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A Possible Defense of Davidsonian Monism
—Cooperating with Della Rocca’s Rehabilitation of Spinoza—

Shohei Edamura

0. Introduction

In this paper, I will propose a defense of anomalous monism of Donald Davidson, by arguing that though it is a mistake to attribute mental features to physical states, nonetheless mind and body can be token-identical on the basis of the concept of identity suggested by Michael Della Rocca. There is a classical criticism against the identity theory - it seems that bodies do not have mental properties, and minds do not have physical properties. Considering this point, Paul Churchland states that mind and body are not identical since they do not satisfy the condition of identity given by Leibniz’s Law. According to Leibniz’s Law, A and B are identical if and only if exactly the same set of properties are true of A and B. For Churchland, since the mind has mental properties, but the body does not, they cannot be identical. Considering this criticism, a defender of the identity theory has two options: claiming that mind and body satisfy the condition of identity provided by Leibniz’s Law, or claiming that they are identical though they do not satisfy that condition. The former option is difficult to hold: I cannot find any clue to deny that it is wrong to ascribe mental properties to the body; consequently, my option is the latter. In proposing a possible defense, I borrow the concept of identity suggested by Della Rocca. In his interpretation of Spinoza, Della Rocca argues that it is possible that even though mind and body are identical, the contexts involving the attribution of mental properties to objects are “referentially opaque.” Due to this opacity, some true statements concerning mind do not hold for body, and therefore mind and body do not satisfy the condition of identity provided by Leibniz’s Law.

In the first part of my paper, I will introduce Davidson’s anomalous monism as a representative candidate of token-identity theory of mind. In the second section, I will discuss a common objection to the identity theory, and see how it may work for the token-identity theory. This leads to the discussion of Della Rocca’s interpretation of Spinoza, how it aims to undermine the worry for the token-identity theory and why we can persuasively construct a defense of Davidsonian monism on the basis of the concept of identity proposed by Della Rocca.
1. Davidson’s Anomalous Monism

In this section I shall introduce the token-identity theory in general, pick out four basic principles of Davidson’s anomalous monism as one promising version of the token-identity theory of mind, and see that they constitute the essential part of his theory of mind.

Before examining Davidson’s argument for his principles, some background on the token-identity theory concerning the relationship between mind and body will be helpful, since Davidson’s view is taken to be one version of this type of identity theory. According to the token-identity theory, any event which is instantiated by some physical properties (ex. c-fiber firing) is token-identical to the event which is instantiated by some mental properties (ex. pain or hurting). In other words, “every token of a mental event is a token of neural event” (Bechtel 1988, p. 107), and in the same manner, every token of a physical event is also a token of mental event. We should note that in the framework of the token-identity theory, it is not true that two really distinct and ontologically separated events (i.e. mental and physical events) are connected by the bridge of the relation of “identity.” Rather, strictly speaking, there is only one event which has mental and physical properties at the same time. Also, it should be noted that the token-identity theory does not entail that mind and body are type-identical. That is, the same type of mental properties may be instantiated by different types of physical properties. For instance, Martians may feel pain whenever there are x-fiber firings instead of c-fiber firings. Aliens living in the planet Y may feel pain when their silicon bodies are damaged. Thus pain may be instantiated in various ways. One of the motivations of the token-identity theory is that it is doubtful that “research will support a correlation between types of phenomena described mentally and types characterized physically” (Bechtel 1988, pp. 106-7). Type-identity theorists would say that through the accumulation of empirical data we will be able to see the law of correlation of mental and physical phenomena. But since it is possible that many kinds of physical properties may instantiate pain, token-identity theorists do not support this view.

Now we turn to Davidson’s anomalous monism. Though Davidson does not use the term “token-identity theory(2),” his theory shares an essential part in common with the token-identity theory proposed after his renowned paper “Mental Events.” First, Davidson is skeptical about a theoretical explanation of the correlation of mental and physical events. Like other token-identity theorists, Davidson has an intuition that even if scientific research has advanced abundantly, it will not systematically reveal how some physical phenomena exactly correspond to mental phenomena. Also, it seems that his theory does not exclude the possibility that the same type of mental properties can be instantiated by different physical properties. Since no law of correlation of mental and
physical phenomena is introduced, a type of mental phenomenon may correlate to various types of physical phenomena. For further considerations, we have to see the three basic principles of Davidson’s monism:

The Interaction Principle (IP): Some mental events causally interact with some physical events. (Davidson 1970/80, p. 208)

The Cause-Law Principle (CLP): Where there is causality, there must be a law: events related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws. (Davidson 1970/80, p. 208)

The Anomalism Principle (AP): There are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained. (Davidson 1970/80, p. 208)

By supporting IP, Davidson accepts an intuition that a will causes some motions of a body (ex. when I want to listen to Beethoven’s symphony and try to pick up a CD, my will causes the motion of my hand). Also, Davidson supports a traditional idea that if something causes another, there is a law-like relationship between them (CLP). One problem with CLP is that it is difficult (or even impossible) to tell mental properties from the corresponding physical properties and vice versa. Thus he accepts AP. However, CLP and AP prima facie contradict each other, given IP is true. IP tells that some events instantiated by mental properties (ex. my will to pick up the disc) causally interact with other events instantiated by physical properties (ex. movements of my right hand). But if the mental phenomenon X causally interacts with the physical phenomenon Y, then according to CLP, there should be a strict law between X and Y, which contradicts AP. So Davidson has to explain how these principles can be consistent with each other. According to Davidson, “a version of the identity theory of the mental and the physical” shows “how the three principles may be reconciled” (Davidson 1970/80, p. 209).

Suppose that the event A has a set of mental properties (call it A’) and that of physical properties (A”). This event, with a set of physical properties A”, is supposed to cause some other events having physical properties (suppose that one of these events is B) (Davidson 1970/80, pp. 223-4). So even if the set of mental properties A’ cannot cause the physical properties of other events, the event A, with A”, can cause the set of physical properties of B (call it B”). Also, there is a strict law at least in the physical world. So there is a strict law which connects the sets of physical properties A” and B”, and the relationship between A” and B” obviously satisfies CLP. Now given the set of mental
properties A’ instantiates exactly the same event as A” does, if A” causes B”, then A, with A’, also causes B”. But without the mediate of the set of physical properties A”, A cannot cause B” in accordance with CLP.

In brief, Davidson holds these three principles as core components of his identity theory, and believes that they are consistent. (5) His anomalous monism has considerable merits. First, like other token-identity theories, it can avoid the problem of multi-realization, and suggests that one type of mental phenomena can be instantiated in many ways in the physical realm. Second, it somehow explains a kind of causal relationship between will and action, and the freedom of will, both of which have been great problems in the history of philosophy. Given these merits, it is reasonable to anticipate that Davidsonian anomalous monism is a promising version of identity theory.

2. A Problem – Typical Criticism to the Identity Theory –
Although it looks promising, identity theory has been confronting serious objections. One of the most important criticisms is that since mind and body have different properties, they cannot be identical. Descartes already held this kind of view. (6) In the twentieth century, this kind of objection was raised in a different way: A mental property is essentially different from a physical one, and the reduction of mental properties is impossible. Gilbert Ryle defended this claim, without committing to any version of substance-dualism. For Ryle, it is simply “a category-mistake” (Ryle 1949, p. 16) to ascribe mental properties to bodies, or physical properties to minds. (7) This idea can be employed to deny the identity of mind and body. For instance, Paul Churchland rejects the identity theory on the basis of this idea and Leibniz’s Law, which holds that two items are numerically identical if and only if any property had by either one of them is also had by the other (Churchland 1984, pp. 29-30):

\[(x)(y)[(x = y) \equiv (F)(Fx \equiv Fy)]\]

Now if a mental state M is identical to a physical state P, then:

\[(M)(P)[(M = P) \equiv (F)(FM \equiv FP)].\]

In other words, if there is a property that is true of the mental state M, but not of the physical state P (or is true of P, but not of M), then the identity theory will be exploded. (8)

Before considering a possible defense of Davidson’s identity theory against this objection, we
should take note of one problem: It seems that Churchland mainly had the type-identity theory in his mind when he raised this criticism. Then, is it reasonable to take the token-identity theory to be one of the opponents of this criticism? So far, we have seen the criticism against the identity theory, and that criticism argues that it is a mistake to ascribe mental properties to physical things. Now it seems that token-identity theorists, including Davidson, suppose that the term “pain” refers to the neutral event rather than a set of mental properties, and the term “c-fiber firing” also refers to the same event. If we follow this idea, it does make sense to say that pain is identical to a c-fiber firing, and there is no conflation of mental and physical properties.

Then are token-identity theorists always free from the criticism we have seen? I think the criticism we have seen still suggests something against the token-identity theory. It is true that we have statements in which the terms “mind” and “body” are not interchangeable, and therefore Leibniz’s Law seems to be violated. So, we can reformulate the criticism following the line of Churchland:

(1) The terms “mind” and “body” refer to one and the same object. (Premise)
(2) If “mind” and “body” refer to one and the same object, these two terms satisfy the condition of identity proposed by Leibniz’s Law. (Premise)
(3) “Mind” and “body” satisfy the condition of identity proposed by Leibniz’s Law. (1 and 2)
(4) There are some statements in which “mind” and “body” are interchangeable, and the truth values change if we substitute one for the other. (Premise)
(5) “Mind” and “body” do not satisfy the condition of identity proposed by Leibniz’s Law. (4)
From (3) and (5) we have a contradiction, which shows the premise (1) is false.

The arguments (1)-(3) and (4)-(5) are valid. Since Churchland would accept the two other premises (2) and (4), for him, the whole argument is sound and establishes the falsehood of the token-identity theory.

Then how can we cope with this argument? A possible strategy is to deny one of these two premises, instead of (1). Now it seems to be difficult to deny (4), as we have seen, since it is clearly a category-mistake to ascribe physical properties to my will, for example. Thus, I will consider the option to deny (2), to argue that this argument does not establish the falsehood of the token-identity theory. Given Davidson’s view is a version of the token-identity theory, this strategy may provide a good defense for Davidsonian monism.
3. How can Della Rocca’s concept of identity be “imported” to Davidson’s Anomalous Monism?

In this section, I will introduce Michael Della Rocca’s concept of identity and argue that it provides a good reason to deny premise (2) in the previous argument, and by doing so contributes to a possible defense of Davidson’s monism. In fact, Della Rocca’s concept of identity is suggested in his study of Spinoza. According to Della Rocca, Spinoza supposes that even though mind and body are not different things, the mind has some properties which cannot be ascribed to the body (Ethics 3P2 Schol: Della Rocca 1996, pp. 118-9).

Della Rocca tries to reconstruct Spinoza’s theory of mind using modern terminology. Della Rocca argues that Spinoza takes causal contexts to be referentially “opaque” rather than transparent (cf. Della Rocca 1991). For Spinoza, a human mind is a mode of thought of the one and only substance (namely, God), while a human body is a mode of extension of substance. Now the statement that a mode of extension Me₁ causally interacts with a mode of extension Me₂ is true, whereas the statement that a mode of thought Mt₁ causally interacts with a mode of extension Me₂ is false. However, Spinoza holds that a mind is identical to its body. How can we reconcile the difference between Me₁ and Mt₁ on the one hand, and the identity of mind and body? Concerning this problem, Della Rocca suggests that Leibniz’s Law does not always hold between mind and body:

There are certain kinds of properties that are such that the fact that a has a property of that kind and b does not does not by itself undermine the claim that a = b (Della Rocca 1993, p. 194).

These kinds of properties are called intentional properties, which Della Rocca distinguishes from extensional properties:

I will call a property an intentional property when (and only when) contexts involving the attribution of that property to objects are opaque. I will call all other properties extensional properties. Thus the properties of being thinking and being extended are intensional properties since attribute contexts are opaque. If the general properties of being thinking and being extended are intensional, then so too are all the more particular properties that presuppose one or the other of these general properties. (Della Rocca 1993, p. 193)
Della Rocca holds that the following version of Leibniz’s Law is exceptionless: \( a = b \) iff \( a \) and \( b \) have all their extensional properties in common. An example of extensional property is duration. Spinoza states that “we do not attribute duration to [the mind] except while the body endures” (Spinoza 5P23D; Della Rocca 1993, p. 199). Thus duration is considered to be a neutral or extensional property. On the basis of these neutral or extensional properties, we can conclude that mind is identical to body. Without neutral or extensional properties, the identity of mind and body is not justified.

One of the serious worries concerning Della Rocca’s view is that the terms “opaque” or “opaque context” are used in linguistic contexts, while one may suppose that Spinoza is talking about metaphysical and real properties of the substance and its modes when he discusses attributes such as extension and thought. Let us see an example of opaque context. Two statements, that Hesperus is a planet and that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, entail that Phosphorus is a planet. However, this does not mean that if John believes that Hesperus is a planet, the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus entails that John believes that Phosphorus is a planet. Instead, he might believe that Phosphorus is a bright star. The context of “John believes \( S \) is \( P \)” is opaque, and even if \( S = T \), we cannot substitute \( T \) for \( S \).\(^{12}\) We should note that opaque contexts are merely linguistic or conceptual, and not concerned with the nature of mind-independent metaphysical realities. For example, in the case of John, even if John does not believe that Phosphorus is a planet, in fact, it is. How he conceives of it does not affect how it actually is.

Now we turn to Spinoza’s theory. It seems that for Spinoza, God actually has the attributes of extension and thought, and there are such things as minds and bodies. If Spinoza is talking about metaphysical entities, one may think that the concept of opacity, which is essentially linguistic, cannot be used to solve the mind-body problem in Spinoza. Della Rocca explicitly considers this problem and provides an explanation. We have to see Spinoza’s philosophy a little bit in detail. In fact, for Spinoza, an attribute is “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” (Ethics 1D4).\(^{13}\) This definition of attribute might allow us to understand Spinozistic attributes in a kind of conceptual context.\(^{14}\) By His infinite intellect, God conceives Himself through many attributes.\(^{15}\) This intellect is essentially different from human intellects or reasons in that it is not limited at all. But we can still say that attributes are concerned with the way in which the intellect conceives the metaphysical reality, namely, God or substance. In the same manner, human minds conceive something through extension or thought. For example, when John conceives Bob through
extension, he is thinking about Bob’s body, while he thinks about Bob’s mind through thought.

Furthermore, for Della Rocca, Spinoza commits the existence of neutral modes or “trans-attribute modes” (Della Rocca 1996, pp. 158-64). The modes are neutral to attributes, but still exist as parts of the substance. Thus, according to Della Rocca’s interpretation of Spinoza, first, there are ultimate realities: God or substance, and His modes which are neutral to any attributes. For instance, there are such beings as John, Bob and others, all of which are neutral to any attributes. But they are conceived in different ways. If John is conceived through extension, you will see his body, while if you conceive him through thought, then you perceive his mind.

Now Della Rocca states that Spinoza holds the “conceptual separation” of attributes. For Spinoza (also for Descartes), extension is conceived without thought, and vice versa (Ethics 1P10). Given this conceptual barrier between extension and thought, any events conceived through thought cannot be explained by other events conceived through extension and vice versa. So, we cannot conceive mental properties through extension, since extension only allows us to conceive physical properties.

In that kind of framework, then, it is reasonable to hold that there are intentional and opaque contexts concerning mind and body. Thus Della Rocca states that causal contexts are intentional and opaque on Spinoza’s theory. According to Della Rocca, the conceptual separation of extension and thought is the key to understanding why causal contexts are opaque in Spinoza (cf. Della Rocca 1996, p. 123):

It is fairly commonplace in current philosophy to regard causal contexts as referentially transparent. The intuition here is that whether or not it is true to say that one item causes another is not dependent on how those things are described. This seems right; there are, though, some demurrals. According to J.L.Mackie and G.E.M.Anscome, at least some causal contexts are opaque. The basis for their views is the notion that the truth of certain causal claims requires that those claims have explanatory value. These causal claims must, in order to be true, explain why the effect occurred. Now it is widely agreed that explanatory contexts are opaque. (Della Rocca 1996, p. 144)

Della Rocca notes that some distinguished philosophers admit that some causal contexts are opaque, since they are regarded as kinds of explanatory contexts. Now, given that Spinoza admits the conceptual barrier or separation of extension and thought, a mental phenomenon (ex. a will to pick
up a book) cannot explain a successive physical phenomenon (ex. a movement of the right hand). This is why the following inference fails:

(1) Mode of extension A causes mode of extension B.
(2) Mode of extension A = mode of thought 1.
Therefore, (3) Mode of thought 1 causes mode of extension B. (Della Rocca 1996, p. 122)

Even though A is identical to 1, A causes B but 1 does not, since there is a conceptual and explanatory barrier between extension and thought. Thus, we can find an opaque context in this inference.

Now we are in a position to examine how Della Rocca’s concept of identity of mind and body provides materials for the groundwork to the worry of Davidson’s anomalous monism. According to Della Rocca’s interpretation of Spinoza, mind and body are identical iff they have all their extensional properties in common. That is to say, mind and body do not have to share intentional properties. Now the initial worry for Davidson’s monism is that for some philosophers, since mind and body have different properties, they cannot be identical. Or, mind and body do not share all the properties, and therefore they cannot satisfy the identity provided by Leibniz’s Law. But, once we accept Della Rocca’s concept of identity, then mind and body do not always have to satisfy the condition provided by Leibniz’s Law. Though they are identical, they have different intentional properties, and therefore we cannot replace “mind” with “body” (and “body” with “mind”) in opaque contexts.

4. Possible Objections and Replies
Lastly, I will consider potential objections to the defense of Davidson’s anomalous monism on the basis of Della Rocca’s concept of identity.

First, given that Della Rocca’s concept of identity is introduced in his interpretation of Spinoza, one may be tempted to say that it cannot be imported to the framework of Davidson’s anomalous monism.

In response to this objection, I will point out that Della Rocca’s concept of identity is logically consistent with the three principles of Davidson’s monism. The Causal-Law Principle (CLP) is relatively easier to consider. The existence of strict physical laws never undermines Della Rocca’s
concept of identity, since Spinoza also commits to their existence, and Della Rocca introduces his concept of identity in a way that it is consistent with Spinoza’s view on physical laws.

How about the Interaction Principle (IP)? According to IP, given the event A, which is instantiated by a set of mental properties A’ and a set of physical properties A”, A, with A”, causally interacts with another event B with a set of physical properties B”, even though it also has mental properties. Considering this point, one might say that A’ itself does not cause B”, and though body can cause some physical phenomena, mind cannot. But we have to consider what the term “mind” actually refers to in Della Rocca’s interpretation of Spinoza. For Della Rocca, the term “mind” designates an individual, which is ultimately neutral to the attributes, and so does “body.” In fact, “mind” and “body” refer to one and the same thing. To be sure, if “mind” refers to a set of mental properties, then mind cannot cause physical phenomena. However, if it refers to an individual object, which is neutral to the attributes, then mind and body are the same thing, and since this object has physical properties, it certainly causes physical phenomena.

Now we are ready to examine the Anomalism Principle (AP). One problem with AP is that Della Rocca introduced his concept of identity when he interprets Spinoza, who definitely does not support AP. Unlike Davidson, Spinoza holds that there are purely psychological laws. And if there are purely psychological laws, AP will be violated since AP entails that, for instance, a mental state cannot be explained by previous mental states. However, when we accept Della Rocca’s concept of identity, we do not have to accept his whole theory which he proposes in his interpretation of Spinoza. Though Della Rocca’s concept of identity at least requires the concepts of opacity, extensional property and neutral mode or object, it does not establish the existence of strict psychological laws.

Now we turn to the second potential objection. One may say that given that according to Della Rocca’s interpretation of Spinoza there are modes or individuals which are neutral to attributes, it is difficult to individuate them. In response, we have to see how they can be individuated.

First, I will argue that an explanation of individuation of neutral modes can be given in Spinoza’s metaphysics. As we have seen, Della Rocca proposes the extensional properties of modes, which are shared by mind and body. So, my proposal is to see whether neutral modes can be individuated through the extensional properties. To be sure, there are at least two problems. First, though Della Rocca suggests that duration is an extensional property, it seems that duration is not sufficient for individuation. For example, we can think about two people, Mary and Kathy, who were
born at $t_3$ and deceased at $t_4$. Their duration does not distinguish one from the other. Again, we have to see Spinoza’s metaphysics in detail. In fact, Spinoza seems to suggest extensional properties other than duration, such as conatus or striving. For Spinoza, mind has its own striving to get something, and it is called “will” (Ethics 3P9 Schol). But if the striving is related to the mind and body together, it is called “appetite.” It seems that mind and body share another extensional property “striving.” So, we might be able to identify Mary from Kathy, given Mary’s striving was stronger than Kathy at $t_5$, for instance. The second problem with the explanation of neutral modes through extensional properties is that since for Spinoza there are many attributes other than extension and thought, it is not clear that the modes of all the attributes share their extensional properties. It is not easy to address this problem since Spinoza does not discuss attributes other than extension and thought in detail. Still, I do not find any obvious inconsistency in supposing that duration, striving and other extensional properties are shared by the modes of all the attributes.

Second, I suggest that though Spinoza’s metaphysics is not the same as Davidson’s, it is still possible for Davidson to introduce extensional properties for individuation. To be sure, Davidson suggests that we can individuate events through physical properties, place and time (Davidson 1963/80, pp. 166-8). For example, Bill’s hitting a home run can be individuated by where he played (ex. the home base at the small stadium in the campus of the University of Houston), when he played (ex. at 5pm March 20 2009), the initial velocity of the ball (ex. 100 miles/h to such and such direction) and others. But this suggestion does not entail that individuations are entirely impossible without them. There might be some metaphysical and extensional properties, which we do not know well, but still contribute to individuation of events. These extensional properties may not be exactly the same as what Spinoza introduces, but it is possible that the events in Davidsonian monism have a different set of extensional properties which contribute to their individuations.

5. Conclusion
Since Davidson’s view is a version of the identity theory, anyone who defends his position has to have some reply to the criticism based upon the distinction of mental and physical properties. We have already seen Della Rocca’s concept of identity, and that it is consistent with the elements of Davidson’s identity theory. On the basis of this concept of identity, against Churchland, we could conclude that the mind is identical to the body even though some mental properties cannot be ascribed to the body.

One might feel that this conclusion somehow trivializes the important problem: To be sure, it is
true that if we change the concept of “identity,” we may able to have a different conclusion concerning whether the mind is identical to the body or not. But this kind of shift of terminology itself is not likely to solve a philosophical problem.

However, accepting Della Rocca’s concept of identity is something more than a mere shift of terminology. It is concerned with what concept of “identity” is intuitionally plausible and philosophically fruitful. We can still discuss which concept of identity should be introduced. Churchland could claim that Della Rocca’s concept of identity is not an authentic one, and that mind and body are not identical in the strict sense. But at least there seems to be a possibility to defend Davidson’s identity theory until a sufficient reason is give for why we have to accept Churchland’s concept of identity rather than Della Rocca’s.

**Notes**

(1) Della Rocca also addresses Davidsonian anomalous monism, and points out a remarkable similarity between this theory and Spinoza’s metaphysics. See Della Rocca 1996, pp. 152-6.

(2) Davidson himself uses the expression “a version of the identity theory.”

“[W]e can infer the truth of a version of the identity theory, that is, a theory that identifies at least some mental events with physical events” (Davidson 1970/80, p. 209).

(3) Not only that, this will violate a traditional idea that any mental phenomenon as such cannot cause physical phenomena, which has been held by Spinoza, Leibniz, Malebranche, Arnauld and others.

(4) Davidson admits that the supervenience of the mental on the physical is consistent with Anomalous Monism (Davidson 1970/80, p. 214; 1993; 1995, p. 266).

(5) Davidson states that in the framework of his version of identity theory, the three principles are reconciled, and considered to be consistent (Davidson 1970/80, p. 209).

(6) See The Philosophical Writings of Descartes vol. 1 p. 195 (A.T. 8a 7), vol.2 pp. 20-3 (A.T. 7 30-4).

(7) In the first chapter of The Concept of Mind, Ryle refers to the traditional problem of “how a person’s mind and body influence one another,” which is “notoriously charged with theoretical difficulties” (Ryle 1949, p. 12). For Ryle, however, if one tries to explain how they interact, with what theory as it may, she makes “a category-mistake” (Ryle 1949, p. 16). For Ryle, it is perfectly proper to say that minds exist, and “in another logical tone of voice,” bodies exist. But it is redundant to say that both mind and body exist, since this statement is just like saying that “he bought a left-hand glove and a right-hand glove and a pair of gloves” (Ryle 1949, p. 22).

(8) Churchland states that in fact some physical properties (ex. spatial property) cannot be ascribed to mental states and vice versa (Churchland 1984, p. 30). In addition, Churchland claims that mental states such as pleasure and pain are immediately known by introspection. On the basis of this understanding, Churchland formulates his argument as the following:

1. My mental states are introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self.
2. My brain states are not introspectively known by me as states of my conscious self.
Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law (that numerically identical things must have exactly the same properties),
3. My mental states are not identical with my brain states.

(9) Thus, it is certain that we can ascribe this concept of identity to Della Rocca’s own philosophy. But still, we can talk about the identity suggested in his work.
(10) According to John Mackie and Elizabeth Anscombe, at least some causal contexts are opaque (Anscombe 1969; Mackie 1974 Chap.10; Della Rocca 1993, p. 208).
(11) In fact, Della Rocca points out that Leibniz himself has recognized that the Leibniz Law does not hold in complete generality (cf. Mates 1986, pp. 130-2 C 102-3).
(12) At first, Della Rocca introduced the concept of opacity with a linguistic example (Della Rocca 1996, p. 122). Suppose that John believes that the spy is a spy. Also, suppose that the spy is John’s brother. It is still possible that John does not believe that John’s brother is a spy.
(13) Della Rocca explicitly refers to this definition of attribute for justifying the opacity concerning mind and body: “I believe that Spinoza’s use of the phrase “what the intellect perceives…as” in the definition of “attribute” is meant to point out this opacity.” (Della Rocca 1996, p. 165)
(14) I have to admit that it is not so remarkable whether mental and intentional properties depend upon the way in which the intellect conceives neutral modes and therefore they are not real and metaphysical properties. One serious problem is that Spinoza seems to suppose that attributes really constitute God’s essence.
    I will not solve the debate in the interpretations of Spinoza. Rather, I just suggest that Della Rocca’s theory has its own consistency, and we can learn a lot from it in defense of Davidsonian monism.
(15) In fact, Spinoza suggests that the number of attributes is infinite (Ethics 1P11, 16).
(16) Della Rocca’s view is complicated. Though he commits the existence of trans-attribute modes, he holds that the identity of modes is demonstrated on the basis of “explanatory barrier” between attributes and parallelism (Della Rocca 1996, p. 152).
(17) In fact, Davidson also suggests that the attribution of mental properties to an event comes from how we conceive it:
    “Let us call a description of the form ‘the event that is M’ or an open sentence of the form ‘event x is M’ a mental description or a mental open sentence if and only if the expression that replaces ‘M’ contains at least one mental verb essentially” (Davidson 1970/80, p. 211).
(18) Also, see The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. vol. 1 p. 195 (A.T. 8a 7).
(19) One problem with the import of Spinozistic extensional properties is that the existence of strivings may necessitate the existence of strict psychological laws. It seems that Spinoza supposes that any previous mental strivings perfectly determine the successive mental phenomena in accordance with some strict psychological laws. Still, Della Rocca’s concept of identity does not require all the extensional properties Spinoza introduces, since it only entails that there are extensional properties whose contexts are always referentially transparent.

References

[Abbreviations]
A Possible Defense of Davidsonian Monism

Ethics Spinoza Ethica. Cited by Book and Proposition.


