhāva) of smoke, the thing to be denied, is not perceived.213

(2) Non-cognition of an effect (kāryānupalabdhi): ‘The actually
efficient (apratibaddhasāmarthya, lit., whose efficiency is not impeded) causes producing smoke do not occur here, because there is no smoke. The presence of the causes of smoke [i.e., fire combined with wet fuel] is to be negated, and their effect is smoke which is not perceived here.214

(3) Non-cognition of a cause (kāraṇānupalabdhi): ‘There is no smoke here, because there is no fire.’ The presence of smoke is to be negated; its cause is fire which is here not perceived.215

(4) Non-cognition of a pervader (vyāpakānupalabdhi): ‘There is no asoka tree here, because there are no trees here.’ The presence of an asoka tree is to be negated: the tree is its pervader which is here not perceived.216

(5) Perception of something incompatible with the presence [of what is to be negated] (svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi): ‘Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is fire here.’ Fire is incompatible with the essence of the sensation of cold which is to be negated; fire is here perceived.217

(6) Perception of what is incompatible with an effect (kāryaviruddhopalabdhi): ‘Here there are no actually efficient causes of the sensation of cold, because there is fire here.’ A cause, only when it has reached

214. kāryānupalabdhir yathā, nāḍyapratibaddhasāmarthyāni dhūmakāraṇāni santi. dhūmabhāvāt.=NB II. s. 33; TSoP 290, No. 4. As said above, this formula appears for the first time in NB. But Dharmakirti already gave a hint for its possibility in PV when he said that the production of an effect is inferred from the totality of its causes, and that in this case the probans and the probandum stand in the relation of essential identity and not in that of causality; since the production of the effect in this case does not need any other condition (PV I. v. 7; hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryatpāda 'numiyate, arthāntarāna-pekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo 'navarṇitaḥ). If we can infer an effect from the totality of its causes on the ground of essential identity, we are permitted also to infer the absence of the causes from the absence of their effect, under the following two conditions: 1) we infer from the absence of an effect only the absence of its causes existing at the last moment of their momentary stream, since they alone are ascertained to be unimpeded in their efficiency and thus may be called the totality of causes. All the other preceding moments of the causes may have been impeded in efficiency and may not bring about the effect. Thus we cannot infer the former’s absence from the latter’s absence. We are not sure that there was no fire yesterday, even if we do not see smoke today. 2) This formula is applied only when the cause is not visible itself. If seen, it can be negated by the first form of anupalabdhi. Cf. NBT 31, 10–13.

215. kāraṇānupalabdhir yatha, nāḍy atra dhūmaḥ dahanābhāvāt.=NB II. s. 40; TSoP 290, No. 2.

216. vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā, nātra śīṃśapatvā vykṣābhāvāt.=NB II. s. 34; TSoP 290, No. 3.

217. svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhir yathā, nātra śītasparśah. vahneḥ=NB II. 35; TSoP 290 No. 5.
the last situation (antyadasāprāpta) [of its own flux, i.e. the moment immediately preceding the production of the effect], produces its effect, but not a cause unconditioned. This is the reason why the qualifier ['actually efficient' (apratibaddhasāmarthya)] is stated. [The existence of] the causes of cold are to be denied; their effect is cold; what is incompatible with it is [the presence of] fire, which is here perceived.

(7) Perception of something incompatible with a cause (kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi): 'He betrays no symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold], because he is near fire of a particular kind [i.e. efficient enough to dispel cold]. Symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold] are to be negated; their cause is cold; what is incompatible with this is efficient fire which is here perceived.

(8) Perception of what is incompatible with a pervader (vyāpaka viruddhopalabdhi): 'Here there is no sensation of freezing, because there is fire here.' The sensation of freezing is to be negated; its pervader is cold; what is incompatible with this is efficient fire which is here perceived.

(9) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with the essence [of what is to be negated] (svabhānaviruddhakāryopalabdhi): 'Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is smoke here.' The sensation of cold is to be negated; what is incompatible with this is fire; smoke is the latter’s effect and is here perceived.

(10) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with the effect [of what is negated] (kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhi): 'Here there are no actually efficient causes of cold, because there is smoke. The causes of cold are to be negated; their effect is cold; with this fire is incompatible; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived.

(11) Perception of an effect of something incompatible with the causes

218. kāryaviruddhopalabdhir yatā, nēhāpratibaddhasāmarthyaṁ śītakāraṇāṁ santi, vahneḥ =NB II, s. 38; TSop 290, No. 8.
219. kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhir yatā, nāsyā romaharsādiviśeṣāṁ santi, sannihitadhana viśeṣatvāt=NB II, s. 41; TSop 290, No. 6.
220. vyāpaka viruddhopalabdhir yatā, nātra tuṣārasparśāḥ, dahanāt=NB II, S. 39; TSop 290, No. 7.
221. svabhāna viruddhakāryopalabdhir yatā, nātra śītasparśāḥ, dhūmāt=NB II, s. 36; TSop 291, No. 13.
222. kāryaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yatā, nēhāpratibaddhasāmarthyaṁ śītakāraṇāṁ santi dhūmāt=TSop 292, No. 16; this form is lacking in NB.
[of what is to be negated] (kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi): ‘In this place there is no one who betrays the sensation [of cold] connected with symptoms such as the bristling of the hair of the body specially [caused by cold], because here there is smoke.’ Particular symptoms such as bristling [specially caused by cold]²²³ are to be negated; their cause is cold; what is incompatible with this is fire; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived.²²⁴

(12) Perception of the effect of something incompatible with a pervader [of what is to be negated] (vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhi): ‘Here there is no sensation of freezing because here there is smoke.’ The sensation of freezing is to be negated; its pervader is cold; with this fire is incompatible; fire’s effect is smoke, which is here perceived.²²⁵

(13) Perception of what is pervaded by something incompatible with the existence [of what is to be negated] (svabhāvaviruddhavyātopalabdhi): ‘Here there is no fire because of the sensation of freezing.’ Fire is to be negated; cold is incompatible with the existence of fire; The sensation of freezing which is here perceived is pervaded by cold.²²⁶

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²²³. G. T romahārṣādiviśeṣāyām instead of M. 32. 19 romahārṣādīparśāvīśeṣāyām.
²²⁴. kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā, na romahārṣādiviśeṣayuktasparśavān ayam pradeśo, dhūmāt=NB II, s. 42 ; TSop 291, No. 14.
²²⁵. vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā, nātra tuṣārasparśaḥ, dhūmāt=TSop 292. No. 15; this is lacking in NB.
²²⁶. svabhāvaviruddhavyātopalabdhir yathā, nātra vahnuḥ tuṣārasparśāt=NB II, s. 37 ; TSop 291, No. 9. Dharmakirti’s illustration of this formula in NB, na dhruvabhāvi bhūta-syāpi bhāvasya vināśo. hettantarāpekaṇāt, offers a complication as it is related to the vexed problem of momentariness. Mokṣākara avoids it here, and takes another illustration which is quite easy to understand. The Buddhist theory of universal momentariness, which is hinted here by Dharmakirti, is dealt with in § 16 by our author. Stcherbatsky, in II. 92 as well as in I. 378, fails to understands the implication of the above mentioned inference of Dharmakirti, partly because of the vagueness of Dhromottara’s commentary, and thinks ‘This is the argument of the realists against the Buddhist theory of instantaneous existence or constant evanescence’. He quotes in I. 92, n. 1 Rgyal tshab who correctly interprets this argument as a prasāngha, but Stcherbatsky seems not to have properly understood Rgyal tshab. Durvekāmśra in DP 133, 5-6 interprets this inference as viruddhavyātopalabdhiprasāngha, pointing out that the word api in the sūtra means that this must be taken as a prasānghagādhana (reductio ad absurdum, see § 24). In fact the inference is Dharmakirti’s own argument in the form of reductio ad absurdum made against the Naiyāyikas, who recognize on the one hand the necessary connection between kṛtakatva and anityatā, and on the other explain anityatā as destruction by means of a special cause other than the own nature of a thing. If a produced thing, say, a jar, depends for its destruction on a special cause such as a shock by a hammer, its destruction
(14) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the
effect [of the object of negation] (kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi): ‘Here
there are no actually efficient causes of fire because of the sensation of
freezing.’ The causes of fire are to be negated; fire is their effect; cold
is incompatible with fire; the sensation of freezing which is here perceived
is pervaded by cold.227

(15) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the
cause [of the object of negation] (kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi): ‘Here
there is no smoke because of the sensation of freezing.’ Smoke is to be
negated; its cause is fire; what is incompatible with fire is cold; the sensa­tion of freezing, which is perceived here, is pervaded by cold.228

(16) Perception of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the
pervader [of the object of negation] (vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi): ‘This is not permanent because it produces the effect only occasionally
(kadācītākāraśīca).’ Permanency is to be negated; changelessness
(niratiṣayatva) is the pervader of permanency; changeableness (sātīsāyatva)
is incompatible with it; ‘occasionally producing the effect’ which is here
perceived, is pervaded by changeableness.229

(33.16) It is to be understood that these fifteen formulae beginning
with the [second] kāryānuptopalabdhi are essentially identical with the [first]
svabhāvānuppalabdhi [and are derived from the latter]. Further subordinate
forms may be enumerated according to the various circumstances of applica­tion (prayuktibheda).

It cannot be due to the inherent nature of a jar; therefore destruction is not of neces­sity or constant. Thus, anityatā is not the essential nature of produced things, i.e. there
is no identical, necessary connection between anityatā and kṛtakatva. This inconsistency
in the theory of the Naiyāyika is criticised by this prasākga. It is also untenable that
non-produced or permanent things the destruction of which is not admitted have the charac­
ter of anityatā; this is also meant by the word api in the sūtra.

Dharmakirti discusses this criticism of the Naiyāyika in PV I. v. 194-195 and HB
(cf. Peking, 339, b6 ff; Reconstruction 55, 2-7); Arcaṇa minutely and precisely
interprets it in HBT 57-61. Dharmakirti and probably Dharmottara either did not enter into
detailed explanation of the implication of the inference in question, since they are here
concerned with the formula of negative inference.

227. kāryaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nēhāpratibaddhāsāmārthīṇī vahnikāraṇī
santi, tuṣārasparśāt=TSop 291, No. 12; NB lacks this.
228. kāraṇaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nātra dhūmas tuṣārasparśāt=TSop 291, No.
10; NB lacks this.
229. vyāpakaviruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā, nāyaṁ nityaḥ, kadācītākāraśīca=TSop
291, No. 11; NB lacks this.
Of these, the svabhāvānupalambha, [the first and principal form of negation] establishes not the absence of an object, but the applicability of negative activities (asadvyavahārayogyatva) because the absence is proved by the perception itself. All the others establish the applicability of negative activity as well as the absence of an object, since they have as their object things not directly perceived [but indirectly inferred] (parokṣa).\textsuperscript{230}

Here ends the chapter on inference for oneself of the Tarkabhaṣā.

Chapter III. Inference for others (parārthānumāṇa)

14. Inference for others defined. (34.6) Inference for others (parārthānumāṇa) is the statement of a logical mark having the [above mentioned] three characteristics. A formal argument stating the three characteristics, which are respectively called anuvaya (positive pervasion), vyatireka (negative pervasion) and pakṣadharmatā (the fact that h is a property of s) is metaphorically (upacārāt) called inference [for others or syllogism].\textsuperscript{231}

15. Two kinds of syllogism. (34.9) This [inference for others] is of two kinds: syllogism formulated by the method of agreement (sādharmyavat) and that formulated by the method of difference (vaidharmyavat). Agreement [or homogeneity] here is the similarity between the locus of a probandum (sādhyadharmin=p) and the locus of its instance (dṛṣṭāntadharmin=dp) with regard to the presence of the logical mark [in them]. A syllogism comprising this agreement is called ‘formal proof by the method of agreement’ (sādharmyavat sādhanavākyam). Difference [or heterogeneity] is the dissimilarity between p and dp with regard to the presence of h [i.e., h is present in p while it is not present in dp]. A syllogism comprising this difference is called ‘formal proof by the method of difference’ (vaidharmyavat sādhanavākyam).\textsuperscript{232}

16. Illustration of svabhāvahetoh sādharmyavān prayogah. (34.13)

\textsuperscript{230} Cf. n. 204 above.

\textsuperscript{231} NB III, s. 1–2, cited in n. 152 above. A set of propositions is the cause of an inference which another person acquires by hearing it. Thus a verbal statement is called inference, not directly, but only metaphorically. For the three characteristics of a logical mark, see §10 above.

\textsuperscript{232} NB III, s. 3–5: taddvividham, prayogahedāt, sādharmyavat vaidharmyavac eti; NBT on it: dṛṣṭāntadharminā saha sādhyadharmināḥ sādṛṣṭyam hetuktaḥ sādharmyam ucyate, asādṛṣṭyam ca hetuktaḥ vaidharmyam ucyate....
Of these, a syllogism by the method of agreement formulated with a logical mark of identity (svabhāvaḥ etoḥ sādharmyavān prayogah) may be illustrated by interpreting the Buddha's teaching 'All that is produced is momentary' in view of the Sautrāntika doctrine. What is produced (saṃskṛta) means all things that have originated as results of the causes and conditions aggregated together. They are said to be momentary (kṣanika) as they exist only for the moment in which they are produced.

16.1 Proof of universal momentariness. (34.18) Now we see that all things such as a jar etc. are destroyed by conjunction with a hammer etc. If the essential nature (svārūpa), by which a jar etc. in its last moment perishes, is existent in the [same thing] when it is just produced, then it should perish immediately after its production because of that [essential nature]. Therefore all things are evidently momentary.

(35.2) It may be contended that a thing is given by its own causes such an essential nature that it perishes after staying for a certain period of time. [But it is not reasonable, because] if so, a thing would not perish even when it is hit by a hammer, but continue to exist again for the given period of time, since such is its essential nature; again this may be the case [when it receives another shock of a hammer, and thus it follows that] it would never perish. Therefore, if a thing were produced so as to stay for two moments, it would, at the second moment just as at the first, stay for another two moments due to its being durable for two moments. In this way it would not cease to exist at the third moment because it has even then the same nature.

(35.9) [Another opponent] may contend: "A thing is so made by its own cause as to be durable; but it may be forcibly destroyed by an incompatible thing such as a hammer and the rest". This is not correct. How is it reasonable that the destruction of a thing is caused by an incompatible power, while the same thing does not perish because of its being permanent. For this is as unreasonable as to say that Devadatta is dead while he is living. In other words, if it perishes, how can you say that it is produced by its causes so as to be imperishable? For you cannot say that an immortal quality dies. We hold, therefore, that a thing is produced by its own cause to be perishable, because perishing can be by no means connected with an imperishable thing, while the disappearance of a thing is actually experienced. Thus, it perishes at the
very moment of its birth. In this way the theory of momentary destruction [of every thing] (kṣanakṣayitva) has been proved. We may formulate [the discussion made above] into the following syllogism: 233

Whatever is by nature perishable perishes immediately [after its birth as e.g. a jar at the last moment of its existence];
Material objects etc. are by nature perishable at the time of their birth;
[Therefore, material] objects etc. perish immediately after their birth;

[This syllogism is] formulated with a logical mark of identity.

16.2 Recognition is merely constructive imagination. (36.1) "If things are perishing at every moment, how is our recognition (pratyabhijñā) in the form 'This is the very same as that' possible?" To this our reply is this: [This is said] because every moment [of the flux of a thing] is produced so as to be very similar to the immediately preceding moment and because our nescience (avidyā) continues to exist. At the very moment when a thing perishes, another at the next moment which is similar to it is born. In this way the difference in form [between the two moments] is neglected; and the flux of moments is not interrupted by non-existence. Consequently an ordinary person gets, by means of constructive imagination (adhyāvasāya), the idea of identity (abheda) that this is the same as that in spite of the actual difference [of the two moments]. We know by experience that one easily gets an idea of this being the same as that regarding completely different things such as grass, hair etc. which, having been once cut off, grow again (lūnapunarjātakuṣakeśādi)234. Why cannot the same kind of imagination occur in the present case? We have thus proved that what is produced is all momentary235.

233. T spyor ba yaḥ śār itar bya ste=prayogāḥ punar pūrvat kartavyaḥ. G ayam instead of punar in M.

234. This is a stock-example of Buddhist logicians meant for the refutation of recognition. See for example, PV Bh 144. 3; RNA 84. 3. The refutation of recognition is dealt with by our author in § 28.2. Ratnakirti gives a systematic exposition of the problem (RNA 106-112).

235. Our author's argument in § 16, 1-2 is a brief extract from the highly developed Buddhist theory of the momentary destruction of all things (kṣanabhākga). He seems to owe his argument here, directly or indirectly, to Karpakagomin who demonstrates a similar discussion commenting on PV I. v. 195 (v. 197 in Kitab Mahal ed) and Svavṛttī (cf. Karpa-
16.3 Nirviṣeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.9) The syllogism set forth above is of the formula with a simple, identical logical mark \( (\text{nirviṣeṣaṇasya svabhāvahetoh prayogaḥ}) \). The [same] formula with a simple, identical logical mark is illustrated by another syllogism:

All that exists is impermanent \( (\text{yat sat tat sarvam anityam}) \) as e. g. a jar;

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kagomin, 368. 7-13 and 369. 3-8). This argument of Mokṣākara is in its turn quoted almost verbatim in SVM 104, 12-105, 15 for the sake of criticism. Malliṃeṇa clearly ascribes it to our author saying (SVM 105, 25-106, 1) : *yac ca kṣaṇikatvāsthiṇāpaṇaṃ mokṣākaraugitaṃ nandantu eva pralāpitaḥ tat....*

Dharmakīrti discusses the problem of kṣaṇabhaṅga in PV I. v. 193-196, and more extensively in HB II. Arcaṭa’s commentary on HB II is a valuable dissertation on the problem. His separate work Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśādhiṣṭṭha is not extant. Durvekamīśra wrote another Kṣaṇabhaṅga which is also lost now, but his commentary Alokā on HBT is published together with HBT. Dharmottara’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśādhiṣṭṭha is preserved in Tibetan translation with its commentary by Muktākalaśa; the Tib. text of Dharmottara’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśādhiṣṭṭha is edited and translated by Frauwallner (WZKM 42. 217-258). Śāntirākṣita and Kamalāśila discuss the same problem in the *Sthirabhāvaprākṛta* of TS and TSP. Jñānāstirmitra wrote a large article Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśādhiṣṭṭhaśāstra (JNA. 1-159) which is the most important work on this theory; and this work was abridged by his student Ratnakīrti in his Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśādhiṣṭṭha (RNA 62-88). The latter wrote another article, *Sthirasiddhidīya* (RNA 101-121). Ratnakārāśānti discusses logical problems concerning the proof of kṣaṇabhaṅga in his *Antaryāpitsamarthana* (SBNT 103-114; the work is translated into Japanese by me in Bukkyō Shigaku *Volume III*, no. 4, 21-40 「ラトナーカラヤンティの論理学書」). The theories appearing in TS, TSP, Ratnakīrti’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgaśādhiṣṭṭha and Ratnakārāśānti’s work are explained by Mookerjee (cf. the first three chapters of his *Universal Elux*).

236. PV I. v. 186: *upādibhidēpekṣaḥ vā svabhāvaḥ kevalo ‘tha vā, ucyate śādhyasiddhiḥ-artham nāsa kāryatvatasattvavat.* Here Dharmakīrti classifies svabhāvahetu into two kinds.

a) kevala- ([illustrated by *sat*]) and b) upādibhidēpekṣa- ([ill. by kārya=kṛtaḥ); but he mentions c) svabhāvabhūtaḥdharmanīveṣa- ([ill. utpattimaḥ] in his *Svargviṭti*. In NB III. s. 11-15 too, the above-named three kinds are enumerated. The idea of this classification is clear: The logical identity of the probandum and the probans does not mean the total sameness of both, but the sameness in essence. And this sameness in essence may be sometimes pure and simple as in the case of existence and impermanence, which do not permit the interference of any third entity; and another time it is understood together with a contingent, third entity which the probans necessarily presupposes, as in the case of product-ness and impermanence. Product-ness presupposes a cause. Dharmakīrti regards this third thing as a *upādhi* (contingent condition). But once this main classification is stated, one is tempted to subdivide. From existence we derive the idea of origination (*utpatti*) which Dharmakīrti considers a particular property belonging to the existent itself (svabhāvabhūtaḥdharmanīveṣa), i. e. this origination is not the third thing separate from the existent, but a part of it. According to Dharmottara and other commentators this particular property, origination, is obtained through logical imagination in which one contrasts it to non-origination. Thus, this case is added in the list as a subdivision of a) (corresponding to No. 2 of NB & TBh). Concerning b) Dharmakīrti says
These things cognized by valid knowledge all exist; 
[Therefore these things are all impermanent].

Another syllogism proving that the Vedas are human products can be formulated with [the same] identical mark:

Any verbal statement is a human product as e.g. the verbal statement of a passer-by;

The Vedic injunction ‘One who wants rebirth in heaven should perform the fire-sacrifice’ is a verbal statement;

[Therefore the Vedic injunction is a human product.]

16.3.1 Savīśeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.16) A syllogism of the formula with a qualified identical mark (saviśeṣaṇa-prayoga) is next shown:

All that have origin is impermanent (yad yad upattim tat sarvam anityam) as e.g. a jar;

Sound has origin;

[Therefore sound is impermanent.]

Those things which are excluded from [the class of] what has no origin are called having origin. When we, saying ‘the origination of a thing’, mean that this distinct [aspect] (vyāvṛtti) is a different thing [from ‘existence’] since it excludes other distinct [aspects incompatible with it] (vyāvṛttyantaravyavaccheda), then the identical mark [i.e. existence] is qualified by a property [having origin] which, though actually identical

that the idea of product necessarily presupposes the idea of cause, though the cause is not manifestly expressed. Dharmottara thinks in NBT on NB III, s. 15 that this presupposed third entity, cause, may be expressed by its own word as in the case of pratayava-bhedabhedavātva or may not be so expressed as in the case of kṛtya-bhedavātva, and that the presence and the absence of the actual usage of the word ‘cause’ do not change the significance. Therefore he concludes that the syllogistic form of svabhāvahetubhātva is threefold, viz. 1) sūdha=a) = nirviśeṣaṇa of TBh, 2) avyatiriktyaviśeṣaṇa or saviśeṣaṇa and 3) vyaniriktyaviśeṣaṇa or bhinnaviśeṣaṇa. Manorathanandin, commenting on PV I, v. 186 (III, v. 185 in Patna ed.) gives a similar exposition and classifies into sūdha, abhinnaviśeṣaṇa and bhinnaviśeṣaṇa. TSp follows Dharmottara. It seems to be Mokṣākara-gupta alone who enumerates as the fourth the case of pratayabhedabhedavātva, giving to this the name prayuktabhinnaviśeṣaṇa. This cannot be a merit of his, because he gave only a separate name to what was actually recognized by Dharmakirti and his commentators.

237. G pramāṇapratitāh padarthāh instead of pramāṇapratitāh in M; T, agreeing with G, reads ishad mas rto paḥ dnos po.

238. NB III, s. 11: yat sat tat sarvam anityam yathā ghaṭādir iti sūdhasya svabhāva-hetuḥ prayogah; and NBT.

239. The Tibetan translator may have had in his manuscript rathya-puruṣa instead of rathyāpuruṣa in M. G, as T reads: sīh rta tön pa or one who rides a cart.
[with existence], is differentiated from it by imagination (kalpitena bhedena)\(^{240}\).

16.3.2 Bhinnaviṣeṣaṇa-prayoga. (36.20) The formula with an identical mark qualified by a contingent property (bhinnaviṣeṣaṇasya [svabhāvahetuk] prayogah) is next illustrated:

Whatever is produced is impermanent (yat kṛtakaṁ tad anityam)
as a jar;
Sound is a product;

[Therefore sound is impermanent.]\(^{241}\)

One may object: ‘You may call an expression such as ‘one who possesses a brindled cow’ a usage of a contingent property. However, in the word ‘product’ we do not recognize any such word signifying a contingent property\(^{242}\) as we find in the word ‘a brindled cow’ [possessed by a person]. Thus, how can you call [the probans kṛtaka] an example of contingent property?’ We reply: A thing which depends for its own origination on the operation of other things [i.e. its causes] is called a product. Therefore, the word ‘product’ connotes the nature of depending on the operation of others; this is why we call it ‘qualified

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\(^{240}\) NB III, s. 12 : yad utpattimat tad anityam iti svabhāvabhūtadharmaḥbhedena svabhāvasya prayogah. Mokṣākara follows Dharmottara in explaining the formula, but perhaps with a misunderstanding. Commenting on the word bheda, Dharmottara says: anutpannebhyo hi vyavṛttim āśriyottanmo bhāva ucyate saiva vyāvṛttir yadā vyāvṛttiyantararimārapekṣā vaktum izyate tadda vyatirekiniṁa nirdiśyate bhāvasyobṛtattir iti. According to Durvekamīśra (DP 158, 6–8), the probans, what is originated, is so judged in view of the distinction from, or the exclusion of, what is not originated such as ether. But the question may be put forward: if a thing is called what is originated in contrast to what is not originated, why do you use the expression ‘it has origination’ (utpattir asya=utpattimat)?

\(^{241}\) NB III, s. 13 : yat kṛtakaṁ tad anityam ity upādhibhedena. NBT 45, 17–19 illustrates the differences between the three kinds of expressions, śuddha, avyatiriktena viśeṣaṇena viśeṣaṇa viśeṣaṇa vṛttaḥ and vyatiriktena viśeṣaṇena viśeṣaṇa viśeṣaṇa vṛttaḥ by the example of Devadatta: Devadatta may be referred to by the name Devadatta itself; he may be called the long-eared; he may be called the owner of a brindled cow.

\(^{242}\) Read bhinnaviṣeṣaṇa for bhinnasēṣaṇa in M.
by a contingent property"243.

16.3.3 Prayuktabhinnavišeṣāna-prayoga. (37.7) The formula with an identical mark manifestly expressing a contingent qualifier (prayuktabhinnavišeṣānasya svabhāvasya prayogaḥ) is illustrated lastly244.

Whatever is variable according to a change in its cause is a product (yaḥ prayayabhedabhedi sa kṛtakaḥ) as smoke;

Sound is variable according to a change in its cause;

[Therefore, sound is a product.]

Pratyaya means kāraṇa (cause). A thing which is subject to change according as its cause varies, is here meant by the word prayayabhedabhedin. It means that an effect is big when its cause is big, and is small if the cause is small. The word prayayabhedabhedin which manifestly expresses a contingent qualifier is here used; this is why the formula is called prayuktabhinnavišeṣāna.

Various kinds of the identical mark have been shown above in order to remove misunderstanding [about the logical mark of identity], that is to say, in order to teach that if different properties are imagined [of a logical mark], the fact of an identical mark being used remains the same.

17. Illustration of svabhāvahetor vaidharmyavān prayogaḥ. (37.16) A syllogism by the method of difference formulated with a logical mark of identity (svabhāvahetor vaidharmyavān prayogaḥ) is next illustrated:

1. Whatever is not immediately destructible at a given time is not of a perishable nature at that time as e.g. ether245;

Those things beginning with matter are, however, perishable at the time of their birth;

[Therefore, those beginning with matter are immediately destructible at the time of their birth.]

In a syllogism with a negative vyāpti, [i.e. that by the method of difference] (vyatirekaprayoga=vaidharmyavān prayogaḥ) the negation of

243. The same objection is raised in NBT 45, 20-21 and the reply forms NB III, s. 14 : apekṣīpataracyāpāro ki bhāvaḥ svabhāvaniśpattau kṛtaka iti.

244. NB III, s. 15 : evaṁ prayayabhedabhediteṣādāyō draṣṭavyāḥ. As said in n. 236, NBT as well as NB regards this as a special case of the third formula (bhinnavišeṣāna), while our author takes it out as the fourth.

245. T : gaḥ daḥ gaḥ... de daḥ de... (=yad yad... tat tad...) instead of yad yadā...tat tadā... in M.
the probandum is pervaded by the negation of the probans, and accordingly the absence of the probandum is definitely known in the absence of the probans. In the same way we can formulate [the remaining forms of svabhāvahetu] by the method of difference.

2. Wherever there is no momentariness there is also no existence
   \((yatra \ kṣanikatvāṁ \ nāsti \ tatra \ sattvam \ api \ nāsti)\) as e. g. in a flower in the sky;
   However, sound is existent;
   [Therefore sound is momentary].

2a. Wherever there is no impermanence recognized, there is no origination as in the hair of a tortoise;
    Sound has origination;
    [Therefore, sound is impermanent.]

3. Wherever there is no impermanence there is no product-ness as in a rabbit’s horns;
    Sound is a product;
    [Therefore sound is impermanent.]

4. Wherever there is no product-ness there is no variation concomitant with the variation in its cause as in ether;
    Sound is variable together with the change in its cause;
    [Therefore, sound is a product.]\(^{246}\)

18. Illustration of kāryahetor sādharmanyāna prayogaḥ. (38.8) A syllogism by the method of agreement formulated with a logical mark of causality is next illustrated.

Wherever there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen;
    Here there is smoke;
    [Therefore, here there is fire.]\(^{247}\)
An effect should be applied as a probans for proving its cause, the probandum, only when the relation of a cause and an effect has been [beforehand] established through perception and non-perception (pratya-
kṣānapalambha)\textsuperscript{248}.

18.1 Illustration of vaidharmya-prayoga. (38.11) A syllogism by the method of difference (\textit{vaidharmya-prayoga}) [formulated with a logical mark of causality]:

Where there is no fire, there is no smoke as in a great tank;
However, here there is smoke;
[Therefore, here there is fire.\textsuperscript{249}]

19. Illustration of a syllogism of negation by the method of agreement. (38.12) A syllogism of negation formulated by the method of agreement (\textit{anupalabdheḥ sādharmyavān prayogah}), which is aimed at denying the existence of a composite whole (\textit{avayavin}):

A thing which, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived in a place, is to be judged as not existing in that place as the horns on the head of a man;
The composite whole [of a jar] which is asserted by the opponent to be perceptible is not perceived in the aggregated parts meant by the word ‘jar’;
[Therefore, a composite whole does not exist in a jar.\textsuperscript{250}]

19.1 Illustration of a syllogism of negation by the method of difference. (38.12) A syllogism of negation formulated by the method of difference (\textit{anupalabdher vaidharmyavān prayogah}):

A thing existent as perceptible by nature is necessarily perceived as a particular object of blue etc. which is admitted as perceptible\textsuperscript{251};

In this particular place\textsuperscript{252} we do not perceive a jar, although it is existent as perceptible by nature;

\textsuperscript{248} NBT 49, 11-12: \textit{yathā mahānasādīv iti, mahānasādau ki pratyakṣānapalambhābhāyāṁ kāryakaraṇabhāvātmāvibhāvo niścitaḥ}. See also NB III, s. 24: \textit{ihāpi siddha eva kāryakāraṇabhāve kāraṇe sādhye kāryahetur vaktaivaḥ}. The Buddhist theory of the establishment of a causal relation by \textit{pratyakṣānapalambha} will be soon dealt with again in §22.

\textsuperscript{249} NB III, s. 27: \textit{asaty agnau na bhavaty eva dhūmāḥ, atra cāsti dhūma iti kārya-hetoḥ prayogah}.

\textsuperscript{250} NB III, s. 9: \textit{yaḥ upalabdhiḥ laksanaprāptaṁ san nāpalabhyaṁ saḥ sādvyavakāraṇiva-yāḥ siddhāḥ, yathānyeva kāsid drṣṭāḥ śāsaviṇādiḥ. nāpalabhyaṁ ca kvaicit pradeśaviśeṣa upalabdhiḥ laksanaprāpta ghaṭa iti}.

\textsuperscript{251} T \textit{snon po la sogs paḥi khyad par mhon sun niid du mhon par ḣod=drṣyatvedābhimatanalāḍīviṣeṣaḥ} instead of \textit{niilāḍīviṣeṣaḥ} of M.

\textsuperscript{252} T \textit{phyogs kyi khyad par ḣdi na =iha pradeśaviśeṣe} as we read in G.
Therefore there is no jar in this place.  

20. Pervasion explained in relation to the two syllogistic forms. (38.20) It should be understood that while the probans (śādhanā) is pervaded by the probandum (śādhyā) in all the syllogism (śādhanavākyā) formulated by the method of agreement, the non-existence of the probandum (śādhyābhāva) is pervaded by the non-existence of the probans (śādhanābhāva) in the syllogism by the method of difference. Either the statement of the necessary existence (niyatatva) of the probans in the probandum or that of the necessary non-existence of the probandum in the non-existence of the probans is called 'pervasion' (vyāpti). Therefore when the pervasion [between the two terms] is established by means of valid knowledge, there should be no shade of doubt that the probandum might not exist in the same locus (dharmin) in which the probans exists.

20.1. The Naiyāyika's proof of the existence of God as an illustration of untrue vyāpti. (39.6) However, doubt arises inevitably when a universal (sarvopasanāravati) vyāpti is not established by means of valid knowledge as, for instance, in the case of the inference from an effect which is aimed at proving the existence of God (iśvara). That is to say, they [i.e. the Naiyāyikas] state the following proof: 

253. NB III. s. 25: vaidharmavatāḥ prayogah, yat sad upalabdhi lakṣaṇapraṇaptam tad upalabhyata eva, yathā nilādviśeṣaḥ, na caivaṁ ihāupalabdhi lakṣaṇa-praṇaptasya satā upalabdhir ghaṭasyettām upalabdhiprayogah.

254. G. T have ca. which is dropped in M.

255. The Buddhist campaign against the theism of the Naiyāyika was started by Dharmakirti in PV II v. 10–29; commentators on PV including Prajñākaragupta further developed their criticism of theism. Śantirikṣita and Kamalaśīla devoted a chapter for the refutation of God in TS and TSP (TS v. 46–93). Śāntideva and Prajñākāramati deal with the problem in BCA and BCAP IX, v. 119–126. The theistic argument of the Naiyāyika which forms the object of criticism for these Buddhists seems to be set forth by Aviddhakarṇa. Uddyotakara, Praśastamati etc. as named in TSP. In the latest period of Indian Buddhism. Jānānāśrimitra wrote a lengthy dissertation Īśvaravādādhikāra (JNA 233-322), which consisted of Pārvapakṣasaṃkṣepa, Īśvaradūṣaṇa and Vārttikasaptaslokitvyākhyāna. The last chapter consists of three sections and is an elaborate commentary on the seven verses of Dharmakirti, viz. PV II, v. 10–16. Ratnakirti made a résumé of Jānānāśri’s Īśvaravādādhikāra. It is incorporated in RNA 29–52 under the title Īśvarasādhana-dūṣaṇa. Mokṣākara, as usual, follows the latter two authors when he criticises the Naiyāyika’s theism in the following text. The opponents of these three Buddhists are mainly Śaṅkara, Narasimha, Trilocana, Vācaspatimiśra, Vittoka, etc. (RNA 35–36). Vācaspatimiśra demonstrates his own theistic argument in NVT 953. 1 ff. (ad NS 4. 1. 21). Following Ratnakirti. Mokṣākara introduces Vācaspati’s theory of the classification of the existent things in the world into three kinds, his syllogism proving the existence of God, etc. But Buddhist criticism is logical and centers around Vācaspati’s theory of vyāpti, which is found mainly in NVT 138. 25–140. 15 (see n. 270).
“We are able to prove the existence of the omniscient God, whether or not an omniscient lord [i.e. Buddha] really exists. For the existent in the world is of three kinds: 256 1) Some things such as a jar etc. which have been definitely produced by an agent (niṣcitakartṛka); 2) some things such as ether (vyoman) etc. which definitely have no agent (niṣcitakartṛntītī); 3) and the third group of things such as the earth etc. the existence of whose agents is doubted. There is no class of things other than the above [three] 257. [Thus, our syllogism may be formulated as follows:]

Those which are classified as things the existence of whose agents is uncertain, trees in a forest whose origination we can actually see or the earth etc. which have remained very long since their creation, and so on, must all considered to have an intelligent agent as their creator (buddhimatkartṛka);

Because they are effects (kāryatvāt);

For example a jar. 258

The probans [of this inference] is not illegitimate (asiddha), because the

256. T omits trayāḥ khalu.

257. JNA 233, 15-16: trayo hi bhāvarāṣayaḥ, buddhimatkartṛkāś ca ghaṭādayāḥ; akartṛkāś cākāśādayāḥ; saṃdigdhakartṛkāś ca bhūdharādayāḥ. RNA 39, 25-28: nanu ṣrksādayāḥ pakṣādayāḥ pakṣīkṛtāḥ, kathāṁ tair vyabhičāraḥ. trividho hi bhāvarāṣiḥ, saṃdigdhakartṛkāḥ yathā ṣrksādīḥ; prasiddhakartṛkā yathā ghaṭādīḥ; akartṛkā yathākāśādīḥ. tatra prasiddhakartṛke ghaṭādau pratyakṣaṇupalambhābhīyāṁ vyāptim ādāya saṃdehaṇade kṣmāruhādau kāryatvam upasāṁkṛtya buddhimmān anumiyate.... This latter passage is parallel to that in JNA 284, 21-24. Cf. NVT 953. 1 ff.: etavād abhipretam ācāryasya, trayo hi khalu bhāva jagati bhavanti, prasiddhacatanakartṛkāḥ yathā prāśādaṭṭilaṅgoparatorādayāḥ, prasiddhātalaveṇaryāḥ yathā paramānyavākāśādayāḥ, saṃdigdhacatanakartṛkāḥ yathā tanatarumahādharādayāḥ.

258. JNA 233, 6-10: iha pratyaavasthānam anyeṣam, vividdāśadībhātah bhūdharādī buddhimatkartṛpyāvakaḥ, kāryatvāt; yad yat kāryaṁ tad buddhimatkartṛpyāvakaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ yathā ghaṭāḥ; kāryaṁ cēdaṁ bhūdharādi; tasmād buddhimatpyāvakaḥ iti, na cēdaṁ asiddham, bauddhāśāpi vindhyagandhamādānādāmithā kāryate vividdāḥbhāvat. nāpi viruddham, sapakṣe bhāvat. na cānaikāntikam, kvacid api kārte buddhirad adhiṣṭhānayabhičārasya darṣayitum asakyatvāt.... Cf. NVT 953, 5ff.: vividdāḥbhāsītas tarumahādharādayaḥ upādānabhījñakartṛka utpattimattvāḥ, acetanopādānātvaḥ vā, yad utpattimad acetanopādānakaḥ vā tat sarvam upādānabhījñapūrvakaṁ yathā prāśadādi, tathā ca vividdāḥbhāsītas tanutarumahādharādayaḥ, tasmāt tathāḥ, na caiṣam utpattimattvam asiddham.... A similar syllogism is quoted in RNA 29, 13-17. RNA 36, 14-19 ascribes the same kind of syllogism to Vācaspati: tathā ca vācaśatīḥ pramāṇayati. vividdāḥbhāsītā dhimatarūgirīśgarādayāḥ upādānādībhījñakartṛkāḥ; kāryatvāt; yad yat kāryaṁ tat tad upādānādībhījñakartṛkam.... Similar inferences meant for proving the existence of God are proposed by many Naiyāyikas and quoted by Ratnakirti in his Īśvarasādhanadāpa. The inference with kāryatvā as the probans is the most representative argument of the Naiyāyika.
effect·ness of all [these] things is established by valid knowledge. Nor is it incompatible (viruddha), since it is present in the sapakṣa. Nor is it inconclusive (anaikāntika), because there is a proof contradicting the opposite of the assertion to be proved (sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapra·mānasadbhāvāt) [i.e. we can argue by the following reductio ad absurdum to prove the vyāpti:]

We cognize by a mental perception accompanied by repeated past experience (bhūyodarśanasahāyena mānasapratyakṣena)259 [the pervasion] that an effect (kārya) [say, a jar] is always produced through the agency of a potter who is endowed with intelligence (buddhimat). If [on the contrary] a thing could come into existence without [being mediated by some] intelligent [agent], then it [e. g. a jar] might sometimes not be produced even when the intelligent agent [e. g. a potter] intends [to make it]. [But this is absurd], because an effect cannot even once arise without its cause. Therefore, we should in no case suppose that a thing can

259. T mañ du mthon bari rgyu can gyi yid dañ mhon sum gyis....=bhūyodarśanani~ban·
dhanamānasena pratyakṣena ca.... T seems to understand mānasapratyakṣa- as a dvandva compound, which is wrong. Krishnamacharya condemned the same word as a mistake on the part of Mokṣākara, and suggested a correction into alaukikapratyakṣa (G. Tiṅka. 77. 20 ff.: atra mānasenēti viṣeṣaṇam prāmādikam....). He could be right, if Mokṣākara introduced here the theory of the syncretic school of Nyāyavaiśeṣika. However, Mokṣākara, following Ratnakirti, refers to Trilocana and Vācaspatimīśra of the Naiyāyika and Kumārila and Sucaritamīśra (Kāśikākāra) of the Mimāṃsaka, who all maintain that a universal concomitance is grasped by perception helped by repeated past experience. RNA 42, 3-5: bhūyodarśanagamyā hi uyāptiḥ sāmannyadharmayor (SV Anu. v. 12a-b) iti prā·
siddham eva. asyāyaṃ arthaḥ kāśikākāraya uyāktāḥ : prācīnānekārśanasanajitasaṁskāraśa·
hāye carame (darśane) cetasi cakāśī dhamasyādgniyatiasasvabhāvatam.... (SVK III. 16. 14-15): RNA, 42. 10-11: trilocanena punar ayam arthaḥ kathāḥ, bhūyodarśanasahāyena manasā
tajjātyānām sambandho ghṛito bhavati. ato dhūmo 'gniḥ na vyabhicarate. tadevyabhicāre'py
apādhirahitām sambandham atikrēmeta. hetor vipakṣaśākhāvīratakaḥ prarnāyaṃ upalabdhi
-lakṣāṇapratyāppādhvirahaniścahetur anupalambhākhyaṃ pratyakṣaṃ eva. tatoḥ Siddhaḥ svā·
bhāvīkaḥ sambandhaḥ tathāhāpīti svamataṃ vyavasthāpitam iti (cf. n. 270 below); RNA 42, 15: vācaspatināpīdam uktam, abhijātamanībhavedattvavād bhūyodarśanasanajitasaṁskārasa·
hāyam indriyam eva dhāmādinām bahyādibhiḥ svābhāvikasambandhaḥgrāhīti uktam (NVT 140. 5-6). These three passages are quoted again in RNA (Vyāptimūrgya), 99, 11-12; 99, 20-21; 100, 22-24. Vācapatī does not agree with Trilocana and say that svābhāvika-sambandha is grasped either indriyapratyakṣa or other means of valid knowledge according to circumstances, when it is produced through bhūyodarśana. At least the theory of Trilocana and Sucaritamīśra completely identical with what Ratnakirti and Mokṣākara say, inasmuch as they admit that universal concomitance is grasped by mental perception helped by repeated past experience. Therefore our text in M needs no correction.
be an effect and at the same time not produced by an intelligent agent".260

20.2. Refutation. (40.5) To this the following reply can be made: All philosophers agree that in every case a probans proves its probandum if and only if the pervasive relation (vyāpti) between the probans and the probandum has been established by valid knowledge generalising [all the cases of the probans and probandum] (sarvopasamāreṇa pramāṇena)261. Now, if the vyāpti [in your syllogism] is grasped between [an effect in general and] an intelligent being who is qualified by having a visible body (dṛṣyaśariraviśiṣṭa- buddhimat-), then this probans, just as the probans prameyatva (being an object of cognition), is inconclusive owing to non-exclusiveness (sādhāraṇānaikāntika), because we find growing grass, which is not endowed with the said probandum [i.e. is not produced by a visible intelligent agent], is also an effect.262

(40.10) You cannot contend that [our criticism is irrelevant, as] the very grass etc. is comprised in p [of the above said inference]. For an object clearly deviating from the vyāpti (vyabhicāraviśayā) cannot be put forward as p, since there is a rule [set forth by Dharmakīrti]: A

260. Jhānaśrimitra reproduces five kinds of viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa which the Naiyāyika proposes in order to substantiate the vyāpti ‘an effect is produced by an intelligent agent’. Of these five, the first is parallel to what Mokṣakara refers to here. See JNA 237, 22-238, 3: yathā saugatānaṁ citrabhānōr anumāṇe yadi citrabhānum antareṇa kāraṇāntarāda api dāhūmā devaṁtare kālaṁtare vā jāyeta; dṛṣṭayor api desakālayor na citrabhānoḥ sakṛd api ātmastatiḥ labheta, yaṃmān na tadābhāve bhavatas tatkāryanīyam yutkāḥ, atīprasahgatā; tataḥ ca tādṛṣṭasya sarvasvāvadādhetutvān na tataḥ sakṛd api jāyeta. bhavati ca, tasmān nātajjanyaṁ tādṛṣṭam iti viparyaye bādhakapramāṇavṛtyā pratibandhasādhīṇaḥ. tathātmaṁ api yadi kīcchid buddhimadadhiśṭhānām antareṇyanyo’ti kāryam upajāyeta, hantu na tarchi sakṛd api buddhimaṭaḥ kumbhakārāder utpadyeta, bhavati ca, tatas tajjanyaṁ ity ekāḥ bādhakāḥ pramāṇām.

261. T bsal bar bya ba dān sgrub par byed pa gaṅ zga gi khyad par thams cad ŋe bar sdu paṅ ātsh mas grub pa.... Gaṅ zga gi khyad par should be read: gaṅ dag gi khyab pa. Tn has khyab for khyad.

262. RNA 39, 21-24, kiṁ dṛṣṭaśaritrāpādhitā buddhīmaṇmātreṇa vyāptitr ghyate, āho svid dṛṣṭaśaritrāpādhitāvadureṇa dṛṣṭādṛṣṭasādhāraṇaṇīti vikalpau. yady ādyāḥ pākṣaḥ, tada tathābhūtasādhyaḥ antareṇāpy utpadyamāne viṣapādu kāryatvadārśanāt prameyatvādi vac sādhāraṇānaikāntika hetuḥ. As for the fallacy of sādhāraṇānaikāntika illustrated by the probans prameyatva see § 10.1 and n. 168.

263. PV IV v. 91: amisiddhāḥ pramāṇābhyyāḥ sa cōpagama īṣyate, saṃdisgehe hetuvacanād vyasto hetor anāśrayaḥ. utpaga ma in this verse means pākṣa. M has vyakto instead of vyasto. But T bsal, PV, the same verse cited in JNA (244, 3), that in RNA (39.4 f. b.), etc. agree to vyasto. In the inference in question, the p. grass, is seen by valid perception not to have an intelligent agent with a visible body. Since grass is clearly rejected as belonging to the class of s by perception, it is absurd to try to prove by inference that it has an intelligent agent with a visible body as its cause, i.e. that it belongs to the class of s.
probans is stated only concerning a $p$ which is not yet ascertained [to be $s$ or non-$s$]; and what has been rejected [to be $s$ by other valid knowledge] should not be [put forward as] the locus of the probans\textsuperscript{264}.

(40.13) [The opponent may object:] “We see smoke without [seeing] fire on a mountain which is not climable\textsuperscript{265}. Thus, it is easy to point out the same deviation in the case of [a mountain put forward as the locus of] smoke”. This is not correct. Such a mountain is qualified to be an object which is doubtful [of having fire] (samdigdhaviṣaya) [and fit to be made a $p$], just because fire cannot be seen on the mountain as it is not climable. In the problem under question, however, you want to grasp the vyāpti [between an effect] and ‘having an intelligent agent with a visible body’, [and yet we do not perceive the agent, who, if he existed, would be seen]; therefore, it is rightly said that the existence of an intelligent agent is contradicted by the non-perception of a perceptible object (dṛṣyānupalambha).

(40.18) Or otherwise, if you construe the vyāpti as that [between an effect] and an [intelligent agent] whose body is invisible\textsuperscript{266} or an intelligent agent in general, we cannot ascertain the negative vyāpti of such a probandum as an invisible one or an intelligent one in general by means of the non-perception of a perceptible object. Thus, yours is a fallacious probans named samdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛtti\textsuperscript{267}. For in this case the vyāpti between the non-existence of the probandum and the non-existence of the probans is not available\textsuperscript{268} because [the probandum itself] is not established

\textsuperscript{264} RNA 39, 25ff.: namu vyāpādayaḥ pakṣikṛtāḥ, kathāṁ tair vyabhicāraḥ...yad āha, na sādhvyayāvāya vyabhicāra ity ayuktam etat. na hi vyabhicāraviṣaya eva pakṣo (Read so instead of pakṣo) bhavitum arhati, sāmādghāh hetuvacanād vyāsas evaḥ atyāṁ anāśraya iti nyāyāt. vyabhicāraviṣayatā ca dṛṣṭaśaṁśaipādhaḥ buddhinnatmakṣaśaya tṛṣādyutpatattau dṛṣṭyaṁupalambhena pratikṣiptatvat... This is a citation from JNA 284, 21-285. 1.

\textsuperscript{265} For asakṣaṁraḥ parvate T has skyed (p. bskyed) par mūs pa la la (Even some places which are unable to give rise to [fire]). But here ārohana must be taken in the sense of climbing.

\textsuperscript{266} Read with G and T aḍṛṣṭaśaṁśaipati do dṛṣṭya- in M.

\textsuperscript{267} For this fallacy see §10.2.4.

\textsuperscript{268} M has ākaśādau between sādhyaḥpaṭavyaḥ and asiddhatvena; but better to omit it. Concerning our author’s argument in this paragraph. cf. RNA 40, 2ff: atka vyabhicārakāśaḥ trividhābhāraviṣayavasthāpānaṁtthāṁ ca viṣeṇādu pratyakṣāṇaṁpratiśiptena dṛṣṭyāśaṁśaipādhaḥ buddhinnatmakṣaḥ vyāptir avagamyata iti doityaḥ samkālaḥ. tādā viṣeṇādu buddhinnatmakṣaḥ sambhavamānavatvā na sādhyaḥpaṭavāniṁkātāṁ brūmāḥ. kiṁ tārthi vyāptigrhaṇaṁkāle dṛṣṭyāśaṁśaipādhaḥ buddhinnatmakṣaḥ dṛṣṭyāśaṁśaipādhaḥ dṛṣṭyaṁupalambhena vyatirekāśiddhāḥ vyāptir abhāvāḥ sāmāddhāha (-vipakṣa- ) vyāvṛttiḥkvām ācāśmahe...
In this connection the revered master Jñānaśrimitra says:

If you, in order to remove [the fallacy that $h$] effect-ness, is found in the $vipakṣa$ [i.e. in what has not a visible intelligent agent as its cause], imagine an invisible agent, how can you establish the $vyāpti$, since it is deprived of confirmation by the negative $vyāpti$?

Or, if you, hoping to establish the negative $vyāpti$, rely on a visible agent, then [$h$, effect-ness] is clearly seen in the $vipakṣa$, because grass etc. grows without it [i.e. the operation of a visible agent].

20.2.1. Trilocana's objection rejected. (41.7) Trilocana said as follows:270 ‘Just as smoke etc. is connected with fire etc. by the intrinsic

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269. $Jñānaśrimitrapāda$ is found only in M. The first half of this verse can be certainly ascribed to him since it occurs in JNA 28s, 7-8, but the second half cannot be traced in JNA. It is Ratnakirti who put these two halves together as the summary of his preceding argument, and it is likely that the second half is a product of Ratnakirti himself.

270. In §20.2 the Buddhist criticised the Naiyāyika's argument, pointing out that the $vyāpti$ between 'effect' and 'intelligent agent' does not represent a valid causal relation. But the Naiyāyika contends that it is not only causality but the intrinsic relation of a thing with another which forms valid $vyāpti$. Vacaspati on NS 1.1.5 refutes the Buddhist theory of $vyāpti$ that invariable concomitance is determined not by mere perception and non-perception but by the principle of causality or essential identity (cf. PV I, v. 31: $kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā nīyāmakāt, avinābhāvanīyamān 'darṣanān na na darṣanāt'). After criticising the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika view of $vyāpti$, he proposes the intrinsic relation ($svabhāvikasambandha$) as the criterion of $vyāpti$, and says that this intrinsic relation is grasped by sense-perception or other $pramāṇas$ helped by past repeated experience of perception and non-perception (cf. PV 259 above). In RNA 41, 17 ff. Ratnakirti summarises this argument of Vacaspati and introduces it as a $pūrvaṇapakṣa$. Mokṣikākara here presupposes the same $pūrvaṇapakṣa$, though he ascribes it to Trilocana, the guru of Vacaspati.

Vacaspati’s argument may be recapitulated as follows: ‘effect-ness’ is a probans not because it is perceived in the $sapakṣa$ and not in the $vipakṣa$, but because it possesses a $svabhāvīka$ relationship with ‘intelligent agent’. This $svabhāvīka$ relationship is understood by perception in the $sapakṣa$ and non-perception in the $vipakṣa$ in such a manner as we explain in the following. Thus, mentioning perception and non-perception in connection with the $svabhāvīka$ relation is also not irrelevant. If it is ascertained that $x$ is related with $y$ by a $svabhāvikasambandha$, $x$ is the probans and $y$ the probandum. For instance, the relation of smoke with fire is $svabhāvīka$, but that of fire with smoke is not, because fire without smoke can be seen as in the case of red-hot iron. Fire is connected with smoke
relationship (svābhāvikā sambandhaḥ), just so is ‘being an effect’ related with ‘an intelligent agent’, for in this case no limiting condition (upādhi) [of the relation] is found, nor is any case of deviation [from the relationship] (vyabhicāra) experienced’.\(^{271}\)

But this is not correct, for by the word upādhi is meant some other thing by the dependence on which [the probans is related to the probandum, i.e. if \(x\) needs \(z\) in order to be related with \(y\), this \(z\) is called upādhi]. This ‘other thing’, however, is not always perceptible; and it may be existent, though invisible owing to its inaccessibility in place, time or nature. Therefore, there may be an upādhi even in the relation of smoke with fire, and yet it may not be seen. Thus, how can it be ascertained as absent just because it is not cognized?

(41.14) The other reason proposed [by Trilocana], ‘because no deviation is experienced’ is not established because it is doubtful. Even if we do not see deviation repeatedly owing to the lack of other conditions only when it is connected with wet fuel. Thus, when fire is related to smoke, the relation is limited by a contingent condition (upādhi), i.e. wet fuel, and it is not by nature. On the other hand, the relation of smoke with fire is intrinsically necessary because no limiting condition is found here, since no case of deviation is seen, and because we cannot harbour doubt about what is not experienced. You cannot suspect the validity of the intrinsic relation by imposing a limiting condition which is imagined simply because there is neither proof nor disproof and which is actually imperceptible by nature. That is nothing but excessive doubt (saṅkāpiśāci). Therefore, if we do not find a limiting condition in spite of our effort to do so, then we come to know that no limiting condition is existent. And we can ascertain the intrinsic nature of the relation.

\(^{271}\) As explained above, svābhāvikasambandha is a term used by Trilocana and Vācaspati as meaning an intrinsic, necessary relation of a thing with another, its antonym being aupādhi-ka- or sopādhi-ka-sambandha. Ratnakirti’s representation corresponding to the passage that concerns us now runs: (RNA 42, 18-19) svābhāvikas tu dhūmādīnāś vahnyādibhiḥ sambandhaḥ tadupādher anupalabhyaṁatvat, kvacid vyabhicārasyād ādarsanād iti tvavyāvāsya laksanam uktaḥ. This passage is identical with NVT 139, 2-3, where, however, Vācaspati adds as the third reason anupalabhyaṁanasyāpī (vyabhicārasya) kalpanānupapatteḥ (cf. n. 270 above, Ratnakirti’s summary of Vācaspati’s argument). Buddhist reply to this reads (RNA 42, 20-23): etac cāsiddham, yata upādhiśabdena svato ‘rthāntaram eva-pekeṣāṇaṁ abhidhātyam. na cārthāntaraṁ drṣyatāmiyaṁ. adṛṣyasyāpī deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa-sya sambhavat. tatas ca dhūmasyāpī hutāśena saha sambandhe syād upādhiḥ, na cāpalakṣyata iti kathā adārsanāṁ nāsty eva yataḥ svābhāvikasambandhasiddiḥ....

The traditional definition of upādhi by the Naiyāyika after Udayana is: sādhīyaṁyāpaka-te sati sādhārayāpaka-ḥ. (That which is not a pervader of \(k\), while it is a pervader of \(s\).) Vācaspati, however, explains upādhi by the illustration of wet fuel (NVT 138, 2 f.b.—139,2=RNA 41, 20–22. See n. 270 above). The definition of upādhi in RNA and TBh arthaśāntaraṁ kiṁcic apekeṣāṇiyaṁ is based on this explanation of Vācaspati and perhaps his teacher Trilocana, though it is not verbally found in NVT.
[for its cognition], we cannot negate [the possibility of deviation] in all the cases\(^2\)\(^7\). This much [of scrutiny] is not to be blamed for transgressing the established custom of logicians (prāmāṇikalokayātrā)\(^7\), for the logician enjoins that doubt should be harboured about anything which is lacking a proof (sādhaka) or disproof (bādhaka). And even if we doubt in such a way, we would not fall into [the fault of] abstaining from action in all cases, for action is possible from doubt as much as from valid knowledge\(^7\).4

(42.2) [The opponent says:] \(^7\)

"Just as Buddhists call a thing an effect and another a cause, but not everything, despite the fact that all things are not different in respect of their individuality, just so we also maintain that a particular thing such as smoke etc. is connected by an intrinsic relation with [another such as] fire, but not everything [with

\(^{272}\) RNA 42, 27-29: kvacid vyabhicārasādārāsanād iti tu mass utkam tat pratyukta eva, adhyāsāupy upādhe sambhavyamānātā, vyabhicārasya ca pratyayantaraivaikulyenāhātārānaṃ 'pi niṣeddhum aśakyaśūnā... The passage recurs with slight differences in RNA 102, 30-33.

\(^{273}\) Vācaspati argues (RNA 38, 11-13 =100, 10-11 =NVT 139, 9-11): tasmat prāmāṇikalokayātām anupālayatā yathādārāsanāṃ sākkaniyam, na to adṛṣṭam api, viśeṣasmyapakṣo hi saṃśāyo nāṃṣṭer bhavati, na ca smṛṭir ananubhātacare bhavati. The Buddhist replies to it (RNA 43, 1 ff.): na ca itavatā prāmāṇikalokayātātikramaṇāḥ, prāmāṇikākair eva sādhakabādhaḥkapramāṇābhāve nyāyaprayātasya saṃśāsāsyasya vihitavaiśā.

\(^{274}\) Vācaspati argues in NVT 139, 6-7=RNA 38, 9-10: Excessive suspicion, if it is given an opportunity beyond the limit of the world of knowledge, will move about at liberty and will not be checked anywhere. Thus, one will not take action in any matter (nāyam kvacit pravarteta), for all things may be somehow thrown into doubt. See also NVT 139, 21-140.1: dhūmaviśeṣasya tu vinā vahhim anupalambhād, upādhibhāsaya cādṛṣṭamānasya kalpatanāṁ prāmāṇābhāvād, viśeṣasmyapakṣasya ca saṃśāsāsyadupalābhadhāpūree anupāddād, utpade caśītraprasaṅgāt prekṣavatprārthītyacchedāt svabhāvikād sambandho vadhāryate. Rātnakirti replies to this (RNA 43, 2-3): na ca sarvatrāpratītprasāṅgāḥ, prāmāṇād arthasaṃśāyāc ca pravṛttter upapateḥ.

\(^{275}\) Replying to Buddhist logicians, Vācaspati argues that kāryatva is a probans only because it is related to its probandum by svabhāvikasambandha (cf. n. 270 above). Buddhist logicians, criticising this theory, argues (NVT 139, 11-14 =RNA 41, 29-31= RNA 100, 16-18): If one thing is connected by svabhāvikasambandha with another which is not the former's cause, it would follow that everything is by nature (svabhāvataḥ) connected with any other; and everything would be inferred from everything. Or the contrary, if one thing is connected with another because the former is an effect of the latter, why is everything not an effect of any other, since all things are similar in their individuality (anyatva)? Thus, if (i.e. svabhāvikasambandha) necessarily entails the fault of over-application (atīprapaṅgā). To this Vācaspati replies: na bhāvasabhaveḥ paryānyojayoḥ, tasmaḥ anyatvāviśeṣ'pi kīcchād eva kāryān kāryaḥ ca kīcchād. It is this passage that appears in our text 42, 2-5 in a slightly different form. Mokṣākara ascribes it to Trilocana.
any other”.

(42.5) This is untenable\(^\text{276}\). Is \textit{svabhāvikasambandha} established by a proof (\textit{pramāṇa}) so that your assertion may be correct, just as the causal relation that a thing called smoke is dependent on fire is established through a proof? Again, what is the meaning of \textit{svabhāvikasambandha}? There may be three alternative interpretations [of the word]: 1) self-born (\textit{svato bhūtaḥ}); 2) Born out of its cause (\textit{svahetor bhūtaḥ}); 3) Born without causes (\textit{ahetuka}). Among them, however, the first alternative is unreasonable, because it is incongruent that a thing acts upon itself. Nor is the second tenable, because [by asserting it,] you would come to accept the causal relation (\textit{tadutpattisambandha}) [which the Buddhist holds]. If the third is maintained, the theory of \textit{svabhāvikasambandha} would be extremely irrational\(^\text{277}\), as it is not determined in place, time, and nature.

(42.12) Again, a \textit{vyāpti} is not established\(^\text{278}\) by the mere existence of an example (\textit{dṛśţānta}), be it that in agreement or in difference, because otherwise such a relationship would be recognized even between a camel and an ass which happen to be together by accident. Therefore, an instance which is called a corroborative example is applied to a probans in order to recall the proof establishing the necessary relation [of two things], which, once cognized, has been forgotten; but you cannot take up a case of mere accidental proximity (\textit{svasaṁnidhimātra}) [as a corroborative example]. For, returning to ‘ether’ [which is the instance in difference of your syllogism], it is not known in this case that the absence of the probans [i.e., ‘not being an effect’] is necessitated by the absence of the probandum [i.e., ‘not having an intelligent agent as cause’] because we find in ether not only the absence of an intelligent agent but also the

\(^{276}\) In NVT 139, 15-16 as well as RNA 43, 5-6, the reply of Vacaspati cited above is criticised: You cannot say that the essential nature of a thing is not to be questioned. For the same indisputableness of the nature of a thing (Read \textit{svabhāvānanyayoga}) could be maintained even when things other than effects and causes are supposed to be connected by nature.... Ratnakirti continues his criticism and comes to say (43, 16-20): \textit{kim ca svabhāvikasambandha iti ko'ṛtāḥ. kim svato bhūtaḥ, svahetuto bhūta, ahetuko vēti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ, na tāvād ādyāḥ pakṣāḥ, svātmanī kāriṭvāvirodhatā. dvitya-pakṣe tu tadutpattir eva sambandho mukhāntareṇa svikṛta iti na kaścid vivādaḥ. ahetukate tu deva-kālasvabhāvaniyamābhāvaprasahgāh ity asahgataḥ svabhāvikāh sambandhāḥ.}

\(^{277}\) asangatā in M is a misprint for asangatā.

\(^{278}\) Read \textit{vyāptipār asiddhiḥ} instead of \textit{vyāptisiddhiḥ} in M. According to T (khyab pa grub pa ma yin te) and G.
absence of a not-intelligent cause\textsuperscript{279}. What is the thing which necessitates by its own absence the absence of ‘effect-ness’? This is the question to be solved in order to establish the negative vy\={a}\=pti (vyatireka), viz., the absence of the probans necessitated by the absence of the probandum. [But it is not known from your example.] You may contend: ‘We see\textsuperscript{280} the positive vy\={a}\=pti between effect-ness and an intelligent agent in the case of a jar; and this makes us know that in the case of ether too the absence of effect-ness is due to the absence of an intelligent agent alone’. But this is not tenable. For the relation between the two [i.e. ‘effect’ and ‘intelligent agent’], be it that of identity (\textit{tiiddhi/mya}), or causality (\textit{tadutpatti}) or of intrinsic nature (\textit{sv\=abh\=avika}), has not yet been established by a proof beforehand\textsuperscript{281}.

\textbf{20.2.2. Vyatireka cannot be established by mere non-perception.} (43.5) Furthermore, a negative vy\={a}\=pti is not established only by non-perception (\textit{adar\=sanam\=atra}). For, by saying that \(h\) is not cognized in the vipak\=sa, we mean the absence of the knowledge cognizing it [i.e. \(h\) in the vipak\=sa]. And a cognition is the effect of its object, since there is a universal rule that what is not a cause is not an object of cognition. However, we cannot infer the absence of a cause from the absence of its effect, since fire without smoke can [sometimes] be perceived. Your argument [that there is no object when there is no cognition] may be valid if the presence of an object were pervaded by the presence of its cognition; but this vy\={a}\=pti is an utter impossibility, because, otherwise, it would follow that everyone is omniscient (\textit{sarvadar\=sin}). Thus, the negative vy\={a}\=pti cannot be proved only by non-perception. In this connection the following is said:

Non-perception of [\(h\) in] all the sapak\={a}sa means the uncertainty [of the vy\={a}\=pti]; non-perception of [\(h\) in] one member of the sapak\={a}sa alone [when \(h\) is seen in others of the sapak\={a}sa] means a deviation [from the vy\={a}\=pti];

For even a seed that is covered by soil or submerged in water is

\textsuperscript{279}. M acetanasya k\=ar\=anasya ni\=v\=trtir nastya eva makes no sense here. G and T (\textit{sems pa med pa\=hi rgyu ya\=n idog pa yod pa kho na ste}) agree to the reading ni\=v\=trtir asty eva.

\textsuperscript{280}. T rjes su hgro ba ma mtho\=n ba las (anuy\=adar\=san\=ad)…ma must be omitted. G 24. 4-5 must be read according to the footnote 1.

\textsuperscript{281}. G sambandha\=h pram\=anato na pras\=adhita ity uktam. T agrees with M.
apparently seen to be absent\textsuperscript{282}.

20.2.3. Vācaspatimisra’s objection refuted. (43.15) Vācaspatimisra said: “Doubt is [waving knowledge] in which the memory of the details [of an object] is lacking. Therefore, it is customary to doubt when we see an object, [but not when we do not see an object at all.]”\textsuperscript{283}

To this we reply: That principle is not universally applicable. We will argue, however, having hypothetically admitted it. \textsuperscript{284}Seen from your point of view, ‘cognizability’ (\textit{prameyatva}), ‘smokiness’ (\textit{dhūmatva}) and ‘being an effect’ (\textit{kāryatva}) are all of the same kind, inasmuch as they all have the common quality of ‘being deprived of the relations of identity (\textit{tādātmya}) and causality (\textit{tadutpatti}), [since you do not accept these two relations]. Among these, \textit{prameyatva} has been shown to have the fault of deviation; and this makes us throw doubt upon the other two. Thus it is that we doubt what we see\textsuperscript{285}.

(44.3) Thus, [the Naiyāyika’s syllogism for proving the existence of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{282} Our author follows RNA 38, 19-26: \textit{tad etat pralāpamatram, na hi mahatāpi \textit{prayatnena vipakṣe mṛgyamāṇasya hetor adarśanamātreṇa vyatirekaḥ} sidhyati. tathā hi vipakṣe hetur nāpālābhyata ity anena \textit{tadapalambhakapramāṇanirvittir ucye}, pramāṇāḥ ca \textit{prameyasā kāryam}, nākāraṇam vipāya iti nīyāt. na ca kāryaniḥsttu kāraṇanirvittir upalabdhaḥ. nirdhūmasyāpi vahner upalambhāt. yadi punah pramāṇasattayā \textit{prameyasattā} vyāptā syāt taddā yuktaḥ etat. kevalam iyam eva vyāptār asambhāvini. sarvasya sarvadārśavasrasyaṣtāya.}
\item \textsuperscript{283} This contention of Vācaspati is often quoted by Ratnakirti. See, for instance. RNA 38. 11-13: \textit{tasmat \textit{pramāṇikakarayātrām} anuपālayatā yathādārśanam eva \textit{saṁkāryam}. na \textit{te} \textit{ādṛṣṭam} \textit{api}. \textit{viśeṣaṃsrtyāpeko} hi saṁśaya nāṃśy atr bhavati. na ca \textit{smṛty} anunabhātacare bhavati (cf. n. 273 above). See also NS 1.1.23: \textit{saṁmāṇeḥkadharmapattier vipatitpatter upalabhyahupalabdhvaya}vasthātā sa \textit{viśeṣāpeko} \textit{vimarsaḥ} saṁśayaḥ.
\item \textsuperscript{284} M tathi hi (\textit{kārayadūmātyatvāyaḥ}) \textit{tādātmyatadupattisambandhaviyogitvena sādhāraṇena} \textit{dharmaṇa} \textit{prameyatvadūmātyatvādharṣidiṇāṁ} \textit{tannadāntaḥ} \textit{sa}vaṣṭiṣyatvam. The bracketed words are not found in G. T and are certainly redundant. G -\textit{tyāga}ṃ for \textit{viyogitvena}; T agrees with M. G \textit{sādhāraṇadharmena} for \textit{sādhāraṇena} \textit{dharmaṇa}. G. M \textit{tannadānena}, but T and RNA (n. 285) have \textit{tvammatena}.
\item \textsuperscript{285} RNA 39, 7-10: \textit{evam ca sati} \textit{tādātmyatadupattilakṣaṇapratibandha}vicyogitvena sādhāraṇena \textit{dharmaṇa} \textit{prameyatvadūmātyatvādharṣidiṇāṁ} \textit{tvammatena} \textit{sa}vaṣṭiṣyatvā \textit{prameyatvavrtyabhicāraraśanam} eva \textit{saṁkām} \textit{upasthāpayatī} yathādārśanam evēdam \textit{āsākkitam}.
\end{itemize}
God] cannot escape the criticism that the probans has the fallacy of saṃdīgḍhavipākṣavyāvṛttikatva (h’s exclusion from the vipākṣa being doubted); and this is a valid confutation (saddūṣaṇa). He [Vācaspati] however, objected: “Our probans is not fallacious, and is not to be refuted. By pointing out [a fallacy in it], you have fallen into a position of defeat (nīgraḥasthāna) called ‘blaming what is not fallacious’ (adośodbhāvana’”286.

But, contending in this way, the disputant [Vācaspati] has been contradicted by his own doctrine of a position of defeat called ‘refuting what should not be refuted’ (nīraruṣyojuyuyoga)287. We should not pay any more attention to this pitiable person (devānām priyāḥ)288.

20.2.4. The problem of solipsism discussed.289 (44.9) The objection

286. G asaddo~odbhiivana; T skyon ma yin pa brjod pa seems to agree with M.
287. NS 5, 2, 22 : anigrahaṃ nīgraḥasthānābhivyapayo nīruṣyojuyuyogaḥ.
288. RNA 39, 13f : tad evaṃ vipakṣe "darsanāmātṛaṇaḥ hetor vyātekhaśūddhena saṃdīgḍha-vipākṣavāyāvruttiktaṃ nāma hetudūṣaṇam dūrvarām eva. ata evaśyāpañyādośodbhāvanaḥ nāma nīgraḥasthānam iti yad anenāveditaḥ tad api sāvyadām. prayutāsmin hetau saḍaṇe parihartaye nāyany hetudoṣo’to na parihartayo 'syā cūpanyādo 'dośodbhāvanaḥ nāma nīgraḥasthānam iti bruvann ayam eva tapasvi samatena nīruṣyojuyuyogalakṣaṇanena nīgraḥasthaṃ nighyata iti kṛpām arhati.

289. §20.2.4 is entirely lacking in G and partially preserved in M, in which the meaning is not very clear: only T has maintained the whole section. Whether the existence of the minds of other persons can be inferred or not is a vexed problem in Buddhist philosophy, since the radical idealism of the Vaiśānavādin easily leads to solipsism, while the Sautrāntika as bāhyārthaśādīvin used to criticise the former for solipsism. However, the Vaiśānavādin does not always hold solipsism. In fact, he recognizes the existence of other people’s minds in the sense of saṃvṛtisatya, i.e. he thinks that the existence of other persons’ minds as representations of one’s own mind is established in the domain of logic; but in his epistemology, which is a radical empiricism, he says that all things are representations of one’s own mind, and that therefore the existence of another personality independent of one’s own cannot be proved in the sense of paramārtha. Thus, it is often found that one and the same Vaiśānavādin proves sometimes the existence of saṃtānāntara and another time disproves it. Ratnakirti wrote Saṃtānāntaradūṣaṇa in which he demolished the opponent’s inference of other people’s minds from the standpoint of paramārtha; but in his Iśvaraśādhanadūṣaṇa, in which he argues from the standpoint of the Sautrāntika or the saṃvṛtisatya of the Vaiśānavāda, he says that the inference of the existence of saṃtānāntara is logically valid, whereas the inference of the existence of God is not. Regarding this double attitude toward the problem, see Introduction to my paper ‘Buddhist solipsism—a free translation of Ratnakirti’s Saṃtānāntaradūṣaṇa’ (IBK Vol. XIII. no. 1. pp. 9–24). In the Tibetan version of §20.2.4 Mokṣākara follows Ratnakirti as asserting that saṃtānāntara exists.

Mokṣākara’s argument found in T is merely a digest of Ratnakirti’s discussion and can be reconstructed by the light of the latter’s passages in RNA. The Tibetan is once restored into Skt. by Iyengar in M Appendix III. But we can better it now that RNA is published. The following are Tibetan text and a Skt. reconstruction. The fragments
may be raised: "If vyāpti—since it is grasped by direct perception and non-perception—were a relation which holds between universals related as cause and effect only when both are perceptible, as in the example of the universals 'smoke' and 'fire', then one could not infer the existence of other personalities, since the mind of another person, being invisible by

in M are retained so far as they are identical with T. My tr. is based on T in principle.

Tibetan:  "If vyāpti—since it is grasped by direct perception and non-perception—were a relation which holds between universals related as cause and effect only when both are perceptible, as in the example of the universals 'smoke' and 'fire', then one could not infer the existence of other personalities, since the mind of another person, being invisible by
nature, is not comprised [in the situation] at the time when the *vyāpti* is [said to be] grasped”.

But this is not acceptable, for in this situation self-consciousness is the factor which brings about the knowledge of the *vyāpti*; because, on the basis of self-consciousness in general, located in one’s own and in another’s personality, the mind of another person is [in this sense] visible. Or alternatively, the mind of another person is ‘visible’ because it always occurs in conjunction with a visible body.

Nor is the following objection tenable: “If this were so, an intelligent being in general, or fire in general common to the fire of digestion or of a picture, would properly come within the range of normal sensory perception in general, so as to be visible; [and this is obviously not so]. Therefore, *vyāpti* is established only between visible fire and smoke, and it is not valid to assert by direct perception a *vyāpti* between the motions [of a body] which are visible and non-visible minds common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others, [since this rests on an illicit extrapolation from data visible to sense-perception]”.

[This argument is not correct] because, although a mind in general common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others is by nature invisible, it is related to a visible body so as to form a single unity, so far as we admit the existence of the external object. And such a mind in general as occurs insepably [with a visible external object], though common to one’s own personality and the personalities of others, is known to be the pervader of the motions [of a body]. Thus, two objects, when they are by nature visible or occur inseparably with a visible thing, are established by clear normal perception; and the *vyāpti* between them is also grasped. But this does not hold good when a mind in general common even to invisible persons is concerned, since it is deprived of the said relation [to a visible body]. After all, therefore, another personality can be inferred. It is in this sense that the rule is set forth that a *vyāpti*, when it is grasped by direct perception and non-perception, holds good only between two visible things.

20.2.5. Other fallacies of the proof of God are pointed out. (45.1) Again, if your reasoning is aimed at proving that [an effect] presupposes [as its cause] an intelligent being in general, the proof is to be criticised for asserting the obvious (*siddhasādhanatā*). [For we admit that all ef-
fects are produced by actions, which are caused by the mind.]

Alternatively if the precedent existence of the intelligent agent who is qualified by uniqueness, permanence, omniscience and other qualities, is to be proved, the vyāpti between the probans 'effect' and the probandum ['the intelligent agent] qualified by such special qualities' cannot be established in the locus of your corroborative instance [e.g. a jar] by means of any valid cognition, [for a potter is not omniscient etc.]. Thus, your reasoning is inconclusive (anaikāntikatva).290

(45.5) You may contend: ‘We grasp the vyāpti [between h and s] referring to [an intelligent being] in general, and then prove the existence of [the intelligent being qualified by] the particular qualities on the basis of h [effect] being found in p [trees, earth etc.] (pakṣadharmatā).’ But this is not allowed. You may establish by virtue of pakṣadharmatā the specific qualities belonging to s only when h does not fail to occur in p together with the qualities. For example, from smoke is inferred a general quality of fire, ‘its occurrence on a mountain’291, but not particular qualities [of fire] such as ‘being caused by grass’. For we see smoke [caused by the leaves of trees]292 on a mountain, even if there is no grass. Likewise, if you mean the existence of an intelligent being with a physical body, let it be proved; but not his omniscience which is absolutely not the case. An effect can be produced without an omniscient being.293

290. RNA 30, 15-16: nanu buddhimatpūrvakatve sādhye siddhasādhanaṁ, abhimataṁ hi paresaṁ api karmajatuṁ kāryajātasya, karmyaś ca cetanātmakavāt cetanāhātukatvāt va; taddhetukatvāh ca jagataḥ. At the beginning of his Iśvarasādhanaṭhakṛiti Ratnakirti profusely cites arguments from the Nyāyaśāstra; for the passage which concerns us now see NKan 212. 14ff. Mokṣākara’s discussion in § 20.2.5 which is closely related to RNA has much to do with NKan too. See also RNA 30, 16-17: sarvajñāpūrvakatve tu sādhvyavāptīḥ svapne’pi nāpaladbhā, dṛṣṭaṁ ca sādhyaṁ, kulādīnām asarvajñātvaṁ; 49, 14ff.: yad etat kāryatvaṁ sādhanaṁ kim anena viśvasya buddhimantrāpūrvakatvaṁ sādhyaṁ, āho svad ekatavibhutasarvajñātvatvavādīguṇaviṣṭaḥbuddhimatpūrvakatvaṁ. prathamapake sādhhasādhanaṁ, doitye tu vyāptār abhāvāt anāikāntikātva.

291. M parvaladeśaśvētīteva, but G parvalaiकाःśvētīteva and T (n. p) dper na du ba las du baḥi phyogs su hjur pa ṛiṃ kyi me bzin no (=dhūmād dhūmāśvētītvasya...). Tp has la laḥi instead of las du baḥi, but it is misleading.

292. M tāṃvatām antareṇaḥ api parvate dhūnaderasānāt; G... api pāryatve dhūmasya sam-bhavati; T sīh gi lo ma las byuḥ ba ṛiṃ laḥ.

293. This paragraph is an abbreviation of RNA 30, 22-31.5 which consists of citations from NKan (sāṃnyaṃatrāvāyāpyāpy antarbhāvāvāśāya sāṃnyāsya pakṣadharmatāvaseṣaṇa sādhyaḥḥarmiṇy anumānād viṣeṣaśāyaḥ anumāṇaḥ bhavaṁ eva... and The Buddhist reply to it). See also RNA 49, 17ff.: nanu sāṃnyayena vyāptau pratitāyam api pakṣa-dharmatābalād viṣeṣaśiddhiḥ... and Ratnakirti’s reply to it.

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(45.13) Omniscience cannot be proved even by [supposing the agent’s] being perfectly conversant with [the nature,] materials, [auxiliary causes, recipients, objects to be given etc. of the world] (upādānādyabhijñatva)294. It might be proved if the uniqueness [of the intelligent being] were beforehand established, which is, however, not the case295. For ‘effect’ is made possible even by the ‘previous existence of plural agents’ as e.g. an ant-hill is made by a number of insects. If you mean by the probandum that an ant-hill also presupposes the supervision of God, then how can you set forth as the corroborative instance a jar, which according to you would also presuppose the unique, omniscient God [and which would be a part of p]? Or else, how can you deprive a potter of his agent-ness which is actually experienced? How again can you remove the cause-ness of the insects which is also well known? You may not assume that if there are many agents there would be differences of opinion [which may hinder producing an effect], just because we actually see [an ant-hill being made by many insects]296.

(46.1)297···Therefore, it is settled that the universal vyāpti between the probans and the probandum must be shown in reference to the locus of the corroborative instance through the means of valid knowledge.···297

(46.3) 298···Moreover, when the probandum is the intelligent being who is permanent, unique and omniscient, your [probans] is incompatible (viruddha). For ‘effect’ is actually pervaded by ‘having intelligent agents who are impermanent, plural and of imperfect knowledge.’ The kind of probans proving that which is incompatible with the probandum is called ‘incompatible hetu’; and your probans proves what is incompatible with the probandum.···298

(46.6) 299···So much for our treatise demonstrating the criticisms of

294. RNA 49, 28 ff. (Opponent:) yady evaṁ suśvarūpopādānopakaraṇasahapradānapra-yojanaḥbhijñā eva kartā sādhyaṁ, svarūpam iha ca deyaṇukaṁ kāryam; upādānam iha para-māṇḍujāticatuṣṭāyam; upakaraṇah samastakṣetraṁhasamavīṣhidkarmādharmau, sakṛpaṭānāṁ kṣetrafāṇāḥ, yān ayaṁ bhagavān svakarmabhīḥ abhipraite; prayaṇaṁ ukṣhaḍukhopahṛghad kṣetrafāṇānām, evaṁbhūte buddhimaṁ sādhyaṁ kutaḥ siddhasādhanam, na cāyāptiḥ,... Ratnakirti’s reply follows in 50, 19 ff. See also RNA 29, 8-9; N Kan 210, and Vacaspati’s syllogism in n. 258 above.

295. RNA 51, 10 : ekakartur na siddhau tu sarvaṁjñataṁ kimāśrayam.

296. RNA 32, 23-25 : ekasya kartur abhāve bahūnaṁ vyāhatamanasāṁ svātāntreṇa paras-pəravirodhena mithāḥ svānukulāḥbhāpyaṇavaradhena Yugapakāryāntuḥ, utpānasya va vilopādiprasakgaḥ syād iti, ekate tu siddhe sarvaṁjñatasiddhir avirodhini.

297. 298. 299. G has 298 before 297 and omits 299. T agrees with M.
God which had incidentally become a topic. 299

21. Relation of anvaya and vyatireka. (46.8) [Objection:] “In the syllogism by the method of agreement the anvaya alone is stated, but not the vyatireka; and in the syllogism by the method of difference the vyatireka alone is stated, but not the anvaya. How then can you say that the three characteristics of the probans are stated by [each of] these two syllogisms?”

[Answer:] This is not a fault. For even when a syllogism is formulated by the method of agreement, the vyatireka is also understood by implication. And on the other hand, if the vyatireka is not grasped, the error (viparyaya) must be pointed out by supposing that the probans is not absent even when the probandum is absent. If so, even the anvaya would be invalid, because it is implied that the probandum is not present even when the probans is present. In the same way, when a syllogism is formulated by the method of difference the anvaya is also understood by implication. For if the anvaya is not grasped in this case, the error must be pointed out by supposing that the probandum may not be present even when the probans is; and this renders even the vyatireka invalid, since it is implied that the probans is present even in the absence of the probandum. Thus both the syllogisms manifest in effect the three characteristics of the probans; and there is no fault [in our theory] 300.

22. Antarvyāpti and bahirvyāpti. (47.1) Now, the following summary is given in order to make two problems easily understood: In what locus is vyāpti between h (ādhyāta) and s (ādhyāya) grasped? By what proof is it grasped?

Regarding the vyāpti between ‘existence’ (svatātva), h as essential nature (svabhāvaḥ), and ‘momentariness’ (kṣaṇikatva) some logicians are of the opinion that it is to be grasped in p (ādhyādharmin) itself; they maintain the theory of intrinsic pervasion (antarvyāpti) 301.

300. This problem is discussed in NB III s. 28-32 and NBT. (NBT 51. 1-2): nanu ca sādharmanāvati vyatireko nōktāḥ, vaidharmyāvati cānvayaḥ; tat katham etat trirūpapaligā-khyānam ity āha. (NB III. s. 28) sādharmanyeṇāpi hi prayogē rīthād vaidharmyagatiḥ... tathā vaidharmyeneṇāpy anvayagatiḥ ; (s. 31) asati tasmin sādhyābhāvante hetvābhavasyāsiddheḥ....

301. So far as I know, Ratnakaraśānti is the only Buddhist logician who openly pronounced the theory of intrinsic determination of universal concomitance (antarvyāptiva). He wrote the Antarvyāptisamārthana (SBNT 103-114), maintaining that the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is grasped in p itself by means of viparyaya-bāḍhaka-kaṇḍa (cf. § 24.1). He discarded the necessity of a corroborative example and said
Others hold that the same vyāpti is to be grasped in dp (dṛṣṭānta-dharmin), say, a jar, by means of reasoning to an undesired conclusion (prasāṅga) and its reduction into a normal syllogism (prasāṅgaviparyaya); they maintain the theory of extrinsic pervasion (bahirvyāpti)302.

As for hetus as essential nature other than that of ‘existence’, hetus as effect and hetus as non-cognition, the vyāpti is to be grasped in d.

[To be more precise] the vyāpti between ‘aśoka tree’ and its probandum ‘to be called a tree’ is grasped in reference to a corroborative instance by means of perception and non-perception (pratyakṣanupalambha); the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is grasped by two proofs, prasāṅga and prasāṅgaviparyaya, or by the proof which refutes the opposite of the assertion to be proved and which is aimed at excluding successive and simultaneous action [the pervader of effective action or existence] from [what is not momentary, i.e. the permanent] (sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇena kramayaugapadyanivṛttilakṣanena)303. This vipakṣa taken as the locus [of the sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa, i.e. what is not momentary] is not definite as to its reality, and is regarded as real when considered to be established by self-consciousness and as unreal when considered to be just imaginary304.

that asādhiirafRow, which necessarily follows in such an inference is not a hetvabhāsa for clever persons who do not rely on external examples for determining vyāpi. Mookerjee gives an excellent exposition of the theory, see 24 ff. My Japanese translation of the Antarvyāptisamarthana is available in Bukkyō Shigaku. (仏教史学) Vol. VIII. no. 4, 219–238 (ラトナーカラショーンティの論理学書).

302. Buddhist logicians in general maintain bahirvyāptivāda; at the later stage of Buddhist logic Jānaśrimitra and Ratnakirti asserted it in contrast to antarvyāptivāda held by Ratnākarasānti. The former two logicians recognized the necessity of a corroborative example even in the inference of the Buddhist theory of universal momentariness, though they are not so far from Ratnakarasānti inasmuch as they also rely on viParyayabādhakapramāṇa when determining the vyāpti between existence and momentariness. See Jānaśrimitra, Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya; Ratnakirti’s digest of it, Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi, of which a detailed exposition is supplied by Mookerjee, 1–83. prasāṅga, prasāṅgaviparyaya, and viparyayabādhakapramāṇa are illustrated in § 24. 1, where our author again follows Ratnakirti.

303. See § 24. 1.

304. The p of the viparyayabādhakapramāṇa formulated by Buddhist logicians (cf. § 24. 1), viz. ‘the permanent’, is not real for Buddhists. Thus, the inference necessarily contains the fallacy of asiddhi. The Naiyāyika vehemently attacked this point and Ratnakirti in RNA 78 ff. tries to prove that even the idea of ‘the permanent’ has a kind of reality and can be put forward as the subject of a proposition. The discussion is interpreted in Mookerjee 24 ff. See also my paper ラトナーカラショーンティの論理学書と内面充論の生成 (阪本博士頒寿記念仏教史学論集 264–270). But our author here seems to refer also to the theory of the Sākāravijnānavādī yogācāri who admits that every content of self-consciousness is real.

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The vyāpti between ‘smoke’, h as effect, and ‘fire’ is grasped in a dp such as a kitchen; and it is grasped by means of threefold cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (trividhapratyakṣānupalambha) [according to some], or by fivefold cognition consisting of perception and non-perception (pañcavidhapratyakṣānupalambha) [according to others].

The vyāpti between ‘non-perception’ and ‘to be called non-existent’ is grasped by the perception [of things other than the denied object].

As for other cases, be they h as essential nature or as effect, we should grasp the vyāpti by making appropriate deductions according to the nature of a case.

23. Untrue vyāpti effects the fallacy of anaikāntikatva. (47.19)

When vyāpti is not definite, the probans has the fallacy of inconclusiveness. And this [inconclusive probans] is threefold: inconclusive due to h being subsistent only in p (asādhāraṇānaikāntika); inconclusive due to h being non-exclusive (sādhāraṇānaikāntika); inconclusive due to h’s non-occurrence in the vipakṣa being doubtful (samdigdha vipakṣavyāvrttika). Of these, an asādhāraṇānaikāntika [-hetu] is illustrated: [This] living body

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305. In the Buddhist logic, causality (kāryakāraṇabāsya), which together with identity (svabhava) forms the two principles of valid pervasion (vyāpti) between the probans and the probandum, is said to be inductively understood through positive and negative perception (pratyakṣaṇupalambha). Pratyakṣaṇupalambha here means the observation of the concomitance in agreement, as well as in difference, of a cause and an effect. The theory was first propounded by Dharmakirti and was maintained throughout the subsequent development of Indian Buddhist logic. However, Dharmakirti did not definitely prescribe how many times cognitions are required as indispensable for determining a causal relation. Hence, the logicians following him came to hold different opinions on this point. The causal relation of fire and smoke, for instance, can be ascertained if we observe that smoke, which has not been there, occurs when fire has appeared, and that when the fire has gone, the smoke disappears as well. In this illustration we can count one prior non-perception of smoke, two successive perceptions (fire and smoke), and two successive non-perceptions (no fire and no smoke). Thus, some of Buddhist logicians, such as Dharmottara, asserted that all five of these cognitions are indispensable. Others such as Jñānaśrīmitra, however, thought that either 1) one prior non-perception of fire and smoke as a unit, followed by two successive perceptions, or 2) one perception grasping fire and smoke together and followed by two successive non-perceptions can severally determine a causal relation without requiring all five, for either group contains in itself both perception and non-perception which respectively prove the concomitance in agreement and that in difference. Thus, in this theory the number of indispensable cognitions is reduced to three. I discussed the history of this problem in detail with an English translation of Jñānaśrīmitra’s Kāryakāraṇabāsyaśiddhi in my paper ‘Trikaṇācakacacintā. Development of the Buddhist theory on the determination of causality’, MIK Nos. 4-5. 1-15.

306. See §10; 10. 2. 4 with notes.
is endowed with a soul, because it has breathing and other characteristics like another living body and unlike a jar. We are not certain if this probans [breath] is pervaded by a soul in the case of another living body; and we are also not certain if in the case of a vipakṣa, jar, breathing is not found exactly because it has no soul; however, it is somehow found in p, this living body. For these reasons, it is called an exclusive, inconclusive hetu. Another illustration of asādhārana: Sound is impermanent because it is audible like a jar and unlike ether [where a homologous example is not available, since a jar is not audible]. Sādhārana-ṇānaṅkaṅka [-hetu] is illustrated: Sound is permanent, because it is an object of cognition like a jar and unlike ether. Sāndīghavipakṣavyāvṛttika [-hetu] is illustrated: He must be black, because he is a son of that man as other sons of that man who are actually seen.

24. Prasaṅga defined. (48.11) We have said before that the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is to be understood by prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya. What is here meant by prasaṅga? Prasaṅga is reasoning for bringing out an absurd conclusion which is undesirable to the opponent by means of a statement based on a vyāpti established by proof (pramāṇaprasyāsādhāvyāptikena vākyena parasyānistāpādanāya prasaṅjanam prasaṅgaḥ).

24.1. Illustrations of prasaṅga, prasaṅgaviparyaya, and sādhyavipar-
yayabādhakapramāṇa. (Td. 358, a 2) For example, if a jar [at the present moment] were admitted to maintain one and the same nature that subsisted in the past and will continue to do so in the future, then we could point out [the absurdity] that it is [at the present moment] capable of producing the effects belonging to the past and future [moments of time].

dah ma ḍhol paṭi dus kyi ḍhos paṭi don bya ba (d. adds dah) da ltar gyi dus su mi byed do ḍes pa (p. 387a) khyab par byed pa mi dmigs paṭo. ḍhrel pa las nus pa med paṭi skad cig pa ni ḍhig go ḍes pa thal bar ḡyur ba dah thal ba las bslog paṭi tshad ma dag gis yod pa ḍid la skad cig pa ḍid ḍyi[-s] khyab pa ḡgrub po. bsgrub par bya ba las bslog pa (p. la) gnod pa can gyi tshad mas sam ḍes bṣad pa de brjod par bya ste. gaḥ ḍig rim gyiḥ ḍbras bu byed pa ḍid dah ḍom pa ma yin par ḍbras bu byed pa ḍid ḍu yod pa ma yin pa de ni don bya ba nus pa ma yin te, ḍper na nam mkhaṭi pa-dma ḍzin ; skad cig ma yin par yah ḍom ḍbras bu byed pa ḍid dah. ḍom ma yin par ḍbras bu byed pa ḍid dag yod pa ma yin no ḍes pa khyab byed mi dmigs paṭi mṭshan ḍid can bslog pa la gnod pa can gyi tshad mas, skad cig ma yin pa ḍid las khyab pa (p. omits pa) byed rim dah cig car bslog pa ḍod gzin ḍom paṭi, don bya ba byed pa ḍid yid kiṭi ḍu ḍiṭhan ḍid can bslog pa ma gyi tshad mas, skad cig ma yin pa ḍid las khyab pa (p. 387a) khyab Par byed Pa mi dmigs Paṭo. bsgrub par bya ba ḍes Pa khyab Par byed ma byed ma ḍiṭhan Pa ḍu ḍiṭhan dsu mi byed do dPer na nam mṭshan; skad cig ma yin pa ḍid las khyab po (p. 387b) de nas skad cig pa ḍid kyis khyab po ḍes yod pa ḍid la skad cig pa ḍid kyis khyab pa ḡgrub po ḍes paṭo.

Sanskrit translation: yathā ghāṭādīnām1 atitānāgatakālābhāvyarthakriyākārītvaprasaṅhanam. tathā hi, yad yadda yatkriyāsamaṃthām tat taḍā (taṭ)2 karoty eva, yathā (antya)3 kāraṇāsāmagri svākhyām; atitānāgatakālābhāvyakhāyaṃjanaṃ samarthāh kāyaṃ dhao vartamānākāle plītī svabhāvahetuprasaṅgaḥ.

na karotī ca viparyayaḥ, yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samartham, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodraḥ śāyākhye; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānākāleś atitānāgatakālābhāvyakhāyaṃ samarthastu priyāṃ vartāvatā svākhyāṃ tvaṣṭṛtiṣ sidhyati.

śādyatviparyayābhādānaprabhāmaṇe vṛtīktam taḥ ucyatām, yat kramīkāryakramīkāryaṃ kāryakāryaṃ ca na bhavati nā yat kramīkramīkramiir ca na bhavati na tat arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ; yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samartham, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodraḥ śāyākhye; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānābhāvyāṣaṃ svākhyāṃ kramānubhāvyāṣaṃ kramiikramiir ca na bhavati na tat arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ; yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samartham, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodraḥ śāyākhye; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānābhāvyāṣaṃ svākhyāṃ kramānubhāvyāṣaṃ kramiikramiir ca na bhavati na tat arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ; yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samartham, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodraḥ śāyākhye; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānābhāvyāṣaṃ svākhyāṃ kramānubhāvyāṣaṃ kramiikramiir ca na bhavati na tat arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ; yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samartham, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodraḥ śāyākhye; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānābhāvyāṣaṃ svākhyāṃ kramānubhāvyāṣaṃ kramiikramiir ca na bhavati na tat arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ; yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samartham, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodraḥ śāyākhye; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānābhāvyāṣaṃ svākhyāṃ kramānubhāvyāṣaṃ kramiikramiir ca na bhavati na tat arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ; yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samartham, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodraḥ śāyākhye; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānābhāvyāṣaṃ svākhyāṃ kramānubhāvyāṣaṃ kramiikramiir ca na bhavati na tat arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ; yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samartham, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodraḥ śāyākhye; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānābhāvyāṣaṃ svākhyāṃ kramānubhāvyāṣaṃ kramiikramiir ca na bhavati na tat arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ; yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samartham, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodraḥ śāyākhye; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānābhāvyāṣaṃ svākhyāṃ kramānubhāvyāṣaṃ kramiikramiir ca na bhavati na tat arthakriyāsamartham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ.

Notes: (1) grub pa la sogs pa nīn ma lit. means siddhādīnām which Iyengar restores. But siddha or prasiddha (things well known) is very unlikely though not absolutely impossible. 1 assume this is a mistake for bhum pa due to the orthographical similarity, though no Tibetan ed. gives this reading. (2) T drops tat. Cf. RNA 63. 14–17: yad yadda yaj jananaṃvavahāryāgoyām tat taḍā tat janayat eva, yathāntyā karaṇaṃsāmagri svākhyāṃ; atitānāgatakāśaṃvavahāryāgoyāyaṃ cāyaṃ ghaṭo vartamānābhāviṃkāryakaraṇākāle sakaḷaṃvāryātikaraṇākāle plītī svabhāvahetuprasaṅgaḥ. (3) T omits antya, which, however, is very important in this context. (4) RNA 64. 8–11: yad yadda yan na karoti na tat taḍā tatra samarthavavahāryāgoyām, yathā śāyākhyām akurvan krodvāraḥ śāyākhyhe; na karoti caiva ghaṭo vartamānākaraṇākāle sakaḷaṃvāryātikaraṇākāle cāitānāgatakāśaṃvavahāryāgoyāyaṃ cāyaṃ ghaṭo vartamānābhāviṃkāryakaraṇākāle sakaḷaṃvāryātikaraṇākāle plītī svabhāvahetuprasaṅgaḥ. (5) RNA 77. 11–12: yasyā kramaṃkramu na vidyete na tasyārthāyaṃśaṃtham. yathā śāvāv­śaṃsaḥ; na vidyete cāṣṣaṃkāśaya kramaṃkramu iti vāyāpakāṇuṇupalambhoḥ iyengar: yat krami­kāryakāryaṃ akrāmis yākāryaṃ ca na bhavati na tat arthāyaṃśaṃtham, yathā vyopaṃdamaṃ;
the jar]. For [it is inferred in the following way]:

Whatever is capable of a certain action at a certain time, does make that [action] at that time, as e.g. the totality of cause and conditions at its last moment is capable of producing its own effect.

[According to the Naiyāyika], this jar is capable even at the present moment of producing the effects belonging to the past and future time;

[Therefore, this jar should produce the effects of the past and future, which is absurd].

This is a prasaṅga formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. The (prasaṅga-) viparyaya can be formulated by adopting 'not producing' [as h]:

Whatever does not produce a certain effect at a certain moment is incapable of producing that effect at that time as e.g. a grain seed which cannot produce a rice-shoot is incapable of producing a rice [-shoot];

This jar does not produce at the present moment the effects belonging to the past and future;

[Therefore, it is incapable of producing them, i.e. not permanent].

We have said that [the same vyāpti is proved] also by the sādhyaviparyaya-bādhakapramāṇa. This is to be stated:

Whatever does not possess causal efficiency in succession or in simultaneity, is not capable of causal action as e.g. the sky-lotus;

What is not momentary does not possess causal efficiency in succession and in simultaneity;

[Therefore, it is not capable of causal action, i.e. not existent].

akṣaṇikasya kramākārāritvāṁ anarthasya kāryakārāritvāṁ ca nāstīti. No word for anartha is found in T. (6) T skad cig pañ ẖal ba med do must be corrected into skad cig pa la ẖal baṅ. Otherwise, it is unintelligible. Cf. RNA 78, 8-9: tad ayam akṣaṇikād vinivartamāṇah svavyāpaṁ sattvam nivartya kṣaṇike viśrāmayati. ẖal ba means vi-śram (cf. J. Bacot, Dictionnaire Tibétain-Sanskrit, s.v.), which the Tibetan translator misunderstood. Iyengar’s restoration avilambāt is not acceptable.

310. Prasaṅga, prasaṅga-viparyaya and viparyayabādhakapramāṇa are used in order to establish the vyāpti of another independent syllogism (svatantraprayoga). In our present context the independent inference concerned is: yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ; santā cāmi vinośpadihūtaḥ padārthāḥ. Thus, the vyāpti to be proved by prasaṅga is: whatever exists is momentary. We have to keep in mind that since Dharmakīrti’s time, Buddhist logicians had defined ‘existence’ as ‘being making effective action’ (arthakriyā-kārīta). Hence, the concerned vyāpti can be proved by refuting that the non-momentary or permanent has no effective action; arthakriyākāritch is the pervader of sattvā (existence).
This is an inference sublating the opposite of the assertion to be proved (śādhyaviṣayāyatayabādhaka), formulated according to the formula of vyāpākānupalabdhi. Through this inference is excluded the pervader [of ‘existence’], ‘succession and non-succession’ from the non-momentary: and so ‘existence’ defined as ‘being causally efficient’ (arthakriyākārītva), [the pervaded], which is also excluded from the non-momentary, necessarily rests with the momentary; therefore ‘existence’ is pervaded by ‘momentariness’. Thus, the vyāpti between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ has been established.

24.2. (48.15) [Another example of prasaṅga is seen when] we deduce the plurality of a universal, when it is admitted [by the opponent] that a single universal (sāmānyā) abides in many individuals. For the inference is formulated as follows:

Whatever abides in many things [at the same time] must be plural, as e. g. the fruits of the fan-palm contained in many vessels;

A universal is said to abide in many;

[The absurdity that] follows is: Therefore, a universal must be plural. [You have to admit this absurd conclusion], or if you do not admit it, you may not assert the occurrence of a universal in many individuals.

24.3. Function of prasaṅga. (49.1) [objection:] ‘This inference called prasaṅga cannot be a valid means of proof since [h in this case] does not possess the three characteristics [of the valid probans] How can you argue by means of it? ’ [Answer:] Prasaṅga is used in the same way as one term of a vyāpti is stated in order to recollect
the vyāpti itself. It is said [by Dharmakīrti]:

Prasāṅga may be applied to show that when two terms are necessarily connected, the absence of one of them [viz., the absence of the pervader, necessarily] implies the absence of the other [the pervaded]. The meaning of this half-verse is as follows: When the universal comitance between the pervaded and the pervader is admitted, if the pervader is not recognized [in a certain locus], the existence of the pervaded is also not allowed there. In other words, when the pervaded is recognized, the pervader is to be necessarily recognized.

25. **Confutation.** (49.7) According to the rule, when a debater has stated a proof, the opponent is to make a confutation (dūṣaṇa) of it. Confutation consists in pointing out the fallacy due to any illegitimate, incompatible or inconclusive hetu as defined [by Dharmakīrti]:

Confutation is pointing out the defect [of an inference].

[Objection:] "If Confutation consists of pointing out these [three kinds of fallacies] alone, where are others such as useless argument (vaiyarthya), inefficient argument (asāmarthya), unwarranted stretch of a rule (atiprasāṅga) etc. included?"

[Answer:] They are included in the same three fallacies. Of these, the useless argument can be included in the ‘asiddha’. For a probans is said to be a quality of p which is not yet determined [as to its relation to the probandum] (sāmīdghasādhya dharma); and when useless argument is made of a certain thing, the probans fails to conform to the [above mentioned] definition of a probans, ‘being a quality of p which is not yet determined [as to its relation to the probandum]’. Thus it can be called [a sort of] asiddhi;[317]... [because the essential characteristic of a probans is not existent in this case]...[317] The following is said [by Dharmakīrti in connection with this]:

A probans is stated concerning only a p which is not yet ascertained [to be s or non-s]; and what has been rejected [to be s by other

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315. PV IV, v. 12c-d: prasaṅgo dvayasambandhād ekābhāve 'nyahānaye. Rāhula Sankṛityāyana reads prasaṅge for prasaṅgo, but the latter is given in a foot-note. G ekābhāye for ekābhāve. but T. M ekābhāve.

316. NB III, s. 138: dūṣaṇāni nyūnatādyuktiḥ. According to III, s. 139 and NBT on it, any of the three kinds of fallacies, viz., asiddha-, viruddha- and anaikāntika-hetu is meant by nyūnatā.

317. Found only in M.

318. See § 20. 2 and n. 263.
valid knowledge] should not be [put forward as] the locus of the probans, viz., p.

Inefficient argument, on the other hand, is included in the fallacious probans which is illegitimate by itself (svarūpāsiddhi). For the essence of a probans is the efficiency of the probans, and because [the lack of efficiency] means the unreality of the probans (hetor avastutva).

The Unwarranted stretch of a rule should be included in the ‘an-aikāntika’, since [in it h] is connected even with the vipakṣa, stretching itself beyond the quality to be proved (sādhyadharma).

25.1. Refutation of ātman. (50.1) The confutation of h whose locus is unreal (āśrayāsiddhahetut)319 takes place when a p, in which [a debater] starts to prove [the existence of] s, turns out to be sublated by another proof, as is the case with [the inference] ‘The soul (ātman) is ubiquitous, because it has the quality to be perceived everywhere’320. [This can be confuted as follows:] Since Buddhists do not admit the reality of the soul itself, how then can it be established that it has the quality to be perceived in every place?

For this is said by the heretic: ‘There exists another substance called ātman, which is separate from things such as a body and which is the actor of good and evil deeds (śubhāśubhakarmakartṛ), the enjoyer of their results (tatphalabhoktṛ), permanent (nitya) and ubiquitous (vyāpin)321. Although it pervades the whole world, it is yet said that a living body, which is admitted322 as a receptacle [of the soul’s] experience [of pleasure and pain] (upabhogaṇyatana), is possessed of the soul’323.

But this is not tenable, since there is no proof for establishing [the existence of] the soul. For the soul is not apprehended by sense-perception, because [the five kinds of sense-] perceptions beginning with the visual have the five kinds of objects, colour etc., which are determined to their

319. M. G. āśrayāsiddhir hetor duṣṇaṃ. T gzi ma grub pa rtags kyi skyon no =āśrayāsiddhir hetor (or āśrayāsiddhahetor) duṣṇaḥ. Āśrayāsiddhahetor duṣṇaṃ may be better.

320. NB III, s. 67 : dharmyasiddhiiv apy asiddho, yathā sarvagata ātmēti sādhye sarvatraṇalībhayanāgaguṇatvam.

321. TS v. 171-172 :anye punar ihātmānaḥ iechādīnāṁ samāśrayam, svato 'cidrūpam iechanti nityaṁ sarvagataṁ tathā. śubhāśubhānāṁ kartāraṁ karmāṇaṁ tatphalasya ca, bhoktāraṁ cetanaṁ cetanaṁ na svarūpataḥ. This represents the theory of ātman expounded by the Naiyāyika and Vaiṣeṣika.

322. M inserts pareṇa before parigṛhitam, but it should be omitted as in G, T.

323. NBh ad NS 1. 1. 9 : tasya (=ātman) bhogāyatanaṁ sārima.
respective [senses, and the soul is not the object of any of these five sense-perceptions]. [Nor is the soul the object of] ego-consciousness (ahaṁpratyaya) which is none other than mental perception (mānasa) [as defined by the Naiyāyika]. Since this has as its object the body and others [but not the soul]324, ego-consciousness occurs in the form of 'I am fair', 'I am big', 'I go' and so on; and in this connection the Alāṁkārakāra [Prajñākaraguṭa] said325:

The knowledge of 'I' pertains to the parts of the body or sense-organs, since [our knowledge in the form of] 'I am one-eyed', 'I am happy', 'I am fair', takes place because of the experience of the receptacle common [to these conditions].

And there cannot be such qualities as fair complexion or bigness apart from the body of a person; nor is the action of going, which is connected with a bodily substance, reasonably ascribed to the ubiquitous and formless soul. Nor can this [idea of soul] be applied [to the body] in the secondary sense of the word (bhākta), just as the idea of a lion is [figuratively] applied to a boy, since [if so,] it follows that this is after all false identification (skhaladyātī)326.

(51.1) [The existence of the soul] is not known by inference either, since we do not find a logical mark as effect or essential nature [for the proof]. Firstly, a logical mark as effect is not found because nothing is causally related to the soul, since this, being always beyond our perception, lacks the definite presence in a particular place, time and form327, while a causal relation is to be established by [the clear perception of]
the concomitance in agreement as well as in difference [between two terms]. Secondly no logical mark as essential nature is available just because the existence of the entity (dharmin) [which is to be called a soul and to which a logical mark is to belong] is itself not established. And there is no third logical mark [admitted by us]³²⁸.

You may propose another kind of probans to be pervaded by the probandum [or the soul], but how can the probans be pervaded by the latter, when this is not at all existent? Furthermore, we should ask if this soul is a conscious being or an unconscious being. If it is a conscious being and a permanent entity, it would necessarily follow that the eyes and other sense-organs are useless. If, on the other hand, it is an impermanent conscious being, then you have merely given the name ātman to knowledge; and there should be no difference of opinion between us. Or, if the soul is unconscious and invisible³²⁹, then the fact that it is not perceived does not permit its existence. Thus, the non-existence of the soul is proved beyond objection. Therefore, all things that are products are without ātman.

25.2. Confutation of svarūpāsiddha; untrue vyāpti is not different from anaikāntika. (51.13) A probans which is fallacious owing to its own unreality (svarūpāsiddha) is also called illegitimate (asiddha) as in the case of [the inference] 'sound is impermanent, because it is visible'³³⁰.

[Objection:] "Why do you not mention [the disclosure of] the illegitimacy (asiddhi) of a vyāpti as a kind of refutation, when it renders what the opponent wants to prove impossible?"

[Answer:] It is not mentioned separately, since it is understood by the confutation of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). For vyāpti cannot be grasped between two particulars (svalakṣaṇa), because a particular, which is determined in place, time and form³³¹, has no common aspect with other particulars. Instead, vyāpti should be grasped only between a probans and a probandum represented as universals. And in this case too, if the probans is not known as pervaded by the probandum, it is in fact inconclusive since the probandum may not be present when the probans

³²⁸. For a similar discussion see TS v. 207-209 with TSP.
³²⁹. G abodhasvarūpoḥṛṣyā ca, though M as well as T reads abodhasvarūpoḥṛṣyā ca.
³³⁰. NB III, s. 60: yathā, anityaḥ śādā ē śādā yāḥṛṣyā cākṣaṭvām ubhayāsiddham.
³³¹. M desahākāraṇiyatadvendpy....; api is omitted in G. T.
is present.

26. The theory of *apoha*. (52.3) [The following objection may be raised: ] “The universals (*sāmānyā*) are indeed not accepted [by you Buddhists]; how then can you grasp a universally applicable (*sarvopasaṁhāravati*) vyāpti between a probans and a probandum that are universals?”

[Answer:] There is no such a fault [in our theory]. Buddhists do not admit such a universal as that which others wrongly imagine, since it is sublated by valid knowledge. We do not, however, deny [the universal] called *apoha* (discrimination) which is defined as the negation of the opposite (*anyavyāvrtti*) and which is well known in our verbal usage (*vyavahāra*).

[Objection:] “What is this *apoha*? [It may be interpreted in the following three senses: ]

1) An external object such as a jar as conceptually determined (*yathādhyavasāyam*) is called *apoha*, the term being understood as when we say ‘the other or the dissimilar is discriminated from this’;

2) Or *apoha* may mean the mental image (*buddhyākāra*) as it manifests itself (*yathāpratibhāsam*), the term being understood as in ‘the dissimilar is discriminated or made distinct in this mental image’;

3) *Apoha*, when taken as the negation of a proposition (*prasajyarrūpa*), may actually mean the mere absence [without implying the affirmation of the opposite] (*nivṛttimātra*), *apoha* being understood as negating (*apohana*)333.

332. T ṭo na khyed la ci ma grub pa ma yin nam. Ci here must be a mistake for spyī. Then, this passage may mean nanu bhavatāṁ sāmānyam aprasiddham. M. G nanu sāmānyam ced aprasiddham. Iyengar’s footnote 1 in M 52 is unreliable.

333. Our author reproduces these three kinds of wrong interpretations of *apoha*, following the *pūrvapakṣa* in Ratnakirti’s *Apohasiddhi* (RNA 53, 2–4): nanu ko’yaṁ apoho nāma. kim idam anyasmād apohyate, asmād vānyad apohyate, asmin vānyad apohyata iti vyutpattīyā vyāptīyāvṛttatām bāhyam eva viviṣātām; buddhyākāro vā; yadi vāpohanaṁ apoha ity anyaśvāryāvṛttimātram iti trayaḥ pakṣāḥ. Professor Frauwallner once wrote (WZKM Bd. 38, 231, 17 ff.): “Ratnakirti scheint nämlich in seiner Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi Udayana nicht zu kennen... Dagegen schliesst sich der *pūrvapakṣa* seiner Apohasiddhi (SBNT S. 1–3, 4) (=RNA 53, 2–24) eng an eine Stelle aus Udayanas ‘Ātmatatttvaviveka’ an (B. I. S. 278, 1 ff.), und ein grösserer Absatz ist fast wörtlich daraus übernommen (S. 1, 15–2, 11 (=RNA 53, 9–16) =S. 279, 17–282, 5). Der ‘Ātmatatttvaviveka’, Udayanas ältestes Werk, ist also aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach zwischen Ratnakirti’s Kṣaṇabhāṅgasiddhi und Apohasiddhi verfasst”. This observation, together with others, led Frauwallner to the following conclusion:
And if \( \text{apoha, i.e. negation} \) means affirmation \([\text{of a positive entity}]\) \( (\text{vidhi}) \) as conceptually determined, then it indeed comes to mean the same as an object \( (\text{viśaya}) \) \([\text{which renders the designation apoha meaningless; and the other two interpretations are also untenable}]^{334}\).

[Answer: ] [These three interpretations are] not [acceptable]. [By \( \text{apoha} \)] we mean the affirmation \([\text{of a positive entity}]\) qualified by discrimination \( (\text{apohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ})^{335} \). However, those who stress affirmation \( (\text{vidhivādin}) \) think that after we have known the cow, we consequently determine the discrimination of the essence of the cow from that of the non-cow; those who stress the negative function of \( \text{apoha} \) \( (\text{nivṛtty-} \)

\(^{(232, 21 \text{ ff.)}} \) "Ratnakirti muss daher ein älterer Zeitgenosse Udayanas sein. Wir werden infolgedessen nicht fehlgehen, wenn wir seine Blütezeit um 950 ansetzen. Damit ist aber auch die Zeit seines Lehrers Jñānaśrī bestimmt. Er muss in der ersten Hälfte des X. Jahrhunderts gelebt haben und der Höhepunkt seines Wirkens dürfte ungefähr in das Jahr 925 fallen". This insight of Frauwallner which was once so significant, however, must be corrected, now that we have the edition of Jñānaśrimitra’s works which were then unknown to Frauwallner. The \( \text{pūrvaṇa} \) of Ratnakirti’s \( \text{Aphāsiddhi} \) is in fact an abbreviation of that of Jñānaśrimitra’s \( \text{Aphāprakaraṇa} \) (JNA 201–202). The three kinds of wrong interpretations of \( \text{apoha} \), which we have seen in RNA as well as TBh, are found in JNA 202, 12–24; the passage beginning with \( \text{atha yady api nivṛttaḥ ahaṁ pratyemiti na vikalpaḥ} \), which Ratnakirti quotes and whose authorship Frauwallner ascribed to Udayana, is originally cited by Jñānaśrimitra (JNA 201, 17–202, 1). Since I think no one would dare to say that Jñānaśrimitra is indebted to Udayana for these passages, we have to infer that Ratnakirti, Mokṣākara and Udayana owe these to Jñānaśrimitra who in his turn must have cited these from an author unknown to us.

For the Buddhist theory of \( \text{apoha} \) readers are referred to E. Frauwallner’s Beiträge zur Aphalehre, a German translation from the Tibetan text of the portion treating \( \text{apoha} \) in PV I (WZKM Bd. 37, 39, 40 and 42) and of the \( \text{Aphāprakaraṇa} \) of Dharmottara (Bd. 44); Mookerjee’s exposition in his \( \text{Universal Flux} \) 107–139; Dharmakirti’s elucidation is now available in Skt. original, being included in Gnoli’s edition of PV I; Śāntiraksita’s view of \( \text{apoha} \), as well as Kamalaśīla’s, is found in TS and TSP, Šābdārthaparīkṣā. Among other Sanskrit texts containing \( \text{apohavāda} \), the most important are JNA 201–232, \( \text{Aphāprakaraṇa} \) and RNA 53–61, \( \text{Aphāsiddhi} \).

\(^{334}\) JNA 202, 13–14: \( \text{tena na kaśicd upayogah, apohanāmnā vidhier eva vivakṣatvat, na ca nāmāntararakaṇe vastuṇāḥ svarūpaparāvyrttiḥ} \). The other two interpretations are also refuted by the opponent in JNA 202–203 and RNA 53, 5–8. The argument is, in brief, as follows: The first two meanings of \( \text{apoha} \) signify affirmation, which renders the use of the name \( \text{apoha} \) (negation) useless; the third is absurd, since in our cognitive experience we get a positive idea, say, fire in a mountain, and not the mere negation ‘there is no non-fire’.

\(^{335}\) RNA 54, 1–2: \( \text{atraḥbhidhiyate, nāsmābhir apohāsabdena vidhier eva kevalo ’bhiptre-} \), \( \text{nāpanyayavāyitātmāram, kim te anyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ, tataḥ ca na } \text{pratyekapakṣopamāpāpadīrōvakuśaḥ} \).
are of the opinion that we first know the discrimination of the dissimilar thing and then consequently confirm the thing which is discriminated from others, viz. the cow. Thus [both the interpretations] are wrong. For at the time of judgment we do not experience an order of comprehension in which [negation or affirmation] occurs first. In fact it is not the case that one, having understood the affirmation, later confirms the negation by implication (arthāpattitalaḥ), or that one, having understood the negation, later confirms what is discriminated [from the dissimilar]. Therefore, we say that the very understanding of the cow is the same as the understanding of what is discriminated from the dissimilar.

(53.3) Although it is pointed out that the word denoting discrimination from the dissimilar is not clearly expressed through the word 'cow' which is actually pronounced, we do not remain unconscious of the discrimination of the dissimilar which is the qualifier [of the cow]. For the word 'cow' is applied by verbal agreement to the thing that is discriminated from the non-cow. Just as on hearing the word indivara on which we are agreed to mean the blue lotus, we unavoidably represent blueness at the very moment we understand the lotus, just so on hearing the word 'cow' denoting in verbal agreement the thing that is discriminated from the non-cow, we unavoidably represent the negation of the non-cow at the same time as we understand the cow, since the former is the qualifier of the latter. To cite direct perception as another instance, its function of grasping the mere non-existence in the form of prasajya-pratiśedha is none other than its function of generating the concept of non-existence; in the same way, of the affirmative concept, its function representing the likeness [of its object] is said to be the same as the grasping of the non-existence [of the dissimilar]. Otherwise, If the discrimination of other things is not comprehended even when the meaning of the word 'cow' is known, how then does a person who so knows begin to look after a cow, leaving aside other animals? It would then follow that a man who has been commanded to tether a cow may tether horses

336. G, T tatkāla eva; M tulyakālam eva. but the manuscript of M seems to agree with G, T (cf. M 53, n. 2).

337. T rjes su mthun pa rjes su sgrub pa ḡbyin par nus pa =unurūpānuṣṭhānānāśa-kṛti (cf. RNA 54, 13).
too\textsuperscript{338}. Thus, it has been settled that the external object is placed in \[i.e.\] the content of the word through logical construction \((adhyavasāya)\), but not through the manifest perception of the discrete nature \((sva lakṣaṇa)\) \[of the object\]. This is attested by the fact that the discrete nature of an individual thing as determined in a particular situation, \[i.e.\] in place, time and form, is not manifested \[in the word\] as it is in direct perception\textsuperscript{339}. Concerning this the supreme lord of logic \((nyāya parameśvara)\) \[Dharmakirti\] said:

Unless one’s visual organ operates, the object \[of a word\] does not become visible in his knowledge by \[simply hearing\] the word; it is not as in visual perception\textsuperscript{340}.

\[54.3\] Moreover, if a thing discrete and distinct \((sva lakṣaṇatma- vastu-)\) formed the content of a word, it would be entirely comprehended \[when the word is heard\]; this renders both the affirmative and negative usage \[of the word\] impossible. For when the object is present, \[the statement\] that it is is useless and \[the statement\] that it is not is incoherent; and when the object is not present, it is useless to say that it is not, and it is incoherent to say that it is. But \[in practice\] we use the words ‘it is’ and so forth. Therefore, it is settled that a word does not signify a

\textsuperscript{338} RNA 54, 3-15 : \textit{yat tu goḥ pratitau na tadātmāparātmēti sāmarthyād apohaḥ paścān niścīyata iti vidhīvīdināṁ matam; anyāpoḥ pratitau vā sāmarthyād anyāpoḥo 'vadhāryata iti pratiśedhavādināṁ matam, tad asundaram. prāthamikasyāpi pratiśāktikramādarśanāt, na hi vidhiṁ pratipadya kaścid arthāpattitāḥ paścād apoham avagacchati; apoham vā prati­padyaśaya-poṭham, tasmād goḥ pratiśāttitr ity anyāpoḥha pratiśāttitr ucyate...} (RNA up to 54, 15 well corresponds to M up to 53, 15). The so-called \textit{vidhīvādīn} may be represented by Śāntirakṣita (cf. TS, TSP 1019-1021), while the \textit{pratiśedhavādīn} \[or niśvītinādīn\] is likely to refer to Dhīnaga and Dharmakirti \[cf. Frauwallner’s citation from Śāṅkaramiśra in WZKM Bd. 38, 230 : kirti-dīhnagādibhir gaur iyam ityādivikalpe vidhīśphurasyāṁ nāstī evety uktam, jñānaśriyā tu vidhīśphuraṇām adhyapagamya niśedhasphuraṇām api tatra bhavātiti svikṛtam. yaḥ aha; tatrāpohas tadgū ṅavatvena ganyata iti. The last part of the passage is found in JNA 206, 3). Mookerjee classifies three stages in the development of \textit{apoha}-theory, represented by 1) Dhīnaga, 2) Śāntirakṣita, and 3) Ratnakirti \[Mookerjee, 132\], which seem to correspond to \textit{pratiśedhavāda}, \textit{vidhīvāda} and the synthetic theory of Jñānaśrimitra respectively. By Ratnakirti referred to by Mookerjee, we have to understand both Jñānaśri and Ratnakirti.

\textsuperscript{339} RNA 55, 16-18 : \textit{tatra bāhyo 'rtho' dhyaṇasāyād eva śabdasāyyo vyavasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇaparāśthāpyātī, pratyakṣavād desakalāvasthāniyatisparamāptasyaktasvalakṣaṇāśphurasyāt.}

\textsuperscript{340} śabdenāyāppīṭkasya buddhāv apratibhāṣanāt, arthasya drśīva eva (= JNA 208, 17-18 =RNA 55, 19-20). JNA as well as RNA ascribes the verse to Śāstra, i.e. Dharmakirti; but it is not found in PV.

\[\textbf{125}\]
particular entity.  

(54.8) [Objection: ] "Just as you, having grasped a jar as a particular, later apply another means of valid knowledge [i.e. inference] to the same object in order to determine [other qualities of it such as] momentariness, just so even if we have by the word ‘tree’ apprehended an element of it ‘tree-ness’, we may again use the word ‘exist’ in order to determine ‘existence’ as another element [of the tree])."

[Answer: ] This is untenable. Since direct perception is indeterminate by nature, we apply another means of knowledge [even after we have perceived] an object with a nature with which we are not well acquainted. In the case of conceptual knowledge (vikalpa) which is itself determinate, however, if the nature [of an object] is once grasped, there remains nothing else to be grasped by another means of knowledge.

27. Refutation of a universal. (54.15) We do not find any proof to establish the existence of a universal (sāmānya) which is conceived by others as inherent in many individuals (anekavyaktisamaveta), visible (drṣya), single (eka) and permanent (nitya). Therefore, it is not correct to maintain the existence [of a universal]. For when we experience an individual (vyakti) such as a cow, no single dependent (anuyāya) [to be called a universal] other than the characteristics of the individual consisting of a [peculiar] colour and form appears in our perception, just because such a thing is not directly experienced.

Nor is it reasonable to imagine the existence of a universal because it is otherwise inexplicable (anyathāṇupāpatti) that we get an idea reflecting on one [class–] form immediately after we perceive the particular

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characteristic [of an individual]. For this idea may arise indirectly (paramparayā)\(^{344}\) from individuals with generative efficiency effected by their own causes [so as to give rise to an idea]. Though individuals are all different from one another, some alone are capable of generating [a certain class-idea], but not all; in this way, a relation of cause and effect [between individuals and a class-idea] is cognized by perception and non-perception, and cannot be violated. And in fact we experience that such efficiency belongs only to some individuals, though all are equally discrete and distinct (bhedāviśeṣa), as [only] the Coccus cordifolius (guḍūci), neem etc. are effective as anti-febrile [and not others]. Concerning this [Dharmakirti] said:

Some things, though they are distinct and discrete, are determined by nature to bring out one and the same effect such as the same judgment, the cognition of one object and so forth, just as a sense-organ, [an object, light, attention, a soul and their contact bring out one cognition of colour, though they are distinct]\(^{345}\).

Furthermore, we may ask a question: We admit [for the sake of argument] that a universal [say cow-ness] is distinguished from all other dissimilars; but how is it inherent only in individual [members] of [the class of] cow even when they are as much distinct and discrete as other individuals, and how can it generate the same form of mental image

\(^{344}\) Mookerjee, 90: "The contention of the Naiyāyika that ideas of universals arise immediately on the operation of the sense-object contact is not true, because such ideas are conceptual in character and conceptual thoughts can emerge only after the name-relations are remembered. First of all, there is the sensuous presentation immediate and direct and divested of all foreign reference. Secondly, a mental energising towards the recalling of the verbal association; thirdly, the remembrance of the name. So the mind has travelled far away from the immediate datum of presentation and the idea of the class-character arises only after a series of psychical operations, which have little bearing on the immediate objective datum".

\(^{345}\) The first half of this verse is omitted in G, T. PV I. v. 73-74 : ekapratyavamarśa-rthajñānādyekārthāsādhane, bhide 'pi niyatāḥ kecit svabhāvenendriyādyavat. yathendriyavijñāyokamanaskārā atmendriyamanorthatatsaṁnikarṣa v 'saty api tadbhāvaniyate sāmānye rūpa-vijñānam ekāh jana-yanti, evāṁ śiṁśapādaya'pi bhedāḥ paraśparānunayē prakṛtyayai-vai-kām ekākāraṁ pratyabhijñānam jana-yanti anyāṁ v yathāpratyayāṁ dahanaghyādikāṁ kāśṭhasādhyāṁ arthakriyāṁ, na tu bhedāvīśe'pi jalādayāṁ, śrotadīvād rūpādi-jñāne. jvarādi-smane kācit śahā pratyekam eva vā; drśśā yathā vauṣṭhānuhā nānāte 'pi na ca-paṇāḥ. yathā v guḍūcivayādcādayāḥ saha pratyekam v jvarādi-smana-dalakṣaṇām ekāh kāryaṁ ku-rvantī, na ca tatra sāmānyam apekṣante, bhide'pi tatprakṛtīte, na tadaviśe'pi dādirapuṣ-ādayaḥ... Also see TS v. 723-726 ; Frauwallner, Beiträge zur Apohalehre, WZKM Bd. 39, S. 264.
(buddhi) in relation to them [i.e. individual cows] and them alone?  

And the opponent may reply that it happens so by nature (svabhāvena). But this [reply] lacks a proof. On the other hand, when we explain the phenomenon on the basis of their essential nature (svabhāva), it is well established by proof for us and is supported by logic.

(55.17) Similarly, the opponent proposes another syllogism in order to prove [the existence of] a class (jāti):

"A distinct knowledge (viṣiṣṭabuddhi) is invariably connected (nān-tariyaka) with the cognition of a qualifier (viṣeśaṇa), as the knowledge of a stick-holder (daṇḍin);

The knowledge ‘This is a cow’ is a distinct knowledge;

[Therefore, it is invariably connected with a qualifier, the class of cow.]

This syllogism is in sense based on the principle of causality [since distinct knowledge is an effect of the cognition of a qualifier]."

We reply: Is the probandum here the invariable connection of the distinct knowledge with the cognition of a separate qualifier or its invariable connection with the perception of a qualifier in general? If the first alternative is maintained, it is sublated by perception, since neither [the qualified nor the qualifier] is [separately] manifested in indeterminate perception which grasps the total reality as a whole. Moreover, distinct knowledge set forth as the probans of [the existence of] a universal contains the fallacy of inconclusiveness, since distinct knowledge is acquired even without the cognition of a qualifier separate from the qualified, as we know that this jar has its own form or that cow-ness is a universal. If on the other hand the second alternative is maintained, it only proves what is obvious (siddhasādhana) as one asserts that a jar has its own form, since [even Buddhists] admit the relation of the qualifier and the qualified as derived from the imagined

346. G kiṃ ca sarvato vijātiyād vyāptīte’pi sāmānye kim iti bheda-viṣeṣe’pi gowyaktiṣv eva samavetāt tatraiva caikākāraṁ pratitiṁ janayati. M reads sarvagate (which is unfit) for sarvato, inserts tat sāmānyam before tatraiva and has buddhim instead of pratitim. T seems to omit ca after tatraiva; otherwise it agrees with M.

347. Both M and G wrongly have viṣiṣṭabuddhitvaḥ ca sāmānyam ity anaitkāntiko hetuḥ. T khyad par can gyi blo ṣid kyaṅ spyi ta gtan tshigs ma ŋes pa yin te=viṣiṣṭabuddhitvaḥ ca sāmānye 'naikitkāntiko hetuḥ. See Ratnakirti’s passage in n. 350.

348. Read gotvaḥ for gotva in M 56, 6.
difference, and use such an expression as 'This thing has the universal of a cow'\textsuperscript{349}. For, in fact, the judgment 'This is a cow' is made by virtue of the cognition of what is discriminated from the non-cow. Thus, the universal cannot be established by this inference either\textsuperscript{350}.

Since in this way the universal imagined by others does not withstand scrutiny, the following has been settled: The universal, which is merely an entity distinguished from the dissimilars and which is designated by the word 'discrimination' (\textit{apoha}), forms part of our verbal convention according to our logical construction; this is quite immune from faults.

(56.14) The following syllogism should also be formulated in order to refute the universal: \textsuperscript{351}

When a thing, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived at a given place, it is the object to be judged as absent then and there, as horns on the head of a horse;

The universal, in spite of [your supposition that] it is by nature perceptible, is not perceived in the particulars which are actually seen;

[Therefore, it is not existent.]

This is formulated on the ground of the non-cognition of an entity itself (\textit{svabhāvānupalabdhi}).

No assumption of the fallacy of illegitimacy (\textit{asiddhi}) can be made [concerning this inference], since, in spite of a thorough examination, we do not find anywhere [a universal which is] the second entity following

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\textsuperscript{349}. T. G \textit{vyavahārakāraṇaḥ} \textit{kṛtvā} for \textit{bhedam upādāya}. T \textit{spaṣṭatvāt (gsal ba ŋid)} for -\textit{syeṣṭatvāt}.

\textsuperscript{350}. Mokṣākara verbally follows RNA 59, 21-60, 3: \textit{athēdām jātiprasādham anumānam abhidhiyate}.avadhiṣṭajñānam tadviṣeṣaṇagrāhaṇāntariyakam, yathā daṇḍijñānam; viṣeṣajñānam ekād gaur ayam ity arthaḥ kārṇaṃti, viṣeṣaṇānubhavakāryam hi dṛṣṭante viṣeṣabuddhiḥ siddhiḥ. atrāṇuyogaḥ, viṣeṣabuddhiḥ bhinnaviṣeṣaṇagrāhaṇāntariyakatvam vā sādhyam viṣeṣaṇātmātṛanubhavāntariyakatvam vā. prathamaṇapakṣe pakṣasya pratyakṣabādhā sadhanāvadhānām anavakāsāyati. vastugraṅkīṇah pratyakṣasyobhāyapratibhāsādhanāt. viṣeṣabuddhiḥca saṃmayāhetur anaiṅkāntikah, bhinnaviṣeṣaṇagrāhaṇām antareṇāpi darśanat, yathā svāraṇāvān gṛhaḥ, gotvam saṃanyam iti vā, dvitiyapakṣe tu siddhasādhanaḥ, svāraṇāvān gṛhaḥ ityāvādyat gotvajātīmān pinḍa iti parikalpitaṃ bhedam upādāya viṣeṣaṇāviseṣyābbhāvasyeṣṭatvād agoyavyayātumabhavabhāviśtvād gaur ayam iti vyavahārasya.

\textsuperscript{351}. Mokṣākara owes this inference to Paṇḍita Āsoka. Cf. Saṃyādusāṇaṇidiprasārī, SBNT 97, 8-11: yad yad upalabhīkṣaṇaṇaṃprāptaṃ san nōpalabhīyate tat tad asad iti prekṣāvadhir vyavahartayaṃ yathāmbharāṁbhurum; nōpalabhīyate cōpalabhīkṣaṇaṇaṃprāptaṃ saṃanyam kućīd āpīti svabhāvānapalabdhiḥ. The same logic, however, is applied by Buddhists to the negation of \textit{avayavān}, see e. g. TSP 188, 5 ff.
[a particular], independent of the particular entity characterised by colour
and form. Nor is it tenable that it is, in spite of its invisibility, established
by perception as in the case of knowledge. For, while knowledge, though
not grasped by visual cognition, is established by the proof of self-con-
sciousness (svasamvedana), this universal, being a quality of an object
of the senses (artha-dharma), should be grasped by visual cognition.
And in fact the opponent admits its perceptibility. Thus the universal
fictitiously conceived by the opponent does not withstand scrutiny; only an
entity which is [by logical construction] discriminated from others is said
to be a universal. And it is settled that all things that are products are
void of such a universal as is imagined by others.

28. Refutation of God as the permanent agent. (57.7) It should
not be understood that [all produced things] are made by some intelligent
being. For if there were an operator of this world, he would be either
a permanent being or an impermanent one. Of these, first, he cannot
be permanent, because when the operator is active permanently, the crea-
tion, preservation and destruction [of the world] would certainly occur
simultaneously. The very nature by which he is [said to be] the operator
of preservation and destruction should continue to be present in him even
at the time of creation, and accordingly he would at the very time [of
creation] effect preservation and destruction. It may be contended that
he will not act so because he lacks auxiliary causes (sahakārin), but
this is not correct. For he is never dissociated from permanent auxiliary
causes which are always present with him; and again he is never dis-
sociated from impermanent auxiliary causes, since these must be depend-
ent on him for their origination. Therefore, it would follow that he
effects all [the three kinds of operations] at the same time352.

(57.17) [The opponent : ] ‘‘There is not such a fault, since God is
endowed with intelligence. For an agent deprived of intelligence may
effect simultaneously all the works which are caused by its presence alone.
An intelligent being, on the other hand, need not work when he does
not wish, though he is always capable of doing so. Why then is he
criticised?’’353

Answer: He is to be criticised in this way: These wishes are also

352. For a similar argument see BCAP 258, 22-30; TSP ad TS v. 87.
353. A similar objection is ascribed to Uddyotakara in TSP 55, 4-8.
caused by his own existence alone; and why does he not work? You may contentd that although he is efficient by his own existence, he has such a nature that he does not work without being given contingent powers which are defined as auxiliary causes. But this [objection] has no sense at all, since [in the same way] one can show you a conclusion that [a woman], who is by birth a barren woman, is also a mother.

(58.6) [The opponent:] “An effect indeed has such a nature that it is not produced merely by the efficiency [of an operative cause], but comes into existence after having depended on auxiliary causes too; [so, you should not criticise as above]”.

[The author:] This is not correct. For efficiency will necessarily produce its effect without expecting the help of auxiliary causes, because otherwise it would be just inefficient.

28.1. The permanent cannot produce an effect gradually. (58.9) Again it is not correct that a permanent [agent such as God] produces an effect gradually (kramaṇa), since it does not require [anything else for its action]. Regarding this, Dharmakirti whose name is celebrated all over the world said:

Successive [change] cannot occur to the permanent, since this is independent [of other causes], and since this remains the same self at both times whether it is doing an action or not doing it. By this it is refuted that the permanent such as a soul or momentary things such as a jar etc. produce an effect gradually. And in this argument there is no fault of incompatibility with perception, since we cannot grasp the permanent by indeterminate cognition. For indeterminate cognition that is momentary cannot perceive what is not mo-

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354. G as well as T inserts na before karoti.
355. TSP ad TS v. 87 (54, 23–25): syād etat, nēsva eva kevalāṁ kāraṇam api tu dharmādisahakārikāraṇāntaram apekṣya karoti, nīmīttakāraṇatvād iśvarasya, tena dharmādeh kāraṇāntarasya vaikalyād avikalakāraṇatvam asiddham iti; BCAP ad BCA IX. 125 a (259, 17–23).
356. M dharmakirtiḥ; G and T have only kirtiḥ. PV II, v. 268 b–269 a: nityasya nirapekṣatvāt kramottātā viruddhyate, kriyāyām akrīyāyāḥ ca kriyā ca sadṛṣṭātmanaḥ. T of TBh agrees with this verse completely; but M and G change viruddhyate into na yujyate and kriyā ca into kālayoḥ ca.
357. M, T read: utmādīnāṁ aksanikānāṁ ghaṭādīnāṁ kṣāṇikānāṁ ca kramaṇaḥ kāryaka-raṇāṁ pratyuktam. G nityānāṁ utmādīnāṁ aksanikānāṁ (ca) ghaṭādīnāṁ..., is unintelligible. A momentary thing cannot operates for many moments in order to produce an effect gradually.
mentary. The non-momentary [or the permanent] indeed means what operates for many moments; and how can it be grasped by indeterminate cognition which lasts only for a moment? What resided in the past or will reside in the future does not manifest itself at the present time, for otherwise it would follow that it belongs to the present. Or it would follow that the termini of the birth and destruction [of the present thing] are manifested. Therefore, indeterminate cognition is not able to grasp a thing which pervades the past and future time.  

28.2. Refutation of recognition. (59.3) The same argument serves to explain that recognition (pratyabhijñā) is not of the nature of indeterminate cognition. Indeterminate cognition is indeed [defined as] intuitive knowledge (sākṣātkāri jñānam); and what resided in the past is not to be put before the eyes, but only to be remembered. Indeterminate cognition, on the other hand, is not of the nature of remembrance (smṛti).

The following objection may be raised: "While remembrance is that which does not intuit the present state of a thing, how can that [recognition] which is intent upon intuiting it [=the present state] be called remembrance? Regarding this, Kumārilabhaṭṭa said:  

Remembrance takes place in the form ‘[I remember] that’, pertaining only to what has been cognized before; recognition, on the other hand, is in the form ‘This is the same as that’, and is quite different ['from remembrance']."

[The Author:] If so, recognition would have a twofold nature, that of remembrance and that of grasping, and is not of the nature of grasping alone, since what is remembered cannot be grasped and what is grasped cannot be remembered. However, it is impossible that there are remembrance and grasping in one cognition, because these two are incompatible with each other. No sane person can contend that we grasp [a thing] by the same function of [knowledge] by which we remember;
and if you say that grasping is made by a function different [from that of remembrance], there cannot be both remembrance and grasping in one [cognition] \(^{361}\). Even if this [possibility] were admitted, it would mean that [the knowledge] has at the same time the nature of pratyakṣa and that of non-pratyakṣa, and not that it is only of the nature of pratyakṣa, for pratyakṣa cannot occur in an object which is being remembered\(^ {362}\). Therefore, the knowledge of [the so-called] recognition is simply erroneous, because it has no proper object. [Our argument may be formulated into] the following syllogism:

The knowledge of recognition has in reality not a single object as in the case of grass which, having been once cut, grows again;

‘This blue [thing] is the same as that’ is the knowledge of recognition;

[Therefore, it has not a single object].

This is a negative inference derived from the cognition of what is pervaded by a thing incompatible with the denied object (viruddhavyāptopalabdhi). Since oneness and plurality are incompatible with each other, two perceptions respectively pertaining to the one and the other are also mutually incompatible. Thus, the knowledge of recognition is pervaded by ‘having plural objects’ which is incompatible with ‘having a single object’, as the logic explained above shows. Accordingly recognition does not sublate our inference of momentariness.

(60.6) Again, it cannot be contended that [recognition] pertains to a single object because, when hair and other things are recognized, it has the universal [of hair etc.] as object. For in fact it is only particular hairs that are recognized. If, on the contrary, a universal is recognized, we would [acquire the knowledge that] this hair-ness is the same as that, and not that this hair is the same as that [as we actually recognize]. Therefore, when one object is concerned, the occurrence of the knowledge of recognition, be it successive or simultaneous, is incongruent; and you

\(^{361}\) M rūpāntareṇa caikasya smaraṇagrahaṇe na syātām, but G rūpāntareṇa grahaṇe na ekasya smaraṇagrahaṇe syātām ; T seems to read rūpāntareṇa grahaṇena. I follow G.

\(^{362}\) I follow G : bhāve’pi prayākṣāprayākṣatvāṃ syāt, na tu prayākṣatvam eva, smaryamāṇe prayākṣāyogāt. M : bhāve’pi prayākṣāprayākṣe syātām, na tu smaryamāṇe prayākṣam eva, prayākṣāyogāt ; T agrees with M. though it has prayākṣaprayākṣe for prayākṣāprayākṣa by mistake. M and T may be understood as meaning’...and not that there is only prayākṣa when an object is being remembered, since this cannot be prayākṣa’.
should not suspect the possibility of [the probans of our inference] being incompatible or inconclusive. Nor can you say that the very recognition determines the singleness of the object, since it is just the object of the present examination. Thus, it has been settled that there is no permanent agent.

28.3. Karman or the mind is the sole cause of the world. (60.12)

[The Opponent:] “If the permanent agent is not the [supreme] cause of the world, what then is the cause of it?”

[The Author:] Actions of sentient beings, called good or evil, [form the instrumental cause of the world,] as is said [in the following]:

The mind alone produces the world of sentient beings as well as that of inanimate things in all their various aspects; for all the universe is said to have been produced by actions, and no actions are possible apart from the mind.

Employing the view of the Vaibhāṣika school the omniscient Buddha said:

Ether and the two kinds of cessation [i.e. that due to wisdom and that not due to wisdom], these three are the non-produced which are eternal;

all produced things are momentary, devoid of ātman, and have no creator [other than karman].

29. The existence of an omnicient person proved. (61.3) “It may be fitting for you to adduce the words of the omniscient one if and only if the existence of the latter is established. What proof do you put forward

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363. See n. 234 above.
365. M Vaibhāṣikam āśritya; G=T vaibhāṣikamatam āśritya. The expression of course means that the Vaibhāṣika understands the Buddha as teaching the following.
366. ākāśaṁ dvau nirodhau ca nityam trayam asaṁśkrtaṁ. sāṁśkrtaṁ kṣaṇikaṁ sarvam ātmaśūnyam akartākam. The first half is omitted in G. The verse is identical with JSS v. 21 (Yamaguchi, 292: nam mkhaḥ ḏgog pa gñis dag daṅ, ḏus ma byas gsum po ni rtag, ḏus byas ḏdag gis kun stoh la, byed pa po med skad cig ma.) Cf. AK I, v. 5 ff.: anāsraṇa mārgasatyam trividhāh cāpy asaṁśkrtaṁ. ākāśaṁ dvau nirodhau ca tatrākśaṁ anāṣṭiḥ.... Regarding akartākya, on which Bodhibhadra comments that there is no agent other than karman, see Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad AK IV, v. 1 (de la Vallée Poussin, IV, 1: Ce n’est pas Dieu qui la fait intelligemment... La variété du monde nait des actes des être vivants.) Two kinds of nirodha means pratisamkhya- and apratisamkhya-nirodha.
for the existence of an omniscient one?"

We answer:

A quality of the mind, when brought about by repeated meditation which is made ardently, incessantly and for a long time, can be manifested clearly, as e.g. the figure of a girl [is clearly manifested] to her lover;

The mental images having the four noble truths as objects are also the qualities of the mind produced by the practice as described above;

[Therefore, they can be manifested clearly.]

This is an inference formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. [Regarding this inference] you may not suspect the fallacy of illegitimacy (asiddha-) either in respect of the locus of h or in respect of h itself. The p [of this inference, i.e.] the mental images which are brought under conceptual knowledge and which have the four noble truths as their objects, and h, a quality of the mind in general, are [real and legitimate] since they are both the contents of everyone's self-consciousness (pratyātmavedyatva). Nor is this [hetu] incompatible, because it is present in a lover as a sapakṣa. Nor is it inconclusive, for we can establish by means of perception and non-perception a universally applicable causal relation between a mental quality accompanied by repeated meditation, as cause, and its vivid manifestation as effect, just as between a potter and a jar; and once this relation is established, it is also established that the probans 'a mental quality accompanied by repeated meditation' is pervaded by [the probandum] 'fitness for manifesting itself clearly'.

[The procedure of grasping the causal relation in question is as follows:]

The locus (adhikaraṇa) of the vyāpti in question is the figure of a girl occurring in [the mind of] a man who is in love with her. (1) We do not see the manifestation [of the figure] before it has become a quality of [the lover's] mind through earnest, incessant and prolonged meditation upon it [anupalabdhi No. 1]; (2) later we come to see the meditation [by him] [upalabdhi No. 2]; (3) and then we see the clear manifestation [of her figure] [upalabdhi No. 3]. Thus the causal relation between clear manifestation and the mental image produced by repeated medita-

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367. M sphaṭapratibhāsakaraṇavogyatā; G -karaṇa-. T gsal bar snaḥ bar byar ruṇ ba. G’s reading is better. Cf. Ratnakirti’s passage in n. 368 below.

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tion is established by three cognitions consisting of perception and non-perception (trividhapratyakṣāṇaupalambha). And from this we know the universal vyāpti [between the probans and the probandum in question]. Therefore, there being no fallacy of inconclusiveness, our hetu is faultless.

29.1. Proof of the existence of an all-knowing person. (62.4) By the inference stated above you may indeed prove [the possible existence of] an omniscient being (sarvajña) who is meant to be a person intuiting the images of the four noble truths, from the fact that he intuits the images of the four noble truths; but you cannot establish one who intuit everything without restriction (aviśeṣena sarvadharmaśākṣātkāraṇa). Therefore, to prove this, you have to state another inference.

[The Author:] We will answer:

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368. This section consists of verbatim citations from RNA 1, 16-21 and 3, 12-19: yo yathā sādaramārthakālābhyaśasahitacetoṣaṁghaḥ sa sarvāḥ sphaṭibhāsavyaghaḥ, yathā yuvatyākāraḥ kamīṇaḥ pūraṣṭasya; yathoktābhyaśasahitacetoṣaṁgha cāmi caturāryasatyavīṣaya ākāraḥ iti svabhāvo hetuḥ. Tatra na tāvad āśrayadvāreṇa hetudvāreṇa vāsiddhisambhāvanā, saṁkalparūḍhānāṁ catūrāryasya kārāṇāṁ cetoyamārānasya ca hetoḥ pratyātmavedyatevāḥ. Na caīṣa niruddho hetuḥ, sapakṣe kāminy ākāre sambhavat, na cānaikāntikaḥ, abhyāsasahitacetoṣaṁghaḥ sphaṭapratibhisāsayo kāryakārāya gṛhaśūkhaḥ kārāya iva sarvopasāṁkāraṇaḥ pratyakṣasamplabhahatoḥ kāryakārābhavāsviśdīhin abhyāsaḥsahitacetoṣamāraṇāya sādhanaḥ sphaṭapratibhisākaraṇayogyatāya vyāptisiddheḥ. Tathā hi. vyāptiḥadhikaraṇaḥ kāṃtāraśvarini vyāptiḥkāre sādaramārthakālābhyaśasahitacetoṣamārāṇāḥ pūrāvam anupalabdhiḥ sphaṭabhāsya, paścāt abhyāsaḥsāmedanāḥ sphaṭabhāsasāmedanām iti. trividhapratyakṣāṇaupalambhasādhayaḥ kāryakārābhavāḥ sphaṭapratibhisābhvyāsasacavicītākārāyov ikarvam uṣṭamūnā sarvopasāṁkāraṇvātī vyāptiḥ. ato'naikāntikatāpy asambhavinīty anavadyo hetuḥ. Trividhapratyakṣāṇaupalambha see n. 305.

369. At the beginning of Sarvajñaśiddhi (RNA 1, 9-14) Ratnakirti quotes PV II, v. 33 in which Dharmakirti declares that he means by the supreme source of knowledge one who knows the truths regarding what are to be abandoned and what are to be acquired together with their means, but not one who merely knows everything (heypoṣeṣyatauvāsya sābhvyapāyasya vedakaḥ, yaḥ pramaṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ). Ratnakirti calls this supreme source of knowledge sarvajña and a knower of everything sarvasarvajña. For Buddhists following Dharmakirti sarvajña is more important than sarvasarvajña. And Ratnakirti says that his inference beginning with yo yathā sādaramārthakālābhyaśasahitacetoṣaṁghaḥ... (which Mokṣākara cites in § 29) is meant for proving sarvajña, and not sarvasarvajña. He continues to say, however, that he will quench the thirsty desire of common people for the proof of the existence of a sarvasarvajña. And he formulates an inference proving it in RNA 28. 10 ff. Thus, we have to bear in mind that there are two kinds of omniscient beings. Mokṣākara deals with sarvajña in § 29 and sarvasarvajña in § 29. 1.
Words agreeing with a proof and having a definite object presuppose directly or indirectly the knowledge intuited that object, as e.g. the words ‘fire burns’;

The words ‘all produced things are momentary’ also agree with a proof and have definite objects;

[Therefore, the words presuppose the knowledge intuited all things, i.e. there must be an all-knowing person.]

[This inference] is in content based on the principle of causality.

It has not the fallacy of illegitimacy (asiddhi), since we prove the momentary destruction of all things and accordingly these words are true. Nor is [the probans] incompatible, since it is present in the sapakṣa. Nor is it inconclusive, since, though words in general may be preceded by doubt or error, we know by perception and non-perception that the words agreeing with a proof and having a definite object are directly or indirectly preceded by the knowledge intuited that object. If this were not admitted, all the probans as effect would be annihilated, since even smoke etc. would not have their cause.

29.2. Proof of the succession of lives. (62.17) The following objection may be raised: “Conceptual ideas which are meditated upon would be manifested only after a long time expressible in terms of a succession of many lives. But what proof do you adduce in order to establish a succession of lives (bhavaparamparā)?”

We answer:

[A moment of] the mind is necessarily joined together with (prati-


371. M 62. 15 -purvakatvena, but G, T -tvam, which is better. Or we may construe the passage reading vyāptēḥ (M 62. n. 2) so that it may run: ...vacanasya...-tvena...vyāptēr upalambhāt (we know the vyāpti between the words agreeing with a proof and having a definite object on the one hand and the precedence of the knowledge intuited that object on the other.)

372. RNA 28. 11-19: yat pramāṇasamvādiniṣcitārthavacanāṁ tat sākṣāt paramparayā vā tadarthasākṣāt kāriṇānāpūrvavakam. yathā dahano dāhaka iti vacanam; pramāṇasamvādī niṣcitārthavacanāṁ cēdan kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṁskārā ity arthataḥ kāreyetah, nāsiṣsidhiḥ, sarvabāhāvākṣaṇābhāgaṃprasādhanād asya vacanasya satyārthatvāt. nāpi virodhaḥ, sapakṣe bhāvāt. na ānākaṅkātāḥ, vacanamātṛasya saṁśāvatvāparāśasūrakatvāt'pi pramāṇaniṣcitārthavacanasya sākṣāt pāramparayeṇa tadarthasākṣāt kāriṇānāpūrvavakatvāt. anyathā niyamaṇa pramāṇasamvādāyogat.

373. G ...bhāvyamānasya saṁkālpa-ṛūḍhatvām saṁbhāvyate, but M= T bhāvyatva saṁkālpa-ṛūḍhasya sphujābhāvatvaṁ sambhāvyate.
another \(\text{sāndhatte}\) the mind, as the present moment of mind;

That belonging to the moment of death is also a \(\text{moment of the mind}\);

\(\text{Therefore, it necessarily engenders another moment of the mind}\)\(^{374}\).

\(\text{This is an inference}^{374}\) formulated with a logical mark of essential identity. There is no deviation \(\text{from the vyāpti of this inference}^{374}\) even in the case of the last moment of the mind of an arhat \(\text{(arhaccaramacitta).}\) For it is known only from a Buddhist tradition \(\text{(āgama)}\) that \(\text{an arhat, having destroyed all passions, does not receive another life after his death}\); \(^{375}\) and \(\text{some Buddhists are of the opinion that even the last moment of the mind of an arhat}^{376}\) engenders another moment free from passions; moreover, the probans \(\text{of this inference}^{377}\) implies the qualification 'so long as \(\text{the mind is accompanied by passions}^{377}\)'. Thus is proved the existence of the future lives. It is commonly said that all people enter into religious practices \(\text{(abhyāsa)}\) such as austerity, liberality,

\[374. \text{A similar argument is found in TS v. 1899 and TSP: maraṇākṣaṇāviṃśām svopā-deyodayaṃ, rāgino hinasaṅgatvāt pūrvavijñānāvāt tatāh. yat sarāgaṃ cittaṃ tat svopādeyayacittāntarodhayasaṃartham sarāgatvāt pūrvavasthācitavat; sarāgaṃ ca maraṇa-cittam iti svabhāvahetvā.}^{375,376}\]

\(\text{In this inference}^{377}\) \(h\) is not a mind in general, but the mind beset with passions; this is implied in Mokṣākara's inference, since he says: \(\text{hetoḥ klése satiti višeṣaṇāpekaṇant.}\) Malliṇeṇa cites this inference of our author for the sake of criticism, ascribing it to Mokṣākara (SVM 123, 18-20: \(\text{yac ca mokṣākaraguptena yac cittaṃ tac cittāntaraḥ pratisam-dhutte yathēdāniṃṭṭanāṃ cittaṃ, cittaṃ ca maraṇakālabhāviti bhavaparamparāsiddhaye pramā-nam uktam tad vyartham....}^{377}\)

\[375. \text{Cf. E. Krishnamacharya's commentary in G 98-99. In TS, the Lokāyata formulates a syllogism which denies the next life (TS v. 1863) saying that a mind at death and beset with desires does not engender another moment of the mind because it is also a mind at death, just as the last moment of the mind of an arhat. To this replies TS v. 1916, pointing out that the opponent cannot adopt the Buddhist doctrine that the last moment of the mind of an arhat does not engender another moment of the mind. For if he presupposes a Buddhist doctrine for his inference, he has to admit another Buddhist doctrine, that of the next life too. Mokṣākara's expression \(\text{tasyāgamaṃṭṭratatisatvat}^{378}\) is too brief to convey his intention. But probably he means the same as TS, i.e. the doctrine of the last moment of the mind of an arhat is known to the opponent only by a Buddhist tradition; so he cannot points out the vyābhičāra utilizing this theory which is not accepted by himself.}

\[376. \text{TS v. 1917-1918 and TSP say that some of the Mahāyāna Buddhists, say, the Mādhyamikas, are of the opinion that Buddhas reside neither in nirvāṇa nor in samsāra. This means that the last moment of the mind of Buddhas engenders another free from passions.}

\[377. \text{See n. 374 above. M hetoḥ klése satiti višeṣaṇā-..., but G, T...klése satiti višeṣaṇā-..., which is better.}

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learning etc. (because of the impressions caused by) their practices in former lives. And in order to establish this, we will formulate a proof:

Every [moment of the] mind is preceded by another [moment of the] mind, as the present moment of the mind:

That belonging to the time of birth is also a [moment of the] mind;

[Therefore, it is also preceded by another, viz. a past mind].

This inference is based on a logical mark as effect\textsuperscript{378}.

30. The doctrine of the Vaibhāṣika. (60.10) \[The opponent: \]

"Is emancipation not possible by intuiting the truth? And the truth is unique as [Dharmakirti himself] says:

Emancipation is [accomplished by] seeing emptiness;

all other religious practices are for that purpose\textsuperscript{379}.

How then can there be two kinds of omniscient beings [i.e. \textit{sarvajña} and \textit{sarvasarvajña}] and also different schools among Buddhists?"

[The author:] This is not to be confuted, because the Blessed One [or the Buddha] taught all these [different doctrines] in order to introduce sentient beings [of different capacities] into truths. Thus, the Vaibhāṣika holds:

Ether and two kinds of cessation, these three are the non-produced which are eternal;

All produced things are momentary, devoid of \textit{ätman}, and have no creator [other than \textit{karman}]\textsuperscript{380}.

\textsuperscript{381}... [Although the knowledge born out of sense-organs has not the form [of atoms], the assemblage of atoms appears as an existent.]...\textsuperscript{381}

31. The doctrine of the Sautrāntika. (63.17) The Sautrāntika holds the following theory: All that is manifested in the form of blue etc. is knowledge, and not an external object (\textit{bhāyo’ṛthaḥ}), since an sentient

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\textsuperscript{378}. TS v. 1897 : \textit{tasmāt tatṛdādviṃśānāṃ svopādaḥnabodhaḥvam ; vijnānāvādīhetubhya idānīṁtāntacittavat}, and TSP.

\textsuperscript{379}. PV II. v. 254 : \textit{sā (=saṃśāraduḥkhatā) ca naḥ pratyayotpattiḥ sā nirātmayadṛg-āśrayaḥ, muktis tu śūnyatādṛśīs tadarthāḥ śeṣabhāvanāḥ}. Our text seems to cite the last half of this verse. M as well as G has \textit{muktis tu śūnyatādṛśīs tadarthāśeṣabhāvanā}, but T (\textit{stoṅ pa ṇid lta bas gro bal ḥgyur, bsgoms pa lhag ma de don yin}) agrees with PV.

\textsuperscript{380}. See n. 366.

\textsuperscript{381}. This verse which is found only in T is also identical in sense with the first half of JSS v. 22 (Yamaguchi, 292) : \textit{mig las skye blo rnam med cin, m yön sum rig pa rdul gyi tshogs, blo dan yes bya kha che yi, bye brag smra baḥi gsum du bṣad}. (The last half means: This is said to be the theory of the wise Vaibhāṣikas of Kashmir).
(jaḍa) thing is not able to become visible (prakāśa). Concerning this it is said:

The range of the senses [i.e. the external reality] (indriyagocara) is not perceptible itself, though it gives rise to the knowledge with the form of it [or the objective reality]382.

The author of the [Pramāṇavārttika-] Alaiṅkāra, [Prajñākaragupta] says too:

If a blue thing is perceived, how can it be said to be external [to the knowledge]?

If a blue thing is not perceived, how can it be said to be external383?

[The opponent :] "If that which is visible is none other than knowledge, how then do you know that there is an external reality?"

[The author :] The proof of an external reality is made through [the following reasoning] by the method of difference (vyatireka): Indeed, forms such as blue do not become visible at every place and every time; nor are they possible even when we suppose that they occur only because of our own material cause (upādāna=samanantarapratyaya)384, since, if so, it remains inexplicable why they occur pertaining only to a definite object. Therefore, we can ascertain that there must be, apart from the immediately preceding moment of our own consciousness (samanantarapratyaya), something which is a cause of these [visible forms] and by virtue of which [the representations of forms] occur only at some place and sometimes. This ‘something’ is the external reality385.

31.1. Refutation of the soul. (64.9) However386, this external reality

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382. svākārajñānanakā dyasya nēndriyagocaroḥ. This is identical with JSS v. 23 a-b: mthoḥ ba dhaṅ poḥi yuḥ min te, ātē pā rnam pa bcos pa skye (Yamaguchi, 296). T of TBh translates it: raṅ rnam can śes skyed byed pa. dhaṅ poḥi spyod yul snaḥ ruṅ min. This verse is quoted in SVM 110. 18, in which -iṇāna- is changed into -buddhi-.


384. M. G svopādānamātrabalabhāvīte sati; T raṅ giṅ bar len pa tsaṁ las ēs par snaḥ ba niḍ du gyur na yam svopādānamātrabalapratibhāvīte sati.

385. About the sākāraavāda of the Saṅgrāntika see n. 148 above. For a similar and more detailed description of the epistemology of this school see SDS 33, 220–38, 271. Jadunatha Sinha gives a good account of it in his Indian Realism Chap. II. Kanakura also collects and translates into Japanese the accounts of the Saṅgrāntika theory as appear in non-Buddhist works (E. Kanakura, Gekyo no Bunken ni mieru Kyobu-setsu, Studies in Indology and Buddhology, presented in honour of Prof. S. Yamaguchi on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, pp. 55–68).

386. G kaṅ punar; M=T na punar....
is neither a composite whole (avayavini), nor any of quality (guna) and
the other categories conceived by other schools as depending on sub-
stances (dravyasrayin), nor any of the nine kinds of substances including
atoms (paramayu).

Of these, neither quality nor the others [i.e. karman, samanya, and
viśeṣa] are [the external reality], since their existence is negated through
the negation of the substance [which forms their substratum]. And since
[the relation called] inherence (samavaya) cannot possibly exist when there
is no substance in which [quality etc. is said to] be inherent, we do not
care for a separate criticism of this [inherence] here. Substance is of
nine kinds, i.e., earth (prthivi), water (āpas), fire (tejas), air (vāyu), ether
(ākāsa), time (kāla), direction (diś), soul (ātman) and mind (manas).

(64.14) Firstly, the following inference may be formulated for the
negation of the soul:

Knowledge which occurs occasionally is necessarily preceded by an
occasionally existent cause, as e.g. the knowledge of lightning.
The consciousness of the self (ahamkārajana) occurs only occa-
sionally,
[Therefore, it is preceded by, or has as its object, an occasionally ex-
istent cause, and not a permanent thing such as a soul].
This inference is in sense based on the principle of causality. The pro-
bans has no fallacy of illegitimacy, since the presence of knowledge-ness
[h] in self-consciousness (ahamkara), p, is established by perception. Nor
is the qualifier ‘occasionally existent’ illegitimate, because actually we are
not always conscious of ourselves. It is not incompatible, since we see it
in the sapakṣa: nor is it inconclusive, since the vyāpti between the occasio-
nally occurring knowledge and the occasionally occurring cause of it is as
well attested by perception and non-perception as that between smoke and
fire. If otherwise occasional knowledge occurs because of a non-occasional
cause, the absurdity would follow that it does not occur because of an
occasional cause. If [you contend that it has] not a definite cause, it is
tantamount to saying that it has no cause at all. If none the less this
inference is said to be inconclusive, even a well known probans such as
smoke [for the proof of fire] would be inconclusive too, because we see
no difference between them. Or, we may say, if the consciousness of the

387. G duṣaṇam api, but M. T tadduṣaṇam atra....
self is preceded by a non-occasional cause, it would occur continually, which is obviously not the case. For a cause must be by nature functioning; what is not functioning can be called a cause only figuratively;\(^388\) and what is functioning and what is not are not identical. If they were identical, then even that which is functioning would become that which is not functioning, since it could have the nature of that [which is not functioning]\(^389\). Moreover, if the consciousness of the self were [constantly] produced by a non-occasional cause, other knowledge would necessarily occur together with it [which is not permissible to the opponent]\(^390\), since [a non-occasional, or a permanent cause is] a self-contained totality [depending on nothing else] (avagrasāmagrika) [and should occur always].

You may contend that a soul is not the cause, but the object of the consciousness of the self. But we say 'No'. There cannot be an object [of knowledge] which is not a cause [of knowledge], since otherwise everything could be its object (atiprasaṅgāt).

31.2. Refutation of ether, time, direction and the mind. (65.13)
As to the problem whether or not\(^391\) there is any real entity called ether, we say there is not. For at a place where there is already a resisting substance (sapratigham dravyam), ether does not make room [for it]; and at a place where there is nothing, room [for a thing] is made by virtue of the very absence [without the intervention of ether]. Where then will ether make room?\(^392\) Inasmuch as [the essential function of] ether is said to consist in making room (avakāśapradā), if ether were existent, there should be room at all times, at all places and by all means; but this is not the case. Therefore, we comprehend that there is no ether. This refutation, however, is made from the standpoint of the Vaibhāṣīka\(^393\).

(66.1) Others [like the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas] hold that ether has sound as its quality; besides, it [=ether] is said to be a single entity. [But this is untenable, since] if so, no sounds, depending on the common substratum, could be heard separately. Thus, a sound sup-

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388. G=T upācārikakāraṇātāt; M upācārataḥ kāraṇātāt.
389. G kuruvaṭōpy utpattīḥ, but M=T kuruvaṭōpy akuruvaḍrūpattīḥ.
390. In connection with this, perhaps we should recall NS 1. 1. 16: yugapajjñānamut-pattir manaso liṅgam.
391. M ta nāsti vā. ta must be omitted.
392. vā in M 65. 15 and 16 are omitted in G, T.
393. Read Vaibhāṣīka instead of vaimāṣika.
posed to have occurred at a distant place would be heard as loud as that at a close place; or otherwise there should be the necessary corollary\(^{394}\) that if a distant sound is not heard, a close sound would not be heard either. Again, direction as well as time is also held to be a single unity. This entails that the notion of ‘east’ and ‘before’ (\(p\text{\text{\textbackslash}}\text{\textbackslash}urva\)) as well as ‘west’ and ‘after’ (\(apara\)) is impossible. The same logic may be applied to [the proof that] the mind (\(manas\)) cannot be permanent. For, the present opponent infers the existence of a mind on the ground that [two or more pieces of] knowledge do not in reality occur simultaneously [and that this fact is due to the existence of a separate entity called mind which mediates between the soul and knowledge]\(^{395}\). [But this is against our experience] for we experience plural knowledge simultaneously as when we see many girls dancing. And if the mind is permanent\(^{396}\), then it is not correct to maintain that plural knowledge [occurs successively]. Therefore there is no mind either.

31.3. Refutation of earth, water, fire and air. (66.10) [The substances of] earth and the rest are still left [to be examined]. They are regarded [by the opponent] to be of two kinds according as they are seen as a composite whole (\(avayavin\)) or as the component atoms (\(parama\nu\)).\(^{397}\) Of these, a composite whole such as a jar is known to have been made up of atoms through a definite process of formation beginning with the combination of two atoms, etc.; but we [have refuted it] saying that the

\(^{394}\) G ana\text{\textbackslash}k\text{\textbackslash}ntika\text{\textbackslash}ḥ, but M=T ek\text{\textbackslash}nta\text{\textbackslash}ḥ.

\(^{395}\) See n. 390 above.

\(^{396}\) \textit{Nit\text{\textbackslash}yam omitted in G, T. In this case the sentence may be translated: If there will be a mind, then (the simultaneous occurrence of) plural knowledge (which we experience, for instance, when seeing dancing girls) will not be possible. Mok\text{\textbackslash}š\text{\textbackslash}kara might mean this, but if so, the permanency of a mind referred to at 66, 5 would remain unrefuted, though the singleness of it could be refuted. TS v. 632 (\textit{nit\text{\textbackslash}y\text{\textbackslash}e tu manasi pr\text{\textbackslash}\textbackslash\text{\textbackslash}tap\text{\textbackslash}ḥ pratyayā svap\text{\textbackslash}nam pratyayataḥ, tena hetur iha prokto bhavati avigh\text{\textbackslash}nat\text{\textbackslash}ḥ) as well as the verses cited in G 203. 7-11 (of which the source is not mentioned by Krishnamacharya) refutes the permanency of a mind, saying that if a mind is permanent, plural knowledge would occur simultaneously. Thus, if we read \textit{nit\text{\textbackslash}yam} of M 66. 7 we must understand the sentence to mean: If a mind is permanent, then plural knowledge would not occur successively; or dropping na in M 66. 8 we should read: If a mind is permanent, then plural knowledge would occur simultaneously, which contradicts your theory.

\(^{397}\) Of the nine substances, the first four, viz. earth, water, fire, and air are permanent when seen as atoms, and impermanent as effects made of atoms; ether, time and direction are single, permanent and ubiquitous; the soul is permanent and ubiquitous; the mind is permanent. Cf. NK 370. 20-23; TS v. 550, etc.
non-perception of that [composite whole] which is [said to be] by nature perceptible does sublate [its existence]. The following objection may be raised: “Without the composite whole, how is this [jar] manifested as a single entity?” To this we have already replied [quoting the verse of Dharmakirti]: 399

Only parts placed closely [together] are seen as they are, but another entity which is their possessor and which itself consists of no parts [i.e. a composite whole] is not apprehended.

The opponent: “What is meant by the manifestation of parts?”

The Sautrāntika: It is simply the manifestation of atoms, which, being placed in different directions are piled together (saṅcita).

The opponent: “If so, why did Dharmottara say that grossness (sthaulya) is the quality of the manifested (pratibhāsadharma) and not the quality of the real?”

The Sautrāntika: The significance of the words is as follows: An [external] reality (artha) is not known itself, because it is said that the knowledge of an [external] reality is possible only in the secondary sense. Therefore, this manifestation of blue etc. is perceived as pervading different spots; the very manifestation is none other than the manifestation of grossness [and there is no separate, gross entity].

(67.2) To the Vaiśeśikas it is atoms that make up the composite whole; according to the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas, atoms [when united together] come directly into the range of perception; according to the Sautrāntikas [however, they are not perceptible themselves, but] are just liable to leave an impress of their own forms [in our knowledge]. But these atoms are not existent at all according to the theory of the Yoga-cārās.

398. See § 7. 2. 399. See § 7. 2 and n. 140. T tha dad pa thag ņe bar gnas pa rnams kyi kho na de lta de ltar snaḥ ste, de daḥ (n. dbaḥ) ldan pa ḷgaḥ ḷig kho na slar yaṅ dbye ba med par rtogs par ḷgyur ro. The Tibetan translator seems not to have realised that this is the same verse as that in M 22, 14 (§ 7.2) where he gives a different translation. In the present translation he missed out na in the last half.

400. pratibhāsadharmaḥ sthaulyam, not identified. But a similar passage is found in DP 43, 8-10: ekājñamgraḥyāḥ tathāvidhā bahavah paramāgaḥ sthūla iti. ekōyaṁ sthūla iti tu tathābhūtapatribhāsārayaḥ vyavasthāpyamānaḥ tvāt pratibhāsadharma ity ucyate, na vastudharmaḥ, prayekam aparimāpyer iti.

401. bhāktaṁ syād arthavedānam. Not identified.

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32. The doctrine of the Yogācāra school. (67.5) [The Yogācārin’s argument for the refutation of atoms is as follows: ] A single atom can never be established, for when an atom is placed in the middle, surrounded by [other] atoms existing over, below, and on the four sides of it, it would necessarily have six parts [thus the argument for the alleged indivisibility of an atom falls to the ground]. For [if it is an indivisible entity] the same atom in the middle which is in contact with another atom in the front is not able to be in contact with another at the back, since the former two atoms would necessarily occupy one and the same spot. 402... In the same way, if the atom at the back is in the same spot [in which the middle and front atoms are placed], then the middle atom alone could be in contact with it. 402 Even when there is no direct contact [between atoms], if they face each other, it will come to the same thing. Thus, a bodily object would be reduced to the size of an atom [which is absurd].

(67.13) Or we can examine the problem as follows: 403... What is visible cannot consist of one [atom] as is understood by the examination stated immediately above; ... 403 nor can it consist of many [atoms] since one atom is not united with another. 404 That is to say, if this [atom] has parts, how can it be an atom [which must be indivisible]? Or if it has no parts, all bodily objects, say a mountain or the earth, would be reduced to the size of an atom, because conjoined atoms, being wholly united, all occupy one and the same spot. Therefore it is necessary to admit that two atoms [i.e. that in the front and that at the back] are distinct in existence from each other. And just as they are [distinct], just so are those conjoined atoms at the upper, lower, southern and northern part distinct in existence from one another. Thus, it will be a necessary corollary that an atom is six-sided (ṣadāṁśatā), as is said by [Vasubandhu] as follows:

If an atom were conjoined with six other atoms simultaneously, it would be six-sided; if six atoms occupied the same spot, a bodily

402. G evaḥ ca sa pūrva-paramāṇusahāśvabhāvo'parāḥ paramāṇaḥ pratyasidhed yadi so 'pi tatra syāt; T de itur mi rdur phra rab šur ma dāh ſe bahi raḥ bāin de rdur phra rab ma rtogs pas gal te ḥgyur na de yaḥ der ḥgyur ro. Both G and T seem to be defective. I follow M.
403. Omitted in G.
404. T rdul phra rab kyi (n. inserts cha) šas la (p. d. las) rdul phra rab mi dmigs paḥi phyir ro. I follow M. G.
object would be of the size of an atom.\textsuperscript{405}

And when an atom is not established, a number [of atoms] are also not established; thus there are no atoms at all.\textsuperscript{406}

(68.6) [The opponent:] “If there is no external object, what is this cognized image (\textit{pratibhāsa}) related to?”

[The Yogācārin:] The image of our cognition occurs because of our untrue, latent seeds of representation [which have been stored in subconsciousness] since the beginningless past (\textit{anādivitathavāsanā}),\textsuperscript{407} and is seen\textsuperscript{408} [as if external], though it has nothing [external] as its object. Thus: the image of our cognition will have an object only if there existed an external reality to be referred to. But this [external reality] must be either a composite whole or the accumulated atoms. But both the contentions have been refuted by the proof contradicting them which we have stated just above, and have no more reality than a day-lotus in the sky. Concerning this the following is said:

There is no composite whole, nor are atoms real; the image of cognition has no object, but resembles experiences in a dream.\textsuperscript{409}

Knowledge in a dream is known to have no [external] object; and there is no difference between the experience in a dream and that in a state of waking, since both are seen to be the same in every respect. Knowledge, when it has not acquired a different feature from the knowledge having no [external] object, is not able to experience what is related to an [external] object. [This argument may be formulated into the following

\textsuperscript{405} =\textit{Vimśatikā}, v. 12 : \textit{saṅkena yogapad yogāt paramāṇoḥ saṁvāsātā, saṁmāṁ samāna-deśatvāt piṅḍaḥ syād anumātrakaḥ.}

\textsuperscript{406} Detailed refutation of \textit{paramāṇu} by the Yogācārins is found in various texts such as \textit{Vimśatikā}; Dignāga’s \textit{Ālambanaparikāśārītī}; \textit{TS Bāhyārthaparikšā} v. 1967–1998.

\textsuperscript{407} M = G \textit{vitata}, but T \textit{ji ita ba bīn ma yin paḥi = vitatha}.

\textsuperscript{408} G \textit{sambāvyate} (made possible); M = T \textit{lakṣyate}.

\textsuperscript{409} na sann avayavi nāma na santi paramāṇavaḥ. \textit{pratibhāso nirālambāḥ svapnānubhavasaṁśvibhaḥ.} The first half is missing in G, T, and M has \textit{sān nāvayavi} which must be corrected into \textit{sann avayavi}. The source is not identified, but this verse is again identical with JSS v. 25 (Yamaguchi, 302) : \textit{cha sas can kṣe bya med cik. phra rab rdul rnam med pa dahn. so sorr naḥ ba dmigs med dahn. ņams su myoḥ ba rmi lam ḥdra. Here, however, the last bāḍa reads ‘experience resembles a dream’.

\textsuperscript{410} G \textit{dvitīyam}; M \textit{dvitīyam ṇānām}; T \textit{dvitīyam ākāśakeśadārśanam. Ākāśakeśa, a hair in the sky, is the illusion of a hair floating in the sky seen by a man with diseased eyes, and is used as a simile of a cognition which occurs without depending on an external reality.}
syllogism:

Knowledge, which is not different from the knowledge having no external object, has no external object, as the second cognition [of a hair in the sky] is not different from the first cognition of it.

The knowledge in a state of waking, the present subject of controversy, is not different from the knowledge in a dream [which has no external object].

[Therefore it has no external object].

(69.2) [The opponent:] “If there is no external thing, then what is the ultimate reality?”

[The Yogācārin:] The ultimate reality is the pure consciousness without manifoldness which is freed from stains beginning with [the bifurcation of] cognitum and cognizer (grāhyagrāhakādikalkānkānākitaṁ niśprpañca-vijñānamātram), as is expressed in [the following verse:]

Consciousness freed from cognitum and cognizer is the ultimate reality.

Again, the following is said [by Dharmakīrti:] [Excepting knowledge itself], there is nothing to be experienced by knowledge, and [likewise] it has no experience other [than self-experience]; since knowledge is deprived of cognitum and cognizer, it is illuminated by itself.

The Blessed One said too:

External objects are not existent as ignorant people imagine; the mind, urged by the latent seeds of representation, takes the form of the external thing.

411. M paramārthasat; G, T sat.
412. grāhyagrāhakānirputam vijñānaṁ paramārthasat. This is identical with JSS v. 26 a-b (Yamaguchi. 302); guṇa daḥ ḍāsin ṭa las grol baḥi. rnam ū ses dam paḥi don du yod. A very similar verse is found in JNA 435, 9: grāhyagrāhakāvaidhuryād vijñānaṁ paramārthasat. ekānekaviyogena vijñānasādyāpi śūnyatā. 
413. PV III, v. 328: nānyo'ñubhāyas tend (=jñānena) sti tasya nānubhavo'paraḥ, tasyāpi tulyacodyatvāt svayaṁ saiva prakāśate, which is changed by our author into nānyo 'ñubhāyo buddhydāsti tasyā nānubhavoparaḥ, grāhyagrāhakāvaidhuryāt svayaṁ saiva prakāśate. This change is followed by Vādirājāśuri (NVV I. 317. 19), Hemacandra (AYV 111, 1-2), Madhava (SDS 31, 196-197) and Guṇaratna (TRD 40, 13-14).
414. bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā balair vikalpyate, vāsanāluṭhitam cittam arthā-bhāsaṁ pravaratate. Lākṣāvatārasūtra. Nanjio ed. 285, 4-5, where vāsanāir luido is given for vāsanāluṭhitam.
32.1. Sākārvāda and nirākārvāda of the Yogācārins. (69.11) Concerning this point, some [Yogācārins, i.e. Sākāraṇānavādins] maintain the following: All this that is commonly known to be existent as the body or the object [of its activity] is none other than knowledge. And since this knowledge is conscious only of itself, we conclude that there is neither cognitum nor cognizer for anyone; through logical construction (kalpana), however, appears the relation of cognitum and cognizer. Therefore, the truth consists in the knowledge which, though having [various] images (ākāra),, is freed from the imaginary relation of cognitum and cognizer.

Others [i.e. Nirākāraṇānavādins] however, argue as follows: The essence of knowledge is not stained by the specks of any images and resembles a pure crystal [or the clear sky of an autumnal midday]. Those images of cognition (ākāra) are indeed not real and become perceptible by being shown by nescience (avidyā). Therefore the cognized is not existent in reality; and since the cognized is not existent, the quality of cognizer, which is ascribed to knowledge in relation to the [cognized], also does not exist.

33. The doctrine of the Mādhyāmikas. (69.19) According to the view of the Mādhyāmikas, however, even that knowledge which is admitted as real by the Yogācārins is not in reality existent, since it cannot withstand scrutiny. For in the world they say that what is endowed with independent essence (svabhāva) is ultimately real. But when examined, that [knowledge] cannot have an independent essence, be this single or plural [i.e. uniform or variegated], since it does not withstand the examination of singleness and plurality; G omits it totally. The author refers to the negation of the existence of an atom as well as atoms, which is demonstrated at the beginning of the present section. A more elaborate argument of the Mādhyāmika against the existence of cognition is found in PV III, v. 209-210: citrāvibhāṣyay artheśu yady ektavān na uṣṭyaṁ, saiva tāvat kathāṁ buddhir ekā citrāvibhāṣiṁ. idam vastubalāyataṁ yad vadanti viśeṣitāṁ, yathā yathārthāṁ cintyante viṣeṣīṁ tathā tathā. When a controversy as to how cognition which is by nature

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415. Read sākāraṁ instead of M 69, 15 sākāra. This word is missing in G, T, but has a very important significance.
416. The second simile is found only in T: ston ka dri ma med paḥi ŋin phyed kyi nam mkha' ltu bu.
417. M, G grāhyābhāvāt; T rnam pa thams cad du de med paḥi phyir-sarvathā tadbhāvāt.
418. See Appendix II.
419. M pūrvavīcāraśatvāt; T gcig paḥam du ma rnam par dpyaś pa śahr bjod paḥi phyir ro (since we have before stated the examination of singleness and plurality); G omits it totally. The author refers to the negation of the existence of an atom as well as atoms, which is demonstrated at the beginning of the present section. A more elaborate argument of the Mādhyāmika against the existence of cognition is found in PV III, v. 209-210: citrāvibhāṣyay artheśu yady ektavān na uṣṭyaṁ, saiva tāvat kathāṁ buddhir ekā citrāvibhāṣiṁ. idam vastubalāyataṁ yad vadanti viśeṣitāṁ, yathā yathārthāṁ cintyante viṣeṣīṁ tathā tathā. When a controversy as to how cognition which is by nature
amination which is stated above [regarding atoms]. Concerning this, the following is said: \(^{420}\)

To the wise, that knowledge [which the Vijñānavādins admit as real] is also not ultimately real, since it, as the sky-lotus, is deprived of single or plural essence.

The revered Dharmakirti said too: \(^{421}\)

An essential form by which things are defined does not in truth exist; because single or plural essence is not present in these things.

In the same way, the following is said by the author of the \([Pramāṇa-vārttika-]\) Alamkāra [Prajñākaragupta]:

When neither conceptual knowledge nor the other [i.e. indeterminate perception] has validity, who is then to blame even if everything is shattered? \(^{422}\)

In the sense of the highest truth, there is no difference between the fettered and the emancipated, since no difference appears to those who see that all things are equal. \(^{423}\)

The syllogism [for the proof] also runs as follows:

A thing of which the essential quality is determined neither as single nor as plural is not ultimately real, as e.g. the sky-lotus;

Knowledge has not an essential quality either single or plural;

[Therefore, it is not ultimately real].
This inference is based on the principle of the non-perception of the per-vader [of the probans] (vyāpakāṇupālabdhu). Firstly, this is not an illegitimate probans, since it is quite manifest that an essential quality, single or plural, cannot be possessed by knowledge with an image, just as it is not by an external thing. For the object, concerning which ordinary people talk of the external thing, is none other than cognition itself to those who maintain [that the world is merely] knowledge with various images (sākāravādī). Therefore, the [argument], which, against [the view of ordinary] people, contradicts externally existent things plays the same role of a contradictor also concerning the internally existent. A gross object is not admitted as consisting of one atom or many atoms.424 And this image which [according to you] consists of knowledge425 may be a single gross image or plural images divisible into many atoms [of knowledge]; but in either case you cannot avoid the [same kind of] criticism [as was] made against the assertion of [the reality of] external objects.

The distinguished Bodhisattva [Śāntirakṣita] said in the Madhyamakālaṁkāra:

If knowledge were admitted [by you to consist of parts] as many as the number of [its variegated] forms, then it would be difficult [for you] to avert the same kind of criticism which is made regarding [the reality of] atoms....426

424. M=T...tata yat tasya bahirbhāve bādhakaṁ tad evāntarbhāve'pi bādhakam. na hi sthūlam ekam anekaṁ ca paramāṇuṛupam apiṣyate. G tato yat tasya bahirbhāve bhāvaśabdhaṁkā hī...paramāṇuṛupam apophyate. I follow M, but G is not different from it in sense.

425. M viḥṣāṇātmakānāṁ ayam ākāro, but G, T (rnam par 'ses paḥi bdag ņid du gyur paḥi rnam pa ḍhi...), viḥṣāṇātmakās cāyam ākāro... The latter reading is definitely better. About viḥṣāṇātmaka- paramāṇu- and sthūla see for instance RNA 123, 4ff.

426. This is inserted between bhinnāḥ and ubhayathāpi (M 91, 3) only in T: dbu ma rgyan du bdag ņid chen po bo-dhi-sa-tva yis, ci ste rnam paḥi graḥs bain du rnam par 'ses pa khas len na, de tshe rdul phra ḍhrar gyur paḥi ḍpyad pa ḍhi lās bzlog par dkaḥ. 'ses gzungs so. Iyengar gives his own restoration into Skt. in M 93. 13–16, which is not very faithful to the Tibetan especially in the last half of the verse. The verse is a verbatim quotation from Madhyamakālaṁkārakārikā v. 47 (Peking ed. 50, b4). Śāntirakṣita's own interpretation of it is found in Madhyamakālaṁkāravṛtti. Peking ed. 62, b7–63, a5: gal te bar med par gnas paḥi rdul phra rab kyi ho bo rnam s līr rigs mthun paḥi rnam par 'ses pa maḥ po ḍhi dag kyaṁ ḍbyun na, deṣi tshe rdul phra rab la ḍpyad pa ci ḍhrar bas sīhar byas pa de ḍhrar ba ņid rnam par 'ses pa rnam s la yaṁ bzlog par dkaḥ bar ḍgyur te... Then he gives his criticism of atoms which is very similar to the passage we met in M 67, 7–12. It is quite likely that this portion is a later interpolation. and so I have translated it after the present Skt. sentence is finished.
For that is not [meant merely as] a criticism relating to external things but also as applicable to what is not [external.]\(^{427}\)

The objection that a contradiction pertaining to a bodily object (mūrti) is not [applicable] to a bodiless [image] consisting of knowledge is also not cogent. For even knowledge, inasmuch as it is [maintained to be] endowed with a form, has a shape, since this image pervading a certain space\(^ {428}\) is none other than a shape (mūrti).

Here ends the chapter ‘Inference for others’ of the Tarkabhāṣā written by the Buddhist monk Mokṣākaraṇagupta, great doctor\(^ {429}\) of the monastery of Jagaddhala.\(^ {430}\)

By the merit I have gained by writing this Tarkabhāṣā may all people in this world attain Buddhahood!

\(^{427}\) The text seems confused here and I follow the amended text of G which reads: na hi tad bahirbhāvanibandhanaṃ dūṣṭaṇāṃ yena tadabhāvena bhavevat (cf. Śuddhipatra in G. 111). M has: na hi tadaviṣāne bahirbhāvanibandhanaṃ dūṣṭaṇāṃ yena tadabhāvena bhavet (Concerning knowledge you cannot put forward a criticism relating to external things, which is possible only as that relating to external things.) This may be understood as a part of the objection in M 71, 5-6. T.: gāh gi phyir gāh gis de yod na yod par bygyur ba rnam par šes pa de phyi rol gyi dḥos poḥi rgyu mtshan can (d. p. omit can) ma yin te could be understood as M.

\(^{428}\) G deśacitāṇiṃ aḥāro; T yul la rnam par rgyas pa daḥ idan poḥi rnam pa... = M deśavitāṇavān aḥāro.

\(^{429}\) G mahāyati, but M, T mahāpaṇḍita.

\(^{430}\) G śrīmadrājajadadhala; M, T śrīmanmahājagaddhala.

**APPENDIX**

**Appendix I = n.212.** Buddhist logicians set forth various kinds of the classification of negative inference (cf. the diagram). Dharmakirti himself classified it into four kinds with four subordinate forms (PV I, v. 4 and Svavrtti), three kinds (HB), and eleven kinds (NB). The four basic kinds proposed in PV I, v. 4 are: 1) viruddhasiddhi = svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi (illustrated by na śītasparśo 'trāgnek); 2) viruddhakāryasiddhi = svabhāvaviruddhakāryopalabdhi (na śītasparśo 'tra dhūmat); 3) hetvasiddhi = kāraṇanupalabdhi (nātra dhūmo 'nagnek); 4) dṛṣṭyānmanor asiddhi = svabhāvānopalabdhi (nātra dhūmo 'nupalabdheḥ). However, in his Svavrtti on the same verse Dharmakirti actually enumerated six forms, adding a derivative form to each 1) and 4), viz., 1a) vyāpakaviruddhasiddhi = vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi (na tuśītasparśo 'trāgnek); 4a) vyāpakaviruddhāsiddhi = vyāpakānopalabdhi (nātra śīmāsāpā vṛksāhāvat). Furthermore, in PV I, v. 5 he adds 3a) tadviruddhānimittasyānopalabdhiḥ = kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi (nāya romaharśādiviśeṣāḥ santi saṁnihitadahanaviśeṣatvat), and in the Svavrtti on it he gives 3b) kāraṇaviruddhākāryopalabdhi (6, 15-16: etena tatkāryād api tadviruddhākāryābhāvagatir uktā veditavyā yathā na romaharśādiviśeṣayuktāt sūryapuruṣavn

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ayam pradeśo dhūmāḥ). Thus he concludes that non-cognition is eightfold due to the variety of application or syllogistic argument (6, 18: ...iyam prayogabheda aṣṭadhānapalabḍhiḥ). These eight formulae correspond in the order of our enumeration to Nos. 5, 9, 3, 1, 8, 4, 7, 11 of Mokṣākara’s classification respectively. It is to be noted that kāraṇānapalabḍhi and its three subordinate forms (Nos. 2, 6, 10, 14 in TBh) are totally missing in PV.

In HB Dharmakirti proposes a classification into three kinds, viz., kāraṇānapalabḍhi, vyāpakānupalabḍhi and svabhāvānapalabḍhi (HBT 202, 15 ff.; HB Reconstruction, 68, 12-13). These three formulae form the principle which underlies the classification in PV, for kāraṇānapalabḍhi can subsume Nos. 3, 3a, and 3b in PV, vyāpakānupalabḍhi Nos. 4a, 1a. and svabhāvānapalabḍhi Nos. 4, 1, and 2. Arcaṭa, when commenting on HB followed Dharmakirti’s classification into three, but at the same time he enumerates at another place (6, 5-6) four kinds of anupalabḍhi, viz., the above-named three forms of HB with viruddhatādhi as the fourth.

In NB Dharmakirti gives more derivative forms than in PV, the total amounting to 11. The three new forms added in NB are: No. 6 viruddhayāptopalabḍhi as a subordinate form of svabhāvānapalabḍhi, No. 2 kāraṇānapalabḍhi and its derivative No. 7 kārayaviruddhapalabḍhi. Kāraṇānapalabḍhi appears in NB for the first time; adding this to the three forms in HB, we get four forms which seem to offer the basic principle for the classification of negation. In NB, however, Dharmakirti does not explain his principle, nor does Dharmottara in his com. on NB.

What we have referred to just above form Mokṣākara’s principle of classification. He takes up svabhāva-, kārya-, kāraṇa- and vyāpaka-anupalabḍhi as the four basic forms. Dharmakirti in NB has already given four forms related to svabhāva (Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6) and this suggests that three subordinate forms may be enumerated under each of the four basic forms, although Dharmakirti himself actually gave only one subordinate form under kāryānapalabḍhi, two under kāraṇānapalabḍhi and one under vyāpakānupalabḍhi. Now Mokṣākara formally gives three subordinate forms to each of the four basic forms, adding as the result five forms which lacked in NB. Thus, the total number becomes 16. TSop followed TBh in classifying anupalabḍhi into 16 forms, though the order of enumeration is a little different between the two.

Durvekamisra, the commentator on NBT clearly knew the classification into 16. He says in DP 124, 15 that negation is to be regarded as of 16 kinds (...ṣodāṣapakāṛēti tu draṣṭālayam) and in DP 140, 10 ff. that 11 forms enumerated in NB and NBT are a synecdoche (upalakṣaṇa) since more forms may be added. Saying so, he enumerates three more forms: vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabḍhi (No. 12 of TBh), kārayaviruddhakāryopalabḍhi (No. 10) and vyāpakaviruddhayāptopalabḍhi (No. 16), illustrating each of them by the same inference as in TBh. And then, he says (DP 141, 1-2) that there are some people who add another two forms, viz. kārayaviruddhayāptopalabḍhi (No. 14 of TBh) and kāraṇaviruddhayāptopalabḍhi (No. 15), giving again the same illustrations as in TBh. Thus, Durveka himself classified negation into 14 forms and at the same time knew that the classification into 16 was made by some people.

The problem is: Who are some people referred to by Durveka? So far as we know, the classification into 16 forms is clearly described only in TBh and TSop, both of which seem to be posterior to DP. According to the editor of DP, Durvekamisra is a pupil of Jitāri, who was a teacher of Atiśa. That is to say, Durveka is a contemporary of Jñānaśrimitra, who preceded Mokṣākara by more than two generations. Therefore, Durveka cannot refer to Mokṣākara as well as Vidyākaraśānti, the author of TSop. It is most likely, therefore, that the classification of negation into 16 kinds existed before Mokṣākara. Jñānaśrimitra mentions vyāpakaviruddhakāryopalabḍhi, which is admitted by Durveka and
## Classification of anupalabdhi

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<th>DP</th>
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<td>3 svabhāva-anup.</td>
<td>1 svabhāva-anup. (s. II, 32)</td>
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<td></td>
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corresponds to No. 12 of TBh (cf. JNA 190, 2), and this suggests that Jñānaśri knew more forms than PV, NB and NBT, and that it is the group of logicians headed by him who first proposed the classification into 16 kinds. But I cannot produce further evidence for it.

Appendix II=n. 418. A similar description of the sākāra- and nirākāra-vijñānaveśa of the Yogācārins appears in Bodhīdhara’s commentary on JSS, Peking ed., 51, b3 ff. which is translated into Japanese by Yamaguchi (308) : "dir rnal ḥbyor spyod pa ni rnam pa gniś te, rnam pa daḥ bcaς pa daḥ, rnam pa med paḥo. de la rnam pa daḥ bcaς pa ni slop ḏpam ḥphyogs kyi glaḥ pa la sogς pa dag gi ḥđod pa ste. rnam pa gzan gyi dbaḥ du ston ḏas ji skad ḏu : naḥ gi śes byaḥi no bo ni, phyi rol ḥtar naḥ (snah?) gaḥ yiṃ te. don yin śes bya ba la sogς pa ste rnam par śes paḥi tshogs drug tu smra baḥa. rnam pa de med pa ni slop ḏpam ḥḥags ḥthsogs med la sogς pa ste, de dag rnam pa kun ḏu brtags pa rab ṛib can gyi skra śad la sogς pa ḥtar smra bas, don ni don du grub ḥgyur na, mi ṛtog ye śes med par ḥgyur, de med pas na saḥs rgyas ḥṇid. thob ḏar ḥṭhad pa ma yin no. de bāṃ du. mi ṛtog ye śes rgya ba la. don kun snah ba med phyir yaḥ. don med khoṅ du chud ḏar bya. de med pas na rnam rig med ces brjod ciṅ. rnam par śes paḥi tshogs brgyad daḥ, kha cig cig ḥṣa smra ba ste. ceg ḥt ni rnam pa daḥ bcaς pa dag la yaḥ kha cig go.

Tr.: Here the Yogācārins are of two kinds, [those who maintain that knowledge is] always (endowed with images (sākāra) and [those who maintain that knowledge in its absolute state is] without images (nirākāra). Of these, sākāra is propounded by Dignāga and his followers. They teach that the images of cognition belong to the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhava), as is said (in the Alambanaparikṣā v. 6 as follows): “The object of cognition is the same as the internal image which appears as if it were externally existent...” They talk only of six kinds of cognitions. Nirākāra is taught by Ācārya Ārya Asaṅga and his followers. They maintain that the images of cognition belong to the represented nature (parikalpitasvabhava) and are [as much false as] the hair seen by one suffering from partial blindness. It is said (in Mahāyānasamgraha, ed. Lamotte, Chap. II. 14b. c=VIII. 20. c.) : “If the object of cognition is established as an external reality there would not be non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajnana); without it Buddhahood cannot be attained”. And again (Mahāyānasamgraha, Chap. II. 14b. f=VIII. 20. f) : “Where non-conceptual knowledge occurs, all objects never appear; therefore one must understand the non-existence of the object. Since it is not existent, the content of cognition is also not existent”. They talk of eight kinds of cognition; but some say there is only one kind [of cognition]. This theory of one kind [of cognition] is maintained also by some of the Sākāravādins.

In continuation to n. 148 above, I will give here a brief description of the development of the sākāra- and nirākāra-vāda in Mahāyāna Buddhism. According to Ratnākaraśānti (see the quotation from his Prajñāpāramitopadeśa below), the Madhyamikas as well as the Yogācārins are each divided into two groups, one maintaining sākāravāda and the other holding nirākāravāda. But the most important development is that among the Yogācārins. The Sautrāntikas thought that what we perceive is not an external reality itself, the existence of which can be known only by inference, but the impress or image which is left by the external reality upon our consciousness. The Yogācārins advanced a step farther and said that the external reality is not existent at all and that the world is none other than the worlds which are the sole reality. Therefore, to the Yogācārins, the image of cognition is the representation of our mind: and this necessarily implies that a cognition is always endowed with an image which is represented by our mind. Thus all the Yogācārins must be sākāravādins so far as the cognition of common people is concerned. A problem, however, appears in regard to an emancipated person, who is supposed to
have acquired nirviśāl-pakajñāna or non-conceptual, supermundane knowledge. Some Yogacārins thought that knowledge of an emancipated person is free from the fetter of cognitum and cognizer and accordingly is clear like a pure crystal without specks. And they thought this clear, imageless knowledge is the essence of cognition, regarding images as false, unreal specks born from our vāsana. This is the essential of the nirākārajñānavāda held by some of the Yogacārins. But others from the same school criticised this theory saying that what is not real can be never manifested, since otherwise a sort of the unfavourable doctrine of asatkhyāti would follow. Every cognition, so long as it is knowledge, must have an image, and there is no harm in that an emancipated person’s knowledge is with an image, if he is freed from conceptual thinking. This is the essential point of the sākārajñānavāda of the Yogacārins.

What I have depicted above is the fairly later aspect of the controversy regarding sākāra and nirākāra, and must have been developed after Dharmakirti and reached its final phase at the time of Ratnakarasānti and Jānaśrimitra. Jānaśrimitra, a sākāra-vādin, owes much of his theory to Prajñākaragupta and Dharmakirti, while Ratnakarasānti, a nirākāra-vādin, seems to be akin to Śāntiraksita. We are not sure of characteristics of the controversy before Dharmakirti. In various places of his books, however, Yamaguchi says that Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakirti, etc. represented the sākāra-vāda, and Guṇamati, Sthiramati, etc. the nirākāra-vāda. His opinion seems to be mainly based on the above passage of Bodhibhadra’s and Hsüan-chuang’s description of different theories of the Vijñānavādins in the Vijñāpatimatratosiddhi with K’uei-chi’s com. As well known, however, the information given by this Chinese source is not always parallel with what we know from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources such as the writings of Sthiramati, and it must be accepted only with reserves. None the less, I think that the controversy ascribed to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati by the Chinese tradition is equivalent in principle to the controversy of sākāra and nirākāra that is known from Sanskrit sources. As for the difference between Dharmapāla and Sthiramati as informed of by Hsüan-chuang and his direct disciple, Frauwallner gives the best survey.


Frauwallner's opinion that the origine of Dharmapāla's theory is traced back to Asaṅga is different from the description of Bodhiśāstra who ascribes the nirākāra-vādā to the same Asaṅga, if Dharmapāla is accepted as a genuine nirākāravādin. Apart from the controversy of early Yogacāra-scholars, Ānātapiṭaka and Ratnakirti represent the nirākāra-vādā while Ratnakaraśānti the nirākāra-vādā in the latest stage of Indian Yogacāra school—in this connection it is interesting to remember that Ānātapiṭaka and Ratnakara held different opinions also on bahir- and antar-vyāpti-vādā, which may suggest opposition in general between these two great scholars. Fortunately, the controversy between Ānātapiṭaka and Ratnakara is attested by rich materials.

PPU, 161, a5-161, b4: de bas na chos thams cad sems tsam daṅ, rnam par šes pa tsam daṅ, gsal ba tsam yin pas rnam par rig paṅi gzhū ba phyi rol gi yon yod pa ma yin pas, rnam par rig pa rnam kyang ḍāsīn paṅi raṅ būṁ du yod pa ma yin te, ēdi gni ni yid kyi mḥon par brjod paṅi phyir chos thams cad kyi kun tu brjod paṅi raṅ būṁ yin no. gaṅ la brjod še na, don med par yah kun tu brjods paṅi ho bo ḍiṅ la mḥon par žen paṅi bag chags las skyes paṅi don du snaṅ baṅ yah daṅ pa ma yin paṅi kun tu rtog paṅo. yah daṅ pa ma yin paṅi kun tu rtog pa de ni chos rnam kyi gnyan gi dbaṅ gi no bo ḍiṅ daṅ ḍkhorul pa daṅ, phyin ci log daṅ, log paṅi šes pa yah yin no. ēdi ltar deṅi gzhū ba daṅ ḍāsīn paṅi rnam pa ni ḍkhorul pa daṅ bslad paṅi dbaṅ ḍbāṅ ḍig snaṅ bas brdoṅ paṅi phyir, yah daṅ pa ma yin paṅi kun tu rtog pa de la de skad ces bya ste, deṅi raṅ būṁ de ni yah dag pa ma yin paṅo. yah dag pa ḍiṅ gah yin še na, gsal ba tsam mo. de niṅ kyis na rnam pa de ni ḍkhorul paṅi mṭshan ma daṅ. spros paṅi mṭshan ma šes bya bar brjod de. ḍkhorul paṅi dmigs pa yin paṅi phyir ro. gniś kyi mṭshan šes ḍkyan bya ste, gniś ltar snaṅ baṅ phyir ro. spros paṅi mṭshan med (Read ma) thams cad žiṅg rten las ḍdas paṅi ye šes la ḍgag par ḍgyur la. des na de ni ma ḍkhorul pa daṅ yah dag paṅi ye šes su yah dag brjod do. de niṅ kyi phyir de yah yōṅs su grub paṅi ho bo ḍiṅ yin te.

Tr.: Therefore, all things are the mere mind, the mere knowledge and the mere illumination. An external reality which is said to be grasped by cognition is not existent; and accordingly the cognition is also not existent as having the nature of cognizer. These two [i.e. cognitum and cognizer] are the expression (abhiliipa) of the thinking (manas) and as such belong to the represented nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) of things. Where are they represented? [They are represented in] the wrong representation (abhūtaparikalpa) which appears pretending to be external things and which is born from the latent seeds of representation (vīśāna), which are attached to [constructing] represented images where there are no [external] realities. This abhūtaparikalpa is the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) of things, and is false, perverted and erroneous knowledge. For its aspects of cognitum and cognizer are both unreal, since they appear only because of falsity (bhṛ ants) and confusion (vīplava). This is why it is said that [the two are represented] in the wrong representation. Their nature is not real. What then is reality? The pure illumination (prakāśamātra) alone is real. Thus, it is said, the images (ākāra)
(of cognition) are marked by falsity (bhārāṇinimitta), marked by manifoldness (prapañcannimitta). It is because they are objects of false (cognition). They are also called twofold form, because they appear as two (i.e. cognitum and cognizer). All manifold marks are destroyed when one gets supermundane knowledge (lokattarajñāna). So this is rightly called real knowledge. This is the very reason why it is the accomplished nature (parinibbānavābhāva).

ibid. 167, b8-168, a3: snon po la sogs pa de gsal bāin pa yin yaḥ gnod pa yod paḥi phyir brdus pa yaḥ gعرب po. de brdus pa par grub pas na deḥi bdag ṣṇid de yaḥ brdus pa par grub po. yaḥ gsaḷ ba de rigś pa ni ḫḵhrul pa daḥ bral bas mḥon sum yin paḥi phyir dhos po ṣṇid de gṛph pa yin te. gaḥ gi phyir gsal ba ni gsal ba ṣṇid kyis ḡḥug mahi ṛaḥ bāin yin te. gaḥ gi myoḥ ba ṭẖi ḫḵhrul ṭar ḫḥog paḥi bslad ṭas bdag ṭaḥ med paḥi phyir ro. yaḥ sḥon po la sogs paḥi rāḥ bāin yin paḥi phyir bslad ṭas byas ṭar ḫygyur la. de ṭtar gyur bas na de myoḥ ba yaḥ ḫḵhrul ṭar ḫygyur ro. ṭe ṭaḥ na sḥon po la sogs pa la ni gnod pa ḫḥuṅ paḥi sḳaḥs yod kyi gsal ba la ni ṭaḥ yin no.

Tr.: (Represented images) such as a blue thing etc, though they are being manifested, are proved to be unreal (alika), since they are contradicted (by another cognition). Since they are proved to be unreal, their substratum itself is proved to be unreal. However, the consciousness of illumination (prakāśa) itself is directly intuited as free from falsity, and accordingly is established as real. For illumination has as its inborn nature illuminating function, and cannot be approached by confusion (viplavopanita), so that the consciousness of it might be false. On the other hand, blue is another thing (different from the illumination itself), and can be approached by confusion; therefore, the knowledge of it may be false. Thus, there may be occasions in which [the knowledge of] blue, etc. is [negated] by another contradicting cognition, but it cannot happen in the case of the illumination itself.

This passage of Ratnakara is cited as a pūrvapakṣa by Jñānāśrimitra in JNA 368, 6-10, though the Tib. translation deviates from the Skt. from time to time: bhavatvāiśākāñā

PNU Peking ed., 168, a4ff.: rnal ḡbyor sbyod pa pa daḥ, ḍbu ma pa śes pa ŭnam pa daḥ beas par smra ba ḍha ṭiig na re, sḥon po daḥ gsal ba ḍag brdus pa daḥ brdus pa ma yin pa ḡyur na. ḍhoṣ ḡyal ba ṣṇid kyis na deḥi bdag ṭar ḍḥad par ḍi ḫygyur la. deḥi bdag ṣṇid ma yin na yah sḥon po la sogs pa gsal bar mi ḫygyur na sḥon po la sogs pa ni gsal ba yin te. ṣgro (ma) bṭags paḥi dhos po ḍḥur paḥi gsal ba ḍas ḣzān ma yin paḥi phyir sḥon po la sogs pa ni ṣgro ma bṭags paḥi dhos po ḍḥur ba ḍin ṭes zer te. de ḍag gi ṭtar na gsal ba ḍams cad phyin ci ma ḍag paḥi ṛaḥ gi ḍo bo myoḥ baḥi phyir, thams cad ḫḵhrul ṭaḥ med ṭar ḫygyur ro. ḍes na ṭaḥs can thams cad ṭraṭ ṭu ḍgral bar ḫygyur la, ṭraṭ ṭu yaḥ ḍag paḥr ṭaḥs sṅaḥs ṣṛgyas ṣṇid du ḫygyur ro...

Tr.: Some of the sākārājñānavādins of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika school say as follows: “If (as the nirākāravādin maintains, the image of cognition) such as blue is unreal and the illumination (of cognition) is real, they, being incompatible entities, could not be identical; and if (blue) would not be identical with the illumination, blue could not be illuminated (i.e. could not become visible). But it is a fact that blue is seen. Then, [i.e. if they were identical] blue, etc. would not be imagined things, since it is not different from the illumination which is not imaginary.’’ (Answer) If it is as they say, all cognitions

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would know the correct nature (of things); this would result in that there are no false cognitions at all. Thus, all people would be always emancipated, i.e. all would be perfectly enlightened ones.

This discussion continues longer, and the Sanskrit parallel to the portion of the answer is found in JNA 387, 8-23 and RNA 129, 1-12: *tathā hi sarvair eva prakāśair aviparitārthasvarūpāsatvam bhrānter atyaṃ abhāvaḥ syāt, tataḥ ca sarvasattvaḥ sadaiva sahyaksambuddhā bhaveyuh...*. I refrain from quoting farther, though parallels may be increased more, since this is not a place to enter into a detailed account of the controversy.
**SANSKRIT INDEX**

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ERRATA

Read \textit{samyagjñāna} instead of \textit{saṁyag-} in p. 23, l. 12; n. 3, 4, 6, 22, 85.

Read \textit{purato} \textit{vasthitān} instead of \textit{-vasthatān} in n. 124 (l. 2).