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Annotated translation of the chapter on the Yogācāra of the Blo gsal grub mtha’

— Part One —

Katumi MIMAKI

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* The present translation is one of the results of the research which I accomplished at the “Seminar für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens” of Hamburg University from October 1985 to March 1987 as a research-fellow of the Humboldt Foundation (“Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung”). Here I would like to thank the foundation for having provided me with the ideal conditions for research during this period. I would also like to express my profound gratitude to Lambert Schmithausen, my host-professor, and to David Seyfort Ruegg, both of whom organized a collective seminar during my stay at Hamburg, and rendered their assistance not only in technical matters, but also as friends and colleagues. I would like to thank also Félix Erb and Burkhard Quessel for their useful suggestions and remarks in the seminar. My thanks go equally to David Jackson, Robert Kritzer and Wendi Adamek who, taking the trouble to read through my final English version, have filled my lacunae in a language which is not my own. If there is any merit in my present work, it is thanks to those I have just mentioned; but if there are errors, needless to say I am alone responsible.

** The Tibetan text is critically edited in Mimaki (1982) 95–137, and a synopsis was already provided there. But as the result of a more careful reading of the text, I present here a revised synopsis with slight emendations in detail. About the importance of the present document, the Blo gsal grub mtha’, see Mimaki (1982) 1–54.
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Translation***

[1. Teachings of definitive and provisional meaning, according to the Yogacāra school]

[1.1. The teaching of definitive meaning: mind only]

[82 b 2] Now [here is] the explanation of the doctrinal position

*** In the present annotated translation the philological information, which was already given in the notes of the Tibetan edition (Mimaki (1982) 95–137), will generally not be repeated.

The Muni (thub pa) proclaimed as [the teaching of] definitive meaning that all things are nothing but representation (nān māra, vijñāpti-mātra).

As the Blessed One said in the Daśabhūmika-sūtra:

1) In this chapter the particle las is used in this place, whereas in the Mādhyamika chapter the particle la is used: da ni theg pa chen po dBU ma pa'i grub pa'i mtha' bṣad pa la chos thams cad bden pa gnis su gsun pa (BSGT 96 a 6, Mimaki (1982) 138).
“O, Victor’s sons (rgyal ba’i sras, jina-putra), these three realms (khams gsum pa, traitdhatuka) are nothing but mind.”

[It is] also [said] in the Laṅkāvatāra [-sūtra]):

“The individual (gañ zag, pudgala), the flow [of consciousness] (rgyun, samštati), the aggregates (phuñ po, skandha), the conditions (rkyen, pratayaya), as well as the atoms (rdul, anu), primary matter (gtso bo, pradhana), the Lord (dban phyug, īsvara) and the agent (byed po, kartṛ) are constructed only in the mind.”

2) A comparison of variants indicates clearly that our author did not cite this Sūtra from the original Sūtra itself, but from a treatise which cites this Sūtra. This is also the case for the Daśabhūmika quotation cited immediately before. Concerning these three verses of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, as indicated in notes (292)–(294) of Mimaki (1982; 96), the first two and the last two of these three verses are cited respectively in the Madhyamakālankāra-vrtti (Abbr. MAV) of Śāntarakṣita and in the Madhyamakāloka (Abbr. MĀL) of Kamalaśila, and it is very possible that our author, dBus pa blo gsal, cited these verses from these two treatises (more probably the first verse from the MAV and the last two verses from the MĀL), even if there are nevertheless slight differences between the variants in detail. Here is the Tibetan text of the Laṅkā in these two treatises (italicized words indicate variant readings): -MAV (ed. Ichigō: (1985 a) p. 126): gañzag rgyun dañ phuñ po dañ / rkyen dañ de bzin rdul rnams dañ // gtsabo dban phyug byed pa dag // sms tsam po las nam par brtags // don yod ma yin sms nid de // phyi rol don mtho log pa yin // rigs pas rnam par bitas na ni // gzuñ dañ ’dzin pa ’gag par ’gyur // ; -MĀL (P. 157 a 5–6, D. 145 b 1): don yod ma yin sms nid de // phyi rol don mtho log pa yin // rigs pas rnam par lta rnams kyi // gzuñ dañ ’dzin pa ’gag par ’gyur // ji ltar byis pas1) rnam brtags ltar // phyi rol don ni yod ma yin // bag chags kyi2) ni bsgrigs pa’i sms // don du snañ ba rab tu ’byun // (:1) pas D, pa P ; 2) kyi D, gyis P). On the other hand, it is interesting to notice that the last verse is cited in the Tattvaratnañvālī of Advayavajra (11 th c.) in support of the opinion of the Nirākāravadin (cf. Shastri (1927) 18.12–13, Ui (1952) 4.8–9, Ui (1963) 5.5–8); and the Tibetan version of it is perfectly identical with our text here (cf. Mimaki (1986) 10.17–20). The new critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the Tattvaratnañvālī has been prepared by the present translator and is forthcoming.

3) The original reading of BSGT “rgyun du” should be regarded as an error for “rgyun dañ”, as indicated by the Tibetan versions of the verse of the Laṅkā and its citation. Probably the rjes ’jug “it” of “dañ” was written at the foot of the character “dañ”, like a wa zur, and a抄ist mistook it for a žabs kyu.

4) Whether this is to be understood as “the Lord and the agent” (Izumi (1927) 46 & 161, Suzuki (1932) 70, and Yasui (1976) 71 & 253) or “the Lord who is the agent” (Ichigō: (1985 a) 145) is difficult to decide from the verse itself, but I took it in the former sense, according to the prose passage preceding this verse in the Laṅkā. There the difference between the tathāgatagarbha theory and the tīrthika’s atmanvāda is explained, and kartṛ is used in the sense of atman: cf. Laṅkā 33.15: tīrthakarā api bhagavan nityān kartrā nirguna vibhur avayaya ity atmanvādopadesam kurvanti // (“Oh Blessed One! the non-Buddhists maintain the theory of atman that the permanent agent is . . .”).

5) (Tib.) sms tsam po las / (Skt.) citta-mātrā; cf. sms tsam po la (reading of Peking edition of the verse of the Laṅkā cited in the MAV, ed. Ichigō: (1985 a) 126, n. 2).
"The object does not exist, but only the mind. The sight of an external object is erroneous. For those who see with logical rigour, [the duality of] object and subject ceases."

"The external object does not exist as ordinary people (byis pa, bāla) construct [it]. The mind, which is agitated by impregnation (bag chags, vāsanā), appears as if it were an [external] object."

It is said also in the Upāliparipṛcchā):

"There is no executioner (gnod par byed pa, kāraṇā-kāraka) who wields the sword (ral gri, asi), the lance (mda' chen, tomara) and the dagger (mtshon, šastra). But by force of [mental] construc-

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6) Cf. n. 295 of Mimaki (1982) 97. The Upāliparipṛcchā corresponds to the twenty-fourth assembly, "Assembly with Upāli" (優波離會) of the Mahāratnakūṭasūtra (T. [11] (310) 514 b 8 – 519 b 16), the Sanskrit text of which is known to us only from Sanskrit fragments and many citations. The Sanskrit fragment was first edited by N. Dutt in The Indian Historical Quarterly (Ⅶ, 2, 1931, pp. 259 – 286) and was more completely edited by P. Python (1973), with the help of two Tibetan versions (Peking and sNar than) and four Chinese ones. Among the Chinese versions, T. [11] (310) 514 b 8 – 519 b 16 and T. [12] (325) 37 b 1 – 42 c 10 are complete, whereas T. [12] (326) 42 c 11 – 43 b 6 and T. [30] (1582) 960 c 1 – 962 b 16 are either partial, or free translations. The location of the Upāliparipṛcchā in the Tibetan bKa' 'gyur is: C. (1029 (24)) ca 132 b 1 – 151 a 5, sDe sge (68) ca 115 a 1 – 131 a 7, IHa sa (68) ca 222 a 2 – 246 a 2, N. (56) ca 220 a 1 – 244 a 2, and P. [24] (760 (24)) zi 111 a 3 – 129 a 8.

The Upāliparipṛcchā is cited in texts of a later period, such as the Śīksā–samuccaya, the Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, the Prasannapadā, etc. The two verses cited here in BSGT are cited in the Prasannapadā (ed. La Vallée Poussin, 53.9 – 54.2, 191.4 – 7) in the following form. The readings different from Python's edition are indicated in italics:

na ca kāraṇa kāraṇa | santi yehi kṛtā asa-tomara-śastrāḥ |
kalpa-vaśena tu paśyati tatra kāya patanti apāyita śastrāḥ //
citra-manorama-sajjita-puspāḥ svarṇa-vimāna jalanti manojñāḥ |
tev api kāraṇu nāst'ha kaśca te 'pi ca sthāpita kalpa-vaśena //

The present translation is in principle based on the Tibetan version of the BSGT. The important variant readings are indicated in the following notes.

7) The reading of the Sanskrit manuscript is kāraṇa-kāraṇa (agent and cause); that of the Prasannapadā (kāraṇa kāraṇa) can be understood in the same sense. Python, based on Mvyut 3837 (kāraṇa-kāraṇa grahaḥ / gnod byed) (漢 作害), proposed a correction of the text to kāraṇa-kāraṇa, which corresponds well with the Tibetan version.
tion (rtog pa, kalpa) one sees in the evil realms (nan son, apāya)\(^8\) [the dagger] falling on [his] body. There is [however in reality] no dagger\(^9\) there."

"The multicoloured and pleasant flowers bloom and the golden pavilions shine in a lovely way. In this [world] for these [things] there is no agent: these [things] are fixed by force of the [mental] construction."

\[83\ a\ 1\] Thus, this [teaching of] representation only (rnam par rig pa tsam, viśnapti-mātra), without duality of object and subject (gzun ba dañ ’dzin pa gnis su med pa, grāhya-grāhakādvaya) and void of the Self and things (bdag dañ chos kyis ston pa, ātma-dharma-śūnya), is the intended [meaning] (dgons pa, abhipraya) of all the extremely profound teachings of the Buddha. Therefore all the Sacred Writings (gsun rab, pravacana) which teach in that way are of definitive meaning (gies pa’i don, nītārtha).

\[1.2.\ The\ teaching\ of\ provisional\ meaning:\ the\ existence\ of\ visible\ matter,\ etc.,\ and\ the\ absence\ of\ self-nature\]

\[83\ a\ 2\] [Objection:] Why then did [the Buddha] teach for example that visible matter (gzugs, rūpa) and other [objects] exist, or that all things are without self-nature (ñio bo rīd med pa, nīḥsvabhāva)?

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8) \(\text{Apāyi}\) is loc. sg. of \(\text{apāya}\), a synonym of \(\text{durgati}\) (cf. Edgerton BHSD 46); \(\text{ta}\) is nom. pl. of the demonstrative. In the verse cited in the \(\text{PrasP}\), we find the form \(\text{apāyita}\), which May (1959; 156) translates as "celui qui est jeté en enfer", considering it as the subject of the verb \(\text{paśyati}\). The Tibetan version is rather near the reading of the \(\text{UP}\) as edited by Python. There are, nevertheless, several obscure points concerning this verse. For example, is \(\text{de dag}\) of \(\text{nan son de dag na}\) the translation of \(\text{ta}\)? See also the next note.

9) \(\text{UP ta ṣastraḥ}\). Did the Tibetan translator see \(\text{na ṣastraḥ}\) to translate it as \(\text{mtshon cha med}\)?
[Answer:] The teachings that [things] exist or that [they] do not exist, are held [by the Yogācāra] to be of provisional meaning.  

(k° XI–1 ed)

[1.2.1. The existence of visible matter, etc., as a teaching of provisional meaning]

[83 a 2 ] Further, [the Buddha’s] proclamation in the Scripture (mdo, sūtra) that the sense-fields (skye mched, āyatana) such as visible matter (gzugs, rūpa) exist, was stated with a special intention with regard to people who are to be trained by that [proclamation] (des ’dul ba’i skye bo, tad–vineya–jana). As it is said in the Vimśatikā (k° 9 and 8) [of Vasubandhu]:

“From its own seed a representation appears having [a certain] image (snañ ba, ābhāsa). The Muni proclaimed them (seed and image) as the two-fold sense-fields of the [representation].”

“If the existence of the sense-fields such as visible matter has been proclaimed, this is with a special intention with regard to (agons pa’i dbañ gis, abhiprāya–vasāt) people to be trained (’dul ba yi skye bo, vineya–jana) by this [proclamation]: just as in the case of spontaneously produced beings (brdzus te byun ba’i sens can, upādāka–sattva)"
[1.2.2. The absence of self-nature as a teaching of provisional meaning]

[83 a 4 ] In the same way, [the teaching of] the absence of self-nature for all things and other [teachings] which the Blessed One proclaimed in the Extremely Vast Basket (ṣin tu rgyas pa’i sde snod, vaipulya-pitaka)\(^\text{12}\) were also proclaimed through a special intention. As it is said at great length in the Samdhinirmocana[-sutra]\(^\text{13}\) :

"Listen! I shall explain to you the intended meaning of the teaching that all things are without self-nature, without production, without destruction, calm from the beginning and naturally extinguished. Paramārthasamudgata! You should know the following. I taught that all things are without self-nature, having in mind three absences of self-nature (iyoridmedpa, niḥsvabhāvatā)\(^\text{14}\) : namely, the absence of self-nature as to characteristic (mtshan no bo niḥmedpa, laḳṣaṇa- niḥsvabhāvatā), the absence of self-nature as to birth (skye ba niḥmedpa, utpatti- niḥsvabhāvatā) and the absence of self-nature as to ultimate reality (don dam pa niḥmedpa, paramārtha-


\(^\text{13}\) Through a comparison of the Tibetan texts, it is clear that dBus pa blo gsal did not cite the passage directly from the Samdhinirmocana-sūtra itself. Identification of the source from which he cites it must await further research.

\(^\text{14}\) Cf. TrsBh 41.7-8 (ad Trs k6.23) : . . . trividhā niḥsvabhāvata laksana-niḥsvabhāvata utpatti-niḥsvabhāvata paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvata ca / (Tib.) . . . niḥmed pa nram pa gsum ni mtshan niḥmed pa daṅ / skye ba niḥmed pa daṅ / don dam pa niḥmed pa’o /.
Maitreyanātha says [in his Mahāyānasūtrālankāra (XI k\textdegree{}52\textsuperscript{16} & 50)]:

"Concerning the beginning [of the round of existences],\textsuperscript{17} identity,\textsuperscript{18} otherness,\textsuperscript{19} the particular character (rañ gi mtshan \textit{nīd, svalakṣaṇa: viz. parikalpita–svabhāva),}\textsuperscript{20} itself (rañ, svayam, viz. para-tantra–svabhāva),\textsuperscript{21} change (ghān du 'gyur, antyathābhāva, viz. parinīṣpanna-

\textsuperscript{15} āl s\textit{nā} nas is known to be a honorific title; cf. — Laufer (1914) 1135; — Bacot (1954) 313 n. 4; — Hadano (1966) 46; — De Jong (1972) 510–511, 558 n. 23. It is the equivalent of \textit{pāda}, an honorific Sanskrit term used in the plural; cf. PrasP 359.7 = (Tib.) P. [98] (5260) 'a 133 a 7. But the process of the formation of this term is still to be investigated. In the Tibetan expression "someone says...," the subject is normally expressed by the instrumental case, as for example in BSGT 83 b 3–4 (\textit{dByig gnen gyis... žes gsun\textit{s pa}). Thus, here in the expression, "the venerable Maitreyanātha says..." (\textit{mGon po Byams pa}'i āl s\textit{nā} nas... ces gsun\textit{s pa}), it is possible to think that āl s\textit{nā} nas is āl s\textit{nā} na, plus the instrumental affix -s; that is to say, the original form of this honorific term is āl s\textit{nā} na, and not āl s\textit{nā} nas. However, more frequently āl s\textit{nā} nas is considered to be one word; cf. — the title of the eighth chapter of Bhavya's \textit{Madhyamakaratompradīpa} (slob dpon gyi āl s\textit{nā} nas kyi \textit{che} ba brjod \textit{pa}'i skabs); — Fukuda & Ishihama (1986) 191 (\textit{dKon mchog 'jigs med dba-sn po}'i āl s\textit{nā} nas kyi \textit{mnam par thar pa}...). It is sometimes written āl \textit{mīa} nas; cf. \textit{Madhyamakaratompradīpa}, P. [95] (5254) \textit{tsha} 327 b 1. It is reported that it is also written āl \textit{sīa} nas (as well as in corrupt forms, such as āl \textit{sīar nas or āl \textit{bsīn} nas) in letter–documents found in Tun–huang; cf. Takeuchi (1986) 567–568.

\textsuperscript{16} The \textit{Mahāyānasūtrālankāra} XI k°52 is famous for demonstrating the intellectual receptivity to the truth that states of existence have no origination (anupattikā-dharma–kṣānti), and eight kinds of anupattika-dharma–kṣānti are explained.

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. MSABh 68.7–8 : ādau saṃsārasya na hi tasyādy–utpattir asti /.

\textsuperscript{18} CF. MSABh 68.8–9 : tattve 'nyatve ca pūrva–paścimānām na hi saṃsāre teṣām eva dharmānām utpattir ye pūrvam utpānṇās tad–bhāvenānupatīte /.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. MSABh 68.9 : na cānyeṣām api pūrva–prakāramupatīte /.

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. MSABh 68.10 : svalakṣaṇe parikalpitasya svabhāvasya na hi tasya kadācid utpattir /.

\textsuperscript{21} Cf. MSABh 68.10–11 : svayam anupattau paratantrasya /.
defilement\textsuperscript{23} and purification,\textsuperscript{24} the intellectual receptivity (\textit{bzod pa, ks\^{a}nti}) to the [truth that] states of existence have no origination is stated.”

And also,

“Because [things] do not exist of themselves, [do not exist] by [their] self-nature, do not endure in [their] self-nature\textsuperscript{25} and self–nature does not exist as apprehended, one admits that the absence of self–nature [of all things] is taught.”

The master Vasubandhu too says in the \textit{Tri\textsuperscript{26}ṃśikā} (k\textsuperscript{o}23) :

“Having in mind the three absences of self–nature of three natures, [He] taught the absence of self–nature of all things.”

\textsuperscript{22}) Cf. MSABh 68.11–12: \textit{anyathābhāve parinispānnasya na hi tad–anyathābhāvasya-otpattir asti} /.

\textsuperscript{23}) Cf. MSABh 68.12: \textit{saṃkleśe prahīñe na hi kṣayajñāna-lābhinaḥ samkleśasyotpattim punah paśyanti} /.

\textsuperscript{24}) MSA has here “\textit{khyad par la}” (\textit{viśeṣe}) instead of the “\textit{rnam byaṅ la}” (\textit{vyavādāne}) of our text. This means, according to the MSA, that there is no origination of distinction for the Buddhas who have the \textit{dharma} for a body. dBus pa blo gsal did not cite this verse of MSA correctly, probably because he confused the phrases in his memory, being too much influenced by a certain set of terminology: \textit{kun nas non moṅs pa} (\textit{samkleśa}) / \textit{rnam byaṅ} (\textit{vyavādāna}). Cf. MSABh 68.13: \textit{viśeṣe buddha-dharmakāya-nāmī na hi teṣām viśeṣotpattir asti} / (Tib.) P. [108] (5527) phi 188 a 5 : \textit{khyad par ni saṅs ngas kyı chos kyı sku rnam la ste / de dag la ni khyad par du skye ba med do //}. Concerning the interpretation of the term \textit{dharma-kāya}, see Paul Harrison, “Is the Dharma–kāya the Real “Phantom Body” of the Buddha?,” article to be published in \textit{Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies} 15, 1, 1992.

\textsuperscript{25}) In the \textit{Samdhinirmocanāsūtra} and the MSA k\textsuperscript{o}52 cited just above, and also in the \textit{Trś} k\textsuperscript{o}23 cited soon after, it is a question of the three \textit{niḥsvabhāvatā} of \textit{trisvabhāva}, viz. \textit{parikalpita–, paratantra– and parinispanna–svabhāva}. But here in this verse (MSA k\textsuperscript{o}50) it is a question of the three \textit{niḥsvabhāvatā} of the three characteristics (\textit{lakṣāna–traya}) of conditioned things (\textit{samskṛta}), viz. production (\textit{utpāda}), duration (\textit{sthiti}) and destruction (\textit{bhaṅga}). Cf. – MSABh 67.20–21 : \ldots \textit{ity etat trividhām niḥsvabhāvatvam samskṛta–lakṣāna–trayāṇam veditavyam} /; – MSA–\textit{Vṛttibhāṣya} of Sthiramati (ed. Hayashima (1979) 39.27–28 : \textit{de ltar skye ba raṅ bzin med pa dan} / žig pa raṅ bzin med pa dan / gnas pa raṅ bzin med pa dan / \ldots . It is not clear, however, if dBus pa blo gsal was conscious of this difference in citing this verse (k\textsuperscript{o}50) from the MSA.

\textsuperscript{26}) To briefly note the new publication of the Sanskrit manuscripts (facsimile edition) of three works of Vasubandhu including the \textit{Trś}: K. Mimaki, M. Tachikawa and Y. Yuyama (ed.), \textit{Three works of Vasubandhu in Sanskrit Manuscript}, the \textit{Triśvabhāvanirdesa}, the \textit{Viṃśatikā} with its \textit{Vṛtti}, and the \textit{Triṃśikā} with Sthiramati’s Commentary, Bibliotheca Codicum Asiaticorum 1, the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1989.
2. The divisions of the Yogacāra

2.1. The main divisions: the *Satyākāravādin (rNam bden pa) and the *Alikāravādin (rNam rdzin pa) [27]

[83 b 4] [Here is] an explanation of how [the Yogacāra] ex-

27) If we present in the form of a table the classification of the Yogacāra school which follows in our text, we have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rNam bden pa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sNa tshogs gnis med [pa] .... Šāṅkaranandana, Prajñākaraṇagupta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graññ bā ṣ [pa] .............. Śākyabuddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ses dañ rnam pa phyed mar smra [ba]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rNam rdzin pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dri bcas pa .............. Vinditaeva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dri ma med pa .............. Dharmottara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concerning this classification of dBus pa blo gsal, we can make at least the following three remarks:

First of all, the famous classification of the Yogacāra school into the Luṅ gi rjes 'braṇ (*Agaṃārusārī, followers of the Āgama, viz. the Yogacārabhūmi) and the Rigs pa'i rjes 'braṇ (*Nyāyānusārī, followers of the seven treatises of Dharmakirti), a classification which Obermüller (1931; 99) introduced to us, is not found. Unfortunately, Obermüller does not seem to give the source for his description. It seems that we do not find this classification yet in the writings of Tson kha pa. The Second Dalai Lama, dGe 'dun rgya mtsho (1475 - 1542), mentions it in his GTD2 (cf. Mimaki [1983] 49.24 -26), whereas it does not appear in his contemporaries' works, such as the JTG of Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469 -1546) or the PSGT of Paṅ chen bSod nams grags pa (1478 -1554). So we might conclude as a working hypothesis that this classification began to be used rather late, namely around the fifteenth century.

The second point that we can make concerning the classification of dBus pa blo gsal is that he uses the terms, rNam bden pa and rNam rdzin pa, to indicate the two branches of the Yogacāra-vijñānāvādān, as do the Tibetan writers usually. In fact, it was generally thought that the Tibetans prefer to use these terms, whereas the Indian authors use the terms rNam pa dañ bcas par smra ba (Sākāravādin) and rNam pa med par smra ba (Nirākāravādā). See, for example, JSSN 202.2 -3 : dir rNam 'byor spyod pa ni rnam pa gnis te / rNal pa dañ bcas pa dan / rNam pa med pa'o //; TRat 1.15 -16: Yogācāraś ca dvividhāḥ sākāra-nirākāra-bhedena / (Tib.) 2.4 -5 : rNal 'byor spyod pa la yan rnam pa gnis te / rNal pa dañ bcas pa dan / rNam pa med pa'i dbyey bas so //. But I can now say that not only the terms, rNam bden pa and rNam rdzin pa, but also terms indicating the sub-schools of the rNam rdzin pa, viz. the Dri bcas pa and the Dri ma med pa, can be found in an Indian text. The text in question is a short doxographical text, namely the Sarvayānālokavivāsa-bhāya or Sarvayānālokavivāsa-vaitihāsya-nāma (P. [102] (5303) ha 415 a 1 - 425 a 6 ; D. (3907) a 306 a 4 - 313 a 7 ) of Subhūtighoṣa (Rab 'byor dbyaṅs) ; cf. P. 420 b 7 -421 a 1 : rNam brdzun pa la yan gnis su 'dad // Dag pa dan ni dri mar byas // rNam brdzun dag pa ni rnam pa dkar dmar la sogs pa 'di sāṅs rgyas pa'i gnas shabs na med la / ma dag pa la snaṅ no sēzer bo // Dri ma dañ bcas pa ni rnam pa'i 'khor lo 'di sāṅs rgyas pa'i dus na yān yol la / 'khrul par sēs pas phyin ci log dan pa'i rēs pa'ain med do sēs pa mig bsdus pa'o // "One accepts that there are two [sub-schools] in the rNam brdzun pa, viz. the 'Pure' and the 'Impurity [Possessing].' The 'Pure' [school] of the rNam brdzun pa maintains that these images, such as white and red etc., do not exist in the state of being Buddha, but appear for those who are not [yet] pure [viz. who have not yet reached the Buddha stage]. The 'Impurity Possessing' [school] says that this
Concerning the method of maintaining this Path of the Great

Circle of images exists even at the time of being Buddha, but since he knows that it is false, he does not have the fault of possessing a delusion. Thus is the conclusion.”

The rNam rdzun dag pa corresponds to the Dri ma med pa, and the Dri ma dan bcas pa to the Dri bcas pa of BSGT. Thus, the ideas of the two sub-schools of the rNam rdzun pa are clearly mentioned in this text, even though, unfortunately, no proper name of the advocates of these sub-schools is indicated.

The third point that we can make is that, in the classification of dBus pa blo gsal, the names indicating the three sub-schools of the rNam bden pa show a transitional step before reaching the fixed form which we can find in the doxographical texts of a later period, such as the GTCM or the CKGT. Here are the sub-schools of the Yogācāra-vijñānavādin in form of a table as they are found in GTCM na 6 b 1 - 7 a 1, 68 a 1 ff., CKGT 207.16 ff., 211.19 ff.; see also Hakamaya (1976):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-school</th>
<th>GTCM</th>
<th>CKGT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sNa tshogs gnis med pa</td>
<td>[GTCM]</td>
<td>Dharmakirtti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gZuṅ 'dzin grangs māṃ pa</td>
<td>[GTCM]</td>
<td>Śākyabuddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sGo na phyed tshal pa</td>
<td>[GTCM]</td>
<td>Śaṅkarānandana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a comparison of the two tables clearly shows, the terms naming the two sub-schools of the rNam rdzun pa are almost the same in BSGT and GTCM/CKGT. On the other hand, those for the three sub-schools of the rNam bden pa, except for the sNa tshogs gnis med pa, differ considerably, even though the contents of the philosophical ideas expressed by these three sub-schools are the same. We find the same situation in the gZuṅ legs par bṣad pa (gZuṅ 'bum, vol. 3, 141 b 6 ff.) of Sakyapaṇḍita (1182 - 1251); the ideas are already expressed, but the terminology differs; the terms indicating the three sub-schools are “gNgūs med du smra ba,” “rNam pa'i grangs ji snged pa sgo pa'i grangs kyang de snged du 'dod pa,” and “rNam par sgo pa sgo na bkas pa ltar 'dod pa.” All this means that the names of these three sub-schools were not yet fixed in the period of dBus pa blo gsal, viz. the mid-fourteenth century. sTag tshan lo tsā ba sEd rabs rab chen (1405 -?) says in his grub mtha' that the division of the rNam bden pa into these three sub-schools was made by Bod sna ma dag (earlier Tibetans), and he uses these three names in their fixed form; cf. TTGTRG 68 b 6 - 69 a 2 : Sems tsam rNam bden pa la'ani Bod sna ma dag / sGo na phyed tshal pa da'ni / gZuṅ 'dzin grangs māṃ pa da'ni / sNa tshogs gnis med pa sgo gsum du 'byed pa la / Bod phyi ma dag gis dga'pa sna tshogs byas pa ni mi rigs te / de gsum du yod par rGya gar mkhas pa'i gzaṅ la grags śini don la grub pa'i phyir te / . . .

I am not sure whom he had in mind with the expression “Bod sna ma dag.” As an example of an author who precedes him and who uses almost the same terminology for these three sub-schools, we can point to rGyal tsab rje Dar ma rin chen (1364 - 1432). In fact he uses in his dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaṅ (ed. Sarnath, 1976, 87 ff, ed MA k' 46 ff.) the names “sNa thogs gnis med pa,” “rNam sles grangs māṃ pa,” and “sGo na phyed tshal pa,” which are almost the same as those of a later period, but not yet completely the same. Therefore, there is still a need for research into the history of this terminology. On the other hand, in the above two tables, the attribution of Indian dialecticians to the sub-schools differs considerably. To fully clarify this point, an investigation should be made regarding the Indian texts themselves.

The present note is based partially on the summary of my paper (not yet published), which I read at the 32th International Congress of Asian and North African Studies in Hamburg 1986; the revised version of the paper is forthcoming.
Vehicle, there are two [schools, the one which asserts that] the image [in the cognition] (rnam pa, ākāra) is real and [the other which asserts that it] is false. (kṣ XI–2 ab)

[83 b 4] Concerning how [the theory of] this Path of the Great Vehicle — which proclaims that all things are nothing but representation — is maintained, there are two [schools, namely] the *Satyākāravādin (rNam bden pa) which maintains that the image (snañ ba, abhasa) is cognition (śes pa, jñāna) and the *Alikākāravādin (rNam rdzun pa) which maintains that the image is superimposed by cognition.

[83 b 5] Among them the master Dignāga28), the great Brāhmaṇa Śaṅkarānandana29) and others maintain the image to be the self-nature of cognition.

[83 b 5] It is said for example in the Ālambanaparikṣā (kṣ 6 a–c) [of Dignāga] :

“The internal form to be known, which appears as if it were external, is the object, because it is the self-nature (rnam ses īno bo, vijñāna-rūpa) of the cognition.”

The great Brāhmaṇa [Śaṅkarānandana] also says in the Aṇophasīddhi :


28) Cf. JSSN 202.3–5 : de la rNam pa dañ bcas pa ni slob dpon Phyogs kyi glan po la sogs pa dag gi 'dod pa ste ./
29) His dates were proposed as 9–10 th century by Gnoli (1960; xxiv). His name is normally given as Śaṅkarānanda in the catalogues of the Tibetan Canon, but Frauwallner showed that his correct name is, in fact, Śaṅkarānandana. Cf. — Frauwallner (1933) 241 = (1982) 488 ; — Miyasaka (1971 ; 74 = 1984 ; 393) ;— Bühnemann (1980) 191 n.1. For the identification of his Sanskrit texts, see Bühnemann (1980). See also infra n. 30.
even be superimposed in that [cognition].”

[84 a 1] The master Ārya-Asaṅga, the master Dharmottara, and others maintain the image to be superimposed by cognition.

[84 a 1] It is said in the Mahāyānasamgraha [of Asaṅga]:

“If the object is established as object, a cognition free from constructions (ye ses rtog pa med, jñānam akalpakam) would not be possible. Without a [cognition free from constructions] it would not be possible to obtain Buddhahood.”

“When cognition free from constructions operates, no object appears. One should, therefore, know that there is no object." Without it, representation (rnam rig, vijnapti) does not exist."

The master Dharmottara says also [in his Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā]:

“If all images exist, even Brahman cannot think that any

30) Concerning the source, see Mimaki (1982) n. 303. The first half of this verse is cited in the GTCM (ed. sGo mañ, na 68 a 5 - 6 ; ed. bKra šis 'khyil, 563.4) as one of the sources in support of the position of the sGo na phyed tshal pa. On the other hand, later in our text (BSGT 84 b 4) Saṅkaranandana is considered to be an advocate of the sNa tshogs gnis med pa (see also supra n. 27). A final decision regarding his doctrinal position needs more careful study.

31) These two verses of the Mahāyānasamgraha are cited also in the JSSN (202.15 - 23) as a source in support of the position of the rNam pa med pa (Nirākāravadin) of the Yogācāra-vijñānavādin. The Sanskrit text for these two verses is now available in the ASBh (42.8 -9 ; 42.14 -15):

arthasyārthatva-nispati jñānam na syād akalpakam /

tad-abhāvāc ca buddhatva-prāptir nāivōpapadyate //

jñāna-cāre vikalpe hi sarvārthākhyānato 'pi ca /

arthābhāvo vagantavyo vijnaptes tad-abhāvataḥ //

It was Lamotte (1938; tome II, p. 20* note) who indicated that these two verses are found in the ASBh (T. [31] (1606) 715 b 19). For pada c of the second verse, the manuscript (fol. 38 b 3), Tatia's edition and a Sanskrit reconstruction found in Nagao (1982), all have the reading arthābhāvopagantavyo, but it should be corrected as given here. I owe the information for this correction to Lambert Schmithausen.

32) arthābhāvo vagantavyo. See supra n. 31.

33) Translation here according to the Tibetan version. Cf. Skt.: "..., representation [does not exist]."
cognition is erroneous. If [the image], even if not real, appears, even Śata-kratu (brGya byin, i.e. Indra) cannot deny [this fact] by saying that the [image] is not illusory manifested by the cognition. No one can establish that all cognitions (myon ba, anubhava) are real: therefore there is no doubt that a cognition manifests something unreal.”

[84 a 4] [These] two [schools — the *Satyākāravādin and the *Alikākāra-vādin —] agree on [the following points]: the external object is not real, cognition cognizes itself (raṇ rig pa, svāsamvedana) and the experience which is cognition free from duality (myon ba gnis med pa’i šes pa) exists in ultimate reality.

2.2. Philosophers who sometimes take the position of the *Satyākāravādin and sometimes that of the *Alikākāravādin

It is accepted that some learned masters did not oppose the system of either (the *Satyākāravādin or the *Alikākāravādin).

(k° XI–2 cd)

[84 a 5] It is accepted that both masters, Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti, have taught having adopted part of both [schools, namely] the *Satyākāravādin (rNam bden pa) and the *Alikākāravādin (rNam rdzun pa).

[84 a 5] [Vasubandhu] says in the Trimśikā (kk° 1–2 ab) [from the *Satyākāravādin’s point of view]:

“The diverse metaphorical constructions of Self and things (bdag daṅ chos su ṅer ’dogs pa, ātma-dharmopacāra) which arise are the transformation of consciousness (rnam par šes par gyur, vijnāna–
parināma). This transformation is threefold: maturation (nam \(\text{par smin, vipāka,} \text{ viz. ālayavijñāna})\), what is called self-conceiving (\(\text{nār sems, mananākhya,} \text{ viz. kliṣṭamanas})\) and the representation of objects (\(\text{yul la nam par rig pa, viṣayasya viññaptir,} \text{ viz. the six pravṛtti-vijñāna}).”

[84 a 6] He says also in the Viṃśatikā (k\(^o\) 1) [from the *Alīkā-kāravādin’s point of view]:

“[All] this is nothing but representation because the object which does not exist appears, just as a man suffering from partial blindness (\(\text{rab rib can, taimirika})\) sees hairs or a [double] moon which do not exist [in reality].”

[84 b 1] [Dharmakīrti] says in the *Satyākāravādin’[s manner] in the Pramāṇavārttika (III k\(^o\)328):

“The self-nature of this [cognition] has the form of blue and the other [objects], and is a perception (myon ba, anubhava).\(^{34}\) Even though it is the perception of its own form, it appears as the perception of blue and the other [objects],”

and also in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (1 k\(^o\)59 a-c):

“Therefore the appearing object and the cognition of that [appearing object],\(^{35}\) even if the external object existed, are not different [from each other]. Consequently the cognition has two forms (\(\text{ishul gnis nid, dvi-rūpa})\) [namely, the form of the object and that of the cognition itself].”

[84 b 2] He says [also] in the *Alīkākāravādin’s manner [in PVn I kk\(^o\)39 - 40 = PV III kk\(^o\)330 c–332 b]:

\(^{34}\) Translation from the Sanskrit. Cf. Tib.: “Because the nature of the [cognition] is the [color] blue and the other [objects], the self-nature [of it] is also a perception.”

\(^{35}\) de blo BSGT, blo de PVn. The reading of BSGT seems better.
"[The cognition] which without the forms of the cognized and the cognizer is thus set forth in the way it is seen, by those who are in error (’khrul pa, bhrānta), as bifurcating (bslad pa, viplava) into the forms of the apprehended and the apprehender having distinct characteristics—just like the distinction of [erroneous] cognition in the case of hair [nets] and so forth—then its having the characteristics of apprehended and apprehender is not to be objected to."

[2.3. The internal divisions of the *Satyākāravādin and the *Ālikākāravādin]

[84 b 4] [Here follows] the exposition of the divisions of the Mind Only [school].

Certain [philosophers] maintain that the diverse [images] are not different [from the cognition, and certain others state] that there exist as many [cognitions] as the number [of images, and others say] that the cognition and the image (mam pa, ākāra) are counterparts. (kš XI–3 ab)

[84 b 4] The great Brāhmaṇa [Śaṅkaranandana]36 and the author of the Pramāṇavārttika[–bhāṣyā]ālaṅkāra (=Prajñākaragupta)37 maintain:

36) See supra n. 29.
37) Prajñākaragupta’s doctrinal position as an advocate of citrādvaitavāda can be seen, for example, in the following passages of his Pramāṇavārttikabhaṣya: — PVBh 286.4: . . . sakala–nīlādy–ākārā buddhir ekāvam citrākārā /; — PVBh 287.22: citrābhāsāpī buddhir ekāvam . . . See Oki (1975), Iwata (1991) 56–64, 211–212, 246–250, etc.; see also Oki (1973).
as the images [which appear] as an object are [nothing but] cognition, the images which appear as diverse [things] also have for their self–nature only one cognition. The master Śākyabuddhi and others state that as many cognitions exist as the number of the forms (rnam pa, ākāra) of atoms existing in visible matter, sound and the other [objects]. Moreover [there are some who] maintain that the image and the cognition are counterparts. Thus there are three divisions of the *Satyākāravādins.

There are two divisions of the *Alikākāravādins, [namely,] the “Impurity Possessing” (Dri bcas [pa]) and the “Spotless” (Dri med pa).

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38) This position is what is termed sNa tshogs gnis med pa (Citradvaita) in such later doxographical works as GTCM and CKGT. See supra n. 27.

39) His dates were proposed as c. 660 - 720 by Frauwallner (1961; 145 = 1982; 867), c. 650 - 700 by Miyasaka (1970 - 1971; II 88). He is said to be a disciple of Devendrabuddhi, who is himself a direct disciple of Dharmakirti. While Devendrabuddhi wrote his commentary on the PV chapters II–IV in continuation of Dharmakirti’s own commentary (the so-called svāvyrtti) on chapter I, Śākyabuddhi composed his text as a sub-commentary on these earlier explanations, covering all four chapters of the PV; cf. Steinkellner (1980) 283. His name was given as Śākyabuddhi in Frauwallner (1933; 238)=(1982; 485), then as “Śākyamati (or Śākyabuddhi)” in Frauwallner (1961; 145)=(1982; 867). Recent scholars use either the name Śākyamati (Gnoli [1960], Steinkellner [1980], Iwata [1981], Inami [1990], Iwata [1991]), or Śākyabuddhi (Stcherbatsky [1962] I 39-45, Hakamaya [1976] 240-241, Matsumoto [1980–1981]). Most recently, while editing his Pramāṇavarttikātikā according to a newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript, Inami (1991; 356 & 352 n.2) has decided on the name Sakya-buddhi, based mainly on 1°) Mvyut 3489, and 2°) his transcribed name in the Tshad ma rnam ṇes kyi brgyud pa of Bu ston (Tohoku 5170 [40]), as indicated by Miyasaka (1971; 88, 50)=(1984; 376, 424). The passage in the Tshad ma rnam ṇes kyi brgyud pa of Bu ston is as follows: omi ḍh namah Śa kya bu ddha ye hüm /; cf. Tohoku 5170 (40) = The Collected Works of Bu-ston, ed. Lokesh Chandra, Satapitaka 56, New Delhi, 1969, vol. 16 (Ma), 22.5–6. In the forthcoming “Systematische Überblick über Pramāṇa–Literatur,” also by Ernst Steinkellner “Śākyabuddhi (*Śākyamati)” is chosen. I owe this information to Helmut Krasser. It seems, therefore, that Śākyabuddhi is the correct form of his name.

40) This position is what is termed gZun ’dzin grans mṇam pa in such later doxographical works as GTCM and CKGT. See supra n. 27.

41) This position is what is termed sGo na phyed tshal pa in such later doxographical works as GTCM and CKGT. See supra n. 27. Concerning this position, see also Fukuda (1987) and Kobayashi (1988).
[84 b 6] Those who maintain, [as do] the master Vinitadeva and others, that false images exist [even] in the Buddha stage (sāṅs rgyas kyi sa, buddha-bhūmi) are the “Impurity Possessing” (Dri bcas pa). Those who admit, [as do] the master Dharmottara and others, that they do not exist in the Buddha stage are the “Spotless” (Dri med pa). Thus there are two divisions.

[85 a 1] Among them the *Satyākāravādin maintains that the

42) dBus pa blo gsal gives no support in source of the idea that Vinitadeva is an advocate of the Dri bcas pa branch of the rNam rdzun pa, but in the sTag tshaṅ grub mtha’ rani gesture of sTag tshaṅ lo tsa ba Śes rab rin chen (1405–?), the Santāṇāntarasiddhiṭṭhā of Vinitadeva is cited to show this. Cf. TITGTRG 71 b 2 – 4 : rGyud gzhan grub par yān “bcom ldan ’das kyi las don thams cad thugs su chud pa ni bsam gyis mi khyab ste /” (Santāṇāntarasiddhiṭṭhā of Dhammakirti, in Bibliotheca Buddhica 19 (1916) 71 – 72 = P. [130] (5716) ce 404 b 1, Eng. tr. Kitagawa (1965) 429, Jap. tr. Katsura (1983) 114) śes gsun la / de'i ’grel byed slob dpon Dul ba thas ni / “mnam par gta’g pa ’jig rten las ’das pa’i rjes las thob pa so sor rtag pa’i ye śes kyi gzhan gyi sens mūkhyan la ye śes gzhan gyis ni ma yin no // ye śes de ni gzun ’dzin dan bcas kyi/ / de nēd kyi las log pa ċid du gaug pa’i phyir /” (see below Bibl. Buddhica 19 (1916) 73.4 – 13) śes sogs ni Dri bcas pa dan/. The same passage of the Santāṇāntarasiddhiṭṭhā is cited in the same context in GTCM na 71 a 1 – 2 and also in CKGT 212.20 – 213.1 (Hakamaya (1976) 246), even though lCan skya is rather sceptical concerning this division. To our surprise, however, in the bsTan gyur version of Vinitadeva’s tīkā, there is a negative particle in the boldfaced passage; cf. Bibl. Buddhica 19 (1916) 73.4 – 13 – P. [136] (5724) tshe 21 a 1 – 4, D. (4238) 50 b 4 – 6 : so sor rtag pa’i ye śes ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye śes kyi rjes las thob pa gzun ba dañ ’dzin pa’i rnam par rtag pa dañ ldan pas / . . . de la gzun ba dañ ’dzin par rnam par rtag pa yod par khas blas pas phyin ci log pa yin de te / de phyin ci ma log pa ċid du gaug pa’i phyir ro //”. Therefore, if the Tibetan attribution of Vinitadeva to the Dri bcas pa branch of the rNam rdzun pa is based only on this passage, viz. on a misreading of it, this attribution is by the force of things completely doubtful. On the other hand, we cannot deny, nevertheless, the fact that the division of the rNam rdzun pa into two sub-schools, namely the Dag pa (= Dri med pa) and the Dri bcas pa, already existed in an Indian text, namely the Sarvayānaloκavīṣeṣa-bhāṣya or Sarvayānaloκakara–vaibhāṣya–nāma of Subhūtigṛhoṣa (see supra n. 27), even though no proper name was cited there. A more careful and systematic study should be done concerning this division.

43) Above, in BSGT 84 a 3, Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścaya–tīkā was cited to show his position as an advocate of the rNam rdzun pa, but no precise source is shown in BSGT to indicate his position as a follower of the rNam rdzun Dri ma med pa school.

44) As we have seen in supra n. 27, these two terms indicating the branches of the rNam rdzun pa, viz. Dri bcas pa and Dri ma med pa, are not purely inventions of Tibetan authors; we can find approximately, though not precisely, the same terminology in an Indian text, namely Subhūtigṛhoṣa’s (Rab ‘byor dbyanš)’s Sarvayānaloκavīṣeṣa–bhāṣya or Sarvayānaloκakara–vaibhāṣya–nāma. His rNam rdzun dag pa corresponds to the Dri ma dañ bcas pa to the Dri bcas pa of our text.
object–universal (don spyi, *sāmānyārtha), the double moon (zla ba gñis, dvicandra) and other [objects] are also the self–nature of the cognition (ses pa'i dnos po). For as it is said in the Pramāṇavārttika (III kk 9 c–10 c):

"[Objection:] If the universal (spyi, sāmānya) is the object as the self–nature of cognition, the absurd consequence will arise [that the universal is also the proper character (svalakṣaṇa)].

[Answer:] There is no fault, because it is so accepted. For the universal (spyi, sāmānya) as the self–nature of the image is apprehended similarly in all [things]."

and also [in PV III k 16 c–d]:

"The [blue in a dream] is a cognition, because one perceives by oneself what is not perceived by people who are in a suitable place [to perceive it] (ruñ yul, yogya-dešaka). A name and the other [factors] are [also] explained by this [case]."

[85 a 2] The *Ālikākāravādin maintains that the object, even though it does not exist [in reality], [appears] by force of the habitual persistence (goms pa, abhyāsa) of the impregnations (bag chags, vāsanā)

45) I.e., that the universal is also svalakṣaṇa as the nature of cognition.
46) Here translated from the Tibetan text. If we translate from the Sanskrit text: “there is the universal as the self–nature of the [external] object, because there is the universal [depending on the differentiation from other things (tad–vyāvṛtti–samaśrayat)] in all [things]."
47) nram pa'i no bo nid kyi (ākāra–rūpatvena) BSGT, don gyi no bo nid kyi (artharūpatvena) PV. Both BSGT and PV have kyi; we would like to read this as kyis. The reading nram pa'i of BSGT could be a wrong citation owing to a confusion of memory, but we have tried to translate according to the reading of BSGT. Cf. — PV Bh 191.20: arthasya bāhyasya rūpeṇa samānatā /; — PVV 104.8 – 9 : arthārūpatvenādhyavasyamāna–jñeya–rūpatvena samānatā . . .
48) If a “name” existed, separate from the consciousness, in the external world, everyone who is near it would have heard it. "Mīn sogs" (nāmādi) here means nāma (name) and nimitta (characteristic). Dharmakīrtī argues here as a Sautrāntika, who is nāma-nimitta–vādin, and denies the opinion of the Vaibhāṣika that the name exists in the external world. Cf. PV Bh 194.21 – 23 : na hi Sautrāntikasyeva nāma-nimitta–vādinah sidhyati vyatirekah / manaskārādīrātareṇa nāma-nimitta–viṣayābhimatayā buddher bhāvat /. See Tosaki (1979) 49 – 50, 78 – 79.
of ignorance. As is said in the *Pramāṇavinīścaya* (I k"39 ab=PV Ⅲ k"330 cd)⁴⁹:

"[The cognition] does not have the forms of the cognized and the cognizer, just like the distinction of [erroneous] cognition in the case of [illusory] hair [nets] and so forth."

[3. The five categories (*gzi lña, paṇca-vastu*)]

[3.1. Matter (*gzugs, rùpa*)]

Among the five categories (*gzi lña, paṇca-vastu*) which are knowables, [here follows] an explanation of the category "matter" (*gzugs kyi gzi, *rùpa-vastu*).

Appearance as matter [by virtue] of the habitual persistence (*goms pa, abhyāsa*) of impregnations (*bag chags, vāsanā*) is the category "matter." [According to the *Satyākāravādin* it is the self–nature (*dños po*) [of the cognition], and [according to the *Alikākāravādin* it is superimposed (*btags pa, samāropa*) [by cognition].

*85 a 4* The mind (*sems, citta*) and the mental factors (*sems las byun ba, caitta*), appearing as matter by virtue of the impregnation, are the category "matter." It is the self–nature of the cognition (*šes pa’i dños po*) according to the *Satyākāravādin (rNam bden pa)*, and it is superimposed (*sgro btags pa, samāropa*) by cognition according to the *Alikākāravādin (rNam rdzun pa).*

⁴⁹ This verse has already been cited above in BSGT 84 b 2–3.
According to both [systems, the *Satyakaravadin and the *Alīkāravādin, the following is commonly accepted:] the four gross elements (*byun ba chen po, mahābhūta)—the element earth (*sa'i kham, *prthivī-dhātu) and the rest—which are causal matter (*rgyud pa gzugs), are the appearance of solidness (*sra ba, *khara) and the rest. In resultant matter (*bras bu'i gzugs) produced from the gross elements (*byun ba las gyur pa, *bhautika), the five sense-faculties (*daññ po, *indriya) such as the eye are supports (*rten, *aśraya) of cognition (*nam par śes pa, *vijnāna), are material (*gzugs can, *rūpin) and subtle (*daññ ba, *prātīgha), and are the object of the mental [consciousness] (*yid kyi yul, *mano-gocara); the appearance of five objects such as visible matter and the others (*gzugs la sogs pa yul tiar) snañ ba are the objects of the cognitions of the visual and other faculties. Non-information (*nam par rig byed ma yin pa, *avijnāti) is invisible (*bstan du med, *anidārśana) and non-resistant (*thogs pa med pa, *apratiṣṭha), is an act consequent to will (*bsam) pa'i las, cetayitva karman), is born from a cause which is information (*nam par rig byed, *vijnāti) or contemplation (*tiñ ñe 'dzin, *samādhi), is a good or bad [act] comprised in discipline (*sdom pa, *samvara) or non-discipline (*sdom pa ma yin pa, *asamvara) or what is neutral (*bar ma, *madhya). All these do not exist separately from the mind and the mental factors.

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50) Cf. AKBh 24.4: *rūpa-prasāda / gzugs daññ ba [(Tib.) P. 46 b 5].
51) The original reading of BSGT: sīnar should be corrected to tiar.
52) The reading bsam should normally be bsams; cf. AK Index by Hirakawa (1978) 310. But the reading bsam exists also as a variant; cf. AKBh (Tib.) P. 190 a 7, 191 b 3, etc.
53) Cf. AKBh 8.9 (ad AK I k°11): samāsatas tu vijnāti-samādhi-sambhūtam kuśalā-kuśala-rūpaṃ avijnātiḥ // (Tib.) P. 33 b 3–4: mdo rnam par rig byed daññ tiñ ñe 'dzin las byun ba'i gzugs dge ba daññ mi dge ba ni rnam par rig byed ma yin pa'o //
54) Cf. — AK IV k°13 ab: avijnātiḥ triḍhā jñeyā samvarāsamvarētarā / (Tib.) rnam rig min rnam gsum śes bya / sdom daññ sdom pa min daññ gzan //; — AKBh 210.20: . . . samvarāsamvara-madhya-sthā . . . / (Tib.) P. 207 a 1: . . . sdom pa daññ sdom pa ma yin pa daññ bar ma la gnas pa. . .
[3.2. Mind (sems, citta): The number of types of consciousness which certain philosophers maintain]

[85 b 1 ] Explaining the category “mind” (sems kyi gzi, *citta-vastu):

The positions [are] three: [certain philosophers] maintain the mind to be eight groups of consciousness, [certain others] to be six [groups] and [others] to be one.

(The copulative verb) “are” is to be understood [as completing the meaning of this verse]. The mind grasps the object in its general aspect.55) There are three opinions regarding that mind: that it consists of eight groups of consciousness, that it is six [groups], and that it is one.

[3.2.1. Those who maintain eight groups of consciousness]

[85 b 3 ] Among these [three positions], the master Ārya-Asaṅga, the master Vasubandhu and other [philosophers] maintain eight groups of consciousness. For they maintain as it is said in the Lankāvatāra[-sūtra] (X kô 102):

“The mind is the receptacle-consciousness (kun gzi'i rnam śes, ālaya-vijñāna). The ‘Mind’ (yid, manas) is self-conceiving (nār sems, po tsam 'dzin pa'i śes pa yin la /). See also the reference to many other sources in Kajiyama (1966) 47 = (1989) 234 n. 98.

55) Cf. — MAnVBh ad MAnV 1 kô 8 : tatrārtha-dṛṣṭir vijñānam tad-viśeṣe tu caitasāḥ // (I kô 8) tatrārtha-mātre dṛṣṭir viṣeṣe caitasā caitasā vedanādāyāḥ / (Tib.) Yamaguchi (1966 a) 9.3 - 6 : de la don mthon rnam par śes // de yi khyad par sens las byun // (I kô 8) śes bya ba'o // don tsam mthon ba ni rnam par śes pa'o // don gyi khyad par mthon ba ni sens las byun ba rnamz te tshor ba la sogs pa'o // ; — TBh 15.18 - 19 : cittam vastu-mātra-grāhakam jñānam / (Tib.) P. 368 b 8 : sems ni dnos po tsam 'dzin pa'i śes pa yin la /.
manyānātma).\(^{56}\) What grasps objects is said to be the cognition \((\text{rnam par śes, vijñāna}),\)

and because it is said also in the Trimsikā (kkO 1–2 ab, cf. BSCT 84 a 6):

“This transformation is threefold: the maturation \((\text{rnam par smin, vipāka, viz. ālayavijñāna}),\) what is called self–conceiving \((\text{niar sems, mananākhya},^{56} \text{viz. kliṣṭamanas})\) and the representation of objects \((\text{yul la rnam par rig pa, viśayasya vijnaptir, viz. six pravṛttivijñāna}),\)”

[3.2.1. a. Receptacle–consciousness \((\text{kun gzi'i rnam par śes pa, ālaya–vijñāna})^{57}\)]

The maturation \((\text{rnam smin, vipāka, viz. ālayavijñāna})\) contains all the latent seeds \((\text{sa bon, bija}).\) It is associated with the five \([\text{mental factors}],\) namely, cognitive contact \((\text{reg, sparsa})\) and the \([\text{four}]\) others. \((\text{k}^\circ \text{ XI–5 ab})\)

\([85 b 5]\) Among these \([\text{eight forms of consciousness}],\) the maturation \((\text{rnam par smin pa, vipāka})\) is the receptacle–consciousness \((\text{kun gzi'i rnam par śes pa, ālayavijñāna}).\) It is not impeded \([\text{by “Defilements”}]\) \((\text{ma bsgrigs, anivṛtā}),\) is neutral \((\text{luṅ du ma bstan pa, avyākṛta}),\) and is the support \((\text{rten, sthāna})^{58}\) of all the latent seeds of the whole rounds of existence and deliverance.

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\(^{56}\) Cf. — MANVBh 48.12 (ad MANV III k°22): ... tatra mano yan nityam manyanākāram / (Tib.) Yamaguchi (1966 a) 68.5–6; de la yid ni gan rtag tu rlim sems pa ni (sic, read pa'i) rnam pa'o //; — MANVBh cited in MAVT 162.13: tatra mano yan nityām mananākāram iti / (Tib.) P. [109] (5534) tshi 103 a 3–4; de la yid ni gan rtag tu rlim sems pa'i rnam pa'o śes bya ba la //.

\(^{57}\) Concerning this subject, see the recently published, very detailed study by Lambert Schmithausen: Ālayavijñāna, On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy, 2 vols, Part I: Text, Part II : Notes, Bibliography and Indices, Tokyo, the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987.

\(^{58}\) Cf. TrśBh 18.23–24: tatra sarva–sāṃklaṭa–dharma–bija–sthānaṃtad ālayah / ālayah sthānām iti paryāyau / (Tib.) P. [113] (5565) si 174 a 5–6; D. (4064) si 149 b 6; de kun nas non mons pa'i chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi (gyis P.) gnas yin pas kun gzi ste / kun gzi daṅ rten śes bya ba ni rnam graṇs su gtogs pa'o //.
(khor 'das, *samsāra-nirvāṇa). The aspect of maturation of the receptacle-consciousness is so named because, by virtue of the impregnations of the previous good or bad acts, it is projected in this life as the mind of beings who are in upper realms (mtho ris, svarga) and bad realms (nian 'gro, durgati). The aspect of [latent] seeds is so named because in it (viz. alayavijñāna) there exist good or other impregnations from beginningless time (thog ma med pa, anādi).

[86 a 1] It is said in the same [treatise, the Trimsikā k° 2 cd and k° 4 b]:

"Among these [three transformations], the maturation is the receptacle-consciousness

(59) and it contains all the latent seeds."

And also,

"It is not impeded [by "Defilements"] (ma bsgribs, anivrta) and is neutral (luñ ma bstan, avyākṛta)."

Moreover, so long as the receptacle-consciousness exists, it is associated with the five universal [mental factors] (kun tu 'gro ba, sarvatra-ga), namely, cognitive contact (reg pa, sparṣa), attention (yid la byed pa, manaskāra), sensation (tshor ba, vedana), notion (’du ses, saṁjñā) and volition (sems pa, cetanā). So long as the round of existence (khor ba, samsāra) [continues], cause and effect arise without interval. When one obtains the knowledge of the destruction [of "Defilements"] (zad pa šes pa, kṣaya-jñāna) and the knowledge of the non-production [of future "Defilements"] (mi skye ba šes pa, anutpāda-jñāna), the Badness (gnas ņan len, daṇḍa-thūlya) is totally eliminated: the [receptacle-consciousness] therefore has come to an end (ldog pa, vyāvṛtta).

59) Skt.: "the consciousness called receptacle..."
It is also said in the same treatise, the Trimsıkā (k° 3 cd and k° 4 c2–5 a(Skt.) = k° 4d–5a(Tib.)):

"[The receptacle-consciousness is] always associated with cognitive contact, attention, sensation, notion and volition."

"It continues (rgyun 'bab, vartate srotasā) as a stream (chu bo, ogha) and it stops at the level of an Arhat."

We know that the [receptacle-consciousness] exists according to the proclamation in the Samdhinirmocana [-sūtra]:

"The appropriation-consciousness (len pa'i rnam par šes pa, ādāna-jhāna), profound and subtle, continues with all latent seeds like a stream. I did not teach it to ordinary people (byis pa, bāla), lest they might take it for a Self."

3.2.1. b. The 'Defiled Mind' (ñon moṅs can gyi yid, kliṣṭamanas)]

Self-conceiving is the 'Defiled Mind' (ñon moṅs can gyi yid, kliṣṭamanas), and it is different from the former (viz. ālayavijñāna) and the latter (viz. pravṛttivijñāna), (k° XI–5 ed)

Self-conceiving is the 'Defiled Mind.' It arises from the receptacle-consciousness and takes this [receptacle-consciousness] as object [in the form of] a Self (ṇa, aham) and what belongs to a Self (ṇa yi, mama). It is said in the Trimsıkā (k° 5 b–d):

"Based on it (viz. ālayavijñāna), there arises the consciousness named 'Mind' (yid, manas) which takes it (viz. ālaya-vijñāna) as

60) The two reasons why this consciousness is called ādāna-vijñāna are explained, for example, in the Mahāyānasamgraha I. 5; see Lamotte (1973) I 4–5; II 14–15, Nagao (1982) 85–86; (1) dban po geugs can thams cad kyi rgyu yin pa dañ / (2) lus thams cad ne bar len pa'i gnas su gyur pa'i phyir te / [reconstruction into Skt. in Nagao (1982) 11: (1) sarva-rūpindriyopādānatvena, (2) sarvātmabhāvopādānāśrayatvena ca]
object and which is self-conceiving.

[86 a 5] The ['Mind'] is different from the former (viz. alaya-vijñāna) and the latter citta (viz. pravṛtti-vijñāna). As the master Sthiramati explains: "By the [third line of the verse Trś kś 5] '... named 'Mind' which takes it as object,' [the author, Vasubandhu] distinguishes [the 'Mind'] from the receptacle-consciousness and the active cognition (jug pa'i rnam par şes pa, pravṛtti-vijñāna)."

[The 'Defiled Mind'] is neutral and is accompanied by the four "Defilements" (bhag ti moś, kleśa).

[86 b 1] The ['Defiled Mind'] is always impeded and neutral (bsgrigs la tuñ du ma bstan pa, nivṛṭtyākṛta). It is always accompanied by the four "Defilements," namely, having in regard to the [five] aggregates which are the basis of clinging to existence (ne bar len pa'i phun po, upādāna-skandha) the [wrong] view of a Self (bdag tu tla ba, ātmadṛṣṭi), the delusion of a Self (bdag tu rmoś pa, ātmamoha), the conceit of a Self (bdag tu nā rgyal ba, ātmamāna) and attachment to a Self (bdag tu chags pa, ātmasneha). In the same way it is associated with the five universal [mental factors] (kun tu 'gro ba, sarvatra-ga), namely, cognitive contact (reg pa, sparśa), attention (yid la byed pa, manas-kāra), sensation (tshor ba, vedanā), notion (du šes, samjñā) and volition (sems pa, cetanā). Moreover, concerning these ['Defilements" and mental factors, the 'Defiled Mind' is associated] with those [of the plane and the stage] where [the being (sems can, prānin) is born, but not with those of the other planes (khams, dhātu) and stages (sa, bhūmi). It is also said in the Trimśikā (kś 6–7 ab'):

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61) In Trś kkś 6–7 (cf. Mimaki (1982) n. 324). 'nivṛṭtyākṛta' is an adjective modifying 'kleśa.' dBus pa blo gsal seems to take it to modify 'kliśṭa-manas,' which is not impossible. Cf. TrśT 474.41: nivṛṭtyākṛtam hi kliśṭam manah.

62) Cf. TrśT 475.34–36: yasmin dhātāu yasyām vā bhāmāu jāto bhavati prāṇi tad(-) dhātukais tad-bhūmikair eva satkāyadrṣṭy-ādibhis tat sampravijyate, . . .; (Tib.) 75.1–2: khams gān dañ sa gān du srog chags skyes par gyur pa'i khams de pa dañ / sa de pa ŋid kyi 'jig tshogs la tla ba la sols pa dañ (P. om. dañ) de mtshuṅs par ldan te / . . .
"It is always associated with the four "Defilements" which are impeded and neutral (bsgrigs la luṅ du ma bstan pa, nivṛtvāvyākṛta); "Defilements" called the [wrong] view of a Self, the delusion of a Self, the conceit of a Self and attachment to a Self; "Defilements" which belong to the [plane and the stage] where [the being (sams can, prāṇin)\(^{62}\)] is born. It (the 'Defiled Mind') is also [accompanied by the mental factors] such as cognitive contact."

[The 'Defiled Mind'] does not exist in the three [states] of the Arhat and so forth. (k\(^{\circ}\) XI-6 b)

[86 b 4 ] The 'Defiled Mind' does not exist in the Arhat, because he has eliminated all "Defilements." In the same way, it does not exist either in the attainment of cessation (gog pa'i sūños par 'jug pa, nirodha-samā-patti) or on the Path surpassing the world ('jig rten las 'das pa'i lam, lokottara-mārga). For [in the attainment of cessation] it is stopped by virtue of the Path, and [on the Path surpassing the world] the seeing of non-substantiality (bdag med pa mthon ba, nairatmya-darsana) is the antidote (gṛṇen po, pratipakṣa) to the [wrong] view of a Self, etc. (bdag la sogs par\(^{63}\) lta ba, atma-darsana). As it is said in the same [treatise, the Trimsikā k\(^{\circ}\) 7 b2-d]:

"The ['Defiled Mind'] does not exist for the Arhat. It exists neither in the attainment of cessation nor on the Path surpassing the world."

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63) The meaning of "la sogs par" is not clear. These words do not exist in the Sanskrit text, but do exist already in the bsTan 'gyur version of Tibetan text; this is, therefore, not an invention of our author, dBus pa blo gsal. Cf. TrśBh 24.20 - 21 (ad Trś k\(^{\circ}\) 7):

nairatmya-darśanasyatma-darśana-pratipakṣatvān na lokottara-mārga pravartitum utsahe(ta) /; (Tib.) P. 179 b 8 - 180 a 1 ; D. 154 a 5 - 6 : bdag med par mthon ba ni bdag la sogs par lta ba'i gṛṇen po yin pas 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam na de (P. lam de) byun bar mi nus te /.
[3.2.1. c. Active cognitions (jug pa'i rnam šes, pravrttivijnāna)]

The active cognitions, which cognize objects such as visible matter, are of six kinds.

[86 b 6] [They are named] "active cognitions" (jug pa'i rnam par šes pa, pravṛtti-vijnāna), because they act by distinguishing objects (yul la chad ciṅ jug pa), or because they act having clear forms (rnam pa gsal bar, *sphu-ṭākārena). They are of six kinds. They grasp the objects which have the nature of visible matter, sound, smell, taste, the tangible and the object of thought (chos, dharma). As it is said also in the Ghanavyūha[-sūtra] :

"What [has the function of] representing an object is a active cognition,"

and also in the Trīṃśikā (k Elementary texts of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, ed. with an Introduction and Transliteration R.C. Erdtmann, New Delhi, 1985) :

"The third [vijñāna-parināma] is the apprehension of six kinds of objects."

[87 a 2] Because they deposit good or other impregnations (bag chags, vāsanā) [in it], these [active cognitions] form the causal condition (rgyu'i rkyen, hetu-pratyaya) for the fundamental consciousness (rtsa ba'i rnam šes, mūlavijnāna, viz. ālayavijnāna) to remain in the round of existence (khor ba, samāsara) : The impregnations [for their part] form the causal condition for the active cognition[s] ; therefore there is wandering in the round of existence.

[3.2.1. d. Transformation of the base (gnas gyur pa, āśraya-parāvṛtti)65]

[87 a 3] When one has become a Buddha, the receptacle[—con-
sciousness], transformed into the mirror-like-gnosis, forms the support for the other three gnoses. As it is said in the [Mahāyāna-] sūtrālaṅkāra (IX k67):

“The mirror-gnosis (me lon ye ses, ādāra-jñāna) is immovable. Three gnoses depend on it, these being [the gnosings] as to equality, differential observation and accomplishment of what is to be done.”

The ‘Defiled Mind’ is transformed into the gnosing of equality (mñam pa ŋid kyi ye ses, samatā-jñāna), the mental consciousness (yid kyi ses pa, manovi-jñāna) into the gnosing of differential observation (so sor rtog pa’i ye ses, pratyavekṣā-jñāna) and the consciousness of the five media (sgo la’i ses pa, *panca-dvāra-vijñāna, viz. pañcendriya-vijñāna) into the gnosing of accomplishment of what is to be done (bya ba grub pa’i ye ses, kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna).

[87 a 5] These [points above] are the doctrinal positions of those who maintain eight groups of consciousness.

[3.2.2. Those who maintain six groups of consciousness]

[There is] a doctrinal position which maintains that the above-mentioned six cognitions are the six groups of self-cognitions. (k7 XI-7 ab)

[87 a 5] The master Dignāga, the master Dharmakīrti and others maintain that the six groups of cognitions are self-cognitions. These are exactly the above-mentioned66) six active cognitions. And these are already explained in relation to the two schools of the Yogācāra.67)

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66) Cf. supra BSGT 86 b 6-87 a 3.
67) Cf. supra BSGT 84 a 4-5.
[3.2.3. Those who maintain a single consciousness]

A single mental consciousness (yid kyi sas, manovijnâna) appears diversely on the basis of sense-faculties.\(^{68}\) (k\(^n\) XI-7 ed)

[87 a 6] The Bodhisattva who accepts the single consciousness (gCig pur smra ba'i byaṅ chub sems dpa')\(^{69}\) [maintains the following:] the single mental consciousness (yid kyi sas, manovijnâna) appears as the diverse cognitions of visible matter, sound and the other [objects] on the basis of sense-faculties\(^{68}\) such as the eye, just as a single monkey in a house with six windows appears as many [through each window]. For it is said in a Sutra\(^{70}\):

"Beings have [a single] flow of consciousness each," and it is said also in the \(*Dvâdâsâyatanânirdeša* (sKye mched bcu gnis bstan pa'i mdo)\(^{71}\):

"The six consciousnesses are comprised in the sense-field of the mind (yid kyi skye mched, mana-âyatana)."

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68) Cf. AKBh 380.8: indriyatas / (Tib.) P. [115] (5591) niu 42 a 2 : dbaṅ po'i sgo nas.

69) Cf. MSam-Bhâṣya of Vasubandhu (P. [112] (5551) li 173 a 6 , ad MSam II 12): byaṅ chub sems dpa' kha cig ni yid kyi rnam par sas pa gcig pu ñid du 'dod do //. Cf. Hakamaya (1976) 250 n. 34.

70) The original source is yet to be identified. This Sutra is cited in the MAV of Śântarakṣita (P. 62 b 2, D. 65 b 6 ; ed. Ichigô: (1985 a) 132, (1985 b) 146, ad MA k\(^n\)49) as counter-evidence to the opinion of some philosophers (probably Śâkyabuddhi, cf. Iwata (1981) 156 [19] [21], Ichigô: (1985 b) 198 n. 21, n. 23), who maintain that many cognitions of the same kind can appear simultaneously.

71) BSCT 87 b 2 "sKye mched bcu gnis bstan pa'i mdo las kyaṅ / rnam par sas pa drug ni yid kyi skye mched kyis bsdus pa'o sas gsun s pa'i phyir" is an approximate paraphrase of the MSam II 12 C (Lamotte (1973) 30.5-7 ; Nagao (1982) 69.8-9, reconstr. Skt. 69.20-21 ; Fr. Tr. 103 ; Jap. Tr. 311): yâh skye mched gcu gnis bstan pa las rnam par sas pa'i tshogs drug ni yid kyi skye mched do sas ji skad gsun s pa lta bu'o // (reconstr. Skt.) punaś ca dvâdâsâyatanânâḥ desitânâḥ yathôktaḥ sa d-vijnânakâya mana-âyatanaṁ iti /. Thus in the MSam, "skye mched bcu gnis bstan pa" seems not to be considered as a proper name. Is it dBus pa blo gsal's misunderstanding to consider it the name of a Sutra? In the corresponding passages of GTCM and CKGT, such a Sutra is not mentioned.
Thus [the Bodhisattva who accepts single consciousness] maintains.

[87 b 2] Such are the doctrinal positions of those who maintain six groups of consciousness (rNam par šes pa tshogs drug du smra ba, *Ṣaḍvi-jñānakāyavādin) and those who maintain a single consciousness ([rNam par šes pa tshogs] gcig du smra ba, *Ekavijñānakāyavādin). 72)

[3.3. Mental factors (sams la byuṅ ba, caitta)]

Regarding the mental factors, there are two opinions: that the mental factors are different from the mind and that they are not different [from it]. (kṣ XI-8 ab)

[87 b 3] Regarding the mental factors which have been mentioned above, 73) there are two opinions: that they are different from the mind and that they are not different [from it].

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72) So far as the expression “rnam šes tshogs gcig” is concerned, we can find it for example in CKGT 202.6: rnam šes tshogs gcig tu ’dod. In BSGT, only three doctrinal positions are treated, namely the *Aṣṭavijñānakāyavādin, the Ṣaḍ and the *Eka°. In CKGT (202.5 - 203.2, cf. Hakamaya (1976) 234, 249-251) and GTCM (nia 78 a 6 ff.), more positions are explained: 1) *Eka-vijñānakāyavādin: there are two kinds, those who maintain only ālayavijñāna and those who maintain only mano-vijñāna. 2) *Dvi-o: those who maintain kliṣṭa-manas and pravṛtti-vijñāna. 3) Ṣaḍ-o: followers of the seven treatises of Dharmakirti (sDe bdun gi rjes ’braṇ gi sems tsam pa). 4) *Sapta-o: those who maintain sad-pravṛtti-vijñāna and adāna-vijñāna. 5) *Aṣṭa-o: followers of the Yogācārabhūmi (Sa sde sogs las ’byun ba ltar gyi luṅ gi rjes ’braṇ gi sems tsam pa). 6) *Nava-o: those who maintain sad-pravṛtti-vijñāna, adāna-vijñāna, ālayavijñāna and amalavijñāna. This is said to be the doctrinal position of Yaṅ dag bden pa ( Paramārtha). The CKGT does not mention any source, but in the GTCM (nia 78 b 7), the rNam par ŋes pa’i mdzod (= 決定論 Jue ding zang lun, T. [30] (1584)) is mentioned. The Jue ding zang lun is a translation of the first part of the Viniscaya-saṁgrahāni of the Yogācārabhūmi, but it is more than a translation; Paramārtha inserted some interpretations of his own inspiration. The amalavijñāna is one example (id. 1031 a). The amala-vijñāna is mentioned, by the way, in other works translated by him such as, a) Zhuan shi lun 轉識論 *Vijñānaparināmaśāstra, T. [31] (1587) 62 c; b) Shi ba kong lun 十八空論 *Aṣṭādaśaśūnyatāśāstra, T. [31] (1616) 863 b.

73) Cf. supra BSGT 85 a 4, 85 b 1 (?).
[3.3.1. Those who maintain that the mental factors are different from the mind]

[87 b 4] The first [opinion] is that of masters such as Ārya-Asaṅga. They [refute by the following four reasons those who maintain that the mental factors do not exist separately from the mind and that they are nothing but the states of it]74) : (i) If the mental factors did not exist substantially, the determination that the aggregates (phuñ po, skandha) are five would not be possible because sensation (tshor ba, vedanā) and notion (du ses, samjñā) also would not exist substantially. (ii) Since there is no difference in the cause (byed pa'i rgyu, kārana), it is not possible concerning the effect (viz. mental factors) [to say] that they are established substantially or are not established.75) (iii) If there is, in the mental factors, a difference (khyad par, viśeṣa) which is not similar to the mind, the [mental factors] could be established substantially [: therefore, the mental factors would be different from the mind]. If there is no difference, it is not possible [to consider the mental factors] even as the different states [of the mind : that is meaningless].76) (iv) It is in contradiction with what is said in

74) The following is a paraphrase of the YBh (D. (4038) zi 87 b 6–88 a 1 ; T. [30] (1579) lvi 609 a 3–b 10), at the end of which our verse (BSGT 87 b 6–88 a 1) is found as bar dom (antaroddaṇa). In this part of the YBh concerning the pañcaskandha, the opinion of those (certain Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas) who maintain that the mental factors are nothing but the mind is refuted: dge sbyon dan bram ze la la min la sens tsam žig rdzas su 'dod la sens las byun ba'i chos rnams ni mi 'dod pa gaṅ dag yod pa de dag kyaṅ mi 'thad do // . . .

75) The explanation of the second reason in BSGT is not very clear. In Ybh, the opinion that the mental factors are nothing but states of the mind is criticized, for the reason that there is no other primary cause because of which the states of the mind could change. Cf. YBh D. 77 a 5–6, P. 80 b 7–8 : byed rgyu khyad par med pa'i phyir sens kyi gnas skabs gzan du 'gyur ba ni mi ruṇ no // skad cig gceg la gaṅ gis gnas skabs gzan la ston par 'gyur ba'i byed rgyu khyad par can gzan ni mi dmigs te / de lla bas na gnas skabs kyi bye brag kyaṅ mi ruṇ no //.

76) Here also the opinion that the mental factors are nothing but states of the mind is refuted. Cf. YBh D. 77 a 2–5, P. 80 b 2–7.
a scriptural passage (_luañ, ágama):

“The mind is defiled by [a mental factor,] passion (’dod chags, rāga), and purified by [a mental factor,] faith (dad pa, śraddhā).” 77

Such is the refutation [by the master Ārya–Asaṅga and others]. It is said in the Viniscayasamgrahani [of the Yogacarabhilmi] :

“[The opinion that the mental factors are not different from the mind does not stand,] because the five [aggregates] would not be possible, because there is no difference [in] the cause, because there are faults [even if one considers the mental factors only as] the states of the [mind], and because it is in contradiction with scripture (luañ, ágama).” 78

[3.3.2. Those who maintain that the mental factors are not different from the mind]

[88 a 1 ] The second [opinion] is that of the Bodhisattva who maintains a single [consciousness] (gCig pur smra ba’i byaṅ chub sems dpa’), 79 the master Dharmakirti and others.

[88 a 1 ] [The Bodhisattva who maintains a single consciousness] 79 maintains that [consciousness] proceeds alone, as is said in the Brāhmaṇavarga of the Udānavarga 80 (XXXII k^67[Tib.] = k^55[Skt.]):

77) In YBh an Ágama is cited under a different form, and the second part of our Ágama is not found there. Cf. YBh D. 77 a 7, P. 80 b 8–81 a 1: ‘dod chags kyi ne bar non monis pa can du ’gyur ba dañ / ze sdañ dañ / gti mug gis ne bar non monis pa (D. ma) can du gyur pa’i sems ni rnam par grol bar mi ’gyur ro žes ji skad gsuñs pa’o //.

78) bar sdom (antarōddāna) in YBh D. 77 b 7, P. 81 b 8, T. 609 b 8–9. See also Mimaki (1982) n. 332.

79) The source for the combination of gCig pur smra ba’i b^5 and the UV is the MSam II 12 C and the MSam–bhāṣya of Vasubandhu. Cf. supra n. 69, n. 71. It is clear, judging from the wordorder, that our author cited this verse of the UV from the MSam.

80) Cf. Schmithausen (1970) 54 (also 55, 60, 98, 104):

dārāmga(ma)m ekacaram aṣṭartram guhāsayam (/)
damavyati duridamam cittam brāhmaṇam tam bravmvy aham (/)

Skt in YBh (Ms. 135 a 5 f., Chin. 386 a 20, Tib. P. diz 298 b 8, D. tshi 256 b 3–4).
“I call a Brähmana one who will train the mind which, without a body, residing within, going far, proceeding alone, is difficult to train.”

[88 a 2] The master [Dharmakīrti] also holds the mind itself to be sensation (tshor ba, vedanā) in so far as it experiences (ñams su myon ba, anubhava), 81) to be notion (du šes, samjñā) in so far as it apprehends the phenomenal marks (mtshan mar ’dzin pa, nimittodgraha)81) and to be volition (sems pa, cetanā) in so far as it moves toward the object (yul la g-yo ba). For it is said in [his] Pramāṇa-viniscaya (I 70. 23–25):

“Because one sees that they are of the same nature, the buddhi (blo)82) on the one hand and the anubhava (ñams su myoni)82) on the other hand are not different,”

and [in PVn I k°27 b–d=PV III k°279 b–d]:

“If [you, the Sāṁkhya, say that the [color,] white, and pain etc. which appear as different]83) are not different, and that the buddhi (blo)82) and the vedanā (myon)82) which appear without difference are different, what would the difference and the non-difference be based upon?”

—36—

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81) Cf. — AK I k°14 cd: vedanā ’nubhavah samijñā nimittdgrahanåtmåkå // (Tib.) P. 35 a: tshor ba myon ba ’du šes ni (//) mtshan mar ’dzin pa'i bdag ŋid do //; — PrasP 343.9 (ad MM XVIII 1): riśpånbhava-nimittdgrahanåbhishåmskåraṇa-viśaya-pratijñåpåti-la-kšånaḥ pañca skandåḥ / (Tib.) P. 128 a 1–2: phun po bha ni gzugs su run ba dañ / ñams su myon ba dañ / mtshan mar ’dzin pa dañ / mnion par ’du byed pa dañ / yul so sor rnam par rig pa’i mtshan ŋid can yin na / . . .

82) In these citations from the PVn, at first glance it seems that the identification of the buddhi with the anubhava/vedana (therefore that of the mind with the mental factors) is treated. But, in the PVn and the PV, it is the Sāṁkhya philosophy that is criticized at the end of the svasaśvedana section. The buddhi is the non-intelligent element in the Sāṁkhya philosophy, and the anubhava/vedana is the apprehension of buddhi by the unique intelligent element, puruṣa. Thus the buddhi and the anubhava/vedana are distinguished in the Sāṁkhya philosophy, and that position is criticized.

83) Päda a: bhinnåbhåḥ sita-duḥkkhådir / (Tib.) dkar sdug la sogs tha dad snaṅ.
Therefore this is what is said in the \textit{Mahāyāna-}sūtrā-
laṅkāra (XI k° 34)\textsuperscript{84}:

"The mind is considered to appear as double (viz. cognizer and
cognized). In the same way\textsuperscript{85} it is considered to appear as
passion (\textit{chags, rāga}) etc. and faith (\textit{dad, śraddhā}) etc. There is no
[factor other than it], either defiled or good."

\textbf{3.4. Conditioning factors not associated [with the mind] (\textit{mi ldan pa’i
‘du byed, viprayukta-saṃskāra})]

Explaining the conditioning factors not associated [with the
mind] (\textit{mi ldan pa’i ‘du byed, viprayukta-saṃskāra})\textsuperscript{86}:

The conditioning factors not associated [with the mind],
such as acquisition (\textit{thob [pa], prāpti}), are designations for the
three [categories] of matter (\textit{gzugs, rūpa}) and the other [two].

(k° XI- 8 cd)

\textsuperscript{84} According to Sthiramati’s commentary on this verse, this refers to those who
maintain that the mental factors and the external objects do not exist apart from the
mind; cf. ed. Hayashima (1978) 98: \textit{Sems tsam su smra ba kha cig ni rnam par rig pa
tsam žes bya bas sems tsam du zad kyi / sems las ma gtogs par sems las byuñ ba’i chos
dan phyi’i yul rnam med kyi med par ‘dod do //}. But it is not certain that one could
only interprete this verse in this manner.


\textsuperscript{86} We are not sure if there is any reason for the fact that our author omits the term \textit{gzi}
only after \textit{mi ldan pa’i ‘du byed}. He puts it after all the other four categories; ex. \textit{gzugs kyi gzi}, etc. The situation is the same for the other chapters, viz. the Vaibhāṣika
chapter (BSGT 65 a 5) and the Sautrāntika chapter (BSGT 79 a 2). As we shall see
in the following passages, according to the Yogācāra, the \textit{viprayukta-saṃskāras} are
nothing but designations for states of matter, mind and mental factors. See the same
– 156.
The conditioning factors not associated [with the mind] are designations for the states of [matter,]\(^{87}\) mind (sems, citta) and mental factors (sems las byun ba, caitta). Because matter (gzugs, rūpa) also does not exist apart from these two (viz. the mind and the mental factors), the [conditioning factors not associated with the mind] are, in reality, designations solely for the states of the mind and the mental factors.

In this connection, when one accepts the receptacle-consciousness,\(^{98}\) [1] acquisition (thob pa, prāpti) is the state in which the good or other potential power (nus pa, sakti) is acquired in the receptacle-consciousness. [2] Non-acquisition (ma thob pa, aprāpti) is the state in which the [potential power] is lost. [3] Homogeneity (skal ba mñam pa, sabhāgata) is the state in which the bodies and so forth of beings are homogeneous. [4, 5, 6] Unconsciousness ('du šes med pa, āsamjñika) and the two absorptions (sñoms 'jug, samāpatti) [viz. the absorption of unconsciousness ('du šes med pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa, āsamjñhisamāpatti) and the absorption of cessation ('gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa, nirodhasamāpatti)] are the states in which mind and the mental factors do not appear. [7] The vital faculty (srog gi dbañ po, āvītendriya) is the state in which a being persists, having the homogeneity of its kind (ris mthun, nikāya-sabhāga). [8, 9, 10, 11] The four characters (mtshan nīd, laksāna) are designations for the states of a series: production (skyed ba, jāti) [is a designation] for the state in which matter, the mind and the mental factors have newly arisen; duration (gnaś pa, sthiti) [is a designation] for the state in which

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\(^{87}\) According to the context, it would be better if we had gzugs dañ before sems dañ. Cf. infra BSGT 88 b 2. One might argue that matter (gzugs) is not necessary here because this is the Vijñānavāadin chapter. But in the preceding verse (BSGT XI-8 cd) itself we already have gzugs sog s gum.

\(^{88}\) It seems strange that the case in which one does not accept the receptacle-consciousness is not explained in this treatise.
[matter and so forth] are born in a homogeneous series; aging (r̥ka ba, jara) [is a designation] for the state in which they have arisen in a non-homogeneous series; impermanence (mi rtag pa, anityata) [is a designation] for the state in which they have arisen without remaining later. [12, 13, 14] According to the *Satyakaravadin (rNam bden pa) the designation as three collections (tshogs, kāya) is used for the state in which the mental consciousness (yid kyi ses pa, mano-vijñāna) appears as words (min, nāma), phrases (tshig, pada) and syllables (yi ge, vyanjana).

According to the *Alikākaravadin (rNam rdzun pa), it is the state in which the series of word-universals (sgra spyī phren ba) appears as these three.

### 3.5. Intermediate stanza (bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa, antara-sloka)

Thus, because the four [categories] are conditioned (‘dus byas, saṃskṛta), how causes, conditions and effects [function] is on the whole as [explained] before. Concerning the causal relation, there are two [possibilities], simultaneous and non–simultaneous. (AŚ XI-1)

This is an intermediate stanza (bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa, antara-śloka).

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89) Cf. BRGT of ‘Ba’ ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ, rtsa ba 17 a 6 (=p.110): tshogs gsum rNam bden ltar na ni // yid kyi miṅ tshig yi ger snaṅ // rNam rdzun ltar na sgra spyī yi // phren ba gsum du snaṅ ba yin //.

90) The present translator is for the moment incapable of explaining why the designation as three collections is the appearance of the mental consciousness for the rNam bden pa, and that of the series of word–universals for the rNam rdzun pa.

91) Cf. BSGT 68 a 5–69 b 5 (Vaibhāṣīka chapter).

[3.6. The unconditioned (‘dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta)\(^{93}\)]

[88 b 4 ] Explaining the category of the unconditioned (‘dus ma byas, asaṃskṛta):

The four unconditioned [factors are] empty space (nam mkha’; ēkāśa), two cessations (‘gog pa, nirodha) and Thusness (de bzin nid, tathatā).

One should supply the copula [in this verse]. One calls unconditioned (‘dus ma byas pa, asaṃskṛta) a thing (chos, dharma) in which there is neither production nor destruction.

[88 b 5 ] The [unconditioned factors] are of four kinds. Among them, empty space is the mere absence of a resistant tangible thing (thogs par byed pa’i reg bya, pratigha-spraṣṭavya). Cessation without intelligence\(^{94}\) (so sor ma brtags par ‘gog pa, apratisamkhyā-nirodha) is simply [the state in which] the conditioned is not produced because of the incompleteness of conditions. Cessation with intelligence\(^{94}\) (so sor brtags pa’i ‘gog pa, pratisamkhyā-nirodha) is simply [the state in which] by means of antidotes (gñen po, pratipakṣa) impure latent seeds are exhausted in the receptacle-consciousness. This is Thusness (de bzin nid, tathatā) or the Perfect [Nature] (yoins su grub pa, parinippana), which is pure by nature and free from adventitious defilements (glo bur gyi dri ma, āgantuka-mala).\(^{95}\)

Thusness (de bzin nid, tathatā) is the Perfect [Nature] without change.

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\(^93\) Concerning the unconditioned, see a detailed study in Bareau (1951).

\(^94\) pratisamkhyā=prajñāviśeṣa. Cf. AK Bh 4.1-2 (ad AK I k° 6): duḥkhādīnām ārya-satyāṇam pratisamkhyānām pratisamkhyā praṇāviśeṣas tena prāpyo nirodham pratisamkhyā-nirodhaḥ / (Tib.). P. 29 b 5-6 : sdug bsnal la sogs pa’i bden pa rnam la so sor rtog pa ni so sor brtags pa ste šes rab kyi bye brag go // des thob par bya ba’i ‘gog pa ni so sor brtags pas ‘gog pa’o //.

\(^95\) This passage is a continuation of the explanation of the third asaṃskṛta. The explanation of the fourth asaṃskṛta, Thusness, begins in the next passage.
(gyur ba med pa'i yoins su grub pa, nirvikāra-parinīṣpatti)\(^{96}\) which does not have the characteristics of a Self and things (chos, dharma).

### 3.7. The relation between the five categories and the aggregates, sense-fields and elements\(^{97}\)

[89 a 1] Showing the five categories which are knowable as aggregates and so forth:

Three and a half, or one and a half, or seven and a half are the aggregates and so forth that are reals (rdzas, dravyasat).

\((k^3 \text{ XI} - 9 \text{ ed})\)

[89 a 2] The conditioned factors (dus byas, saṃskṛta) can belong (gyur) to all three rubrics (chos gsum) [: i.e., the aggregates, the sense-

\(^{96}\) Cf. MA\(n^\)V II k\(^3\)11: artha-præpti-prapattyä hi paramārthas tridhā matah / nirvikārāvi-
paryāsa-parinīṣpattito dvayam // (Tib.) don dañ thob dañ sgrub pa ni // don dam rnam pa gsum du 'dod // 'gyur med phyin ci ma log pa // yoins su grub pa rnam pa gnis //.

And according to the MA\(n^\)VBh we can establish the following schema:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{arthā-paramārtha} &= \text{tathāta} \\
\text{præpti-paramārtha} &= \text{saṃskṛta} \\
\text{paripattī-paramārtha} &= \text{mārga}
\end{align*}
\]

saṃskṛta — nirvikāra-parinīṣpatti

samkṛta — aviparyāsa-parinīṣpatti

\(^{97}\) In order to facilitate the understanding of the following passages, here is a table of concordances concerning these items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[gzi lha]</th>
<th>[5 phun po]</th>
<th>[12 skye mched]</th>
<th>[18 khams]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gzugs</td>
<td>gzugs tshor ba</td>
<td>mig lus yid</td>
<td>mig lus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sems</td>
<td>'du šes rnam šes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sems byun</td>
<td>'du byed chos</td>
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<tr>
<td>ldan min 'du byed</td>
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<tr>
<td>'dus ma byas</td>
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</table>
fields and the elements], whereas the unconditioned ('dus ma byas, asams-kṛta) will belong (gyur) to [the last of the eighteen] elements (khams, dhātu) and [the last of the twelve] sense-fields (skye mched, ayatana).

[89 a 2 ] So far as the aggregates (phun po, skandha) are concerned, three and a half [of the five aggregates] exist as reals (ṛdzas, dravya-sat), namely, the aggregates of sensation (tshor ba, vedanā), notion ('dus ses, saṃjñā), conditioning factors ('du byed, saṃskāra) that are mental factors (sems las byun ba, caitta), 98) and consciousness (mam par ses pa, vijñāna).

[89 a 3 ] So far as the sense-fields are concerned, one and a half [of the twelve sense-fields] exist as reals, namely, the sense-fields of the mind (yid kyi skye mched, mana-ayatana) and the mental [factors] which constitute a part of the sense-fields of the objects-of-thought (chos kyi skye mched, dharma-ayatana).

[89 a 3 ] So far as the elements are concerned, seven and a half exist as reals, namely, the seven mind-elements (sems kyi khams, citta-dhātu) and the mental [factors] which constitute a part of the element of the objects-of-thought (chos kyi khams, dharma-dhātu).

[89 a 4 ] According to [those who maintain] that the mind and the mental factors are not different, the aggregate of consciousness (rnam par ses pa'i phun po, vijñāna-skandha) alone, or the sense-field of the mind (yid kyi skye mched, mana-ayatana) alone, or the seven mind-elements (sems kyi khams, citta-dhātu) alone exist as real. The way the aggregates, sense-fields and elements which consist of matter do not exist as reals was already explained [when I mentioned above how] matter does not exist as a real. 99)

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98) The viprayukta-saṃskāras are denied substantial reality in the Yogācāra system, as was shown above in the section [3.4].

99) Cf. supra Section [3.1]—BSGT 85 a 4-b 1.
[3.8. The relation between the five categories and the Four Noble Truths]

These [five categories] are included within the Truths of Suffering, of Origin, of Cessation and of Path. (kO XI-10 ab)

[89 a 5] These categories are included within the Four Truths. Among them, the aggregates of appropriation (ne bar len pa'i phun po, upādāna-skandha) in the resultant aspect, included within the beings which are born and the birth-places where they are born, and which are suffering each in their own way (cit rigs par, yathāyogam) the three sufferings (sdug bsnyal gsum, tri-duḥkhatā), ¹⁰⁰ are the Truth of Suffering (sdug bsnyal gyi bden pa, duḥkha-satya). The aggregates of appropriation in the causal aspect, namely, the acts associated with impurity (zag pa dañ bcas pa'i las, sāsrava-karman) are the Truth of Origin (kun byun gi bden pa, samudaya-satya). Cessation with intelligence and Thusness are the Truth of Cessation ('gog pa'i bden pa, nirodha-satya): this is the obtained result. The [five] aggregates without impurity (zag pa med pa'i phun po, anāsrava-skandha)¹⁰¹ which lead to Nirvāṇa (mya 'nan las 'das pa) are the Truth of Path (lam gyi bden pa, mārga-satya). Empty space and cessation without intelligence are not included within the Four Truths.

(To be continued)


¹⁰¹ Anāsravāh pañca-skandhāḥ = 1) śīla, 2) samādhi, 3) prajñā, 4) vimukti, and 5) vimukti-jñāna-dārśana. Cf. AKBh 17.24 – 18.1; (Tib.) P. 41 b 4 – 5.
Abbreviations and Bibliography

AK: Abhidharmakośa(kārikā) of Vasubandhu, ed. with AK Bh.


BSGT: Blo gsal grub mtha’.


C: Co ne edition.


D: sDe dge edition.


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MĀL: Madhyamakāloka of Kamalaśila.
MANV: Madhyāntavibhāga (kārikā) of Maitreya, ed. with MANVBh.
MM: Mūlamadhyamakārikā of Nāgārjuna. Ed. with PrasP.
MSA: Mahāyānasūtrālāṅkāra of Maitreya. In Lévi (1907).
MSABh: Mahāyānasūtrālāṅkārābhāṣya of Vasubandhu. In Lévi (1907).
N: sNar than edition.
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PSGT: *Grub mtha’ rnam gzaug* of Pan chen bSod nams grags pa. Ed. sBag sa (20 folios).

PV: *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakirti.

PVBh: *Pramāṇavārttika-bhāṣya* of Prajñākaragupta. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1, Patna, 1953.

PVn: *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakirti.


T.: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (Chinese Tripitaka). The number in square brackets and that in parentheses indicate respectively the volume and the number of Taishō.

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YBh: Yogācārabhāmi.